Significance of the Battle of Manzikert
The significance of the Battle of Manzikert in the stability of the Byzantine Empire
This is an essay I've done for my diploma, complete with references, everything, bibliography included. I hope you guys enjoy and I invite you all for discussion! :)
NOTE: I took out all of the quotations because of copyright issues, but there is a bibliography underneath that acknowledges all of the sources that I have used.
In the 11th century, a large gathering of military might and valour was about to be consumed between the rocky mountains of Anatolia, a battle that would foresight the fall of the Byzantine Empire. Seemingly unimportant, it was undoubtedly the military confrontation between two Eastern empires and their distinctive cultures, ending up to be a turning point in the history of the Byzantine Empire. The battle was one of the most decisive defeats the empire suffered up to that point, marking the start of its inevitable decline and subsequent fall to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. The battle itself played an important role in the breaking down of Byzantine rule in Asia Minor, paving the way for Turkish tribes and sultanates to settle and develop to the expense of the Byzantine Empire. As a direct result of this military defeat, the Byzantines were never able again to field such a large force and mount such a strong reply to enemy attacks and soon this inability turned into complete helplessness, decisive elements in leading to the Fall of Constantinople in 1453. What is the significance of the battle of Manzikert for the Byzantine Empire? Steven Runciman pointed out, the battle of Manzikert was a disaster for Byzantine history. Although the Byzantine Empire was a strong and united entity in the Middle Ages, the battle of Manzikert proved that the empire was no longer invincible, as many had thought it would be; from that time a slow decline had begun which was greatly sped up by the defeat. The importance of the battle should not be underestimated. The defeat shaped the history of the medieval world because of its far reaching consequences that impacted the Byzantine Empire, the pillar of culture and civilisation in the Middle Ages.
The Seljuq Turks were a family of nomadic Oghuz Turks who had converted to Islam around the end of the tenth century, they migrated to the Anatolian plateau and its surroundings at the peak of the Byzantine expansion in the Middle Ages, eventually arriving to the borders of the empire after the death of Basil the IInd. The policy of the three major Seljuq rulers, Tighrul, Alp Arslan and Malikshah, was not to restrain the hordes of tribesmen, instead focusing on expanding against easier targets. The relatively easy conquest of areas such as the Middle East,for example, ensured the expansion of their empire in the Mesopotamia and the surrounding regions such as Arabia and Iran. Before long, however, came the opportunity of invading these territories controlled by the Byzantine Empire.
The nomadic Seljuqs under the leadership of Alp Arslan first met the enemy army at Manzikert, in eastern Anatolia, in 1071. Raids and skirmishes inside Byzantine territories were frequent, but this was the first true test of valour and skill in battle between the two eastern empires. In early April 1071, Alp Arslan had received news of the arrival of the Byzantine army led by the emperor himself in eastern Anatolia, and he decided to return east to deal with this new threat. Carole Hillenbrand offers an interpretation of the events that is generally accepted in the historical society - the enemies of the Seljuqs' were led by Romanus Diogenes who was a capable commander but who had serious domestic challenges to deal with. Not only that but the battle itself proved to be another challenge, and a setback, for the new Byzantine Emperor.
The Battle of Manzikert was a straightforward, yet decisive clash between two Eastern empires, fought on a rocky area in the eastern part of modern Turkey. Upon arrival in the easternmost parts of the Empire, Emperor Romanus Diogenes split his army, sending the powerful tagmata troops under Joseph Tarchanaiotes to guard the road to Khilat, a nearby settlement, and prevent a surprise attack from behind, while he himself marched on to besiege Manzikert held by the Seljuq troops. In the end, Manzikert itself surrendered without a fight, but at Khilat, his plans were thwarted. Ever since he had learned Romanus was advancing on Manzikert, Alp Arslan had been on the march towards the two cities, assembling an army as he went. As the Byzantines moved on Khilat from the north, they collided with a powerful 10,000-man advance force separated from Alp Arslan's 40000-man army. Surprisingly, the Byzantine main corps under General Tarchanaiotes fled the battlefield, leaving Romanus with his own troops. Hillenbrand and other historians argue that this was mostly in part due to treachery from the general.
The armies of the two empires approached, clashing in the rocky and mountainous terrain of the Anatolian-Armenian plateau which favoured close-quarter combat, but made it easy for skirmishes and ambushes to be effectively used. Determined to draw the Seljuq’s into a general engagement, Romanus drew up all his forces for battle on the second day, and, although he followed his strategic planning perfectly, the Seljuq skirmish troops overwhelmed the Byzantine army with their composite bows, raining bolts and arrows upon the inflexible ranks of the Byzantine defensive troops. The fighting was fierce in the front lines but neither side managed to gain any ground, or disrupt the line by decisively defeating any battalions in the wings. The retreat planned by Diogenes was decisively crushed by the fierce counterattacks of the Seljuq armies who broke the organised lines. It all crumbled because of the fleeing of a large body of the army led under Andronicus Doukas. Despite the imminent defeat it was clear that only a portion of the Byzantine army actually fought at Manzikert.
Despite the defeat, for many historians it was unclear why the strong network of fortresses at Manzikert broke up so easily. It is intriguing therefore that they fell so quickly at the hands of nomads inexperienced in siege warfare, especially against strong fortifications that surrounded these areas, particularly the town of Manzikert. Because of this, the whole system of eastern fortifications that were useful for the Byzantine Empire crumbled and thus the Seljuq Turks gained a foothold in the Armenian-Western Anatolian area. What strikes those who have studied the battle most is that Romanus Diogenes made an odd choice of commanders and troops to accompany him on this important expedition. Initially, he chose to leave Nikephoros Botanaiates behind, a competent officer whom, however, he suspected of potential disloyalty. John Haldon claims that despite Andronikos Doukas' disloyalty, Romanus chose him as his company. A grave mistake from his part, continues Haldon, since Doukas did not intervene with his army and spread the rumour that the emperor died just for the army to break up. Without a strong rearguard to cover his back in case of an attack, Romanus was forced to adjust his tactics, but eventually the missing link triggered a domino effect caused by the Seljuq counterattacks.
Romanus Diogenes himself was captured, and this news sent a powerful shock wave which reverberated in the capital Constantinople and the other major cities of the empire. This degenerated in a full scale civil war that ended with a total collapse of all state institutions which had been providing stability and were the unifying element of the Byzantine Empire. The internal weakness only provided even more fertile ground for the nomadic Seljuqs to settle in the Anatolian plateau and its surrounding areas, robbing the empire of one of the main bases for soldier recruitment.
For the Seljuqs, the impact of the surprise victory was much more than a simple morale boost for the armies. It was one of the most glorious moments in Seljuq history, a moment of pride that would last for generations. Not surprisingly, the support for the Seljuq Sultan grew immediately. The burden grew heavier on the Byzantine Empire as more and more soldiers joined the enemy army and gradually it could not contain the masses of warriors thrown against the capital city of Constantinople. Manzikert was naturally cast as not merely a geo-political struggle but also religious, and it was the source of much propaganda for the cause of the Seljuq Turks who were not only boosted by the victory but were also boosted by the new aura of their leader. Here it is imperative to mention the difficulty on relying on medieval sources, such as the Arabic sources who praised Alp Arslan. The bias is now evident, from Seljuqs and Byzantines. Many of the contemporary accounts and subsequent attempts at noting down the battle for posterity have clearly exaggerated the number of enemy troops and other details such as the real implication in the battle of the emperors, which make them unreliable when analysing the battle. Most of the contemporary sources do not differ greatly in their description of the battle and its immediate aftermath.
Romanus was released and briefly returned to his position as emperor but he was quickly captured and blinded by the governing landowners, sending a clear message to the future emperors, exacerbating the empire's current troubles. Despite the huge problem that Manzikert posed, some historians propose that it did not have such a powerful impact as previously believed. Through her argument, Carole Hillenbrand points out the consequences in the short term rather than the long term. Hillenbrand cites numerous Muslim sources, both contemporary and from later periods when describing the aftermath of the battle. On the other hand, because of the Sultan's reluctance, we can consider that the impact has been greatly lessened overall, due to the fact that the victors did not advance deep into Byzantine territory. It was the colonisation of the Anatolian plains by the Turks, after their victory at Manzikert, which led to the external destabilisation of the empire weakening it steadily and leading ultimately to its demise in 1453. This important internal weakness was directly caused by the defeat at Manzikert. In fact, historians such as Runciman have argued that it has been the most decisive defeat in Byzantine history.
The ensuing civil war between Romanus' supporters and his opponents, sapped the resources in troops and money on both sides and for some historians such as John Haldon it was only a matter of time before the Seljuqs invaded Anatolia. Internal disputes were all too common in the Byzantine Empire, but the severity of the fighting which followed the Battle of Manzikert was unprecedented. The imposing of a poll tax by the Seljuqs seriously aggravated the situation presented to the high officials in Constantinople. Paying tribute to a group of nomads who could have easily been defeated by the might of the Byzantine army did not sit well with the vanity of the Byzantine population. As a result of the civil war ensued after the battle, the first revolts started in less than a year after Michael Doukas became the new Emperor in 1071, leading to a severe devaluation of the empire's currency, which further aggravated the consequences. The problems of the Empire escalated to the point where in 1078 his generals Nikephoros Bryennius and Nikephoros Botanaiates revolted against his rule, threatening a civil war. Revolts and economic disaster lasted for more than ten years after Manzikert until a young general by the name of Alexios Komnenos took over the throne and embarked on a recovery of the Byzantine Empire.
Dealt a heavy blow at Manzikert, the Byzantine Empire now had numerous problems in needed to urgently attend to. The loss at the hands of the Seljuqs meant that the three main eastern themes, Anatolikon, Armeniakon and Kappadokia were lost forever. The loss of these key regions therefore had a considerable long-term impact on the defence of the Byzantine state not only in the years following the battle but even its ability to raise a serious force in the 12th and 13th centuries. Paul Markham however argues that this was not the case but nevertheless Anatolia was a huge farming land with a booming population, and it wasn't surprising that it provided the highest number of professional soldiers towards the defence of the Byzantine Empire. With the loss of these two regions, successive emperors installed a pronoia feudal system that created a serious defence crisis for the empire which was never solved, and this increased its reliance on expensive and aggressive foreign mercenaries. The instalment of the pronoia system, military service in exchange of land, was similar to western feudalism, and this only managed to exacerbate further defensive problems for the Byzantine Empire. This feudal system was initiated by Manuel I Komnenos and his deputies as a response to the defeat at Manzikert, in order to stabilise the empire by giving soldiers and free citizens the chance to own land in exchange for the military service the empire relied on. Without a stable defence, the empire became significantly weaker and by the beginning of the 15th century almost all of its territories had been lost to foreign invaders, and as a result it came to no surprise that Constantinople fell in 1453. The consequences of this defeat enabled the Turkish nomads to enter and settle inside the Anatolian plateau which became their base for future operations.
The loss of the Anatolian plateau also created a severe economic problem which gradually aggravated itself. The introduction of the pronoia feudal system was the first step towards the Westernisation of the empire, a system imposed by the advancement of the armies of the empire's enemies but also due to the influence of the landlords in the Byzantine court who pressed for this peasant-suppressing measure that would further expand their estates and enrich them considerably. Anatolia and Armenia were huge fertile farming areas which provided profitable means of living for the the typical Byzantine farmer who in turn provided military services and the majority of the taxes for the empire's treasury. The domino effect caused by the internal weakness had an irreversible impact on the empire's finances, unable to improve the infrastructure, trade and finance system, which could improve the bleak economic situation the empire was facing. To make matters worse, the reliance of the mercenaries who were supposed to protect the empire actually caused more problems than the traditional enemies of the empire. Although the allelengyon tax, which imposed huge levies on the rich landowners, had largely been discontinued in 1030 by Emperor Roman Argyros, special taxes aimed at the landowning nobility continued to provide a significant amount of money to the treasury. Paul Markham also points out a significant problem ensued after Manzikert - the Empire's coinage. The Byzantines only had very limited gold reserves to back up their nomisma currency. The Seljuq court, however, became a significant consumer of coinage, which over time eroded Byzantium’s gold reserve.
In contrast with the gradual encroachment of Seljuqs in Anatolia, Armenia was lost immediately after the battle. Armenia and the subsequent Armeniakon theme was part of a complex defence system that protected a mountainous province rich in natural resources and fertile grounds, encouraging agriculture that eventually had an impact on the Byzantine military as well. Since most of the warriors were farmers, the impact was dramatic. Pre Manzikert, Armenia was a province vital to the integrity of the Byzantine state, with local rulers keeping order for the Byzantine landlords. Armenia kept the eastern borders safe due its strategic location that made assault and invasion virtually impossible without heavy casualties. Without the eastern pillar of defence, the rest of the eastern territories were vulnerable, relying only on manpower for their defence. Not only did they lose a significant source of income and their experienced soldiers, but it provided a perfect place from where Turkish could launch and sustain their attacks. This lead to the creation of the powerful Sultanate of Rum and Konya. Ironically, later on in Anatolia and in the surrounding mountainous regions Osman created his small kingdom, which eventually evolved in the powerful Ottoman Empire. Still surprising to most historians is the immediate switch of the ownership which occurred as a generally peaceful transfer of power.
The defeat at Manzikert and the subsequent civil war had a completely different outcome from what most had expected – it ensured a political debacle from the landowners who demanded more land and more power within the empire, and the lack of payment in cash towards the citizens was substituted with payment in land. The farmer-soldier system collapsed and this gave even more power to the land hungry aristocrats. The rebuilding of the original Byzantine farmer-warrior system was restarted more than twenty years after the battle by Alexios I Komnenos but the empire crashed once more, this time definitively, once the western forces part of the Fourth Crusade captured Constantinople in 1204. The sacking of the Byzantine capital was a direct consequence of the internal and external weakness of the empire created by the battle of Manzikert and the subsequent defeat at Myriokephalon. These severe defeats created serious internal problems which affected the stability and integrity of the empire in the long run. Thematic troops formed the backbone of the Byzantine Army until 1071, and it eventually showed, mainly by using hindsight, that the collapse of this proto-federal system which provided quality soldiers towards the defence of the empire was crucial. Unable to defend itself from the incursions of the Seljuq Turks and later on from their descendants, the Ottoman Turks, the final moment came in 1453 when the capital was conquered.
Manzikert was not that much of a political blow to the Byzantine internal structure but more likely a simple manifestation of the interest within the Empire that eventually took over power. Starting from General Tarchaniotes' failure to inform Romanus of his defeat to the rampant greed and political intrigue because of the defeat, all of these consequences added up and eventually destabilised the empire internally. Furthermore, treachery at Manzikert from the Doukas' part left the army in a hazardous position from where it could not recover and at least fend off the chasing Turks. To historians such as Bevin Alexander, the battle of Manzikert is not considered as a death blow but rather a acknowledgement that it had died from the inside many years before. Entering an era of political and social instability after Basil II's death in 1025 weakened the Imperial structure itself, unable to cope with the external dangers any more. Most of the historians agree that it wasn't a military disaster, but it was rather a political failure. The defeat would eventually turn out as a ethnic and religious transformation of the surrounding areas of Manzikert, Armenia and Anatolia, and helped establish the Seljuq Sultanate of Rum and the one in Konya, and later on the Ottoman Empire. After Manzikert, Byzantine separatism exacerbated by the endless power struggles in Constantinople was free to run rampant and destroy the empire from the inside. And it is because of the political disaster that the structure of the Byzantine Empire crumbled and thus the Seljuq Turks established their state inside its heartland, leading up to the definite fall on the 29th of May 1453.
Bibliography
Alexander, Bevin, How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War, New York, United States of America, Crown Publications, 2003
Attaleiates, Michael, Historia, translated by Dr. R. Macrides, appendix in Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol, Edinburgh, Edinburgh Press, 2007
Brezeanu, Stelian, O istorie a Bizantului (A History of Byzantium), Bucharest, Romania, Editura Meronia, 2005
Comnena, Anna, Alexiad, translated by E.R.A. Sewter, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Great Britain, Penguin Classics, 1969
Haldon, John, The Byzantine Wars, Stroud, Great Britain, Tempus Publishing, 2001
Heath, Ian, Byzantine Armies 886-1118, Oxford, Great Britain, Osprey Publishing, 2005
Hillenbrand, Carole, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol The Battle of Manzikert, Edinburgh, Scotland, Edinburgh University Press, 2007
Markham, Paul, The Battle of Manzikert, De Re Military: Society for Medieval Military Studies http://www.deremilitari.org/resource...es/markham.htm, accessed 16th of December 2009
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Originally Posted by Brandy Blue
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