RUSI commissioned a report to ask two questions:
1. Is it still desirable and appropriate for the UK to wish to act as a Great Power?
2. If it is desirable to remain a Great Power, how can this be achieved?
Question #1 was satisfactorily answered with the following motives:
a) Thucydides wisdom – all nations seek power for reasons of fear, interest and honour
b) The Strategic Bargain – where we work with partners to ensure collective security
c) National Obligations – Uninterrupted access to economic recourse & Defence of the Realm
d) Military Aid to Civilian Authorities – a resource to resort to in times of natural disaster
Question #2 looked at the various options that can be taken in light of the failure of the SDR vision, and in recognition of the current financial situation which makes the SDR an unachievable dream.
a) The Global Guardian Doctrine – i.e. we maintain our ability to mount large scale theatre level operations out-of-area, examples of which would be Desert Storm and Afghanistan, including protracted COIN operations.
This is a Great Power Status
It meets motives a, b, part of c and d.
b) The Strategic Raiding Doctrine – i.e. we maintain our ability to mount medium scale assaults via amphibious/naval capability in conjunction with rapid-reaction/expeditionary forces, examples of which would be the Falklands Conflict and Sierra Leone.
This is a Great Power Status
It meets motives a, b, c, and d.
c) The Contributory Doctrine - i.e. we maintain a reduced military that whilst broadly capable, and able to contribute usefully to international operations, would lose any possibility for national autonomy for intervention operations, because we would be dependent on other nations for the capabilities it had surrendered. We would be in a similar position to Germany or Poland; able to provide brigade level combat units or specialist functions to multinational operations.
This is NOT a Great Power Status
It meets motives b and d, as well as part of c.
d) The Gendarmerie Doctrine - i.e. we lose all ambition to high intensity warfare outside of our own national borders, and capable only of providing light weight peace-keeping forces for multinational operations. We would be in a similar position to Belgium or Denmark.
This is NOT a Great Power Status
It meets motives d, as well as part of c.
e) The Little Britain Doctrine – We abandon all but home defence, we would remain in a similar position to Ireland.
This is NOT a Great Power Status
It meets motive d.
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