Advantage: Defense

Based on the opportunity to plant stakes around your troops and earthworks around your artillery when defending (if you've been in that spot at least one turn), the greater importance of ranged combat and the greater ability to use cover and terrain, the defense has a much more imbalanced advantage in E:TW than in past TW titles. But as history marches inexorably to trench warfare, perhaps this is justifiable.

Nonetheless, it can give you a further advantage when besieging AI cities because it seems the cities can't hold out for very long, and the AI doesn't seem inclined to bring reinforcements in to help break the siege (although I haven't played too much so far, only RTI, and I'm not sure the AI has had the available troops nearby in these cases). That means so far I've rarely had to assault a fort; just wait a few turns and they have to sally, and you can sit back and play defense on a nice hill.

Also, while I like the zone of control feature and the opportunity to intercept invading forces, it seems odd that you're on defense when intercepting. Isn't it like an ambush, where you're attacking the enemy and they should be defending (albeit in some disarray)? Not that I mind playing defense more, but it seems that feature adds even further to the defensive advantage in the game.

CA should make the AI smarter about calling in reinforcements to break sieges and allow cities to hold out for more than a few turns. You should be forced to have to go on the attack more often. Of course, so far I've only played RTI, and the Brits weren't too smart about deploying reinforcements quickly to break the most important siege of the Revolutionary War, so maybe this is intentional in RTI! :laugh4:

Thoughts?

I think its more of a 'march out to defend your land' type of deal and not an ambush but you can treat it however you like. It doesn't matter much if you have time limit turned off.

Allow me to disagree. It is heading to an advantage to defense that would be reached in 1915 (yes, WW1 started as a movement war) with the advent of of heavy machine gun and evolved trench warfare. 18th, 19th and early 20th century warfare had heavy focus on MOVEMENT. Tactical & Strategical movement was used to counter the advance that was made into defensive warfare, and it worked very well until defensive could also get movable (heavy machine gun).

On the campaign map you could just go around a entrenched army and go for the region capital. The only choice left for the defender is ether intercept you: they lose trench and they come to you (you become the "defender") or lose their city.

On the battlefield it might be less biased on attack but still, with the advent of movable artillery attack have a small advantage. If the defender plant stakes and hold to fix positions they are quickly pounded to weakness by artillery and charged from the front by bayonet infantries and from the rear by cavalries. A maneuvering and disperse opponent as less chance of getting hit hard that a fixed one.

I think the biggest defense advantage comes at sea. In my experience, the defender ALWAYS has the wind at their backs. This is a major pain, because it means there's no real advantage to attacking at sea, no opportunity to outmaneuver your opponent.

IMO, who gets the wind at their back should be based on the number of stars the admiral has, perhaps give an admiral +%10 to his chance to get the wind at his back for each star he has over his opponent.

EX: If one admiral had 3 stars and another 4, the 4 star admiral would have %60 chance of getting the wind advantage, and the 3 star just %40. If they were BOTH 3 stars, then they would have an even 50/50 chance.

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Originally Posted by Sheogorath

I think the biggest defense advantage comes at sea. In my experience, the defender ALWAYS has the wind at their backs. This is a major pain, because it means there's no real advantage to attacking at sea, no opportunity to outmaneuver your opponent.

IMO, who gets the wind at their back should be based on the number of stars the admiral has, perhaps give an admiral +%10 to his chance to get the wind at his back for each star he has over his opponent.

EX: If one admiral had 3 stars and another 4, the 4 star admiral would have %60 chance of getting the wind advantage, and the 3 star just %40. If they were BOTH 3 stars, then they would have an even 50/50 chance.

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Very good suggestion. :2thumbsup:

I would just like to propose that instead of a 50/50 chance, even matched admirals get cross wind so they actually start even. It reflect the post battle maneuvers in that they did not manage to get the upper hand from one another.

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Originally Posted by Melvish

On the campaign map you could just go around a entrenched army and go for the region capital. The only choice left for the defender is ether intercept you: they lose trench and they come to you (you become the "defender") or lose their city.

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When you intercept, you're defending, not the intercepted army. But the point remains: If you avoid interception by going straight for the capital, you get to defend, even though you're the "attacker," because the AI will inevitably have to sally out after only 2-3 turns and likely with no reinforcement help. This adds up to a significant advantage for the human player on top of an already weak AI because he/she gets to defend when taking a city, and the disparity in difficulty between defense and offense on the battlefield is even greater in this game than past TW games, in my opinion.

Do you think the defense-offense balance is more, uh, balanced than in past TW games? I don't, although admittedly I haven't played too too much yet and only RTI.

I don't think that's necessarily wrong, but CA can make some adjustments for the AI to mitigate that, like making the AI more likely to call in reinforcements when sallying out to attack a besieging army and increasing the number of turns besieged cities can hold out.

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Originally Posted by Rufus

Do you think the defense-offense balance is more, uh, balanced than in past TW games? I don't, although admittedly I haven't played too too much yet and only RTI.

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I don't think either that it is "balanced". I think, IMHO, that attack is more advantaged than defense, as it should be since it portrait a time period were movement warfare was the rule and even the mightiest fortress were "easily" defeated (ex: Quebec was destroyed at 80% by Wolfe guns and Louisbourg was utterly destroyed).

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Originally Posted by Rufus

I don't think that's necessarily wrong, but CA can make some adjustments for the AI to mitigate that, like making the AI more likely to call in reinforcements when sallying out to attack a besieging army and increasing the number of turns besieged cities can hold out.

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Indeed the AI is in need of much improvement, That "no-naval-invasion" thing is the reason i've stop to playing games with UK/France as they was no real opposition.I've switch to more land focused factions like Prussia, Poland and Russia.

That random battle reinforcements direction arrival also got skeptical too.

Clausewitz, On War:

Book 6, Defense

Chapter 2; Advantages of the Defensive.

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What is the object of defence? To preserve. To preserve is easier than to acquire; from which follows at once that the means on both sides being supposed equal, the defensive is easier than the offensive. But in what consists the greater facility of preserving or keeping possession? In this, that all time which is not turned to any account falls into the scale in favour of the defence. He reaps where he has not sowed. Every suspension of offensive action, either from erroneous views, from fear or from indolence, is in favour of the side acting defensively. This advantage saved the State of Prussia from ruin more than once in the Seven Years' War. It is one which derives itself from the conception and object of the defensive, lies in the nature of all defence, and in ordinary life, particularly in legal business which bears so much resemblance to war, it is expressed by the Latin proverb, Beati sunt possidentes. Another advantage arising from the nature of war and belonging to it exclusively, is the aid afforded by locality or ground; this is one of which the defensive form has a preferential use.

Having established these general ideas we now turn more directly to the subject.

In tactics every combat, great or small, is defensive if we leave the initiative to the enemy, and wait for his appearance in our front. From that moment forward we can make use of all offensive means without losing the said two advantages of the defence, namely, that of waiting for, and that of ground. In strategy, at first, the campaign represents the battle, and the theatre of war the position; but afterwards the whole war takes the place of the campaign, and the whole country that of the theatre of war, and in both cases the defensive remains that which it was in tactics.

It has been already observed in a general way that the defensive is easier than the offensive; but as the defensive has a negative object, that of preserving, and the offensive a positive object that of conquering, and as the latter increases our own means of carrying on war, but the preserving does not, therefore in order to express ourselves distinctly, we must say, that the defensive form of war is in itself stronger than the offensive. This is the result we have been desirous of arriving at; for although it lies completely in the nature of the thing, and has been confirmed by experience a thousand times, still it is completely contrary to prevalent opinion—a proof how ideas may be confused by superficial writers.

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Book 7, Attack

Chapter Six, Attack of an Entrenched Camp

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What would be the object of entrenchments generally, if not to strengthen the defence? No, not only reason but experience, in hundreds and thousands of instances, show that a well-traced, sufficiently manned, and well defended entrenchment is, as a rule, to be looked upon as an impregnable point, and is also so regarded by the attack. Starting from this point of the efficiency of a single entrenchment, we argue that there can be no doubt as to the attack of an entrenched camp being a most difficult undertaking, and one in which generally it will be impossible for the assailant to succeed.

It is consistent with the nature of an entrenched camp that it should be weakly garrisoned; but with good, natural obstacles of ground and strong field works, it is possible to bid defiance to superior numbers. Frederick the Great considered the attack of the camp of Pirna as impracticable, although he had at his command double the force of the garrison; and although it has been since asserted, here and there, that it was quite possible to have taken it; the only proof in favour of this assertion is founded on the bad condition of the Saxon troops; an argument which does not at all detract in any way from the value of entrenchments. But it is a question, whether those who have since contended not only for the feasibility but also for the facility of the attack, would have made up their minds to execute it at the time.

We, therefore, think that the attack of an entrenched camp belongs to the category of quite exceptional means on the part of the offensive. It is only if the entrenchments have been thrown up in haste are not completed, still less strengthed by obstacles to prevent their being approached, or when, as is often the case taken altogether, the whole camp is only an outline of what it was intended to be, a half-finished ruin, that then an attack on it may be advisable, and at the same time become the road to gain an easy conquest over the enemy.

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Seems about right :book:

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has been confirmed by experience a thousand times, still it is completely contrary to prevalent opinion—a proof how ideas may be confused by superficial writers.

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This is outstanding and is almost universal in its application. We need not limit this idea to 18th century warfare.

Anyhow I think you settled it that the advantage in the game should go to the defensive army and that CA got it right.

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Originally Posted by Rufus

CA should make the AI smarter about calling in reinforcements to break sieges and allow cities to hold out for more than a few turns. You should be forced to have to go on the attack more often. Of course, so far I've only played RTI, and the Brits weren't too smart about deploying reinforcements quickly to break the most important siege of the Revolutionary War, so maybe this is intentional in RTI! :laugh4:

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It is different in RTI from the Grand Campaign. In RTI, most sieges last 1-2 turns before the city falls. So far I've only been fighting in the European theater, but all the sieges I've seen there have had 4 to 6 turns time limits. In fact, I have never even taken a city via siege in the GC because the circumstances always demand that my army move on or prepare for a new enemy. Maybe this isn't just a RTI/GC difference but is instead something unique to fighting in the colonies, but in any case it's not like that in Europe.

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Maybe this isn't just a RTI/GC difference but is instead something unique to fighting in the colonies, but in any case it's not like that in Europe.

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I'd tend to agree that it is a difference between the colonies and Europe. European cities are much closer together and there are many more armies facing you within close proximity to your own forces. Even the majority of the minor kingdoms in Europe have at least 2 full stacks after a certain period of time. My experience in the colonies (as France) is that even late in the campaign the British only have a few large stacks and they are quite spread out.

@ Oleander Ardens: Interesting debate but i find it amusing you use Clausewitz to defend the superiority of defense (if that was your intent, i may have misinterpreted your statements at the end of the post) ; because he view defence as the prologue to offense, and that the two should be considered as a whole and that the object of defense is to prepare the offense (thus promoting the superiority of the offense IMHO).

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Book VII: The Attack---NATURE OF THE STRATEGICAL ATTACK
We have seen that the defensive in War generally—therefore, also, the strategic defensive—is no absolute state of expectancy and warding off, therefore no completely passive state, but that it is a relative state, and consequently impregnated more or less with offensive principles. In the same way the offensive is no homogeneous whole, but incessantly mixed up with the defensive. But there is this difference between the two, that a defensive, without an offensive return blow, cannot be conceived; that this return blow is a necessary constituent part of the defensive, whilst in the attack, the blow or act is in itself one complete idea

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I know he advice on not attacking heavily entrenched defensive positions but also hint that using movement or heavy firepower is a good way to neutralize those said positions thus setting offense as an end goal. France as proved this time again in the Napoleonic wars and so did Germany in WW2 (Maginot line?).

There that old Samurai moto that said "It is easier to attack than defend" (just watched "The Seven Samurai" last night).


Beside do you win war only by remaining on the defensive?

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that then an attack on it may be advisable, and at the same time become the road to gain an easy conquest over the enemy.

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Ardri: that the advantage in the game should go to the defensive army and that CA got it right

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Well CA certainly got it right if i think it favor offense and is done right and you think it favor defense and is done right!

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Originally Posted by Ardri

I'd tend to agree that it is a difference between the colonies and Europe. European cities are much closer together and there are many more armies facing you within close proximity to your own forces. Even the majority of the minor kingdoms in Europe have at least 2 full stacks after a certain period of time. My experience in the colonies (as France) is that even late in the campaign the British only have a few large stacks and they are quite spread out.

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Thanks - That's good to know. In RTI sieges too often it's as if the attacker gets to play the role of defender by forcing the besieged troops to sally. I don't think the AI has ever "intercepted" me on the way to one of their cities, either, which would've at least given them the chance to fight with the advantages of defense. If I reach the city without being intercepted, the only way the AI gets the advantages of defense is if I choose to storm the walls, which I never do if I only have to wait a few turns before they're forced to sally.

In general, you should be forced to make a difficult decision between storming the walls if you really want to take the city, or risk the failure of the siege by waiting too long and giving the enemy the chance to bring in reinforcements (or risk harming other efforts where your forces are needed by getting bogged down in a lengthy siege).

Sounds like CA got those things right at least in the GC. But what about intercepting - is the AI more likely to intercept you in the GC compared to the RTI? The AI hardly ever intercepts my army heading toward their cities in RTI.

It is of course a complex question and Clausewitz did treat it as such. From the text I quoted already:

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In tactics every combat, great or small, is defensive if we leave the initiative to the enemy, and wait for his appearance in our front. From that moment forward we can make use of all offensive means without losing the said two advantages of the defence, namely, that of waiting for, and that of ground. In strategy, at first, the campaign represents the battle, and the theatre of war the position; but afterwards the whole war takes the place of the campaign, and the whole country that of the theatre of war, and in both cases the defensive remains that which it was in tactics.

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Not that this suits also modern warfare equally well. In three overlapping layers called strategic, operational and tactical offense and defense are interacting. They always uniquely twistend and intertwined. One can be in the strategic (and operational) defensive form and as well be on the tactical offensive one in many locations - as in the Volkskrieg, popular uprising or Napoleon's campaign in 1814 which ended with his Waterloo.

Personally I always had the interpretation that the TW games favored the aggressive offense on the campaign (strategy) map and tactical defense on the (tactical) battlemap. While the "interception" on the campain map strenghens the strategic defense and strenghens and weakens the strategic offense the ability to entrench increases the advantages of a tactical defensive posture.


A deeper discussion should take place in the monastery. :bow:

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But what about intercepting - is the AI more likely to intercept you in the GC compared to the RTI? The AI hardly ever intercepts my army heading toward their cities in RTI.

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I cannot compare the two as I didn't play RTI past episode 1 when I got the game and currently in my French campaign in Europe I have simply shredded through he minor kingdoms all the way to Saxony without fighting a major power(major kingdoms have more armies and thus I believe would be more likely to intercept you), but I do think that when you come into range of 2 AI armies marching into their territory the two combined will intercept you (I believe this is the case, I can't remember for certain off the top of my head). However, if it is your army marching against the regional capital the army they have within will not intercept for the most part.

I believe that the AI tends to only intercept/attack your forces when it can go into battle with superior or nearly equivalent strength. Given that most garrisons are lowly militia, the AI tends to try and play defense in a siege rather than intercept and fight a field battle it knows it will lose. I guess you could say the AI would rather lose later than sooner. That is just my observation of the AI's behavior.