Advantage: Defense

[Melvish]

Allow me to disagree. It is heading to an advantage to defense that would be reached in 1915 (yes, WW1 started as a movement war) with the advent of of heavy machine gun and evolved trench warfare. 18th, 19th and early 20th century warfare had heavy focus on MOVEMENT. Tactical & Strategical movement was used to counter the advance that was made into defensive warfare, and it worked very well until defensive could also get movable (heavy machine gun).

On the campaign map you could just go around a entrenched army and go for the region capital. The only choice left for the defender is ether intercept you: they lose trench and they come to you (you become the "defender") or lose their city.

On the battlefield it might be less biased on attack but still, with the advent of movable artillery attack have a small advantage. If the defender plant stakes and hold to fix positions they are quickly pounded to weakness by artillery and charged from the front by bayonet infantries and from the rear by cavalries. A maneuvering and disperse opponent as less chance of getting hit hard that a fixed one.

[Sheogorath]

I think the biggest defense advantage comes at sea. In my experience, the defender ALWAYS has the wind at their backs. This is a major pain, because it means there's no real advantage to attacking at sea, no opportunity to outmaneuver your opponent.

IMO, who gets the wind at their back should be based on the number of stars the admiral has, perhaps give an admiral +%10 to his chance to get the wind at his back for each star he has over his opponent.

EX: If one admiral had 3 stars and another 4, the 4 star admiral would have %60 chance of getting the wind advantage, and the 3 star just %40. If they were BOTH 3 stars, then they would have an even 50/50 chance.

[Melvish]

I think the biggest defense advantage comes at sea. In my experience, the defender ALWAYS has the wind at their backs. This is a major pain, because it means there's no real advantage to attacking at sea, no opportunity to outmaneuver your opponent.

IMO, who gets the wind at their back should be based on the number of stars the admiral has, perhaps give an admiral +%10 to his chance to get the wind at his back for each star he has over his opponent.

EX: If one admiral had 3 stars and another 4, the 4 star admiral would have %60 chance of getting the wind advantage, and the 3 star just %40. If they were BOTH 3 stars, then they would have an even 50/50 chance.

Very good suggestion.

I would just like to propose that instead of a 50/50 chance, even matched admirals get cross wind so they actually start even. It reflect the post battle maneuvers in that they did not manage to get the upper hand from one another.

[Rufus]

On the campaign map you could just go around a entrenched army and go for the region capital. The only choice left for the defender is ether intercept you: they lose trench and they come to you (you become the "defender") or lose their city.

When you intercept, you're defending, not the intercepted army. But the point remains: If you avoid interception by going straight for the capital, you get to defend, even though you're the "attacker," because the AI will inevitably have to sally out after only 2-3 turns and likely with no reinforcement help. This adds up to a significant advantage for the human player on top of an already weak AI because he/she gets to defend when taking a city, and the disparity in difficulty between defense and offense on the battlefield is even greater in this game than past TW games, in my opinion.

Do you think the defense-offense balance is more, uh, balanced than in past TW games? I don't, although admittedly I haven't played too too much yet and only RTI.

I don't think that's necessarily wrong, but CA can make some adjustments for the AI to mitigate that, like making the AI more likely to call in reinforcements when sallying out to attack a besieging army and increasing the number of turns besieged cities can hold out.

[Melvish]

Do you think the defense-offense balance is more, uh, balanced than in past TW games? I don't, although admittedly I haven't played too too much yet and only RTI.

I don't think either that it is "balanced". I think, IMHO, that attack is more advantaged than defense, as it should be since it portrait a time period were movement warfare was the rule and even the mightiest fortress were "easily" defeated (ex: Quebec was destroyed at 80% by Wolfe guns and Louisbourg was utterly destroyed).

I don't think that's necessarily wrong, but CA can make some adjustments for the AI to mitigate that, like making the AI more likely to call in reinforcements when sallying out to attack a besieging army and increasing the number of turns besieged cities can hold out.

Indeed the AI is in need of much improvement, That "no-naval-invasion" thing is the reason i've stop to playing games with UK/France as they was no real opposition.I've switch to more land focused factions like Prussia, Poland and Russia.

That random battle reinforcements direction arrival also got skeptical too.

[Oleander Ardens]

Clausewitz, On War:

Book 6, Defense

Chapter 2; Advantages of the Defensive.

What is the object of defence? To preserve. To preserve is easier than to acquire; from which follows at once that the means on both sides being supposed equal, the defensive is easier than the offensive. But in what consists the greater facility of preserving or keeping possession? In this, that all time which is not turned to any account falls into the scale in favour of the defence. He reaps where he has not sowed. Every suspension of offensive action, either from erroneous views, from fear or from indolence, is in favour of the side acting defensively. This advantage saved the State of Prussia from ruin more than once in the Seven Years' War. It is one which derives itself from the conception and object of the defensive, lies in the nature of all defence, and in ordinary life, particularly in legal business which bears so much resemblance to war, it is expressed by the Latin proverb, Beati sunt possidentes. Another advantage arising from the nature of war and belonging to it exclusively, is the aid afforded by locality or ground; this is one of which the defensive form has a preferential use.

Having established these general ideas we now turn more directly to the subject.

In tactics every combat, great or small, is defensive if we leave the initiative to the enemy, and wait for his appearance in our front. From that moment forward we can make use of all offensive means without losing the said two advantages of the defence, namely, that of waiting for, and that of ground. In strategy, at first, the campaign represents the battle, and the theatre of war the position; but afterwards the whole war takes the place of the campaign, and the whole country that of the theatre of war, and in both cases the defensive remains that which it was in tactics.

It has been already observed in a general way that the defensive is easier than the offensive; but as the defensive has a negative object, that of preserving, and the offensive a positive object that of conquering, and as the latter increases our own means of carrying on war, but the preserving does not, therefore in order to express ourselves distinctly, we must say, that the defensive form of war is in itself stronger than the offensive. This is the result we have been desirous of arriving at; for although it lies completely in the nature of the thing, and has been confirmed by experience a thousand times, still it is completely contrary to prevalent opinion—a proof how ideas may be confused by superficial writers.

Book 7, Attack

Chapter Six, Attack of an Entrenched Camp

What would be the object of entrenchments generally, if not to strengthen the defence? No, not only reason but experience, in hundreds and thousands of instances, show that a well-traced, sufficiently manned, and well defended entrenchment is, as a rule, to be looked upon as an impregnable point, and is also so regarded by the attack. Starting from this point of the efficiency of a single entrenchment, we argue that there can be no doubt as to the attack of an entrenched camp being a most difficult undertaking, and one in which generally it will be impossible for the assailant to succeed.

It is consistent with the nature of an entrenched camp that it should be weakly garrisoned; but with good, natural obstacles of ground and strong field works, it is possible to bid defiance to superior numbers. Frederick the Great considered the attack of the camp of Pirna as impracticable, although he had at his command double the force of the garrison; and although it has been since asserted, here and there, that it was quite possible to have taken it; the only proof in favour of this assertion is founded on the bad condition of the Saxon troops; an argument which does not at all detract in any way from the value of entrenchments. But it is a question, whether those who have since contended not only for the feasibility but also for the facility of the attack, would have made up their minds to execute it at the time.

We, therefore, think that the attack of an entrenched camp belongs to the category of quite exceptional means on the part of the offensive. It is only if the entrenchments have been thrown up in haste are not completed, still less strengthed by obstacles to prevent their being approached, or when, as is often the case taken altogether, the whole camp is only an outline of what it was intended to be, a half-finished ruin, that then an attack on it may be advisable, and at the same time become the road to gain an easy conquest over the enemy.

Seems about right

[Ardri]

has been confirmed by experience a thousand times, still it is completely contrary to prevalent opinion—a proof how ideas may be confused by superficial writers.

This is outstanding and is almost universal in its application. We need not limit this idea to 18th century warfare.

Anyhow I think you settled it that the advantage in the game should go to the defensive army and that CA got it right.