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And what happened in Russia? The rise of 70 years of Communism.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
Germany was required to abrogate treaties dating to 1843, surrender all colonies, give up provinces in the east in addition to the north and west. Give up mineral rights to France, submit to the military occupation of its most industrialized region in the Ruhr and for the most part hand the Saar over to the French to administer.
It was shot sighted. It strongly favored the two reaming powers. It was vengeful.
But don’t take my word for it. Read it! Surly you don’t need scholars and lawyers to reach your own conclusions.
Imagine for a moment that you are on the receiving end of that document and try to think how you would feel if you were forced into signing it.
It is easy to see why the Germans felt as they did and that is why the loosing side got their point across as excepted history up to this point.
Just because Germany wasn't completely broken up into small little states does not mean that it did not have large territorial losses. It's overseas colonies were large and important, in Germany's eyes colonies gave it it's place under the sun. Once again, just because it wasn't the most unfair does make make it moderate or fair, as pointed out earlier the Germans agreed to an armistice and then were left out of the creation of a peace treaty, if the Germans had submitted to unconditional surrender as the Axis powers did in WWII it would not be the same but because they were in a position of weakness they had sign the peace treaty.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
From the outside looking in, one could make a case that Europeans, since the Golden Bull of 1356, have sought some way toQuote:
Originally Posted by Husar
1. prevent the slaughter of its inhabitants, and
2. prevent rule by a dictator
by thinking up rules and Conventions and Treaties and other agreements. All of which "worked" for awhile, only to be tossed eventually in the name of some emergency, or tribal need for revenge for oppression. Versailles (and the League of Nations) was merely the early 20th Century version of that effort.
I don't really find this to be a persuasive argument for harshness considering that Britain, as a victorious power, and the victorious power which had been continuously actively fighting for the longest, lost most of our overseas territories after WW2, and the trading base that was the basis of our power. Germany were in no shape to significantly continue resistance by the time the armistice was agreed, and the subsequent treaty reflected their lack of power, just as Brest-Litovsk reflected Russia's lack of power to resist anything Germany might wish to impose on them. Such is war. The later rise of the Nazis was due to two factors. Firstly, the worldwide depression, whose cause had little to do with Versailles. Secondly, the myth that the German Army hadn't been beaten, but was sold out by the civilian government. This second point would have been argued whatever the terms of the treaty, simply because the Allies treated the Germans as the defeated (which they were), while the Germans deluded themselves that they hadn't been beaten.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
From all the accounts I've read, the Germans in WW2 had a similar attitude, and if peace had been concluded while they were still in Belgium and Poland, they would have kept a grudge against the Allies, and looked to avenge their so-called defeat in the next war. This arrogance was only knocked out of them by taking the fight into Germany, and showing them they were indisputably the losers of the war.
There is also the matter of the Allies treating Germany as though it were still the old Imperial state and not a new Republic.
Had they actually negotiated with the freely elected government the likelihood of future conflict could possibly have been avoided.
Had France been treated this way after the fall of Napoleon there would have been several of the older states reformed from what is today French territory.
The study is correct in it assessment of the German reaction. They were treated the same as the old Imperial Germans.
It makes not difference whether the so call war guilt clause was written by two Americans, or the French, or even by a Martian Council of Elders it was a trigger phrase and any fool can see that.
The guilt for the failure should be sheared out among the Allied Governments, and not least to the United States who should have, better than the European Powers, seen what this would mean to the people of the new Republic of Germany.
In American History it is taught that had Wilson succeeded in placing the US in the League of Nations there would never have been a Second World War, which is patently farcical with the role they played in the treaty.
The handling after the Second World War was little better. It ended Germany as a threat but brought us the Cold War and only the dread of Nuclear Annihilation kept us from a third.
Oh goodie, I do enjoy talking about Versailles.
A couple of points I should like to make:
Firstly, I think some posters over-estimate the Allies capabilities in November 1918. Though it is true the German army was in full retreat, morale was not completely broken, hence the incomprehension on the part of many soldiers concerning Germany's effective surrender. Furthermore, to project the snapshot of the last stage of the war over a hypothetical continuation is grossly erroneous. Remember, the German army was steaming towards Paris until the Battle of the Marne. In effect, had the war continued in 1918, the Allies would still have had to fought through the Ardennes and the hilly terrain north of Lorraine, ideal for defence and useless for tanks. I also highly doubt the political will of America and much of Great Britain to continue a war which had clearly become offensive rather than defensive. War exhaustion was high amongst all the nations, though now Germany would have had the fillip of defending the Heimat against foreign invaders.
I need to only point to the Greco-Turkish war to show how even ill-equipped and trained troops with enough resolve can decisively an invader.
Secondly, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was quite different to Versailles. Though German territorial gains were huge, it was a negotiated settlement: the Bolsheviks wanted a truce at any price in order to eliminate their opponents in the civil war. They were under no illusion that the treaty was a lasting peace; it was merely a stop-gap until the inevitable world revolution had made it null and void.
But Britain didn't have to lose it's colonies it simply gave up most of them due to the various independence movements and its war exhaustion. If Britian or France or really any of the colonial powers had wanted to maintain their colonies they could have at the cost of another colonial war. This is not comparable to stripping Germany of its colonies, Britain gave up its empire due to cost, public opinion, and war exhaustion, not because it had to.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
I don't despute that Germany would have lost WW1 after 1918 but it would have been at the cost of many more allied lives, the armistice was welcomed by both sides as an end to the fighting but don't imagine that there was no will left to fight in Germany. I'd rather not do "what ifs" but I think it wouldn't be too hard to accept that the german military extablishment would not have agreed to an armistice if they knew what the terms of Versailles would have been.
A respectable peace treaty that didn't try to turn a great power into a weak one would probably have been more effective for peace than Versailles. The Nazies were able to make use of the stab in the back myth because Germany was treated so harshly after the armistice and the German populace obviously thought they were given an undeservedly bad deal.
As for the German attitude in WW2, I think that many Germans probably accepted that the war was lost by the end of 1943, with it's tremendous defeats by the USSR as well as the vast increase in bombing from the Allied powers. The various German memoirs I've read seem to show rather a surprise that they weren't able to conclude a peace with Britain after the fall of France and would have liked to conclude a peace with the western powers if it allowed them to concentrate their effort against the soviets. The assassination attempt against hitler (I refer to the one in 1944) was an attempt to bring about a German government with which the allies would have been satisfied to conclude peace with.
The rise of the German idea of military superiority seems to only have occured during and after the Franco-Prussian war. By all accounts the Germans expected the French to invade Germany in that war which it didn't due primarily to the inefficiecy within the French mobilization system which gave the German nations a numerical superiority which detered the French invasion of Germany and allowed a German invasion of France. Only after the German victory in 1871 did they seem to think that the military solution would always result favorabley to them. Once again I think that a peace treaty that didn't seek to punish Germany so harshly would have allowed Germans to accept that they were defeated instead of being led to believe that their state of affairs was a result of a stab in the back.
Also, shouldn't this thread be in the monastery?
These topics heat up too much and get locked, so Louis posted it here, where there are less restrictions :shrug:Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
How would I feel? Me, I'd feel very sad about having lost the war.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fisherking
But I wouldn't tell myself bedtime stories how I did not lose the war, nor how losing a war does not come at a price, nor that the Jews/Bolshevist/liberal-capitalist were behind it all.
I'd accept it and move on. You win some, you lose some. No point in being an idiot about it.
All countries have lost wars, and all have understood this comes at a price - territorial loss, dynastic change, loss of influence or resources etc. Yet for some unexplained reason, the thought that Germany in 1918 should've been excempted from this is considered an article of faith.
Germany was defeated. Germany pleaded for an end to military hostilities. This was granted, to avoid further bloodshed. Bloodshed which would've been entirely unecessary, since Germany accepted defeat. The terms of the armistice were quite clear.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The...istice_Demands
Germany was not 'in a position of weakness', a position that was subsequently 'exploited'. Germany was defeated and accepted this defeat. Since there is no point in continuing the fight only to wait for the politicians to have settled on all the little details of the defeat, the armistice was accepted by the allies to prevent more deaths and the destruction of Germany.
The notion that Germany only agreed to a 'ceasefire', and that this was subsequently abused by the allies is erroneous.
(Imagine the following scenario: Germany is completely defeated, Germany pleads for an end of hostilities, and the allies continue fighting. Surely, this is outrageous? If one takes this into deliberation, it becomes clear why the armistice and treaty are regarded as 'lenient'. In 1918, events such as Dresden were avoided, that is, continuing the fight long after the war has been won.
If the allies can be considered harsh, it must be that it took them two months to agree to Germany's desperate pleas for an end to hostilities.)
The allies suspended military operations to prevent further casualties. Why needlessly waste more lives when Germany is defeated and has accepted defeat already? Why spend months more fighting simply because no definitive peace treaty has been agreed upon? Why needlessly continue the fight to an unconditional surrender, when this will only have more bloodshed on both sides, and a very likely breakdown of Germany - which the allies sought to avoid. The allies wanted Germany left intact, a bulwark against bolshevism, and with its economy left functioning.
The term 'armistice' might be misleading. It was not a ceasefire, not a temporary cessation of hostilities. It is an acceptance of defeat. For example, in Juny 1940, France and Germany signed an armistice, instead of a surrender treaty.
Yet, unlike the armistice of 1918, nobody will be so naive as to mistake this for anything but an acceptence of defeat. Nobody will claim that the French army was not defeated and merely asked for a ceasefire. Nobody in his right mind will descibe this armistice as 'France only asked for an armistice, this armistice was then exploited by Germany because France was now in a position of weakness'.
The mythology that surrounds 1918-1919 beggars belief.
Oh well. In 1945, the allies were neither as naive nor as lenient as they were in 1918/1919. To prevent renewed myths and nonsense from taking hold, this time they made sure that nobody could mistake a German defeat for anything else. Sad and tragic indeed. But such is the consequence of mythology. It is not just rhetorics to state that the myths and erroneous assumptions surrounding the treaty of Versailles caused sixty million deaths.
Lies! Filthy lies!Quote:
Originally Posted by Husar
France did not play a dangerous game of sacrificing Europe to her own aims from 1789 to 1940. :no:
France has done so from 843 all the way up to now.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
I'm always away when people start interesting threads.Quote:
Originally Posted by King Henry V
It seems to me that you're ignoring the south. Macedonian front collapsed completely, Bulgaria was out of the war, and there was no significant German force between French and Serbian divisions and Germany. They were in Hungary when armistice was declared. Hindenburg cited collapse of the Macedonian front as the last straw, saying that after that there is no hope of victory. Even without that, German economy was on the verge of total collapse. Not saying that everything was fine and dandy within the Entente but they could have gone on for much longer.
Germany was defeated, no doubt about that.
About the treaty, I'm with Louis, Meneldil, Pannonian... that it indeed wasn't that harsh. It is also a matter of defining "harsh". Arguably, all peace treaties are harsh on the losers but compared to treaties of the era (Brest-Litovsk) or the treaty Germany intended to put before the allies had it won, it wasn't that harsh. Certainly not harsh enough to warrant an entire generation of people who felt they have been victimised by the rest of the world.
Pannonian said it best with this:
I'd also say that German backing was the main reason Austria dared to risk war with Russia. Germany wasn't drawn in the war in support of an ally, Berlin actively encouraged Vienna to pursue military action. It was in a way natural, like France and Britain, Germany was highly industrialized country but with twice the population and GDP of those countries. Even so, Brits and French had all those nice colonies, getting cheap everything they need, from diamonds to oil and were generally acting all important around the world. At the same time Germany had the poorest colonies and was stuck between France and Britian on one side and Russia on the other. As Germany was the strongest military and economic power on the continent, it was bound to act on it eventually.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
To think that we granted an armistice, thereby preventing a nice Serbian-French march into Vienna, only to hear perennial nonsense about how they were not defeated at all. (And it had been all too long since French troops had their traditional march right through Austria too!).Quote:
Originally Posted by Sarmatian
Tell us more about the South Eastern front. Do the Turks, Bulgarians and Austrians too deny they lost?
How is the creation of Yugoslavia viewed in its succesor states? The Treaty of Versailles was, after all, only one of a number of treaties to end this war and create a new order.
This book still doesn't change the events.
It is just allied apologists saying that Germany shouldn't have reacted so badly.
It is just more blame and blaming someone never solves the problem.
We should learn from mistakes of the past and find remedies and not say that a total failure was someone else's fault. What good does that do?
The Allies overstepped the bounds of good sense and dictated the terms of peace rather than negotiating them.
The German reaction may have been unreasoning, in blaming the people forced to sign it, but it was foreseeable.
It wasn’t just a failure, it was a colossal failure and pointing fingers as to who was the most at fault is of very limited value.
Not entirely. Just as it was the case for Germany, France bitterness and will for "la revanche" wasn't really based upon the terms of the treaty. By 1890, France was back in the top 3 of European superpowers, the economy was going fine (despite being less industrialized than in Germany or UK), etc. etc. I think in 1870 most Alsacians barely spoke French, and a large part of them agreed to be annexed by Germany. Yet, people were still ressentful about the war of 1870, still thought Germany had to pay.Quote:
Originally Posted by The Wizard
Except for the unfair commercial clauses that France was still submitted to, the effects of 1873 were pretty much nonexistant by 1900. Fact is, it was an era of rampant nationalism, a time when nation building was heavily based on sending young men to war against a supposed eternal rival, and imposing your will on the international scene.
While it is true that the defeat of 1870 caused a deep impact in the french national mythos (and also gave birth to the whole "Jews betrayed us" and "collectivist are going to destroy or country conspiracy theories, as the punishment of the Paris Commune and the whole Dreyfus Affair underlined), it was mostly because France still considered herself and her 'people's army' to be the top military power of the world, and got her ass beaten to oblivion by what was she considered to be the underdog of Europe, in a few weeks. Not because of the terms of the treaty.
great thread people, very insightful.
my reading of Dreadnought causes me to side with Louis et-al, given that Versailles was no harsher than the treaty imposed on France at the end of the previous Franco-German war some few decades earlier.
Well duh, they shouldn't have. The only issue is wether the Versailles treaty was such a humiliating and heavy burden on the Germans that it all becomes more understandable.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fisherking
To me, the idea that Germany was somehow compelled to invade Poland and annex Chzechoslovakia because they were forced to pay to England and France is a bit odd.
Regardless of wether the Versailles treaty was harsh in either its wording or execution (I think it was, even if it was not unusual for the time)...it's not sufficient to explain why the Germans embraced the nazis and caused WW2.
Serbian army, naturally after so much suffering and spilled blood, wanted to push on to Vienna, but allies sent a clear signal to stop and get out of Hungary. Balkan countries tended to be as pigheaded then as they are now and would loathe to abandon territory the army had control of :laugh4:, although a nice, in-style entry in Vienna would have definitely painted a clearer picture about who lost the war to the general population.Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
I believe it was pretty clear to everyone except Germany that the war was lost, that it wasn't "we're offering armistice since we don't want to fight" but "we're offering armistice since we're defeated".
Unfortunately, it is difficult to apply western European standards to Balkans. As one, I believe American, history professor said:"For Britain, France, Germany, even Russia and the United States, the World War I years of 1914 to 1918 are powerful dates around which we can organize our thinking. World War I stands as a watershed event that fundamentally changed these nations' historic progress.
Such a view of World War I is less attractive and useful for thinking about Balkan affairs. Halting a discussion of Greek or Serbian nationalism in 1914 or 1918 leaves the story unfinished. It makes more sense to trace Serbian nationalist thought from the 1840s all the way up to 1929, perhaps even to the history of Serbia during World War II and during the 1980s. In the same way, it makes sense to look at Greece from 1821 up to 1923 and beyond: events as recent as the Cyprus crisis of the 1970s are extensions of nineteenth century issues. In Western Europe, 1914 ended a century of relative peace, but for the Balkan countries, World War I was only the latest war in a string of crises and confrontations. For Serbia, 1914 was an extension of the fighting of 1912 and 1913, and it has been called the "Third Balkan War" by some writers. For Greece, the period 1914-1918 was a middle period in a decade of fighting that began in 1912 and ended in 1923."
In Yugoslavia, there were many different pan-slavic movements and often they had contradicting ideas about how post-war Yugoslavia should be organized and even what should become part of it. Serbian prime minister, Pasic was originally opposed to the idea of Yugoslavia, but he caved in to the pressure of the King and other politicians. His contribution was try to organize Yugoslavia relatively similar to Prussia-Germany model, a large state encompassing all or most south Slavs but ruled by Serbian king and effectively dominated by Serbia politically.
Now, in retrospect, some in Serbia think we shouldn't have pursued Yugoslavian idea but instead should have accepted the extremely large territorial extension offered by the Allies under the treaty of London. That would have made a huge Serbian state that would have encompassed around 3/4 quarters of Yugoslavia.
https://img85.imageshack.us/img85/74...sforserbia.png
Croatians were pressuring for a Yugoslavia and national councils pledged support of unification with Serbia as that was the only way they could have a say during the peace conference and they were afraid that what doesn't become part of Yugoslavia would be claimed by Italy, or even Hungary and Austria.. Slovenians were thinking along similar lines. Allies actually opposed the idea of Yugoslavia at first, primarily because of the complicated situation it would create with another ally, Italy. Without informing Serbia, Istria and Dalmatia were promised to Italy. Creation of Yugoslavia meant contesting claims between two allies. At first, allies refused to acknowledge that the delegation at the peace conference represented Serbs, Croats and Slovenes but addressed the delegation as "the delegation of the Kingdom of Serbia". So immediately after the war the creation of Yugoslavia was seen in very positive light. It changed after the war, as we've seen.
An interesting article: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article...inety-years-on
This text provides and nice background of the history of the Balkans and naturally deals with the causes and the effects of the WW1 in the Balkans. It is relatively short (for its scope) and broad and paints a good "bigger picture" about Balkan history in general for people interested in it. The WW1 part starts about 2/3 through it.
Oh come now, sir, you're not seriously suggesting that the Serbian Army, even with the help of a few French divisions, having fought against the combined armies of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany for the past four years was in a fit state to advance all the way across Austria-Hungary to Germany?Quote:
Originally Posted by Sarmatian
I don't deny that Germany was defeated by November 1918, however there are many varying degrees of defeat, and Germany's was not a total one, nor do I think it would have been had the war continued. The problem therefore was the gap between the severity of the treaty and the degree of defeat.
I majored in European History with a concerntration in the inter-war years, with a particular emphasis on Germany. I'm also a Jew and about as far from a German sympathizer as you can get. However, you can chalk me up in the anti-Versailles camp. Versailles was not remotely balanced given the realities of the origins of the war and the state at the time of the Armistace. Versailles absolutely gutted Germany economically and politically, and opened up rifts within German society which were easily exploited by both the Fascists and the Communists.
It is wrong to say that Versailles caused WW2. It most certainly did not. However, it is equally wrong to say that it had nothing to do with WW2. Versailles was one of several major factors which contributed to the Nazi rise to power. The others are the Great Depression, the Bolshevik Revolution, the US refusal to join the League of Nations, and the complicity of the Centre Party. I do not consider Versailles to be more or less important than any of those other factors; they all hold equal responsibility and the absense of any single one of them may have been enough to prevent WW2.
Actually, Serbian army spent more than 6 months resting and refitting on Corfu prior to the breakthrough. That breakthrough threw 300,000 Bulgarian soldiers out of the war and left central powers with no significant forces in the south. It was a major defeat for the Central Powers. Ludendorf, when informed of it, had a fit with foam coming out of his mouth and his adjutant thought that he would die of shock. I've already cited Hindenburg's assessment. Given that allies had complete control of the seas, that force could have been infinitely resupplied and even reinforced with more British and French division if there had been need for it. Stopping it would require establishing a front along a very long border, which means digging trenches, building field fortifications, barbed wire etc... and, more importantly, manning it. Germany didn't have the manpower or time to do it. Budapest would have been taken in matter of days, Vienna probably in the matter of weeks. Ottoman Empire was also near the end of its endurance which would free up a lot of British divisions. I don't believe Germany alone had enough manpower to establish a completely new front that would have needed to be hundreds of kilometers in length. Even if it did, it would have severely weakened German position in the west.Quote:
Originally Posted by King Henry V
I'm not saying it wouldn't have been bloody, but German defeat was a done deal. By suing for peace, Germany saved itself from destruction. One could argue that Germany should have felt grateful allies didn't finish the job. Instead they tried it once more 20 years later after which they finally learned the lesson that they could get more by selling us their cars than trying military conquest.
Oh, and Romanian army could have joined the party in the south were it needed
What he said!Quote:
Originally Posted by TinCow
:bow:
Not only had the French-Serbian-Greek troops been doing just that, what's more, there not even was an Austria-Hungary anymore when we were done with them. It had collapsed. The Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes had broken away. Hungary and Austria had split.Quote:
Originally Posted by King Henry V
As the British marched on virtually undefended Constantinople, d'Espèrey and his army had crossed the Danube, and stood deep into Hungary. Bulgaria, Hungary and the Ottoman Empire had been defeated one by one. To the west, the Italians had knocked out Austria.
All of Austria-Hungary had surrendered and had ceased to exist. And for a punchline: part of the armistice was...that the Entente armies were to be given free passage through Austria-Hungary to Germany!
http://www.forost.ungarisches-instit...19181103-1.pdf :yes: :italy:
Germany faced imminent invasion.
We had it for the picking: crossing into Germany in the West, where the Germans had been fully driven out of France, or crossing into Germany from the south or southeast, where nothing stood in the way anymore. The outcome on either fronts was certain.
[sentimentalism]No country suffered more than Serbia in WWI. If ever a country snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, it was Serbia in 1917/18. I'm not going to take away their ultimate victory from them. [/sentimentalism]
More immediately relevantly, compare Versailles with Brest-Litovsk, which the Germans had imposed on the Russians but a year earlier. Having dictated such a treaty, Germany are in no position to complain about the harshness of any terms dictated to them in turn.Quote:
Originally Posted by Furunculus
The idea that Versailles paved the way to the fascists and to the communists doesn't hold much water does it? Very similar movements appeared among the victorious nations (namely France and Italy), before nazism even had any meaningful weight within Germany (and even the economical crisis, might I add). Similarly, much like France, Germany never was a monolithic nation. The disparity between conservative prussia and the more liberal areas (and former states) was quite similar to the opposition between die-hard republicans and monarchists in France. The rifts opened up by Versailles had actually been there since Germany became a country.Quote:
Originally Posted by TinCow
That being said, I agree that Versailles was an important event for the German national myth. Yet, my opinion is that, had the treaty requested 20 billions marks instead of ~130 (which never were paid, mind you), Germany would still have claimed the treaty was too harsh, simply because the country couldn't swallow defeat (once again, much like France in 1870).
Edit: My point about nazism and communism appearing in the interwar period is that these ideologies didn't simply pop out off nowhere because of the treaty. They've had roots in Germany (and much of western Europe) since the mid-19th and probably since the french Revolution. The volkisch movement, romantism, new racial and religious theories, the appeal and the hatred for the french Revolution, nationalism... All this have been at work for a long time. Versailles (and WWI) only revealed what was already present.
I did not say that Versailles "paved the way" for fascists or communists, only that it created additional rifts in German society which were exploited by both parties. The German political revolution began before WWI was even over, so that was a given in any post-war scenario. However, Versailles caused additional economic problems over and above those that would have been felt with the oncoming of the Great Depression. Keep in mind that German hyperinflation was the direct result of war reparations and the government's response to the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. This made it easier for the communist movement to grow much faster in Germany than it would have if the nation had been more economically stable. In addition to normal strength all opposition parties gain during times of economic instability, the fascists also grew as a direct counter to the communists; reduce communist growth and the fascist response would have been similarly stunted. Reduce economic instability, and both groups would have been smaller. The war guilt clause, and the public perception of the Armistice/Versailles swindle, also provided excellent propaganda for the fascists to exploit.Quote:
Originally Posted by Meneldil
What it all boils down to is that there was too much instability and too little national cohesion for the Weimar Republic to hold together. People seem to forget that Germany had already undergone a revolution before WWI was even over. The Weimar Republic had a lot of potential to produce a modern, democratic nation but it was simply too new to withstand the constant battering it got from so many different sources. The blame thus lies directly with the factors that undermined Weimar, all of them.
If you want to see a direct contrast of how this situation was better handled, you need look no further than WW2. The same nations were involved, with the same result in the war, but Germany emerged from it as a prosperous and democratic nation. The reason for this was that a great deal of effort was made by the western allies, particularly the US, to ensure that Germany was stabilized and returned to economic solvency as quickly as possible. After WWI, the Allies stripped Germany bare and gave its new government no support. After WWII, the Allies (mainly the US) invested heavily in the German economy and backed the new government with military and diplomatic support. The different outcomes were heavily influenced by this.
I say this is based on obsolete, at least rearguard, conceptions. The reparations were only indirectly responsible for the hyperinflation - because it was the German government, not reparations, that created runaway inflation in a bid to avoid reparations.Quote:
Originally Posted by TinCow
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Is it? Or is this a myth and was Germany severly plundered after WWII, whereas it was not nearly plundered to the same extent after WWI?Quote:
If you want to see a direct contrast of how this situation was better handled, you need look no further than WW2. The same nations were involved, with the same result in the war, but Germany emerged from it as a prosperous and democratic nation. The reason for this was that a great deal of effort was made by the western allies, particularly the US, to ensure that Germany was stabilized and returned to economic solvency as quickly as possible. After WWI, the Allies stripped Germany bare and gave its new government no support. After WWII, the Allies (mainly the US) invested heavily in the German economy
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
To which list of plunder after WWII one can add:
- massive forced labour of Germans. (five million men)
- infinitely larger reparations payments
- much larger territories annexed. (Not to mention, ancient German lands, whereas in 1918 the annexed territoried were mostly recent aquisitions, notably since 1870)
- prevention of food supplies or foreign aid to Germany for longer than the period after the armistice of 1918. Also, in 1918, the starvation of Germany was a solely pressure means to force Germany to accept the peace treaty. In 1945 Germany had already unconditionally surrendered. Deliberate blockage of food and aid lasted until 1947. Mass starvation ensued, more intense than in 1919, and for far longer. Even in 1948, German child mortality rate was twice that of its neighbours.
Here's a Dutch journalist's opinion on Versailles shortly after its signing:
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/...heditorial.htmQuote:
Dutch Algemeen Handelsblad Editorial on the Treaty of Versailles, June 1919
The peace conditions imposed upon Germany are so hard, so humiliating, that even those who have the smallest expectation of a "peace of justice" are bound to be deeply disappointed.
Has Germany actually deserved such a "peace"? Everybody knows how we condemned the crimes committed against humanity by Germany. Everybody knows what we thought of the invasion of Belgium, the submarine war, the Zeppelin raids.
Our opinion on the lust of power and conquest of Germany is well known. But a condemnation of wartime actions must not amount to a lasting condemnation of a people. In spite of all they have done, the German people is a great and noble nation.
The question is not whether the Germans have been led by an intellectual group to their destruction, or whether they are accomplices in the misdeeds of their leaders - the question is, whether it is to the interest of mankind, whether there is any sense in punishing a people in such a way as the Entente governments wish to chastise Germany.
The Entente evidently desires the complete annihilation of Germany. Not only will the whole commercial fleet be confiscated, but the shipbuilding yards will be obliged to work for the foreigner for some time to come.
Whole tracts of Germany will be entirely deprived of their liberty; they will be under a committee of foreign domination, without adequate representation.
The financial burden is so heavy that it is no exaggeration to say that Germany is reduced to economic bondage. The Germans will have to work hard and incessantly for foreign masters, without any chance of personal gain, or any prospect of regaining liberty or economic independence.
This "peace" offered to Germany may differ in form from the one imposed upon conquered nations by the old Romans, but certainly not in essence. This peace is a mockery of President Wilson's principles. Trusting to these, Germany accepted peace. That confidence has been betrayed in such a manner that we regard the present happenings as a deep humiliation, not only to all governments and nations concerned in this peace offer, but to all humanity.
These conditions will never give peace. All Germans must feel that they wish to shake off the heavy yoke imposed by the cajoling Entente, and we fear very much that that opportunity will soon present itself. For has not the Entente recognized in the proposed so-called "League of Nations" the evident right to conquer and possess countries for economic and imperialistic purposes? Fettered and enslaved, Germany will always remain a menace to Europe.
The voice and opinion of neutrals have carried very little weight in this war. But, however small their influence and however dangerous the rancorous caprice of the Entente powers may be to neutrals, it is our conviction and our duty to protest as forcibly as possible against these peace conditions.
We understand the bitter feelings of the Entente countries. But that does not make these peace conditions less wrong, less dangerous to world civilization, or any less an outrage against Germany and against mankind.
Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VII, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923
I did not really have the time to read everything so perhaps I will comment later some things. Now I see Bulgaria has been much debated. Bulgarians had the best army on the Balkan peninsula ( for example, the Bulgarian army encircled and threatened with destruction the Greek army led by Prince Constantine in 1913, despite it was fighting both Greece and Serbia simultaneously; for this Bulgaria was often referred as "Prussia of the East"). It was exhausted in two subsequent wars (in 1912 with Greece and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire, resulting in a victory; and in 1913 it quarrelled with its allies Serbia and Greece for the division of the territories, Romania and the Ottoman Empire used its occupation and attacked Bulgaria thus Bulgaria lost the war for the Ottoman heritage; this naturally made the Central powers an ally). The WW1 arrived too early for Bulgaria and when Bulgaria joined in 1915 it was not entirely recovered from the wars. Neverhteless, the Bulgarian army had its share in the defeat of Serbia and Romania. The Bulgarian army slowly grew with the progress of the war and finally in 1918 the Bulgarian army reached between 700 000-900 000 mobilised men. This for population of 5 million people is a huge burden (20 per cent of all the population, which basically means that almost all the male population were mobilised). Like all the soldiers of the Central powers it was badly supplied. The Bolshevik revolution also influenced the demoralised army. And on the top of this, Bulgarians were badly outnumbered on the Balkan frontier and forced to defend alone the most of the front (there were a few German divisions but these were definately not a significant reifnorcement compared with the huge enemy army; I think there were some divisions from Austria-Hungary as well). Eventually, after 3 years of fighting, the Bulgarian army was forced to retreat. This had a tremendous impact on the Bulgarian morale and eventually, some regiments rebelled and the frontier collapsed completely. Before that, as a last signal of what was once a powerful army, General Vladimir Vazov (brother of a famous Bulgarian poet and national hero) managed to prevent a second breaking in the frontline and pushed the Allies in a famous victory at Doyran. This minor victory helped to save from captivity significant part of the Bulgarian army and secured slightly better conditions for capitulation (Bulgaria was not occupied by any of its neighbours).
On a different matter. Bulgaria was the only defeated country that preserved its royal line (Tzar Ferdinand I abdicated in favour of his son). I would say that the next monarch (Boris III (1918-1943))was a stabilisng factor in the society since it prevented from establishing either left or right wing dictatorship. He ruled as a dictator in the last years of his reign but there was not really anything from the madness of the totalitarian ideology (for example, Bulgaria even maneaged to save its Jews, despite being an Axis ally in the WW2). I've always wondered what would have happened if the Kaiserreich was preserved (even reinstalled by the Allies) and Kaiser Wilhelm II was replaced by the next in line... One can say an Italy case was possible but I think that the Savoy King was remarkably incompetent. In addition, one can easily notice that the Mussolini regime was far less oppressive than Hitler's. Just a material for reflection.
Btw, somebody mentioned why did not the Allies pushed into German territory? This would have prolonged the war and everybody feared of Red revolution. It would also cost more lives and total destruction of Europe. It would be really a madness. I also think that the capitulation of Germany was forced by internal factors, not only by the dropping of Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Ludendorf's offensive failed and there was no hope the nightmare will end with victory. Eventually, the Navy (ironic isn't it having in mind the love of the Kaiser for the ships) rebelled and the Kaiser was forced to flee.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Doiran
I completely agree that the German government caused the hyperinflation, but the fact remains that they did it because of (1) war reparations that they were either unwilling or unable to pay, and (2) the costs of supporting the striking Ruhr workers in 1923. Blame the Germans all you want, but the fact remains that without the reparations and the French occupation of the Ruhr, hyperinflation would not have occurred. Under these circumstances, blaming Germany exclusively for hyperinflation is simply passing the buck. France, Britain, and Belgium share the blame with Germany.Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
It was not so much the plundering that was the impact, it was the failure to rejuvenate the nation afterwards. First, in WWI reparation were made in financial means which Germany could not afford, resulting in a collapse of the entire financial system. In WWII, reparations were made in movable and intellectual property, something which caused decreased output but did not fundamentally destroy the financial system. Second, after the WWII plundering, the US re-invested a huge amount of money in rebuilding the German economy. As a result of this Britain and France actively fell behind Germany, because their economies were heavily based on plundered German equipment and technology which was old and obsolete by the standards of the late 1940s. With American investment income, Germany was re-outfitted with the most modern machinery for industrial and technical production, which laid the ground work for the German economic revolution which has continued to this day. It is not coincidental that after WW2 Germany and Japan both became leading economic powers, while Britain and France lost much of their economic influence.Quote:
Is it? Or is this a myth and was Germany severly plundered after WWII, whereas it was not nearly plundered to the same extent after WWI?
It's not really the same. After WW2 Germany laid in ruins, no political system, no institutions with industry and infrastructure in appaling state. Everything had to be rebuilt. The problems Germany had after WW1 were political and economic, and both were their fault. Part of reparations for WW1 was also taken in intellectual property. The reduction of the army was beneficial economically as it reduced expenses in the long term.Quote:
Originally Posted by TinCow
Reparations didn't help German economy but they didn't bring it to collapse. More important reasons for its collapse were severe strain placed on it by war and delibarate actions of German government.
What treaty of Versailles hurt the most was German pride. They didn't demand the same train car to be pulled out of museum for armistice to be signed in 1940 just for kicks.
I would like to point out that the book cited in the OP rejects the opinion, held by some of the pro-Versailles posters in this thread, that it should have been much harsher (this, at least, as stated by the summaries and reviews I have read so far). The traditional view of Versailles from an economic point of view is also maintained in said book (as seen in Louis's latest post: Feldman and Ferguson agree Germany was unable to pay, and the reparations structurally weakened the Weimar Republic).
It would be a sufficient condition, not a necessary one. As TinCow states.Quote:
Originally Posted by Kralizec
Wonderful discussion so far, but I begin to believe it is in the wrong forum....
I know, I agree.Quote:
Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh
But Lemur wanted to hear none of it.
“Versailles was not remotely balanced given the realities of the origins of the war”: That is the part Louis is constesting, and I agree with him after reading his comments: Versailles was not a Guilty Verdict. The fact that Austria started a war she wouldn’t if Germany hadn’t agreed has nothing to do with the Treaty.
The perception of the Treaty by Germany after the WW1 is just as a construction for:
The Militaries: To rewrite history in their favours, pretending they could have won, which became we would have won if…
The Politicians, to blame every thing going wrong on a very easy scapegoat. You have no electricity: Versailles
You have no jobs: Versailles
You have a parking Ticket: Versailles.
“I don't deny that Germany was defeated by November 1918, however there are many varying degrees of defeat, and Germany's was not a total one, nor do I think it would have been had the war continued.”
It was a total collapse!!!!
After the last July 1918 German offensive and its failure, Germany lost the gains done in 4 years in 3 months.
The heavily fortifided lines fall in the Anglo-French-Canadians-US troops on the East/West –for the Germans, their Allies were routing on the South, South East… Internal up-raising and revolt were brewing inside…
Contrary to the French in 1914-15, the Germans were not able to regroup and counter-offensive…
If the war would have continued, the blood shed would have been worst for Germany and the conditions of surrender harsher…
“The problem therefore was the gap between the severity of the treaty and the degree of defeat.” The problem was Germany built a non-guilty conscience and refuse to aknowledge the defeat on the battlefiled…
This drove the Germans in a self inflicted humiliation and their ressentemt was skillfully exploited by all politicians untill they found their master in manipulation in the name of Adolf Hitler…
In term of humiliation, I do not remember a Victory Parade in Berlin in 1918.
“Blame the Germans all you want, but the fact remains that without the reparations and the French occupation of the Ruhr”
Funny enough, I do not remember hyper inflation starting in France during the German Occupation after 1871.
As Menedil pointed out, France went as well with civil war (Commune de Paris), political changes (III Empire to III Republic), foreign occupation, humiliation and amputation of territories.
The condition of the defeat were worst for France in 1871 than for Germany in 1918.
And the conditions for another war were in the Peace Treaty.
But French Revenchism is blamed. Not harsh peace treaty.
Without German Unification proclaimed in Versailles, without German Parade in Paris in 1870, without the HUGE war reparation (under the pretext France started the war… remind you something?), without annexing French Territories, WW1 wouldn’t have happened…
The fact is in 1871, the French blamed themselves and Louis Napoleon Bonaparte for the defeat.
And they prepared for the Revenge, eyes fixed on the blue lines of the Vosges. En parler, jamais, y penser, toujours: To speak about, never, to think about, always…
The Germans were aware of this and knew at the first opportunity offered the French would go for it. The 2nd French Colonial Empire was built and developed for this goal… The French Foreign Policy was aimed at this, so big was the humiliation and the desire of the revenge…
The German attack on the neutral Belgium and France gave the opportunity and the good conscience the French were waiting for…
So, Versailles treaty was the combinations of these factors, but, as such, was not so harsh, especially when, as it was showed in this debate, Germany never paid it.
“This peace is a mockery of President Wilson's principles. Trusting to these, Germany accepted peace.” These 14 points were proposed on Januaru 1918. The German answer was in July 1918 Offensive.
Germany couldn’t in good faith hoping that the Anglo-French would, after having defeating their armies, go for it…
The German envoys came hoping it would be the bases of the talks, but it wasn’t not up to the USA of 1918 to negotiate, but the French and the English.
I can understand the 1918 Germans’ hopes…
But Germany had no choice in November 1918.
Luddendorff’s failure followed by Allies counterattacks forced in 100 days the exhausted and battered German Armies toward theirs own borders…
The demand to the German fleet to go at see and to die is another clue on how much the German defeat was deep and irreversible…
Since it seems most of the arguments are being repeated again and again, I may afford to make a slight comment before I go to sleep...
I think you want to bury your thesis alive with this sentence. Better think over this statement carefully.Quote:
The condition of the defeat were worst for France in 1871 than for Germany in 1918.
It is this exact link that is the crucial point.Quote:
Originally Posted by TinCow
Not the reparations, but the German government created the hyperinflation. This they did to undermine the reparation payments. This is the pattern of behaviour of the German governments throughout the period, before and after 1933. Not the Treaty itself was the problem, but German obstruction, German refusal to accept concilliation efforts.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:Whilst I agree that it is more profitable to fight against America than with America, I disagree this was much different in the 1920's.Quote:
Originally Posted by TinCow
The UK and France had to pay vast sums to America. Additionaly, France's north - her industrial and mining heartland - lay in ruins still. Both countries economies were in shambles. France never asked nor received reparations remotely sufficient to undo the ravages of WWI. Germany, by contrast, received more loans than it needed to pay for reparations. Despite Germany's sabotage of its economy, Gemany witnessed a period of massive growth in the second half of the twenties. Alas, it was all too shortlived. 1929 ended all of that.
Feldman and Ferguson are shredded to pieces in the book by the other authors. (See spoiler above)They are rearguard, representing mostly obsolote views.Quote:
Originally Posted by Wizard
Ferguson in particular has the problem he agrees with the modern findings that Germany only ever had to pay 19 billion - a very modest sum. He has the additional problem that he maintains the (modest) reparations caused economical woes, while simultaneously stating that deliberate German policy was the cause for the hyperinflation of the 20's and the deflation of the 30's.
A kind of TinCow then. :tongue:
Educated in older conceptions of Versailles, accepting of the newer findings, but not quite mentally ready to accept the full staggering consequences of it.
I do. I remember a victory parade in Berlin in 1918.Quote:
Originally Posted by Brenus
By the German troops.
Yes, really.
Now I haven't read the book, but as far as I know Feldman and Ferguson are the only authors to write on the subject of economics in that work, being the experts employed to write on that subject in the book. They represent another voice in the debate that you have not mentioned (for which I do not blame you, I'd do it too if it were me).
As far as I have read in peer reviews so far (and I recognize this is inferior to reading the book itself), the general consensus of the book's authors is that the Treaty of Versailles was the best achievable document given the circumstances (i.e. the clashing interests of the U.S. v. the UK and France, and the ability and will towards enforcement), which is what I was taught. Of course, this is a general consensus distilled from the varying opinions expressed by the various authors, but still.
Also, about the reparations and hyperinflation. The point is not who is to blame (at least, not mine). The point is the demand for reparations put the German government before a choice it could not fulfill, while the opposing side (France) was unwilling to budge. In other words, the Treaty was a failure (at least in the field of economic reparations) from the outset because it set unrealistic demands that fostered conflict and undermined its effectivity, damaging peace in the process and inflaming German public opinion needlessly through heavy-handed policies directly derived from the Treaty's clauses. It was this hostile international environment, which is partly to blame on Versailles, that led to economic stagnation throughout the Interbellum (and not just after '29) and also prepared the ground for the rise of radically right-wing movements like the Nazis.
According to the old Tommies who were interviewed for posterity a few years ago before they died off, they were advancing several km a day (on average), advancing as far as they could before meeting resistance, then calling in the heavies, or doing the job themselves if they felt inclined. What surprised me was that they were happy with the war, and were disappointed when it ended. Unlike WW2, and unlike the Germans in both wars, the Allies had plenty of logistical and human resources, and the casualties they suffered during an advance were felt to be justified by the advances they made. The Allied soldiers were trained for a job, they did their job well, and they could see the tangible results of their work, so they were satisfied, and could have kept this up for longer if necessary.Quote:
Originally Posted by Brenus
Thus far, I have twice quoted them, and once went over them in my own words. :book:Quote:
Originally Posted by The Wizard
I think Sarmatian, Louis and Brenus heavily over-estimate the military capabilities of the Entente in 1918. Austria-Hungary might have been broken, but you speak as though the Allies had unlimited reserves of manpower. There would still have been an awful lot of territory to occupy before reaching the German border, too much for the Allies to achieve anyway considering their resources. Similarly I very much doubt that they would have been able to push very far into Germany without severe losses that would have had much of public opinion calling for peace.
Well being able to sue for peace and actually getting peace are two different hings. I assume we are saying that Germany didnt agree to versaille. Then the people of the entente didnt really have a "choice" if neither side was willing to yield right?
On the first point, I do not see how that comparison is remotely relevant to the situation. Are you actually arguing that hyperinflation was not caused by the German government's reaction to war reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr?Quote:
Originally Posted by Brenus
On the second point, I believe that is one of the most inaccurate statements made in this thread.
I am very confused by your reaction. Are you actually saying that Versailles had NO impact whatsoever on causing WW2? If you re-read my first post, I very clearly stated that Versailles was only one of several factors that caused the war. I fully believe that had any of those other factors been different, that WW2 would never have happened even with Versailles. I feel like you are having some intense allergic reaction to the very concept of Versailles having any influence on anything.Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
:yes:Quote:
Originally Posted by The Wizard
You know, I don't understand what drives the current WW1 revisionism. A couple of years ago some academic was quated as saying something like, "most people now accept that the Germans in WW1 represented just as much of a threat to liberty and human rights as in in WW2".
What idocy is this, to make all Germans into monsters; and all their governments into Nazis?
That's a modern day perspective. The Allies had already sustained heavy casualties without calling off the war, and with the advances of 1918, which would have been even more marked with the maturation of the original 1919 plans and the continued starvation of Germany, the soldiers were happy that they were tangibly winning and moving. Forget the war poets, who were unrepresentative of the majority of soldiers, and read the accounts of the campaigns of 1918. The Allies were plentifully equipped with whatever equipment and supplies they felt were needed, they were conversant in the language of combined arms, and they still had plenty of manpower in reserve (remember there were no commitments in the far east, so both Britain and France could concentrate the resources of their empires on the western front).Quote:
Originally Posted by King Henry V
None of which reflects the bottom line, which is what was really beginning to worry Paris and London.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
As they say PVC the winners write the history books. WW1 was one of the last wars in which there were not really defined lines of "good or evil". which are of course very subjective terms to hold. Not to say that the residents weren't filled with propaganda hating on everything about the enemy. Like sauerkraut=the devil and pastries=evil. (well not really but propaganda gets pretty ridiculous). The English and French had to rewrite history so as to favor them and therefore excuse the massive loss of life they just incurred upon their respective people. In essence they created a bogeyman.
I am not sure how you can say Versaille was not a cause for WW2. To be sure it was not the single defining cause but it most definitely had an impact. The German people were most certainly not favored in the treaty which led to resentment which at the very least allowed a man like Adolf Hitler to come to power with his promises. The Treaty was very unfair and in my mind ironically was very similar to a typical congressional budget bill in the US. When Wilson came over on his triumphant entrance to bring world peace he left after making revision after revision and simply making everyone associated with the Treaty angry.
and then the French and English as well as America's somewhat immature fascination with isolationism resulted in a reluctance to call Hitler on any of his bluffs caused many more problems after imposing such harsh repatriations and territorial grabs.
Which to some extent is understandable after the meat grinder that was WW1
“On the second point, I believe that is one of the most inaccurate statements made in this thread.” Really? You mean France still had Armies to oppose to the Germans in 1870? Paris wasn’t starve to death and didn’t surrender? The German Troops didn’t Parade in Paris? Didn’t occupying the Country untill full payment was done?
The conditions of the Peace Treaty imposed by Germany, the lost of territory, the War Reperations, the Civil War, Regime Change, all these were better than the condition imposed to Germany in 1918?
Think twice.
"the Allies had unlimited reserves of manpower": They had. That is what the USA entrance in the war meant. A endless reinforcement...
Anyone else noticed how it's mostly the french arguing for this, the americans mostly against it and the british are split?
I'm against it, too, of course, can't let the frenchies get away with this. :smash:
So basically the french paid all their unfair reparations and we were clever enough to evade our very fair reparations and that is why we're the bad guys and deserved to be punished? Maybe it was dumb not to punish us then because when Hitler stopped paying anything, France and Britain did nothing, waiting for Hitler to build up his army, is that our fault as well now?
Maybe the Allies should have tried winning hearts and minds after WW1. :eyebrows:
Ignoring that, it seems like you frenchies are still angry because of 1871, and if you still are today then sure as heck the treaty of Versailles was your revenge for 1871, you even wanted the war to get your revenge, when Germany inquired what France would do in the case of a war between Germany and Russia, France more or less indicated that it would attack, no, not Russia... it's why there was the triple entente in the first place.
And let's not forget the whole situation only arose because Germany tried to be more like France and Britain but the two had already enslaved most of the world so the conflict was carried out here in Europe.
It's a bit like that new brutal mafia clan challenging the old familias, you're lying to yourself when you think the old powers were somehow gentle, tame and more adorable.(except in 'Carlito's way' but that does not apply here)
I was enticing you into debate.Quote:
Originally Posted by TinCow
My point of view is perhaps best, and most briefly, summed up with:
That is the crucial bit.Years ago in a Holocaust course I co-taught, I had portrayed the Versailles Treaty as neither harsh nor conciliatory. Lucjan Dobroszycski, a survivor of Auschwitz, a great historian of Jewish history, thought the Treaty dealt harshly with Germany. I indicated the conflict between our interpretations. With a characteristic twinkle in his eyes he asked, "Might we agree that Germans perceived the Versailles Treaty to be harsh, and perceptions play crucial roles in history.
Of course Versailles was central to the events in the 20's and 30's. But...Versailles was workable. It was not conciliatory, but it wasn't harsh either. It didn't work out because people perceived the treaty to be punitive and unworkable.
Who says any such thing?Quote:
Originally Posted by PVC
Strangely, the Germans have written history. The view of German nationalist agitation has become dominant.Quote:
Originally Posted by Centurion
Most of their points are factually incorrect, or fundamentally erroneous.
Yes, I knew this would be the impression. I have therefore taken specific and explicit care in avoiding naming French historians*. My sources are German, Canadian and American. :book:Quote:
Originally Posted by Husar
*who, incidentally, usually have a more negative view of Versailles than German, British or American historians. For an excellent read though, try Georges-Henri Soutou. He shows remarkable continuity between French policy after WWI and WWII. France after 1918 sought accomodation with Germany, co-operation. French policy was mostly realistic and rational, aimed at accomodating Germany and striving towards fixing Germany's place as the peaceful, largest power in Europe.
If you'd like to debate this, start a second thread. Any response I make will derail this thread.Quote:
Originally Posted by Brenus
I strongly agree that perception was the single strongest factor in Versailles' contribution to WW2. That isn't just German perception though, it was also strongly British as well. Appeasement as a policy was founded in the idea that Germany had a right to regain what had been stripped from her. Even many French, Americans, etc. perceived Versailles as too harsh as well.Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
Beyond perception, I do believe Versailles did have a real impact that was significant enough to be contributory, while at the same time nowhere near as significant as was proclaimed by the various German nationalists groups in the interwar period. I think the point at which we draw the line on this impact is where you and I are disagreeing. I believe that Weimar was significantly undermined by German economic weakness in the 20s and early 30s, and Versailles contributed a moderate amount to that economic weakness. I do agree with you that had other events unfolded differently, Weimar could have met the terms of Versailles without falling to Nazism. That in itself is proof that Versailles was 'workable' as you like to say. Yes, I agree that Versailles could have been followed to the letter without a second war, if other factors had been different.
As for your terms 'harsh' and 'punitive'... harsh feels like a moral judgment which I am not trying to make. Versailles certainly wasn't 'easy,' but it feels like most perceptions of its severity are rather amorphous and based on emotion rather than actual balancing of the impact. As for punitive, Versailles was certainly punitive. Versailles punished Germany for losing WWI. Therefore, by definition, it was punitive.
Such things have been said in the popular press these last few years. Germany has no heroes from either War, to hear it told in Britian. As far as the German historiographical reaction; don't ignore the German crisis of confidence, and the crisis of their history, that has lead to such idiocy as retiring the Iron Cross as a medal for valour and has left the German army demoralised and reluctant to do any actual fighting.Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
The modern claim is that the guilt clause wasn't a guilt clause at all simply because it was crafted by two Americans.
Yet this was seen as outrageous from the very first reading of the treaty.
There are many more onerous parts that don't seem to have been addressed here.
Additionally, the fact that it is not the Kiser's Government that is forced to make these concessions but a new German Republic seems of little importance to those who drew up the thing.
We have also seen what Dutch and Neutral sentiments were to the treaty from the outset, and most likely those opinions were not the second hand opinions voiced by the Germans, but rather from their own reading of the document.
The German reaction was plainly foreseeable and if not it was certainly plane from their first reading. To pretend that the Allies were being moderate is a fantasy, even if they tried to convince themselves of it.
The fact that Germany may have sabotaged its self to avoid payment is not very surprising either. They were forced to view the French and British as enemies from the very inception of their government.
Germany behaved much as a fox caught in a trap, chewing off its foot to escape.
It fostered German Nationalism and galvanized it in a way to recoup its injured pride.
Despite the founding of the League of Nations a reading of the treaty makes those who drafted it look like small and petty men with base motives.
Placing a new “spin” on it is like dressing a donkey in a tuxedo.
One of the tragedies is that I am a Germanophile. I grew up on Arte, speak German and have a great love for its culture. I can recite Schiller backwards and draw all of Cologne's romanesque churches with my eyes closed.Quote:
Originally Posted by Philipvs Vallindervs Calicvla
I have no moral qualms about Germany in 1914-1918. I do resent Germany's unwillingness to accept defeat, certainly in light of what this eventually led to.
The nazis I consider a disaster. They were just too much, they went a level beyond anything seen before in modern Europe. Uncouth, unsophisticated. Nowhere near as fascinating as they are sometimes thought to be. Banal. An excersize in pointlessness and futility.
Germany is a culture nation. It is also Prussian militarism.
If only German liberalism could've united Germany in 1848, instead of Prussia! Even so, I have little resentment against the period 1866-1918.
1918-1945, on the other hand, was an exersice in lunacy.
Of course, the very reason of the contention, is: what was behind 1918-1945: legitimate injustice, or perceived injustice? This is the question. This will decide a person's anger, at either the treaty or at German nationalist agitation, either of which is consequently held to no small degree responsible for WWII.
Me, I grew up naive about the period: 'Poor Germany, so hardly done by. Even if I regret the extent of German aggression in WWII, obviously Germany received a bad deal. Versailles was too stern. Etc.'
But the more I've learned, the more I've read, the clearer it has become that Versailles was not at all harsh, never mind tried to punish or destroy Germany. On the contrary. It was, certainly taking realistic limits into account, a lenient, workable treaty. The policy was to incorporate Germany peacefully as Europe's biggest power, within a peaceful Europe.
No. Nobody would make such a ridiculous claim.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fisherking
Well, looks like the nation of poets beat the brutish gauls there. ~;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
Well, look, all this proves is that Fragony was right all along and the modern liberal hippie commie left like to apologize for everything, cane themselves and generally feel like their own people are the worst anyway. :mellow:Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
Ist das so? :inquisitive:Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
I think were at impasse because of our definition of "harsh". As I've already said, arguably all peace treaties are harsh on the losers, but the general conception of the Versailles Treaty is that 1) it was incredible harsh and restricting, unlike any other 2) that it caused hyper-inflation and 3) that it was responsible for bringing Nazi party to power.
1) Comparing it to treaties of the same era show this to be false. Peace treaty of 1871, Brest-Litovsk, WW2... show that it wasn't harsher than any of those treaties.
2) German economy was heavily hit by the war and hyper inflation was deliberately caused by the German government. Reparations strained the economy even more, surely but they weren't sole reason for hyper inflation or even the most important reason.
3) Arguably this might be considered true, but I would choose different wording - it wasn't Versailles treaty that was responsible but German perception of the Versailles treaty. They didn't believe they had been defeated and they had felt humiliated.
All this nonsense how Versailles treaty crippled German economy was proven false when just 20 years later (including four years of the Great Depression) Germany emerged as the principal economic and industrial power of Europe once again, with the strongest or second strongest army after Soviet Union (it's a matter of debate I would rather avoid at the moment). If it was so harsh, so crippling, so restricting how is it possible that only 2 decades after Germany had not just recovered, but regained its position of the dominant power in Europe in every way...
I think one of the greatest tragedies with the continuing emphasis on whether Versailles was the cause of WW2 is that it ignores other major factors which need a lot more public attention: (1) American isolationism and (2) Communism.Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
IMHO, the US has as much blame for starting WW2 as Germany, France, and Britain. The US was the only nation that emerged unscathed from WWI. It's refusal to join the League of Nations and its total disengagement from European diplomacy removed the only option for a neutral (at the time) arbitrator in European politics. Had the US remained actively engaged in Europe after 1918, I believe war with Germany could have been avoided.
At the same time, the growth of Communism itself propelled the Nazis to power. There were very strong pro-German movements in Britain and France in the 1930s, even after 1933, which specifically saw Germany in general (and Hitler in specific) as bulwarks against the USSR. In the 1920s, Communism was growing very, very quickly in much of Europe. It was a realistic possibility that Germany, France, and Spain could have gone communist at various points in time. Without the Communist threat in Russia, I believe that Britain and France would have taken a far harder line with Germany from 1933-1939. In addition, without the Communist agitation in Germany, the Nazis themselves would have gained far less support and would not likely have earned the Chancellorship in 1933. Without control of the Reichstag, the Nazis would have been just another strong right wing political party as are present in so many nations even today.
I also believe that war itself was inevitable due to Communism. The conflict between Communism and Capitalism was going to occur even if Weimar had never fallen and Hitler remained nothing more than a forgotten painter. Remove the German WW2, and you instead replace it with a Soviet WW2, but that's another topic.
Lewis, that was one of the things that struck me when reading the paper. Perhaps I got it wrong some how but it was there assertion.
With the rest please bare with me.
The revolutionary government took power on November 9 and the Armistice was signed on November 11th taking Germany out of the war.
I think that the German People were proud of that. They were forming a new republic and putting an end to a very nasty war. They didn't feel defeated, the Kiser was defeated. I think they may have felt a little surprised that the Allies didn't share in their joy and kept up the blockade.
On the other hand France, Britain, et. all expected contrition and they didn't see near enough. Not that it would have made much difference in the treaty terms, but this made them unhappy.
Not allowing Germany to negotiate was not a slap just to the German Government but to the German People.
Had the Allies recognized this and negotiated in good faith they may well have gotten reparations, most of what was in the treaty, and a friendly State in Central Europe. In handling it in the way they did they continued the enmity of the war and the resentment and hostility that followed.
That was the mistake.
French policy was most certainly not conciliatory towards Germany following 1918. France (and its little ally Belgium) took the hardest line when it came to Germany, Versailles and reparations, often clashing with Britain (and of course Germany) in the process. It is as I said: it's not just about perceptions. The Treaty of Versailles demanded things that could not be provided and therefore created conflict that would otherwise not have been there. When Briand partially reversed that policy with Locarno, things were looking up, till everything was messed up again by the Great Depression (which was made so bad partly due to the financial currents set up to pay the Versailles reparations, as well as the hostile international environment the Treaty fostered). Locarno and Versailles were basically dead by 1932, at the latest by '36.
However, TinCow in his latest post is very correct. The U.S. was arguably already the new hegemon in 1918, yet refused to take on the responsibilities that came with the role. This left the declining powers of Europe to squabble amongst themselves for twenty years until they :daisy:ed up so hard even American isolationist opinion couldn't ignore the implications. And the same goes for the effect of the perception of a communist takeover, which was what drove many leaders to view the Soviet Union and the Comintern as a greater threat than Hitler and Mussolini, disastrously underestimating them until it was too late.
This doesn't take away the importance of Versailles, though. The perceptions it created, the policies it dictated and the unrealistic expectations it had were all important factors in undermining the Weimar Republic's integrity and creating an atmosphere of hostility that pervaded Europe throughout the Interbellum and led almost directly to WW2. Versailles may not be the most important factor, but it would be foolishness to discount it as one altogether.
Perhaps, but you de-emphasized (they weren't bolded, only the reviewer disagreeing with them) their articles because they don't fit into the point you're trying to make :book:Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
Why are people blaming Britain? It was Britain that made sure the treay was as moderate as it was, with a few concessions to the French. Britain wanted to keep a strong Germany, France for example wanted to see Germany broken up into smaller states like the Habsburg Empire. Either way, when Germany wrote that blank cheque to the Habsburg Empire, it began the war. Russia declared war on the Habsburg Empire, Germany declared war on Russia and France (not the otherway round), Germany then declared war on Belguim, etc, which made Britain come in Belguims aid.
In short, Germany is very responsible for the war. Also, German reprerations were no where near the level that France had to spend, rebuilding half of its nation. Also, the amount of loans Germany recieved from the United States more and covered the cost of the reperations, so any problems were down to the German Government, and the Great Depression.
My personal opinion that the question of who to blame for WW1 is a question of propaganda, with Entente propaganda (the evil Huns did it!) facing off against Triple Alliance propaganda (we were attacked!).
As far as I'm concerned, this was a conflict a long time coming, and that any perceptive mind could have seen coming from far, far away (as Friedrich Engels did as early as 1878, as I recall). Every single major power on the European continent was ready to pull the trigger, and had been sharpening knives to settle some old grudges for decades. Everyone, consequently, is partially to blame. Though I am sympathetic to the viewpoint that it was the horrible Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in the month separating the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the ultimatum to Serbia, a month in which all sympathy for the Habsburgs in the world had drained away, which sealed the deal.
I'm going to derail this discussion horribly, aren't I? I couldn't help myself, though... :embarassed:
But then why would I have quoted the part in the first place, twice no less, if I wanted it de-emphasized?Quote:
Originally Posted by The Wizard
I bold the most relevant part as a courtesy to the reader, who may not want to read the entire bit but does want to be able to quickly follow the conversation. I quote the entire bit for those more interested, that they can understand the larger context. I give links, for those who want to follow up on that, plus for those who want to check my sources.
The bit shows contuining historical debate, yes. disagreement. It also shows that Ferguson and in particular Feldman are an increasing minority, and that Ferguson's midway position is not without incongruities.
I do hear you.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fisherking
One could argue that the allies should have taken the moral high ground. Even disregarding modern morality ('we don't do that stuff anymore'), by the standards of their time it was possible to understand that industrial scale warfare was a dead end. That realpolitik, power politics, if those are the words, were a dead end.
One should be noble in victory, respectful to the loser. One wins some, one loses some. It could be the other way round next time, it has been the other way round in the past. Events could've unfolded differently.
And noble, no, this Versailles was not.
But noble is the exception, not the rule. One does not hold the absence of nobleness against someone, one admires it when it is present.
Even so, Versailles was full of idealism. It did not seek to supress Germany, never mind suck it dry or humiliate it. Versailles was not even a mixture of realpolitik and humilation. Versailles was a mixture of realpolitik and idealism.
Versailles was not harsh. It was perhaps not directly conciliatory either. However, where it was not conciliatory, it left open the possibility of concilliation. Germany was not crippled. Germany was left Europe's most powerful state. Many provisions were conditional in the first place, or could easily be revised at a later date.
Versailles was not meant as a system to keep Germany down forever. It was meant as a system that would eventually incorporate, once passions had settled down, Germany as a peaceful state, as the largest power in Europe, in a system that sought to overcome differences in a peaceful manner.
In the execution of this Versailles failed. Why? Because Germany cried bloody murder from the start, never reconcilling itself with defeat. Because the allies - who had too much, not too little, sympathy for Germany - bought into this from the start, because the allies lost track of what they set out to do and let Germany play them against each other. The atmosphere became one of overthrowing the peace system, rather than preserving the peace. With the powers trying to maintain the peace becoming the agressor in public opinion, and the power trying to destroy the peace the victim.
Twenty years of allied concilliatory efforts were only ever met with a reprisal of the entire war.
Germany did not want re-concilliation. Germany wanted not to undo the peace treaty. Germany wanted to undo the war itself.
No, these are good points. You've made several, even if I can't possibly respond to every point raised in this thread.Quote:
Originally Posted by The Wizard
To me, blackadder said it best, and most succinctly:
Baldrick: 'Why are we at war?'
George: The war started because of the vile Hun and his villainous empire-building.
Edmund: George, the British Empire at present covers a quarter of the globe, while the German Empire consists of a small sausage factory in Tanganyika. I hardly think that we can be entirely absolved of blame on the imperialistic front.
Even if Germany is most directly responsible for the war - which I think it is - this loses much of its political relevance in light of the eagerness of the other powers, and its moral significance in light of the imperialism of all.
:laugh:Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
That reminds me of a letter A. A. Milne wrote in 1937:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Excellent quote from an excellent show! I have to say the fine arguments put forth by most of you make me very jealous of your abilities to convey a point so well. So far this has been five pages of fine reading!Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis VI the Fat
Well, my understanding is that yes, Germany was seen as an autoritarian and agressive country, even in 1914, while UK and France were respectively seen as the good old pal and the country of the human rights (TM). Which explains why volunteers flocked from the US way before the country joined the Allies. Now, comparing 1914 Germany to the IIIrd Reich and calling Germans nazis is obviously overkill, but I've always thought that France and the UK were seen as the good guys by other democratic countries.Quote:
Originally Posted by Philipvs Vallindervs Calicvla
@Husar: to answer your point, I don't think Versailles should have been harsher. I don't think countries should impose reparations treaties over their defeated foes, but I understand that it was a common practice back then, and that everybody would more or less have done the same.
As pointed out several times, Germany had France sign a harsh treaty (I wouldn't call it harsher than Versailles though), and intended to turn Russia into a 3rd word country by dismantling the Empire and taking away all of its industrial power. That's how things went back then.
My point is that no matter how harsh Versailles was/n't, should/n't have or could/n't have been, it would still have been a national trauma for Germany, a taint that had to be fixed somehow. From the moment it begged for an armistice to the rise of Hitler, the country developped this whole "jewish communists backstabbed us, we could still have won" conspiracy theory. Versailles is important because of how it was perceived, not because of the terms of the treaty.
Invading the country and showing the population that Germany was utterly and completely defeated could have prevented that, though that's merely a "what-if".
I blame All the nations of the entente as well as Germany and Austria-Hungary for WW1. I blame American Isolationism for helping the war last as long as it did. What i am saying is the British and French gloss over their help in starting the war. The GREAT war was caused by extreme nationalism, a web of conflicting alliances, old european politics mated with modern technology, and a convenient serbian with a gun.Quote:
Strangely, the Germans have written history. The view of German nationalist agitation has become dominant.
Most of their points are factually incorrect, or fundamentally erroneous.
In what way did Britain help start the war, except by being a Great Power whom Germany wished to surpass? Britain entered the war under a specific condition - the violation of Belgium's neutrality. Given how important Belgium is to the balance of power in Britain's vicinity, were we supposed to ignore Germany's invasion?Quote:
Originally Posted by Centurion1
That was no more than a pretext, Britain was a part of the European alliance system as much as any other country was.
Do you really believe that sort of thinly veiled bull. Britain entered the war because britian saw they could gain something. They did too as german influence in the colonies was diminished. well pretty much destroyedQuote:
In what way did Britain help start the war, except by being a Great Power whom Germany wished to surpass? Britain entered the war under a specific condition - the violation of Belgium's neutrality. Given how important Belgium is to the balance of power in Britain's vicinity, were we supposed to ignore Germany's invasion?
Which German colonies did Britain covet? Also, please explain your dismissal of a balance of power policy in the Belgium-Holland area that goes back to Georgian times, arguably even Elizabethan times. England has demanded a neutral Belgium for centuries, long before Germany existed.Quote:
Originally Posted by Centurion1
not any specific colonies but i am sure in the far east and africa they enjoyed when Gemrany lost her colonies. And the balance of power is exactly why they entered. They didnt want either france or germany to become too powerful. Belgium most definitely was not the singular motivation between entering the war maybe for the common man but not for the higher ups.Quote:
Which German colonies did Britain covet? Also, please explain your dismissal of a balance of power policy in the Belgium-Holland area that goes back to Georgian times, arguably even Elizabethan times. England has demanded a neutral Belgium for centuries, long before Germany existed.
The far east colonies were given to Japan. The main ones which Britain took over were those in Africa, which were the leftovers after Britain and France had already taken their pick. Show me some colonies which Britain could have conceivably gone to war for, rather than picked up after fighting German forces there.Quote:
Originally Posted by Centurion1
Once England had accepted that France was no longer disputed territory, Belgium and Holland was the key to maintaining a balance of power on the continent. It's not an excuse, but a concrete reason for war. British forces fought against Napoleonic forces there, most notably at Waterloo, and before that, had fought against the Revolutionary French. Before that, we fought against the Spanish. That's centuries of English/British interventions in Belgium/Holland, not for direct benefits, but to maintain a smallish but neutral state there, somewhere where we can land, but also a barrier to any power wishing to dominate the mainland, and potentially threaten England. Why do you dismiss this historic policy, but point to some worthless colonies instead as our reason for war?
TBritians view since the beginning of the Imperialist movement has always been less Euro centralized than any other nation, which is why they were so successful. As to the colonies they simply wanted German influenced removed completely so as to have one less competitor in those regions.Quote:
he far east colonies were given to Japan. The main ones which Britain took over were those in Africa, which were the leftovers after Britain and France had already taken their pick. Show me some colonies which Britain could have conceivably gone to war for, rather than picked up after fighting German forces there.
Once England had accepted that France was no longer disputed territory, Belgium and Holland was the key to maintaining a balance of power on the continent. It's not an excuse, but a concrete reason for war. British forces fought against Napoleonic forces there, most notably at Waterloo, and before that, had fought against the Revolutionary French. Before that, we fought against the Spanish. That's centuries of English/British interventions in Belgium/Holland, not for direct benefits, but to maintain a smallish but neutral state there, somewhere where we can land, but also a barrier to any power wishing to dominate the mainland, and potentially threaten England. Why do you dismiss this historic policy, but point to some worthless colonies instead as our reason for war?
Edit: your direct benefit was to not allow any one power not all the power in Europe and ground so close to your shores. It was not for the benefit of Belgium/Holland it was for the benefit of Britian. Which is just as selfish as any other nations reasons to go to war. They wanted to be number 1.
Once again, why the heck would we care about the colonies Germany had? We already held all the strategically important points we could want, and then some. Both ends of the Mediterranean were controlled by us, plus strategic points in between. Plenty of coaling stations dotted around the oceans without ever needing to stop in German territories. We controlled all points of access into the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic and Pacific. Just about the only strategic point we could have coveted, and didn't already have, was the Panama canal, which was American. You generalise Britain's imperialism by saying it's less Euro-centric than other European countries, but then fail to grasp what that imperial vision was.Quote:
Originally Posted by Centurion1
Also, you've failed to make a case for us helping to start the war, which was your original claim. We demanded that Belgium should have its neutrality respected. How the heck is this helping to start the war? If Germany wanted to get at France, they could have done so through Alsace-Lorraine.
JUst a remark. Great Britain would have entered the war with or without the invasion of Belgium. I doubt anybody will reject that. Indeed, I think that whilst the head of states have some responsibility, the whole military machine started to work. Perhaps, the mobilisation decision was what triggered the war. They Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia and perhaps even France had gone too far. All the government wanted the war (there was a hectic preparation for war during the past years), the Central Powers (unlike the Marrocan crisis in 1912 when the Kaiser stepped back) just made the first step being the strongest and the best prepared and the others gladly accepted it. Perhaps Russia was not happy to start the war because it had many internal problems.
Following the Tangier affair in 1905, England did begin -- haltingly and never full-heartedly -- to develop a plan for coordinated action with France operating on the basic premise that Germany would attept a large flanking attack through Belgium so as to avoid assaulting the heavily fortified zone between Verdun and the Swiss border. To the extent that this contributed to the "entangling alliances" that helped create conflict, England does bear some culpability. However, the UK did not jump in whole-heartedly and Belgium was critical to their decision.
The violation of Belgian neutrality was the real reason for war and it is possible that Grey could not have procured a Declaration of War without Germany's violation of that neutrality, despite the growing anti-German sentiment of the British populace and the efforts of Britain's G-1 team. Belgium became THE issue that would bring the British in fully as an ally of France. The need to insure that Germany was the one to make such a violation was so important to the French government that they ordered the French Army to back up 10km along the ENTIRE frontier so as to make certain that no accidental violation of Belgian or Lux neutrality was made by some patrol or some commander who got confused. This order was made DESPITE the fact that France's primary strategy was an attack immediately South of the Ardennes -- backing up is rarely the best means of building momentum.