North Korea fires series of missiles

[Redleg]

Rory: One of the targets would be their artillery pieces on the boarder. I'm almost certain we can knock most of them out, minimizing the damage done.

This would be an incorrect assumption. The artillery systems in North Korea are confiqured into hard sites located in the mountains surrounding the DMZ. Many of these pieces would not be moved into firing postions until North Korea decides to attack - (which will minimize the time that the United States has to attempt to knock them out) or an active defense of their side of the DMZ is deemed necessary.

There is a large amount of mobile artillery that will have to be brought up - however the majority of the larger weapon systems that can range Souel are in place alreadly in the hard sites. These systems will have the majority of the WMD munitions alreadly in place prior to a determination to attack. There is a suspected rotation of WMD rounds also to keep an immediate ability to strike deep into South Korea to create choke points and mass havoc in case of a pre-emptive attack by South Korea or the United States.

In short no easy solution is available to knock out the multiple pieces of heavy artillery that are located in the hard sites along the DMZ. Last information that I had access to and was for general information was that their were over 500 known hard locations - with the possiblitily of others being created. The number of dummy locations is also hard to predict because the North Korean's have understood the threat to their artillery from US Air for some time.

(Now this is old information from the 1994-1999 timeframe - but I doubt that its changed muched.)

Chezi: I'm not saying let the local rebels/militia deal with it, I'm saying let the South Korean Army deal with it. There is a bit of a difference between letting the locals do the work and letting the neighboring, developing country's army do the work.

Why should the South Korean Forces attack into North Korea - they understand the threat to them far greater then we do in the United States. They practiced (1994-1995) all the time manning the defensive belts A and B. While the United States with its 2nd Division units were to man parts of Defensive line C to await reinforcing South Korean divisions from just south of Souel.

Now I must ask do you know how many avenues of attack exist from the South into North Korea. (I happen to know - its one less then the avenues of attack from South Korea into North Korea. The number is less then 4.)

[Ice]

This would be an incorrect assumption. The artillery systems in North Korea are confiqured into hard sites located in the mountains surrounding the DMZ. Many of these pieces would not be moved into firing postions until North Korea decides to attack - (which will minimize the time that the United States has to attempt to knock them out) or an active defense of their side of the DMZ is deemed necessary.

There is a large amount of mobile artillery that will have to be brought up - however the majority of the larger weapon systems that can range Souel are in place alreadly in the hard sites. These systems will have the majority of the WMD munitions alreadly in place prior to a determination to attack. There is a suspected rotation of WMD rounds also to keep an immediate ability to strike deep into South Korea to create choke points and mass havoc in case of a pre-emptive attack by South Korea or the United States.

In short no easy solution is available to knock out the multiple pieces of heavy artillery that are located in the hard sites along the DMZ. Last information that I had access to and was for general information was that their were over 500 known hard locations - with the possiblitily of others being created. The number of dummy locations is also hard to predict because the North Korean's have understood the threat to their artillery from US Air for some time.

(Now this is old information from the 1994-1999 timeframe - but I doubt that its changed muched.)



Why should the South Korean Forces attack into North Korea - they understand the threat to them far greater then we do in the United States. They practiced (1994-1995) all the time manning the defensive belts A and B. While the United States with its 2nd Division units were to man parts of Defensive line C to await reinforcing South Korean divisions from just south of Souel.

Now I must ask do you know how many avenues of attack exist from the South into North Korea. (I happen to know - its one less then the avenues of attack from South Korea into North Korea. The number is less then 4.)

Not going to attempt to argue with this. Solid facts, and good information. I stand correct. I still feel though, that North Korea isn't this supergiant most make it out to be.

[Aenlic]

Perhaps not, Ice; but Redleg nailed the details pretty well, from what I've been able to gather from reading. His knowledge is a bit more intimate militarily, I expect.

What we're forgetting here is that the U.S. is not really the threatened party. Yes, NK tested a TP-2; but the real threat is against South Korea and Japan. The TP-2 failed; but even if it had worked perfectly it still would only be a missile which might reach Alaska at best. Added to that is the fact that North Korea is unlikely to have a nuclear device capable of being put on top of a missile and launched successfully and then reach its target and still work. It took us a long time to figure out how to make that work; and that was with many of the world's best minds in nuclear arms and ballistic systems and a budget several orders of magnitude greater than that of North Korea's entire economy. We didn't get our first ICBM completely working until the Atlas in 1959. We had the bomb for 14 years prior to that. The real threat from North Korea would be some other delivery method which matches their current capabilities. A nuclear device in a cargo container, perhaps. For this we are woefully unprepared. But that's another argument altogether.

South Korea and Japan are the ones who are more rightly concerned. We won't do anything that will seriously endanger either one of those countries. If Japan or South Korea or both decide that the threat is too great to leave alone, then we'll act; but not until then. At this point it looks to me like South Korea, while worried, is still going with the idea that North Korea is close to failing internally; and they'll then pick up the pieces. I think Japan agrees substantively with this. So we're not in the driver's seat.

[Redleg]

Perhaps not, Ice; but Redleg nailed the details pretty well, from what I've been able to gather from reading. His knowledge is a bit more intimate militarily, I expect.

Its more complex then I wrote - that and I made a typo - For NK to attack South they have 3 main avenues of advance and 2 minor avenues. Read Major Avenue as one that will support Army and Corps level attacks, the minor avenues will support light Infantry Corps and Divisions.

South Korea is limited by the fact that the 1 minor avenue and 1 Major Avenue of Attack close down just north of the DMZ - merging into other avenues. Can you image the confusion of two different attacks merging into one avenue while fighting against a well entrenched enemy. Not a battle I would want to fight in.

Now South Korea does have some Airborne and Seaborne options to play - along with the United States - but one also must remember that NK learned many lessons during the 1950-1953 hot phase of the war.

What we're forgetting here is that the U.S. is not really the threatened party. Yes, NK tested a TP-2; but the real threat is against South Korea and Japan. The TP-2 failed; but even if it had worked perfectly it still would only be a missile which might reach Alaska at best. Added to that is the fact that North Korea is unlikely to have a nuclear device capable of being put on top of a missile and launched successfully and then reach its target and still work. It took us a long time to figure out how to make that work; and that was with many of the world's best minds in nuclear arms and ballistic systems and a budget several orders of magnitude greater than that of North Korea's entire economy. We didn't get our first ICBM completely working until the Atlas in 1959. We had the bomb for 14 years prior to that. The real threat from North Korea would be some other delivery method which matches their current capabilities. A nuclear device in a cargo container, perhaps. For this we are woefully unprepared. But that's another argument altogether.

Pretty much sums up why I believe that the testing was done for political purposes. I suspect a new round of talks will happen soon with North Korea getting some key concessions to keep their economy afloat. This actually plays into South Korea's hand because everytime that these concessions happen major movement of material crosses the border between the two nations. While North Korea uses a lot of propaganda to keep their people controled - the South Korean government is also pretty good at getting their own propaganda into North Korea. The more movement of material into the North the greater the information flow into North Korea.

South Korea and Japan are the ones who are more rightly concerned. We won't do anything that will seriously endanger either one of those countries. If Japan or South Korea or both decide that the threat is too great to leave alone, then we'll act; but not until then. At this point it looks to me like South Korea, while worried, is still going with the idea that North Korea is close to failing internally; and they'll then pick up the pieces. I think Japan agrees substantively with this. So we're not in the driver's seat.

This sums up my opinion fairily close - just add China's influence has to be considered and given for any postive steps to happen regarding the current North Korean Regime. This is why North Korea does not like the 6 party talks. Its one thing to ingore and discredit the American's - but to ignore the Chinese causes more hardships for the North Korean Regime then they normally want to have to deal with.

[Divinus Arma]

An Old Seargent Major of mine once told me of South Korean discipline. He was doing some training with the ROK Marines and was with a commander. Two young troops were brought in and asked, essentially, if they had fallen asleep on post.

They said yes. And were executed by pistol almost immediately.

Not sure of the truth of this, but it wouldn't surprise me.

[Redleg]

For those interested the de-classified portions of OPPLAN 5027 can be found here. Its a suggested reading for anyone that thinks that North Korea is an easy fight. It will also help some understand why the United States does not want to actually fight a conflict again in Korea.


http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...oplan-5027.htm


I would suggest reading several of the links in the document. It discusses the most probable course of action for a North Korean attack. Gives the base assumptions for a successful South Korean Defense. And some other useful information.

The plan is dated and unclassified now - but will it give a decent picture of the scenerio of a resumption of hostitiles for the reader.



Avenues of Approach


http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...map-avenue.gif

[caravel]

Redleg is right, many people, especially the misinformed media have dubbed Iraq as the US's "next vietnam". In reality North Korea would be their next vietnam, though 1000 times worse. I don't blame them for not going in there, only a complete loon would. In the end NK will rot itself from the inside out like any other supposed "communist" oppressive regime.

[Banquo's Ghost]

Redleg, thank you for the links and information. Most useful.

[Redleg]

Your welcome.

[Spino]

Calling North Korea the 'next Vietnam' is ludicrous. Vietnam was a slow, painful bleeding process deliberately fostered by the Johnson administration which was adamant in its refusal to fully commit the US military to the task of winning the war. When the Nixon administration eventually unleashed the full might of US air power against North Vietnam the effects were positively devastating and were single handedly responsible for bringing the North Vietnamese government to the peace table. Unfortunately by then war was politically unwinnable. Comparatively speaking the 'bleeding process' in Iraq has been far less costly and the overall results of our campaign have proven much more successful than was the case in Vietnam.

People really need to define what in blazes 'the next Vietnam' means before throwing that term around. Sure, if forced to draw a comparison the situation in Iraq might make a better comparison than a potential conflict in Korea. In Vietnam we took the initiative to ensure that the South remained 'democratic' or rather devoid of Communism. In Iraq we took the initiative to throw Saddam Hussein out of power and replace him with a democratically elected government (hey, I'm no neo-con and admit it was a geo-political move to effectively neuter and make an example of one of the most dangerous and powerful regimes in the world). If we were to fight a large conventional war in Korea we would be defending an existing, stable democracy which also happens to be a staunch ally and trade partner, hardly a similar situation to either Vietnam or Iraq. And you can bet world opinion would be firmly on our side with respect to our participation in another Korean war too (rabid anti-American lefties excepted of course).

People keep overlooking the ROK military every time there is a discussion of a possible invasion by North Korean forces. The ROK is not only as fearsome as their reputation which precedes them but their training, tactics & technology are firmly up to date. ROK forces would also be defending their homes against an invader whose true colors and intentions are well known and despised, thus increasing their ferocity and determination to put up an even stiffer resistance. True, if North Korea decided to invade South Korea the initial shock of its assault would certainly be great but the forces they would be up against now possess a considerable qualitative, technological & command/control advantage, much moreso than the gap that existed between the two sides back in the 50s. Once the initial shock subsided North Korean forces would experience jaw droppingly horrendous casualties, especially once Allied air & missile strikes came into play and began operating 24/7. Wrap your mind around the potential casualties inflicted by area affect weapons such as clusterbombs & fuel air explosive weapons on large troop concentrations, weapons which were not around in the last Korean conflict. I don't care how many gun tubes North Korea has at its disposal, how effectively it uses those guns is my concern. And given that North Korea's military is based on a Soviet/Chinese model I'm fairly confident its overall efficiency with such weapons is questionable. Once air superiority is established the real nightmare would begin for NK troops as B-1s & B-52s would be sent in loaded for bear with precision guided munitions or dumb bombs for carpet bombing.

Furthermore regardless of the size and strength of US ground forces in the region in a matter of days every single target of military or economic worth in the North could and would be hit by Allied guided missile & stealth strikes launched from bases in South Korean, Japan and from naval assets in the region, effectively crippling North Korea's means to support its troops (and its population).

As to North Korea's navy... flotsam & jetsam.

There's much more to conflict resolution than head counts and the number of gun tubes available. And the evolution of modern land forces has simply paled in comparison to the progress made in air power and guided munitions technology. While the roles of these assets haven't changed much since WWII the fact that a single plane or precision guided munition can now be relied upon to do the job of what used to require an entire formation of heavy bombers speaks volumes as to how these assets can affect the outcome of a conflict (not to mention their cost effectiveness). For all its artillery & manpower North Korea simply has nothing in its arsenal that can comes close to what the US can put into the air and onto a target.

[Redleg]

Calling North Korea the 'next Vietnam' is ludicrous. Vietnam was a slow, painful bleeding process deliberately fostered by the Johnson administration which was adamant in its refusal to fully commit the US military to the task of winning the war. When the Nixon administration eventually unleashed the full might of US air power against North Vietnam the effects were positively devastating and were single handedly responsible for bringing the North Vietnamese government to the peace table. Unfortunately by then war was politically unwinnable. Comparatively speaking the 'bleeding process' in Iraq has been far less costly and the overall results of our campaign have proven much more successful than was the case in Vietnam.

People really need to define what in blazes 'the next Vietnam' means before throwing that term around. Sure, if forced to draw a comparison the situation in Iraq might make a better comparison than a potential conflict in Korea. In Vietnam we took the initiative to ensure that the South remained 'democratic' or rather devoid of Communism. In Iraq we took the initiative to throw Saddam Hussein out of power and replace him with a democratically elected government (hey, I'm no neo-con and admit it was a geo-political move to effectively neuter and make an example of one of the most dangerous and powerful regimes in the world). If we were to fight a large conventional war in Korea we would be defending an existing, stable democracy which also happens to be a staunch ally and trade partner, hardly a similar situation to either Vietnam or Iraq. And you can bet world opinion would be firmly on our side with respect to our participation in another Korean war too (rabid anti-American lefties excepted of course).

Just in case people miss the main point of the first two paragraphs. The key is the whole OPPLAN for South Korea is based upon a defensive strategy not an offensive one.

People keep overlooking the ROK military every time there is a discussion of a possible invasion by North Korean forces. The ROK is not only as fearsome as their reputation which precedes them but their training, tactics & technology are firmly up to date. ROK forces would also be defending their homes against an invader whose true colors and intentions are well known and despised, thus increasing their ferocity and determination to put up an even stiffer resistance. True, if North Korea decided to invade South Korea the initial shock of its assault would certainly be great but the forces they would be up against now possess a considerable qualitative, technological & command/control advantage, much moreso than the gap that existed between the two sides back in the 50s. Once the initial shock subsided North Korean forces would experience jaw droppingly horrendous casualties, especially once Allied air & missile strikes came into play and began operating 24/7. Wrap your mind around the potential casualties inflicted by area affect weapons such as clusterbombs & fuel air explosive weapons on large troop concentrations, weapons which were not around in the last Korean conflict. I don't care how many gun tubes North Korea has at its disposal, how effectively it uses those guns is my concern. And given that North Korea's military is based on a Soviet/Chinese model I'm fairly confident its overall efficiency with such weapons is questionable. Once air superiority is established the real nightmare would begin for NK troops as B-1s & B-52s would be sent in loaded for bear with precision guided munitions or dumb bombs for carpet bombing.

Furthermore regardless of the size and strength of US ground forces in the region in a matter of days every single target of military or economic worth in the North could and would be hit by Allied guided missile & stealth strikes launched from bases in South Korean, Japan and from naval assets in the region, effectively crippling North Korea's means to support its troops (and its population).

This is correct based upon the current strategy in defending South Korea from a North Korean attack.

There's much more to conflict resolution than head counts and the number of gun tubes available. And the evolution of modern land forces has simply paled in comparison to the progress made in air power and guided munitions technology. While the roles of these assets haven't changed much since WWII the fact that a single plane or precision guided munition can now be relied upon to do the job of what used to require an entire formation of heavy bombers speaks volumes as to how these assets can affect the outcome of a conflict (not to mention their cost effectiveness). For all its artillery & manpower North Korea simply has nothing in its arsenal that can comes close to what the US can put into the air and onto a target.

What people need to focus on is not troop numbers but relative combat power. Then look at what ratios are involved between defense and offense force. To insure operational success the recommended attack to defend combat power ratio is 3:1. Frankly the combat power in South Korea is geared toward forcing North Korea not to attack - without upsetting the combat ration balance.

Don't sell the North Korean's short - when they attack they will have 2 to 3 days before the United States can move enough resources to defeat North Korea in total. This is what both Korea's understand. South Korea has enough force structure to indeed delay and maybe even halt a North Korean Attack vicinity Defensive Line Bravo.

If North Korea gets to the Han River and into Seoul within 2 days all the American Airpower coming to bear in a matter of days is for naught.

The stratgety for South Korea since the 1970's has been one of defense.