Civil War Bull Run Demo -- New

[Red Harvest]

MMG has released a demo of Civil War Bull Run. You can grab it at their website here. It is a nice little game for $20. You will find the AI much more challenging than RTW...

[Divine Wind]

Downloading the demo now, thanks Red Harvest.

[SpencerH]

Did you ever play the Sid Meier civil war games?

[The Scourge]

Agh! Just ordered the full game a few days ago.
Oh well ,pretty sure I won't regret it.


SpencerH .Played Gettys Burg all the time ,and it's still one of my all time favorite war games.
And everything I've read about Bull Run ,makes it sound even better.

[SpencerH]

Yeah I thought it was a good game that seems to be very overlooked.

[Gregoshi]

Okay, I played some of the demo and I'm impressed. Pretty cool, but for a demo I was surprised at how much marching along the road through the woods there was - it really slowed things down, but the fighting was pretty good. I'll play a little more of the demo to be sure, but it hardly seems like you can go wrong for $20. I like it so far.

[doc_bean]

What's the game like? Is it just battles? Is there a campaign map? ect.? The ACW is one of my favorite wars to study, i've been waiting a long time for a decent game based on it (although if someone would mod Imperial Glory, they could come close).

If you like Cossacks, the same people are making a civil war game now.

As for CWBR, just download the demo and see for yourself

[jeffreyLebowski]

my only knock on this game so far is that the gamespeed adjustment is utterly useless. i mean, some people might enjoy watching sprites march down a road for 10 minutes, but i'll take a pass. i popped on time compression only to find that it barely increases the game speed. instead of marching like arthritic senior citizens with a broken hip, they march like arthritic senior citizens after the hip's healed up. besides that nag, this game does indeed seem very cool. a lot like sid meier's gettysburg, but updated.

[phred]

Here's a pretty thorough review from The Wargamer

http://www.wargamer.com/reviews/civilwar_bullrun/

[Red Harvest]

Did you ever play the Sid Meier civil war games?

Yep, unfortunately XP SP2 effectively kills both Gettysburg and Antietam. I enjoyed both of them. I think CWBR is considerably tougher.

There are some facets of the CWBR game that are going to need some adjustment for the next in the series, but they have made a very good start.

[CBR]

There is no campaign as it only focuses on the battle/scenarios. We can just hope they eventually will make it MP.

But I do find US Civil War tactics to be pretty boring compared to Napoleonic warfare. But its definitely a good game considering it was made by two guys in their spare time.


CBR

[CBR]

Oh yes they just never had the good quality cavalry for the shock action plus the terrain was not always suited for the cavalry. That and the tendency to dig in whenever they could which you rarely saw in earlier times.

But apart from that it was still very Napoleonic in its basics.


CBR

[Red Harvest]

Oh yes they just never had the good quality cavalry for the shock action plus the terrain was not always suited for the cavalry. That and the tendency to dig in whenever they could which you rarely saw in earlier times.

An interesting subject and one I've been trying to come to grips with for some time. I'm not as familiar with Napoleonic cavalry as I would like to be, but in most cases, cavalry of the pre-ACW period seems to be overrated or remembered for a few dashing moments such as dealing the coup de grace to a wavering foe. They were certainly difficult to maintain with real quality.

The problem is that the type of cavalry you describe was obsolete, as were most Napoleonic tactics by the end of the American Civil War. Entrenchment became common because of improved rifles and artillery--these forced the infantry to dig in. And even the best shock cavalry in the world would have been reduced to a useless state by the end of a season of campaigning--making extended elite training of questionable value. Weapons and warfare had advanced to the point that Napoleonic cavalry were not effective. It simply would have been a waste of resources to even fully develop shock cavalry. They couldn't be employed against entrenched forces, and mounted infantry were far more effective in wooded terrain. JEB Stuart was a big fan of saber fighting and all that, but it wasn't terribly practical against ordered or disciplined infantry (or even at times in the American revolution...such as at Cowpens.) NB Forrest used his cavalry to get to the point of action/decision and dismount. He preferred arming his men with revolvers and carbines that were more versatile and deadly in thickets (where much of the fighting happened) than long rifles would be. In the ACW cavalry became almost completely mounted infantry.

In few places would the terrain favor mounted combat against an organized foe. And even on open ground, a man with a revolver or a breach loading carbine was going to be quite effective vs. mounted cavalry--not to mention a repeater. And good breachloaders could be used from the saddle. The mobility of a horse was highly useful, but in getting infantry to key points rapidly, not so much in actual combat. Major force deployments still relied on foot slogging, but also on trains and by boat. During the ACW mounted infantry developed to the point that it could be deployed to hold against formed infantry. This was particularly true of units such as Wilder's Lightning Brigade that used Spencer repeaters to hold off a confederate infantry division at Hoover's gap. Has shock cavalry ever existed that could prove more effective than trained repeater armed mounted infantry?

Cavalry's weakness is that it was a dependent arm. It relied on artillery or infantry action to first disorder enemies so that they would break when charged. While infantry rifles and artillery advanced, horses were not going to become an order of magnitude faster. Cavalry is also an offensive arm. Cavalry did not hold ground in the face of an infantry attack. Mounted infantry could and did as their weaponry improved.

In the ACW cavalry/mounted infantry were mainly used for screening, raids, protecting lines of communication, and probing. The density of troops required in most campaigns in the ACW almost invariably led to problems with finding adequate forage. The animals were ridden hard, poorly fed, and soon broken down. Cuirassiers could hardly be expected to fluorish in such an environment. The men were often poorly fed as well...so this wasn't necessarily animal neglect, but men lasted longer. How many infantry could be fed and maintained for the cost of maintaining a single horse?

So that is my conclusion: Logistics, terrain, and weaponry all made traditional cavalry obsolete by the time of the ACW.

P.S. Although this has an "America-centric" ring to it, I believe that the major developments that occurred during the ACW were really a matter of timing on the world stage. The conflict started at a time when many new technologies were coming to the forefront around the world and it involved two highly literate societies (for the time.) It lasted long enough that the new tech was encouraged and implemented.

[SpencerH]

It's been said many times that the ACW was the first 'modern' war and in many ways, including the virtual elimination of the effectiveness of the massed cavalry charge and the change to using cavalry as mobile inf, it was.

[Kraxis]

My only knowledge of the ACW is basically the Osprey series (oh yes I knew the way the war was fought and by whom for what reason and where, but never any details on the battles themselves), and I must say that compared to the Napoleonic battles there is a severe lack of subleties and refined tactics. And those books were in many cases written by authors who are very proud and perhaps suffer from a bit of a minority complex, so it isn't as if the authors are biased against the ACW.

Take a look at Shiloh or Antietam and you will find mishmash battles where the initial plan was fine, but the generals were simply not up to the job, and thus the battle devolved into a scrum where it was basically who could deal out the most damage the fastest head on.

Many would argue that the CSA had good generals, but I think it came more down to their troops than their generalship, but I would agree that the CSA generals were better commanders (than their northern counterparts, save Sherman and Grant), just not anything great.

[Kraxis]

Yes, that pretty much says how I have felt it was fought. Two sluggers going at it in the ring, Ali dancing, no fancy overhand-rights, just pure straight rights and lefts.

Jamestown (or what it was called, you know the one where the Union tried to get across a river and had to fight uphill), is the epithomy of tactical forgetfulness.

But was it really a volounteer war all the way through? I mean it was almost every ablebodies male in the south, and a serious part of the same population on the north. That has only been done since by conscription.
But I do know of the 90-day heroes (which in their own right forced a number of hasty battles because the generals didn't dare to extend their terms).

[Quietus]

There is no campaign as it only focuses on the battle/scenarios.

It cost half that of RTW but no campaign or replayability? I reckon only two factions and not a lot of unit variety. And the graphics look MTW-ish.

On the scale of 1 to 5 how would you guys rate this game?

[CBR]

It cost half that of RTW but no campaign or replayability? I reckon only two factions and not a lot of unit variety. And the graphics look MTW-ish.

On the scale of 1 to 5 how would you guys rate this game?

Well I must say that I havent played it much and dont plan to either, mainly because the tactics are poor (and thats the era and not some game mechanic problem) and that there is no MP.

I bought MTW for MP only as the campaign simply doesnt interest me, so a game with no campaign doesnt bother me of course. But I did feel it was worth the to support the creators of CWBR. Afterall they managed to make a battle engine with less bugs than RTW...

So I would say its a good game (4/5) for any who is interested in the Civil War but for others it would be too limited. But do try the demo (dont know whats in it actually heh) as it is afterall a tactical battle engine and interesting to try out.


CBR

[Gregoshi]

Gelatinous Cube, the Battle of the Crater was at Petersburg, not Jamestown. There were so many things screwed up by the Union in that battle it is unlikely they could have tried to screw up and been any more effective. In addition to what GC mentioned, the Union dictated when the attack would start, yet amazingly, the units that were to participate in the attack weren't ready when the explosion happened. The Confederates around the Crater where stunned for several minutes. A Union attack at this time would have collapsed the Confederate defenses and ended the trench warfare stalemate. Would have... There is a great quote from Grant about the missed opportunity, but I can't find it.

[Red Harvest]

It cost half that of RTW but no campaign or replayability? I reckon only two factions and not a lot of unit variety. And the graphics look MTW-ish.

On the scale of 1 to 5 how would you guys rate this game?

I rate it a 4/5. It is narrow in scope, but executes well in that scope. Graphically it is using 2D images on the 3D map. Replay is limited because it is a single battle--just like the Sid Meier's Antietam and Gettysburg, or the Waterloo game. However, in addition to the scenarios there is "open play". And open play is interesting because you never know what you will face or from what direction. You might get an absolute walkover, or something completely impossible, or something in between--just like real life.

RTW fails in both the strategic and tactical level. They didn't execute well at either and there is little challenge vs. either. RTW is like playing checkers with an ornate chessboard, a beautiful setting with so much lost potential. Most players (including myself) won't be able to beat a CWBR scenario on the normal play level the first time out. Contrast that with RTW.

[Red Harvest]

My only knowledge of the ACW is basically the Osprey series (oh yes I knew the way the war was fought and by whom for what reason and where, but never any details on the battles themselves), and I must say that compared to the Napoleonic battles there is a severe lack of subleties and refined tactics. And those books were in many cases written by authors who are very proud and perhaps suffer from a bit of a minority complex, so it isn't as if the authors are biased against the ACW.

Take a look at Shiloh or Antietam and you will find mishmash battles where the initial plan was fine, but the generals were simply not up to the job, and thus the battle devolved into a scrum where it was basically who could deal out the most damage the fastest head on.

Many would argue that the CSA had good generals, but I think it came more down to their troops than their generalship, but I would agree that the CSA generals were better commanders (than their northern counterparts, save Sherman and Grant), just not anything great.

Shiloh and Antietam were early war battles. The generals were indeed not up to the job in the early years. In the East it was the Union generalship that was poor. In the West it was the CSA generalship that was terrible while Union generalship was largely mediocre.

Shiloh had problems from the outset with the CSA deployment. The attack was carried out with the 3 corps attacking in 3 successive parallel waves. It should have been done with the corps divided into 3 wings. Shiloh was thicket and creeks interspersed with fields. No corps commander could maintain control over several miles of front through such terrain (or even open terrain for that matter.) Once the initial attacks had stalled, the corps commanders took command of the intermingled forces in their area as wings. Bragg failed to use flanking forces to envelope the hornet's nest, and thereby blunted his attack by successive piecemeal frontal assaults.

Antietam I am less familiar with since I haven't studied it in detail. I've read some accounts of it and other battles where Union commanders stuck to the Napoleonic tactic of holding 1/3rd of their forces as a reserve. That worked when your opponent did the same...but wiley folks like Lee and Forrest would throw in everything they had at the decisive points, giving them localized superioriety in attack or equivalence in defense that was sufficient to hold. These generals were more modern in their approach...and less traditional.

Much of the war was bludgeon style, but terrain was a large part of it. As best I can tell, europeans at the time were not fighting the majority of their battles in heavy forest and thicket. It was hard to see the ends of a regiment in such conditions or even to identify the enemy. Once division or corps commanders sent their forces into the woods, much of the fighting devolved to brigade control (at best) or regimental level control.

There are plenty of examples of large scale flanking moves and such. Bull Run was such an attack, and nearly succeeded. Most ACW battles revolved around gaining or holding some vital transportation link (cross roads, or rail hubs, or mountain passes.)

Wilson's Creek is an interesting very early battle. I've been over this battle field a few times and the woods and hills make it tough to maneuver or see (only about 60 miles from where I grew up, and very much the same type of hills woods, and streams.) The Union commander Lyon had quite a few 90 day men who were about to complete their tour. His force was only about 40% of the size of the CSA and Missouri State Guard units nearby who were massing for an attack. So Lyon did a night march out of town and attempted a daybreak pincer attack to disperse them and thereby gain time for his Federal forces. His main body fought very well. Interestingly, his pincer attack failed to have the desired effect, arguably because it was led by an experienced European (German) of mediocre skill and poor judgement, Franz Sigel--who had fought in the German revolution of 1848. While Sigel was initially successful in scattering the rebel forces by bombarding their camp, he mistook an advancing CSA regiment for the gray clad 1st Iowa. When they unexpectedly fired on his force from 40 yards, his men scattered. This doomed the vastly outnumbered main force, which repulsed three counterattacks on their line, losing Lyon in the process. Despite being very early in the war, the Federals withdrew in good order even though they had suffered 25% casualties, lost their commander, and had a handful of cavalry while the rebels had thousands of mounted men.

[IceTorque]

I give it a 4/5.

I particularly like the GUI it gives it that sense of realism
give the orders and wait.

CBR i heard you were off playing Silent Hunter III,
is it as good as the mags say it is ?

[Kraxis]

Antietam was quite interesting.

The battleplan was to attack the CSA forces in succession. Each corps mounting an attack to draw in the neighbouring the units, then the next corps would come in against a weaker line and so on. It was done in mainly open terrain with some hills and cropfields. But there was a major bungle up in getting off too late, the individual corps attacked too late comparatively to each other, so instead of the CSA getting depleted, it was themselves that got defeated in detail.
The major problem was that the only true regular force in the Union army, 5th Corps I believe, made up entirely of regulars was not used at all.

While European forces had about 1/3 in reserve that was to counter any enemy surprises, to stiffen attacks and throw back counterattacks. Basically a firebrigade. Had the 5th corps been used as such, it would without a doubt have been a Union victory, ending the war right there.

As I said earlier, the plans were sound enough, but often they were not up to the task of actually carrying them out. Shiloh is a definate proof of overcomplicating the task, as well as the order: "if you don't know where the battle is, head for the sound of the guns". Not that great in a forest where you suddenly face a canister spewing 6 pounder.

Chancelorsville, or what it was, was also a major tactical bungle. The list goes on... Quite simply it was often a a realist knowing his own quite limited abilities up against a one of equal limited abilities not knowing his limitations.

And you can't hold it against Sigel that he made an error like that. His enemy didn't have that problem with him. It happene all the time in the early war, and mostly with Union troops firing on Union troops. With that in mind I find it likely that Lyon had made it specific to his subordinates that he didn't want any FF at all, he simply couldn't afford it. So the CSA troops marching on Sigel realized that he didn't know they were his enemies marched as close as possible before firing. The fact that they did that would have confirmed for Sigel that they were friendly (they haven't fired yet... good... an enemy would have done that long ago). Especially considering the abilities and experince of the troops that early in the war. Such daring and nerve would have been almost unthinkable.

[The Scourge]

Interesting that two small developer games are getting a lot of attention on this forum lately.
CWBR ,and Mount and Blade.
Got them both ,and they're two of the best games I've played in years.
Anyway ,thought I'd get that one in .

[Red Harvest]

Antietam was quite interesting.

The battleplan was to attack the CSA forces in succession. Each corps mounting an attack to draw in the neighbouring the units, then the next corps would come in against a weaker line and so on. It was done in mainly open terrain with some hills and cropfields. But there was a major bungle up in getting off too late, the individual corps attacked too late comparatively to each other, so instead of the CSA getting depleted, it was themselves that got defeated in detail.
The major problem was that the only true regular force in the Union army, 5th Corps I believe, made up entirely of regulars was not used at all.

While European forces had about 1/3 in reserve that was to counter any enemy surprises, to stiffen attacks and throw back counterattacks. Basically a firebrigade. Had the 5th corps been used as such, it would without a doubt have been a Union victory, ending the war right there.

Yes, McClellan was far too timid. Great organizer and trainer, charismatic, but a poor battlefield commander because he lacked boldness. However, his basic concept for Antietam was flawed in my opinion. Trying to coordinate successive attacks across a wide front invites timing errors from the outset. His men had to march to position and develop the enemy positions...one can see how trying to time series assaults would have little hope of proper coordination under the circumstances. And series attack vs. arced defensive formations also allows defenders to support one another via interior lines. This is the recipe for defeat in detail because the defender's flanks are protected, while the attacker's flanks are necessarily exposed by each advance. Much better to call for a general advance so that fighting will still be ongoing in each sector and therefore mutually supporting and denying the enemy the ability to shift units from sector to sector. Whichever enemy sector is nearest collapse is the one to hurl the reserves at.

And you can't hold it against Sigel that he made an error like that. His enemy didn't have that problem with him. It happene all the time in the early war, and mostly with Union troops firing on Union troops. With that in mind I find it likely that Lyon had made it specific to his subordinates that he didn't want any FF at all, he simply couldn't afford it. So the CSA troops marching on Sigel realized that he didn't know they were his enemies marched as close as possible before firing. The fact that they did that would have confirmed for Sigel that they were friendly (they haven't fired yet... good... an enemy would have done that long ago). Especially considering the abilities and experince of the troops that early in the war. Such daring and nerve would have been almost unthinkable.

I can hold this one against Sigel. There is a lot more to the story. He pressed Lyon heavily to have his german regiments detached to do this flank attack. Lyon was actually opposed to splitting the force as were the other commanders, but after a private discussion consented and provided Sigel with some dragoons to guide him.

Sigel misread the lull after the first confederate counterattack on Lyon as a general withdrawal by the confederates. He ceased fire from his battery and did *nothing* as he assumed the rebels were in full retreat while they were actually regrouping for another assault. Sigel then utterly failed to properly secure his position and did not send an officer forward to determine the nature of the approaching troops until they were quite close. The officer, a Capt. Tod, realized too late and was shot as he attempted to raise his weapon, just before the rebels attacked. A bit earlier Sigel did have his regiments wave their banners to signal they were union since they were also not wearing regulation blue. That prompted fire from a rebel battery along a wooded hill to his right which he had failed to identify. Sigel's brigade was also flanked a few seconds later by two other regiments of which he was apparently unaware. He made too many mistakes at once for me to dismiss this one. He was on some of the more open terrain (a small plateau) and yet saw nothing before it was too late. Incidentally, two of the same CSA regiments that defeated him had just repelled a small federal task force's attempt to silence a battery enfilading Lyon's line from across Wilson's Creek. These CSA units had done quite a bit of marching to reach Sigel. Had Lyon had the Sigel's extra men with him, he could have used a larger force to successfully deal with the battery that enfiladed his own position on Bloody Hill. Being short a brigade was critical.

Sigel had a "history" of poor judgement. A few weeks before he had rashly charged out to Carthage, Missouri (without authorization if memory serves) with the same two german regiments, intent on kicking the secessionist Missouri State Guard out of the state. That edge of the state is mostly prairie and gently rolling hills--ideal terrain for MSG cavalry to gobble up his infantry only force...particulary since he was outnumbered 4:1. Luckily for him, his Germans were well drilled and did good work. (German militia groups in St. Louis had been drilling continuously before the war.) At Carthage Sigel realized after aligning for battle and after an artillery duel that he was going to be enveloped by the cavalry proceeding along his flanks. He was able to retreat in good order using successive creeks as barriers. Fortunately for him MSG cavalry were largely worthless at the time (other than Shelby's tiny command) and the MSG cav commander Rains was one of the most inept cavarly commanders of the ACW (perhaps only matched by Stahel, Sigel's close friend and cavalry commander at New Market.) A battalion of Sigel's Missouri infantry performed a bayonet charge on some cavalry that blocked their escape route, scattering the riders. One thing Sigel was competent at was retreat. He wasn't really a bad person and he was a decent organizer, but he had poor strategic judgement and he fumbled badly in key situations, resulting in disaster for his commands at Wilson's Creek, MO later at New Market, VA and finally at the supply depot Martinsburg where he abandoned all the stores and retreated his command without a shot. The fiasco at Martinsburg got him relieved of all command.

[Gregoshi]

Another of McClellan's failings at Antietam (and other battles), was that his intelligence network was bad - run by Allen Pinkerton (later the founder of the famous Pinkerton Detectives). Pinkerton and his people were terrible spies and the numbers on Lee's strength where always over inflated. Then when McClellan got the numbers, he inflated them even more. McClellan had just under 90000 men at Antietam. Lee had only about 35000 men, but McClellan was convinced Lee's army numbered over 100000. McClellan was being "courageous" by taking the attack to Bobby Lee even though he was "outnumbered".

[Gawain of Orkeny]

Well I liked the demo so much I went out and bought the game. Only problem is for some reason I cant see any units in the game

[Gregoshi]

Confederate and Union Battlefield Ninjas maybe?

[CBR]

CBR i heard you were off playing Silent Hunter III,
is it as good as the mags say it is ?

I have played a bit of MP but I dont think its very suited for that. The campaign on the other hand is very good IMO.


CBR

[CBR]

An interesting subject and one I've been trying to come to grips with for some time. I'm not as familiar with Napoleonic cavalry as I would like to be, but in most cases, cavalry of the pre-ACW period seems to be overrated or remembered for a few dashing moments such as dealing the coup de grace to a wavering foe. They were certainly difficult to maintain with real quality.

Cavalry was certainly expensive but definitely worth it. Napoleon actually changed the way it was used and formed whole divisons of cavalry and Im pretty sure some of the largest cavalry charges in Western history happened during these years.

A bit of info on it here:

http://www.napoleon-series.org/milit...n/c_eylau.html

The problem is that the type of cavalry you describe was obsolete, as were most Napoleonic tactics by the end of the American Civil War. Entrenchment became common because of improved rifles and artillery--these forced the infantry to dig in.

AFAIK this book did dispell some of the myths about the US Civil War: Battle Tactics of the American Civil War by Paddy Griffith. Just using my (perhaps) corrupted memory right now:

Cavalry that could make fast maneuvers to outflank enemy infantry and rout them quickly was by no means obsolete. It was used in the Franco-Prussian war too. The frontal assault might have been made slightly more difficult but was not easy during Napoleonic times anyways. There was just no large numbers of cavalry nor was it trained for such attacks (being used more as mounted infantry) and the terrain didnt help on it either.

The doctrine about digging in started before artillery and rifles changed any tactics. The main reason for it was that the Americans saw their militia infantry to be not as strong as regular infantry so fortifications were a must to bolster the defense.

Most artillery were 12 pounder muzzleloaders and in the beginning of the war a lot of infantry still used smoothbore muskets too as well as getting nearly no proper traning to use their weapons. Collected data on average ranges for musket/rifle engagements suggests a small increase in the later years but nowhere near the potiential the rifle had compared to the musket. And overall the ranges doesnt seem to be much different than what was seen during Napoleonic times. The main explanation for that would be the lack of training and the general confusion during a engagement meant that soldiers didnt aim very well, so the rifle's potiential was more or less wasted.

The last stage of the war there as some aggressive use of cavalry (more or less the first time IIRC) which showed how good cavalry was, instead of just doing raids and recon. In most occasions it was used dismounted but IIRC at one point cavalry frontally attacked some trenches.

I cannot comment on how logistics in USA would have made it worse for cavalry compared to say Europe but that is a local thing and nothing to do with technology and tactics. But that along with the terrain might have given ACW shock cavalry some problems. But nonetheless it still took nearly 4 years IIRC before we see some good battlefield use of cavalry (actions leading up to Appomattox). Cavalry was always good at pursuing and enhancing an enemy rout but was simply not present at all and that IMO made way too many battles indecisive.


CBR