Who is the most overrated general ever?

[Mulceber]

Very clever + average general ability + luck + great staff support + outstanding legions = Caesar

Ok, I could maybe buy the notion that Caesar wasn't an Alexander or a Hannibal when it came to battlefield tactics, but AVERAGE GENERAL ABILITY??? Bullshit. He had some battles that didn't go particularly well, yes, but this guy is definitely above average. And I think you're forgetting the fact that, strategically (as opposed to tactically), Caesar was probably the equal of any general who ever lived - certainly better than Hannibal, who wasn't able to string his amazing battlefield victories together into a successful campaign.

Also, you argue that part of it was his outstanding legions, but how do you think those legions got to be so extraordinary? Caesar didn't inherit them in that condition, they BECAME that way over the course of his campaigns in Gaul. So during Caesar's early campaigns at least, he didn't have the quality of his legions to rely on.

I wouldn't write off Caesar's luck either - it wasn't just that he rolled the dice and won; Caesar gambled on himself, but the reason he always ended up winning (the exception being 3/15) was because he usually stacked the deck in his favor so to speak - he'd put forth every effort to gain every advantage so that when he did roll the dice, the odds were in his favor. -M

[Xtiaan72]

Ok, I could maybe buy the notion that Caesar wasn't an Alexander or a Hannibal when it came to battlefield tactics, but AVERAGE GENERAL ABILITY??? Bullshit. He had some battles that didn't go particularly well, yes, but this guy is definitely above average. And I think you're forgetting the fact that, strategically (as opposed to tactically), Caesar was probably the equal of any general who ever lived - certainly better than Hannibal, who wasn't able to string his amazing battlefield victories together into a successful campaign.

Also, you argue that part of it was his outstanding legions, but how do you think those legions got to be so extraordinary? Caesar didn't inherit them in that condition, they BECAME that way over the course of his campaigns in Gaul. So during Caesar's early campaigns at least, he didn't have the quality of his legions to rely on.

I wouldn't write off Caesar's luck either - it wasn't just that he rolled the dice and won; Caesar gambled on himself, but the reason he always ended up winning (the exception being 3/15) was because he usually stacked the deck in his favor so to speak - he'd put forth every effort to gain every advantage so that when he did roll the dice, the odds were in his favor. -M

Agreed. He put half of those legions together himself when he ascended to the governorship and cleverly filled the ranks with recently Romanized Northern Italians that had no allegiance to Rome, only to him.

Good generals win some battles. Great generals win wars.

By that standard you would have to rate him higher than Hannibal, Napoleon and most of the other contenders... Alexander stands alone and is one of the few that holds up very well against his accomplishments.

There is that saying on the football field, "Don't give up the big one."....Caesar just didn't do that. In the end, very few can say that.

[Africanvs]

Agreed. He put half of those legions together himself when he ascended to the governorship and cleverly filled the ranks with recently Romanized Northern Italians that had no allegiance to Rome, only to him.

Good generals win some battles. Great generals win wars.

By that standard you would have to rate him higher than Hannibal, Napoleon and most of the other contenders... Alexander stands alone and is one of the few that holds up very well against his accomplishments.

There is that saying on the football field, "Don't give up the big one."....Caesar just didn't do that. In the end, very few can say that.

I respect Caesar as much as his biggest fan, but let's not get carried away here. Caesar knew how to get the most out of his men, but an innovator, he was not. When people say he inherited the army they mean that Caesar had access to the Marian reformed Roman legion. This was no conscripted army of levies; we're talking about a professional fighting force of men, many of them already veterans of several campaigns before Caesar took command. The fact is, he was very successful, and that in and of itself speaks volumes.

[Xtiaan72]

Well said... I certainly wasn't trying to come off as one of his biggest fans ( Although perhaps I did!).
I was just trying to make a reasonable argument that he is not over-rated!

Let's face it some of the things he did were.....not so nice to say the least ( genocide and political thuggery topping the list!). That is what tarnishes his legacy more than anything else inmo. I wouldn't take issue with anyone questioning his character but his success (as you said) is pretty hard to argue with.

Although, there is probably a case to made that a 'nice' guy could not have won a battle like Alesia. I'm not a fan of Caesar but as a figure he is very compelling and certainly complicated.

[Macilrille]

Two things:

1. Caesar was a man of his time, I have said it before; do not judge the past by today's standards.
2. Notice that I, a military historian, have not commented on this subject, it is a moot and redundant debate I am sorry to say. It would never pop up on for example H-War or a University.

If you push me for my opinion I would say Zhukov or Monty, or possibly even Rommel, Hannibal for ancients- for the same reason as Rommel, tactical genius, strategical blunderer.

That said, the discussion is still moot.

[Ludens]

First of all he had a poor plan for getting Roman allies to detatch. He wanted them to view him as a friend rather than an enemy, so he often promised no harm would come to them if they did not join him. This meant that if they stayed loyal to Rome, it was better than if they went over to Hannibal, and then Rome won, because Rome would come back and punish them.

That's a pretty bold statement to make. Slaughtering thousands of countryman, friends, family, colleagues tends to make people emotional, so it's not sure that it would have convinced the Italians to defect. Possibly, Hannibal's strategy was to show the Italians that he was not like Rome and would offer them better terms than the total submission required by the Senate. It didn't work as well as he hoped, but that doesn't mean the opposite would have worked better.

Another example of Hannibal's poor planning is his enourmous blunder of failing to properly use the battle of Cannae. He had just crushed the Roman army, leaving them practically defenseless; many of Rome's allies detatched, feeling that Rome was doomed; all Hannibal had to do was march on the city. He may not have thought he could take it, but just the presence of his army outside the city could have forced the Romans to terms.

I've argued against this idea before: Rome was slap-bang in the middle of enemy territory, Hannibal didn't have siege equipment and not enough men to invest the city. Leading his battered army (legendary victory or not, they would have taken a beating at Cannae) would have stretched his supply lines. With 20.000 survivors from Cannae, whom had refused to surrender, reforming in his rear, another 20.000 Romans coming from the north (they would be destroyed by Gauls pretty soon after, but Hannibal couldn't know that) and 10.000 new troops levied in Rome herself, it would be Hannibal's army that went hungry, not Rome. Yes, the Romans panicked. But they wouldn't have given up.

Also, remember that the Italian theatre was not the only part of Hannibal's strategy. Carthaginian armies were busy kicking the Romans out of Spain and Sicily as well. Hannibal's Italian campaign was at least partially intended to allow other Carthaginian commanders to strip away Rome's provinces. However, maybe because of Hannibal's success in Italy, the senate decided to send reinforcements to Spain. After all, they couldn't go on the offensive in Italy, so those troops would be more useful elsewhere.

[artaxerxes]

I've argued against this idea before: Rome was slap-bang in the middle of enemy territory, Hannibal didn't have siege equipment and not enough men to invest the city. Leading his battered army (legendary victory or not, they would have taken a beating at Cannae) would have stretched his supply lines. With 20.000 survivors from Cannae, whom had refused to surrender, reforming in his rear, another 20.000 Romans coming from the north (they would be destroyed by Gauls pretty soon after, but Hannibal couldn't know that) and 10.000 new troops levied in Rome herself, it would be Hannibal's army that went hungry, not Rome. Yes, the Romans panicked. But they wouldn't have given up.

Also, remember that the Italian theatre was not the only part of Hannibal's strategy. Carthaginian armies were busy kicking the Romans out of Spain and Sicily as well. Hannibal's Italian campaign was at least partially intended to allow other Carthaginian commanders to strip away Rome's provinces. However, maybe because of Hannibal's success in Italy, the senate decided to send reinforcements to Spain. After all, they couldn't go on the offensive in Italy, so those troops would be more useful elsewhere.

Hey, I've wondered about those things a lot of times. Very nice to get an explanation. Thank you! :D

[Mulceber]

but an innovator, he was not.

I wouldn't go that far - to my knowledge, his double-wall from Alesia had never been done before, and the tactic he used for routing Pompey's cavalry at Pharsalus (having his legionaries retreat and replacing them with auxilaries using their pila as spears) was pretty innovative. I agree that he didn't revolutionize battlefield tactics, but he had a couple of interesting innovations that helped him gain his victories. -M

[Africanvs]

That's a pretty bold statement to make. Slaughtering thousands of countryman, friends, family, colleagues tends to make people emotional, so it's not sure that it would have convinced the Italians to defect. Possibly, Hannibal's strategy was to show the Italians that he was not like Rome and would offer them better terms than the total submission required by the Senate. It didn't work as well as he hoped, but that doesn't mean the opposite would have worked better.

You make a great point here, and it is my opinion as well that that is what Hannibal was trying to do. Unfortunately, in war, a general doesn't get points for trying, and being a nice guy. The fact that it didn't work as well as he hoped, doesn't excuse the fact that it was an improper assessment and a failed plan.

I've argued against this idea before: Rome was slap-bang in the middle of enemy territory, Hannibal didn't have siege equipment and not enough men to invest the city. Leading his battered army (legendary victory or not, they would have taken a beating at Cannae) would have stretched his supply lines. With 20.000 survivors from Cannae, whom had refused to surrender, reforming in his rear, another 20.000 Romans coming from the north (they would be destroyed by Gauls pretty soon after, but Hannibal couldn't know that) and 10.000 new troops levied in Rome herself, it would be Hannibal's army that went hungry, not Rome. Yes, the Romans panicked. But they wouldn't have given up.

Also, remember that the Italian theatre was not the only part of Hannibal's strategy. Carthaginian armies were busy kicking the Romans out of Spain and Sicily as well. Hannibal's Italian campaign was at least partially intended to allow other Carthaginian commanders to strip away Rome's provinces. However, maybe because of Hannibal's success in Italy, the senate decided to send reinforcements to Spain. After all, they couldn't go on the offensive in Italy, so those troops would be more useful elsewhere.

I don't know. You make a good case but it's a little hard for me to believe that Hannibal was simply a decoy to help other generals take Rome's provinces. Also when talking about numbers, just because Rome has 20,000 here and 10,000 there doesn't mean much. You're talking about levies, many of them probably fresh recruits, or dishonered and disunited men in the case of the veterans of Cannae. Hannibal had a battle hardened army and had completely won the war of psychology. In any case, if it were me in Hannibals shoes, two things are for sure. 1) I would have felt like I just destroyed all the men in Rome after Cannae. If I'm not mistaken, Cannae was the biggest battle to have ever happened at that time, and the biggest loss of life in a single day on any ancient or modern battlefield. 2) I wouldn't have imagined that any nation could be that tenacious and resourceful.

Ultimately we cannot know why Hannibal did what he did. He may not have had a successful plan, but the kindness he showed to the Italian allies is at least proof that Carthagians weren't necessarily the barbarians they are often made out to be. His victories have stood the test of time and continue to be taught as tactics today, and many people regard him as one of the greatest generals in history. In any case, we have the value of examining him and his campaign from a safe distance. Who's to say what it looked like on the ground. A coward, he definitely wasn't.

[Ludens]

What we learned in history class in Norway at least was that generals squandered their men, because they weren't up to speed on how modern warfare was conducted. Sending massive formations of men against enemy lines could be good earlier, but with gatling guns it was waste of men.
Also add in documentaries, movies and perhaps the best "documentary" IMO, Black Adder Fourth Series. There were good generals yes, but the majority it seems (to my eyes) were still employing tactics from the previous century.
And for new tactics, there is the battle of Amiens where combined arms tactics were employed.

It's not true that the generals of the WWI didn't change their tactics, the changes just didn't work. They tried mass bombardments, they tried aerial attacks, they tried gas warfare: nothing was able to break the stalemate until the British introduced the tanks in 1917 and the Germans developed infiltration tactics in 1918. Yes, the military academies still taught 19th century tactics, but then no one had seen a war like this before.

That's not to say WWI leaders were good, but I doubt they were particularly more stupid than generals of other times. In the end, however, they were held collectively responsible for the failure of WWI, and that is probably the cause for their bad reputation nowadays.

You make a great point here, and it is my opinion as well that that is what Hannibal was trying to do. Unfortunately, in war, a general doesn't get points for trying, and being a nice guy. The fact that it didn't work as well as he hoped, doesn't excuse the fact that it was an improper assessment and a failed plan.

It certainly failed, but that is hindsight talking. Hannibal wanted to woo away the Italian cities from Rome, and decided that slaughtering Italian captives was not the way to do it. I can't find anything wrong with his assessment here.

You make a good case but it's a little hard for me to believe that Hannibal was simply a decoy to help other generals take Rome's provinces. Also when talking about numbers, just because Rome has 20,000 here and 10,000 there doesn't mean much. You're talking about levies, many of them probably fresh recruits, or dishonered and disunited men in the case of the veterans of Cannae. Hannibal had a battle hardened army and had completely won the war of psychology.

Fair points. However, I still think that Hannibal's campaign in Italy should be seen in the context of the greater war. Hannibal didn't win in Italy, but he didn't exactly lose either. It was the failure of Carthaginian armies in other theatres that allowed Rome to win the war.

As for attacking Rome, it's not a question of numbers but of supplies. Hannibal didn't have siege equipment, so a direct assault was out of the question. Without siege equipment, storming fortifications is a dicey proposition. The 10.000 Roman defenders also maybe levies, but there's nothing like defending your home to raise men's morale, so they would have given him quite a fight. Neither could Hannibal have invested Rome. It was in the middle of hostile territory, and those 20.000 survivors of Cannae plus the consular army from cisalpine Gaul would be more than enough to cut his supply lines. Like I wrote: it would Hannibal's army that went hungry, not Rome.