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Important Case Study
• Awlaki represents the most effective and refined version of his English speaking Salafi-jihadi predecessors, who has adapted more effectively to Western political and social culture. However, unlike his forebears, he was also long considered a leading moderate Muslim and critic of al-Qaeda, having cultivated this image in the years both before and immediately following 9/11. The ideological and intellectual journey that is evident within his public discourse makes him a useful and pertinent case study for the radicalisation of Western Muslims.
• Despite some reports to the contrary, Awlaki was well known as a popular preacher long before the recent media interest in him. According to some sources, by 2000 he was one of the most well known English speaking Islamic preachers in the United States.
• Although there is a clear shift towards violence in his later work, a close analysis of the corpus of Awlaki’s sermons and articles shows a surprising level of consistency throughout. Little has changed from his earlier years in both his discourse and ideological worldview. Rather, the only significant change has been in the prescriptions for solving the perceived problems faced by the ummah (global Muslim community).
Connections with the Muslim Brotherhood
• During his time in the US and UK, many of Awlaki’s main backers and sponsors were closely tied to the international Muslim Brotherhood movement.
• While in America, much of Awlaki’s work was more comparable with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood than it was with al-Qaeda’s. His recommendations for Muslims living in the West were almost identical to those put forward by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the Brotherhood’s spiritual leaders. However, even at this early stage, he displayed an admiration for Sayyid Qutb, one of the intellectual godfathers of Salafi-jihadism.
Homegrown Jihadism
• The story of Anwar al-Awlaki, and in particular his intellectual progression to jihad, provides a unique and revealing insight into jihadism in the West. This movement is no longer confined to Muslim majority countries, and through arguments he and others have provided, its message now resonates with small sections of Western Muslims.
• The movement has achieved this level of resonance through a process which includes the appropriation of contemporary Western political discourse about human rights, injustice and foreign policy, interwoven with the history of Islam and the Executive summary fostering a of global Islamic consciousness which demands violent action in order for it to survive and expand.
• Using a number of case studies of individuals influenced to act by Awlaki’s work, this report shows precisely how Awlaki has made key Salafi-jihadi theological and ideological dictums relevant and accessible to Western Muslims through translation and his use of language.
• Throughout his career, Awlaki’s main focus has been to convince Western Muslims that their governments are actively engaged in a multi-faceted war against Islam and Muslims. During his more Muslim Brotherhood-influenced phase, his suggested responses to this threat included political activism within Western Islamist lobby groups, and as he embraced Salafi-jihadism, this gradually became a call for violence.
• In his earlier stages, Awlaki’s ability to juxtapose key moments from the early history of Islam onto the present situation of Western Muslims made him immensely popular and easily accessible. In his later, more al-Qaeda aligned work, one can see how he employs this skill as a highly effective mobilisation tool, using the examples of Mohammed’s more violent phases to encourage modern day jihad.
Relevance to al-Qaeda Post-bin Laden
• A significant feature of much of Awlaki’s work is the lack of direct references to the al-Qaeda network or any of its leading members. This reflects his desire, and that of many other actors within the movement, for the global jihad to move away from a reliance on a particular group or individual, and instead to take the shape of a social movement that transcends personality, culture and organisational affiliation. This is particularly important in the post-bin Laden era, where al-Qaeda and other global jihadists are struggling to remain appealing and relevant.
• Despite his popularity, there is a large gap between Awlaki and senior al-Qaeda leaders like the late Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi, in terms of both the depth of his arguments and his personal experiences in the global jihad. Awlaki’s presentation of global jihadist ideology is a simplified version of what these and other men have already formulated, and he has tailored it so as to appeal to as many people as possible within the new ‘Facebook generation’ of young, Western Muslims.
• The vast majority of Awlaki’s output is spoken and he has written little, especially when compared to Zawahiri, whose lengthy treatises have provided al-Qaeda with its ideological backbone. In addition, Awlaki has no experience in the battlefield, which sets him apart from the majority of leading al-Qaeda members.
Policy Implications
• Awlaki’s story, while not providing any definitive answers, suggests that there is no easy formula or grand strategy which will solve the problem of homegrown extremism and radicalisation. In particular, it warns against policies that are predicated on the distinction between violent and non-violent actors within the Islamist movement; these distinctions are unclear, and the boundaries that do exist are blurry and easily traversed.
• According to intelligence officials who were involved with the initial assessments of the ideologue for the United States government, Awlaki’s main role in the global jihad is ideological rather than operational. Despite his direct involvement in a number of attempted terrorist attacks in the West, it is his ability to project Salafi-jihadi ideology and mobilise Western Muslims through his sermons that represents his greatest threat. Awlaki is therefore a key tactical asset to the global jihad’s strategy for garnering Western recruits and expanding the movement.
