Great Northern War

[SwordsMaster]

Again, I present you, historians a query:

I need information, as detailed as possible about the opening moves of the Great Northern War, we're talking about the 1697-1702 period. I need to know what difficulties each of the states had, who were the major figures involved, and what general political-economic-social issues happened in the period. I have a decent background on Russia, but almost no information on any of the other players.

Questions like what made the english support Sweden instead of Denmark? Who were the people involved in the negotiations? Why did the Ottomans sign a bad peace treaty with Russia? What was the role of Mazepa? How closely was the Hetman state aligned with Poland or Russia?


I appreciate the help.

[Rodion Romanovich]

Just off the top of my head about the initial moves:
Sweden faced war with Denmark-Norway, Poland and Russia simultaneously, a result of the increasingly aggressive and imperialistic strategy as begun by Charles X and to some extent during Oxenstierna. The Swedish strategy in the Great northern war seems to have been to try and strike one enemy after another to push the easiest ones out of the war early. Denmark was defeated early, because of much smaller resources, and, their participation in the war was probably somewhat of a gamble considering this, probably hoping the Swedish would attack some other nation first or stay on the defensive, or that the other participants would send assistance to Denmark before they got overwhelmed. Poland and Russia managed to organize some cooperation before meeting the Swedish forces, however, but the cooperation was very fresh and untested, as the battle at Narva demonstrated, additionally the Polish had declined a lot in military power since the previous century, and the Russian troops were quite badly organized at the time. However, the campaign in Poland delayed the Swedish forces a lot, enough for the Russians to reorganize and prepare their defenses, and for renewed Danish resistance to eventually build up.

[Watchman]

I'm confused as to what exactly Oxenstierna and Carolus X have to do with the issue (outside their part in building up the Swedish Empire in the mid-late 1600s in the first place), since the conflict was triggered by the death of the latter's son Carolus XI and the accession of his young son as Carolus XII - which assorted neighbour with axes to grind figured would make for a good occasion to renegotiate the borders at the point of the bayonet.

[Rodion Romanovich]

I'm confused as to what exactly Oxenstierna and Carolus X have to do with the issue (outside their part in building up the Swedish Empire in the mid-late 1600s in the first place), since the conflict was triggered by the death of the latter's son Carolus XI and the accession of his young son as Carolus XII - which assorted neighbour with axes to grind figured would make for a good occasion to renegotiate the borders at the point of the bayonet.

That time represented the transition into a more hostile, unprovoked type of expansion, but was a small semi-OT reference. For instance, the late 30 years war to some extent, but more so Charles' X's attempt to conquer Poland and accepting and breaking peace treaties repeatedly to try and conquer Denmark (which failed btw), weren't exactly gentlemanly behavior. I think most historians I've read make the connection between the more Imperialistic-oriented politics, and the rise of a more united front of enemies. For instance, Russia had very bad relations with the Commonwealth only 60-80 years earlier, and near-ally status with Sweden.

The on-topic part of this half phrase which you focused so much on, was that the transition into an over time more clealry Imperialistic-oriented policy led to the formation of a coalition against Sweden, which was how the Great Northern war begun.

As for Denmark not receiving more support from England/Dutch, IIRC it was because nobody in the west wanted Denmark to retake Scania and reestablish the Sound Straits toll. On the other hand, nobody wanted a Swedish Sound Straits toll either. IIRC (and this development may have been before or after the war, I don't recall the exact years), there was a transition of support from these trading nations from Sweden (against Denmark), towards against Sweden.

[Watchman]

That time represented the transition into a more hostile, unprovoked type of expansion, but was a small semi-OT reference. For instance, the late 30 years war to some extent, but more so Charles' X's attempt to conquer Poland and accepting and breaking peace treaties repeatedly to try and conquer Denmark (which failed btw), weren't exactly gentlemanly behavior. I think most historians I've read make the connection between the more Imperialistic-oriented politics, and the rise of a more united front of enemies. For instance, Russia had very bad relations with the Commonwealth only 60-80 years earlier, and near-ally status with Sweden.

Casus belli those days tended to amount to teensy-weensy fig leaf excuses at the best of times, and treaties to not much more than the paper they were written on if and when Realpolitik dictated different, but do recall there was a long-running dynastic dispute between the Swedish and Polish branches of the Vasa family; aside from sheer opportunism, that was part of Carolus X's reason to invade Poland back in the day.

The reason others started ganging up on Sweden was simple enough really - it was the biggest kid on the block following the Thirty Years' War and Carolus X's reign spent mostly warring (Dunno 'bout Carolus XI - I'm under the impression he spent most of his reign holding on to and consolidating the earlier conquests), and awfully close to making the Baltic a "Swedish lake". This naturally did not sit particularly well with any of its neighbours, and most of them had learned the hard way it was too strong for them to take on alone - so it made very good strategic sense for them to join up for the effort.

True, the Russian army was of quite low quality at the time, and Charles XII made the right decision in using an aggressive, quick advance of his well-drilled infantry to strike decisively at a portion of this force and drive them back.

That was actually the standard Swedish tactical paradigm those days - decisive aggressive advance, more often than not relying primarily on shock, momentum and cold steel. This was in part dictated by sheer practical necessity; Sweden had had a bit of a manpower problem already back in Thirty Years' War and the constant warring since then hadn't particularly improved things, so its field armies were all things considered rather small. If they intented to win it had to be through breaking the enemy psychologically in the shortest possible time, which was best achieved through ferocious shock action. This was part of why their infantry formations retained some pikemen after the weapon had otherwise already passed into obsolescence (the Russian infantry of the period retained pikes chiefly to help counter the very aggressive Swedish heavy cavalry), for example.

[Watchman]

As books go, a good one I've read is Peter Englund's Poltava. As the name indicates it chiefly covers that particular campaign and battle, but typically of the author's rather holistic style discusses a fair bit other things on the side.

[Rodion Romanovich]

Casus belli those days tended to amount to teensy-weensy fig leaf excuses at the best of times, and treaties to not much more than the paper they were written on if and when Realpolitik dictated different, but do recall there was a long-running dynastic dispute between the Swedish and Polish branches of the Vasa family; aside from sheer opportunism, that was part of Carolus X's reason to invade Poland back in the day.

That is no different from what "casus belli" in the attacker's vocabulary has meant throughout the entire history of mankind. But the theoretical concept of casus belli is about a more objective judgement of what constitutes breaking a treaty and making an unprovoked attack - a concept which although subject to some disagreements, is intuitively known by most people and has been so throughout history. You can see that treaty writing was quite complex already at the time of the 30 years war. To claim they had no sense of the theoretical concept of what constitutes a fair casus belli is to underestimate negotiations of that time.

And I also don't think you can deny that Swedish politics saw a transition towards significantly more hollow excuses for going to war during this period. For example, the quite substantial casus belli for fighting Poland during Gustavus Adolphus was:
1. the Polish king still made claims to the Swedish throne
2. there were dangers of Polish cooperation with Denmark (Denmark threatening to break Swedish blockade of Riga and making some other threatening moves), and Denmark had tried quite often to invade Sweden with very little provocation in that period
3. Poland were fighting Russia, which was semi-allied to Sweden (they were switching between formal ally and neutral back and forth during this time), and Poland was generally aggressive on offense at that time, and so a threat to most of her neighbors.

Compare this with the claimed casus belli for Sweden attacking Poland during Charles X: that the Polish king had never officially given up his official claim for the Swedish throne - a tiny administrative detail simply forgotten by their king, as Poland had long before that given up all practical attempts of claiming the Swedish throne

Also compare it to the Swedish claimed casus belli for breaking the second peace treaty with Denmark during Charles X: that Charles X simply realized he changed his mind and didn't want peace, thinking he could gain some more land if he started the war again right after signing the peace treaty.

The reason others started ganging up on Sweden was simple enough really - it was the biggest kid on the block following the Thirty Years' War and Carolus X's reign spent mostly warring (Dunno 'bout Carolus XI - I'm under the impression he spent most of his reign holding on to and consolidating the earlier conquests), and awfully close to making the Baltic a "Swedish lake". This naturally did not sit particularly well with any of its neighbours, and most of them had learned the hard way it was too strong for them to take on alone - so it made very good strategic sense for them to join up for the effort.

Current strength matters, but not nearly as much as the opponent's perception of what strength you try to acquire in the nearest future. An aggressive grand strategy and declining diplomatic honor provokes far more dangerous coalitions far more often than does strength alone. This is a recurring theme in imperialism which usually marks the beginning of the transition into a its "decline and fall" phase.

Let us for instance look at the historical facts - Sweden was not quite strong at the time. Quite overstretched and in great economical trouble during both Charles X's later reign, all of Charles XI's reign, and all of Charles XII's reign. The army was largely financed by France, a foreign country, and so the payment source for the military forces was quite unreliable. Their one strength was the army quality and the geographical separation of the opponents. Hardly the "biggest kid on the block". Russia, which had far greater resources in almost everything at that time, was the "biggest kid on the block". Sweden was, at this time, more like the 160 centimeter aggressive little bully kid who always kept starting new fights with the other kids.

I think you make a mistake when you completely ignore the role of the aggressiveness as a factor in affecting diplomatic position.

[Innocentius]

Whole essays could be written on the Great Northern War. Only the questions you presented are enough to fill a few books, but if you have any more precise question I will answer them according to my ability.

The only question I can answer somewhat correctly from memory is that one about the English: The English supported the Danish out of fear that Sweden might take control of both sides of Öresund, thus being able to impose whatever Sound Dues they wished. This was an old concern for both the English and the Dutch, who both generally worked to prevent either side in the neverending Swedish-Danish wars of gaining full control of Öresund.

I'm not sure if Denmark could have been said to have smaller resources than Sweden. Denmark had a bigger population and more supporters than Sweden, and a lack of manpower was always a problem for the Swedes. By 1710, Denmark had apparently recovered from whatever problems they suffered at the onset of war, as they were able to launch an invasion of Scania, and fought the Swedish in Pomerania and Saxony in subsequent years.

Bad cooperation was not the reason behind the defeat at Narva, it was quite simply the incapability of the Russian army. Of course, thousands of factors played their part and again one could write a lot on the subject, I just wanted to point out that badly organized cooperation wasn't exactly the reason behind Karl's victory at Narva.

It's somewhat unfair to descripe it as if Karl's campaigns in Poland bought Peter time. By the treaty of Altranstädt, Peter had already gone through great efforts to reorganize the Russian army, and while Charles focused on fighting the Poles and Saxons, the Russians conquered Livonia and Finland bit by bit.

A book I can recommend is Voltaire's Charles XII. Although it's full of factual errors and dramatizations it gives you a pretty good and fairly accurate picture on Karl, who along with Peter and August were the main actors of the Great Northern War. Karl's rather extraordinary (not necessarily in a good sense, no) personality very much affected the progress and outcome of the war.

[Rodion Romanovich]

Bad cooperation was not the reason behind the defeat at Narva, it was quite simply the incapability of the Russian army. Of course, thousands of factors played their part and again one could write a lot on the subject, I just wanted to point out that badly organized cooperation wasn't exactly the reason behind Karl's victory at Narva.

True, the Russian army was of quite low quality at the time, and Charles XII made the right decision in using an aggressive, quick advance of his well-drilled infantry to strike decisively at a portion of this force and drive them back. The cooperation problems should however not be underestimated. Two badly organized armies in themselves, put together into one army in all haste, usually makes for a quite disorganized mess. Not to take away credit for the victory, which despite discounting these factors is impressive, but I think many underestimate the communication difficulties most of the time suffered by coalition armies throughout history.

[Arngrim]

Again, I present you, historians a query:

I need information, as detailed as possible about the opening moves of the Great Northern War, we're talking about the 1697-1702 period. I need to know what difficulties each of the states had, who were the major figures involved, and what general political-economic-social issues happened in the period. I have a decent background on Russia, but almost no information on any of the other players.

Questions like what made the english support Sweden instead of Denmark? Who were the people involved in the negotiations? Why did the Ottomans sign a bad peace treaty with Russia? What was the role of Mazepa? How closely was the Hetman state aligned with Poland or Russia?


I appreciate the help.

Unfortunately, all my history books and research papers are hidden in the attic of my mother, 100 kilometers from where i live, and i haven´t worked with this period for almost 20 years, so i apologize in advance for any mistakes i might be guilty of.

From the Swedish point of view.

History in brief.

The Swedish Empire started to develop on the collapse of the Teutonic Order State, When the Estonians choose to become subjects to the Swedish king Eric XIV in the 1560's rather than become Poles or Russians. This resulted in many border wars with Russia and Poland. By the time of Gustavus Adolphus (Prior to 1628), as a result Sweden had pilfered Ingria from Russia, and Livonia from Poland. Swedish involvement in the thirty years war led to the aquisition of the German provinces Pomerania, Wismar, and Bremen-Verden. Wars with Denmark - Norway gave us the Norwegian provinces of Jämtland, Härjedalen and Bohuslän, and the Danish Provinces of Halland, Skåne and Blekinge.

By the 1660 with the death of the aggressive King Karl X Gustav the Swedish age of expansion was over.

1675-1680, due to a treaty of mutual support with France, Sweden sort of stumbled into the Scanian war, wich the neighbors of Sweden transformed into the first Revenge war, mistaking the young Swedish king Charles XI's
dyslexia for stupidity. They learned the hard way that the king was neither stupid or a coward. France negotiated a peace, including Sweden in the peace treaty, without asking Swedish permission. This resulted in the end of the French - Swedish Alliance, but also in twenty years of armed neutrality, and peace. The longest peace period for more than century. Charles XI used this period to rearm and reorganize the Swedish Army and Navy, to the tools which could fight half of Europe for 20 years, and propably could have fought for a couple of decades more, with the proper leadership.

A German - Livonian traitor and swedophobe by the name Johan Reinhold Patkul started organizing a Leage of Aggression consisting of Denmark - Norway, Saxony - Poland and Russia, with Sweden as target. In 1697 with the death of the much feared and respected Charles XI, and the ascendance to the throne by the 15 year old Charles XII, The conspirators felt that it was time to act.

Opening Moves;


Saxony - Poland attacked Livonia and put the city of Riga under siege.

Denmark - Norway attacked the Duchy of Holstein, which was a close ally of Sweden, while mounting raids over the Swedish -Norwegian border.

Since the Baltic Sea was frozen, it took a courier more than a month to ride around the Botnian Gulf with the news of the Saxonian - Polish attack.

In the autumn of 1700 Russia attacked Ingria and Estonia and put the frontier fortress city of Narva under siege, Sacking and burning the countryside.


The answer;

As soon as the Baltic was Ice free, the Swedish Navy was made ready for action and joined a British - Dutch fleet and started a naval blockade of Copenhagen, while the Swedish army started to prepare for being shipped over to Denmark. Later in the summer a Swedish army descended on Danish soil outside Copenhagen, and scared the Danes into stopping the aggression against Holstein and signing a peace treaty. They would be back!

In the late autumn 1700, almost to late, a Swedish small army was shipped over to Estonia, joined up with local units and garrisons - finding out that there was no provisions for the army, and the country plundered and burnt. Charles XII decided to gamble. A four day forced march whitout food, and "sleeping" in knee-deep mud and snow, fighting several skirmishes with Cossacks and other Russian irregular units, took the 9000+ Swedish army to the 37000 Russian troops encircling Narva.

Aided by a sudden blizzard the Swedish army managed to breach the Russian fortifications, and a vicious, disorganized and confused battle took place, lasting well into darkness. I do not doubt that the Swedes, delirious because of sleep and food deprivation also fought trolls, goblins, dragons and occasional dinosaurs besides Russians. To make things worse, the Dal regiment discovered the Russian Vodka supply, which resulted in a several hours long shootout between that unit and the Guards Regiment, each believing the other to be Russians.

Thousands of fleeing Russians drowned in the Narowa river when a bridge collapsed under them. Only the Russian left wing with the elite regiments kept fighting, while the other units where more interested in plundering their own camp or killing their German officers, which encouraged the Russian army commander, Charles Eugène de Croy to take refuge with and surrendering to the Swedes, together with most of the senior officers. The last remnants of the Russian army, not knowing how few the Swedes were, decided to surrender. They were escorted sans weapons to the border, and tried to march towards civilized Russian areas. Most starved to death. They themselves had burnt and plundered Ingria, leaving no grain and cattle behind.
The provisions in the camps outside Narva were needed for the survival of the Swedish army.

The behavior of the Russian soldiers at Narva created an unfounded and ominous contempt towards Russia, which the Swedes would come to regret nine years later.

After spending the winter in Estonia, the Swedes turned their attention to the Saxons surrounding Riga. After a succesful crossing of the Düna river, the Swedes beat the Saxons, but the lack of cavalry meant that most of the Saxon army run away, to be able to run another day.

The Swedish army followed into Kurland, Lithuania, and finally (Oh no!!! Not again!!! ) The Vietnam of Sweden; Poland.

Saxony was not only at war with Sweden, it was also involved in a little ruckus called the War of the Spanish Succesion. On the same side as Swedens supposed friends England and the Netherlands. so invading Saxony was out of the question as long as that war took place. So for five years the Swedish army marched to and fro in Poland trying to pick a fight with republican armies, crown armies, Russians, Lithuanians, Saxonians, partisans, bandits, Jehovas Witnesses, mosquitos and whatnot.

And since information only to 1702 was requested i think i´ll stop there.

Why England supported Sweden against Denmark?. It didn't. It supported Holstein. England, the Netherlands and Sweden were the guarantee powers of the peace treaty of Rijswik(?) which granted Holstein autonomy against Denmark, and were obliged to force Denmark back in line when it broke the treaty. In fact the British admiral threathened to leave the Swedish army stranded in Denmark if Copenhagen was assaulted.

Besides, England had no issues with Sweden as long as it was ruled by Willhelm of Oranien or queen Anne. It was Georg I of Hannover who wanted to add Bremen - Verden to his collection of German principalitys. Besides, he had hated Swedes since the time he found his wife in bed with the Swedish Count Königsmarck, and had the poor chap assassinated, which in turn would explain the bad blood between Georg and Agust II of Saxony - Poland, who's main squeeze were the sister of the murdered count; Aurora von Königsmarck, Who had a illigitimite son with August II, who would grow up to be known as Marechal Saxe. Auroras other brother took service with the Venetians and commanded the army who put Athens under Siege and blew up Parthenon which the Turks used to store gun powder. (And they say that Swedes didn't contribute to world culture!!!) Ooops! This is sounding like a bad soap opera...

Mazepa; Polish born Ukrainian leader and national hero. Leader of a rebellion against Russia. Friend and ally of Sweden. Died in a Swedish cart during the Swedish retreat from Poltava - Perevolotjna. If you visit the History Museum in Poltava You will find two portrait friezes staring at each other across the entrance. One is of Mazepa. The other is Charles XII of Sweden (or so i am told).

Swedish difficulties; To small a population, and to weak an ecomony to uphold and defend the empire. That problem disappeared when our enemies had occupied all but our core provinces. Roughly the same territory as present day Sweden. Very easy to defend, and hard to attack. Why do you think we have been left alone for 200 years?. As long as our inland production facilities were left intact, we could have fought on for a century, IF lead by a smart king with guts. The army recruitment system only used the male surplus. Vagrants, local trouble-makers and good-for-nothings who got a new chance to be useful for society, or die trying. Since women of childbearing age tended to have children wether they were married or not, army losses meant absolutely nothing demographically. Economically Sweden still produced the lions share of world copper. Swedish iron ore and forrest products were still attractive, even by enemies like England (who actually sold us the cloth we made uniforms of!?!). The society and economy had been reorganized by the Holstein national economy genius Görtz. The mortgages of the national debt was manageable.

Sweden lost because of political incompetence, internal squabbling and cowardly leadership. (which continues to this day IMHO) We were not militarily beaten in 1718. We did not lack resources or manpower. The army in Norway were the best equipped, organized, provisioned and lead army in Swedish history! The lack of cloth uniforms were due to British inabilities to deliver enough quanties in time for the Norwegian invasion.

1719 - 21 was an entirely different story...


Recommended litterature; "Charles XII of Sweden" by Ragnhild Marie Hatton (Professor Emeritus, Cambridge).

[SwordsMaster]

Wow, thank you all for the information. Sweden's take on the issue is taking shape.

Some more questions:

What other personalities have affected the events. Didn't Aurora and embassador Konigsmark visit Russia at some stage? Didn't Konigsmark also put the moves on Peter the Great's german mistress?

What was the relationship between Charles XII and his court. He was extremely young, so the parliament couldn't have trust him completely... How did he manage to raise such a decent army, then if his economy was ruinous and the parliament not too enthusiastic?

How about Saxony and Poland? Apart from August, who else affected the events? Councilors, lovers, spies, other people not directly involved in the military?

About Mazepa: why Sweden over Poland? Why not the other Cossack states? Did he have any family in service in any of the warring nations? Did he consider joining Russia?

What about the Russian Great Embassy? Did it have any kind of effect or relationship on/to the events?

What about Patkul? You can harly explain "he hated sweden", why? What was he involved in to make him hate sweden? Were any of the other livonian knights upset about the swedish rule? Why exactly?

Russia's hands were tied by the mildly successful war with the Ottomans. Why did they sign the peace if hostilities with Sweden were about to start? That would have caught Russia from 2 fronts...

As of the end of the war, don't worry, we just might get there soon.

[Arngrim]

Wow, thank you all for the information. Sweden's take on the issue is taking shape.

Some more questions:

What other personalities have affected the events. Didn't Aurora and embassador Konigsmark visit Russia at some stage? Didn't Konigsmark also put the moves on Peter the Great's german mistress?

What was the relationship between Charles XII and his court. He was extremely young, so the parliament couldn't have trust him completely... How did he manage to raise such a decent army, then if his economy was ruinous and the parliament not too enthusiastic?

How about Saxony and Poland? Apart from August, who else affected the events? Councilors, lovers, spies, other people not directly involved in the military?

About Mazepa: why Sweden over Poland? Why not the other Cossack states? Did he have any family in service in any of the warring nations? Did he consider joining Russia?

What about the Russian Great Embassy? Did it have any kind of effect or relationship on/to the events?

What about Patkul? You can harly explain "he hated sweden", why? What was he involved in to make him hate sweden? Were any of the other livonian knights upset about the swedish rule? Why exactly?

Russia's hands were tied by the mildly successful war with the Ottomans. Why did they sign the peace if hostilities with Sweden were about to start? That would have caught Russia from 2 fronts...

As of the end of the war, don't worry, we just might get there soon.

The question i think i may be able to answer right now; The Swedish parliament DID trust Charles XII completely! They granted him Absolute Rule upon his coronation! The parliament was divided into four corporations, Nobility, Clergy, Burghers and Peasants. To the peasants a strong king was the best guaranty that they never again would be oppressed by the nobility. This also was felt by the Clergy and Burghers, who also was vary of the ambitions of the nobility. The strange ting was that the nobility also voted for giving absolute rule to Charles. Maybe out of loyalty for Charles XI and his memory. He also had been granted Absolute Rule 1680, and that had lead to a twenty year period of peace and growing prosperity!

Regarding the army. Charles XII did not raise it! His father did! And the cost was payed by the nobility. 1680 he started a process called the reduction, which stripped the nobility of most of its ill-gotten wealth and put it back into the national treasury were it belonged. previously the farmers had been organized into the Rote system were tree to four farms together was responsible for recruiting, keeping and equipping a soldier in peacetime. The soldier was given a small homestead for himself and his family, and some land to till. He also was supposed to be a handyman for the farmers in the Rote. Only in wartime or training did the Crown answer for his upkeep. Being a Rote soldier was a very popular career choice for those young men who couldn´t expect to inherit a farm of their own. Besides, the were very popular with the girls, in their dashing uniforms, which they wore to church every sunday. If they wanted to remain faithful to their wife, they had to use a club to fend of the local uniform groupies.

It was somewhat less popular to become a soldier in wartime, but the local Parrish council had absolute power to select
replacements for vacancies in the local Rotes. They tended to choose the least useful male members of the society; vagrants, petty criminals, troublemakers and such, providing they met up with minimum physical standards. They were then promptly marched to the nearest depot station, and shipped away to their regiment, to join in the quest for honour, glory, or at least a dinner party for worms. "Say farewell little butterfly to amusements...!"
This system tended to minimize criminality and enhance harmony in the community, since it gave the young men a motivation to behave.

With the newly aquired resources Charles XI began to organize the officers corps in the same way, giving each a homestead of which to make a living in peacetime, from corporals up to colonels. The homesteads of course getting bigger the higher the rank.

This created a permanent army, with a permanent officers corps, which cost the Crown virtually nothing when un-mobilized.

The soldiers, noncoms, and officers of each parrish trained outside the church after the sermons each sunday, while the rest of the congregation usually had a picnic and watched, taking great pride in "Our boys". also giving the girls ample opportunity to target the next victim of their seduction attempts.

I don't know where you got the idéa that the Swedish economy was ruinous in 1700 - it wasn't. It had exactly the size of army it could afford. And that wasn't enough to protect all of the empire. Especially since the provinces outside Sweden Proper wasn't part of the Rote system, and had to to be garrisoned by mercenaries. As an example; the province of Bremen - Verden cost more to garrison, than it produced in taxes and other revenues. The UK actually did us a favor in taking over that province, moving the hole from our wallet to theirs.

Regarding why Patkul hated Sweden, i honestly don't remember. It might have something to do with the fact that Charles XI on two occasions tried to abolish serfdom in Livonia, and both time was vetoed by the Livonian parliament. Charles XI's Absolute Power only applied in Sweden Proper, not in the "Co-Countries" which was rather autonomous. I seem to remember that the southern gentlemen of Dixieland experienced a mild form of irritation when the US Congress worked towards the abolition of black slavery! This might be something like it.

But the vast majority of the "Livonian Knights" (Actually they were Germans - real Livonians - "the Un-germans" - had very little say in Livonia. Most were the very serfs discussed.) were fierce Loyalists, including every other male member of the Patkul family. Families like Palme, Taube, Rehbinder, Sternberg, von Ungern, Patkul, Paikull et c. (Guess which family i belong to! ) lost most of their able-bodied males in the following years of war.
There was no secession movement. They weren't stupid. They knew that they would be worse of as Russians or Poles. If Prussia (Brandenburg) had been stronger, that would have been something else...

[Watchman]

Swedish difficulties; To small a population, and to weak an ecomony to uphold and defend the empire. That problem disappeared when our enemies had occupied all but our core provinces. Roughly the same territory as present day Sweden. Very easy to defend, and hard to attack. Why do you think we have been left alone for 200 years?. As long as our inland production facilities were left intact, we could have fought on for a century, IF lead by a smart king with guts. The army recruitment system only used the male surplus. Vagrants, local trouble-makers and good-for-nothings who got a new chance to be useful for society, or die trying. Since women of childbearing age tended to have children wether they were married or not, army losses meant absolutely nothing demographically. Economically Sweden still produced the lions share of world copper. Swedish iron ore and forrest products were still attractive, even by enemies like England (who actually sold us the cloth we made uniforms of!?!). The society and economy had been reorganized by the Holstein national economy genius Görtz. The mortgages of the national debt was manageable.

Sweden lost because of political incompetence, internal squabbling and cowardly leadership. (which continues to this day IMHO) We were not militarily beaten in 1718. We did not lack resources or manpower. The army in Norway were the best equipped, organized, provisioned and lead army in Swedish history! The lack of cloth uniforms were due to British inabilities to deliver enough quanties in time for the Norwegian invasion.

Wait, what ? This doesn't jive with what I've read. For one thing you're forgetting the eastern part of the realm (present-day Finland) which wasn't fully lost before 1809, but was overrun and occupied by the Russians several times previously (in the context, after the Poltava disaster virtually crippled Swedish resistance). Since this was - and is - kinda crappy farmland there were few noble estates here, which duly meant the region furnished a somewhat disproportionate chunk of the state's military manpower (as the tenants of the estates were exempt from conscription).

Which also brings up the issue of Swedish military recruitment; AFAIK conscription was well established already by the Swedish entry to the Thirty Years' War, where it was chiefly used to provide garrison forces. Conversely the "national" cavalry was raised through a system where landowners could earn themselves tax breaks or exemption by providing the state with a fully armed horseman - typically the owner hired a farmhand or similar to fit the bill. (A quriously quasi-feudal arrangement when you think about it.)

At some point which I'm not entirely sure of the system was formalised into what in Finnish is known as ruotu (probably from "rota" or something along those lines - the name of the organisational unit used); every ten or five households (not sure which) were required to provide and maintain a soldier for the army - and provide a new one to replace casualties. (Again a peculiarly quasi-feudal arrangement.)

Also already during the TYW, there began to be a noticeable dearth of able-bodied adult males in the land due to so many having been marched off to the war and more likely than not never came back ("the land of soldiers' widows" was one contemporary summary, apparently). After the Great Northern War and the practical collapse of the Swedish Empire Finland in particular was by all accounts virtually denuded of able-bodied manfolk, not that the Russian occupation had exactly helped matter.

At that point Sweden was practically finished as a great power; most of its onetime Baltic aquisitions lost, and the fact its empire had basically been built on "squeezing water out of rock" - straining its limited resource base to the utmost - had come home to roost with vengeance.

[Arngrim]

Wait, what ? This doesn't jive with what I've read. For one thing you're forgetting the eastern part of the realm (present-day Finland) which wasn't fully lost before 1809, but was overrun and occupied by the Russians several times previously (in the context, after the Poltava disaster virtually crippled Swedish resistance). Since this was - and is - kinda crappy farmland there were few noble estates here, which duly meant the region furnished a somewhat disproportionate chunk of the state's military manpower (as the tenants of the estates were exempt from conscription).

Which also brings up the issue of Swedish military recruitment; AFAIK conscription was well established already by the Swedish entry to the Thirty Years' War, where it was chiefly used to provide garrison forces. Conversely the "national" cavalry was raised through a system where landowners could earn themselves tax breaks or exemption by providing the state with a fully armed horseman - typically the owner hired a farmhand or similar to fit the bill. (A quriously quasi-feudal arrangement when you think about it.)

At some point which I'm not entirely sure of the system was formalised into what in Finnish is known as ruotu (probably from "rota" or something along those lines - the name of the organisational unit used); every ten or five households (not sure which) were required to provide and maintain a soldier for the army - and provide a new one to replace casualties. (Again a peculiarly quasi-feudal arrangement.)

Also already during the TYW, there began to be a noticeable dearth of able-bodied adult males in the land due to so many having been marched off to the war and more likely than not never came back ("the land of soldiers' widows" was one contemporary summary, apparently). After the Great Northern War and the practical collapse of the Swedish Empire Finland in particular was by all accounts virtually denuded of able-bodied manfolk, not that the Russian occupation had exactly helped matter.

At that point Sweden was practically finished as a great power; most of its onetime Baltic aquisitions lost, and the fact its empire had basically been built on "squeezing water out of rock" - straining its limited resource base to the utmost - had come home to roost with vengeance.

I recognize many of the myths about Sweden and the Great Northern War including, the sob story about "The land without men" its a myth from the 19th century, with no basis in reality.

Yes, I "forgot" about Finland when i did not include it amongst the core provinces. Yes, it was occupied by Russia, but after that the rest of Sweden was very easy to defend, and 90 % of the mines and production facilities of Sweden lied in this area. Only the coastlines were vulnerable to Russian raids.

I qoute von Clausewitz; "Of the European nations only Russia and SWEDEN, can succesfully defend themselves with the Scorched Earth tactics.

A Danish 16:th century general; "If we send a large army through the Swedish forests it will starve to death. If we send a small one it will be beaten."

About the Rote system, i have explained about that elsewhere. Wether or not it was "Feodalish" or not is irrelevant, since it WORKED. And it was only applied after being accepted as a SUBSTITUTE for the earlier forced conscription, and the local peasantry could say "Aye or Naye". In those provinces were the peasantry said "Naye" It wasn't implemented.

About the economy; there was a balance of income and expenses. Unfortunately it meant that there wasn't enough ships, soldiers and fortresses to defend all of the empire.
The "Rocksqueezing" economy is also a Myth from the 19th century. It is true that the National Debt Increased quite a bit during the 20 years of war, but never to a point were the mortgages became a problem. Our debtors knew we were good for the money. Compare with the American National Debth after the Irakian debacle!

About The crippledness of Swedens defensive capabilities, we weren't more disabled than that we could raise a new army from scratch and kick the Danes out of Scania in 1710 at the same time as we sent shiploads of replacement troops and equipment to Riga, once again under siege. No Finns involved! And those Danes were experienced troops from the war of Spanish succession.

After kicking Danish and Preussian butt in the Battle of Gadebusch 1712 battlefield attrition forced the Stenbock Army to take refuge in the Holstein fortress of Tönningen, where they were encircled by superior forces until it starved to death. (But thats not the point of this discussion!)

The next year Sweden sent the equivalent of another army to bolster the defence of Stralsund, which was under siege by Danish, Prussian, Saxonian, and Russian armies, While the British navy tried to Blockade the city from the sea.

When Stralsund was lost, third army was created from scratch in 1716, raided into Norway, gathering experience, got replenished in 1717 and started a real invasion in 1718. This army got organized in a way wich put 2 - 3regiments (Depending on the number of battalions) plus supporting artillery and permanent command corps and staff into a new type of permanent unit called a "Omdelning" (Do i hear someone gasping "Brigade!?!" in the background?) 3-4 of these "Omdelningar" with a permanent command corps and staff formed a "Tilldelning". Some of these "Tilldelningar" meant for independent operations included extra artillery and cavalry, and some were pure cavalry formations. Yes! Infantry, cavalry and all-arms divisions! 70+ years before the Napoleonic Wars!

An during all this the population in those areas corresponding to present day Sweden increased! Except for the plage years of 1710 and 1711, and a couple of famine years when the crops failed.

The point is; Like the Romans, Sweden could raise new armies every other year until Napoleon needed a wheelchair. As long as The core provinces were unoccupied, and we had a good political leadership. That was no longer the case when the King was hit by a Norwegian sniper and the clowns took over the circus. It wasn't the Norwegians who destroyed the Third army. It was Rehnskjöld and Fredrik of Hessen.

Don't take my word for it. Go to the real experts; Ragnhild Marie Hatton; Charles XII of Sweden.
Peter Englund; various books and essays.
Yearbooks of The Carolean Society contains collections of historical essays of the period written both by serious amateur historians an professionals.

[Watchman]

That's an awfully rosy picture you've got there.

And FYI, I've read most of Englund's relevant writings; the bit about "soldatänkornas land" for example is pretty much verbatim from Ofredsår for example. He dwells at some lenght on the serious problems the Swedish state had paying its war expenses and the various means by which the books were balanced - and what this meant in practice to the populace, who paid the taxes and provided the manpower base. The TYW for example was ultimately chiefly financed by three things: one, massive French subsidies covered a major chunk of the running expenses (Richelieu was perfectly happy to pay for the Swedes messing with the Hapsburgs); two, booty, "contributions", and other payments levied from the war zone - such exaction was developed into a highly organised science by all participants; three, loans and more loans - paid back by taking more loans and the constant stream of "spoils of war".

One of the major hurdles for everyone to stop waging the TYW was in fact specifically that the system had developed into a sort of perpetual machine where the expenses of waging war were covered by waging war - and if you stopped, you promptly lost much of your income but were still saddled by most off the expenses for a while plus the discharge payments of the mercenaries to boot. One of the central demands of the Swedes in the peace negotiations (which started many years before the war ended in 1648) was squeezing massive war reparations out of the HRE for the specific purpose of dealing with that problem.


The constant warmongering of Carolus X didn't really help things; I understand the Treasury only became genuinely solvent under the economic reforms of his son - the "great reduction", as the reappropriation of Crown lands granted to the nobility is known, was a major boost and seems to have been an almost unique achievement. It was AFAIK largely made possible by the very capable centralised state organisation developed already back under Gustavus II Adolphus, and the tacit agreement between the Crown and the aristocracy (dating from the same period) where the latter basically allowed the former to create the modern bureaucratic state without interference, and was rewarded by land and war booty this allowed to be won as well as a place in the new order. I understand (chiefly based on what Englund describes in Den Oövervinnelige) a rather similar arrangement was arrived to between the Count(?) of Brandenburg and the junkers.

Carolus XII in turn spent most of his reign on campaign (not really his fault granted), something which rarely helps state economies; it would have hardly improved matters that in the end the state lost most of its assorted cash-cow coastal territories sprinkled around the Baltic coastline (the very same ones it had spent centuries fighting to take over), and a major chunk of the realm (ie. Finland) spent nearly a decade under a not particularly benign Russian occupation.

About The crippledness of Swedens defensive capabilities, we weren't more disabled than that we could raise a new army from scratch and kick the Danes out of Scania in 1710 at the same time as we sent shiploads of replacement troops and equipment to Riga, once again under siege. No Finns involved!

Well, yeah, obviously - whatever troops could be scrounged up in Finland at that point all went to trying to hold off the advancing Russians, who after Poltava had pretty much a free run of everything Swedish they could reach. Not that the defense of the Baltic territories went particularly well either by what I know of it.

When Stralsund was lost, third army was created from scratch in 1716, raided into Norway, gathering experience, got replenished in 1717 and started a real invasion in 1718. This army got organized in a way wich put 2 - 3regiments (Depending on the number of battalions) plus supporting artillery and permanent command corps and staff into a new type of permanent unit called a "Omdelning" (Do i hear someone gasping "Brigade!?!" in the background?) 3-4 of these "Omdelningar" with a permanent command corps and staff formed a "Tilldelning". Some of these "Tilldelningar" meant for independent operations included extra artillery and cavalry, and some were pure cavalry formations. Yes! Infantry, cavalry and all-arms divisions! 70+ years before the Napoleonic Wars!

Spare the fanboy moe. For one thing, far as I'm aware of a "brigade" is a tactical formation; what you seem to be thinking of sounds more like an "army corps", and thankyouverymuch those were first created by the French under Napoleon. Similar operational entities had of course existed for a long time, but before the Napoleonic wars were invariably rather ad hoc affairs rather than true formal, permanent organisational units.

About the Rote system, i have explained about that elsewhere. Wether or not it was "Feodalish" or not is irrelevant, since it WORKED. And it was only applied after being accepted as a SUBSTITUTE for the earlier forced conscription, and the local peasantry could say "Aye or Naye". In those provinces were the peasantry said "Naye" It wasn't implemented.

And I'm fairly certain that latter part is bollocks. The modern Westphalian state was never big about letting its subjects shrink from their duties, nevermind military, and it had the adminstrative chutzpah to actually enforce the issue. While Leviathan somewhat missed the point it did grasp something of the hard core of the modern state.

previously the farmers had been organized into the Rote system were tree to four farms together was responsible for recruiting, keeping and equipping a soldier in peacetime. The soldier was given a small homestead for himself and his family, and some land to till. He also was supposed to be a handyman for the farmers in the Rote. Only in wartime or training did the Crown answer for his upkeep. Being a Rote soldier was a very popular career choice for those young men who couldn´t expect to inherit a farm of their own. Besides, the were very popular with the girls, in their dashing uniforms, which they wore to church every sunday. If they wanted to remain faithful to their wife, they had to use a club to fend of the local uniform groupies.

You are aware that this system was developed specifically because it was cheap right ? That is to say "out of necessity", because the Swedish treasury flat out couldn't afford a full standing army (in the fashion for example France did). By what I know of it the "rote" system existed at least until the Napoleonic wars (it's not like there were viable alternatives anyway); a rather considerable problem was that the soldiers were in practice a part-time militia, and that showed rather painfully clearly in 1808-1809 against the fully professional Russian army (nevermind now that their conscript soldiers were in practice prisoners-for-life in uniform). As, one suspects, in the other 18th-century scuffles.

[SwordsMaster]

Hmmm... I do believe the truth lies somewhere in between, as usual. I'm still interested on the actors in the courts of all the monarchs involved, who was for, who was against, who wanted more taxes from Livonia, who wanted and alliance with Russia instead (i know this was proposed), and why that failed, who was involved in the negotiations, etc.

About Finland: how was it ruled? Who was the head of th region? What were his views on the situation? Would he prefer to be under Russia rather than Sweden?

[Arngrim]

That's an awfully rosy picture you've got there....

There is no way i am going to spend the rest of the night answering all this, especially since you keep referring to other periods of the Swedish history than the period in question, and even the conditions of other countries !?!

Regarding the military organization of the third Carolean army, i said nothing about any army corps organization. I said all-arms divisions which other European armies adopted later in the century.
If you are in doubt, i can list the military units in a rising order of magnitude;

Army
Army corps (Late 18:th century)
Division (Late 18:th century)
Brigade
Regiment
Battalion
Squadron (seldom used for infantry)
Company

The permanent unit of Omdelning (2 - 3 regiments = 4 - 6 battalions + staff + artillery) corresponds to the later Brigades, and the permanent unit of Tilldelning (2+ Omdelningar) corresponds to the later divisions.

At the time few armies used any higher permanent unit than regiment, although temporary wing commanders could be appointed prior to battles.
Gustavus Adolphus used a formation called Swedish Brigades consisting of 3 pike squadrons and 3 squadrons of musket, but i doubt that they were permanent units.

As for the Rote system you keep dissing, The very army that Charles XII used, and everyone else agrees to its efficiency, was raised, trained and kept by the Rote system. Later Rote soldiers inefficiency had nothing to do with the system as such, but rather with lack of training, bad equipment and a incompetent officers corps. They seemed not to have to much difficulties helping kicking Napoleon in the behind 1813 - 1814 when lead by Bernadotte, or beating the Danes and Norwegians 1815. The Rote system were actually in use until 1901, which meant that the first 85 years of the present period of peace was guaranteed by these incompetent "militia".