Patton pushes on (what if)

[Fisherking]

Had Patton prevailed upon Eisenhower, Marshal, and Churchill to see Stalin’s Soviet Union as a dire threat to Western Society, what would have been the ramifications of such a war? Who would have prevailed? And why do you think so?


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My opinion is that while it would have been anything but an easy win, had the British Commonwealth and the United States, along with other Allied nations with a vested interest, pursued that course they could eventually have prevailed.

While the Soviet empire possessed vast recourses it lacked in infrastructure. The Allied nations possessed strategic advantage in Naval Forces, Air Forces, & Logistics. The Soviets held a technical edge in armor but one which was dwindling.

At the close of WWII the American invasion of Japan was scheduled to commence on 1 Nov. 1945
The invasion force was the largest ever assembled and all tolled was made up of 39 US Divisions. It does not take a huge leap of faith to see that these could have been used to invade the Soviet mainland in the Far East.

The Chinese Civil War was on hold during WWII, to a large extent due to the lack of supplies coming from the Soviet Union. China had had the resistance on the run before the war and had a vested interest in seeing the Soviets weakened or destroyed.

By the Autumn of 1945 it should have been painfully obvious that relations with the Soviet were never going to be what was envisioned by FDR in the mid war years, and that the Western Democracies were going to have to resist in some fashion. Had they had the stomach for a longer war, I believe they would have prevailed.

[Flavius Clemens]

I'm no expert on the era, but a few questions spring to mind.

a) Was Britain in a state - materially and in morale - to keep fighting, or had six years of war left everyone more than ready for peace?
b) Given the state Germany was in, especially its infrastructure, would running supply lines across it have been easy?
c) Would the independence movements in the British Empire - particularly India - have been willing to wait while a renewed European war was conducted?
d) Would the communist movements in Western Europe have been an effective resistance?

[Pannonian]

As I said in the TWC discussion, the Allied troops would not have been in any mood to fight against their erstwhile allies, certainly if they initiated the war. Unless the Soviets very clearly were the aggressors, and they were in no fit state to try anything against the Allies, the most likely result would be a refusal of Allied troops to fight, perhaps mutiny, and revolts or at least protests at home perhaps bringing in new governments. The RAF mutiny of 1946 showed just how fed up the British were of war, and that was just a delay in demobilisation so as to keep them around for colonial policing duties. If the troops were actually told to push on against the Soviets, the mutiny might have started earleir and been more widespread.

[Sarmatian]

Pretty much what Pannonian said. Britain was in best "shape" in Europe at the time. In countries like France or Italy, there would have been even less support for the attack on the Soviets and I think it would in general strengthen communist movements around Europe. It wouldn't be any more pleasant for the Soviets if they were the aggressor.

Invasion of Japan, devoid of anything but a will to resist (and even that was dwindling), and invasion of Soviet Pacific coast are two totally different things - mounting an invasion that needs to be resupplied from thousands of km away, against a country with strong air force and army, on a coast that is frozen most of the year etc etc... is impossible, plain and simple.

During the civil war, there was no China. The civil war was about what would China become. Animosity between SU and China that would appear later certainly doesn't mean that Chinese communists become allies of the West instead of their fellow communists, especially when West is waging war on SU just because they are communists. In fact, I hardly think that West would even try to support communists in China as the only reason for starting the war would be to get rid of communists. They would naturally offer support to those fighting the communists.

When people think that it would be sure, albeit with heavy losses, win for the West, they are not thinking about situation in 1945. They're thinking about a generic NATO vs Warsaw Pact conflict. The situation in 1945 was very different than in, let's say, 60's or 70's. War weariness was unbelievably high, no one had the desire to fight another war, especially aggressive war against someone who's been their ally. Not to mention that, save Britain and Spain, no country in Europe had an army and none but a few European countries had a functioning economy. The attack on SU would most probably backfire and very possibly bring communist in power in more European countries. Let's not forget that right after the war Soviets, and communism in general, didn't have such a bad rep that they would acquire later, and the notion that they have done more than fair share of fighting against Hitler was very much alive...

So, it's all nice talking about who had superior tanks or planes but it isn't important. Economic, political and social aspects are much more important to consider here...

I still think that due to so many variables it is impossible to predict what would happen, but if I had to pick, I'd say the Allied attack on the Soviets would have been disastrous for the West.

[Tribesman]

At the close of WWII the American invasion of Japan was scheduled to commence on 1 Nov. 1945
The invasion force was the largest ever assembled and all tolled was made up of 39 US Divisions. It does not take a huge leap of faith to see that these could have been used to invade the Soviet mainland in the Far East.

Yes , if you re-equip them and retrain them then putting 39 divisions into the vast wastes of Siberia in winter is a great idea .

[Meneldil]

An attack against the SU in 1945 would have meant a communist revolution in France and Italy.

Since the Brits were not in a great shape as well, it would basically have meant a war between the US and SU (+ various communist armed forces).

Then again, I don't know what it would have taken for the US to build a few more A-Bombs and to toast Russia.

[PanzerJaeger]

Subtracting nuclear weapons from the equation (because I just don't think they're very sporting), Patton and the 'Allies' - or what was left of them - would have been sliced, diced, and completely pushed out of Western Europe due to the reasons I mentioned in the earlier thread.

The big Allied advantages listed were:
a-Air Power, specifically strategic assets
b-Naval Power
c-Pacific Divisions

To those I would respond...

a) First of all, air power during WW2 is portrayed as far more influential than it actually was. Look at the numbers..

The Allied bombing campaigns against Germany were as 'successful' as they were because Germany simply could not field enough fighters to turn away the air fleets and German industry was fairly dense. On the other hand, Russia had a very large air force by the end of the war, with powerful and sophisticated designs, and experienced pilots. Russian industry was also spread out far more than that of Germany.

Had the American bombers made it through the far more numerically competent Russian fighter screens, fuel and payload restrictions would have made their damage far less meaningful. Also, by '45, the Germans had become very effective at moving their industrial capacity underground, a tactic which would have certainly been copied by the Soviets.

Just like paratroops, I think strategic bombing would have become cost ineffective. Russian cities were already bombed out and the industry gone...


b) Naval power is important, but not exceedingly so during a European continental war. Surely it would have kept America from being invaded, but such a scenario would have likely not happened anyway. Unlike Germany circa 1918, Russia had far more resources from which to draw upon, so a naval embargo would not have had as much of an effect. The war would be decided in Western Europe, so not much role for the Allied navies.

Of course it would afford the Allies with some invasion options, but the Red Army had enough divisions to keep those bases covered, leading to the next point...


c) The Russians also had a large Army on that side of the world. It had no problems decimating the Japanese in Manchukuo.


Finally, I just don't think the Allied soldiers were up to the task. Despite the hero worship they receive in modern culture, they just weren't that good. Brave? Sure. Skilled? Eh... They had terrible difficulties with relatively weak and under strength German (and Italian :beam:) armies, and their leadership was piss-poor. I've never been quite able to figure out why Patton is lauded the way he is, other than the fact that he was the only Allied commander of rank who had an accurate sense of modern armoured strategy and tactics, had any personality, and wasn't a complete screw up (Monty anyone?). There are literally dozens of Russian commanders who eclipsed his performance during the war.

Conversely, the Red Army fought the finest divisions of the best military around at the time and prevailed. The knowledge, skill, tenacity, and willingness to take casualties these fights instilled in the Russians are incomparable to the Allied experience. The Eastern Front was a far tougher affair, and bred far tougher soldiers.


(BTW, Korea is worth comparing to this scenario for obvious reasons... )

[CBR]

One morning in the sombre atmosphere of the Cabinet War rooms, Churchill ordered his staff to "think the unthinkable". The result was Operation Unthinkable: a putative attack on Russia by a British and American army. Churchill's War Cabinet staff officers set to work.

Too long to quote all here I think. Not sure if they had correct information on the Soviet army but their conclusion was not to do it.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1998/10/01/nwar101.html


CBR

[Cambyses]

Well that report pretty much ends the argument I would think. A short war with limited tactical objectives might be winnable but an sort of WW III would have been a disaster.

For me the only way the western allies would have won is by mobilising the whole world against the Russians - which would have been very hard to do in the circumstances.

Equally its hard to see how the Russians could have won a worldwide war if they had been the agressors and had so many consequently opposed to them.

My conclusion is that whoever had attacked would have lost.

[Brenus]

It would have been a disaster for the Allies.
Imagine asking the French soldiers, Italian, all Continental Europe soldiers to forget and forgive their burned villages, raped women, deported and slaughtered population and now fight alongside the SS against the Heroes of Stalingrad…
As mentioned, if the Allies would have been the aggressors, the Communists in all country would have at minimum sabotage all war effort as they did during the Indochina war in France…
In 1945, France started the Indochina war. De-colonisation was on.
The soldiers were tired of war and wouldn’t understand why to fight former allies. We are not any more in the 16th Century when shifting alliances was possible by the King’s will.

In pure military aspect:
The JS1 & 2 would have pulverised the Patton and other Comet. The Soviet had as well their own jet fighter, as it was revelled a later one in Korea (Mig 15 every one) better than their western equivalent and absolutely independent from the Me 262 design. We know now they started their experiment in the 40’s.
In term of military might I would agree with Panzer. The Soviet fought against full SS Corps (Budapest) and won. Not against Wolkstrum and 2nd or 3rd rank divisions.
Naval superiority against USSR would have been a waste of money.
Division from the Pacific front: So at what date do you want to attack: After the Japanese capitulation? Guys, we won this war and let start this one?
If before what would happen with the soviet Forces which attacked the Japanese in China Manchuria.
I can imagine the Soviet Air Force attacking the B29 over Japon…:beam:

[Kralizec]

It would most likely have been disastrous. The only way I can see the Allies winning would be if they managed to drop nuclear bombs on many of the Soviets' population centres. The USA managed to do this to Japan because they had near-total air superiority by the time, but the Soviet air force would be likely to intercept incoming bombers.

Public opinion wouldn't approve of backstabbing an ally that way, and nor would they like the prospect of another war with additional millions of casualties.


Just like paratroops, I think strategic bombing would have become cost ineffective. Russian cities were already bombed out and the industry gone...

Paratroops were considered cost-ineffective? I recall reading once that Hitler discontinued the use of paratroops after a particulary bad experience with them due to misuse (in Malta, I think) but that some speculate that they could have been of great use on the eastern front, especially in the early months.

[Sarmatian]

While we're at it, maybe some of you more military inclined guys could tell me - would it be practically possible for Americans to drop nuclear bombs on Russia in 1945 (and several subsequent years)?

From what I've been able to get, atomic bombs were still very bulky, heavy, crude and demanded total air superiority to be dropped efficiently. In case of bombing Russia, bombers would have to fly from West Germany or France across several thousands km evading Russian fighters and AA guns to get to Russian population centers. It would have been probably been possible to drop it on Russian army in Germany and Poland, but that would likely turn the population of those countries against the Allies. Rocketry technology still wasn't advanced enough to mount nuclear bombs on rockets. Also, how safe were the bombs? If a bomber flies from France and is taken down over Germany, is there a chance that the bomb would explode? It seems to me that technology still wasn't advanced enough at that time to be effectively used against Russia. Am I right here?

[Vladimir]

It would have been a disaster for the Soviets.
Imagine asking the Polish soldiers, German, all Continental Europe soldiers to forget and forgive their burned villages, raped women, deported and slaughtered population and now fight alongside the SMERSH against the butchering dictator that was Stalin…

A bit choppy but you get the point. You are right though. It would depend on whomever was perceived as the aggressor. Nukes could have won the military battle for the New Allies but I believe we used the only two we had at the time on Japan.

[Pannonian]

Vladimir, you forget that Stalin wasn't a butchering dictator, but Uncle Joe who led the brave Russians against the evil Germans. Unlike 1984, the Allies' population wouldn't be able to stomach fighting with the brave Germans against the evil Russians, whom we've always been at war with. Not without clearcut evidence that the Russians started it, anyway.

[PanzerJaeger]

Paratroops were considered cost-ineffective? I recall reading once that Hitler discontinued the use of paratroops after a particulary bad experience with them due to misuse (in Malta, I think) but that some speculate that they could have been of great use on the eastern front, especially in the early months.


Crete is where the Fallschirmjager were grounded. Some of Germany's finest troops were cut down by relatively weak defenders because in many cases they could not reach their weapons, which were dropped separately. Even though they eventually prevailed - which is a story in itself - Hitler was appalled.

Conversely, it took the Allies a bit longer to realize the diminishing effectiveness paratroopers had on the battlefield as the war became increasingly mobile. D-Day did not go well at all. Troops were scattered all over the place and their tactical effectiveness was limited. However, being the Allies elite troops and having fought extremely well vindicated their use to Allied leadership.

It took Monty's masterwork, Market Garden, to truly put an end to Allied paratroop operations. It demonstrated how incredibly vulnerable paratroops were to a mobile response. The early German successes with paratroops were won in a time when war was a much slower affair against nations that did not have mobile reserves. If forced, the Fallschirmjager could hold out for a relatively long time against an enemy with very few armoured resources.

That unmitigated disaster put an end to Allied plans to jump behind the Siegfried line and into Germany. Even today, although the US and other nations maintain paratroops, it is widely acknowledged that - aside from Special Forces ops - their tactical effectiveness is highly limited and that large scale jumps all but off the table.

Jump school is more of a way to filter out all but the most highly motivated soldiers to create elite divisions. Witness the use of the 101st and 82nd Airborne in the toughest areas of Afghanistan. This was true in the latter part of WW2 as well, with both German and Allied paratroops going on to become some of the best light infantry available to their commanders.

[Tribesman]

It took Monty's masterwork, Market Garden, to truly put an end to Allied paratroop operations.
What was operation Varsity then ?
Wasn't Airborne divisions being sent to the far east for more Allied paratroop operations .

Crete is where the Fallschirmjager were grounded.
That was where intelligence screwed up like at Arnhem and the paratroops landed in what they thought was a safe area only to find it was full of ground troops , and like arnhem the relief column was a pipe dream that couldn't make it in time .

[Vladimir]

Vladimir, you forget that Stalin wasn't a butchering dictator, but Uncle Joe who led the brave Russians against the evil Germans. Unlike 1984, the Allies' population wouldn't be able to stomach fighting with the brave Germans against the evil Russians, whom we've always been at war with. Not without clearcut evidence that the Russians started it, anyway.

Oops, you're right (http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=618F88EF-5463-4195-A112-9B6B453652C6).


Jump school is more of a way to filter out all but the most highly motivated soldiers to create elite divisions. Witness the use of the 101st and 82nd Airborne in the toughest areas of Afghanistan. This was true in the latter part of WW2 as well, with both German and Allied paratroops going on to become some of the best light infantry available to their commanders.

The 82nd had it's wings clipped.

[PanzerJaeger]

What was operation Varsity then ?
Wasn't Airborne divisions being sent to the far east for more Allied paratroop operations .

Yes, you are correct. Poor wording on my part. I should have said meaningful paratroop operations. :shame:

I excluded Varsity from the operations conducted prior to the Normandy invasion and Market Garden because there was no chance of failure. Conducted in what.. March '45... it was more about grandstanding than any kind of operational advantages. Although IIRC it too demonstrated how vulnerable paratroops had become with higher than anticipated casualties, despite the result never being in doubt. Market Garden scuttled some more ambitious plans to use paratroops behind the Siegfried line, which would have actually been an effective yet risky endeavor. It has been documented that Ike and his commanders had turned against airborne operations when they involved a chance of failure.



The 82nd had it's wings clipped.

Man I am behind! Didn't they do a tiny jump in Afghanistan or something?

[Seamus Fermanagh]

While we're at it, maybe some of you more military inclined guys could tell me - would it be practically possible for Americans to drop nuclear bombs on Russia in 1945 (and several subsequent years)?

From what I've been able to get, atomic bombs were still very bulky, heavy, crude and demanded total air superiority to be dropped efficiently. In case of bombing Russia, bombers would have to fly from West Germany or France across several thousands km evading Russian fighters and AA guns to get to Russian population centers. It would have been probably been possible to drop it on Russian army in Germany and Poland, but that would likely turn the population of those countries against the Allies. Rocketry technology still wasn't advanced enough to mount nuclear bombs on rockets. Also, how safe were the bombs? If a bomber flies from France and is taken down over Germany, is there a chance that the bomb would explode? It seems to me that technology still wasn't advanced enough at that time to be effectively used against Russia. Am I right here?

The atomic bombs were "dumb" bombs using standard gravity drop for deployment. They were delivered to their target area by B-29 "superfortresses." These bombers had a combat range of more than 5,000 km (standard there-and-back sortie). They had good speed (topping 350mph unloaded)and a service ceiling in excess of 10km. Thus, the B-29 could have delivered the atomic bomb to the USSR, penetrating past Moscow from bases in occupied Germany (and possibly reaching some of the Ural factories?). Soviet fighters would have been hard-pressed to stop them, at least at first, since most of their fighters did not operate at their best at such altitudes and Soviet air doctrine emphasized the low-level and the tactical. How rapidly the Yak's could have been re-worked or new designs deployed as a counter is questionable. We would have been capable of producing roughly 1 a-bomb a month From October 1945 through the end of 1946 (and possibly more as they got better at generating fissionable material).

The early a-weapons might be triggered accidently by impact, so they were armed in flight. Prior to arming, any aircraft shot down or brought down by an accident could do no more than scatter some radioactive material over a fairly small area. Once armed however.....

[Brenus]

“I should have said meaningful paratroop operations”: That is if you speak only about the WW2.
In Indochina, the French used paratroopers in major combat operation and brake at least two major Vietminh offensives in dropping troops in the rear of the enemy even if the last one was a drop to far: Nghia-Là, Bac-Kan, Laos, That-Khé, la R.C. 4, Phu-Doan, HoaBinh, Na-San, Lang-Son and Dien-Bien-Phu.

Now, Helicopters will do the job.

[Sarmatian]

The atomic bombs were "dumb" bombs using standard gravity drop for deployment. They were delivered to their target area by B-29 "superfortresses." These bombers had a combat range of more than 5,000 km (standard there-and-back sortie). They had good speed (topping 350mph unloaded)and a service ceiling in excess of 10km. Thus, the B-29 could have delivered the atomic bomb to the USSR, penetrating past Moscow from bases in occupied Germany (and possibly reaching some of the Ural factories?). Soviet fighters would have been hard-pressed to stop them, at least at first, since most of their fighters did not operate at their best at such altitudes and Soviet air doctrine emphasized the low-level and the tactical. How rapidly the Yak's could have been re-worked or new designs deployed as a counter is questionable. We would have been capable of producing roughly 1 a-bomb a month From October 1945 through the end of 1946 (and possibly more as they got better at generating fissionable material).

The early a-weapons might be triggered accidently by impact, so they were armed in flight. Prior to arming, any aircraft shot down or brought down by an accident could do no more than scatter some radioactive material over a fairly small area. Once armed however.....

Thanks. Basically, it could have been used effectively. 5000 km range is quite enough to reach the Urals from Germany, even from France and Britain... How politically convenient it would be because of relative proximity of other current/potential allies, that's another issue.

Would the weight of the bomb (4-5 tons) have any effect on maneuvering/altitude/range of a B-29? I vaguely remember a documentary saying that getting off the ground was extremely tricky for pilots carrying the bomb dropped on Hiroshima because of the weight, but I somehow doubt that a B-29 would have troubles with 4-5 tons of weight...

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Thanks. Basically, it could have been used effectively. 5000 km range is quite enough to reach the Urals from Germany, even from France and Britain... How politically convenient it would be because of relative proximity of other current/potential allies, that's another issue.

Would the weight of the bomb (4-5 tons) have any effect on maneuvering/altitude/range of a B-29? I vaguely remember a documentary saying that getting off the ground was extremely tricky for pilots carrying the bomb dropped on Hiroshima because of the weight, but I somehow doubt that a B-29 would have troubles with 4-5 tons of weight...

The B-29s "achilles heel" was a tendency for engine overheating. This would cause it to lose an engine (feathered and shut down to prevent fire) every so often. At altitude the sucker could fly on 2 engines. However, if loaded near its full gross (bombs fuel etc.) and it lost an engine on takeoff, there was a pretty good chance it would crash/crash land.

However, with all 4 engines healthy, it could take its normal bombload (9,000kg) up to 10,000m+ (unloaded it could be nursed to 12,000 m), cruise at 360kph and crank it to 500+ kph at need. Total operational weight is always a product of fuel needed, bombload desired, and distance to/speed to target. A 29 could haul 20,000kg of bombs on shorter trips with diminished speed and agility.

The problem with the early a-weapons was their bulk rather than their total weight. The 29 was the only plane in the inventory with a bomb-bay big enough to deploy the "Fat Man."

[Uesugi Kenshin]

The B-29s "achilles heel" was a tendency for engine overheating. This would cause it to lose an engine (feathered and shut down to prevent fire) every so often. At altitude the sucker could fly on 2 engines. However, if loaded near its full gross (bombs fuel etc.) and it lost an engine on takeoff, there was a pretty good chance it would crash/crash land.

However, with all 4 engines healthy, it could take its normal bombload (9,000kg) up to 10,000m+ (unloaded it could be nursed to 12,000 m), cruise at 360kph and crank it to 500+ kph at need. Total operational weight is always a product of fuel needed, bombload desired, and distance to/speed to target. A 29 could haul 20,000kg of bombs on shorter trips with diminished speed and agility.

The problem with the early a-weapons was their bulk rather than their total weight. The 29 was the only plane in the inventory with a bomb-bay big enough to deploy the "Fat Man."

Weren't the engine problems largely taken care of by the end of WWII though?

[Brenus]

To drop bomb on Japan the US had to secure Air Supremacy. Would had succeed to do so against USSR? Then would have been enough to secure a victory? I can’t see the Russian population rebelling against the Soviets because the West attacks them and nuke them? I would imagine a very hard feeling and revenge desire…

[Fisherking]

Remember that those who do not remember history are doomed to repeat it.

By 1946 it was already apparent that the cold war was begun.

In 1945 the allies already had cause to go to war with Stalin, it was more a matter of downplaying the reasons and covering up more than a few that delayed the initial confrontation which happened in Korea in 1950.

A few reasons for going to war: The pledge to Poland of an elected government. The internment of allied troops in Soviet occupied areas. Installation of Communist Governments in other occupied nations. And the disposition of the Baltic States.

It is easy to see how any and all of these could have been whipped up into a furor and lending some tactical objectives for the attack as well. It would not be the west seen as betraying an ally, the Soviets had already seen to that but were gambling that the west would do just what they did.

You will take note of the second reason. This set the stage for what was to fallow in Korea and Vietnam. Most of these men were never repatriated. Most were air crews and ground support personnel from the Shuttle Bombing missions against Germany.

The technical edge the Soviets possessed in armor would be no surprise to allied troops. Germany held a substantial edge against both the west and the Soviets but it did not insure their victory.

Soviet airpower was no where as strong as some of you have stated. If it were then how was the JU87 and the Bf 109 able to operate successfully against them until the end of the war?

Churchill's plan for Third World War against Stalin is a very pessimistic portrayal of the situation. All of Russia‘s military might at the time was in Europe. The forces that later invaded Manchuria were drawn from there.

It would not have been a walk in the park, and a quick victory was only a pipe dream. It may have proved totally ruinous to both sides but if victory could have been claimed by a combatant, it would have been in the end the Western alliance that prevailed. It may have even come to using the Nuclear option, more than just the threat of it.

The major factor in allied victory would have been Air Power, specifically Tactical Air Power. The role of Strategic Air Power is continually over stated and colored most aspects of the cold war. But the allied tactical air forces of the day were the real power on the battlefield. They disrupted supply, broke up formations and made an enemy‘s ability to resist problematic.

Soviet Logistics were also a serious weakness. Their supply and maintenance structures were extremely inefficient. To a great extent they attempted to live off the land using captured supplies. It doesn‘t work too well on the defensive with air interdiction.

The Soviets obviously doubted their abilities to take on the West, or ol‘ Joe would have never slowed down. And as we all know this turned into a 50 year stalemate.

[Pannonian]

Remember that those who do not remember history are doomed to repeat it.

By 1946 it was already apparent that the cold war was begun.

In 1945 the allies already had cause to go to war with Stalin, it was more a matter of downplaying the reasons and covering up more than a few that delayed the initial confrontation which happened in Korea in 1950.

A few reasons for going to war: The pledge to Poland of an elected government. The internment of allied troops in Soviet occupied areas. Installation of Communist Governments in other occupied nations. And the disposition of the Baltic States.

It is easy to see how any and all of these could have been whipped up into a furor and lending some tactical objectives for the attack as well. It would not be the west seen as betraying an ally, the Soviets had already seen to that but were gambling that the west would do just what they did.

You will take note of the second reason. This set the stage for what was to fallow in Korea and Vietnam. Most of these men were never repatriated. Most were air crews and ground support personnel from the Shuttle Bombing missions against Germany.

I'd like to have seen you try to push those reasons in 1945 for going to war with the Soviet Union. Not a Cold War mind you, which is a standoff with a permanent military presence, but in all other respects is peacetime, but proper redblooded war. Would the Europeans find it an attractive prospect to go to war with the Soviets? Or would replacing their warmongering governments with a more conciliatory or pacifistic one be more attractive? And if the Europeans refused to countenance going to war with the Soviets, would the Americans be able to prosecute this alone?

Before looking at the military aspects, look at the political aspects. If the people don't want to go to war, all the military capabilities in the world matter nowt.

[Brenus]

“If it were then how was the JU87 and the Bf 109 able to operate successfully against them until the end of the war?”
When? The air superiority was definitively in Soviet hand at the end of the war in the Eastern front. Just read the books written by Germans and their fear of the Stormovick…
Even during the battle of Stalingrad (August 1942 – February 1943), the German had lost the Air Superiority, and the Soviet were able de facto to take Air Control of the town…
The JU87 was even a easy picking in 1940… Wrong example…:beam:

“Delayed the initial confrontation which happened in Korea in 1950”: Er, that was against Chinese Communist.

“Germany held a substantial edge against both the west and the Soviets but it did not insure their victory.” Against the West, no doubt, against the Soviet, it can be debated.

“It may have even come to using the Nuclear option, more than just the threat of it.” Again, the first A-bombs had no military use.

“The major factor in allied victory would have been Air Power, specifically Tactical Air Power”. Illusion: the bunkers in Normandy were destroyed by grunts equipped with bangalore, not by bombers.
Tactical Air Power is useful, but again, it needs a air supremacy that I am not sure the Allies could have secured it.

As the logistic point of view, can you just explain how the Allies would refuel and reequipped their units by seas, when most of port installation were completely destroyed, whereas the soviets have just to either use train or roads.
And I even don’t want to speak about reorganising and reequipping the German Army (the part not in Soviet hands) and making all this former enemies fighting together against a united army, in equipment, tactic and language.

“To a great extent they attempted to live off the land using captured supplies”: I completely forgot that Germany was producing T34 and SU152, Migs, Yack and Lavochkin.

“The Soviets obviously doubted their abilities to take on the West, or ol‘ Joe would have never slowed down.” ? Supposition. And he had to digest what he took.
As mention, the Red Army was exhausted, but so the Allies Armies.

As you mentioned, material doesn’t insured victory. So, in term of military command and tactic, experience of the troops, the advantage was in the Soviet side.

[Ramses II CP]

It would have been a staggering disaster for either side to attempt war against the other after the defeat of Germany. I put the matter slightly in favor of the Soviets because, as others have noted, their officers in the field by the end of the war were generally superior and were supremely committed to following orders. I suspect the stalemate line would have fallen somewhere west of Berlin and held there. Scandanavia would certainly have been a lost cause to the Allies, eventually leading to a serious threat of an invasion of Britain and most probably the signing of an unfavorable long term truce.

No significant eastern ground invasion of the Soviet Union would have been attempted, whether from occupied Japan, China, or across the Pacific. It's foolhardy. Minor conflicts might have gone the Allies' way, but taking a strip of useless coastline is meaningless.

I take for granted that nuclear weapons would not be a part of such a conflict because of the political and sociological consequences. The potential further use of nukes against Japan after the first two was even a matter of debate and, obviously, subject to the personal approval of Truman. If nuclear weapons were authorized for use they would be decisive in favor of the US and allies because the Soviets, IMHO, simply could not have reliably guarded their population centers from the sheer number of angles of attack that were possible against them.

:egypt:

[Fisherking]

I'd like to have seen you try to push those reasons in 1945 for going to war with the Soviet Union. Not a Cold War mind you, which is a standoff with a permanent military presence, but in all other respects is peacetime, but proper redblooded war. Would the Europeans find it an attractive prospect to go to war with the Soviets? Or would replacing their warmongering governments with a more conciliatory or pacifistic one be more attractive? And if the Europeans refused to countenance going to war with the Soviets, would the Americans be able to prosecute this alone?

Before looking at the military aspects, look at the political aspects. If the people don't want to go to war, all the military capabilities in the world matter nowt.


Yes indeed I am.

That is why they covered up or made excuses for those things I have listed.

Churchill was willing to take the British to war over the Polish issue. Americans of the time would have demanded the Government do something including going to war over the Prisoners held by the Soviets. The French were struggling with relevance and would not have withdrawn from the pact.

The prisoner issue was so hot that it was not revealed until late into the 1950s…that is well after the Korean War! Even then it was down played so as not to arouse a furor.

The one political aspect I have left out was the amount of Soviet Agents or Sympathizers that were in high positions in western governments. This could have been a major factor for the appeasement polices that were tried. McCarthy may have presided over an overblown witch hunt but we forget it's beginnings had good reason.

[PanzerJaeger]

To add to what Brenus said...


The technical edge the Soviets possessed in armor would be no surprise to allied troops. Germany held a substantial edge against both the west and the Soviets but it did not insure their victory.

This is only true of a few models, which were produced in very limited numbers. The standard German tank throughout the latter half of the war, the PzIV, was only slightly better than the Sherman and somewhat worse than the T-34/76.

The strength of the Panzerkorps was in the crews. Their training, experience and skill allowed them to project power far beyond their vehicle's limitations.

The Red Army had the vast majority of experience fighting this force in open - tank friendly - environments; and thus had a far greater working knowledge of armoured strategy and tactics. And, unlike the Germans, the Russians had significant numbers of superior tanks to force this advantage.



Soviet airpower was no where as strong as some of you have stated. If it were then how was the JU87 and the Bf 109 able to operate successfully against them until the end of the war?

They were also able to operate successfully against the allies until the end of the war. 109s successfully engaged P-51s very late in the war and, IIRC, Stukas were involved in Operation Baseplate during the Battle of the Bulge.

Strictly speaking, neither the Allies nor the Russians gained complete air superiority during the war, as the Luftwaffe operated with at least some level of success on both fronts until the last days of the war. However, it is safe to say that for all intents and purposes that both dominated the sky by the end.

To compare the Allied and Russian air forces, you would need the total numbers of aircraft available to each side. In this respect, I believe the Allies only had a significant advantage in strategic assets, which would not be particularly useful over Russia.


The major factor in allied victory would have been Air Power, specifically Tactical Air Power. The role of Strategic Air Power is continually over stated and colored most aspects of the cold war. But the allied tactical air forces of the day were the real power on the battlefield. They disrupted supply, broke up formations and made an enemy‘s ability to resist problematic.

Don't forget that the Russians also had a very powerful tactical air wing, including the famed Sturmovik squadrons. I'm still unconvinced that Allied air power was significantly stronger than that of Russia.

In any event, air power itself, not just in a strategic role, has been over stated in the historical record; and the only reason it played the role it did in the West was because the Germans were so completely outnumbered. This would hardly be the case in an Allied-Russian conflict.

IMO, the major decisive factor would have been armoured power instead of air, as it was in WW2. In this respect, the Russians had numerical parity, better machines, and more experience.


The Soviets obviously doubted their abilities to take on the West, or ol‘ Joe would have never slowed down. And as we all know this turned into a 50 year stalemate.

Don't underestimate how much nuclear weapons changed the equation.

[CrossLOPER]

The Soviets obviously doubted their abilities to take on the West, or ol‘ Joe would have never slowed down. And as we all know this turned into a 50 year stalemate.
I think he just identified the liberated western countries as a visible horizon for the time being.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Air Supremacy would not have been required for effective deployment of the atomic bomb. Obviously, it was far less risky if air supremacy had been achieved, but an an escored formation of B-29s, only one of which was atomic-armed, would very likely have been able to strike its target. There would always be a chance that the lucky high-level AA hit or fighter attack would get the correct B-29, but the odds would favor the attacker there.

B-29 engine safety improved throughout its service, yes, but as of August of 1945, there was still enough concern to prompt the in-air arming of atomic weapons.

[Brenus]

Well if in order to free the Eastern Counties from the Communist yoke you fry them, you lost the point don’t you?:beam:
So forget the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, the Communists being attack (the point of origin being Patton’s push) THEY would use them as soon they could in retaliation.
Nuclear weapons were not of a military use anyway. Indiscriminate and very difficult to use against military target, especially NOT design for a front line use…:whip:

So we are back to military and material. And I think that the Soviets had all in their advantage…

[Oleander Ardens]

The only way the western allies could have possibly hold their own in Europe in 1945 would have been the use of the defeated German army. Given the hatred for and fear of the "Jewish-Bolshevist" Sovietunion almost all soldiers would have fought against it. As a matter of fact many Germans fought that eventually the Allies would fight with them against the Soviets for the "defense" of Europe. With the massive amount of material and ressources at the disposal of the West and the experienced manpower of the German forces even the migthy Red army could have been overcome...

[Brenus]

“With the massive amount of material and ressources at the disposal of the West and the experienced manpower of the German forces even the migthy Red army could have been overcome...”
Amount of material and resources were as well in the Soviet side. Look at figures of production for T34…:book:

Do you really think that the French, the Italians, the Dutch and even the British would have fought alongside Germans against Russian in 1945?:inquisitive:

[Sarmatian]

Not to mention that experienced German soldiers practically no longer existed. By the end of the war Germany lost 75% of its mobilized forces.

[A Very Super Market]

I think the Brits and Amis would be fine with fighting alongside Heer (And only heer) troops. But the French, Dutch, and other occupied countries would no doubt provide fierce resistance against collaborating with their former occupiers.

[Sarmatian]

I think the Brits and Amis would be fine with fighting alongside Heer (And only heer) troops. But the French, Dutch, and other occupied countries would no doubt provide fierce resistance against collaborating with their former occupiers.

Americans, possibly, but Brits would remember all too well the air raids, terror bombing of urban centers, destroyed buildings, killed civilians, half-destroyed cities, sunk merchants ships, dead sailors because of U-boats and so on... I don't think they would jump from joy if somebody told them they're supposed to fight alongside the Germans, even if it's Heer only...

[PanzerJaeger]

The only way the western allies could have possibly hold their own in Europe in 1945 would have been the use of the defeated German army. Given the hatred for and fear of the "Jewish-Bolshevist" Sovietunion almost all soldiers would have fought against it. As a matter of fact many Germans fought that eventually the Allies would fight with them against the Soviets for the "defense" of Europe. With the massive amount of material and ressources at the disposal of the West and the experienced manpower of the German forces even the migthy Red army could have been overcome...

The German military was fairly spent at that point, but certainly many within the captured leadership would have been pressed into advisory positions - as they were during the Cold War.

[Oleander Ardens]

I will tackle the answers one after the other:

First of all it is impossible to know who things could have evolved in a WW3, but I will lay down some of my thoughts.

a) The point of the political feasability of a "German inclusion" so fresh after the German occupations is a very important one. It is almost impossible to think that the population of countries which have suffered so much from German hands would join forces against a "liberator" like the Red army. The communist forces/tendencies were also very strong in countries like France and Italy which would have caused most likey marxist revolutions.

b) However it is a matter of fact that before the very last months/weeks of the war and the capitulation the German army was the most powerful land force after the Red Army which proved to be surprisingly resilient against all the odds. Without it's inclusion or the possible use of atomic bombs against the Sovietunion it would have been impossible to stop the soviet conquest of all continental Europe in a short period of time.

[Jolt]

Provided that Turkey would allow the USA to rebase their Nuclear Bombers there, while sustaining the advance of the SU, I believe the western SU population centers would be nuked to smithereens (At the very least, Ukraine and the Volga basin) from there that might have had one of two effects. Either the Soviets revolted against the state, leading to quite big revolts since WW1 (Ukraine would probably rise in revolt), or provided the NKVD clamped down on protesters, could lead to a firm rallying under the Soviet banner.

EDIT: Probably, the hittable cities would be Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Minsk, Riga, Vilna, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Kursk, and some others. This in the first year provided that they produced a A-Bomb per month.

[Uesugi Kenshin]

Provided that Turkey would allow the USA to rebase their Nuclear Bombers there, while sustaining the advance of the SU, I believe the western SU population centers would be nuked to smithereens (At the very least, Ukraine and the Volga basin) from there that might have had one of two effects. Either the Soviets revolted against the state, leading to quite big revolts since WW1 (Ukraine would probably rise in revolt), or provided the NKVD clamped down on protesters, could lead to a firm rallying under the Soviet banner.

EDIT: Probably, the hittable cities would be Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Minsk, Riga, Vilna, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Kursk, and some others. This in the first year provided that they produced a A-Bomb per month.

Except they couldn't produce atom bombs that quickly at that point.

[Jolt]

At which point are you talking about?

[Sarmatian]

1945, immediately after the war...

[Spino]

I love these what-ifs...

Since we've established that this hypothetical WW3 scenario would begin shortly after the official end of WW2 (VJ Day, 8/15/45) let me share with you the following wall of text...

Based upon how badly the Soviets were mauled by the Germans up until the last days of the war I'm not so quick to write off the Allies. The Soviets lost an obscene amount of men and material fighting the Germans despite possessing air superiority and enjoying an overwhelming advantage in manpower and equipment. Their losses grew heavier once the front narrowed and they began pushing into Germany itself. Basically I see no reason why the Soviets wouldn't fare just as badly versus the better equipped, supplied and sizeable combined Allied armies.

The most important factor to consider is that once WW2 ended the Soviet Union immediately stopped receiving all Lend-Lease aid. This is no small matter considering it was instrumental in their war effort against Nazi Germany. If WW3 begins in late 1945 that means the Soviets will once again be forced to deal with the logisitcal demands of fielding such a large army over very long supply lines. Per my post in the Japan vs. the US thread one cannot imagine a Soviet victory versus Nazi Germany without factoring in the astounding amount of US/UK equipment and material that was vital to the Soviet war effort.

Plane for plane and pilot for pilot I'm firmly on the Allies' side. The incredibly lopsided Ace totals between Germany & the Soviet Union ought to tell you how an Allied vs. Soviet aerial conflict would have turned out. Once the Allies managed to establish air superiority over the front (a bloody but forgone conclusion) every bridge, railway, river, canal and road leading to the front would be hit and hit hard. These interdiction strikes would prove to be especially painful during the winter months. It's a looong way from the Soviet Union's industrial centers to the front line. Each US made barge, locomotive, truck and jeep lost to Allied air power means the Soviets have to build their own... which means less Soviet built weapons, tanks and planes rolling out of its factories. Imagine trying to fight a brutal conventional war while trying to feed and supply several million men in a stripped and barren countryside in the middle of winter. Good luck trying to maintain an offensive or put up a determined defense when your enemy owns the skies, is fully supplied and equipped while you're struggling to operate at 50-60% of effectiveness.

Speaking purely in terms of numbers the abstract balance sheet would look something like this...
Local Manpower - Soviet Union
Local Armor - Soviet Union
Local Artillery - Soviet Union
Local Air Power - Allies
Strategic Manpower (reinforcements) - Allies
Strategic Air Power - Allies (not even close)
Naval Power - Allies (like comparing a mountain to a molehill)
Naval Air Power - Allies (mind boggling numbers of fleet & escort carriers versus... umm, what Soviet carriers?)
Logistics - Allies (not even close)
Industry - Allies (not even close)

So how do the Allies maximize their advantages while minimizing their weaknesses? By hitting the Soviet Union where it is weakest and forcing Stalin to deal with threats to critical areas that he cannot effectively counter. Allied strategic bombers may not be able to hit the Soviet Union's factories but base them out of Greece or Turkey and suddenly all those oil fields & processing plants near Tblisi are set ablaze. Failing that the Allies could use those strategic bombers to repeat Operation Cobra on an even larger scale and send them on massive carpet bombing sorties on the front lines... Either way it's not a pretty picture.

The wild card? The unbelievably massive mobile force of the combined Allied Navies. Allied fleets would wreak havoc on Soviet ports & cities in the North Atlantic, Baltic and Pacific coasts. Stalin's navy was an outdated joke and the bulk of his air force would be deployed to the western front. How is he supposed to counter the threat from several thousand planes operating from aircraft carriers that are raiding his coasts? What does he have to counter massive surface combat fleets bombarding his ports and industries on the coasts? Even if the US opted to not invade the Soviet's far eastern provinces it could open up a second front with a massive amphibious invasion on the the Soviet Union's Black Sea coast. How could Stalin effectively deal with a large secondary threat behind his front lines?

In order to secure any kind of victory the Soviet Union would need to score major, decisive victory... or two.. or three at the onset of the conflict. It's hard enough pulling off a single modern day Cannae against a competent, formidable opponent but two or three? Considering this is the same nation that expended countless lives in human wave attacks versus entrenched German positions I just don't see it happening. The fact that Stalin shouldn't expect to receive wonderfully boneheaded gifts such as Stalingrad and Kursk from the Allies means his margin for error is close to zero.

Some specific responses to select posts...

I think the Ju-87 is being unfairly labeled as a failure due to improper deployment, especially during the Battle of Britain. ALL ground attack aircraft were susceptible to heavy losses during the war, especially when the enemy commanded local air superiority. Dive bombers and close air support planes simply cannot operate effectively without adequate escort. Despite their durability & survivability even the vaunted IL2 Sturmovik and P-47 suffered badly during the war, mainly due to anti-aircraft fire.

In 1944/1945 the Pz-IV's 75L48 cannon could still handle all but the heaviest of Allied & Soviet tanks at reasonable ranges. The Pz-IV's biggest Achilles heel was its obsolete hull & turret design (the lack of sloped armor did not help its survivability). The T-34/76 may have been a rude shock in 1941 but keep in mind by the time the T-34/85 appeared on the scene it was no longer giving German tankers & AT gun crews fits like it did in 41 when the Wehrmacht had only a handful of long barrel 75mm guns in the field.

In terms of ballistics & accuracy the ubiquitous Russian 85mm AT gun was hardly in the same league as the German 88mm or the US 90mm. In fact it was barely on par with (if not inferior to) the Allied 75mm & 76mm AT guns. Allied and German 75m and 76mm guns consistently performed better than their Soviet counterparts, especially when specialized ammunition was involved. The famous 88mm aside the Panther's 75mm 75L70 cannon was a testament to Germany's superior metallurgical techniques and gunnery optics as it could handle ALL enemy tanks at considerable range. Ditto for the British 77mm 17lber.

In contrast the best Soviet AT gun of the war was the 100mm equipped by all SU-100 tank destroyers which saw limited deployment. Much like the Allies the Soviets knew the number of German tanks facing them would be limited so they opted to equip the bulk of their tanks with guns that were far more effective dealing with infantry in hardened cover than enemy tanks. The fact that the JS-2 & JS-3 tanks sported the 122mm gun (devastating but not very accurate at range) instead of the superior 100mm AT gun shows you where their priorities lie.

As many have said we do need to take into account a sympathetic German government & population. By the end of the war there was no great love to be found between Germans and Soviets. I can easily see former Wehrmacht & SS units joining the Allied cause to push the Soviets out of Germany & Poland.

[Sarmatian]

I think your entire concept is wrong because it based on common misconceptions and stereotypes about the Soviets.




Based upon how badly the Soviets were mauled by the Germans up until the last days of the war I'm not so quick to write off the Allies. The Soviets lost an obscene amount of men and material fighting the Germans despite possessing air superiority and enjoying an overwhelming advantage in manpower and equipment. Their losses grew heavier once the front narrowed and they began pushing into Germany itself. Basically I see no reason why the Soviets wouldn't fare just as badly versus the better equipped, supplied and sizeable combined Allied armies.

First, we need to define "obscene" here. Total Soviet losses (including wounded, disabled...) were 28,199,127. Total German losses of the war were 13,488,000 of which 10,758,000 were lost in the east. So the ratio of Soviet:German losses was slightly less than 2.8:1. Not something that I would call obscene, especially since a huge chunk of that was lost in the first period of the war, when the Red Army was caught not just off guard but sleeping, naked, sick, temporarily blind and disoriented and without any feeling in its legs.

Second, it's another misconceptions that the Red Army had overwhelming numerical superiority. In fact for the first 6 months of the war, Red Army was actually outnumbered by the Axis, most in November when it was outnumbered almost two to one:

Soviet & Allies : German and Allies

June '41 - 1:1.4

September '41 - 1:1.16

November '41 - 1:1.9

December '41 - 1.23:1

So, the first time Soviets actually outnumbered the Germans was in December '41 when three Far Eastern armies were redeployed to the west. After that, Soviet had constantly numerical advantage but until September 1944 it was usually 1.5-2.0:1. The situation changes drastically at the very end of '44 and in 1945 when Soviets knocked out all Germany's allies and got them to fight on their side. Only after that we see 3:1 superiority and 4:1 was just before the war ended, in May '45


The most important factor to consider is that once WW2 ended the Soviet Union immediately stopped receiving all Lend-Lease aid. This is no small matter considering it was instrumental in their war effort against Nazi Germany. If WW3 begins in late 1945 that means the Soviets will once again be forced to deal with the logisitcal demands of fielding such a large army over very long supply lines. Per my post in the Japan vs. the US thread one cannot imagine a Soviet victory versus Nazi Germany without factoring in the astounding amount of US/UK equipment and material that was vital to the Soviet war effort.

The impact of Lend-Lease on the Red Army is vastly exaggerated in the pop culture and often by the western historian. Sure, it looks much when you say 400,000 trucks but it was really a drop in the ocean. Entire Lend-Lease amounted to 4% of Soviet total war production. No doubt it helped to keep the Red Army at top efficiency but hardly instrumental. Also, practically no one knows of the "reverse Lend-Lease", that is, supplies sent to the US by the Soviet Union, for example 300,000 tons of chrome ore and other rare materials needed by the US to keep its wartime economy at peak efficiency.


Plane for plane and pilot for pilot I'm firmly on the Allies' side. The incredibly lopsided Ace totals between Germany & the Soviet Union ought to tell you how an Allied vs. Soviet aerial conflict would have turned out. Once the Allies managed to establish air superiority over the front (a bloody but forgone conclusion) every bridge, railway, river, canal and road leading to the front would be hit and hit hard. These interdiction strikes would prove to be especially painful during the winter months. It's a looong way from the Soviet Union's industrial centers to the front line. Each US made barge, locomotive, truck and jeep lost to Allied air power means the Soviets have to build their own... which means less Soviet built weapons, tanks and planes rolling out of its factories. Imagine trying to fight a brutal conventional war while trying to feed and supply several million men in a stripped and barren countryside in the middle of winter. Good luck trying to maintain an offensive or put up a determined defense when your enemy owns the skies, is fully supplied and equipped while you're struggling to operate at 50-60% of effectiveness.

Again Soviet losses include thousands of planes lost on the ground. In June '41, most of the airfields were closed for expansion so huge number of Soviet aircraft was concentrated on a relatively small number of airfields. Even with most of their air force lost, the Red Army managed to fight effectively against the Germans. The impact of air power in the WW2 is often exaggerated, Sure, it was important in the Pacific but not much so in the war in Europe. Heck, even Germans managed to mount the second Ardennes offensive against the Allies practically without air support. It was a dangerous offensive, too as Allies had too urge Stalin to increase pressure on the Germans from the other side, which resulted in Soviet offensive being launched 8 days ahead of schedule.

The importance of the air power in the WW2 is often exaggerated. It depended to much on the weather and the time of day, opponent could transport his supplies or move his troops at night practically unopposed.



Speaking purely in terms of numbers the abstract balance sheet would look something like this...
Local Manpower - Soviet Union
Local Armor - Soviet Union
Local Artillery - Soviet Union
Local Air Power - Allies
Strategic Manpower (reinforcements) - Allies
Strategic Air Power - Allies (not even close)
Naval Power - Allies (like comparing a mountain to a molehill)
Naval Air Power - Allies (mind boggling numbers of fleet & escort carriers versus... umm, what Soviet carriers?)
Logistics - Allies (not even close)
Industry - Allies (not even close)

As I said, air power is overrated and naval power, especially carriers would have been next to useless. Where would you use those carriers? In the Baltic or White Sea? Black Sea? All places without really a room for manouver where carriers greatest strength wouldn't count for much. Any carrier in any of those seas would have been in range of Soviet airplanes from multiple bases. Carriers were crucial for the conflict in the Pacific. Putting them in the small and shallow seas very close to land would have made them extremely vulnerable.

In general, what would Allies do with naval superiority? It's not Japan where taking control of the seas meant Japan would starve. Soviet could transport everything by land (and they did, except in cases when they did it using rivers).

Industry is where US would have the advantage but be careful not to say Allies. France was just liberated, UK on the verge of bankruptcy.



So how do the Allies maximize their advantages while minimizing their weaknesses? By hitting the Soviet Union where it is weakest and forcing Stalin to deal with threats to critical areas that he cannot effectively counter. Allied strategic bombers may not be able to hit the Soviet Union's factories but base them out of Greece or Turkey and suddenly all those oil fields & processing plants near Tblisi are set ablaze. Failing that the Allies could use those strategic bombers to repeat Operation Cobra on an even larger scale and send them on massive carpet bombing sorties on the front lines... Either way it's not a pretty picture.

Neither Greece nor Turkey were actually in the Allies. Soviet troops looking across the border from Bulgaria to Istanbul (not to mention those on other side of Turkey) would have made Turkey think twice before joining the Allies. I'd say after the horrors of the WW2, any nation that could stay away from the conflict would, especially nations like Greece and Turkey that were extremely close to the Soviets and would stand so much to lose. Both would in all probability stay neutral.


The wild card? The unbelievably massive mobile force of the combined Allied Navies. Allied fleets would wreak havoc on Soviet ports & cities in the North Atlantic, Baltic and Pacific coasts. Stalin's navy was an outdated joke and the bulk of his air force would be deployed to the western front. How is he supposed to counter the threat from several thousand planes operating from aircraft carriers that are raiding his coasts? What does he have to counter massive surface combat fleets bombarding his ports and industries on the coasts? Even if the US opted to not invade the Soviet's far eastern provinces it could open up a second front with a massive amphibious invasion on the the Soviet Union's Black Sea coast. How could Stalin effectively deal with a large secondary threat behind his front lines?

Great. Now Allies' ships control the seas which Soviets don't use and threaten ports that Soviets don't use. Although actual control would be questionable as we have seen during WW2 how naval vessels were vulnerable to air attacks. Invasion of the Soviet Pacific coast would have been the pinnacle of stupidity as those troops would have to march through Siberia, through 10,000 km of nothing where winter lasts during most of the year to actually get somewhere.

Black Sea invasion - again implies Turkey is in the Allies. It was neutral during WW2 when it had much less to lose. Even with Turkey, it's likely to fail. Reinforcing and resupplying troops already in Europe would have been a priority and would take up huge resources from the Navy, because there's no way that Allied force that was in western Europe could have stood against more than 6,000,000 Soviet troops and their allies.


In order to secure any kind of victory the Soviet Union would need to score major, decisive victory... or two.. or three at the onset of the conflict. It's hard enough pulling off a single modern day Cannae against a competent, formidable opponent but two or three? Considering this is the same nation that expended countless lives in human wave attacks versus entrenched German positions I just don't see it happening. The fact that Stalin shouldn't expect to receive wonderfully boneheaded gifts such as Stalingrad and Kursk from the Allies means his margin for error is close to zero.

Countless human wave attack is another misconception. Already seen in 1943, but from 1944 Deep Operations were performed with perfection - Operation Bagration, Vistula Oder offensive, destruction of the army group South Ukraine. Manchuria etc... Not to mention it was performed against the best of Feldheer, while Allies, with exception of a few elite divisions in France were up against second or even third rate German troops, reserves and/or garrison troops.



As many have said we do need to take into account a sympathetic German government & population. By the end of the war there was no great love to be found between Germans and Soviets. I can easily see former Wehrmacht & SS units joining the Allied cause to push the Soviets out of Germany & Poland.

Sympathetic Wehrmacht and SS - sure, but not so sympathetic British, French, Dutch, Belgians, Danes etc...

[KrooK]

Bad predictions:
1. Soviet Union into 1945 had similar level of development of military industry. Russian tanks were better and planes were as good as Western.
2. Soviet Union had much bigger army and supply lines shorter than Western Allies. I don't count GB because they were exhausted of war.
3. Soviet Union had worse commanders (exept General Moroz) but 10 times better soldiers than Western Allies. And what do you think would happen if US Army enter Russia into russian winter. American sources are crying about heroism of paratroopers into Bastogne - for Russians behavior like that was ABSOLUTELY NORMAL.
4. Chinese resistance was weak, corrupted and untrained. Nothing strange that even during 1944 Japanese Army was winning into China.
5. Russia can't be treat like a country - ITS CONTINENT - and you can't forget about it.

[Brenus]

Marshal Stalin’s speech to the Soviet the day after the US attack lead by Gal Patton (the intervention was broadcasted to all USSR and Russian Held Territory):

“One again an eagle rise on the West and attacked the birth place of Socialism.
Once again an eagle wants to feed on the flesh of the men who brought the light to mankind…
Yesterday saw a new day of infamy…
Yesterday, the USA allied with the Nazi SS wearing their true uniforms launched a surprise attacked on our peace keeping forces in Germany.
Once again, the Capitalists try to impose the yoke of servitude on the land of the Free.

Comrades, Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, once again we have to fight a war we didn’t start.
Rise up, join the Glorious banner of the Red Army and we will defeat together the Imperialists.

Soldiers, Sailors and aviators the Rodina expects you to do you duty. You defeated the Nazi Barbarians; you will not be defeat by the Capitalists and their marionettes.”

Deployment of the Red Army:
Manchuria and Asia: Neutralisation of the US Navy in Pacific in attacking Japan.
Deployment of medium and long range bombers IL-2 and IL4 (Range 2,600 km up to three 1,102lb torpedoes could be carried)
Attack on the US fleet with bombers, blockade of Japan
Support to China, Vietnam and communist movements in the region.

Strong message is sent to Turkey to keep out of the mess. USSR is closer to Ankara than USA.

Europe: Reactivation of the Communist guerrilla in Greece.
Tito gives authorisation of the Russian armies to cross Yugoslavia and to use the harbours of Montenegro and Croatia.
Russian tanks are in range of Trieste.
Ever Hodza do the same for Albania.

Pressure put on France (Governement Provisoire Gal de Gaulle who has no love for USA) and Italy to stay out of the conflict (strong communist parties).
In case of involvement of theses countries a long side of the US, the III International and the 21 conditions apply.
Sabotage and attack on the logistic lines of the US.
Sabotage in the reconstruction of the harbours destroyed by the Germans.

Germany: US soldiers facing Katiouchka for the first time and the Massive Tank attack…:sweatdrop:

[Oleander Ardens]

Actually the Soviets had always the numerical superiority, even at day 1. The greatly superior number of standing troops and material was however split between the frontline and the strategic reserve so that there was a slight German superiority at the areas near the frontline. And of course great operational superiority on the areas where the big breakthroughs were planned.



Figure 2. Scope of Operations

AXIS FORCES RED ARMY FORCES

June 1941: 3,767,000 2,680,000 (in theater)
3,117,000 (German) 5,500,000 (overall)
900,000 (in the west)

June 1942: 3,720,000 5,313,000
2,690,000 (German)
80 % in the East

July 1943: 3,933,000 6,724,000
3,483,000 (German)
63 % in the East

June 1944 3,370,000 6,425,000
2,520,000 (German)
62 % in the East

Jan. 1945 2,330,000 6,532,000
2,230,000 (German)
60 % in the East

April 1945 1,960,000 6,410,000

Total Mobilized 34,476,700


The Lend-Lease program is usually underlined by "American" writers and downplayed by Russian writers. I think David Glantz conclusion - even if debateable, as he also writes - comes far closer to the truth than this two positions, especially the Russian/Soviet one. Most likey the Sovietunion could have won without this support, but it proved to be immensly helpful in many critical areas and allowed the Soviets to concentrate on a highly efficient production in other areas. Note that he doesn't discuss here the importance of the allied air campaigns and later ground offensives 1942, 1943 and 1944 in diverting men and especially material away from the Eastern front.

Bold/Underlined by myself.



Figure 7. Lend-Lease Assistance to the Soviet Union

Lend-Lease Domestic Production

Armored vehicles 12,161 (12 %) 98,300 (7,056 US)

Guns and mortars 9,600 (2 %) 525,200

Machine guns 131,600

Combat aircraft 18,303 (15 %) 122,100
Fighters 13,857
Bombers 3,633
Transport 710
Reconnaissance 19
Training 84

Aircraft engines 14,902 (6.7 %) 222,418

Trucks and Jeeps 409,526 (55 %) 744,400

(reached Russia) 312,600 (42 %)

Explosives (tons) 325,784

Locomotives 1,860 (6.3 %) 29,524

Rail cars 11,181

Field telephones 422,000

Foodstuffs (tons) 4,281,910 (25 %) 17,127,640

Oil (POL) (tons) 2,599,000

Boots 15,000,000 pairs

Without Lend-Lease food, clothing, and raw materials (especially metals), the Soviet economy would have been even more heavily burdened by the war effort. Perhapsmost directly, without Lend-Lease trucks, rail engines, and railroad cars, every Soviet offensive would have stalled at an earlier stage, outrunning its logistical tail in a matter of days. In turn, this would have allowed the German commanders to escape at least some encirclements, while forcing the Red Army to prepare and conduct many more deliberate penetration attacks in order to advance the same distance. Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken 12 to 18 months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet soldiers could have waded at France’s Atlantic beaches. Thus, while the Red Army shed the bulk of Allied blood, it would have shed more blood for longer without Allied assistance

Attention, Sarmantian:


Countless human wave attack is another misconception. Already seen in 1943, but from 1944 Deep Operations were performed with perfection - Operation Bagration, Vistula Oder offensive, destruction of the army group South Ukraine. Manchuria etc... Not to mention it was performed against the best of Feldheer, while Allies, with exception of a few elite divisions in France were up against second or even third rate German troops, reserves and/or garrison troops.

Pefection is a too strong word to describe even Bagration, and Glantz shows just how many soviet offensives in the spirit of "Deep battle" ended in terrible soviet casualities compared to the German ones. What is true that the operational skill of the soviet commanders grew progressively aided of course by the ever increasing crushing superiority especially in military hardware. This was very important as it limited the (still terrible) casualities in the last two years as manpower became a lot thinner.



Heck, even Germans managed to mount the second Ardennes offensive against the Allies practically without air support. It was a dangerous offensive, too as Allies had too urge Stalin to increase pressure on the Germans from the other side, which resulted in Soviet offensive being launched 8 days ahead of schedule.

The importance of the air power in the WW2 is often exaggerated. It depended to much on the weather and the time of day, opponent could transport his supplies or move his troops at night practically unopposed.

Nota bene that the Germans were forced to make the offensive under the protection of the weather - their best flak. Once the weather cleared the situation become very soon very desperate as the supply was reduced to a trickle as the Jabos harried and destroyed everthing moving. Actually better progress by the German army would have been better for the Allies (as Eisenhower, an avid reader of Clausewitz stated). This would have allowed to annihilate the great majority of the mobile forces in the West.

Actually it is almost impossible to overstate the importance of the soviet air superiority (almost supremecy in 1944 and 1945) in the east after late 1942. In conjuncture with the partizans the ability of the Germans to shift troops and supply became ever smaller. As "highly mobile artillery" and "flying tanks" the might Red air force was a most decisive element in the victories, especially in the deep phases of the great offensive operations.

[KrooK]

Comparison of navy and naval air force has no sense. Soviet Union did not need naval air force - what for:) All their state is on one place. Of course its possible that allied punch could conquer 300 -500 km but what then....
1. Allies are entering steppes of Ukraine/Tajga at far east.
2. Winter starts.
3. Allied soldiers ends like German.
4. Russian soldiers, prepared on winter, counterattack.
5. Russians tanks from Iran are attacking Turkey and ends with air bases mentioned into earlier posts.
6. Russians send military instructors and equipment to Chineese communist party and to India, when we have really massive revolts.

[Sarmatian]

Actually the Soviets had always the numerical superiority, even at day 1. The greatly superior number of standing troops and material was however split between the frontline and the strategic reserve so that there was a slight German superiority at the areas near the frontline. And of course great operational superiority on the areas where the big breakthroughs were planned.

True, I've used numbers only for troops in Western Military Districts (on the first day of invasion) and only troops deployed at fronts for later period. Soviets had much more mobilizable troops, but until they're deployed, you can't count them. What many authors, especially German, tend to forget are Germany's allies. Various Hungarian, Slovak, Italian, Croatian, Finnish and, most importantly, Romanian divisions. They contributed with about 1,000,000 troops which change drastically ratio of forces.



The Lend-Lease program is usually underlined by "American" writers and downplayed by Russian writers. I think David Glantz conclusion - even if debateable, as he also writes - comes far closer to the truth than this two positions, especially the Russian/Soviet one. Most likey the Sovietunion could have won without this support, but it proved to be immensly helpful in many critical areas and allowed the Soviets to concentrate on a highly efficient production in other areas. Note that he doesn't discuss here the importance of the allied air campaigns and later ground offensives 1942, 1943 and 1944 in diverting men and especially material away from the Eastern front.

True, Russian historians tend to downplay lend-lease while American/western tend to emphasize it. Glantz tried to be objective but he made a mistake of just comparing numbers instead of actual production. For example trucks - he concluded that 400,000 trucks sent in lend-lease were crucial because they made up a significant portion of the total trucks in the Red Army. Next, he concluded that without those trucks Red Army wouldn't be able to supply their troops properly and many of their offensives would be stopped early. What he didn't consider is that Soviet production of trucks gradually declined - I think I have the exact numbers of trucks produced per year buried somewhere, I'll try to dig it up - as the number of trucks delivered through lend-lease increased. So, his conclusion that Red Army logistics would be severely strained is flawed since they could produce more trucks and they would if they had to. The overall efficiency of the Red Army would decrease because they would have to divert 1 or 2% of their industrial capacity to producing trucks.


Pefection is a too strong word to describe even Bagration, and Glantz shows just how many soviet offensives in the spirit of "Deep battle" ended in terrible soviet casualities compared to the German ones. What is true that the operational skill of the soviet commanders grew progressively aided of course by the ever increasing crushing superiority especially in military hardware. This was very important as it limited the (still terrible) casualities in the last two years as manpower became a lot thinner.


Obviously, I exaggerated when I said perfection. That was a response to "mass frontal assaults" misconception. Actually, it was late night when I wrote it so I have been more blunt than usual. Although Soviet casualties decreased only slightly later (in 1943, '44, '45), their ability to inflict casualties grew exponentially. Many people tend to think that German army in the east was defeated practically in 1943, which is not true. After Kursk, German army was on the defensive and unable to mount a large-scale offensive but it was far from defeated. Red Army fought the best divisions of the best army in the world that were on the defensive. Even though it was an age of mobile forces, the defender always have the advantage and bigger casualties for the attacker are quite normal. Even then, there were examples of Soviets inflicting far more casualties than they suffered, during the destruction of German army group South Ukraine in '44 the ratio was almost 10:1 in favour of the Red army in casualties sustained. I don't have here the exact numbers of casualties suffered during Operation Bagration against army group Center but from what I remember they were comparable and army group Center at the time was in very good shape. It was weakened somewhat to reinforce army group South but wasn't itself part of any major conflicts and had more than enough time to prepare its defences.

Also, it's true that Soviets often underestimate the impact of Allied landing in France just as much as Allies tend to overestimate it. It did weaken the pressure on the Eastern front but the overall quality of German troops in the west (France, Italy) was much worse than the quality of German troops in the east.



Nota bene that the Germans were forced to make the offensive under the protection of the weather - their best flak. Once the weather cleared the situation become very soon very desperate as the supply was reduced to a trickle as the Jabos harried and destroyed everthing moving. Actually better progress by the German army would have been better for the Allies (as Eisenhower, an avid reader of Clausewitz stated). This would have allowed to annihilate the great majority of the mobile forces in the West.

That's what I said, air power of the time was too much dependent on weather and time of the day. Also, Luftwaffe practically didn't exist at the time and VVS was very strong in 1945. It would certainly be able to put up much better fight that Luftwaffe in '44 or '45.

I don't agree with the other part. If the offensive was successful, it would have cut off a large portion of the British to the north. It wouldn't change anything in the long run but cut off British would have suffered terrible casualties.



Actually it is almost impossible to overstate the importance of the soviet air superiority (almost supremecy in 1944 and 1945) in the east after late 1942. In conjuncture with the partizans the ability of the Germans to shift troops and supply became ever smaller. As "highly mobile artillery" and "flying tanks" the might Red air force was a most decisive element in the victories, especially in the deep phases of the great offensive operations.

In '44 and '45, Soviet pushed Germans out of the USSR and lost a good portion of partisan support. I'm not dismissing air power importance but on the Eastern Front it wasn't nearly as important as armour or artillery and it would have been the similar situation in this hypothetical scenario we are discussing. Don't forget that Soviet first successful large scale offensive was in December '41, when Germans had air superiority. Of course, in the Pacific conflict, air power was much more important. So, I'm not dismissing the importance of air power, just downplaying its importance in this specific conflict we're discussing.

[Oleander Ardens]

True, I've used numbers only for troops in Western Military Districts (on the first day of invasion) and only troops deployed at fronts for later period. Soviets had much more mobilizable troops, but until they're deployed, you can't count them. What many authors, especially German, tend to forget are Germany's allies. Various Hungarian, Slovak, Italian, Croatian, Finnish and, most importantly, Romanian divisions. They contributed with about 1,000,000 troops which change drastically ratio of forces.


That's why I used the numbers provided by Glantz.

June 1941: 3,767,000 vs. 2,680,000 (in theater)
3,117,000 (German) 5,500,000 (overall)
900,000 (in the west)

Makes 650.000 allied troops.

So as I stated before the Sovietunion had less troops in the theater but far more mobilized. Actually one can argue that in this very special case of total strategic, operational and tactical surprise more troops on the frontline in shallow depth would have only added to the desaster.


rly. What he didn't consider is that Soviet production of trucks gradually declined - I think I have the exact numbers of trucks produced per year buried somewhere, I'll try to dig it up - as the number of trucks delivered through lend-lease increased. So, his conclusion that Red Army logistics would be severely strained is flawed since they could produce more trucks and they would if they had to. The overall efficiency of the Red Army would decrease because they would have to divert 1 or 2% of their industrial capacity to producing trucks.

I would certainly be surprised if such a small percentage would be needed to produce such a large amount of Trucks. Also the Soviets seemed to think that the Studer was athe superior truck design (mobile, reliable) and also made it the standard truck the Rocket batteries. Your numbers would certainly be very helpful.


ven then, there were examples of Soviets inflicting far more casualties than they suffered, during the destruction of German army group South Ukraine in '44 the ratio was almost 10:1 in favour of the Red army in casualties sustained. I don't have here the exact numbers of casualties suffered during Operation Bagration against army group Center but from what I remember they were comparable and army group Center at the time was in very good shape. It was weakened somewhat to reinforce army group South but wasn't itself part of any major conflicts and had more than enough time to prepare its defences.

I more than a bit sceptical about a 10:1 ratio in favour for the Red Army - could you bring up sources? The brilliant Operation Bagration Operation Bagration (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration) which is widely seen as the heaviest defeat of the Heer in the East seems to have a far smaller ratio.

The Soviet casualities


178,507 killed and missing, 590,848 wounded and sick - 765.815 in total

G. F. Krivošeev , Grif sekretnosti snjat. Poteri Vooružennych Sil SSSR v vojnach, boevych dejstvijach i voennych konfliktach. Statističeskoe issledovanie. Voennoe Izdat Moskva 1993, ISBN 5-203-01400-0, ISBN 978-5-203-01400-9. с. 203, 371

According to Zaloga:

60,000 killed, 110,000 wounded, and about 8,000 missing, with 2,957 tanks, 2,447 artillery pieces, and 822 aircraft also lost.[14]

Zaloga, S. Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre, Osprey Publishing, 1996, ISBN 978-1855324787.

The German casualities

399.102 soldiers ( 26.397 killed, 262.929 missed, 109.776 wounded) - with estimated 150.000 POW (part of the missing!) and 9000 who filtered later back there are 140.000 dead

# Karl-Heinz Frieser (Hrsg. i.A. des MGFA); Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg - Band 8: Karl-Heinz Frieser, Klaus Schmider, Klaus Schönherr, Gerhard Schreiber, Kristián Ungváry, Bernd Wegner; Die Ostfront 1943/44 - Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten; Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt München 2007; ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2

300,000 dead, 250,000 wounded, and about 120,000 captured (overall casualties at 670,000), 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles

Zaloga, S. Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre, Osprey Publishing, 1996, ISBN 978-1855324787.



The superiority of the Soviets was quite sobering:

Germany

800,000 men
495 tanks (900 SP/tanks [1])
(4000 mortars/artillery guns [1])
1,555 aircraft (1324 [1])

Sovietunion

2,331,700 men
4,050 tanks (5200 SP/tanks [1])
24,000 artillery guns (33000 mortars/artillery [1[)
5,327 aircraft (5100 [1])

~ 140000-150000 partisans operated in the rear of the Heer, laying over 10,000 bombs along the Railways

1 (http://books.google.de/books?id=jypqwCh8bFkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Operation+Bagration&lr=&as_brr=3#PPT9,M1)

So 3:1 in numbers, 3,5:1 in aircrafts, 6-8:1 in tanks, 6-8:1 in artillery/mortars in this long fronts. The Soviet concentrations in the breakthrough areas must have been earth-shaking...

Overview of the casualities:

Frieser is an excellent author, as well as Zaloga. I wonder if the latter has used mostly soviet sources which predate the publication of G. F. Krivošeev. The differences are immense. Overall the modern German accounts are usually very precise about German casualities and G. F. Krivošeev seems to have set a new Soviet standard. The extremely low number of Soviet casualities in Zalogas book compared to G. F. Krivošeev is quite stark. On the other hand the the extremely high number of German casualities, especially killed compared to Frieser is equally stark. So Zalogas numbers seem to have "Propaganda" written all over it.

It would be also very important to know how many of the wounded were permanent losses and how fast the rest could return to the battlefield, if at all.

German - Frieser/Soviet - G. F. Krivošeev

likely killed 140.000 - 178,507 (missed without the POW added for both sides)
captured 150.000 - ~
wounded 109.776 - 590,848 (only the seriously wounded on both sides plus the sicks on the soviet side)

This seems to also to make most sense when one studies the operation(s). Many wounded germans could not evacuated/treated due to the rapid Soviet advance, increasing the dead and captured. A unknow of POW got killed by Partisans. The idiotic "stand fast" of Hitler caused the large amount of pockets and amounted to many prisoners. However in attacking such desperate defensive position the Soviets lost also rather large amount of men, as in the vast majority of such offensives. The large loss in material is also testimony to the heavy partisan activity, but even more so due to the massive and deep reaching use of huge numbers of ground-attack aircrafts (IL-2) against the retreating Germans on the few narrow roads. Broken down/damaged soviet AFV could be repaired, German AFV usually not.

In any case the operation was a outstanding success.


So if we take the captured, missing and killed and afterwards the seriously (not captured, not missing) wounded togheter we come up with ratio a) and b)

German - Soviet losses

a) 290000 - 180000
1,5 - 1

b) 110000 - 590000 (Attention, Soviet numbers contain also the sick, while German numbers don't)
1 - 5 (5,36)

So a 10 to 1 ratio in favour of the Soviets in the Ukraine would be quite amazing...

[PanzerJaeger]

I just wanted to quickly respond to a few points...


True, I've used numbers only for troops in Western Military Districts (on the first day of invasion) and only troops deployed at fronts for later period. Soviets had much more mobilizable troops, but until they're deployed, you can't count them. What many authors, especially German, tend to forget are Germany's allies. Various Hungarian, Slovak, Italian, Croatian, Finnish and, most importantly, Romanian divisions. They contributed with about 1,000,000 troops which change drastically ratio of forces.

I don't think these troops are forgotten. They're simply given the historical weight that they merited. Despite Tali-Ihantala and other victories, the Finns were never a good ally. While they may have been strongest militarily (or tied with Hungary), they were never willing to coordinate their forces with the Germans to a large degree and constantly chose if and when they were going to engage. From there, the list of nation's militaries deteriorates rather quickly in quality and skill culminating in the Stalingrad debacle. Romania had significant numbers, but I wouldn't consider them the most important minor Axis nation as the quality of most divisions was so poor.


Obviously, I exaggerated when I said perfection. That was a response to "mass frontal assaults" misconception. Actually, it was late night when I wrote it so I have been more blunt than usual. Although Soviet casualties decreased only slightly later (in 1943, '44, '45), their ability to inflict casualties grew exponentially. Many people tend to think that German army in the east was defeated practically in 1943, which is not true. After Kursk, German army was on the defensive and unable to mount a large-scale offensive but it was far from defeated. Red Army fought the best divisions of the best army in the world that were on the defensive. Even though it was an age of mobile forces, the defender always have the advantage and bigger casualties for the attacker are quite normal. Even then, there were examples of Soviets inflicting far more casualties than they suffered, during the destruction of German army group South Ukraine in '44 the ratio was almost 10:1 in favour of the Red army in casualties sustained. I don't have here the exact numbers of casualties suffered during Operation Bagration against army group Center but from what I remember they were comparable and army group Center at the time was in very good shape. It was weakened somewhat to reinforce army group South but wasn't itself part of any major conflicts and had more than enough time to prepare its defences.

I generally agree with your assessment of the Soviet forces being highly underrated by Western historians, but I don’t think using their performance in late '44 and '45 is a good example. By that time, the crushing numerical superiority of the Red Army, especially in armor and artillery was simply overwhelming; and the German forces could no longer compensate for their losses - particularly in experienced NCOs. Compounding these difficulties were of course Hitler's stand fast orders and growing interference in day to day operations.

In Bagration, for example, as was already noted, the ratios were enormous. Ignoring the manpower difference, the Soviets had nearly 10,000 AFVs and well over 20,000 peices of artillery. What the Germans could muster paled in comparison. More importantly, much of it was outdated. If we were to cut out only the tanks capable of engaging, say, a T-34/76 - ie later model pzIVs, Panthers, and Tigers - the numbers would be even smaller. The same differences existed in the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive in the Ukraine. Even worse there, nearly half the Axis force was comprised of Hungarian troops. Still, the Russians lost nearly 300,000 men and 1300 tanks in that one operation.

The Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive, of which you referenced, was a unique situation. The collapse of the Romanian forces and later their attacks against the Germans played havoc with the coordination of the defense. More importantly, the South Ukraine Army Group only had one Panzer division to its name facing nearly 2000 Russian AFVs. Worse, the 13th had nothing more powerful than Pz.IVs. Casualties were severe, but I'm not sure how you reach that 10:1 ratio unless you include Romanian losses. Even then, one would have to take Russian estimates at face value - which is never smart.

It should also be noted that when the Germans had even a fraction of parity with their Soviet counterparts, they were still able to deliver tactical and even strategic victory - even in '44. (Debrecen, the Narva battles, the first Jassy-Kishinev Offensive, etc.) Moreover, the '44 Soviet offensives in the North were successful overall, but littered with literally hundreds of German localized victories. There just was not enough of anything to translate them into strategic success.

I would argue that German doctrine and tactics were still far superior to Russian at this time and to the end of the war. The Deep Operations theory was concieved before the war and perfected throughout. However, it can only be cited as successful when the Soviets had massive numerical superiorty - numbers which would bolster even the weakest of strategies. Even with such superiority, it failed cosistently throughout the war - particularly the spectacular defeat of Operation Mars. With significant German resistence, the Russians could ethier not make the initial breakthroughs, as was the case with Mars, or could not sustain the overextension of the lines that Deep Operations called for, as was the case with 3rd Kharkov.

While I believe the Soviets were never as hapless as some have inferred and that they certainly became far more proficient as the war progressed, many factors played more heavily in the '44 offensives than Soviet skill at arms - such as Hitler's constant intervention, the loss of the irreplaceable core of low level officers and NCOs that translated German strategy into battlefield success, and most importantly - massive Soviet numerical superiority. There was simply no way to counter that much armor and artillery. :shrug:

[Sarmatian]

That's why I used the numbers provided by Glantz.

June 1941: 3,767,000 vs. 2,680,000 (in theater)
3,117,000 (German) 5,500,000 (overall)
900,000 (in the west)

Makes 650.000 allied troops.

So as I stated before the Sovietunion had less troops in the theater but far more mobilized. Actually one can argue that in this very special case of total strategic, operational and tactical surprise more troops on the frontline in shallow depth would have only added to the desaster.

There's a reason why Glantz didn't count them until they were deployed. It would be the same as counting those Far Eastern armies immediately in June '41 and not in the December when they were deployed at the fronts, or counting German troops in the Balkans. Actually, I think even German troops in Norway shouldn't be counted because they didn't see any action. It's only 70,000 troops, it wouldn't change the ratio much but fair is fair.


I would certainly be surprised if such a small percentage would be needed to produce such a large amount of Trucks. Also the Soviets seemed to think that the Studer was athe superior truck design (mobile, reliable) and also made it the standard truck the Rocket batteries. Your numbers would certainly be very helpful.


According to any author, Glantz included, that I've seen, entire Lend-Lease from 1941-1945 made up only 4% of Soviet military production. That's those 400,000 trucks + aircraft, tanks, jeeps and everything else. It's pretty clear mathematically that Soviets would have to divert 4% of their industrial capacity to produce all that equipment. Of course that would mean 4% less T-34, 4% less Sturmoviks etc... It would have an impact but it would be marginal. Soviet casualties would probably be somewhat higher and the war would last a bit longer but it wouldn't change anything in the greater picture.

I've found some number for trucks production of the Soviet Union from 1941-1943 that I've probably copy/pasted from some site. I didn't write down the book but the author is Harrison. Anyway, here goes.

Trucks produced by the Soviet Union:
1941 - 139,879
1942 - 32,409
1943 - 46,720

Received through lend-lease from both US and UK
1941 - 2,373
1942 - 79,000
1943 - 173,000

Slightly larger number produced in 1943 than 1942 is because all the chaos of industry transfer, 1942 was particularly bad in terms of production because of that, but it clearly be seen from their production in 1941 that they had to means to produce large numbers of trucks.


I more than a bit sceptical about a 10:1 ratio in favour for the Red Army - could you bring up sources? The brilliant Operation Bagration Operation Bagration (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration) which is widely seen as the heaviest defeat of the Heer in the East seems to have a far smaller ratio.

I should have been more clear. When I said losses were comparable in the Operation Bagration I meant German and Soviet losses were comparable, not comparable to the 10:1 ratio. And yes, you're right, it wasn't almost 10:1 it was almost 7:1. It seems my mind's astonishing ability to remember useless information like that failed me :book:. I thought it was 400,000 to 47,000 which would make the ration almost 10:1 but it was actually 400,000 to 67,000 which makes the ration almost 7:1.

It was during the Iassy-Kishinev offensive and the reason it's not so well known is because army group South Ukraine was formed from what was left of army group South (500,000) and about 400,000 Romanian troops, as PJ already said.

By 29 August, Army Group South Ukraine had suffered a fate similar to that of Army Group Center—the destruction of Sixth Army and two Rumanian armies and the utter collapse of the German front in Rumania. The Germans lost control of the Ploesti oilfields and Bucharest by 2 September. German and Rumanian losses exceeded 400,000 men at a cost to the Soviets of about 67,000 casualties. By 1 September, Army Group South, renamed Army Group South Ukraine, had strength returns of only 200,000 men, with 2,000 allied forces. An Axis retreat ensued across the Carpathians, which did not halt until Soviet forces had penetrated Bulgaria and swung westward into the plains of eastern Hungary. (David W. Glantz, When Titans Clashed, pg. 135)

I agree with you about Krivosheev, he pretty much set the standard for any research on the Red Army and is widely considered the best source for anything involving Red Army and numbers. That's why I like Glantz, he used Krivosheev and not old sources that are usually either incomplete or full of propaganda. Or both, actually.

Sorry that my poor wording forced you to write all that text about Bagration but excellent breakdown of casualties anyway. :2thumbsup:


I just wanted to quickly respond to a few points...
I don't think these troops are forgotten. They're simply given the historical weight that they merited. Despite Tali-Ihantala and other victories, the Finns were never a good ally. While they may have been strongest militarily (or tied with Hungary), they were never willing to coordinate their forces with the Germans to much of a degree and constantly chose if and when they were to engage. From there, the list of nation's militaries deteriorates rather quickly in quality and skill culminating in the Stalingrad debacle. Romania had significant numbers, but I wouldn't consider them the most important minor Axis nation as the quality of most divisions was so poor.

True in a way, but if we're gonna count only troops that were of German quality than we would probably end not counting all other troops involved in WW2. Overall, German army was of better quality than any other involved in the WW2. Also, many of the Soviet troops even in 1945 and especially so in 1941 or 1942 were sent to the fronts without practically the basic training and many Soviet divisions were of poorer quality than Romanian divisions.


I generally agree with your assessment of the Soviet forces being highly underrated by Western historians, but I don’t think using their performance in late '44 and '45 is a good example. By that time, the crushing numerical superiority of the Red Army, especially in armor and artillery was simply overwhelming; and the German forces could no longer compensate for their losses - particularly in experienced NCOs. Compounding these difficulties were of course Hitler's stand fast orders and growing interference in day to day operations.


Why are Hitler's idiotic decisions excuse for every defeat and Stalin's aren't? It's often emphasized how Stalin trusted his generals unlike Hitler who interfered in every decision while both of them interfered and made disastrous decisions. The difference is that Stalin interfered gradually less and Hitler gradually more as the war went on. Stavka members (Zhukov especially) warned Stalin that Kiev would be lost and should be abandoned because Germans would encircle the city and trap. Stalin wouldn't hear of it and removed Zhukov from his position of the Chief of Staff. Kiev was lost precisely in a way Zhukov said it would and app. 600,000 Red Army troops was lost. That's seen as great German victory because of their tactical, doctrinal, strategic or whichever superiority. At Stalingrad, Hitler forbade 6th Army to try to break out, 300,000 German soldiers were lost. That's seen as Hitler's stupidity.

In a way, after '43, German army started to look more and more like the Red Army in 1941 and 1942, while after '43, Red Army started to look more like German army in 1941. Hitler sent Fuehrungoffiziers, which were practically Nazi equivalents of Party Komisars to monitor various commanders, effectively curbing any initiative that they might have had before. Fuehrungoffiziers blamed commanders for every defeat and usually relieved them of command on the spot. Every city was declared a fortress city that's to be defended to the last man etc... Every single one of those things Stalin did in 1941 and 1942 and even 1943, to a lesser degree. So, in essence, why are 1941 and 1942 seen as the period of German crushing victories because of their superiority and 1944 and 1945 are seen as the period of Soviet crushing victories because of Hitler's stupidity?


In Bagration, for example, as was already noted, the ratios were enormous. Ignoring the manpower difference, the Soviets had nearly 10,000 AFVs and well over 20,000 peices of artillery. What the Germans could muster paled in comparison. More importantly, much of it was outdated. If we were to cut out only the tanks capable of engaging, say, a T-34/76 - ie later model pzIVs, Panthers, and Tigers - the numbers would be even smaller. The same differences existed in the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive in the Ukraine. Even worse there, nearly half the Axis force was comprised of Hungarian troops. Still, the Russians lost nearly 300,000 men and 1300 tanks in that one operation.

Again, why is German inferior equipment suddenly an excuse? Earlier German tanks could destroy T-34/75 if they got close or attacked it from the flank or rear. When Manstein's tanks spearheaded by brand new Panthers and Tigers got dangerously close to penetrating Soviet defenses at Kursk, Vatutin's tank army was sent to stop them. The best tank in that army was T-34/75 as 85mm variant didn't exist yet. T-34/75 couldn't penetrate frontal armour of either Panther or Tiger unless at very close range or if it ataccked their sides or rear. On the other hand, Tigers and Panthers could engage T-34/75 at several time bigger distance and they did, quite lethally. So, are we to discount entire Vatutin's tank army because it was inferior and say that Von Manstein was stopped by ghosts?


It should also be noted that when the Germans had even a fraction of parity with their Soviet counterparts, they were still able to deliver tactical and even strategic victory - even in '44. (Debrecen, the Narva battles, the first Jassy-Kishinev Offensive, etc.) Moreover, the '44 Soviet offensives in the North were successful overall, but littered with literally hundreds of German localized victories. There just was not enough of anything to translate them into strategic success.

True, there were instances when German managed to perform well in 1944 or even 1945, but also there are instances when Soviet managed to do the same in 1941, like Je'lna counteroffensive by Zhukov. All in all, it doesn't prove much.

Considering north in the 1944, you're right - Soviet performance was usually mediocre to bad. The reason for it is that the front in the north was much more static than the one in the south and Soviet commanders around Leningrad lack the experience acquired by their colleagues in the south.


I would argue that German doctrine and tactics were still far superior to Russian at this time and to the end of the war. The Deep Operations theory was concieved before the war and perfected throughout. However, it can only be cited as successful when the Soviets had massive numerical superiorty. Even with such superiority, it failed cosistently throughout the war - particularly the spectacular defeat of Operation Mars. With significant German resistence, the Russians could ethier not make the initial breakthroughs, as was the case with Mars, or could not sustain the overextension of the lines that Deep Operations called for, as was the case with 3rd Kharkov.


Operation Mars is indeed the biggest Soviet blunder of the war. They underestimated the opponent, not realizing that AG Center was in much better state than AG South. Even then, Soviets did achieve some success, Tarasov's 41st army penetrated the defences north and south of Belyi for example, but Germans were able to put a sizable number of reserves to the field (1st and 9th Panzer division, GrossDeutschland division, 14th Panzergrenadier division and later 12th, 19th and 20th Panzer division - Glantz, When Titans Clashed, pg. 88) and eventually to close all the gaps.

I am of the opinion that Deep Operations doctrine was superior to Blitzkrieg, although I wouldn't consider either "far superior" to the other as doctrines were very similar - choose a weak spot, apply superior number of combined arms on a narrow frontage, achieve a breakthrough, move mechanized force in to exploit the gap, encircle enemy troops and stop reinforcements and move infantry and slower moving units in to mop up. Of course there were variations but that's the basic principle. Also, from what I remember reading, Tukhachevsky writings on the subject of Deep Battle featured prominently in Guderian's research material.



While I believe the Soviets were never as hapless as some have inferred and that they certainly became far more proficient as the war progressed, many factors played more heavily in the '44 offensives than Soviet skill at arms - such as Hitler's constant intervention, the loss of the irreplaceable core of low level officers and NCOs that translated German strategy into battlefield success, and most importantly - massive Soviet numerical superiority. There was simply no way to counter that much armor and artillery. :shrug:

True, but in the same way, many factors played more heavily in '41 and '42 offensives than German skill at arms. Stalin's constant intervention, the loss of irreplaceable core of command cadre in the purges (from the same book by Glants) - Of an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 officers in the armed forces, at least 30,000 were imprisoned or executed. They included three out of five marshals; all 11 deputy defense commissars; all commanders of military districts; the commanders and chiefs of staff of both the Navy and the Air Force; 14 of 16 army commanders; 60 of 67 corps commanders; 136 of 199 division commanders; 221 of 397 brigade commanders; and 50 percent of all regimental commanders. In addition to that, Red Army was caught mid-doctrines, trying to revert to something remotely similar to Deep Operations after it was practically abandoned after the Spanish Civil War and the death of Tukhachevsky. Defensive positions weren't prepared as they were moved west, most of the equipment was obsolete, new equipment, T-34s for example were few and still new, lacking trained crews, spare parts and fuel and most of all commanders who could use them effectively. Party Komisars terrorized army commanders, curbing any initiative. Stalin changed commanders of the fronts on a daily basis. In 1941 there were three different Chiefs of Staff. Massive numerical superiority in 1944 and 1945 wasn't really that massive and many soldiers in the Red Army were conscripted and sent to front without practically any training. They simply didn't have the staying power of German soldiers. Not to mention that even those soldiers who received proper training, as much as proper training was possible in the chaos that was the Red Army in '38, '39 and '40, they still lacked two years of combat experience their opponents had.

All in all, I would say German army in 1944 was in far better state than Red Army in 1941. By luck, instinct or good use of intelligence (probably by a combination of all three factors) Hitler attacked when Red Army was in its weakest state in decades. Red Army of the 30's would put up a better fight than Red Army of the '41. Basically Red Army in 1941 was no army. Yes, there were a bunch of people wearing the same clothes and they had weapons but that's where any similarity with an army ends.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I think his point regarding the trucks was not that the CCCP could not have produced them -- your figures confirm that they could have -- but that by not doing so they could focus on even more T-34s, KVs, and SUs.

Had the Russians been solely responsible for the production of both, their ability to both forge the powerful attack weapon they eventually did and to develop the logistical tail necessary to a sustained offensive would have been delayed by 6-18 months.

You are correct in that the CCCP, having survived 1941 and 1942, could have defeated Germany without any assistance from the West. It would have been a bit Pyrrhic, but Germany was really past its ability to win after both of those offensives petered out. Whatever else he was, Stalin was a strong enough leader to keep the Soviets in the war and fighting to win.

Had the Russians been forced to build their own transpo as well as their tanks, however, the turnaround would have been significantly slower and Soviet casualties even higher than they were.

[Oleander Ardens]

I will answer in detail later.


I am of the opinion that Deep Operations doctrine was superior to Blitzkrieg, although I wouldn't consider either "far superior" to the other as doctrines were very similar - choose a weak spot, apply superior number of combined arms on a narrow frontage, achieve a breakthrough, move mechanized force in to exploit the gap, encircle enemy troops and stop reinforcements and move infantry and slower moving units in to mop up. Of course there were variations but that's the basic principle. Also, from what I remember reading, Tukhachevsky writings on the subject of Deep Battle featured prominently in Guderian's research material.

This is a difficult topic. Note that German thought had an extremely "deep" impact on many levels in the Russian and later Soviet political, strategic an military principles. Lenin was like Mao an avid reader of "On War" - Lenin even created a specific notebook with commentary on it. Mao would later base his principles of guerillia warfare (the three states, People's War, "perserve" ) on "On War" and Lenin's reading of it. German-Soviet cooperation after 1922 was very close, German general staff training won raving reviews in the Red army. When von Brauchitsch gratulated them Soviet staff after an exercise that "everthing was done in the best tradition of the German military school" everyone looked very pleased, as Vasilevsky recalled. Tukhachevsky the "founder" of deep battle became a deep Clausowitzian at least in his writings. So while there was a vivid discussion/struggle in the triangle of strategic, political and military thought it was one framed by "German" thinking and military tradition.

But while there is no doubt that the German influence was traditionally ar greater on the Russian/Soviet thinkers as viceversa it was no one-way street. This (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lupfer/lupfer.asp) paper shows the tragic dynamics of learning in wartime. While Brusilov had with his rediscovered or invented principles great success with changes both on the operational and tactical level at least most of the tactical aspect wasn't particulary innovative.



The German Army's defensive experiences in 1917 provided another very important source of offensive expertise. The aggressive tenor of the elastic defense-in-depth, especially the counterattack, nurtured offensive excellence. To train the army for this defense, units acquired the spirit of the counterattack, and OHL had codified storm trooper techniques to assist this training. Having accumulated considerable counterattack experience in 1917, the German Army in the west already had a deceptively solid base of doctrine and experience for offensive operations.

The Germans had another source of experience on the conduct of the offense. They had defended against the Allied attacks for three years, and recognized that the Allies had been showing them what not to do.5 Reliance on massive firepower to destroy the enemy was clearly not the solution. In any event, the Germans could not match the Allied expenditure of munitions, so a different offensive technique was required. A French captain inadvertently provided one important source of inspiration for developing such new techniques.

On 9 May 1915 Capt. Andre Laffargue led an attack on a German position. Afterwards, Laffargue reflected upon the problems of the attack and expressed his ideas in a pamphlet, "The Attack in Trench Warfare." The French Army published, the pamphlet, but distributed it for information only; it did not become French doctrine. The British did not translate it.6 Early in the summer of 1916 the Germans captured a copy of the pamphlet, translated it at once, and issued it to units. Ludwig Renn wrote that Laffargue's ideas had immediate use as a tactical manual for German infantry.7

Laffargue personified that resource of talent which exists at the small unit level and develops in combat; he was a part of the "human canister" of combat who did not want to die, but to succeed.8 Exclaiming, "Let us prepare our business down to the slightest detail in order to conquer and live," he set out to record his experiences and ideas.9

Laffargue advocated a sudden attack to achieve a deep penetration. His attack resembled a gulp, not a nibble.* The momentum of the in-depth attack would disrupt the enemy, keep him off balance, and prevent him from organizing an effective response. To capitalize on disruption, the assault had to advance as far as possible. The first wave would identify-not reduce-defensive strongpoints and subsequent attack waves would destroy them. An artillery bombardment applied suddenly in depth throughout the enemy area would precede the infantry assault. Disruption of enemy artillery batteries was particularly important to protect the infantry advance.

*The metaphor likening attacks to consumption of food was popular in the First World War. Joffre described his 1915 strategy of numerous attacks with limited objectives by stating, "I am nibbling at them."10 The German attack regulations of 1918 used the same metaphor and described "devouring" the enemy position.

Laffargue stated that all troops were not assault troops; special training and care were necessary to develop the aggressiveness and skill for the assault. Ironically, the German storm units best epitomized this idea of elite assault units. In his pamphlet, Laffargue also expressed the need for an automatic rifle for firepower in advance positions, a need later met in all armies during the way by the light machine gun.11

Although they did not adopt all of Laffargue's ideas (for example, he was very insistent on some rather cumbersome formations), the Germans derived, greater benefit from his ideas and put more of his ideas into practice than the French did. German units became well acquainted with his concepts and the operations section of OHL was impressed with the practical combination of surprise, firepower, and maneuver to break the tactical stalemate.12

Soviet experience and thinking was mostly important for the technical aspect of the revolutions in technology and the resulting tactical consequences, given the limited possibilities of the Reichwehr to train at home. So although essentially based on the German military philosophy of Bewegungskrieg both "Deep Battle" and the so called "Blitzkrieg" featured interlocking evolutions which integrated new technology and procedures.

A good overview (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lupfer/lupfer.asp)

[PanzerJaeger]

Please excuse the rambling nature of this post... 2 exams and little sleep have taken their toll...




True in a way, but if we're gonna count only troops that were of German quality than we would probably end not counting all other troops involved in WW2. Overall, German army was of better quality than any other involved in the WW2. Also, many of the Soviet troops even in 1945 and especially so in 1941 or 1942 were sent to the fronts without practically the basic training and many Soviet divisions were of poorer quality than Romanian divisions.

I mostly agree, although I'm not sure about the Romanian divisions versus the Russian. I would contend that they were only better in quality than the Italian divisions. (:laugh4:) Also, Russian training increased in quality throughout the war, while that of the Eastern European allies tended to fall dramatically from their already poor state.

I do think it is important to make the distinctions, though, especially in regards to "quick and dirty" summaries of battles such as those found on Wiki - which are shoddy at best at breaking those numbers down. Minor allies can add significantly to the Axis numbers without adding anything to the combat effectiveness of army group in question, especially in the period we are discussing.




Why are Hitler's idiotic decisions excuse for every defeat and Stalin's aren't? It's often emphasized how Stalin trusted his generals unlike Hitler who interfered in every decision while both of them interfered and made disastrous decisions. The difference is that Stalin interfered gradually less and Hitler gradually more as the war went on.

I listed Hitler's interference as a factor, not an excuse, in the timeframe we are discussing (1944), and not as a comparison to Stalin's earlier interventions in Soviet Operations.

I will say that in my opinion, Hitler's interference may be weighted more in historical analysis than Stalin’s for a few reasons. Keep in mind this is just my opinion, and I'm not necessarily convinced that the imbalance you mentioned exists, as I have seen plenty of references to Stalin's meddling when describing the Red Army's operations in the early stages of the war.

First of all, while Stalin's decisions are now evidently clear to have been suicidal for his forces, at the time there was reason to be optimistic. In many of the defeats in which Stalin personally gave stand fast orders, the Soviet Union outnumbered the Germans by a significant margin and were on the defense. Remember, too, that in this early stage of the war, it was inconceivable to many in STAVKA, that such huge numbers of troops could be encircled by the relatively small mobile forces of the Wehrmacht. Sure there were people such as Zhukov who realized the situation early on, but there were plenty who disagreed. On the other hand, Hitler's interference in the later stages of the war was clearly suicidal to all. Russian capabilities were well known by that time and the standard defense against them (elastic) was in direct opposition to stand fast orders and required local freedom of operation, not orders from the Wolf's Lair hundreds of miles away.

Second, it is important to remember that Germany and Russia had very different standards for success in '41. The Wehrmacht's main goal was to instigate and win a climactic battle which would so devastate Russia that it would end the war. To that aim, they pursued the massive envelopments that characterized this period, while trying to keep casualties as low as possible. For Russia, the primary measure of success was time - not land and certainly not soldiers. Every day that passed and Moscow had not been taken, Germany crept ever closer to the perils that came with the winter and the Eastern Divisions en route from the Manchurian border.

In this light, Stalin's stand fast orders and other military bungling were not necessarily wrong. They may not have been the best use of Russian forces and certainly lost huge numbers of soldiers, but they did not actually cost the USSR any land, as it would have been lost anyway in a retreat; and more importantly they cost the Wehrmacht precious time and energy. For example, the diversion to capture Kiev may have been a spectacular success, but it cost the Axis many thousands of irreplaceable soldiers and 4 critical warm weather weeks. Also, the decisions to hold Leningrad and later Stalingrad during Case Blue, when prevailing wisdom was to avoid encirclement, were correct outright.

Conversely, it is quite difficult to make a case for any of Hitler's stand fast orders or other interventions in the later stages of the war. Unlike the USSR in '41, manpower was always at a premium for Germany, and never more so than in '44 and '45. Needless sacrificing of it for a few days or weeks time did not yield the same benefits as it did for Russia. Unlike the USSR, the loss of each trained and experienced soldier had significant repercussions on the combat effectiveness of his unit. More importantly, Hitler stripped his forces of one of the key factors that allowed them to outfight much larger Soviet formations - mobility. If the Germans were to have any chance at all in halting the massive offensives of '44, they needed the ability to first step out of the way of the hammer blow, and then use their superior coordination to strike back once the Russians had exhausted themselves. Instead, Hitler forced his troops to face the largest artillery and armored assaults in history.




Stavka members (Zhukov especially) warned Stalin that Kiev would be lost and should be abandoned because Germans would encircle the city and trap. Stalin wouldn't hear of it and removed Zhukov from his position of the Chief of Staff. Kiev was lost precisely in a way Zhukov said it would and app. 600,000 Red Army troops was lost. That's seen as great German victory because of their tactical, doctrinal, strategic or whichever superiority. At Stalingrad, Hitler forbade 6th Army to try to break out, 300,000 German soldiers were lost. That's seen as Hitler's stupidity.

Well, I don't personally consider Kiev one of the greatest German victories of the war, although I suppose technically it was the single greatest one - being the largest encirclement of troops in history. I think the battles leading up to Kiev, particularly Brody and Uman, are much more demonstrative of German doctrinal and tactical superiority than Kiev. Brody in particular was the largest tank engagement in history until Kursk, where German armored forces fought off and then destroyed a multi-pronged attack from several much larger Soviet tank corps employing the T-34 for the first time - which no German tank could counter. German skill alone was the deciding factor in the battle.

There are some differences between Kiev and Stalingrad, though, besides the differences in the size of the forces captured. The Kiev area was encircled and the troops within it destroyed by a significantly smaller German force. Considering that only around 15% of the German force was mobile, the numbers are even more dramatic. The encirclement at Stalingrad was conducted with a larger Russian force - 5 entire armies with far more mobile elements. Also, while the Soviet force at Kiev did include some spill over from previous battles, it had large amounts of fresh divisions. The German forces at Stalingrad were completely exhausted.

In hindsight, Zhukov was certainly correct, but his accurate prediction cannot discount the tactical, doctrinal, strategic or whichever superiority that contributed to the victory. Kiev was the culmination of all that Wehrmacht theorists and tacticians had been working toward, in that mastery of maneuver and agility had rendered numbers meaningless.

Stalingrad, on the other hand, yielded a more predictable outcome. Hitler ignored the lessons learned in past campaigns and squandered German troops in bitter street fighting which negated their natural advantages against the Soviets - all the while refusing the Romanians any support on the flanks. The fact that five fresh Soviet armies broke through the poorly guarded flanks and encircled a smaller and exhausted German army is not particularly stunning, and was not to the Germans commanders who tried to warn Hitler about it. Compounding his idiocy in conducting the initial battle, Hitler then refused to authorize an immediate breakout.

So while the huge loss at Kiev did certainly involve an element of poor Soviet command - Stalin's orders - the vastness of the forces enveloped still demonstrated the degree of skill the Wehrmacht and the panzer forces in particular had developed by that time. On the other hand, Stalingrad simply demonstrated that if a large enough numerical superiority could be achieved, an adequately exhausted and depleted German army could be defeated.




In a way, after '43, German army started to look more and more like the Red Army in 1941 and 1942, while after '43, Red Army started to look more like German army in 1941. Hitler sent Fuehrungoffiziers, which were practically Nazi equivalents of Party Komisars to monitor various commanders, effectively curbing any initiative that they might have had before. Fuehrungoffiziers blamed commanders for every defeat and usually relieved them of command on the spot. Every city was declared a fortress city that's to be defended to the last man etc... Every single one of those things Stalin did in 1941 and 1942 and even 1943, to a lesser degree. So, in essence, why are 1941 and 1942 seen as the period of German crushing victories because of their superiority and 1944 and 1945 are seen as the period of Soviet crushing victories because of Hitler's stupidity?

I think I addressed this earlier. Numbers play a big part, not to mention the fact that the German victories were scored against a fresh army while the Russian ones were achieved well after attrition had had a major impact on the Wehrmacht. Also Stalin’s decisions are not viewed to be as detrimental as Hitler’s.

Further, I think history distinguishes between the two periods not so much based on the victories themselves, but how they were achieved. The German victories were achieved with a level of finesse that the Russians did not quite master – which is admirable to many.




Again, why is German inferior equipment suddenly an excuse? Earlier German tanks could destroy T-34/75 if they got close or attacked it from the flank or rear. When Manstein's tanks spearheaded by brand new Panthers and Tigers got dangerously close to penetrating Soviet defenses at Kursk, Vatutin's tank army was sent to stop them. The best tank in that army was T-34/75 as 85mm variant didn't exist yet. T-34/75 couldn't penetrate frontal armour of either Panther or Tiger unless at very close range or if it ataccked their sides or rear. On the other hand, Tigers and Panthers could engage T-34/75 at several time bigger distance and they did, quite lethally. So, are we to discount entire Vatutin's tank army because it was inferior and say that Von Manstein was stopped by ghosts?

The point being that Russian armored strength was even greater than the numbers given, as many of the tanks counted as operational could not engage Russian armor at all. Remember, a T-34/76 could successfully engage a Tiger. It was at a significant disadvantage, but it was possible. Many German tanks still counted as operational at this time could not engage a T-34 at all.

If you want to count all German tanks capable of engaging Russian armor with any degree of success, we will have to include later models of the pz.III. Still, one has to remember that the German army still employed many smaller tanks such as pz.IIs, pz.38(t)s, etc for scouting and other purposes but which would never been sent into combat as they had no chance of success against Soviet armor.




True, there were instances when German managed to perform well in 1944 or even 1945, but also there are instances when Soviet managed to do the same in 1941, like Je'lna counteroffensive by Zhukov. All in all, it doesn't prove much.

I would contend that it proves much more than the Soviet victories do, considering the massive numerical imbalances involved.




I am of the opinion that Deep Operations doctrine was superior to Blitzkrieg, although I wouldn't consider either "far superior" to the other as doctrines were very similar - choose a weak spot, apply superior number of combined arms on a narrow frontage, achieve a breakthrough, move mechanized force in to exploit the gap, encircle enemy troops and stop reinforcements and move infantry and slower moving units in to mop up. Of course there were variations but that's the basic principle. Also, from what I remember reading, Tukhachevsky writings on the subject of Deep Battle featured prominently in Guderian's research material.

Deep Operations is a little too open ended for my tastes. If your enemy is not completely helpless, you end up with a hodgepodge of penetrations that are hard to maintain and supply and are more vulnerable to counterattack. With the somewhat more definite nature of Blitzkrieg and its adaptions throughout the war, you end up with those nice big encirclements that can be easier to hold. Of course as you mentioned the two are very close and a competent commander could certainly achieve large encirclements and further success using Deep Operations.

What made the Germans, in my opinion, far superior throughout the war was not just doctrines such as Blitzkrieg, Kampfgruppe, and elastic defense, but their efficiency in carrying them out.

As I mentioned before, I concur that there is nothing particularly wrong with the Deep Operations doctrine. In fact, it was far superior to most of what was being taught throughout the civilized world, including the attritional doctrines among the Western Allied and it worked great against the Japanese.

The problem for the Soviets, in my opinion, was that when they faced an enemy with any degree of mobility, their capabilities never matched what was called for in the doctrine. The history of the Eastern front in ’43, ’44, and even ‘45 is littered with examples of Soviet forces advancing too far and being cut off and destroyed – on both a small and a grand scale. (Manstein became so confident of this occurrence that it became the central tenant in the alternate plan he presented to the Kursk offensive.)

Russian forces never achieved the leadership skill, training, and coordination necessary to conduct a successful offensive based on Deep Operations unless they had massive numerical superiority, and even then they could expect to lose a large part of their lead elements to localized German tactical victories.

On the other hand, it is very difficult to find examples of German pincers being cut off and destroyed. There were of course many pockets left in the wake of Soviet offensives – some of which the Germans were able to breakout from and some of which they were not – but on the offensive the Germans were generally very proficient at keeping their lead elements both alive and effective, even deep into enemy territory. This reflected a certain degree of leadership, planning, training, and coordination that the Russians never developed. One factor almost completely missing was a sophisticated air transport system which delivered invaluable supplies to both advancing German pincers and those troops trapped in pockets.




True, but in the same way, many factors played more heavily in '41 and '42 offensives than German skill at arms. Stalin's constant intervention, the loss of irreplaceable core of command cadre in the purges (from the same book by Glants) - Of an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 officers in the armed forces, at least 30,000 were imprisoned or executed. They included three out of five marshals; all 11 deputy defense commissars; all commanders of military districts; the commanders and chiefs of staff of both the Navy and the Air Force; 14 of 16 army commanders; 60 of 67 corps commanders; 136 of 199 division commanders; 221 of 397 brigade commanders; and 50 percent of all regimental commanders. In addition to that, Red Army was caught mid-doctrines, trying to revert to something remotely similar to Deep Operations after it was practically abandoned after the Spanish Civil War and the death of Tukhachevsky. Defensive positions weren't prepared as they were moved west, most of the equipment was obsolete, new equipment, T-34s for example were few and still new, lacking trained crews, spare parts and fuel and most of all commanders who could use them effectively. Party Komisars terrorized army commanders, curbing any initiative. Stalin changed commanders of the fronts on a daily basis. In 1941 there were three different Chiefs of Staff. Massive numerical superiority in 1944 and 1945 wasn't really that massive and many soldiers in the Red Army were conscripted and sent to front without practically any training. They simply didn't have the staying power of German soldiers. Not to mention that even those soldiers who received proper training, as much as proper training was possible in the chaos that was the Red Army in '38, '39 and '40, they still lacked two years of combat experience their opponents had.

All in all, I would say German army in 1944 was in far better state than Red Army in 1941. By luck, instinct or good use of intelligence (probably by a combination of all three factors) Hitler attacked when Red Army was in its weakest state in decades. Red Army of the 30's would put up a better fight than Red Army of the '41. Basically Red Army in 1941 was no army. Yes, there were a bunch of people wearing the same clothes and they had weapons but that's where any similarity with an army ends.

I disagree almost completely with your later points. :P

Both the Russian army and the German army faced organizational issues before the war. Russia had the Purges and Germany had a little thing called WW1. It should be taken into account that the German military, too, was hamstrung until the very late thirties in much of its military development. For example, tank development lagged significantly behind other nations.

Furthermore, while the effects of the Purges certainly had a negative effect on the Russian military – those effects should not be overstated. While the administrative experience of the officers purged lost was costly, their practical battle experience was of little more value than the officers that replaced them. In fact, some old WW1 vets were replaced with fresh thinkers. Also, it should be remembered that Stalin eventually reinstated a large percentage of those dismissed during the purges.

The Red Army was still very much a competent, functioning military in ’41 – capable of conducting both defensive and offensive operations. Despite the purges, it still had highly skilled commanders such as Zhukov. It had large numbers of trained soldiers (training was much better pre-war than during the first years) and large numbers of armor and artillery, some of it better than that of the Germans. It had one of the largest air forces in the world, and a logistical system larger than that of the Germans. Also, it did have significant recent battle experience in both the victory at Khalkhin Gol, the struggles of the Winter War, and the invasion of Poland – all of which offered invaluable knowledge.

All of this is evident in battles such as Brody and others, which I referenced above, where the Soviets were able to form cohesive fighting formations and engage the enemy in offensive armored thrusts that were far more skillful than anything seen in France. The Germans outfought them, but they were hardly just a bunch of guys sitting around in uniforms waiting to be captured. I believe Axis casualty rates were higher in the East than the West almost from the start. If we were to go by your summation, neither the French nor the British had real armies either.

I just don’t think the situation is comparable to ’44. The numerical imbalances were massive, as can be seen in earlier posts in this thread, especially in armor and artillery. Not to mention that the Wehrmacht had been bled white over years of fighting, while the Red Army only grew in strength and combat effectiveness. Without a counter to Soviet Armored thrusts – ie a significant panzer reserve or artillery screen – the Germans had no chance of success in ’44. The Soviets did in ’41.

[Sarmatian]

I will answer in detail later.


I don't expect anything less from you or PJ, for that mater :2thumbsup:

Considering this post, I think it is common knowledge that Russian military thought was influenced by German more than any other since the time of Peter the Great but in this case I was talking about WW2 and concepts of Blitzkrieg and Deep Operations. I don't see what that has got to do with Clausewitz or Brusilov. Military strategy has evolved constantly through the ages, and great and innovative thinkers built on and added to the concepts earlier times, adapting them to suit current time and needs. That involves more than just copy/pasting and sometime these innovations were advanced enough to be considered revolutionary on their own, even though their basis is the work of someone else.



Please excuse the rambling nature of this post... 2 exams and little sleep have taken their toll...
I mostly agree, although I'm not sure about the Romanian divisions versus the Russian. I would contend that they were only better in quality than the Italian divisions. (:laugh4:) Also, Russian training increased in quality throughout the war, while that of the Eastern European allies tended to fall dramatically from their already poor state.

I do think it is important to make the distinctions, though, especially in regards to "quick and dirty" summaries of battles such as those found on Wiki - which are shoddy at best at breaking those numbers down. Minor allies can add significantly to the Axis numbers without adding anything to the combat effectiveness of army group in question, especially in the period we are discussing.

That is only partially true. After disastrous defeats in the first few months of the war, when most of the trained soldiers were lost, Russian had to rush mobilization and conscription throughout the entire war. Training time was shortened, soldiers were given nothing but the most basic of training before being put to the combat. Anything remotely complicated, like cooperation with different units not to mention cooperation with units of different types was ignored. Also, there were many instances when commanders conscripted civilians on the spot. At least 10 divisions, most of them involved in the defense Moscow at the end of '41, were People's Volunteers, literally civilians who were given weapons with no training whatsoever.

The numbers I used were not from wiki but by Glantz. I would thoroughly recommend him as a reading - by far the most complete and most accurate account of the Red Army during the WW2 and interwar period, filled with tables and numbers. He stayed clear of practically all questionable sources and made good use of the new and/or previously unavailable sources.




I listed Hitler's interference as a factor, not an excuse, in the timeframe we are discussing (1944), and not as a comparison to Stalin's earlier interventions in Soviet Operations.

I will say that in my opinion, Hitler's interference may be weighted more in historical analysis than Stalin’s for a few reasons. Keep in mind this is just my opinion, and I'm not necessarily convinced that the imbalance you mentioned exists, as I have seen plenty of references to Stalin's meddling when describing the Red Army's operations in the early stages of the war.

First of all, while Stalin's decisions are now evidently clear to have been suicidal for his forces, at the time there was reason to be optimistic. In many of the defeats in which Stalin personally gave stand fast orders, the Soviet Union outnumbered the Germans by a significant margin and were on the defense. Remember, too, that in this early stage of the war, it was inconceivable to many in STAVKA, that such huge numbers of troops could be encircled by the relatively small mobile forces of the Wehrmacht. Sure there were people such as Zhukov who realized the situation early on, but there were plenty who disagreed. On the other hand, Hitler's interference in the later stages of the war was clearly suicidal to all. Russian capabilities were well known by that time and the standard defense against them (elastic) was in direct opposition to stand fast orders and required local freedom of operation, not orders from the Wolf's Lair hundreds of miles away.

Second, it is important to remember that Germany and Russia had very different standards for success in '41. The Wehrmacht's main goal was to instigate and win a climactic battle which would so devastate Russia that it would end the war. To that aim, they pursued the massive envelopments that characterized this period, while trying to keep casualties as low as possible. For Russia, the primary measure of success was time - not land and certainly not soldiers. Every day that passed and Moscow had not been taken, Germany crept ever closer to the perils that came with the winter and the Eastern Divisions en route from the Manchurian border.

In general, I'd say Stalin's meddling was far disastrous than Hitler's. I'm speaking of Stalin's meddling not just during the WW2 but also several years before. While Hitler's mistakes merely sped up the inevitable, Stalin's brought the Red Army on the brink of defeat. In just 4 years (1937-1941) he managed to totally mess up what used to be strongest, largest and most advanced army in the world in the 1930's.

Stalin has had several of warnings about Kiev, not just from Zhukov, but also from Kruschev and Budenny and from the Chief of Staff of Southwestern Front Tupikov.

Additionally, until November '41 and report from Richard Sorge that Japan won't attack for sure for another year, Far Eastern armies weren't supposed to be touched.

There are reports of Stalin's meddling but they were never as numerous as reports about Hitler's. There are several reasons for that. First, practically all we knew about the Eastern Front, until 1990's, came from the German side. Second, Red Army won, so there was much less desire to search for mistakes and who was responsible for them, especially outside Soviet Union. Third, some German commanders found it a convenient excuse for their failures. Fourth, Hitler was dead so he couldn't object while Stalin was very much alive and kicking.


In this light, Stalin's stand fast orders and other military bungling were not necessarily wrong. They may not have been the best use of Russian forces and certainly lost huge numbers of soldiers, but they did not actually cost the USSR any land, as it would have been lost anyway in a retreat; and more importantly they cost the Wehrmacht precious time and energy. For example, the diversion to capture Kiev may have been a spectacular success, but it cost the Axis many thousands of irreplaceable soldiers and 4 critical warm weather months. Also, the decisions to hold Leningrad and later Stalingrad during Case Blue, when prevailing wisdom was to avoid encirclement, were correct outright.

Conversely, it is quite difficult to make a case for any of Hitler's stand fast orders or other interventions in the later stages of the war. Unlike the USSR in '41, manpower was always at a premium for Germany, and never more so than in '44 and '45. Needless sacrificing of it for a few days or weeks time did not yield the same benefits as it did for Russia. Unlike the USSR, the loss of each trained and experienced soldier had significant repercussions on the combat effectiveness of his unit. More importantly, Hitler stripped his forces of one of the key factors that allowed them to outfight much larger Soviet formations - mobility. If the Germans were to have any chance at all in halting the massive offensives of '44, they needed the ability to first step out of the way of the hammer blow, and then use their superior coordination to strike back once the Russians had exhausted themselves. Instead, Hitler forced his troops to face the largest artillery and armored assaults in history.


Indeed, we've seen time and again in war that sometimes stubborn resilience and opposition will do more than elaborate plans by experts.

Even Hitler's stand fast orders proved correct sometimes, like during December '41 Moscow counter-offensive. After the initial success, Stalin (again against the advice of his generals) wanted to broaden and expand the offensive. Zhukov and other experienced commanders knew that offensive was based on fresh troops from the Far East and limited number of skiers, tanks and cavalry that were rapidly losing their strength and outrunning their logistical tail.


Well, I don't personally consider Kiev one of the greatest German victories of the war, although I suppose technically it was the single greatest one - being the largest encirclement of troops in history. I think the battles leading up to Kiev, particularly Brody and Uman, are much more demonstrative of German doctrinal and tactical superiority than Kiev. Brody in particular was the largest tank engagement in history until Kursk, where German armored forces fought off and then destroyed a multi-pronged attack from several much larger Soviet tank corps employing the T-34 for the first time - which no German tank could counter. German skill alone was the deciding factor in the battle.

There are some differences between Kiev and Stalingrad, though, besides the differences in the size of the forces captured. The Kiev area was encircled and the troops within it destroyed by a significantly smaller German force. Considering that only around 15% of the German force was mobile, the numbers are even more dramatic. The encirclement at Stalingrad was conducted with a larger Russian force - 5 entire armies with far more mobile elements. Also, while the Soviet force at Kiev did include some spill over from previous battles, it had large amounts of fresh divisions. The German forces at Stalingrad were completely exhausted.

In hindsight, Zhukov was certainly correct, but his accurate prediction cannot discount the tactical, doctrinal, strategic or whichever superiority that contributed to the victory. Kiev was the culmination of all that Wehrmacht theorists and tacticians had been working toward, in that mastery of maneuver and agility had rendered numbers meaningless.


Although Red Army had numerical superiority in the case of Kiev it was vastly outnumbered in tanks, both in terms of numbers and quality, and aircraft.


Stalingrad, on the other hand, yielded a more predictable outcome. Hitler ignored the lessons learned in past campaigns and squandered in bitter street fighting that negated their natural advantages against the Soviets - all the while refusing the Romanians any support on the flanks. The fact that five fresh Soviet armies broke through the poorly guarded flanks and encircled a smaller and exhausted German army is not particularly stunning, and was not to the Germans commanders who tried to warn Hitler about it. Compounding his idiocy in conducting the initial battle, Hitler then refused to authorize an immediate breakout.

So while the huge loss at Kiev did certainly involve an element of poor Soviet command - Stalin's orders - the vastness of the forces enveloped still demonstrated the degree of skill the Wehrmacht and the panzer forces in particular had developed by that time. On the other hand, Stalingrad simply demonstrated that if a large enough numerical superiority could be achieved, an adequately exhausted and depleted German army could be defeated.

Sure, when you present it that way, it's looks as simple as drinking a glass of water. The true success there wasn't deploying fresh troops against weaker but dragging a large portion of the better trained army into urban fighting where their superior skill and training wouldn't count for much, getting them to exhaust themselves while preparing fresh troops for counter-offensive that would shatter them. Also, the decision to take Stalingrad wasn't unsound. All supply lines to the Caucasus went through Stalingrad. By taking the city, Wehrmacht would severely weaken Russian ability to reinforce and resupply troops in the Caucasus


The point being that Russian armored strength was even greater than the numbers given, as many of the tanks counted as operational could not engage Russian armor at all. Remember, a T-34/76 could successfully engage a Tiger. It was at a significant disadvantage, but it was possible. Many German tanks still counted as operational at this time could not engage a T-34 at all.

If you want to count all German tanks capable of engaging Russian armor with any degree of success, we will have to include later models of the pz.III. Still, one has to remember that the German army still employed many smaller tanks such as pz.IIs, pz.38(t)s, etc for scouting and other purposes but which would never been sent into combat as they had no chance of success against Soviet armor.

Actually it wasn't. You're mistaken since you presume to T-34/76 formed the mainstay of Soviet tanks, which is as far from truth as it gets. In June '41, T-34's made up less than 4% and KV's formed less than 2% of all Soviet tanks (they were new and unreliable, most of them were sent near the border with Germany, without trained crews, spare parts and often ammunition). The rest were T-26's and various version of BT's. Those two models were on par, even slightly worse than Panzer II and III and seriously undergunned and underarmoured compared to Panzer IV, even before high velocity gun was mounted on it. Soviets produced a lot of light tanks in during the war, the most important reason is lend-lease probably. As various motor vehicles were arriving from the US, many factories switched to light tanks. They couldn't switch to medium and heavy because that required a good degree of specialization. In fact, only 5 or 6 factories could produce T-34's in the USSR and only 3 of them produced a significant numbers (the rest produced between 500-1500 T-34 during the entire war). Before German invasion, all T-34's were made in Kharkov. That factory had to be dismantled and sent behind the Urals to Nizhniy Tagil when it became clear that Germans would take Kharkov. Other factory capable of producing T-34 in 1941 was Kirov factory in Leningrad, also moved to the east. Neither of them started production before 1942 and both had problems with workers, there weren't enough of them and they weren't sufficiently skilled, so T-34 produced at the beginning of 1942 were few and of poor quality. Until mid-1942, Red Army had to make the most of several hundred T-34 produced in Kharkov before relocation. As 1942 went on the situation gradually improved but T-34's didn't appear in significant numbers until 1943. Even in 1943, T-34's and KV's together didn't make more than half of Soviet tanks, the other half being made up of light reconnaissance tanks, T-50, T-60 or T-70, probably even some T-26's and BT's that left over. Russians, like Germans found out that light tanks were becoming obsolete increasingly fast, even for scouting purposes and they were often relegated to towing artillery. In 1945 T-34's (both 76 and 85 variants) made up 55% of all Soviet tanks


What made the Germans, in my opinion, far superior throughout the war was not just doctrines such as Blitzkrieg, Kampfgruppe, and elastic defense, but their efficiency in carrying them out.

As I mentioned before, I concur that there is nothing particularly wrong with the Deep Operations doctrine. In fact, it was far superior to most of what was being taught throughout the civilized world, including the attritional doctrines among the Western Allied and it worked great against the Japanese.

You're right, actually. It really wasn't so much about the doctrines but the ability to carry them out. The basic concept behind Blitzkrieg or Deep Operations wasn't that hard to grasp. Even people whose I.Q. was measured in two figures could do it but there were certain preconditions that had to be met - enough technologically advanced mobile forces (tanks, mechanized and motorized infantry), sufficiently trained and experienced troops and, most importantly, commanders skilled enough to perform it, from high-ups such as generals down to captains on the field of battle. So, even though there were some local applications of the concept within the Allies, Patton for example, they simply didn't have the skilled enough troops or commanders to perform it on a large scale, just like Soviets weren't able to do it before 1944 properly. There were occasional flashes of it in 1941 and 1942 that became more and more frequent but offensives in the true spirit of Deep Operation had to wait until 1944 and 1945.

Also, maybe the most important reason for allies not to try hard to adopt it was because they had the luxury of time and by using superior firepower they could get the job done. It took more time and less human casualties but Allies had all the time in the world. Sure it presented problems sometimes but considering their situation it was a logical decision.


The problem for the Soviets, in my opinion, was that when they faced an enemy with any degree of mobility, their capabilities never matched what was called for in the doctrine. The history of the Eastern front in ’43, ’44, and even ‘45 is littered with examples of Soviet forces advancing too far and being cut off and destroyed – on both a small and a grand scale. (Manstein became so confident of this occurrence that it became the central tenant in the alternate plan he presented to the Kursk offensive.)

Russian forces never achieved the leadership skill, training, and coordination necessary to conduct a successful offensive based on Deep Operations unless they had massive numerical superiority, and even then they could expect to lose a large part of their lead elements to localized German tactical victories.

That is another misconception. Problem is that until 1990's, we (I mean we, as in, all of us not in the Soviet Union) only had German sources which often were incomplete and more than a little biased. They naturally focused more on German victories than on German defeats, just like Russian sources focused more on their victories than their defeats. Also, Soviets themselves are partially to blame. Information that got to the west was usually half-filled with propaganda, and more often than not they could be summed up as honest, barehanded communist supported by his equally underequipped comrades attacking well entrenched fascist position and tanks and winning because of his pure worker's heart and bravery. I'm exaggerating, of course but you get the point.

There are plenty of examples of large scale Deep Operation being performed with near perfection. Operation Bagration immediately comes to mind. It was performed against AG Center. That army group was practically intact, although it weakened to reinforce AG South but itself didn't see any large scale combat for quite some time. There was more than enough time to prepare defenses, something Soviet didn't usually have the time to do in 1941 and even sometimes in 1942.

The sheer scale preparations is mind boggling, as is the deception that they would attack in the south. Usually Soviet offensives in that period almost always caught Wehrmacht by surprise. Even when Germans found out about the offensive they usually underestimated Soviet capabilities and that was not just bad commanders. After Kursk, Manstein was certain that Soviets were badly hurt and that they would have to spend some time licking their wounds. He didn't expect any large Soviet offensives for quite some time. He must have been really taken off guard when Soviet offensive started practically immediately. German army usually didn't know the scale of Soviet preparations or the size of the force assembled until it hit them and then it was usually too late to make adjustments. Russian Maskirovka proved its worth time and time again.

Furthermore, German sources often didn't grasp correctly what was happening. They treated all offensives separately. In truth, Operation Bagration was just a part of general offensive that was planned. The most important part but only a part. That general offensive consisted of Karelian Isthmus - 10 June, Bagration - 22 June, Lvov-Sandomierz - 13 July, Lublin-Brest 18 July, and lassy-Kishinev 20 August. It involved planning and organizing millions of troops, millions pieces of various equipment in a theater that stretched from Finland to Romania. Wehrmacht was pushed back, lost its best troops and lost two important minor allies. In addition, German irreplaceable losses were significantly higher that Soviet.


On the other hand, it is very difficult to find examples of German pincers being cut off and destroyed. There were of course many pockets left in the wake of Soviet offensives – some of which the Germans were able to breakout from and some of which they were not – but on the offensive the Germans were generally very proficient at keeping their lead elements both alive and effective, even deep into enemy territory. This reflected a certain degree of leadership, planning, training, and coordination that the Russians never developed. One factor almost completely missing was a sophisticated air transport system which delivered invaluable supplies to both advancing German pincers and those troops trapped in pockets.

There are, if you choose to look for it. You won't find that many for several reasons - in 1941 and 1942 Germans still had qualitative superiority in tanks, as I explained how problematic production of T-34 was, and often numerical superiority. Wehrmacht also had undisputed air superiority at the time. Red Army lacked tanks, airplanes, artillery, trained troops and skilled commanders in 1941 and for the most of 1942. In that period, Germans still had enough reserves to counter-attack. In the later stages of the war, Germans practically didn't make anything remotely similar to a serious offensive so it was naturally hard for the Red Army to cut them off. They mostly limited themselves to tactical withdrawals and small scale counter-offensives, with few exceptions.

If you want concrete examples - during Typhoon, on the advance on Mcensk, 4th Panzer division (part of Guderian's Panzer army) fell into a trap set by Leliushenko. It moved into prepared anti-tank defenses bolstered by Katyusha rocket launchers. When it started to withdraw, the few available T-34 emerged from the forest where they were hiding in ambush and cut them off. In the aftermath 4th Panzer division lost all its tanks.
In the Moscow counteroffensive, several German divisions were cut off and destroyed. Also, near Elets, entire XXXIV army corps, part of the Guderian's southern flank was encircled and destroyed. That's only some examples from '41.

The basic principle behind these counter-offensives was also remarkably similar and simple on both sides. When the enemy started its attack, fall back to prepared (usually anti-tank) defenses, inflict significant losses and then move in troops and reserves if needed to encircle or finish him off. In the 1941 and 1942 Germans still had enough equipment, reserves and quality troops to absorb anything but the best planned and executed Soviet offensives. Soviets on the other hand were usually short of quality tanks, artillery, aircraft, trained men and skilled commanders. For example, during Soviets offensives in 1941 there were 7 to 12 artillery pieces and mortars per kilometer of Soviet lines. That density increased tenfold in 1942 and probably hundredfold in the '44 and '45.



I disagree almost completely with your later points. :P

Both the Russian army and the German army faced organizational issues before the war. Russia had the Purges and Germany had a little thing called WW1. It should be taken into account that the German military, too, was hamstrung until the very late thirties in much of its military development. For example, tank development lagged significantly behind other nations.

Furthermore, while the effects of the Purges certainly had a negative effect on the Russian military – those effects should not be overstated. While the administrative experience of the officers purged lost was costly, their practical battle experience was of little more value than the officers that replaced them. In fact, some old WW1 vets were replaced with fresh thinkers. Also, it should be remembered that Stalin eventually reinstated a large percentage of those dismissed during the purges.

The Red Army was still very much a competent, functioning military in ’41 – capable of conducting both defensive and offensive operations. Despite the purges, it still had highly skilled commanders such as Zhukov. It had large numbers of trained soldiers (training was much better pre-war than during the first years) and large numbers of armor and artillery, some of it better than that of the Germans. It had one of the largest air forces in the world, and a logistical system larger than that of the Germans. Also, it did have significant recent battle experience in both the victory at Khalkhin Gol, the struggles of the Winter War, and the invasion of Poland – all of which offered invaluable knowledge.

All of this is evident in battles such as Brody and others, which I referenced above, where the Soviets were able to form cohesive fighting formations and engage the enemy in offensive armored thrusts that were far more skillful than anything seen in France. The Germans outfought them, but they were hardly just a bunch of guys sitting around in uniforms waiting to be captured. I believe Axis casualty rates were higher in the East than the West almost from the start. If we were to go by your summation, neither the French nor the British had real armies either.

I just don’t think the situation is comparable to ’44. The numerical imbalances were massive, as can be seen in earlier posts in this thread, especially in armor and artillery. Not to mention that the Wehrmacht had been bled white over years of fighting, while the Red Army only grew in strength and combat effectiveness. Without a counter to Soviet Armored thrusts – ie a significant panzer reserve or artillery screen – the Germans had no chance of success in ’44. The Soviets did in ’41.

I thought you would :D.

It is actually impossible to overstate how pathetic Red Army was in 1941, especially its defenses in Belorussia and Ukraine. To understand it, we have to go back to WW1.

During the Russian civil war, Red Army fought not just the White Army but also had to fight off Polish invasion and several intervention forces than landed in Russia - Brits and Americans in Archangels and Murmansk, French in Crimea and Caucasus, Czech veterans that took control of Trans-Siberian railroad and cut off Russian Far East where Japanese and Americans roamed at will. Red Army was outnumbered and had to cover vast amounts of land. That war was much more mobile than the one in the west. Red Army had to end the battles quickly and with minimal losses. For that purpose brilliant minds like Tukhachevsky emphasized the strategy from which Deep Battle and Deep Operation doctrines were created - use of mobile forces to penetrate defences, in that time it was usually cavalry, armoured cars and armoured trains where applicable, and to continue exploitation far into enemy rear, never allow him to form a new defensive line or regroup. You see that its practically the same doctrine applied by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in WW2, only with WW1 weapons. There were similar lines of thought in all major armies of the world but only in the Soviet Union that doctrine received official support and was codified as army doctrine in the manual of 1936. I assume you know how much difficulties Manstein and Guderian had when they tried to push their plan for attack on France, not just by Hitler but also by other senior commanders like Halder.

In the thirties Soviet adopted tank as the main weapon for such a doctrine. The first doubts begin to appear after the Spanish Civil War. Tanks of the time still weren't advanced enough, Soviets had problems of coordinating with Spanish infantry, that infantry was of poorer quality than the Soviet etc... All in all, tanks didn't perform as well as they should, but instead of identifying the correct reasons, committee set up to investigate it came to the wrong conclusion. That conclusion was also politically motivated as it was in the same time frame when Purges began. Tukhachevsky and his "faction" was purged, which incidentally involved majority of more open minded officers, leaving half-idiots like Voroshilov in charge of the army. One of the few Tukhachevsky disciples that survived was Zhukov, most importantly because he was relatively young and in the Far East at the moment. In general Far Eastern armies and their commanders weren't touched because they were too far to have any influence on politics and because of growing threat of Japan. Zhukov also had more prestige after Khalkin Gol. Although Khalkin Gol in 1939 showed what Deep Operations doctrine when performed by skilled troops and competent commander was capable of, it wasn't enough to vindicate it. Red Army deteriorated in a much worse fighting force than it was in the mid 1930's. It lost half of almost all officers in the army. What vindicated Deep Operations ironically was Wehrmacht's success in France and the Low Countries and partially it's relatively good application in the later stages of Winter War under Timoshenko.

So, in 1940, Red Army started another very slow, reorganization to make itself more similar to the mid 1930's and Wehrmacht. Soviets expected the reorganization to be finished in 1942. Also, under growing threat of the Germany, Soviets for the first time in a long time started looking at defense. In January 1940 two war games were held, practicing both defense and counter-attack. In the first Zhukov led the attack (enemy) while Belov led the defensive (Soviet) forces. Defensive forces were thoroughly beaten, prompting the Red Army to rethink its defenses. So another reorganization was started.

Lack of skilled officers of course slowed down those reforms. How serious was this lack after the purges show the example of then major later general Biriuzov, who had to assume command of his division because 4 higher officers were either killed or imprisoned. That position required at least three ranks and 10 years more experience than he had at the time.

Furthermore, after the purges, hierarchy in the Red Army was so complicated and huge that commanders often didn't know what to do and who to listen to. That was a part of Stalin's paranoid attempt to control totally every part of the Red Army. Orders were given in sealed envelopes that weren't to be opened unless several officers and political komisars were present, supply depots were sealed of until given specific orders from Moscow etc... In the chaos of the initial German attack many officers were dead so young and inexperienced officers were fearful of opening up the envelopes because they knew what can happen to them. Sure there were some commanders who showed initiative, like Rokossovsky, who refused to wait for the missing officers and practically stormed the depot and disarmed the guards who refused to allow him access, but that was the exception rather then the norm. Also Soviet troops were deployed without any logic. Forward positions were thinly manned not to provoke the Germans. The communications were in breakdown, partly because of German skillful disruption of communication line and partly of the impossible communication and command structure added to the confusion. Troops were given contradicting orders by various officers and Stavka couldn't get accurate information and assessments from forward position. Commanders were simply fearful of reporting just how terrible the situation was. That resulted in Stavka giving orders that were impossible to execute, for example an order to advance given to several division which were to be supported by several more. Problems those divisions that were supposed to provide support didn't exist anymore except on paper. That spelled certain doom for other division. In general, because of not knowing the situation Stavka and Stalin insisted on performing the counter-attack as planned. Of course it was impossible under the circumstances. Many forward supply depots were already taken by the Wehrmacht, there weren't enough supplies, ammo, shells, tanks, artillery and men to do it. Unfortunately, most commanders, knowing what may happen if they don't execute the orders simply started attacking allowing Germans to inflict massive casualties and to capture unimaginable amounts of enemy troops, equipment and supplies. There were some, again most famous example being Rokossovsky who retreated and saved what he could save but it was again the exception. Stavka, after seeing the disaster started to send representatives to bring back correct reports from the fronts. Indeed, Zhukov and Vasilevsky spent a good portion of the '41 just going back and forth from front to Stavka, for the only purpose .

Red Army lost huge amounts of equipment and weapons and their best troops. It lost majority of T-34 tanks, a huge number of airplanes, supplies, artillery, ammunition. That prompted another reorganization as Nazi advance continued. Tanks were no longer plentiful enough to form separate mechanized or tank corps, especially anything remotely similar to German Panzer Armies. They were relegated again to supporting roles. There was severe shortage of skilled commanders, mostly due to the Purge but German attack didn't help either, shortage of trained soldiers, shortage of tanks, airplanes and artillery. Under those circumstances, Deep Operations were off the table, as Zhukov, Vasilevsky and other Stavka members correctly assessed. On purpose, they brought back the Red Army to a far more primitive state than it was, using simply weight of numbers to wear enemy down and slow him down until the relocated industry starts producing again. Few skilled troops were put under competent commanders and organized into shock troops and given what was left of good equipment. The occasional glimpses of well executed delaying actions and counter-attacks in 1941 were performed by these troops. Zhukov and other leaders of the Red Army knew they had to wait until relocated factories produce enough weapons and equipment and until new soldiers acquire experoence and commanders mature enough to perform Deep Operations properly. That was the basic principle behind practically any decision by the leadership of Red Army until mid 1942. The occasional counter-attacks and counter-offensives were performed to slow down the Wehrmacht, rather than to regain huge swaths of territory, although Stalin often intervened in that regard.

[Kagemusha]

Interesting discussion.:2thumbsup: Sarmatian, as it seems that your verdict on the performance of Soviet forces during 1941 is best to say abysmal and that you are under the assumption that their capabilities conducting operations was less then desirable.

In that light. How would you portray the efforts of Soviet Unions Leningrad, Karelian and Volkhov fronts?

As far as i know The Karelian front, pretty much stopped the AOK Norwegen dead on their tracks at the direction of Murmansk, while Leningrad front held their ground with notorius determination. Never mind maybe the first strategic victory of Soviet Union achieved by Leningrad and Volkhov fronts at Tikhvin, which resulted in German failure to connect with Finnish army at River Svir and most likely saved the entire Northern direction, Leningrad, Murmansk and Arkangelsk included.

[Sarmatian]

Generally yes, I'd say the shape of Red Army in mid 1941 was catastrophic. On top of all organizational issues, shortage of new equipment, lack of quality commanders and all those others things I already spoke about, there were deep institutional flaws that had to be addressed. On the other hand, quality of troops was good enough. Of course German soldiers had the advantage as they were veterans of two major campaigns. Compared to that only a small part of Russian troops was involved in Winter War and during invasion of Poland, combat was rare and was pretty much consisted of units of regimental size.

Troops on the border with Finland were in better shape than those on the border with the Reich. They were more experienced, their defensive positions were better and, equally important, weren't changed in 1941 and they faced relatively small number of Germans. Entire AOK Norway consisted of 70,000 men, that's 9 divisions organized in 3 corps. Basically, everything in the North depended on Finland and that's where I agree with PJ - Finland was never an enthusiastic Axis partner as it became one out of pure necessity.

I don't know much about the specific battle of Tikhvin, sources in English are rare and non-existent in Serbian and I can't speak Russian. Or Finnish for that matter. I do know a few words of Hungarian but I don't think that's enough :laugh4:.

From what I remember about Tikhvin, it was a relatively small scale encounter (compared to what was happening in the south). Russian 4th army was initially pushed back, then it received reinforcements and managed to recapture the town. This was happening as the Battle of Moscow was entering its final stages so naturally not much attention was paid to Tikhvin.

So in general, troops in the north were better than their counterparts in the south, they were facing small German army and reluctant Finnish army. They performed better for that reason in the beginning. Of course in the later periods of the war, Red Army troops in the north were totally outclassed by those in the south. Were the Finns actually committed to the war effort instead of just to reoccupying territories lost in the Winter War, we would have probably seen totally different scenarios in the north.

[PanzerJaeger]

That is only partially true. After disastrous defeats in the first few months of the war, when most of the trained soldiers were lost, Russian had to rush mobilization and conscription throughout the entire war. Training time was shortened, soldiers were given nothing but the most basic of training before being put to the combat. Anything remotely complicated, like cooperation with different units not to mention cooperation with units of different types was ignored. Also, there were many instances when commanders conscripted civilians on the spot. At least 10 divisions, most of them involved in the defense Moscow at the end of '41, were People's Volunteers, literally civilians who were given weapons with no training whatsoever.

I don’t necessarily disagree, although Soviet training gradually improved with their situation. What I’m saying is that the same situation was the case with the Eastern European Axis nations, only in reverse. By ’44, they’re divisions were near worthless, whereas most Russian divisions, especially those leading offensive operations, were of much better quality.


The numbers I used were not from wiki but by Glantz. I would thoroughly recommend him as a reading - by far the most complete and most accurate account of the Red Army during the WW2 and interwar period, filled with tables and numbers. He stayed clear of practically all questionable sources and made good use of the new and/or previously unavailable sources.

Yes I love Glantz. I (think) I have all of his published works. His Operation Mars was eye-opening the first time I read it. I was not questioning your numbers in particular, but just making a general statement – as I referenced Wiki in my first response to your initial post as I did not have access to my books and was surprised at how different the numbers they gave were in comparison to what I remembered them to be. I then realized that they lumped all the Axis soldiers together, which is somewhat misleading.




In general, I'd say Stalin's meddling was far disastrous than Hitler's. I'm speaking of Stalin's meddling not just during the WW2 but also several years before. While Hitler's mistakes merely sped up the inevitable, Stalin's brought the Red Army on the brink of defeat. In just 4 years (1937-1941) he managed to totally mess up what used to be strongest, largest and most advanced army in the world in the 1930's.

Stalin has had several of warnings about Kiev, not just from Zhukov, but also from Kruschev and Budenny and from the Chief of Staff of Southwestern Front Tupikov.

Additionally, until November '41 and report from Richard Sorge that Japan won't attack for sure for another year, Far Eastern armies weren't supposed to be touched.

There are reports of Stalin's meddling but they were never as numerous as reports about Hitler's. There are several reasons for that. First, practically all we knew about the Eastern Front, until 1990's, came from the German side. Second, Red Army won, so there was much less desire to search for mistakes and who was responsible for them, especially outside Soviet Union. Third, some German commanders found it a convenient excuse for their failures. Fourth, Hitler was dead so he couldn't object while Stalin was very much alive and kicking.

Stalin’s meddling can only be said to be disastrous in ’41. Even in ’42, the decisions to hold fast in Leningrad and Stalingrad can be seen as prescient. Stalin may have brought the Red Army to the brink, but Hitler brought the Wehrmacht past it and into oblivion.

If we look at the war on a broader scale, Hitler’s poor decisions can be seen to have led directly to the failure in the East and beyond. Apart from the hundreds of small and even large orders he issued that can only be seen as idiotic, he systematically squandered the three major chances the Germans had to bring the war to a favorable conclusion – the three summer offensives of ’41, ’42, and ‘43.

First, the massive successes in ’41 hide the fact that Hitler was constantly moving armies around at his discretion even then. His decision to break apart Army Group Center and take Kiev instead of advancing on Moscow, “for the grain” was catastrophic in its repercussions. As we have already discussed, the Russians lost most of their armored and mobile forces during the failed offensives at Brody, and thus the forces around Kiev were large but would have presented little real threat to a drive towards Moscow by AGC. I believe such a drive would have secured Moscow.

The second major screw up was of course Case Blue. Hitler’s decisions were ruinous on both the strategic and tactical level. Strategically, his insistence on capturing the Caucus oil fields was a needless diversion. Sure it would have been nice to secure the oil and deny the Black Sea to the Russians, but Germany was in a very precarious position even in ’42 and needed to go for the proverbial jugular. This was well known to the German leadership. Tactically, his meddling was even more critical. Even on the approach to Stalingrad, he infuriated top leadership by constantly moving armies around with no understanding of the logistics involved. I already discussed the direct effects his orders had once the city was reached.

Finally, we are left with Kursk in ’43. Now, I know I am in the minority in thinking that the war could have been won at all in ’43. It has been discussed here before and I don’t think it is worth going into again here. Regardless, I think it is undeniable that Hitler’s constant delays and insistence on attacking such well defended area went against everything the Germans knew to be correct in achieving a decisive battle and squandered the last major offensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht.



Indeed, we've seen time and again in war that sometimes stubborn resilience and opposition will do more than elaborate plans by experts.

Even Hitler's stand fast orders proved correct sometimes, like during December '41 Moscow counter-offensive. After the initial success, Stalin (again against the advice of his generals) wanted to broaden and expand the offensive. Zhukov and other experienced commanders knew that offensive was based on fresh troops from the Far East and limited number of skiers, tanks and cavalry that were rapidly losing their strength and outrunning their logistical tail.

I agree. At that point, though, an orderly withdrawal and a more organized defense would have yielded little meaningful territory and saved valuable troops and resources.



Actually it wasn't. You're mistaken since you presume to T-34/76 formed the mainstay of Soviet tanks, which is as far from truth as it gets. In June '41, T-34's made up less than 4% and KV's formed less than 2% of all Soviet tanks (they were new and unreliable, most of them were sent near the border with Germany, without trained crews, spare parts and often ammunition). The rest were T-26's and various version of BT's. Those two models were on par, even slightly worse than Panzer II and III and seriously undergunned and underarmoured compared to Panzer IV, even before high velocity gun was mounted on it. Soviets produced a lot of light tanks in during the war, the most important reason is lend-lease probably. As various motor vehicles were arriving from the US, many factories switched to light tanks. They couldn't switch to medium and heavy because that required a good degree of specialization. In fact, only 5 or 6 factories could produce T-34's in the USSR and only 3 of them produced a significant numbers (the rest produced between 500-1500 T-34 during the entire war). Before German invasion, all T-34's were made in Kharkov. That factory had to be dismantled and sent behind the Urals to Nizhniy Tagil when it became clear that Germans would take Kharkov. Other factory capable of producing T-34 in 1941 was Kirov factory in Leningrad, also moved to the east. Neither of them started production before 1942 and both had problems with workers, there weren't enough of them and they weren't sufficiently skilled, so T-34 produced at the beginning of 1942 were few and of poor quality. Until mid-1942, Red Army had to make the most of several hundred T-34 produced in Kharkov before relocation. As 1942 went on the situation gradually improved but T-34's didn't appear in significant numbers until 1943. Even in 1943, T-34's and KV's together didn't make more than half of Soviet tanks, the other half being made up of light reconnaissance tanks, T-50, T-60 or T-70, probably even some T-26's and BT's that left over. Russians, like Germans found out that light tanks were becoming obsolete increasingly fast, even for scouting purposes and they were often relegated to towing artillery. In 1945 T-34's (both 76 and 85 variants) made up 55% of all Soviet tanks

Yes I am aware of this information. I was using the T-34 as a standard reference point as it was the most common used against German armored forces in the battles we’re discussing. The light tanks you discuss were used in the infantry support role by this time.

Also, a few additional things should be taken into consideration to get a full picture of the armored forces involved.

First of all, IIRC, the T-34 variants made up over 50% of all Russian AFVs, not just what are traditionally considered tanks, ie turreted vehicles. The originator of that stat incorrectly labeled it. This is significant as it includes many more vehicles including all of the SU- type assault guns. Regardless, the T-34 was not the only competent Russian tank. On the contrary, the Russians had large numbers of KV-1 and, by the time we’re discussing, IS-2s – which were used in breakthrough roles in Bagration and easily outgunned everything the Germans had.

Second, one has to acknowledge the gross numbers involved here. The Russians built nearly 60,000 T-34s during the war alone, and IIRC, around 23,000 of them the 85mm variant. At the time we are discussing, the Germans had a grand total of around 300 Panthers operational in the East, while Russian production of T-34s alone was well over 1000 per month.

No matter how you frame it, the differences in armor and artillery were staggering.




You're right, actually. It really wasn't so much about the doctrines but the ability to carry them out. The basic concept behind Blitzkrieg or Deep Operations wasn't that hard to grasp. Even people whose I.Q. was measured in two figures could do it but there were certain preconditions that had to be met - enough technologically advanced mobile forces (tanks, mechanized and motorized infantry), sufficiently trained and experienced troops and, most importantly, commanders skilled enough to perform it, from high-ups such as generals down to captains on the field of battle. So, even though there were some local applications of the concept within the Allies, Patton for example, they simply didn't have the skilled enough troops or commanders to perform it on a large scale, just like Soviets weren't able to do it before 1944 properly. There were occasional flashes of it in 1941 and 1942 that became more and more frequent but offensives in the true spirit of Deep Operation had to wait until 1944 and 1945.

Also, maybe the most important reason for allies not to try hard to adopt it was because they had the luxury of time and by using superior firepower they could get the job done. It took more time and less human casualties but Allies had all the time in the world. Sure it presented problems sometimes but considering their situation it was a logical decision.

Yes I agree with you on that.



There are plenty of examples of large scale Deep Operation being performed with near perfection. Operation Bagration immediately comes to mind. It was performed against AG Center. That army group was practically intact, although it weakened to reinforce AG South but itself didn't see any large scale combat for quite some time. There was more than enough time to prepare defenses, something Soviet didn't usually have the time to do in 1941 and even sometimes in 1942.

Again, I completely disagree about AGC. It was hardly what I would call “in tact”. It had in no way recovered from the Smolensk battles the previous August – in manpower or material. At a time when Russian divisions all along the front were being bolstered by new men and equipment, AGC could look forward to little in terms of reinforcements. And as you stated, significant forces were removed directly before the battle. These forces included a large part of their artillery and most of their tanks. This, in effect, left AGC without a mobile reserve and utterly helpless against the Soviets. I'm not even going to get into the huge partisan uprising that Orleander touched on...

Also, Guderian dismissed the defensive works you mention in Panzer Leader, although I cannot remember why exactly. I will look it up when I get home and edit it in.




The sheer scale preparations is mind boggling, as is the deception that they would attack in the south. Usually Soviet offensives in that period almost always caught Wehrmacht by surprise. Even when Germans found out about the offensive they usually underestimated Soviet capabilities and that was not just bad commanders. After Kursk, Manstein was certain that Soviets were badly hurt and that they would have to spend some time licking their wounds. He didn't expect any large Soviet offensives for quite some time. He must have been really taken off guard when Soviet offensive started practically immediately. German army usually didn't know the scale of Soviet preparations or the size of the force assembled until it hit them and then it was usually too late to make adjustments. Russian Maskirovka proved its worth time and time again.

Furthermore, German sources often didn't grasp correctly what was happening. They treated all offensives separately. In truth, Operation Bagration was just a part of general offensive that was planned. The most important part but only a part. That general offensive consisted of Karelian Isthmus - 10 June, Bagration - 22 June, Lvov-Sandomierz - 13 July, Lublin-Brest 18 July, and lassy-Kishinev 20 August. It involved planning and organizing millions of troops, millions pieces of various equipment in a theater that stretched from Finland to Romania. Wehrmacht was pushed back, lost its best troops and lost two important minor allies. In addition, German irreplaceable losses were significantly higher that Soviet.

I don’t necessarily disagree with any of this. My overarching point is that being massively outnumbered and with a total ’44 Eastern Front armored force numbering in the low hundreds at best, the Germans did not have the ability to seriously contest the offensives we’re discussing; and the Russian successes, while admirable, do not really speak much to their fighting skill in comparison to the Germans at their height. It is surprising that the Russians took so many hundreds of thousands of casualties at all at this stage of the war.





There are, if you choose to look for it. You won't find that many for several reasons - in 1941 and 1942 Germans still had qualitative superiority in tanks, as I explained how problematic production of T-34 was, and often numerical superiority. Wehrmacht also had undisputed air superiority at the time. Red Army lacked tanks, airplanes, artillery, trained troops and skilled commanders in 1941 and for the most of 1942. In that period, Germans still had enough reserves to counter-attack. In the later stages of the war, Germans practically didn't make anything remotely similar to a serious offensive so it was naturally hard for the Red Army to cut them off. They mostly limited themselves to tactical withdrawals and small scale counter-offensives, with few exceptions.

The Germans did not have qualitative superiority in tanks even from the outset and certainly not in ’42. We shouldn’t forget how much of the Panzer forces were made up of pz.IIs and lesser vehicles at that time. Also, while the Luftwaffe certainly dominated, their control was never "undisputed", and in fact their numbers too small to effectively cover the entire front. German qualitative superiority was in training, doctrine, etc.

From the start, the Red Army actually had a far larger armored force (around 3000 tanks versus well over 10,000), air force(4000 planes versus 11,000), and trained contingent of soldiers. These machines were not as worthless as you suggest, especially their tanks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_early_World_War_II_tanks). They simply lost them in battle. Their losses in ’41 of tanks and airplanes both reached over 20,000 each and many millions of men.

Also, the Germans made two large offensives in ’43, neither of which saw the slicing and dicing of forward elements that I described during the ’44 offensives.



I thought you would :D.

It is actually impossible to overstate how pathetic Red Army was in 1941, especially its defenses in Belorussia and Ukraine. To understand it, we have to go back to WW1.

During the Russian civil war, Red Army fought not just the White Army but also had to fight off Polish invasion and several intervention forces than landed in Russia - Brits and Americans in Archangels and Murmansk, French in Crimea and Caucasus, Czech veterans that took control of Trans-Siberian railroad and cut off Russian Far East where Japanese and Americans roamed at will. Red Army was outnumbered and had to cover vast amounts of land. That war was much more mobile than the one in the west. Red Army had to end the battles quickly and with minimal losses. For that purpose brilliant minds like Tukhachevsky emphasized the strategy from which Deep Battle and Deep Operation doctrines were created - use of mobile forces to penetrate defences, in that time it was usually cavalry, armoured cars and armoured trains where applicable, and to continue exploitation far into enemy rear, never allow him to form a new defensive line or regroup. You see that its practically the same doctrine applied by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in WW2, only with WW1 weapons. There were similar lines of thought in all major armies of the world but only in the Soviet Union that doctrine received official support and was codified as army doctrine in the manual of 1936. I assume you know how much difficulties Manstein and Guderian had when they tried to push their plan for attack on France, not just by Hitler but also by other senior commanders like Halder.

In the thirties Soviet adopted tank as the main weapon for such a doctrine. The first doubts begin to appear after the Spanish Civil War. Tanks of the time still weren't advanced enough, Soviets had problems of coordinating with Spanish infantry, that infantry was of poorer quality than the Soviet etc... All in all, tanks didn't perform as well as they should, but instead of identifying the correct reasons, committee set up to investigate it came to the wrong conclusion. That conclusion was also politically motivated as it was in the same time frame when Purges began. Tukhachevsky and his "faction" was purged, which incidentally involved majority of more open minded officers, leaving half-idiots like Voroshilov in charge of the army. One of the few Tukhachevsky disciples that survived was Zhukov, most importantly because he was relatively young and in the Far East at the moment. In general Far Eastern armies and their commanders weren't touched because they were too far to have any influence on politics and because of growing threat of Japan. Zhukov also had more prestige after Khalkin Gol. Although Khalkin Gol in 1939 showed what Deep Operations doctrine when performed by skilled troops and competent commander was capable of, it wasn't enough to vindicate it. Red Army deteriorated in a much worse fighting force than it was in the mid 1930's. It lost half of almost all officers in the army. What vindicated Deep Operations ironically was Wehrmacht's success in France and the Low Countries and partially it's relatively good application in the later stages of Winter War under Timoshenko.

So, in 1940, Red Army started another very slow, reorganization to make itself more similar to the mid 1930's and Wehrmacht. Soviets expected the reorganization to be finished in 1942. Also, under growing threat of the Germany, Soviets for the first time in a long time started looking at defense. In January 1940 two war games were held, practicing both defense and counter-attack. In the first Zhukov led the attack (enemy) while Belov led the defensive (Soviet) forces. Defensive forces were thoroughly beaten, prompting the Red Army to rethink its defenses. So another reorganization was started.

Lack of skilled officers of course slowed down those reforms. How serious was this lack after the purges show the example of then major later general Biriuzov, who had to assume command of his division because 4 higher officers were either killed or imprisoned. That position required at least three ranks and 10 years more experience than he had at the time.

Furthermore, after the purges, hierarchy in the Red Army was so complicated and huge that commanders often didn't know what to do and who to listen to. That was a part of Stalin's paranoid attempt to control totally every part of the Red Army. Orders were given in sealed envelopes that weren't to be opened unless several officers and political komisars were present, supply depots were sealed of until given specific orders from Moscow etc... In the chaos of the initial German attack many officers were dead so young and inexperienced officers were fearful of opening up the envelopes because they knew what can happen to them. Sure there were some commanders who showed initiative, like Rokossovsky, who refused to wait for the missing officers and practically stormed the depot and disarmed the guards who refused to allow him access, but that was the exception rather then the norm. Also Soviet troops were deployed without any logic. Forward positions were thinly manned not to provoke the Germans. The communications were in breakdown, partly because of German skillful disruption of communication line and partly of the impossible communication and command structure added to the confusion. Troops were given contradicting orders by various officers and Stavka couldn't get accurate information and assessments from forward position. Commanders were simply fearful of reporting just how terrible the situation was. That resulted in Stavka giving orders that were impossible to execute, for example an order to advance given to several division which were to be supported by several more. Problems those divisions that were supposed to provide support didn't exist anymore except on paper. That spelled certain doom for other division. In general, because of not knowing the situation Stavka and Stalin insisted on performing the counter-attack as planned. Of course it was impossible under the circumstances. Many forward supply depots were already taken by the Wehrmacht, there weren't enough supplies, ammo, shells, tanks, artillery and men to do it. Unfortunately, most commanders, knowing what may happen if they don't execute the orders simply started attacking allowing Germans to inflict massive casualties and to capture unimaginable amounts of enemy troops, equipment and supplies. There were some, again most famous example being Rokossovsky who retreated and saved what he could save but it was again the exception. Stavka, after seeing the disaster started to send representatives to bring back correct reports from the fronts. Indeed, Zhukov and Vasilevsky spent a good portion of the '41 just going back and forth from front to Stavka, for the only purpose .

Red Army lost huge amounts of equipment and weapons and their best troops. It lost majority of T-34 tanks, a huge number of airplanes, supplies, artillery, ammunition. That prompted another reorganization as Nazi advance continued. Tanks were no longer plentiful enough to form separate mechanized or tank corps, especially anything remotely similar to German Panzer Armies. They were relegated again to supporting roles. There was severe shortage of skilled commanders, mostly due to the Purge but German attack didn't help either, shortage of trained soldiers, shortage of tanks, airplanes and artillery. Under those circumstances, Deep Operations were off the table, as Zhukov, Vasilevsky and other Stavka members correctly assessed. On purpose, they brought back the Red Army to a far more primitive state than it was, using simply weight of numbers to wear enemy down and slow him down until the relocated industry starts producing again. Few skilled troops were put under competent commanders and organized into shock troops and given what was left of good equipment. The occasional glimpses of well executed delaying actions and counter-attacks in 1941 were performed by these troops. Zhukov and other leaders of the Red Army knew they had to wait until relocated factories produce enough weapons and equipment and until new soldiers acquire experoence and commanders mature enough to perform Deep Operations properly. That was the basic principle behind practically any decision by the leadership of Red Army until mid 1942. The occasional counter-attacks and counter-offensives were performed to slow down the Wehrmacht, rather than to regain huge swaths of territory, although Stalin often intervened in that regard.

That is a great write up, and I don’t have any major issues with your facts. I just think you’re overlooking some of the positive factors I mentioned earlier. The Red Army certainly had issues, but it was a functioning, competent military force… arguably better than the Western Allies. It fought hard from the beginning, launching several large scale counter-attacks involving large armored forces on broad fronts. To discount the early German victories so completely ignores the skill in which they were achieved – against superior numbers on defense.

I fear we're starting to go in circles. You feel the Russians were at their weakest in '41 and thus the German victories should be discounted, while I feel the Germans were at their weakest in '44 and thus the Russian victories should be discounted. Both positions are essentially valid to some extent, with the difference being in degree (I of course feel mine is more valid than yours :P). I feel the Russians in '41 were in a far better position in terms of manpower, armor, artillery, planes, freshness, logistics, and all the other factors I've mentioned than the Germans were in '44, thus making the German victories more impressive.

:sweatdrop:

[Sarmatian]

I fear we're starting to go in circles. You feel the Russians were at their weakest in '41 and thus the German victories should be discounted, while I feel the Germans were at their weakest in '44 and thus the Russian victories should be discounted. Both positions are essentially valid to some extent, with the difference being in degree (I of course feel mine is more valid than yours :P). I feel the Russians in '41 were in a far better position in terms of manpower, armor, artillery, planes, freshness, logistics, and all the other factors I've mentioned than the Germans were in '44, thus making the German victories more impressive.

:sweatdrop:

I can live with that conclusion, especially as writing these things started to take way too much time :laugh4:. I've seen that I made some minor mistakes, with names mostly, it should have been Katukov, not Vatutin and Pavlov, not Belov, but if I tried to verify every little thing it would have literally taken me hours to write any of those posts. Overall, I wouldn't say either Red Army's or Wehrmacht's victories should be discounted, we should just take into account the shape of the opponent in both cases. The difference is in degree, as you said, and that's perfectly acceptable to me.

Just to clear a few things up about the stuff I was saying about Bagration - I don't consider the actual execution of that operation excellent. After everything was set in place, even I could have given the order to attack and watch AGC getting smashed. What for me is exceptional about it is how Red Army managed to fool the Wehrmacht that they were going to attack south, while they were preparing to attack AG Center, how they amassed such number of troops and equipment without German intelligence noticing. Because of that German reserves, especially what's left of the armour, weren't at the right place. It's the preparations about Bagration what fascinates me, their sheer scale, the way they were performed and secrecy with which they were performed, not the the actual execution of the plan. With everything set up the way it was, AGC was defeated before the first shot was fired. What we've seen in the Eastern Front is that it is not so much the strategic ratio of forces that counts but their concentration. The ratio by which the fronts that were involved in Bagration outnumbered AGC in men and equipment was much higher than overall ratio, on strategic level.

Another thing about T-34 - when I said German had qualitative advantage in tanks, I meant during Barbarossa and the first half of 1942, and not because those T-34's and KV's weren't good (they were better later when some wrinkles were ironed out, naturally) but because there were too few them and I don't consider either T-26 or BT superior to Panzer II, III or IV, especially since some earlier models of BT were comparable to Panzer I. The shock for the Germans wasn't because hundreds or thousands T-34's rolled towards them at Barbarossa, but because they didn't know it existed and because an army they considered inferior had a piece of equipment like that, so much better than anything they had.

[Oleander Ardens]

A fine discussion, I will later join again :bow:

[Gregoshi]

Awesome discussion all! :2thumbsup:

There have been a few authors thrown around in this discussion. Any recommended reading on the German/Russian armies in the East? :book:

[Kagemusha]

Generally yes, I'd say the shape of Red Army in mid 1941 was catastrophic. On top of all organizational issues, shortage of new equipment, lack of quality commanders and all those others things I already spoke about, there were deep institutional flaws that had to be addressed. On the other hand, quality of troops was good enough. Of course German soldiers had the advantage as they were veterans of two major campaigns. Compared to that only a small part of Russian troops was involved in Winter War and during invasion of Poland, combat was rare and was pretty much consisted of units of regimental size.

Troops on the border with Finland were in better shape than those on the border with the Reich. They were more experienced, their defensive positions were better and, equally important, weren't changed in 1941 and they faced relatively small number of Germans. Entire AOK Norway consisted of 70,000 men, that's 9 divisions organized in 3 corps. Basically, everything in the North depended on Finland and that's where I agree with PJ - Finland was never an enthusiastic Axis partner as it became one out of pure necessity.

I don't know much about the specific battle of Tikhvin, sources in English are rare and non-existent in Serbian and I can't speak Russian. Or Finnish for that matter. I do know a few words of Hungarian but I don't think that's enough :laugh4:.

From what I remember about Tikhvin, it was a relatively small scale encounter (compared to what was happening in the south). Russian 4th army was initially pushed back, then it received reinforcements and managed to recapture the town. This was happening as the Battle of Moscow was entering its final stages so naturally not much attention was paid to Tikhvin.

So in general, troops in the north were better than their counterparts in the south, they were facing small German army and reluctant Finnish army. They performed better for that reason in the beginning. Of course in the later periods of the war, Red Army troops in the north were totally outclassed by those in the south. Were the Finns actually committed to the war effort instead of just to reoccupying territories lost in the Winter War, we would have probably seen totally different scenarios in the north.

I think Glantz, whom you have showed appreciatian in this thread disagrees with you about Tikhvin, or Tikhvinsk-Kirishsk offensive operation as it is officially called.

According to one of the leading historians of the Eastern Front David Glantz: "the concept of blitzkrieg failed for the first time in the Second World War... anticipating" the Soviet victory at Moscow.
I think the reason why the operation is not so well known is that the battle of Moscow has completely overshadowed it. Nevertheles,The battle at Tikhvin was also significant in its direct assistance to the Red Army in the battle of Moscow. Instead of sending troops from the Army Group North to Moscow, Germans were forced to reinforce their armies in the north with divisions from the Army Group Center as well as with other divisions which Germans initially planned to use at Moscow.

Another quote from David Glantz: "During this most critical period of the war, 32 percent of the Wehrmacht's forces, operating north of the Pripiat Marshes, including almost two full panzer groups, were tied down in combat along or adjacent to" Tikhvin. Wehrmacht lost in the battle 45,000 troops.

So i would conclude that The operations around Tikhvin were actually more likely over shadowed by Moscow, rather then insignificant. While the operation helped achieving victory at Moscow, by bogging down German forces needed in Moscow. It also had Strategic importance for the whole Northern Front between SU, Germany and Finland.Here is a map that gives a good overall picture of the front:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7e/Second_world_war_europe_1941-1942_map_en.png

The striped area at North is the area the attacking phase of the Operation reclaimed from Germans. Had Germans advanced to River Svir, that would have achieved the condition Finnish command had set for further major advance preferably towards Icy Sea or optionally towards Leningrad. Finnish Karelian army had 5 divisions and 3 separate Brigades near river Svir, between Lakes Ladoga and Onega. While at Karelian Isthmus there were 7 divisions at Karelian Isthmus North West from Leningrad basically doing nothing. During the negotiations between Finnish headquarters and German OKW. Meeting at River Svir was accepted by both sides as condition for further Finnish offensive. Marshall Mannerheim used that agreement from Autumn 1941 right untill the disaster of Stalingrad as excuse for staying at defense.

If even half of those divisions would have been aimed towards North during Autumn or winter 1941. It would have completely tipped the balance at Northern front. Which would have most likely resulted in fall of Murmansk and Arkangelsk, from which about 40% of Lend lease arrived to SU. Also had Germans reached Svir. Leningrad would lost even the "road of life" over Lake Ladoga thus its chances of survival the siege would have taken a rather large turn to worse, possibly releasing large forces from German army group North to other directions.

EDIT: Greg. Here is an author you want to read if you are interested on the Soviet aspect of the war:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Glantz

[PanzerJaeger]

I can live with that conclusion, especially as writing these things started to take way too much time :laugh4:. I've seen that I made some minor mistakes, with names mostly, it should have been Katukov, not Vatutin and Pavlov, not Belov, but if I tried to verify every little thing it would have literally taken me hours to write any of those posts. Overall, I wouldn't say either Red Army's or Wehrmacht's victories should be discounted, we should just take into account the shape of the opponent in both cases. The difference is in degree, as you said, and that's perfectly acceptable to me.




Indeed, but it was definitely time well spent. You certainly know your facts. :bow:

Also, I did find the quote I was looking for in Panzer Leader, regarding German defensive fortifications. Although very displeased about having to go on the defensive permanently in the East, Guderian set about trying to solidify German holdings. He says:

"Unfortunately we did not manage to carry out the whole of our Eastern programme successfully. It is true that we did succeed in building the necessary fortified lines and positions, but the indispensable garrisons and weapons were not forthcoming as a result of the catastrophic and rapid sequence of events on the invasion front in the West. The value of the fortifications built there fore remained limited. They further suffered as a result of an order by Hitler that the 'Great Defensive Line,' to which the troops were to withdraw immediately before the enemy launched its attack, was not - as the army groups and I desired - to be some 12 miles behind the normal main defensive line, but was to be build at an insufficient depth of only 1 to 3 miles back." - Guderian 371, 372.

Further he writes:

"The fortifications built on the Eastern Front had meanwhile made our line, long and far too thin as it was, yet sufficiently strong for quiet periods. We did our best to make use of the experience we had gained during the recent battles, but in so doing came up against Hitler's opposition. One essential requirement at the front was that the ordinary main line of defense - to be defended on normal occasions - must be separated from the major line of defense, which was intended to be held in the event of the Russians launching a large scale attack against any one sector. The officers at the front wished to build this major defensive line some 12 miles behind the main line of defense, to camouflage it carefully and to install a holding garrison inside it. They further wanted standing authority to withdraw the bulk of their forces into this major defensive line as soon as the Russian artillery preparation that heralded a forthcoming attack should begin, leaving only rearguards in the old main line of defense; the Russian barrage would thus be wasted, his assault, so laboriously prepared, would be fruitless and by the time he came up against our well-prepared defensive positions he could in consequence be repulsed. There can be no doubt that this theory was absolutely correct. I approved it and submitted it to Hitler. He lost his temper, saying that he refused to accept the sacrifice of 12 miles without a fight and ordered that the major defensive line be build from 1 to 2 miles behind the main line of defense. He was basing his ideas on the conditions prevailing in the First World War when he gave those nonsensical orders and no arguments could bring him to see reason." - Guderian 377.



Awesome discussion all!

There have been a few authors thrown around in this discussion. Any recommended reading on the German/Russian armies in the East?

David M. Glantz is excellent. He focuses more on the Soviets, but his books describing specific engagements are well written, thorough, and very accurate.

[Gregoshi]

Thanks Kage & PJ. :bow: Glantz has a ton of books on the subject. Now I just have to decide what aspect of the Eastern Front I want to read about first. Too...many...choices...brain...hurts. :laugh4:

[Sarmatian]

I think Glantz, whom you have showed appreciatian in this thread disagrees with you about Tikhvin, or Tikhvinsk-Kirishsk offensive operation as it is officially called.


You may have misunderstood me. I don't think anything in my post disagrees with what you've written.

I said Tikhvin was small scale but that was in terms of size of forces, not importance of the battle. I've said it tends to be overlooked because the battle for Moscow was happening at the same time. I've said that Finns were never really enthusiastic allies of Germany and that what was gonna happen up north depended on them and that were they committed, we might have seen some totally different scenarios, meaning it could have been very bad for the Red Army

Unless I'm mistaken, that's pretty much your point...

Now, what would happen if Soviets did lose Leningrad, Archangels and Murmansk... That's one of those big "what ifs" of the WW2. What if Yugoslavia didn't back out of the pact, allowing Germany to lauch Barbarossa in May, as it was planned, what if Hitler didn't switch panzers from AGC to AGS, what if French army in 1939 attacked Germany instead of waiting behind Maginot Line...

It would certainly hurt, although I don't think lend-lease aspect would be that important. As you've seen, I've argued that the overall impact of lend-lease is exaggerated and even so, there still was the other way to get lend-lease to USSR. Good chunk of industry was already removed from Leningrad. Soviets couldn't use manpower of Leningrad anyway. It would have been probably a great morale boost for the Wehrmacht as it would maintain their aura of invincibility. Then again, it could have given a morale boost to the Red Army, basically entire city being a martyr... Instead of all those rockets with "Remember Stalingrad" written on them, the inscription might say "Remember Leningrad"...

It would free up some additional German troops, certainly. Whether that would have been enough to change the course of the fight in the East, I really can't say...


Indeed, but it was definitely time well spent. You certainly know your facts. :bow:

Also, I did find the quote I was looking for in Panzer Leader, regarding German defensive fortifications. Although very displeased about having to go on the defensive permanently in the East, Guderian set about trying to solidify German holdings. He says:

"Unfortunately we did not manage to carry out the whole of our Eastern programme successfully. It is true that we did succeed in building the necessary fortified lines and positions, but the indispensable garrisons and weapons were not forthcoming as a result of the catastrophic and rapid sequence of events on the invasion front in the West. The value of the fortifications built there fore remained limited. They further suffered as a result of an order by Hitler that the 'Great Defensive Line,' to which the troops were to withdraw immediately before the enemy launched its attack, was not - as the army groups and I desired - to be some 12 miles behind the normal main defensive line, but was to be build at an insufficient depth of only 1 to 3 miles back." - Guderian 371, 372.

Further he writes:

"The fortifications built on the Eastern Front had meanwhile made our line, long and far too thin as it was, yet sufficiently strong for quiet periods. We did our best to make use of the experience we had gained during the recent battles, but in so doing came up against Hitler's opposition. One essential requirement at the front was that the ordinary main line of defense - to be defended on normal occasions - must be separated from the major line of defense, which was intended to be held in the event of the Russians launching a large scale attack against any one sector. The officers at the front wished to build this major defensive line some 12 miles behind the main line of defense, to camouflage it carefully and to install a holding garrison inside it. They further wanted standing authority to withdraw the bulk of their forces into this major defensive line as soon as the Russian artillery preparation that heralded a forthcoming attack should begin, leaving only rearguards in the old main line of defense; the Russian barrage would thus be wasted, his assault, so laboriously prepared, would be fruitless and by the time he came up against our well-prepared defensive positions he could in consequence be repulsed. There can be no doubt that this theory was absolutely correct. I approved it and submitted it to Hitler. He lost his temper, saying that he refused to accept the sacrifice of 12 miles without a fight and ordered that the major defensive line be build from 1 to 2 miles behind the main line of defense. He was basing his ideas on the conditions prevailing in the First World War when he gave those nonsensical orders and no arguments could bring him to see reason." - Guderian 377.


Well, Heinrici in battle of Seelow (sp?) hills showed that strategy could be useful. He made Zhukov waste his initial artillery barrage and delayed the Red Army for several days. Quite a feat since it was in April 1945, although the terrain configuration itself did a lot for him.

On the other hand, Red Army would probably adapt in some way. Maybe save most of the artillery and make a false attack, prompting Germans to withdraw, then rush in and take those position, deploy the bulk of artillery there and start pounding the second defensive line. Maybe make better coordination with the airforce - after initial artillery attack send massive amounts of CAS fighters to attack German soldiers which are now not dug in but are moving... Red Army had the complete initiative and was therefore in a superior position, it could always be one step ahead of the opponent because Wehrmacht was in a defensive stance, forced to respond to the actions of the Red Army.

Of course, if we're talking about 1944 specifically, Germany was already beaten and the best the Germans could do at that point was delay the inevitable. Nothing short of a miracle or divine intervention would stop Russians from reaching Berlin, and Germans already used up the one they had in the Seven Years' War :D


Thanks Kage & PJ. :bow: Glantz has a ton of books on the subject. Now I just have to decide what aspect of the Eastern Front I want to read about first. Too...many...choices...brain...hurts. :laugh4:

Maybe you could start with "When Titans Clashed". It deals with the entire conflict, 1941-1945 and is relatively broad. After that it would be easier to choose what specific part of the conflict would interest you, if any...

[Oleander Ardens]

Hello Sarmantian, do you have a source that states that the Lend-Lease amounted for only 4% of the industrial production? If yes, was it calculated? Personally I know just too good that sometimes such numbers can be very deceptive. Here I have taken the neat Wiki numbers and the numbers of Glantz. Note that the items are mosty finished goods and mostly at the very end of the value chain (aircraft, radio, trucks)


Production by country

[edit] Vehicles and ground weapons

[edit] Tanks and self-propelled guns


1. Soviet Union = 105,251 (92,595)
2. United States = 88,410 (71,067)
3. Germany = 46,857 (37,794)
4. United Kingdom = 27,896
5. Canada = 5,678
6. Japan = 2,515
7. Italy = 2,473
8. Hungary = 500

Note: Number in parenthesis equals the number of tanks and self-propelled guns equipped with main weapons of 75 mm calibre or larger. Smaller producing countries do not have this differentiation.

[edit] Artillery

Artillery includes anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons with calibres above 37 mm.

1. Soviet Union = 516,648
2. United States = 257,390
3. Germany = 159,147
4. United Kingdom = 124,877
5. Japan = 13,350
6. Canada = 10,552
7. Italy = 7,200
8. Other Commonwealth = 5,215
9. Hungary = 447

[edit] Mortars (over 60 mm)

1. Soviet Union = 200,300
2. United States = 105,055
3. United Kingdom = 102,950
4. Germany = 73,484
5. Commonwealth = 46,014

[edit] Machineguns

Machineguns do not include sub-machineguns, or machine guns used for arming aircraft.

1. United States = 2,679,840
2. Soviet Union = 1,477,400
3. Germany = 674,280
4. Japan = 380,000
5. United Kingdom = 297,336
6. Canada = 251,925
7. Other Commonwealth = 37,983
8. Hungary = 4,583

[edit] Military trucks

1. United States = 2,382,311
2. Canada = 815,729
3. United Kingdom = 480,943
4. Germany = 345,914
5. Soviet Union = 197,100
6. Japan = 165,945
7. Italy = 83,000

[edit] Aircraft

[edit] Military aircraft of all types

1. United States = 324,750
2. Germany = 189,307
3. Soviet Union = 157,261
4. United Kingdom = 131,549
5. Japan = 76,320
6. Canada = 16,431
7. Italy = 11,122
8. France (09/39 - 06/40) = 4,016
9. Other Commonwealth = 3,081
10. Hungary = 1,046
11. Romania = 1,000

[edit] Fighter aircraft

1. United States = 99,950
2. Soviet Union = 63,087
3. Germany = 55,727
4. United Kingdom = 49,422
5. Japan = 30,447
6. Italy = 4,510
7. France (09/39 - 06/40): 1,597 = 542 MS.406 + 437 D.520+ 518 MB.151+ 80 C.714 + 20 VG-33

[edit] Attack aircraft

1. Soviet Union = 37,549
2. Germany = 12,539
3. France (09/39 - 06/40) = 280

[edit] Bomber aircraft


1. United States = 97,810
2. United Kingdom = 34,689
3. Soviet Union = 21,116
4. Germany: 18,449[1] = 214 Ar 234 + 475 Do 17 + 1,366 Do 217 + 5,656 He 111 + 1,146 He 177 + 9,122 Ju 88 + 466 Ju 188 + 4 Ju 388
5. Japan = 15,117
6. Italy = 2,063
7. France (09/39 - 06/40) = 712

[edit] Transport aircraft

1. United States = 23,929
2. Soviet Union = 17,332
3. Germany = 3,079
4. Japan = 2,110
5. United Kingdom = 1,784[2]
6. Italy = 468

[edit] Training aircraft

1. United States = 57,623
2. United Kingdom = 31,864
3. Japan = 15,201
4. Germany = 11,546
5. Soviet Union = 4,061
6. Italy = 1,769

[edit] Naval ships
American Essex class aircraft carrier.

[edit] Aircraft carriers

1. United States = 22 (141)
2. Japan = 16
3. United Kingdom = 14
4. Germany = 0 None completed by the end of the war. Two were in production , Graf Zeppelin and Flugzeugträger B.
5. Italy = 0 None completed by the end of the war. One was in production , see Aquila .

Figure in parentheses indicates merchant vessels converted to Escort carriers.

[edit] Battleships

1. United States = 8
2. United Kingdom = 5
3. Italy = 3
4. Japan = 2
5. Germany = 2

[edit] Cruisers

1. United States = 48
2. United Kingdom = 32
3. Japan = 9
4. Italy = 6
5. Soviet Union = 2

[edit] Destroyers

1. United States = 349
2. United Kingdom = 240
3. Japan = 63
4. Soviet Union = 25
5. Germany = 17
6. Italy = 6

[edit] Convoy escorts
American Fletcher class destroyer.

1. United States = 420
2. United Kingdom = 413
3. Canada = 191
4. Germany = 23

[edit] Submarines

1. Germany = 1,141[3]
2. United States = 203[3]
3. Japan = 167
4. United Kingdom = 167
5. Soviet Union = 52
6. Italy = 28

[edit] Merchant tonnage

1. United States = 33,993,230
2. United Kingdom = 6,378,899
3. Japan = 4,152,361
4. Canada = 3,742,100
5. Commonwealth = 2,702,943
6. Italy = 1,469,606

[edit] Large Scale Civil Engineering Construction

[edit] Concrete bunkers and pillboxes

Estimate - uk only - 72,128,141 tonnes of steel and concrete [4]

[edit] Concrete runways

10,000,000 tonnes [5]

[edit] Materials

[edit] Coal

In millions of metric tons

1. Germany = 2,420.3
2. United States = 2,149.7
3. United Kingdom = 1,441.2
4. Soviet Union = 590.8
5. Japan = 184.5
6. Canada = 101.9
7. Italy = 16.9
8. Hungary = 6.6
9. Romania = 1.6

[edit] Iron Ore

In millions of metric tons

1. United States = 396.9
2. Germany = 240.7
3. United Kingdom = 119.2
4. Soviet Union = 71.3
5. Japan = 21.0
6. Hungary = 14.1
7. Romania = 10.8
8. Italy = 4.4
9. Canada = 3.6

See also: Swedish iron ore during World War II

[edit] Crude Oil

In millions of metric tonnes

1. United States = 833.2
2. Soviet Union = 110.6
3. United Kingdom = 90.8
4. Germany = 33.4 (including 23.4 synthetic)
5. Romania = 25.0
6. Canada = 8.4
7. Japan = 5.2
8. Hungary = 3.1



Figure 7. Lend-Lease Assistance to the Soviet Union

Lend-Lease Domestic Production

Armored vehicles 12,161 (12 %) 98,300 (7,056 US)

Guns and mortars 9,600 (2 %) 525,200

Machine guns 131,600

Combat aircraft 18,303 (15 %) 122,100
Fighters 13,857
Bombers 3,633
Transport 710
Reconnaissance 19
Training 84

Aircraft engines 14,902 (6.7 %) 222,418

Trucks and Jeeps 409,526 (55 %) 744,400

(reached Russia) 312,600 (42 %)

Explosives (tons) 325,784

Locomotives 1,860 (6.3 %) 29,524

Rail cars 11,181

Field telephones 422,000

Foodstuffs (tons) 4,281,910 (25 %) 17,127,640

Oil (POL) (tons) 2,599,000

Boots 15,000,000 pairs


BTW: Looking at the numbers it really seems that the allied cause against Stalin would not be hopeless, given decent manpower of trained soldiers.

[Sarmatian]

Hello Sarmantian, do you have a source that states that the Lend-Lease amounted for only 4% of the industrial production? If yes, was it calculated? Personally I know just too good that sometimes such numbers can be very deceptive. Here I have taken the neat Wiki numbers and the numbers of Glantz. Note that the items are mosty finished goods and mostly at the very end of the value chain (aircraft, radio, trucks)

Several authors really, Glantz included. In fact, whenever I've seen lend-lease discussed in percentages instead of numbers the figure was always around 4%. The issue here is that there are literally thousands of small stuff that don't count for much by themselves but they take up most of the army industry - clothes (summer/winter uniforms, caps, coats, belts etc...), small arms (sidearms, rifles, machine guns etc...), munition and shells (bullets for rifles, pistols, machine gunes, artillery shells, mortar shells, tank shells, grenades, bombs, mines etc...), other field equipment (tents, boats, pontoon bridges, various other pieces of engineering equipment, barricades, barbed wire, tank obstacles etc...), medical equipment, spare parts and so on...

The number of those things built wouldn't measure in thousands or even tens of thousands but in tens or hundreds of millions, for things like bullets and artillery shells. So, 4% all together makes sense for me.

On the other hand, worth of lend-lease is not just in its scale. Some things may have been more critical than others, depending on when they arrived, did the USSR have the means or the technology to produce them etc... Unfortunately, to really assess it, one would have to look at technology available in the USSR, their production capacity for various piece of equipment, rare materials production, their supporting industries (for example, the state of chemical industries) and I don't have the time, resources or desire to do that.

So, maybe those field 400,000+ field telephones, although insignificant in their worth, were more valuable than those 400,000+ motor vehicles, because Soviets didn't have the means to produce them so quickly in such quantity. Foodstuffs may have been invaluable, even though their actual worth would make less than 1% of lend-lease worth.

Then again, some of the stuff delivered through lend-lease, especially in the beginning, was plainly and simply junk. What could the Red Army do with Lees and Stuarts? Dismantle them and use as scrap metal. They quality was awful, Russians would than have to adapt their factories to produce shells for them, spare parts, to worry about skilled mechanics who would know to repair them etc... Sometimes Russian petrol didn't work well on American motors. Equipment like that was more trouble than it was worth, in practical sense.

All in all, lend-lease, although useful, wasn't nearly as instrumental as often portrayed IMHO, for several reasons:

1) It amounted only 4%
2) Bulk of it arrived not when it was most needed but when war was practically decided already
3) A good deal of stuff that arrived in the most crucial first period of the war was either of questionable quality or junk outright



BTW: Looking at the numbers it really seems that the allied cause against Stalin would not be hopeless, given decent manpower of trained soldiers.

In my opinion, armour and artillery would be more useful in a European war than navy or airforce and that's where Soviets were ahead of western Allies. Strong communist organizations in various western countries (first and foremost France and Italy) would make Allied war effort that much harder. Industrial capacity, where western Allies would have the advantage is in the US, so in order to deploy a tank to the front line after it's produced, you have to transport it from factory to a port, load it on a ship, transport it across the Atlantic, unload it in a port and then transport it to the front line most probably by train. It would take weeks (not counting terrible state of ports in western Europe at that time and possibility of sabotage by strong communist movements). In the case of the Soviets, when a tank is produced it would be put on a train and deployed to the front line in matter of days.

Red Army was of better quality and more experienced than US and British - Eastern Front has seen more action than all other theaters combined. Russian commanders were better than their western counterparts. With all due respect to Patton, Bradley, Monty, Mac they just couldn't compare to Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky, Konev. In the case of hypothetical Patton's push, I think the Red Army would have been stopped by the sea and not by the allies...

[Seamus Fermanagh]

BTW: Looking at the numbers it really seems that the allied cause against Stalin would not be hopeless, given decent manpower of trained soldiers.

That would have been a problem for the West. England was near the bottom of the barrel for manpower, a fact that had been affecting their fighting style from 1944 on. The USA had numerous more warm bodies, but had adopted a policy of field far fewer infantry units than might have been fielded at a maximum effort. France had few regulars and other formerly occupied areas were fielding even fewer trained units.

What I don't really know is how close were the Soviets to the bottom of the barrell. Obviously, their population has never really recovered from the Stalin era, but I'm not sure that means they could not have fielded enough replacements to keep that large and well-equipped force they had in 1945 in the field.

[Oleander Ardens]

On the other hand, worth of lend-lease is not just in its scale. Some things may have been more critical than others, depending on when they arrived, did the USSR have the means or the technology to produce them etc... Unfortunately, to really assess it, one would have to look at technology available in the USSR, their production capacity for various piece of equipment, rare materials production, their supporting industries (for example, the state of chemical industries) and I don't have the time, resources or desire to do that.

A good look at the goods seems to support mostly this view. Personally I don't think that the Lees and Stuarts were bad for the timeframe. We are talking here about 1941 and 1942, where the need for tanks was quite desperate in the Sovietunion. The Lee outclassed the MI, MII and was overall in the league of the MIII and MIV - that the preception was not overwhelming is due to the fact that the T-34 was just such though yard stick. The Stuart was still a lot better than the MI and MII and was good design, even if too light for late 1942 and 1943.

Overall I would say that the impact was a lot higher than the 4%, especially since quite some of it arrived when the Sovietunion needed it most and it where often critical goods and components. The relative impact might have been up to 15% - we wil never know.


What I don't really know is how close were the Soviets to the bottom of the barrell. Obviously, their population has never really recovered from the Stalin era, but I'm not sure that means they could not have fielded enough replacements to keep that large and well-equipped force they had in 1945 in the field.

Glantz wrote that in 1944 the Red Army was nearing the bottom of manpower. Given the immense military and civilian losses of the Sovietunion and of some conquered satellites this is all too understandable. A war of attrition between the "Soviet" alliance and the Western allies would most likely been won by the latter. But given the great relative advantage on the field IIRC at least 2-1 in manpower and also in material it is hard to know if to which extent the greater ressources of the West could have been brought to bear.