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As I expected, the Ukrainian situation is different from Afghanistan. The longer this war drags on, Putin's popularity in Russia will decline further. And I think the Ukrainians not falling as quickly as Afghanistan did will encourage NATO to support Ukraine more, perhaps by supplying more weapons. Hopefully, this would discourage China from invading Taiwan.
Interesting assessment from D1:
I did notice from the many OC clips that there didn't appear to be much aerial bombardment or heavy artillery barrage going on, but I figured it was just availability/survivor bias (usually civilian filmers).Quote:
Day 1 of Combat ��, Takeaways from available information:
1.Russians broke with their own doctrine of relying on heavy, concentrated support fires.
2.Failure to prepare the operational area with adequate preparatory fire to break up and destroy Ukrainian defenses was a critical hinderance
3.Russians allowed themselves to dilute their own strength by advancing (and dividing their forces & fires) along 4 axis of advance. None were capable of achieving their objectives as a result.
4.Insufficiently supported troops failed to achieve necessary tactical breakthroughs with strategic implications for the battlespace
5.Airborne/Air Assault forces cannot operate well against even a semi-intact air defense network, or in contested airspace.
6.Airborne/Air Assault insertions against superior local forces are an expensive waste of highly trained manpower.
7.Commando actions ala Joachim Piper in the Ardennes 1944, in Kyiv, did not achieve much success. Commando infiltration of Kyiv a major success prior to operations – massive Ukrainian security failure.
8.Russian morale is lower than expected. Some units appear to have anticipated being met with grateful Ukrainian crowds instead of stiff opposition.
9.Leadership at the Platoon, Company & Battalion level highly questionable in some units based on behavior.
10.Russian troops are ‘green’ overall, noticeable reluctance to dismount APCs/IFVs and provide infantry screen for the armor when in contact. Heavy resulting casualties vs man portablt anti-tank weapons
11.Overall battleplan’s basic assumptions on opposition levels and Russian capability fundamentally flawed. Command & Control rigid and inflexible.
12.Ukrainians delayed mobilization far too long. Decision not to hold on the Dnieper politically more viable than abandoning East Ukraine, but possibly a critical strategic failure militarily
And:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Militaryland
Yes, it may be the case that Putin blundered into an overly-speedy plan (seize Kyiv w/in 24 hours?) that poetically damaged his army's initiative. Maybe that's what DoD was commenting on. Russia has a whole doctrine that ought to oviate the problems of rushing forward (develop the joke) mechanized and airborne elements. But I still wonder if Ukrainian late mobilization, and whatever it is I don't understand about their concentration ahead of an obvious pincer attack zone, isn't a relatively greater miscalculation.Quote:
Originally Posted by LiveUA
At any rate, the quoted fellow has a site providing daily operational analysis of the war, so a good complement to the Russian fascist Youtuber. I appreciate the professional format and citations. (From 10PM Moscow time)
Quote:
Russian forces entered the outskirts of Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro on February 25. Russian sabotage groups in civilian clothes are reportedly active in downtown Kyiv.
Russian forces have so far failed to enter Kyiv’s eastern outskirts. Ukrainian forces have successfully slowed Russian troops, which have temporarily abandoned the failed attempt to take the city of Chernihiv and are instead bypassing it.
Elements of the Russian 76th VDV (Airborne) division have concentrated in southeastern Belarus likely for use along the Chernihiv-bypass axis toward Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
Russian forces will likely envelop Kharkhiv in the next 24 hours after failing to enter the city through frontal assaults on February 24.
Russian forces have achieved little success on frontal assaults or envelopments against Ukrainian forces in Donbas but may not have intended to do more than pin Ukrainian forces in the east.
North of Crimea, Russian forces fully captured Kherson and are likely on the verge of seizing Melitopol in the east. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian forces had bypassed Kherson earlier and headed directly for Mykolaiv and Odessa.
Russian forces may be assembling in Stolin, Belarus, to open a new line of advance against Rivne in western Ukraine.
Quote:
1) Belarus/Kyiv axis: Russian forces entered the outskirts of Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro on February 25. Russian forces have so far failed to enter Kyiv’s eastern outskirts. They have abandoned for now the failed attempt to take the city of Chernihiv and are instead bypassing it. Elements of the 76thVDV (Airborne) division have concentrated in southeastern Belarus likely for use along the Chernihiv-bypass axis toward Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
Quote:
2) Kharkiv axis: Russian forces will likely envelop Kharkiv in the next 24 hours after failing to enter the city through frontal assaults on February 24. Russian forces are now advancing on a broad front along the northeastern Ukrainian border as of February 25.
Quote:
3) Donbas axis: Russian forces have achieved little success on the frontal assaults or the envelopment but may not have intended to do more than pin Ukrainian forces in the east. The Russians have not weighted their ground offensive efforts toward breaking through Ukrainian defensive positions on the line of contact, taking Mariupol from the east, or driving rapidly through Luhansk Oblast to the north. Ukrainian forces remain largely in their original defensive positions in the east. The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may alternatively seek to envelop and destroy Ukrainian forces at and near the line of contact at a later date.
Quote:
Crimea axis: Russian forces fully captured Kherson and are likely on the verge of seizing Melitopol in the east. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian forces had bypassed Kherson earlier and headed directly for Mykolaiv and Odessa.
https://i.imgur.com/VSDgVFH.pngQuote:
Social media users observed a Russian armored column assembling in Stolin, Belarus, on February 25.[29] These forces could potentially conduct a new line of advance against Rivne in western Ukraine.
Russian Naval Infantry have not yet conducted amphibious landings but retain the capability to do so against the Odesa or the Azov Sea coasts or both.
Russian forces continue to refrain from using their likely full spectrum of air and missile capabilities. The Ukrainian air force also remains active. Russian operations will likely steadily wear down Ukrainian air capabilities and eventually take the Ukrainian air force out of the fight.
Russian forces have not yet attempted the decapitation strike several analysts and outlets have forecasted and may attempt to do so in the near future.
Russia has sufficient conventional military power to reinforce each of its current axes of advance and overpower the conventional Ukrainian forces defending them.
I think I'm going to settle more into seeking daily or bi-daily situation updates from here on.
With Russia going in for florid fascism, I fear Youtube will start blocking the Soviet music as well.
https://i.imgur.com/gYu9Es8.jpgQuote:
Originally Posted by Kagemusha
https://i.imgur.com/BuI7gJA.jpg
Freedom Fighters, 2004 (Xbox): "The game is set in an alternate history where the Soviet Union has invaded and occupied New York City. The player takes the role of Christopher Stone, a plumber turned resistance movement leader, fighting against the invaders."
Petro Poroshenko is not the player character we deserve, but he is the one we need.
Apparently another Air assault operation has started at Vasylkiv South of Kiev. Apparently paratroopers. I guess the Russians are trying to cut off Kiev from third side now.
Clashes near the city center and at the power plant. It is bit over 3am at Kiev. I think this is it.The major assault is starting.
Operations Room is a nice animated AAR channel, but relevant for just publishing a video on how the Serbians shot down the only F-117 (stealth strike fighter) ever lost in combat.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Is3R4ie21Mc
It was mostly luck that an SA-3 could down such an advanced aircraft, but the incident was enabled by command getting overconfident and starting to fly sorties without anti-SAM escort craft.
Puts me in mind of the transport planes and helicopters reportedly shot down over various parts of Ukraine lately.
I heard a lot of gunfire via one of the live streams. I don't know which one because this YouTube channel (WacMilk) is showing multiple cities. It seems to be Kiev/Kyiv, but the source's audio is low, whereas this one is louder.
New dawn rises and Kiev still firmly in Ukrainian control. US has apparently offered evacuation for the Ukrainian president and his answer was on a video released this morning: "I dont need a ride.I need more ammunition."
Although Zelenskyy and Poroshenko were political opponents, they are now united against the invasion.
On a slightly positive note, they may have actually surrendered, so there's still hope that the garrison (or at least a major part of it) survived. Fog of war is especially prevalent in the early stages of the conflict, so anything needs to be taken with a pinch of salt, especially the most emotional stories.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
EDIT: More confirmation from the ministry.
Gotta hand it to the Ukrainians. Looking at the resolve of this people while they brace again for the coming night. Is unbelievable They are pretty much arming every one from 16 year old nerd boys to 60 year old Grandmothers, while the afternoon has been very slow in way of fighting near the capital, as if the Russians are also drawing breath and concentrating their forces for i believe even lot more harsh assault then yesterday. But the Ukrainians seem to be ready. I hope them strength to get through this night. My thoughts and prayers go with them.
Kadyrov´s Chechen forces spotted apparently at Gostomel airport NorthWest from Kiev.
Heavy artillery fire broken out at Kharkov. Havent heard such intensity before during this conflict: https://twitter.com/i/status/1497624137891827716
The Russians were really reckless to commit VDV to contested insertions. It is reported that Putin ordered a 12-hour pause to consolidate the advance on the southern front overnight (and/or give the Ukrainian government time to come to terms).
EDIT: According to the Russian YTer the Ukrainian Donbas front is starting to perform a fighting retreat in the direction of Dnipro. Any confirmation?
looking hella' sexy tho while they rape and pillage through the daily chores:Quote:
Originally Posted by Kagemusha
https://twitter.com/ritafloresss/sta...41417568194562
Can't be understated how valuable having Trump out of office is right now. EU resolve would have been nonexistant, and the Ukrainians would be worse-equipped and demoralized with him in the White House congratulating Putin on Russia's strength.
What a somber situation this all is. In 2013, the Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian people, were closer than ever before in history. I'm not one to celebrate "Slavic brotherhood", but it's just so sad that these friendly peer ethnicities have had so much generational - it will last decades - animosity enflamed between them by a few fuckers. All the WW2-era good will, all the propaganda of Soviet heroism (spotted as it was) is now erased by the pure obscenity of irredeemable imperial ambition. Only the Russian people can put this right, if they come around to it. Whatever the United States lost in spirit with the Iraq War pales against this wholly predatory breach against the most dearly-won peace of all history. But there is still time to step down before exceeding what America inflicted in lost life, limb, property. Though so far the Russian invasion is much less brutal than the routine power struggles and ethnic conflicts of Africa and the Middle East that we in the West look down upon, the infamy Putin is accruing is colossal.
This is the battlefield that can arrest the global march of irredentism and fascism, if even for a reprieve of the sort that the collapse of IS afforded against Islamic extremism. Russia needs to get fucked in every way it can be, for the good of us all.
Russia opened the offensive lighter than expected in both manpower and firepower, hoping for a quick Ukrainian collapse by appearances. Even Sumy may still be in Ukrainian hands after heavy back-and-forth fighting yesterday.
https://twitter.com/michaelh992/stat...19903514308612 [VIDEO]
Russia still hasn't established air supremacy. Someone up top seriously thought they could just rush a bunch of cities with APCs and break through into the interior. Pushing mech infantry through urban concentrations with low support is not good doctrine, and it is not Russian doctrine.
Now that they recognized the error of underestimating Ukraine, Russian armor and heavy artillery is making more of an appearance. Civilians will suffer more as a result.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1497668438789132294 [VIDEO]
https://i.imgur.com/tVh4tYH.jpg
https://twitter.com/michaelh992/stat...72098876469249 [VIDEO]
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/s...61156457426946 [VIDEO]
Good thing most people have evacuated their homes in Kiev, etc.
According to this, the head of the German foreign intelligence service had such low confidence in a Russian invasion that he was trapped in Kiev by the outbreak of hostilities. Oh Germany. When you put this against the German army chief inspector announcing that his branch is but a shell with few capabilities, it is pretty lulzy.
But the situation has turned against Putin to the extent that Germany is now donating a large quantity of AT/AA platforms. The EU opponents of maximal sanctions such as SWIFT are also being brought on board. The longer Ukraine can hold out the less tenable the invasion becomes. If Putin wants to advance through the western uplands to occupy the whole country, not just the east (which can be accomplished within the coming days really), then he won't just have an insurgency on his hands - he'll have a fully mobilized and entrenched Ukrainian regular army to break. With partisan activity ongoing in his immediate rear.
If, somehow, a popular revolt against Lukashenko disrupted that territory as a logistical zone for the Russian military, there's even a small chance they can be stopped outright. Professionalization clearly doesn't count for as much as Putin hoped in an unpopular war of choice.Quote:
Originally Posted by Understanding War
There is the following very provocative rumor going around, any insight?
Quote:
Originally Posted by DRM Journal
Kiev still standing at Dawn. Though Russians might be n the early shift this morning around 500 russian armoured vehicles spotted moving towards Kiev from three different directions. Still in a urban fight.It is the infantry that prevails and it seems everyone in Kiev is infantry today.
Russians penetrated into Kharkov.
The Ruskie fascist is absolutely outraged that Sumy has fallen back into Ukrainian hands. He claims it's all the work of bloodthirsty criminals calling themselves "territorial militia." Love to see the smug bastard so butthurt for once.
Now, here I should point out one of the pitfalls of realtime observation of a dynamic modern war is that "taking" a city doesn't mean what it used to. So many cities, from Melitopol to Sumy, have already changed hands multiple times, contributing to the confusion of observers and those on the ground alike. But this ought to have been expected when the forces available for fighting in and around in any city at a given time are numbered in the hundreds or low thousands. Somebody rolls in on a BTR, that side can now claim to 'hold' that neighborhood, at least until they drive away again. Dissociated elements of regular units reappearing, and sporadic militia activity, complicate the picture further.
One of the biggest problems with the fascist's overgenerous maps is that he assigns Russian control to any territory that may have had Russian reconnaisance passing through. Compare then to the Wikipedia ("2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine") map, which I am now relying on as my standard.
https://i.imgur.com/OeUMPhY.png
https://i.imgur.com/TQKx2X6.png
Now, objectively, much of this territory is not actually contested or defended by either side, in which case it should be counted by default as Ukrainian, no-man's-land, or at best graphically symbolized in a distinct way from Russian axes of advance or garrisons, if it is known that the area was last cleared by Russian forces.
I suspect Melitopol may be in Russian hands for good though.
Anyway, some memes:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWClFjsaseE
Amazing to see how well Ukraine is holding, the initial day's actions seem to have galvanized the fighting spirit of the country. I can only hope that they can keep it up.
For the Russians, considering their front-line troops will now have been in various stages of high intensity combat for about 48 hours. Logistics for food, water, ammo, fuel, and medical supplies will need to be constantly topped off. Units that have taken casualties, even if just lots of WIA will need replacements, and most importantly those front-line troops will start to see the effects of sleep deprivation and poor rest from frontline conditions. This together with the morale hit from the slower than expected progress has got to be affecting their Soldiers' performance. Anger, frustration, and mistakes will be made, especially if asked to do unreasonable things without resources. I can imagine those units currently in the fight can probably go another day before they need an 'operational pause' just to get some shut eye besides everything else.
Granted the Ukranian defenders will have the same issues but the morale of the defenders knowing that their efforts are so far successful and considered above and beyond expectations will certainly keep it higher than the attackers for now. I can only hope that they can keep up the fight, those isolated cities in and positions might have food and water stores, but ammo and medical supplies go quickly.
If the Ukrainians keep this up for a few more days I wonder how much the Russian command system can take of shoving troops in the meat grinder. Especially, as this Spartan effort is rallying the world to do things that were off the table like the Germans supply weapons, and the Europeans on board with Swift sanctions.
Zelensky being a King Leonidas is quite something, he has stepped up, certainly a man of the year.
Operational thoughts:
Quote:
4/Thirdly battalion tactical groups are terrible units to support operations. They have overload the commander lack support and might not properly integrate with air or do adeqaute scouting as signals and recon are missing along with liasons with them.
Quote:
9/What people sa wasn't that troops packed spare tanks for long drives. They were carying their fuel reserves on them. The few organic refueling trucks were not enough to make up an actual reserve or depot. They had one full compliment, some spares in one truck , thats it.
10/This didn't seem that crazy in the Kremlin because the prevailing thought in the higher echelons and Putin's inner circle and the FSB was one highly dismissive of Ukraine highly hyped up by Russian army propaganda reporting. They missed that they were buying their own bullshit
11/The release of the information paralyzed them in terms of decision making. But the inherent bias remained and UA delayed mobilising so it didn't dissuade them. For 7 days they ate away supplies rather than actively trying to build them further, they were waiting a go order.
12/The limited supply meant it had to be a mad dash. BTGs were split into smaller sub units traveling on multiple roads to avoid congestion. When they met something they'd wait to coalesce or get into a fight. If the UA was suprised it would work.
13/Were the Ru troops quality ones they'd do better with just surprise on their side. But they were mostly poorly trained as full units were never called up before. Usually a brigade would send only a company and could hand pick.
14/Now it's either confess the lies about readiness or be creative. Because the corruption had created such a rot, brigade commandes chose "creative" (criminal), conscripts were added to the build up. Ghosts soldiers on the roster were hidden. That meant BTGs were far greener.
15/When these hit a city or made contact they'd deploy in unideal formations of platoon to company size. Not their fault all that much, this is what they knew. Then if a UA unit knew in advance where they were and was careful, it would anihilate the BTG splinter formation.
16/Because the timetable had to be kept, supplies were already short with the delay Ru troops would go a step further. They'd keep one sub unit to block and redirect subsequent units, the rest would continue on parallel roads. Again timetable meant usually more major roads.
17/After a couple of road blocks, BTG'd be diluted, lost a bunch of units and fighting to standstill. You'd expect that there would be air or artiller support. But BTGs aren't suited for that, when they move in chunks in parallel the artillery spotters could be in another group.
If true, thank goodness. You love to see corrupt police states implode.Quote:
25/So the air assault fails, part of the pincer moves fail, you can't budge most of the UA troops what do you do? You go for broke, hope you win the race between entrechment in Kyiv and you just throwing all you have and hope if you decapitate UA, regional commands lose faith.
26/Otherwise becuase what remains of your force is split in small groups moving on main roads UA can mobilize move via back roads and just recapture most of the towns as you have few troops for actual 24/7 duties and to even spot them moving back into the town.
27/Can it work? I don't know. Is it a good plan. Hell no. Could they execute anything else, without the entire structure confessing the army has corruption,which yes the boss expected, but it's such a rot it might cost him his throne, yeah not when he's in this mood.
28/ So the spineless bunch decided to throw away 18-19 year old conscripts and veterans and pray they get lucky. Also that Putin hasn't noticed how nuts this is shows that he's either delusional or is completely inept when it comes to military affairs.
PS/ A lot of the commentary prior missed the readiness of the Russian forces and the poor state of affairs. Overreliance on official statements and major military pages missed tons of low level testimonials and regional investigative pieces on how big the rot was.
Now for bad news.
Marco Rubio @MarcorubioQuote:
There's lot of chatter and purported leaks on silovik telegram channels that the General Staff has instructed that Kyiv be taken by Monday, and has overridden the objection of the Airborne forces who think this can only be done at a huge cost of lives.
As a rule I wouldn't trust any of these channels but the info tracks with other info from Kremlin insiders, and it makes sense given what we know of Putin's plans, needs and obsessions. And in this context the surge we see/expect makes sense.
Dmytro KulebaQuote:
#Russian military leaders should think very carefully before following the orders they recently received
#Putin is 2 years shy of the life expectancy of a Russian male
and you will spend the rest of your lives evading an international tribunal for committing his crimes
@DmytroKuleba
:gah2:Quote:
Russian propaganda has gone off the rails and speculates Ukraine might be preparing to drop a ‘dirty bomb’ on the Russian territory. This is a sick fake. Ukraine doesn’t have nuclear weapons, doesn’t conduct any work to create/acquire them. We are a responsible member of the NPT.
It took a Saratoga for the French to aid the Americans.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
Russians looting at Kharkiv. Are these bois hungry? Is the discipline faltering?
https://twitter.com/i/status/1497854775169327109
EDIT: Apparently Russian attack defeated at Kharkov and they are retreating out of the city.
The largest plane in the world, Ukraine's An-225, was destroyed in hangar. I never knew it existed.
German Chancellor Scholz pledges to bump the defense budget up by 50%, build two LNG terminals, and contribute forces to NATO posture in the east. Reichtangle activated.
Mariupol outflanked by amphibious landing. Kharkiv and Sumy still friendly.
The fascist complains that in the besieged cities Ukrainians are starting to form self-defense militias, in his contention not against Russians but against all the marauders and criminals who have emptied out Ukrainian armories and wander the streets menacingly. Lawless uparmed locals are now harassing and violating citizens, whom the fascist government categorizes as saboteurs, even as they themselves demolish Ukrainian bridges and infrastructure.
I don't know advanced Russian vulgarism well, but let's try shtob za yebal'sa.
Just what we were looking for. I had hoped this group, whom I linked to many months ago wrt the Azeri-Armenian war, had begun confirming and compiling equipment losses in the Ukraine war. As before, each item is associated with photovisual corroboration. So far...
Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine
Russia
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Ukraine
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
If what these Russian POWs said is true then Putin made multiple major wrong moves.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nifxKIhFSuw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHpeinnZ5hI
Ah, a trip down the memory lane. Not like it used to be, but still miles ahead of typical internet discussion about the topic. Hope you're doing well guys.
Maps are starting to diverge more on the axes of advance, for instance on how close to Kiev the Russians are in Chernihiv oblast, and the direction of the advance on Pryluky. Mariupol can be considered encircled.
What I don't understand is, why - despite these unexpected days' reprieve - Ukrainian command hasn't pulled back their 10+ Donbass brigades from the line of contact toward Dnipro at the central Dnieper. Or if they have, I haven't heard about a confirmed substantial movement. Most maps indicate Russian probing actions toward Zaporizhzhia already (the provincial capital south of Dnipro), breakthroughs in Luhansk toward Starobilsk, Krupiansk, and Lysychansk. Russian air support will inevitably step up. Very soon it WILL be too late to avoid being outflanked. It may already be too late to withdraw the bulk of so many troops (low tens thousands?) along a few highways. It has to start tonight. Does no one have any insight on why the Ukrainians have allowed this concentration to remain pinned in the Donbas?
It's understandable if there's a last stand action at Mariupol, but this kind of force would be so much more useful in central Ukraine west of the Dnieper than liquidated by rear echelons at leisure.
https://i.redd.it/kdqcwrtspnk81.png
Japan might request the local basing of American nuclear warheads, which... unless they're for Japan's autonomous disposition, I like to think we definitively learned falls in the 'bad idea' category almost exactly 60 years ago.
I think that they probably aren't capable of doing so, large scale movements like the Russians are doing would be vulnerable to Russia aircraft as well as it'd likely be under substantial pressure the moment the Russian's caught wind.Quote:
What I don't understand is, why - despite these unexpected days' reprieve - Ukrainian command hasn't pulled back their 10+ Donbass brigades from the line of contact toward Dnipro at the central Dnieper. Or if they have, I haven't heard about a confirmed substantial movement.
Also, as they've fought there for eight years already it may be a huge morale loss to give it up.
There's a lot of large gaps between the major units and I'm really curious what the heavy push toward Kiev and the potential for direct Belorus involvement will mean for the already stretched Ukrainian army.
All in all the donation of weapons, especially ATGMs and Stingers can't happen fast enough.
As for Germany, I'm happy that it was under a coalition government that they have come to terms with the need for a credible deterrence. Having strength and not using it in favor of diplomacy speaks a lot more than not have strength and depending on diplomacy.
Also happy to the Germans as well as just about every neutral power in Europe (except Austria?) donating weapons to Ukraine. The Swedes and Finns doing this is a huge signal to Russia.
Re: Mauripol brigades - i remember back in 2014 russian aripower destroyed an entire ukranian mech brigade on the move in the space of twenty minutes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...ns-are-nearby/
They'd be abandoning relatively secure positions, retreating over open ground with no air cover and not really towards anything. Surely if / when they loose the ability to fight a conventional war they'd do better to dissolve into the countryside and if anything destroy targets of opportunity.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
The EU et al seem oh so pleased that it took them less than a full week of an invasion do agree to do something and even have the temerity to view themselves as "leading" something. The USA giving weaponry on the condition it was not used in the Donbass region years ago was leadership and strategic planning. Europeans are hoping that the aid can continue to get hundreds of miles through contested territory during a war. Perhaps they intend to use the Stingers to build a safe air corridor as they go.
~:smoking:
Sadly, it actually MAY represent improvement on their part. Of course, it could be argued that the baseline for comparison wasn't all that challenging...Quote:
Originally Posted by rory_20_uk
That Saruman piece of shit Lukashenko could have singlehandedly turned this around by demanding the removal of Russian forces from Belarussian territory. Putin's plans would be enormously complicated by either the loss of or a second war in his logistical space, and simply removing Lukashenko wouldn't overcome, would rather support, this altogether more popular policy of national-level 'civil disobedience.' Instead he reportedly oredered his Uruk-hai toward Helm's Deep at around noon local time on the second of March.
The Russian tells us that the Russians tell him that Ukrainian command has directed Donbas front not to retreat. Whatever the case, it's too late. But I'll answer the comments against that spirit nevertheless.
Yes, absolutely, it would be impossible to withdraw the entire front. A sizeable rearguard would need to sacrifice themselves, and would have even earlier on during the best window of opportunity. But what I mean is that there must have been a window of opportunity to retreat elements of every committed formation. Most could have escaped intact during that Russian quasi-standdown, esp. once it was realized that Russian air power was declining to assert itself as much as capability allowed.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
There's one main highway between Donetsk (city) and Dnipro. The front is too long along N-S axis to assemble along that road. By distributing and staggering a retreat over two days and dozens of secondary roads and side roads, the Russians would not have been able to substantially interdict the retreat, I believe. Consider hundreds of small detachments covering (in actual transit) 100-200 miles.
And I wonder if it would be better to retain, say, 50% of a veteran formation to fight from behind a river, than lose almost all of it in a fight to the finish/surrender. Assuming Militaryland's deployment map reflects current dispositions, the central Dnieper is barely defended on either side.
What happens when the Ukrainian Donbas front collapses and 3 of 4 current Russian fronts can converge uninhibited toward the center of the river and country?
I mean, the article does note that:Quote:
Originally Posted by Furunculus
Quote:
Ukrainian commanders exposed themselves to attack when they failed to appreciate the inherently mobile—and independent—nature of tank operations. Instead of commanding their units while on the move, they clustered around a command post, awaiting orders. That made them a target.
[...]
Armor fights from the hatch,” he added. “Armored formations are built for unencumbered activity. They are not meant to be tethered, whether digitally or physically, to static command posts.” Fox cited U.S. Army general George Patton’s leadership of his own armored forces during World War II. Patton understood that tank units should move quickly to exploit gaps in enemy defenses.
A reasonable alternative, but:Quote:
Originally Posted by rory_20_uk
1. The countryside is also open ground. The Russians have covered the most ground in the south of the country because it is the most open terrain in Ukraine.
2. It's harder to dissolve into the countryside under condition of a double envelopment.
3. Ukrainian partisans will be ineffective if attempting to operate within Luhansk or Donetsk (more forested than Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia oblasts bordering westward), they being the home base of the numerous Russian-aligned paramilitaries who've figured in the conflict fordecadeslolwut, years.
4. This region was practically a green zone for the German occupiers during WW2 due to aforementioned terrain and topography.
5. All the heavy equipment and armored vehicles fall into Russian hands.
There are no uncomplicated options here.
Or maybe they'll break out right through the Donbas and make a thunder run all the way to Moscow to assassinate Putin. :shrug:
Pertaining to your comments about equipment donations to Ukraine, all that stuff is going to support the defense in the west, functionally. Some of it will trickle through to partisans in the east, or into besieged cities, but only light items such as rifles, medical stock, etc.
For the heaviest equipment, such as the dozens of Soviet-era fighters, I wonder if Ukraine even has enough trained pilots to fly them all, or moreover if any of them can survive on the ground once the Russian air force gets serious. The subject of a limited no-fly zone is incredibly fraught and uncertain (the only certainty is that NATO countries vocally reject the suggestion), but if we don't impose one then I can't see any point in trying to prop up Ukraine's air force. Or allow Ukrainian pilots to base in Poland/Romania, but that's functionally equivalent to a no-fly zone.
[NB. Poland has announced that it intends to do just that - host Ukrainian fighters at its airfields - which has the potential to assimilate wider NATO policy. But let's wait and see, since the US may veto such an escalation.]
Actually, you have to consider that a lot of this equipment is going to diffuse internationally to criminals, rebels, and terrorists, or simply get 'lost.' There's no way to keep account of it in an active war zone with a losing recipient. So that's fun.
If Putin keeps his grip on power long enough to see the conventional war through to conquest, that's it, game over - he'll die in office long after. Even a hundred thousand dead Russians wouldn't prevent the victory from cementing his authority, because the result is all that matters to him; it's not like he'd be gearing up to attack a NATO country just the next year. Ukraine would be devastated for a generation. Millions would become refugees. (Any post-war insurgency would predominantly kill Ukrainian civilians and LDPR-type collaborationst militia, not Russian soldiers, so that's no difficulty.)
Putin would in my view be willing to take Russia to the status of a larger, still less isolated, North Korea in the course of reunifying the Russian Empire. Central Asian countries might begin looking for implicit or explicit Chinese defense guarantees. China would have an interest in cultivating a Kim-type subordinate status for Putin. His eventual death would be our one and only long-anticipated opportunity to perhaps resolve the Second Cold War with new Russian leadership. And China would probably have taken the chance to open conflict with Taiwan by that time, and who knows how that would develop. What a disaster.
I can't emphasize enough how important it is for us to stop fascism in its tracks while Putin is at his most vulnerable.
I agree wholeheartedly on the impending dilemma you lay out, I'm just going to have to assume that the Ukrainian army has some sort of plan to prevent the majority of their army being encircled or cut off, who knows though, news from the East is the least forthcoming.Quote:
There's one main highway between Donetsk (city) and Dnipro. The front is too long along N-S axis to assemble along that road. By distributing and staggering a retreat over two days and dozens of secondary roads and side roads, the Russians would not have been able to substantially interdict the retreat, I believe. Consider hundreds of small detachments covering (in actual transit) 100-200 miles.
And I wonder if it would be better to retain, say, 50% of a veteran formation to fight from behind a river, than lose almost all of it in a fight to the finish/surrender. Assuming Militaryland's deployment map reflects current dispositions, the central Dnieper is barely defended on either side.
What happens when the Ukrainian Donbas front collapses and 3 of 4 current Russian fronts can converge uninhibited toward the center of the river and country?
I too see this mostly going to try and stop/blunt any attack on or encirclement of Kiev or the western provinces. Additionally, I'm curious on what type of training they'd be able to provide internally while distributing. New supplies of weapons they already have are easy to distribute as replacements but introducing new weapons like Panzerfaust-3s and Carl Gustavs/AT-4s will require some sort of training period to ensure they are used effectively.Quote:
Pertaining to your comments about equipment donations to Ukraine, all that stuff is going to support the defense in the west, functionally. Some of it will trickle through to partisans in the east, or into besieged cities, but only light items such as rifles, medical stock, etc.
For the heaviest equipment, such as the dozens of Soviet-era fighters, I wonder if Ukraine even enough trained pilots has to fly them all, or moreover if any of them can survive on the ground once the Russian air force gets serious. The subject of a limited no-fly zone is incredibly fraught and uncertain (the only certainty is that NATO countries vocally reject the suggestion), but if we don't impose one then I can't see any point in trying to prop up Ukraine's air force. Or allow Ukrainian pilots to base in Poland/Romania, but that's functionally equivalent to a no-fly zone.
As for the pilots and older MIG-29s, I expect that Ukraine does have enough as undoubtedly the older veteran pilots from a few years ago are stepping up for this duty as opposed to being used as infantry. This aspect however is the trickiest as they may be MIG-29s but they've been integrated into NATO standards, who knows what differences there are in the flight systems, weapons systems, communications systems and so on that a pilot needs to rely on like second nature in order to be effective.
Additionally, I'm wondering about the delivery of these. If these are being flown in that in many ways would make the originating NATO airfields legitimate targets for Russia though I don't think they'd dare to trigger Article 5 now that everyone and their grandma is turned against them in Europe.
The talk about a no-fly zone though is a bridge too far at this point. If it had been considered before the war started then it may have been feasible. Integrating into Ukrainian air-defense to avoid friendly fire would be difficult, doing ground attack on Russians while discriminating from Ukrainian units using almost identical equipment would be extremely difficult (thermals sights don't see chalked on V's or flag colors). Not to mention the obvious danger that directly engaging Russian air units would mean in terms of escalating to a WW3, even if the no-fly zone was restricted to just the Ukraine it would require neutralizing in some form Russian and Belarus air defenses, radars, etcs... on their side of the border.
The 'international legion' is about the closest that NATO/EU members can get to directly supporting Ukraine as if the concept were taken further it could consist of Flying Tigers and Condor Legion type units though this would be only a step away from outright war with Russia.
Here's the current steps to joining it if you're curious:
https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato...algorithm.html
Your above is why I'm full-hog behind supporting Ukraine, Putin NEEDS to fail, Russia must not successfully conquer Ukraine. Even if this means that the government of Ukraine can only rule over a rump state in ethnic Ukrainian-super-majority areas while the rest of the country remain in conflict.Quote:
If Putin keeps his grip on power long enough to see the conventional war through to conquest, that's it, game over - he'll die in office long after. Even a hundred thousand dead Russians wouldn't prevent the victory from cementing his authority, because the result is all that matters to him; it's not like he'd be gearing up to attack a NATO country just the next year. Ukraine would be devastated for a generation. Millions would become refugees. (Any post-war insurgency would predominantly kill Ukrainian civilians and LDPR-type collaborationst militia, not Russian soldiers, so that's no difficulty.)
Putin would in my view be willing to take Russia to the status of a larger, still less isolated, North Korea in the course of reunifying the Russian Empire. Central Asian countries might begin looking for implicit or explicit Chinese defense guarantees. China would have an interest in cultivating a Kim-type subordinate status for Putin. His eventual death would be our one and only long-anticipated opportunity to perhaps resolve the Second Cold War with new Russian leadership. And China would probably have taken the chance to open conflict with Taiwan by that time, and who knows how that would develop. What a disaster.
I can't emphasize enough how important it is for us to stop fascism in its tracks while Putin is at his most vulnerable.
The EU and NATO backing of Ukraine is 100% the template for keeping Taiwan independent, all the stupid far-right people in the US media saying this is making us weaker in confronting the PRC are short-sighted simpletons. Supporting and defending Ukraine even without direct involvement must be successful in order to demonstrate that a great-power can not willy nilly take provinces they think belong to them due to 'history' or demographics.
On a slight side note I do see a lot of interesting conversations in people trying to equate Russia's invasion with NATO actions. The war in Kosovo was to stop a genocide, the war in Libya though stupidly done was to stop a brutal dictator crushing a democratic uprising. The intervention in Syria was more country specific and not a NATO action, the war in Afghanistan though in the long run badly run was a response to 9/11, not a casual attempt to invade and impose a system in the middle of South Asia.
The Iraq War is about the closest thing in equivalence to the Russian invasion as it was about regime change and in hindsight completely inexcusable. Russia's reasoning for this war is absolutely insane and indefensible. The expansion of NATO which up to 2014 was an incredibly hollow force was zero threat to Russia itself; though it is a threat to Russian revisionist/expansionist dreams.
Also, I see a lot of people calling the EU racists for their open arms for Ukraine but not for other migrants from Africa and the Middle East. Ukraine is on the border of the EU, it is in the neighbor, they share cultural, religious, and yes racial ties with their EU neighbors to the West, of course they'll be more welcomed as it is also caused by an invasion from the common threat/enemy to the East. Just like I help my neighbors out when they have trouble as opposed to people at the other end of the district I don't know, this applies to countries too.
On the flip side though, the abysmal treatment of all 'colored' refugees from Ukraine trying to flee the war must be rectified as it is certainly racist. Indian, African, and Arab students and workers are being stopped at the borders to Poland, Hungary, and Romania and told to go contact their embassies which have mostly left the country. I know those receiving countries may be thinking that these are opportunist migrants going into the Ukraine to try and enter the EU but that is a bonkers thought train, it is a war zone, and they must be allowed to flee it like every other white person in Ukraine that tries. The EU must take care of these people too, most of which are looking to go home and not seek asylum in the EU but first they need to get out of the Ukraine.
Kherson almost fully under Russian control. Main disagreements in maps for March 1 are whether (and if so, where) the Russians have advanced north toward Krivy Rih, bypassing Mykolaev, and how far Russians have penetrated south of Kharkiv (Donbas envelopment). Kyiv and Kharkiv have seen few direct incursions today, as bombardment escalates and Russia continues to assemble assault forces and close off the cities. We hope that the mud comes early this year, courtesy of climate change, such that Russian operations west of the Dnieper halt for an extended period.
Spmetla, what are your opinions on the feasibility, in principle, of a standoff-range no-fly-zone over Western Ukraine (just to the limit of Ukrainian control once that front consolidates following the fall of the East). Assume the US would lead, with at least minimal NATO approval (primarily Polish bases). Could our assets ever be enough to degrade Russian CAP/CAS? And would it be enough to keep Ukrainian conventional forces in the fight for an extended duration? And would it reinforce, or undermine, a rallying effect around Putin?
TBH if there turns out to be a considerable operational pause in early spring, with most of the West entrenched, there's a case to be made for NATO uniting on pushing troops forward into the West and demanding an immediate truce from Moscow; presumably a 'successful' diplomatic outcome would entail the partition of Ukraine (Kiev the new Berlin???). If Putin isn't out of power in a month's time after all, there's no reason to expect more time to outweigh diminishing Ukrainian capacity to resist and to hold ground, or in other words no reason to expect our/Ukraine's bargaining position to improve.
And I'm glad you brought up the refugee racism. It's an unhappy impulse, imminently stupid - holding back non-aligned civilians from leaving a warzone is just a drag on the defender's resources. Also, the Ukrainian policy of conscripting any 18-60 y/o man they can get their hands on is pretty foolish. Maybe we've unlearned a lot of lessons in the 21st century, but putting a rifle in the hands of untrained, unwilling people will almost never contribute to combat effectiveness in defense. The vast majority of these Volks conscripts will flee or surrender upon encountering combat. Though this may change in the west over time, depending on how much time the regulars have to offer minimal training.
Reminder that in many cases the Russians at from D0 have had only numerical parity with the Ukrainians, and nevertheless have advanced about as far into the country as the US did into Iraq during Iraqi Freedom (which lasted more than a month in its conventional stage). Despite the tactical failures of Russian units, pound for pound they still look to be superior to Ukrainian units and soldiers. Someone on Twitter compared the tenacity of Ukrainians to Armenians in 2020, pointing out that tenacity can't compensate for lack of firepower. A Russian army with improved logistics and morale would certainly be a legitimate foe for US grunts.Quote:
Originally Posted by Wiki
An article considering possibilities for why the 300+ combat jets Russia assembled for the operation didn't finish off the Ukrainian air force D1 and have been largely grounded until this month. Breaking down the theory of avoidance of collateral damage, a component of which is that the Russian air force has limited experience with and supply of precision munitions. Another potential explanation is fear of friendly fire from SAM systems, which strikes me as an odd explanation given that Ukrainian aircraft fly single-digit sorties and don't seem to be facing any Russian SAM reaction anyway (so why would there be a sudden jump in Russian SAM activity with the sky full of Russian planes?). The last theory is that Russian fixed-wing pilots are poorly-trained and distrusted by command.
Huh... I mean, I have to admit the track record of US intelligence in this crisis, but a number of analysts do accept that Belarussian forces have entered Ukraine (maybe just garrisoning border villages and checkpoints for now??).Quote:
The Verkhovna Rada stated that the Armed Forces of Belarus had joined Russia's invasion and had entered the Chernihiv Oblast earlier that morning. UNIAN stated that a column of 33 military vehicles had entered the region. The US disagreed with these claims, saying that there was "no indication" that Belarus has invaded.[331] Hours prior, Belarus's president Lukashenko said that Belarus would not join the war, and said that Russian troops were not attacking Ukraine from Belarusian territory.[332]
Perhaps Moldova should violate its constitution for a second and invite a few of the NATO units up north to picnic. A constitution is not a suicide pact after all.Quote:
It is being speculated that Russian troops are also going to invade Moldova, which is not a NATO member, after Belarusian president Lukashenko revealed a map seemingly showing the Russian military's main offensives in Ukraine in the form of red arrows; one of the arrows points at Moldova.[338] It is possible that such an invasion would only target the pro-Russian separatist entity of Transnistria.[339]
lolQuote:
Originally Posted by DRM Journal
There have been videos showing, cumulatively, many dozens of saboteurs and Spetsnaz captured or neutralized. I wish we knew the biggre picture of how successful or not this aspect of the operation has been for Russia.Quote:
Originally Posted by ISW
The Azovites et al. are already surrounded, and I have no problem with their fighting to the death for their country, but this is a reminder of how thoroughly fascist Putin's Russia has become.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1344004873096982534 [VIDEO] (The interviewee explicitly identifies himself as a Nazi at the outset)
Quote:
Russian Nazi Alexei Milchakov, who fought on the side of the LPR in 2014, talks about how he cut off the ears of the Ukrainian military and got high on the smell of burnt human meat. In Russia, this is called "anti-fascist" and "defender of Donbass"
I just can't see any scenario in which the US wouldn't then be forced to neutralize Belarus and Russian air defense systems/networks which would require strikes outside of Ukraine and likely escalate to a general state of war.Quote:
Spmetla, what are your opinions on the feasibility, in principle, of a standoff-range no-fly-zone over Western Ukraine (just to the limit of Ukrainian control once that front consolidates following the fall of the East). Assume the US would lead, with at least minimal NATO approval (primarily Polish bases). Could our assets ever be enough to degrade Russian CAP/CAS? And would it be enough to keep Ukrainian conventional forces in the fight for an extended duration? And would it reinforce, or undermine, a rallying effect around Putin?
US and NATO assets would definitely be able to not just degrade but defeat Russian air power, even with Russian's having the homefield advantage for basing. Primarily because the US and NATO are the best at modern 'network' warfare where stealthy platforms like the F-35 essentially can 'suck' the data of enemy signatures and pass it onto other forces to actually do the striking, this together with the US/NATOs superior systems and experience/tactics at jamming/spoofing radars and their launch batteries the Russian's would surely lose.
US airpower would I think lead to a relatively 'easy' defeat of the Russians (in Ukraine at least) when paired with a strong ground component like the Ukrainian army has now in their morale and staying power. That convoy of Russian vehicles would look like Saddam's highway of death retreat from Kuwait of the USAF had their way.
The problem is of course that would lead to WW3. If it was stated before the war that we would intervene to stop any regime change and provide a no-fly zone to protect Ukrainian ground forces, I could see that as something Putin may have been deterred by or at least limited his ambition. However, if we were to try and do the same no when he's at his weakest he may just see that as us being as opportunistic as him and see it as a direct threat to his Russian state and escalate to WW3.
This is why I think Belarus will enter the fray, to completely isolate the combat in the center and east of the country from EU/NATO resupply and any threat of NATO intervention.Quote:
TBH if there turns out to be a considerable operational pause in early spring, with most of the West entrenched, there's a case to be made for NATO uniting on pushing troops forward into the West and demanding an immediate truce from Moscow; presumably a 'successful' diplomatic outcome would entail the partition of Ukraine (Kiev the new Berlin???). If Putin isn't out of power in a month's time after all, there's no reason to expect more time to outweigh diminishing Ukrainian capacity to resist and to hold ground, or in other words no reason to expect our/Ukraine's bargaining position to improve.
You are right though, there is a case to be made for pushing troops in on behalf of Ukraine, though it would need to be in some clear cut and visible manner such as securing a 100mi buffer or something for humanitarian aid and prevent fighting from spreading into NATO/EU countries.
I think the best we can realistically hope for is that the Ukrainians can keep weathering Russian attacks in the cities, defeat/minimize any Belarus invasion, and bleed the Russians so badly that their unit's defect, surrender, or just refuse to fight. I'm praying for a miracle of some sort on the battlefield but just cannot see an endgame that results in Ukrainian victory so long as the Russians use numbers and firepower to compensate for any lack of finesse or tactical ability.
I'll point out though that in the US case and despite now popular perception, the US approach was a bit slower because it was a lot more deliberate. Civilian targets were avoided, gaps in the front weren't evident, and the terrain, though smaller than Ukraine was much more constrictive in that the Euphrates and Tigris areas are a mass of population, canals, and agriculture. Additionally, all the logistics pretty much were limited to one freeway to/from Basrah that then had to support the operations in rugged desert conditions on the flanks of the river/canal regions.Quote:
Reminder that in many cases the Russians at from D0 have had only numerical parity with the Ukrainians, and nevertheless have advanced about as far into the country as the US did into Iraq during Iraqi Freedom (which lasted more than a month in its conventional stage). Despite the tactical failures of Russian units, pound for pound they still look to be superior to Ukrainian units and soldiers. Someone on Twitter compared the tenacity of Ukrainians to Armenians in 2020, pointing out that tenacity can't compensate for lack of firepower. A Russian army with improved logistics and morale would certainly be a legitimate foe for US grunts.
The US way of war in Iraq resulted in only about 200 coalition casualties though the civilian casualties were certainly in the high thousands. Granted that if the Iraqis had even a quarter of the technical and tactical competence and will to fight as the Ukrainians it would have been a lot slower and costlier.
The Iraq war though was against a brutal and relatively unloved dictator, if the US hadn't blown the 1–2-month period of relative calm and somehow prevented the the sectarian violence that escalated into a general civil war who knows how it would have turned out in the long run. As it is now it is a stain on the US both for the reasons for invading and the complete lack of a post-war plan. It looks like Putin is adding the factor of military incompetence and ham-handedness in his invasion with thousands of his own already dead and who knows how many wounded or captured not to mention the horrific and deliberate attacks on civilians with unknown levels of destruction and casualties.
Mearsheimer's worldview is seriously illogical. He believes in his specific model so strongly that it becomes low-key normative for him.
Fair. In partial acknowledgement I would say we ought to be willing to allow the newer, longer-range SAM platforms to operate in most of Belarusian, and certainly Russian, territory if that's what they do, even at the cost of some losses. Though this isn't a fixed fact I also note that Russian AA has been surprisingly ineffective in both Syria and Ukraine from what I can tell. Not as a technology necessarily, but in its deployment.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
God damn it all. Such a tenuous hope could as well be matched by relying on Putin's lackeys to blow his brains out should a Western action happen to provoke omnicidal orders.Quote:
I think the best we can realistically hope for is that the Ukrainians can keep weathering Russian attacks in the cities, defeat/minimize any Belarus invasion, and bleed the Russians so badly that their unit's defect, surrender, or just refuse to fight. I'm praying for a miracle of some sort on the battlefield but just cannot see an endgame that results in Ukrainian victory so long as the Russians use numbers and firepower to compensate for any lack of finesse or tactical ability.
Various commentators make the point that it is immoral to stoke resistance, rhetorical and material, in Ukraine if the inevitable result is greater destruction and loss of life unto and under Russian occupation. And I mean, this is merely logical if you accept that endless conflict and death are bad. Yet I don't accept that any country being invaded should get everyone on their knees in supplication so as to avoid death and destruction. There's also this very urgent need in the present circumstances to stall the ramifications of a fascist war of conquest, the success of which would generate negative knock-on effects for all of us and would utterly devastate Ukraine as a country forever.* It cannot be a sound principle for victims of aggression to instantly submit as to maximize peace. Otherwise we should have never imposed new sanctions on Russia, indeed should have just removed existing ones immediately when Putin cast the die by invading Ukraine; without a concrete strategic objective in mind, such as regime change or an armistice, the sanctions would just constitute a petulant expression of disapprobation of Russian policy, to no real effect but causative of the impoverishment of ordinary Russians.
Thus the most logically coherent alternative is to decide the war in Ukraine's favor by whatever means, or at a minimum prevent Ukraine's comprehensive collapse. But Western leaders don't feel politically licensed, the logistics aren't there, and the decision-makers fear the tail risk of nuclear escalation.
Everything is bullshit.
*According to the IMF last year, Ukraine's GDP per capita indicator has seen about zero percent growth since the end of the Cold War. Ukraine's population meanwhile has shrunk every single year since 1990, down by over 15% since its peak before independence.
More concretely, what do you make of the Polish statement that Polish airfields will support Ukrainian combat operations. For context, Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovakia all reneged on their initial offers to donate combat planes yesterday. Internal governmental divisions? Faltering resolve after the proud rhetoric of the first three days? Hungary, for example, on Monday denied access to its territory for military aid in transit. Are we just going to reclaim all this undelivered aid, stuck on the Polish border or elsewhere, if Belarus attacks and severs the arteries between Ukraine and Poland? Notice how I'm inadvertently managing to reinstantiate the logical dilemma I just raised...
Russian statement recognises Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine. Is this a significant change?
double post
We can keep sending arms, encourage volunteers and providing the extremely valuable intelligence that's allowing the Ukrainians to marshal their limited resources effectively.Quote:
God damn it all. Such a tenuous hope could as well be matched by relying on Putin's lackeys to blow his brains out should a Western action happen to provoke omnicidal orders.
Various commentators make the point that it is immoral to stoke resistance, rhetorical and material, in Ukraine if the inevitable result is greater destruction and loss of life unto and under Russian occupation. And I mean, this is merely logical if you accept that endless conflict and death are bad. Yet I don't accept that any country being invaded should get everyone on their knees in supplication so as to avoid death and destruction. There's also this very urgent need in the present circumstances to stall the ramifications of a fascist war of conquest, the success of which would generate negative knock-on effects for all of us and would utterly devastate Ukraine as a country forever.* It cannot be a sound principle for victims of aggression to instantly submit as to maximize peace. Otherwise we should have never imposed new sanctions on Russia, indeed should have just removed existing ones immediately when Putin cast the die by invading Ukraine; without a concrete strategic objective in mind, such as regime change or an armistice, the sanctions would just constitute a petulant expression of disapprobation of Russian policy, to no real effect but causative of the impoverishment of ordinary Russians.
Thus the most logically coherent alternative is to decide the war in Ukraine's favor by whatever means, or at a minimum prevent Ukraine's comprehensive collapse. But Western leaders don't feel politically licensed, the logistics aren't there, and the decision-makers fear the tail risk of nuclear escalation.
Bear in mind my negative assessment has been wrong so far, the Ukrainians have fought so much better and the Russians so much worse than myself and many proper analysists thought. I was one of the many that thought Ukraine could resist a few days before the Russians broke through and it was a done deal. However, Zelensky rallying his nation has been a boon to the fight together with battlefield success. The war is certainly not decided by any means and I think people like me overstate Russia's ability to absorb losses, it's not 1941, Stalin is not in charge, the current Russian state looks increasingly fragile given the international reaction.
Who knows, if the Ukraine keeps stunting Russian advances effectively the internal pressure in Russia may grow overwhelming. I highly doubt anyone in Russia imagined such a unified international condemnation and such harsh sanctions. A month ago SWIFT was off the table, Nordstream-2 was debatable and Germany sending arms and rearming itself was unimaginable, there's been a sea change in the European political dynamic.
I don't think this is a lost cause as for once there is a strong international reaction to go alongside the action on the ground. I can't imagine that this is a popular war in Russia, the casualties are high, the troops on the ground were not properly prepared for a war and their casualties are immense. Who knows what the actual casualty count is for Russia though, if the Ukrainian numbers are accurate the Russians have taken a third as many losses as their entire war in Afghanistan but in a matter of a week, if the US numbers are accurate, it's still a disaster as its more than the US lost in 20 years in Afghanistan too. Looking at the Russian 'official' numbers those are clearly unbelievable as they've lost more vehicles in verifiable pictures than the Russians say they've lost troops.
Honestly I don't know enough on this to really weigh in. I imagine for the aircraft that the logistics of it are too difficult (they've been NATO upgraded and the Ukrainian pilots would need to train up in probably NATO countries first). Additionally, at a time that NATO is trying to guard their border, sending aircraft piecemeal to a war zone with no replacement available only weakens one's own ability to defend.Quote:
More concretely, what do you make of the Polish statement that Polish airfields will support Ukrainian combat operations. For context, Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovakia all reneged on their initial offers to donate combat planes yesterday. Internal governmental divisions? Faltering resolve after the proud rhetoric of the first three days? Hungary, for example, on Monday denied access to its territory for military aid in transit. Are we just going to reclaim all this undelivered aid, stuck on the Polish border or elsewhere, if Belarus attacks and severs the arteries between Ukraine and Poland? Notice how I'm inadvertently managing to reinstantiate the logical dilemma I just raised...
As for the military aid, I'm sure it will get through somehow, the transiting countries though are understandably worried about Russian reaction.
There are also strong pro-russian elements in a lot of these countries that may be having an effect despite the popular change in opinions.
I meant to comment on this earlier, I actually fully support it. Not that all those men would be really drafted to fight but that their 'duty' right now is to save their country which can be done many ways, hospitals, fire brigades need help, supplies need to be gathered and distributed. The shock of the invasion and the successful defense of the first few days have apparently had a Pearl Harbor effect on the Ukrainian population, there are a lot that are now determined to do their part which may not necessarily be fighting. Those images of construction vehicles recovering tanks and other combat systems or digging trenches and anti-tank ditches are good examples.Quote:
Also, the Ukrainian policy of conscripting any 18-60 y/o man they can get their hands on is pretty foolish. Maybe we've unlearned a lot of lessons in the 21st century, but putting a rifle in the hands of untrained, unwilling people will almost never contribute to combat effectiveness in defense. The vast majority of these Volks conscripts will flee or surrender upon encountering combat.
I think the only real negative downside is that on the Russian side they could arguably say that if the whole country is at war with them that there are no true civilian areas and that everything is a legitimate target.
That reminds me of the fall of South Vietnam. After getting in danger of being flanked when Ban Me Thuot fell, the South Vietnamese soldiers who were holding relatively secure positions at the Central Highlands were ordered to withdraw and regroup to a smaller area. The withdrawal process was organized badly and became a disaster.Quote:
Originally Posted by rory_20_uk
It didn't make sense to me that Putin would invade with just 100K soldiers in groups so far away from each other when Ukraine has 200K. And Ukraine isn't a small country. I assumed that Putin would invade if he deployed more soldiers, but he added only about 7K. When he invaded, I initially thought maybe there were a lot more hidden near the border. It turned out that he was underestimating Ukraine. It seems that last year's Afghan situation influenced his opinion. NATO sending anti-tank weapons to Ukraine gave me hope. That reminded me of Afghanistan when the USSR invaded. But now, two-thirds of Russia's soldiers are involved. Ukraine will continue to need supplies.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
What happened in Afghanistan last year is different. The Afghans experienced unexpected gaps in their defense and didn't have time to prepare. The garrisons who defended ran out of supplies. Those are just a couple of numerous reasons that Afghanistan fell so quickly. In Ukraine, the president is staying in Kyiv despite the Russians approaching close to the city. NATO continues to supply the Ukrainian military. And Ukraine isn't geographically isolated away from the NATO countries.
The Oryx blog I've linked that verifies equipment losses.
https://i.imgur.com/IENH2MV.jpgQuote:
I’ve lost all hope of accurately depicting Russian equipment losses. They’ve become too numerous. For every entry two new losses pop up. Its carnage.
And I covered the collapse of the Afghan Army in August:
A different style of visual representation of the conflict than "zone of control."
https://twitter.com/i/status/1499048268512493568
https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1499041856772276230
https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1499042158753742850
The Russian fascist is focused on recounting stories of Ukrainian militias falling afoul of friendly fire and killing 15-20 of each other (it's always 15-20). In discussing captured towns, he makes a big show of how acquiescence will return citizens to a normal, stable existence (under the watchful sentinel of Russian soldiers, who protect them from marauders), whereas shows of resistance by fanatical nationalists will be crushed into a fine potato salad.
Also, he gave Konotop as an example of a town that negotiated peaceful coexistence with the Russians, yet here's the mayor today... (watch that embedded video!!!)
https://news.sky.com/video/ukraine-c...-city-12555707
When switching between Latin and Cyrillic in the course of keeping up with events, the name "Konotop" is viscerally frustrating, because (is there a term for this?) the lexeme "Konotop" in Latin alphabet is - transliterated - Kopotor" in Cyrillic. It routinely trips me up.
But the majority of Russian people are only exposed to state-approved media, if any at all; it takes active effort even in the "Free World" to seek out detailed information and analysis of current affairs, and in Russia requires some level of technical savvy besides. If you take the fascist Youtuber Yuri Podolyaka I keep citing, his videos on Youtube alone routinely pull hundreds of thousands to low millions of views (and there will be more on native Russian platforms such as Telegram and Vkontakte). I wish you could understand the stuff he says. This is what typical Russians hear *if* they seek out information at all.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
It would take a long time, months, for news of casualties to really filter through and percolate, and Ukraine can't hold out for that time, nor inflict sufficient casualties anyway: one or two hundred thousand at a minimum. Russians today basically accept their leadership and system, whereas in the late 1980s the condition of Russian society was altogether more chaotic and disgruntled. Moreover, under Gorbachev's glasnost the information environment was in some ways more liberal than now, which was a driving factor for the soaring unpopularity of the war by the late 80s.
True.Quote:
which can be done many ways, hospitals, fire brigades need help, supplies need to be gathered and distributed.
I wonder if in 10-20 years we're going to lament a missed opportunity for a decisive Coalition intervention, though to be clear I entertain many doubts myself on the issue.
That is true and a large hurdle to overcome, however because Russia has conscription it does make people a bit more politically aware and engaged once caskets start returning in place of their sons, brothers, and fathers as the US saw in Vietnam.Quote:
But the majority of Russian people are only exposed to state-approved media, if any at all; it takes active effort even in the "Free World" to seek out detailed information and analysis of current affairs, and in Russia requires some level of technical savvy besides. If you take the fascist Youtuber Yuri Podolyaka I keep citing, his videos on Youtube alone routinely pull hundreds of thousands to low millions of views (and there will be more on native Russian platforms such as Telegram and Vkontakte). I wish you could understand the stuff he says. This is what typical Russians hear *if* they seek out information at all.
I have no doubt that most Russians are proud of their country and want to support their troops, however, to have their families killed in a war of choice against their fellow Slavs that are unbelievably called 'Nazis' is probably a bit too much.
You're also right in the slowness that the casualties may cause an effect at home. The economic effects however are immediate and the standard of living and access to the rest of the world that so many have enjoyed for decades has in one fell swoop disappeared. Propaganda can only do so much for blaming everyone else as this is a country normally engaged in the world, not a hermit state like North Korea.
The Beginning of the End for Putin?
Dictatorships Look Stable—Until They Aren’t
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/artic...n=tw_daily_soc
Is Poland Sending Fighter Jets to Ukraine?Quote:
But there are also good reasons that the tides might turn. Despite the repression, protests have taken place in more than 58 cities across Russia. The early demonstrations are remarkable not just for the bravery that they reflect, but also for the potential that they hold—protests in highly repressive regimes are more likely to be successful than protests in less repressive environments. That is because when people take to the streets even when the costs of doing so are high, it sends a powerful signal to other citizens that their dissent is shared. In this way, these early antiwar protests have the potential to trigger cascading opposition. The fact that Russians view Putin’s war as being unjust and egregious makes it especially likely to prompt widespread backlash.
The short answer is “maybe.” But, well, it’s complicated
https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/is...ts-to-ukraine/
Quote:
Ukrainian pilots are currently in Poland, New Lines can confirm, following reporting by Yahoo! News. But they are there not for training purposes but for “consultations” with Warsaw on completing the relevant paperwork for a possible handover of aircraft, according to a former high-ranking Polish military official, who added that “no decision at the political level has been made” as to whether this transaction will occur.
That source also told New Lines that Poland has 28 MiG-29s it could deliver to Ukraine, and R-73s short-range air-to-air missiles, all of which would be of enormous use to Ukraine in its war against Russia. Some Polish aviation experts think that, in reality, only 23 of them are operational.
“The problem is Poland needs MiG-29s, too, because our Air Force works in pairs. Two jets always fly together to intercept or escort any foreign aircraft, such as Russian Su-27s [fighters], that come anywhere near Polish airspace.”
“The Ukrainians got ahead of themselves,” the former official noted, by announcing the transfer of foreign MiG-29s as more or less done and dusted.
Ukraine’s Air Force Command posted to Facebook on March 1 that it was receiving 70 MiG-20s and Su-25s from Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria, adding that 28 MiG-29s would not only come from Poland but “if necessary … be able to base themselves at Polish airports, from which Ukrainian pilots will perform combat tasks.”
The above explains the lag in the MiG-29 problem a bit better than my assumptions.Quote:
The Polish MiG-29 have been modernized over the years and have been equipped with NATO communications and reconnaissance systems. These jets would have to be stripped of this equipment and reflagged before being transferred to the Ukrainian air force.
Another issue involves the logistics of getting the planes to Ukraine. As a NATO member state, Poland would not allow Ukrainian pilots to simply fly them from its runways into Ukrainian airspace because doing so would risk provoking Russia and making Poland (and NATO) direct parties to the conflict. It is unclear, the former Polish military officer told New Lines, how the planes would be imported into Ukraine. There is almost no chance that Ukrainians would be able to base these jets on Polish territory.
Initial reports suggested that the U.S. would backfill Poland’s inventory of MiG-29s with the U.S.-made F-16, of which Poland currently has 48 in its inventory. However, Polish pilots tend to prefer the more familiar Soviet-era MiG, which they view as a “better” fighter jet, according to one of them.
Furthermore, Polish technicians have greater experience fixing the Soviet-era planes than they do their American counterparts.
Just good technical information from an expert:
Jesus, if true, it's practically to the standard of the lazy days of the Soviet Army.Quote:
This is a thread that will explain the implied poor Russian Army truck maintenance practices based on this photo of a Pantsir-S1 wheeled gun-missile system's right rear pair of tires below & the operational implications during the Ukrainian mud season.
For the sin of being the new guy, I was the DCMA quality auditor in charge of the US Army's FMTV "vehicle exercise program" at the contractor manufacturing them from the Mid-1990's to the mid-2000's Then we got more new guys.
Short form: Military trucks need to be......turned over and moved once a month for preventative maintenance reasons.
In particular you want to exercise the central tire air inflation system (CTIS) to see if lines have leaks or had insect/vermin nests blocking the system.
One of the biggest reasons for the repositioning, per TACOM logistic Representatives, was that direct sunlight ages truck tires.
The repositioning of Trucks in close parking prevents a lot of this sun rotting and cycling the CTIS keeps the tire sidewalls supple.
When you leave military truck tires in one place for months on end. The side walls get rotted/brittle such that using low tire pressure setting for any appreciable distance will cause the tires to fail catastrophically via rips.
See early video:
Now look at the same Pantsir-S1 tire sidewalls after the Ukrainians tried to tow or drive it out of the mud.
The right rear tire fell apart because the rips in it were too big for the CTIS to keep aired up.
No one exercised that vehicle for 1 year
There is a huge operational level implication in this. If the Russian Army was too corrupt to exercise a Pantsir-S1. They were too corrupt to exercise the trucks & wheeled AFV's now in Ukraine.
The Russians simply cannot risk them off road during the Rasputitsa/Mud season
And there is photographic evidence of this.
There are 60(+) Russian army trucks crowded & parked on this raised road bed to avoid the fate of the mud-bogged Pantsir-S1.
Given the demonstrated levels of corruption in truck maintenance. There is no way in h--l that there are enough tires in the Russian army logistical system.
So their wheeled AFV/truck park is as road bound as Russian Army columns were in the 1st Russo-Finnish War.
What that means is that as long as and where ever the Spring Rasputitsa is happening. The Russian Army attack front is three wheeled AFV's wide.
When the Ukrainians can block the road with ATGM destroyed vehicles. They can move down either side of the road like Fins in 1939
https://www.eurointelligence.com/
Quote:
Not so swift after all
FAZ informs us that the Swift sanctions are essentially dead in the water. Only seven banks, representing a quarter of the Russian banking sector, are subject to the sanctions. What happened is that once this sanctions list went through the mill of talks with member states, only this pared-down lists survives. The EU originally promised to hit 70% of the Russian banking system. One reason for the exclusion of Sberbank is the deposits held by savers in the bank’s EU subsidiaries. It would have triggered massive deposit insurance claims.
The reduced ambitions embed an important piece of hard information. It is telling us that EU member states will not be ready to impose transactional sanctions on Russia in areas deemed vital to the EU economy, especially the import of Russian gas, oil and coal. What this will also tell us is that we have no means to crush the Russian economy, as Bruno Le Maire suggested. Vladimir Putin has run into big problems with his military campaign. But he will be able to finance the war.
Putin did not anticipate the central bank sanctions. That has turned out to be a real problem for the Russian economy. But he anticipated correctly that the west would continue to buy Russian gas and oil. We think the Russian leadership is also right in their assumption that the main effect of the Nord Stream 2 closure is not so much to make us less dependent on Russian gas, but to increase the price of gas. It will only make us less dependent on Putin if we were to invest in alternative sources of energy. The main fiscal effect of the Russian war against Ukraine is the massive increase in defence spending in Germany and France. Do we have the fiscal capacity to do both, defence and renewable energy investments, at a time when interest rates start to normalise?
The seven banks affected by the Swift exclusion are VTB, Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Rossiya Bank, Sovcombank und VEB. Notably, the two Russian banking giants, Sberbank und Gazprom Bank, are excluded. The ban will only come into effect in ten days, which will allow the Russians to reorganise their banking system, and we presume, re-route payments through banks that are not affected by the sanctions. What this means is that the Swift ban falls into the SINO category: sanctions in name only. The EU is cheering on the Ukrainian side from a safe distance, watching from warm living rooms, heated by Russian gas.
China is clearly watching to see what the consequences of an invasion on Taiwan would be.
They finally dropped the Bayraktar propaganda.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSzZT6VwENo
Quote:
A poll for Finland’s state broadcaster Yle showed 53 per cent of Finns supported joining Nato, 28 per cent were against and 19 per cent did not know. The last time Yle conducted such a poll in 2017 only 19 per cent were in favour of joining while 53 per cent were against.
Goes to show how anti-entanglement the Swedish and Finnish publics were, if even now you can't guarantee bare majority support for NATO accession.Quote:
In Sweden, a late February poll commissioned by public broadcaster SVT found 41 per cent of Swedes supported NATO membership and 35 per cent opposed it, marking the first time that those in favor exceeded those against.
I found the Reuters article the writeup was based off of. Comparing them, I'm not sure the writeup adds any value, and it excludes some useful information to make room for editorializing.Quote:
Originally Posted by Furunculus
Quote:
Sberbank (SBER.MM), Russia's largest lender, and Gazprombank were not included because they are the main channels for payments for Russian oil and gas, which EU countries are still buying despite the conflict in Ukraine.
The EU official added that these two Russian banks were nevertheless subject to other measures.
Officials have been concerned about disrupting energy flows to Europe and the official said it was not possible simply to allow energy-related transactions and exclude others as SWIFT was unable to differentiate between types of payments.
Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said the decision to exclude Sberbank and Gazprombank from sanctions due to "transactions related to energy supplies to the EU" was unacceptable.
"As Poland, we demand that all Russian entities, thanks to which Russia finances the war in Ukraine, be effectively and fully covered by sanctions," he wrote on Facebook.
Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte told a news briefing that more Russian banks could be excluded from SWIFT, which has 11,000 members and no clear global rival.
Although China has set up its own system, it remains small, EU officials said, and despite the existence of a Russian system as well, SWIFT is still used for some 70% of transfers there.
Banks could still carry out transfers through work-arounds such as faxes or bilateral messaging systems, if they existed.
VEB said it was largely focused on domestic projects which were unaffected. For overseas-related businesses it would use SPFS, a messaging system developed by Russia's central bank.
Sovcombank said SWIFT would not impact it because other sanctions had already blocked its ability to make overseas payments. Promsvyazbank said it was prepared for the disconnection from SWIFT and it would not have a significant impact on the bank's operations.
The International Brigade is forming. To their victory this go around. But there isn't much time.
Quote:
As many as 16,000 foreigners have so far answered the call from some 20 nationalities, Zelensky said Thursday, according to the Reuters news agency.
[...]
There were some 400 fighters coming from Sweden, media there said. Another 70 volunteers, including 50 former soldiers, were also coming from as far afield as Japan, Reuters reported.
If NATO won't commit, at least we should return to Cold War tactics of (im)plausible deniability. Donate a wing of F16s, F18s, and their supply/technical train to Ukraine. How will they pilot them? No problem, I'm sure there are ""mercenaries"" around with plenty of relevant experience. Far from unprecedented.
the surprising lack of exposure of UK banks to russian money - relative to our european neighbours:
(article is paywalled, but its the graph at the start that is interesting)
https://www.economist.com/finance-an...covery.content
Also relevant to the UK Politics thread, Pann?
On a similar line of who Ukraine finds to be the most valuable ally - in supporting Ukraine rather than punishing Russia - surprisingly Johnson appears to be the go-to man:
https://twitter.com/b_judah/status/1499823048005926919
The fascist calmly laid out - and I can't say this isn't evidenced in most conflict zones - that according to predictable human psychology the people of occupied Ukraine will gradually be reprogrammed not to fear or resist Russians by instituting a change of government and by replacing their media with Russian-approved content. People will habituate and return to their normal, peaceful, lives in pursuit of their private better futures.
It's true. Guerrillas are always a very tiny proportion of the population. Most people can't sustain intrinsic rage and will to action. It's much easier to prop up an actively-resisting military formation than to foment an insurrection...
He also claims government officials in Ukrainian-held territory are either fleeing en masse or preparing to give over their towns.
Relatedly, the Russians have declared the Kherson People's Republic. Seems to me they're going to be installing puppets in every oblast they occupy. So far Kherson is the only oblast that has been more or less fully occupied, other than the pre-existing seperatist republics.
In operational news, he's confident that there are no Ukrainian regulars to contest the Russian advance outside Mykolaiv in the southern area of operations west of the Dnieper. He also vehemently declaimed Ukrainian soldiers, as Putinists have been for a while, that it is necessary to shell schools and residential buildings because they're used by snipers, artillery spotters, and other no-goodniks. (It's no coincidence he mentioned snipers. The US trained many of them, and they've been killing Russian officers pretty good.)
And here I used to think the authority of the Commander in Chief was absolute, but it seems this doesn't apply when you're a far-right judge under a Democratic president. Lawless Republicans are an intense threat to security of every kind, including national.
Quote:
But the Navy cannot currently deploy this warship, because it has lost trust in its commanding officer, an anti-vaxxer who has repeatedly disobeyed lawful orders, misled superiors, and allegedly exposed dozens of his crew to COVID-19 due to a refusal to get tested.
The Navy wants to remove this officer, whom I’ll call John Doe, from command of the destroyer. But it can’t, because a single federal judge in Tampa has forbidden it. This judge has overruled multiple admirals and captains who assert, under oath, that deploying the ship with Doe in charge would imperil national security. He instead ordered the Navy, under threat of sanction, to keep this disobedient officer in charge of a $1.8 billion warship. The federal judiciary is quite literally preventing the nation from defending itself at sea.
That judge, Steven Douglas Merryday, is a George H.W. Bush nominee who sits on a federal trial court in Florida. He gained notoriety in 2021 after blocking a CDC order that limited cruise ship operations due to the pandemic. So, when the far-right Liberty Counsel sought to halt President Joe Biden’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate for the armed forces, they took their case to Merryday’s court. Predictably, they prevailed: In February, Merryday ruled that the mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, siding with the plaintiffs, Navy Commander John Doe and Lieutenant Colonel Jane Smith. (I’ve applied these pseudonyms to the officers because the court granted them anonymity.)
But Merryday did not merely exempt Doe and Smith from the mandate. Rather, he handed down a sweeping restraining order that prohibited the Navy from taking any “adverse action” against the plaintiffs because of their unvaccinated status. Specifically, he barred the Navy from reassigning them for any reason whatsoever.
This order created immediate problems. An active-duty member of the Marine Corps, Smith is slated to take command of a Combat Logistics Battalion later this year. As Lieutenant General W.M. Jurney attested, this commander must disembark at ally nations all over the world. Many of these countries require all U.S. service members to be vaccinated against COVID before stepping on their shores. Because she is unvaccinated, Smith is not “worldwide deployable,” in Jurney’s words. And yet Merryday has forced the Navy to deploy her.
But Doe poses the bigger threat. He is currently the commanding officer of a warship that may soon set sail. If he falls seriously ill at sea—which is more likely because he refuses the vaccine—he may thwart the entire mission. The issue, however, goes deeper than that. In declarations, Vice Admiral D.W. Dwyer and Captain Frank Brandon explained that Doe’s anti-vax beliefs are part of a broader pattern of insubordination. Brandon testified that last November, he spoke with Doe on Doe’s ship one day before its scheduled departure. Doe was experiencing multiple symptoms of COVID, and appeared to have a relatively severe case; he could, Brandon recalled, “barely speak.” Yet Doe refused to get tested—a clear violation of protocol—and attended a briefing in a cramped room with about 60 other people. Brandon ordered Doe to get a test, which revealed that he did, indeed, have COVID, and exposed dozens of others to the virus.
Doe engaged in other deceptive behavior. For instance, when requesting leave, he concealed the fact that he was flying to another state, which would have triggered a mandatory risk assessment. After Brandon discovered this subterfuge, he learned that Doe had traveled to a high-risk area, requiring five days’ quarantine upon return. Doe did not inform his Executive Officer of this extended absence, creating a “significant and very rare” disruption “across the waterfront” during a crucial phase of ship preparation. Brandon concluded that Doe “intentionally deceived me,” “put his crew at risk,” “failed to comply with the Navy’s COVID-19 policies,” and engaged in “negligent behavior” in “performance of his duties.”
Quote:
light of these fears, the Department of Justice pleaded with Merryday to pause his decision. On Wednesday, he declined. Merryday scorned the notion that Doe might get sick, writing that he is “triumphantly fit and slim and strong.” He also implied that Navy leadership may be lying about Doe’s insubordination in retaliation against his religious beliefs. Merryday declined to fully credit their testimony until he could subject them to cross-examination. He concluded that the plaintiffs’ right to religious liberty trumps the Navy’s profound national security concerns.
The Navy and the federal judiciary are therefore in a standoff. The Navy will not deploy Doe’s warship until he is stripped of command. Merryday will not allow it to do so. As a result, Merryday has effectively taken a 10,000 ton, $1.8 billion guided-missile destroyer out of commission. As the Navy builds up its naval presence in Europe to guard against further Russian aggression, it is down a ship—solely because an unelected judge in Tampa has inserted himself into the chain of command.
Illustration:
Well-watched videos filmed in occupied Melitopol and Kherson, apparently by rando civilians, and not the only. They emphasize how everything is safe and peaceful and in good order, and the comments almost universally express relief that the situation is so calm, everyone is doing a good job, everything is fine, glory to Russian soldiers, soon this will all be over, etc. This is the typical framework for Good Russians.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJ18DCGz8Do
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbq-wRPcm_Y
Though not necessarily more representative, here are a bunch of videos from the past day or two of Ukrainians in the named cities protesting Russian occupation.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1499401416221200391 [Melitopol]
https://twitter.com/i/status/1500118411912916996 [Melitopol]
https://twitter.com/i/status/1500001665277120515 [Kherson]
https://twitter.com/i/status/1500044763306897409 [Kherson]
https://twitter.com/i/status/1500062758007623687 [Kherson]
The fascist says this isn't a war between Ukraine and Russia, but a war between the US (and the UK) and Russia (and China) over Ukraine, a Third World War of a hybrid sort that began long before 2014. This (phase of the) war was inevitable and is not the result of individual decision-makers. That the Americans - though he hangs himself with the un-introspective proviso that he has no idea how - must have secretly provoked Russia in such a way that it was forced to try to resolve the Ukrainian question with haste, in 2022. All of this was preplanned; Poland allegedly prepared to absorb millions of refugees starting a year ago. All the unpleasant videos being shared in Russia and Belarus? Fakes, venomous blanks in the American information war. The world has crossed the Rubicon and Russians will never again return to normalcy and comfort. They must prepare for intensifying hybrid war with the United States, suppressing their "hearts" so as to focus their minds on utmost service to their government (implying "total war").
And the Goebbels-looking rat bastard mumbles it all so coolly.
This is the sort of fascist derangement that needs to be utterly eradicated from the planet in order for peace to obtain. No, you low-human filth, you are the very font of conflict and misery. Eat shit and die and all this sort of trouble magically vanishes faster than your head spins. It's the fascist element, those who wish to realize pride through blood and soil, who clutch the right to rule against their bosom, who have no other concept of existence, that stirs strife, not some abstract law of nations.
Anyway, he naturally doesn't remark on the facts that China has no stake in Russia's conquests, and would rather prefer fewer dramatics disrupting its economic balance, or at least would prefer both Russia and the US keep each other out of China's own hair. Nor can he allow that France and Germany and the rest of the continent are sick of Russia's bullshit and ready to back up their ire with arms under popular approval. (Actually, his only comment on France and Germany is that they are being "forced" by the Anglo-Saxons into a confrontation with Russia.) The worldview is obdurately Manichean, never mind that to the extent Russia can even be called a partner to China, it is a junior one.
Fucking sick pieces of shit.
He's an extreme manifester of Duginism, the obscene dream that Russia and the United States must perpetually compete for world domination. It's literally reading 1984 as a manual. The only (family-friendly) cure for this depth of perversion is to break all the toys and votives about which the ideology swards. Who will de-Nazify and demilitarize Russia? Only the proles can renounce Eurasia.
He's adding hundreds of thousands of subscribers daily on Youtube alone; I won't bother to make guesses as to their geographic distribution.
And some buddy thinks the risk of nuclear escalation should we give Putin's army a booboo, while it's at its weakest, is too high?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QWJ5UKKoycI
Quote:
You can forget about being a world power
As you were recognized by the world before
Now you don't even have the right
To say you are right
Who is "the fascist"? Are we talking about Putin...
I linked the Youtuber Yuri Podolyaka earlier, but also at the top of my previous post. I've commented on him and his analysis in most of my posts for a week. If you can't get an independent translation of his content, you'll have to take my word for it. People like him see the world in terms of a paraphysical confrontation between Russian-Eurasian and Anglo-American civilizations.
You know how small children sometimes playfully count objects around them? She's counting burned houses. [VIDEO]
I loved this song back in the day.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AL-rdzMo1MU&list=LL&index=1
Puts one in mind of Andy Samberg.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1499341576518217730 [VIDEO]
Another clip, captured by New York Times reporters on the ground, demonstrates the chaotic nature of artillery fragmentation. For some bizarre reason, the Russians lobbed a single shell into an open street, with no discernible nearby fighting or military target, nor any followup. Just one shell.
The man talking to the reporters at the beginning was standing out in the open, maybe 10* meters from the blast. He was seemingly unaffected, at least externally. But a family of four walking much further away, 30* meters say, was totally wiped out. Just random death from above.
Poetically, the first man was saying something about civilians ("evacuating 200 children, peaceful population") the second the shell struck.
*These are very approximate distances. I am not apt at estimating distance
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
@spmetla I'm going to need your help on this one.
I want to start figuring out what sort of assets, manpower, the Russian military has brought to bear in its war, and still can.
US intelligence estimates that 95% of the entire assembled invasion force has entered Ukraine. Some of that remainder has to be naval infantry (brigade's worth?) kept ready in Crimea for amphibious assault against Odessa. Various sources report or suggest modest reserves or reinforcements are starting to be brought to the AO.
The Russian armed forces today are built on a contract-professional base with cadre-conscript backfill. Something like a quarter of Russian troops should be conscripts in the active service. We will return to this point.
Both Ukraine and Russia are both reportedly deploying elite special response police in military function, but we'll ignore that and other bits and bobs.
According to IISS Military Balance, the personnel counts for the active service in 2021 are (red for non-frontline):
This article is a good primer on the Russian system of conscription. Conscripts serve for a term of 1 year, of which 3 months is basic training and 3 months is advanced training. There should currently be at least 100 thousand conscripts undergoing training in Russia, spread across all branches. In April the next round of conscription was scheduled to begin, but Putin mustered early just days before the invasion. "Current law precludes conscripts from deploying to combat with less than four months of training; however, martial law or general mobilization could supersede the current policy, allowing for the immediate employment of new conscripts or mobilized reservists."Quote:
ACTIVE 900,000
Army 280,000
Navy 150,000 [Naval Infantry (Marines) ε35,000; Naval Aviation ε31,000]
Air 165,000
Airborne (VDV) 45,000
Special Operations Forces 1,000
Strategic Rocket Force 50,000
Railway Forces 29,000
Command and Support 180,000)
Paramilitary 554,000 [Border Guard Service ε160,000; Federal Guard Service ε40,000–50,000; Rosgvardia ε340,000; Alfa & Vympel SF ε4,000]
Conscript liability 12 months (conscripts now can opt for contract service immediately, which entails a 24-month contract
The conscripts whose term is up next month (drafted April 2021) will almost certainly not be released. However, figure 130 thousand conscripts (drafted October 2021) in training and yet unassigned. We can assume conscripts are spread evenly through the armed forces, but regardless Putin will probably choose to rely on the class still training as a reserve of first call for reinforcing the infantry.
Russia has a 2-million reserve, of which virtually none is active reserve, making the potential Russian reservist hardly better in quality and motivation than an "Enemy at the Gates"-style conscript. Because of the political and disruption invited by mass mobilization, we should expect Putin to rely foremost on active military sources of manpower. We also ignore the reserve for the purposes of our calculation because reservists will always be directed as replacements for unit casualties, and won't be constituted in their distinct formations short of total mobilization.
Now, to the structure of the Army. It was in recent years reformed around the Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) concept, with infantry BTGs integrating various elements around a core of 3 mechanized infantry companies and 1 armored company; for armored BTGs the ratio is reversed. AFAIK only the Army has been structured around BTGs, with airborne, naval infantry, Rosgvardia, and others developing along different lines. BTGs are said to be 600-1000 personnel; at the battalion level I believe almost all are frontline combat personnel. Russia maintained something like 170 BTGs as of last year, which with an average strength of 800 (fudging) would represent 136 thousand out of 280 thousand, which would roughly track with a guess that 50% are non-combat, maybe. This would be flawed if it turns out the Logistical service branch directly serves the Army and other branches (i.e. that this function is not internal to the Army).
A number we'll return to is that at least 100 BTGs were assigned to the invasion force by mid-February. I'm not going to look for accountable estimates of the invasion force at D0, but IIRC it ranged from 150 thousand to over 200 thousand. We can clearly tell then that BTGs can't account for the size of the invasion force, and that VDV, Rosgvardia, etc. must have been included. I'm not sure if the operation has relied on naval infantry overland yet, but we do know that VDV and Rosgvardia have taken a prominent role in battle against the Ukrainians. So have separatist militias, but AFAIK their losses are not included among Ukrainian or other estimates of Russian losses, nor were their forces counted among estimates of Russian buildup.
(Interesting note from link: "In one approach outlined in the assessment, the Russian military would take over most Ukrainian territory east of the Dnipro River, which includes about 50 percent of Ukrainian military forces, including their most capable units." I read elsewhere that the bulk of the Ukainian military started out as operational reserve in the West.)
So let's begin subtracting.
First, forces stationed abroad (not including UN peacekeeping contribution). For now, I'm ignoring equipment such as aerial platforms. The Transnistria garrison will never be discounted from the invasion force.
Call it 23 thousand RU personnel abroad. I can't think of any way to adjust this figure in a way that doesn't fall afoul of double counting, but I'll call it a flat reduction of around 10 thousand from the whatever the final tally comes out to be. Non-frontline branches sum to 540/900 thousand. We need a way to exclude the 130 thousand training conscripts not yet assigned without double counting from the non-frontline services, so still assuming proportional distribution of conscripts in practice we should get the percentage for 540/900. This is a clean 60% non-frontline, so 0.4*130 = 52 thousand still in training. 360-52 = 308 thousand, 300 thousand after the flat reduction. But how many are non-combat oroles? I could very crudely estimate that, as a contemporary military, around 50% of all Russian servicemembers are admin, technical, logistical, etc. That is, non-combat or support roles of any sort. What complicates my ability to apply this estimate with respect to evaluating combat strength of frontline units is the existence of a whole separate logistical branch (see above). Indeed, if I halve 300 thousand I get 150 thousand, which entails a low ball for the invasion force but also that Putin deployed almost all of Russia's conventional striking power to Ukraine. But then again, there's the issue that the estimates on the size of the invasion force itself have never been clear on whether the figures include or exclude support personnel. If anyone knows the answer, it could dramatically improve my exercise.Quote:
ARMENIA: 3,500
AZERBAIJAN: 817
GEORGIA: 7,000;
KYRGYZSTAN: ε500
MOLDOVA/TRANSDNIESTR: ε1,500
SYRIA: 4,000
TAJIKISTAN: 5,000
If I haven't been clear enough up to now, I'm trying to isolate the pre-war component of the Russian military that was deployable groundpounders alone. Serious gaps, to summarize:
1. How many men in the initial invasion assembly?
1.a. How many of them in support roles?
1.b. How many in what I termed "non-frontline" branches, such as Air Force?
2. How many in the Army/Marines/Naval Infantry/Rosgvardia in support roles nationally?
3. How many separatists are there?
Provisionally then, I'm going to make the leap that on Feb 24 this year there were at a very minimum 200 thousand in the Russian military available for frontline duty. Some of these must be permanently stationed in various parts of the country, especially border regions other than Ukraine.
But that's not where we stop, because we haven't counted paramilitaries yet.
Recall
Border guards might be a future source of manpower, but for now discount them. The Federal Guards/Protective Service are internal police so for now discount them. The majority of Russian SOF have apparently been deployed to Ukraine, but there are so few of them that I'll work towards round numbers without reference to them. So we're left with Rosgvardia, the National Guard. Low-quality light mechanized infantry.Quote:
Paramilitary 554,000 [Border Guard Service ε160,000; Federal Guard Service ε40,000–50,000; Rosgvardia ε340,000; Alfa & Vympel SOF ε4,000]
Once again, I have no idea how to enumerate support vs. combat personnel, so I'll rely on ranges again. Say 150-250 thousand Russian paramilitary available
So on Feb. 24 there would have been at least 400 thousand personnel, active military and paramilitary, available for combat duty in Russia, beside over 100 thousand conscripts finishing up their training in the near future. While many of these must be permanently stationed in various locations around the country, they can be redeployed to Ukraine more readily than reservist in bulk.
However much these figures do or don't overlap with estimates of the invasion force, it's pretty clear that Russia has plenty with which to reinforce its operation before resorting to significant reserve callup. If we accept a moderate-high estimate of 10 thousand Russian casualties so far, adjusting for losses among Air Force and support personnel the Russians may have only lost as little as 1% of their ground combat personnel. That's not nearly enough considering Ukraine doesn't have unlimited reserves. To say nothing of their precious trained regulars. I don't believe they've been inflicting much better than a 2:1 loss ratio against Russia so far. Russia will bury Ukraine with its resources unless:
1. The military is paralyzed by mutinies and other mass resistance.
2. The ability to sustain multiple simultaneous operations is crippled by shortages of materiel or other logistical resources.
3. Russian tactics never pivot to reliance on artillery to neutralize enemy defenses (as opposed to feeding AFVs into urban traps).
Here's another mapper, this one attempting to represent combat formations. I'm scanning ~105 BTGs in Ukraine on the current maps, though I can't tell how or whether he represents Rosgvardia and VDV.
https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman
https://i.imgur.com/M15sCrM.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/d0Lnvvh.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/TIGI2YP.jpg
A stark view that supports your pessimism, Monty:
https://twitter.com/defencewithac/st...06258899460103
Correction, I've seen analysts speaking of the VDV in terms of BTGs, so I'll take it that they inherit that structure as well. Though according to IISS Military Balance,
Quote:
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (AB Recce) SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB div (1 tk bn, 3 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD
regt)
1 AB div (1 tk bn, 2 para/air aslt regt, 1 para/air aslt bn, 1
arty regt, 1 AD regt)
2 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)
1 indep AB bde
3 air aslt bde
A little tough to interpret, since the BTG system is supposed to deprecate regiments and integrate two or three artillery batteries and one or two air defense batteries per battalion.
But let's see...
2 tank btn, 9 assault regiments, 5 brigades. Reported total force inventory of 160 tanks (T72).
Brigade = 3 battalions, regiment = 2? = 35 battalions... (Count the 4 AD, 4 arty reg separate or distribute among?) Yeah, I suppose it more or less tracks with 45 thousand personnel total. But then VDV battalions can't be structured just like Army battalions, because an Army armored battalion would have 3 tank companies, 3x10 = 30 tanks, and an infantry/mech battalion would have 1 tank company = 10 tanks. Either the VDV tank battalions are superloaded with tanks and the VDV assault battalions don't integrate tanks, or that contingent of tanks is not actively allocated in full.
Tangentially, I think Oryx remarked that at least one VDV battalion has been destroyed just by confirmed equipment nixed.
The Donbas front is closer and closer to the precipice.
More than destroying enemy forces, the Ukrainians have been doing well in destroying columns of trucks and artillery. The Russian military is agreed by all to be hobbled by logistics failures, and the more trucks and trains they lose, the more infantry they have to devote to securing rear areas, the slower they can build up supplies and replenish damaged or broken vehicles, the fewer axes they can advance along and slower... and so on. This buys the Ukrainians time.
At any rate, the Russian military is a sham and even its latest technologies (often based on final Soviet designs) aren't worth a great deal. Big win for Turkey's arms industry (they also make helicopters).
Speaking of Turkey, in 2019 they brutally carved out a security corridor in Northern Syria on the pretext of enhancing border security adjacent to a chaotic, terrorist-packed territory. Poland needs to be licensed by its allies in staking a similar claim in Western Ukraine down from the Belarus border to the Southern Bug. After all, Poland, like Turkey, is veritably absorbing millions of refugees (a million in just over a week). Good stepping stone for escalation against Russia within a range of options, and well within contemporary standards of deniability. Other NATO countries, and US, can backfill the missing dispositions in Poland itself. Frees Ukrainian reserve brigades to move up. If we're worried about ballistic missile strikes splashing against Polish forces, their deployment can be publicly disclosed and away from typical counterforce targets such as Ukrainian airfields and depots. Just do it.
The BTG system is like the US Brigade system but it is hard to estimate a strict heirachy and quantity because Russia, just like the US and most countries does 'force tailoring' and will add and take away units under Brigade "Task Forces" or BTGs for the Russias to add capabilities as needed.Quote:
A little tough to interpret, since the BTG system is supposed to deprecate regiments and integrate two or three artillery batteries and one or two air defense batteries per battalion.
But let's see...
2 tank btn, 9 assault regiments, 5 brigades. Reported total force inventory of 160 tanks (T72).
Brigade = 3 battalions, regiment = 2? = 35 battalions... (Count the 4 AD, 4 arty reg separate or distribute among?) Yeah, I suppose it more or less tracks with 45 thousand personnel total. But then VDV battalions can't be structured just like Army battalions, because an Army armored battalion would have 3 tank companies, 3x10 = 30 tanks, and an infantry/mech battalion would have 1 tank company = 10 tanks. Either the VDV tank battalions are superloaded with tanks and the VDV assault battalions don't integrate tanks, or that contingent of tanks is not actively allocated in full.
I do agree on the assessment though, the VDV has taken a pounding and they've likely lost in KIA a Battalion at least and I think a brigade in casualties and equipment damage/loss.
This guy on twitter is doing a good job of mapping and is actually trying to estimate the Ukraininan forces as well which is something we haven't seen much of.
https://twitter.com/JominiW
Attachment 25367
Absolutely correct, and the Russian's being a mechanized/motorized force are tied to the roads and open areas for combat so their axises of advance are somewhat predictable now, especially so the supply lines.Quote:
More than destroying enemy forces, the Ukrainians have been doing well in destroying columns of trucks and artillery. The Russian military is agreed by all to be hobbled by logistics failures, and the more trucks and trains they lose, the more infantry they have to devote to securing rear areas, the slower they can build up supplies and replenish damaged or broken vehicles, the fewer axes they can advance along and slower... and so on. This buys the Ukrainians time.
This was a good video that educated me a bit on Russia's supply system and doctrine:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4wRdoWpw0w
I wouldn't so much negate the value of their technologies but would instead emphasize their poor integration. The US and NATO in general focuses heavily on Joint operations and co-planning of air, sea, ground, and how to fully integrate all the enablers such as intel, artillery, air power, and so on. Apparently, the Russians have not been successful in that integration like NATO has and without it each system on its own is extremely venerable. Just seeing the numbers of tanks that have been knocked out due to lack of infantry and the convoys with no escort trucks shows a real failure to assess vulnerabilities and adapt, likely a result of being a no-failure tolerated leadership system serving a dictator.Quote:
At any rate, the Russian military is a sham and even its latest technologies (often based on final Soviet designs) aren't worth a great deal. Big win for Turkey's arms industry (they also make helicopters).
Examples of poor integration of US technology is see very easily in the Saudi Army which has lost multiple M1A1 tanks to the houthis due to poor integration into other combat arms to provide mutual support, same with the Turkish use of Leopard 2 tanks in Syria.
The F-35 may be a game changing aircraft but if used by a country that doesn't support it as needed it's just a very expensive jet, same is true for Russia as we see daily.
Good interview with General McMaster:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iaqZ9ZYFP6U
Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in connection with the statement by the US Secretary of State on providing airplanes to UkraineQuote:
The authorities of the Republic of Poland, after consultations between the President and the Goverment, are ready to deploy – immediately and free of charge – all their MIG-29 jets to the Ramstein Air Base and place them at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America.
At the same time, Poland requests the United States to provide us with used aircraft with corresponding operational capabilities. Poland is ready to immediately establish the conditions of purchase of the planes.
The Polish Government also requests other NATO Allies – owners of MIG-29 jets – to act in the same vein.
Ukraine has one of the most varied stocks of ATGM and RPGs in the world.
I mean that Russian armored and air defense platforms, even of the latest vintage, look unimpressive, like so many tin cans, compared to cheaper, less operationally-complex alternatives. (They were losing their luster in Syria as well.) Defensive/denial platforms have been proving their worth in Ukraine relative to prestige legacy platforms. The customers of Russian arms tend to be smaller or poorer countries that can't rely on extensive combined arms tactics anyway - so at least buy at a discount from now on.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
In Bret Devereaux's series on the history of fortifications, he made the comment that in the Modern System of dynamic warfare the advantage may now be shifting back to the defense. He wrote that a few months ago. I wonder.
So, leaving aside the BTG angle, what do you make of my attempt to calculate theoretically available Russian combat personnel? How are support personnel distributed in the Russian military and National Guard? What roles were covered by Western estimates of the Russian invasion force?
The best I could do within my assumptions is that anywhere from a quarter to a half of all Russian ground combat power (including paramilitary) readily available short of total war has been committed to Ukraine.
McMaster overreaches in way too many pundits have in assuming too much about Putin's goals and beliefs. Even if we can infer some things with extensive circumstantial evidence (such as swift neutralization of political resistance, excessive organizational/operational secrecy, intent on mass detention/murder of dissidents), we can't say that he's 'lost by not winning instantly.' The state of the Russian armed forces or economy at the end of this is beside the point, after all.
The Jomini map is yet another interesting design philosophy, but it's surprisingly-discrepant with other maps I've seen that include Ukrainian formations and dispositions, such as Militaryland's. Half the number of brigades is visible in this map for instance.
But in general every design philosophy can contribute to our understanding of the campaign. Weekly movement of the front/contested space:
https://i.imgur.com/0xPkz9l.jpg
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
The US have said no to the Polish proposal.
Apparently, part of the problem for the Russians is that their actions have not been joined up with their equipment. Their brand new secure communications system relies on 3G to function. One of their priorities in the first days was to knock out all 3G towers. Which meant their secure communications was no longer functional, and they had to rely on commercial networks. If something as fundamental as this was failing at such a basic level, then their enactment of combined arms elsewhere probably isn't very joined up either.
No NATO for Sweden according to PM.
Ukrainians have done better than I expected in keeping Kharkiv and Donbas supplied, it seems. NLAWs arriving in Kharkiv.
The incapacity of the Russian air force has been a gift.
Recent US assessment: 4-10% material losses and 2-4 thousand deaths for Russians.
Ukrainians call a pilot POW's contact and threaten his well-being.
https://twitter.com/NovaGorlivka/sta...97040071766016 [VIDEO]
https://i.imgur.com/IJg9EJh.png
Same POW as in this video. Also seen in a photo-op with Putin and Assad years ago, but I can't pull that up for you. There have been a number of videos of Ukrainians threatening POWs, on top of some of the POW interview clips clearly being coached for public consumption (which is a Geneva Convention violation). And the earlier threat to execute artillerymen on the spot and the recent proposal to put POWs to work (which is permitted under limited, compensated conditions). I hope we don't see any excesses on the defense's part.
The POW 'confessions' have been disgusting to see and I wish that Ukraine would be more professional about it. I know they're doing it as part of their info operations aimed at the Russian people but still inexcusable. Just like we've seen some Russian pilot's kit displayed in immaculate condition but the the pilot himself dead and a bloody mess, it points at beating and execution of some that should be POWs.
Given that it is a Russian invasion I can understand the emotions on the Ukrainian side but the need to try and be professional about it. Difficult to enforce when so many are reservists and part of the mass conscription combined with the massive loss of life on the Ukrainian side. The Ukraine should try harder to push the proper guidelines to its lowest level Soldiers in regard to POWs, war is hell but let's try and at least follow some of the rules even if the Russians don't.
It is certainly a difficult situation to work out. The US would have to have the Ukrainian pilots train up on and receive them in Ramstein which would require the tacit okay from Germany too. Then the aircraft would have to be delivered somehow. If flown in they'd likely be tracked by the standard transponders all the way to a NATO nation on the border of Ukraine before they are trucked or flown over, both of which would open up the ire of Russia on said nation. Slovakia and Hungary are the least likely to need to worry about retaliation of Russia but this war is not done and can go any way.Quote:
The US have said no to the Polish proposal.
He does overreach, but was a good interview anyhow.Quote:
McMaster overreaches in way too many pundits have in assuming too much about Putin's goals and beliefs. Even if we can infer some things with extensive circumstantial evidence (such as swift neutralization of political resistance, excessive organizational/operational secrecy, intent on mass detention/murder of dissidents), we can't say that he's 'lost by not winning instantly.' The state of the Russian armed forces or economy at the end of this is beside the point, after all.
Honestly, I don't know enough about the Russian organization in the support echelons to comment. I think you're likely not too far from the truth. I'm curious about some things we can't calculate and will be hidden by the Russians for years such as how many of those troops were conscripts and how many are being withdrawn now that the Russian people are aware that conscripts were essentially tricked into a war.Quote:
So, leaving aside the BTG angle, what do you make of my attempt to calculate theoretically available Russian combat personnel? How are support personnel distributed in the Russian military and National Guard? What roles were covered by Western estimates of the Russian invasion force?
I'm sure the Western estimates were of what they could observe via satellite in temporary bases and camps so that's not going to include the railroad troops, the air force operating out of at least the Russian bases and so on. Seeing as Russia hasn't done a large military operation out of its borders since Afghanistan in the '80s it probably has failed to build up the logistical side of operations as its major deployments have been internal or right on the border.
The Ukraine has been surprisingly good at pushing supplies forward to the various sectors, priority of course is to Kiev but glad to see supplies reaching other fronts.Quote:
No NATO for Sweden according to PM.
Ukrainians have done better than I expected in keeping Kharkiv and Donbas supplied, it seems. NLAWs arriving in Kharkiv.
The incapacity of the Russian air force has been a gift.
Recent US assessment: 4-10% material losses and 2-4 thousand deaths for Russians.
As for Russian losses, seeing as they have about 55% of their entire army in the Ukraine right now, I don't think they can continue to sustain these losses for several more weeks. The personnel and equipment losses are irreplaceable in the time period for which they're looking to get a victory.
If the fighting goes on into spring and summer when foliage returns and gives even more advantage to the largely leg infantry Ukrainian reservists/territorial troops the Russians will suffer even greater losses outside of the cities too. Especially as NATO/EU countries get more comfortable with sending equipment, weapons, and ammo.
The incapacity of the Russian air force has been one of the most surprising things of the campaign and looking at the losses they are taking and the heavy sortie rate I think we'll see an increasingly absent Russian Air Force. Pilots can't be replaced easily, and the equipment wear and tear, even outside combat will drastically reduce the availability rate. Something that will force them to either fly formations without the full complement of aircraft (what we see now) which will cause more losses, or to just hold them back for special surges and operations which will make Russian ground forces more vulnerable to attack.
With the donation of lots of MANPADS this should force Russian aviation to fly higher which makes them poorer for Close Air Support and makes them easier to track and target by the remaining Ukrainian legacy ADA systems such as S300 and SA8. Not to mention any MiG-29s if those do ever get to the Ukraine.
Do you think the Russians will look to interdict this supply of the Ukrainians with materiel? Considering we're in the Internet Age, would this operation be called Trolling Thunder?Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
I haven't seen the dead pilot one. Well, I've seen a dead pilot, but he was smashed by a failed chute, so that can't be it. Link?
The genuine POW performances I don't really get worked up about (such as the most viewed POW video on the Internet - you know the one). Like, I understand that in a networked digital world having one's face plastered all around the Internet in the status of POW can have all sorts of downstream complications, but compliance to GDPR privacy standards doesn't feel that important in wartime. On the other hand captors being verbally malicious and abusive is a bad sign that can spiral out of control if not checked. It's not like one has to be a sensitive bleeding heart at the sight of a humbled man.
And never practice categorical refusal to take prisoners.
Here's an exemplary interaction IMO.
https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/stat...05899461038081 [CLIP]
One of the operations that, conveniently, would be much easier than Towers of Hanoi if Poland occupied a security corridor in Western Ukraine (including one airfield).Quote:
It is certainly a difficult situation to work out. The US would have to have the Ukrainian pilots train up on and receive them in Ramstein which would require the tacit okay from Germany too. Then the aircraft would have to be delivered somehow. If flown in they'd likely be tracked by the standard transponders all the way to a NATO nation on the border of Ukraine before they are trucked or flown over, both of which would open up the ire of Russia on said nation. Slovakia and Hungary are the least likely to need to worry about retaliation of Russia but this war is not done and can go any way.
Speaking of which, do we know how many SRBM Russia has left after firing off so many hundreds? I keep reading that they can't replace any of them in the near future.
I read somewhere that the Russian arms industry has been producing around a few dozen fighter/strike jets a year for a long time. It's supposed to be worth it for getting the Russian Air Force to almost all new or modernized frames. (Whereas existing US facilities could surge an F35 a day in theory.)Quote:
The incapacity of the Russian air force has been one of the most surprising things of the campaign and looking at the losses they are taking and the heavy sortie rate I think we'll see an increasingly absent Russian Air Force. Pilots can't be replaced easily, and the equipment wear and tear, even outside combat will drastically reduce the availability rate.
Ukrainian artillery units at the front are likely depleted. I don't know if this is current or sound doctrine, but I would permanently assign one or two MANPAD to each battery.Quote:
With the donation of lots of MANPADS this should force Russian aviation to fly higher which makes them poorer for Close Air Support and makes them easier to track and target by the remaining Ukrainian legacy ADA systems such as S300 and SA8.
Audio clip allegedly of Russian soldier(s) bragging about looting luxury goods and executing people in the forest to his partner back home. I'm not sure which would be worse between the clip being authentic and being a propaganda fabrication. https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/com...ir_close_ones/
Germany is a key obstacle to EU sanctions on Sberbank and stopping purchase of Russian petro.
US has activated its strategic materiel stockpile in Europe. Before this is over, I predict we will sorty SSBN subs and swear retaliation against any military detonation of a nuclear device in Europe.
Great look at small-unit action. Anti-tank buffet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gezu6A9zcLU
Quote:
The weapons we saw in this video range from regular RPG-7s over to Panzerfaust 3s, NLAWs, possible RPV-16 and even M141 BDMs.
It's almost odd to post it in this thread, but here's a brief published a month ago arguing that China doesn't have the tools or the institutional knowledge (nor does anyone) to "Overlord" Taiwan.
Philippines ready to back US if it gets embroiled in war
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...?ocid=msedgntp
Just an example of how Xi's short sighted policies and attitudes toward the neighboring 'vassal states' has backfired and sent Duterte and the PHI back to the US fold despite Duterte wanted to pivot to China.Quote:
The Philippine president is ready to open the country’s “facilities” to American forces under a 1951 mutual defense treaty if Russia's war against Ukraine turns for the worse and embroils the United States in the fighting, Manila’s ambassador to Washington said Thursday.
I was pleased to see the Panzerfaust-3s in there already, made it to the frontline very quickly. Crazy to see such a variety of anti-armor weapons in one anti-armor patrol.Quote:
Great look at small-unit action. Anti-tank buffet.
I'm sure you've seen the clips of that BTG NE of Kiev that got driven back today. Crazy to see how poor the Russians are operating. Vehicles bunching up crazy close, no real advancing or retreating in covered bounds and come to find out it's part of the 90th Guards Tank division, just piss-poor training.
I'm just absolutely amazed that after a year of Putin sounding the war drum in ever increasing tone that his army just wasn't ready at all, with even the most basic elements of ground movement beyond their capability. I guess the Generals in charge pocketed the money for training and readiness and ensured that they could put on a good 'show' and make some 'hooah videos' for the fan boys.
I can't imagine the morale is even moderate of the units that have tried and failed repeatedly to surround Kiev or take any of the NE cities. I'm betting that the average RU soldier is just fighting to keep alive as opposed to a sense of patriotism or trust in their leader's orders. Perhaps that's why we see so many mid- high ranking Officers dying, there's no else that can get the troops out front without that personal example of at least a field grade.
This inept Russian invasion is probably going to prove to be the biggest safeguard against any Chinese adventurism in regard to Taiwan anytime soon. The Russians actually have recent military experience and are doing abysmally, I can't expect that a PRC war for Taiwan would go well without some prior conflict to 'practice' how to execute a large scale military campaign.Quote:
It's almost odd to post it in this thread, but here's a brief published a month ago arguing that China doesn't have the tools or the institutional knowledge (nor does anyone) to "Overlord" Taiwan.
I wonder if the transition to contract/professional soldiers - ~70% of current active military - along with downsizing of combat formations just enabled corruption and misappropriation along the way. The Soviet army was feared for good reason.
Unfortunately, the separatist militaries appear to overmatch their Russian masters, having been exposed to continuous low-grade combat for 8 years (whereas the large majority of Russian soldiers have probably never been shot at by opposition). They are reportedly primarily responsible for the large gains made east/northeast of Mariupol and northwest of Luhansk City. Just today they took out at least 5 Ukrainian tanks. And now multiple heavy cargo planes are transiting between Russia and Syria, according to Putin loading up thousands of Assad's goons. It's dirty, but I wonder if we have any assets remaining whom we can induce to escalate their operations.
EDIT: Mig 29 memes.
https://twitter.com/SubwayCubano/sta...44377872044035 [VIDEO]
https://i.imgur.com/Oegpi5R.jpg
Conscript does not equal fearsome. The Soviet Army wasn't feared because it was a conscript army. It was feared because it was conscript army sized, battle hardened, and was at the cutting edge of warmaking technology. The current Russian army isn't conscript army sized, it wasn't battle hardened, and it's clear it's not at the cutting edge of warmaking technology. They can improve on any of these factors.Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
Holy hell, the fascist is legit clowning himself.
According to Yuri, by nationalizing foreign commercial properties and refusing to pay its debts in foreign currencies, Russia will revenge Western sanctions multiple-fold and even gain in the process. The Americans have fallen into a trap by giving the Russian state an excuse to reject the rules of America's game. By detaching itself from all international codes and institutions, Russia will achieve vigorous autarky.
It would be funny if people like this weren't alloted enough power to destroy humanity. I wonder if he would have enough self-consciousness of guilt to off himself in the bunker in the final stages of his dream society.
Or as the tweeter said:Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
Quote:
Read this entire thread to understand why the Soviets were considered to be superior at operational art, despite being over-centralized and generally worse at the tactical level. This is the kind of insane detail needed to plan movements of entire army groups across continents.
"Soviets were considered to be superior at operational art"Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
Operational art wasn't studied as intensively back then as now, and wasn't understood to such an advanced level. As such the Soviets understood it better than others at the time, but not as well as western militaries today. Also, the Soviets had the advantage of being supplied with logistics components by the US, and could thus rely on that all-important aspect of it which the US was always superb at. Without that crutch, the Soviets (and now the Russians) are much, much worse off.
Would it be fair to say that A-10s and other manned ground support aircraft are now obsolete?
Surely it depends on the foe and their current weaponry. The A10 especially was designed from the ground up to take a horrific amount of damage - one engine and half of one wing can be lost, there's two hydraulic systems to fly and a mechanical backup.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
Sure, flying into an area where the S300 is deployed is probably suicidal, but there are probably cases where the risk is worth the reward.
Long term drones are almost certainly the way forward but as yet there are just not the numbers.
~:smoking:
Were the US to do a 'no fly zone' the A-10 would certainly not be in the initial lineup, it'd have to be F-35s and more modern platforms at first. Once those S300s, S400s and so on were neutralized to a certain degree the A10 would then be an ideal CAS platform even with MANPADs in the area for the reasons you've listed.Quote:
Surely it depends on the foe and their current weaponry. The A10 especially was designed from the ground up to take a horrific amount of damage - one engine and half of one wing can be lost, there's two hydraulic systems to fly and a mechanical backup.
Sure, flying into an area where the S300 is deployed is probably suicidal, but there are probably cases where the risk is worth the reward.
Long term drones are almost certainly the way forward but as yet there are just not the numbers.
Just like the B-52 isn't a frontline bomber anymore it is extremely useful in the various roles the USAF have for it, not all platforms need to be top tier high end at all.
Was the same in desert storm, it took F-117s to pave the way in the most contested air space together with the full support of EW platforms and simultaneous strikes on supporting radars, SAM batteries, and command nodes. This type of "Joint" operations is what makes the US so effective and clearly as we've seen by the Russians, hard to imitate as it goes beyond just having systems but the right planning to mesh it all together.
Drones are definitely the way forward but I don't think there will ever be a true replacement for manned aircraft in the CAS role as the descriptions from ground observers to the pilot can be very vague and sometimes take some creative actions to describe or mark where the enemy is and importantly where the friendlies are. Current drones with limited fields of vision can't have the full situational awareness a pilot of a manned aircraft can.
The Russian leadership seems to not have really looked at their 'whole force' when doing reforms. They may have more professional soldiers but looking at their performance the last few weeks it looks like their training hasn't been anywhere near combat standards. From what I understand Russian and Chinese 'wargames' are not like US/NATO ones. In their armies the wargames are highly scripted and rehearsed which deprives them from identifying the problems and doesn't allow for the development of low-level leadership.Quote:
I wonder if the transition to contract/professional soldiers - ~70% of current active military - along with downsizing of combat formations just enabled corruption and misappropriation along the way. The Soviet army was feared for good reason.
The US Army had similar problems in the post-Vietnam army but the development of NTC and JRTC for high level training at the closest possible to combat as can be safely replicated allowed for the US Army to become a 'learning organization' which is why the Army that went into desert storm did not look at all like the army that went into Vietnam or Grenada.
At NTC and JRTC, the opposing force (OPFOR) is designed to beat you, they are supposed to stress every element of whatever unit goes in for a rotation so that problems can be found and fixed. I doubt that the highly centralized and political loyal Russian and Chinese armies allow for such realistic training.
Looking at the poor combat formations, poor maintenance, and poor integration of all their various enabling capabilities (artillery, UAVs, engineers, other combat arms) I think the Russians focused too much on systems instead of their organization. They certainly have the technology but that's clearly not be spread to the lowest Soldier as we look at AK-74s with no optics, no night vision and so on. Same in the other branches, the amount of outdated hardware being sent into a major conflict is surprising. The T-72 tank was proved as obsolete decades ago yet they are more common than the T-80s and T-90s. The Russian air force has the capability to do EW like the US but we don't seem to see that so perhaps they are short on platforms too.
At the losses they are taking right now that production rate won't be sufficient, especially when you consider the spare parts that need to be made just to keep the current airframes air worthy. That's of course assuming those parts aren't dependent on things in their supply chains that just got sanctioned, thinking microchips for avionics, navigation, and targeting systems specifically.Quote:
I read somewhere that the Russian arms industry has been producing around a few dozen fighter/strike jets a year for a long time. It's supposed to be worth it for getting the Russian Air Force to almost all new or modernized frames. (Whereas existing US facilities could surge an F35 a day in theory.)
The F-35 is looking to be ramped up anyhow in production and as more nations have bought it the unit cost has reduced drastically though still much higher than legacy airframes.
Lockheed Martin will deliver “133-139 aircraft this year [calendar 2021], 151-153 aircraft in 2022, and anticipates delivering 156 aircraft beginning in 2023 and for the foreseeable future,” it announced. The company did not say how many of each variant will be delivered. Defense officials have said the pre-pandemic goal was to achieve deliveries of 155 airplanes a year by the end of 2022.
https://www.airforcemag.com/f-35-pro...ion%20facility.
Russia counts on sanctions help from China; U.S. warns off Beijing
https://www.reuters.com/markets/euro...na-2022-03-13/
Watching how China plays out in this war will be extremely interesting. Russia supposedly asking for help from China in UAVs and other things isn't surprising but should be a giant sign to the Russian fanboys that Putin has misled Russia which is now needing help from what really is its biggest rival if they could just stop trying to recreate the USSR in Europe.Quote:
But U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Washington was warning China not to provide it.
"We are communicating directly, privately to Beijing, that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions, evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them," Sullivan told CNN.
"We will not allow that to go forward and allow there to be a lifeline to Russia from these economic sanctions from any country, anywhere in the world," added Sullivan, who is due to meet China's top diplomat Yang Jiechi in Rome on Monday.
I imagine that China will of course support Russia but not in terms of hardware as this sudden show of western unity could backlash hard on China and lead to a serious 'de-coupling' in the future if given reasons to do so. I'd expect China to support economically, probably provide plenty of aid and buy as much Russian energy as they need but nothing beyond that. Risking western sanctions when China is economically precarious too risks internal unrest, something I think Chinese leadership will consider not worth the cost, especially for the last 'colonial power' in Asia.
Article on terror violence and killing in the villages of Ukraine.
Russian war power needs to be irreparably degraded expeditiously.
This isn't sentiment or bloodthirst. The simple truth is that the world must consider itself in a war of annihilation against the Russian military by any means. A hundred thousand dead regulars in short order, or better yet seriously WIA, ought to be enough to grind the Russian maneuver elements to a standstill as the losses are replaced by decreasingly-trained conscripts and reservists inferior to the Ukrainian territorials. And in terms of combat systems destroying artillery is paramount, since it's killing the largest share of Ukrainian regulars (see this brutal clip for just one example) and the Ukrainians usually have no response; at best they can expose their own artillery for counter-battery fire.
https://funker530.com/video/russian-...ainian-patrol/
Are there any sources of loitering drones out there that could push a few hundred units into Ukraine on short notice? Anyone know? A few dozen Bayraktar prove very cost-effective, but they're not enough.
Or...
@spmetla Do we have any Predator drones left on hand? We still possessed a few hundred when they were retired in 2018. If they're still in storage, operable, then a hundred Predators with a thousand Hellfire missiles would make it quite daunting for Russian artillery to operate anywhere in West or North Ukraine, given the 500-mile (I'm also reading 750-mile) combat radius. American operators, either ex- or "ex-"military, also training Ukrainians, whether operating from the Polish or the Ukrainian side of the border. Predators are completely disposable military surplus, so any losses are a write-off. While bulky and obsolete, it remains to be seen whether Russian IADS is competent enough to intercept them.
A better idea than A-10s. And if Turkey can ship their much-feared TB2s into a warzone, we can certainly deliver some retired equipment.
I think so far Ukraine has destroyed 5% of the Russian active military. While impressive, their own casualties are unsustainable, and lost ground usually irrecoverable. Destroying or capturing at least 10% of all Russian active-service T-80s by visual confirmation is illustrative: cool and all, but not nearly enough.
Also, why don't NATO forces on scene in Poland train Ukrainian militia and foreign volunteers in a safe environment before they head to the AO? A good way to keep themselves frosty just in case, moreover.
Recent news: Kadyrov himslf claimed to be in Hostomel (Antonov) Airport. Snipe the SOB and watch Chechnya descend into chaos, right? Would be great if the bulk of Russia's National Guard had to stay out of Ukraine to peacekeep in Chechnya for a bit.
Most of the active service models are modernized, though some models are older than others. The large majority of the T-72s were modernized in the past decadeQuote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
and are apparently considered to be superior to the Soviet models of the T-80, which was based on the T-64. The majority of Russian T-80s are Soviet models. Relevant video:Quote:
T-72B3 model 2011 (~2010)
Upgrade for T-72B tanks, including Sosna-U multichannel gunner's sight, new digital VHF radio, improved autoloader, 2A46M-5 gun to accommodate new ammunition. Retains older V-84-1 840 hp (630 kW) engine and Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour, and lacks satellite navigation.[39]
T-72B3 model 2016 or T-72B3M
Upgrade for T-72B3, with Relikt explosive reactive armour on the sides, side skirts with soft-container reactive armour and slat screens, 2A46M-5 gun capable of firing 9M119M Refleks guided missile, V-92S2F 1,130 hp (840 kW) engine, automatic transmission, digital display and rear-view video.[40][41][42] Often incorrectly referred to as "T-72B4"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VJNcE6hQu4&t=308s
I absolutely agree, Putin/Russia need to be defeated to prevent further escalation down the line as well as secure the rights of neutral countries pursuing their own course.Quote:
This isn't sentiment or bloodthirst. The simple truth is that the world must consider itself in a war of annihilation against the Russian military by any means.
No clue on both of them, I'm sure the stockpiles exist but everyone in NATO is so worried about escalation to a degree that's extremely frustrating.Quote:
Are there any sources of loitering drones out there that could push a few hundred units into Ukraine on short notice? Anyone know? A few dozen Bayraktar prove very cost-effective, but they're not enough.
Or...
@spmetla Do we have any Predator drones left on hand?
I wish our diplomats engaged in a bit of the tongue in cheek sarcasm of the Russians too in their retorts ie: "if you aren't really invading Ukraine and there's no war then there clearly is no reason to oppose our selling/giving weapons to an independent state."
The Russians know NATO/EU weapons and intel are killing their troops, giving Ukraine, drones, aircraft, and even ground vehicles is no more an escalation in my mind than the thousands of ATGMs and MANPADs we are currently giving. Where I'd see the line as too far would be if we were to give Ukraine ballistic missiles or strike capabilities to hit Russia proper.
But tools to defend their own borders should not be such a difficult situation. I think on this point the Biden admin is too weak, they've got the intel and all to guide their decisions but I don't think Putin would dare conduct strikes on NATO territory now that he's seen how hollow his vaunted Army is in dealing with a well armed neutral power. A no-fly-zone and direct action is a bridge too far but selling/giving weapons to the side we support is exactly what the US has always done. Arsenal of democracy and all that.
I personally think they are doing that on a very low scale already as I can't imagine those weapons systems are being handed over without some initial training on use and maintenance.Quote:
Also, why don't NATO forces on scene in Poland train Ukrainian militia and foreign volunteers in a safe environment before they head to the AO? A good way to keep themselves frosty just in case, moreover.
Modernized but still obsolete, sorta like the M-60s in Turkish service. The lack of crew survivability if the ammo is struck, lack of true'hunter killer' capabilities with better commanders independent sights, and the inability of reactive armor to makeup for the ancient passive armor against modern AT weapons is evident. I'm curious to see if the Russians will push any of their T-14's into the fight to see if that has a chance seeing as the T-90s upgrades don't seem to makeup for the weakness of the basic turret/hull design.Quote:
ost of the active service models are modernized, though some models are older than others. The large majority of the T-72s were modernized in the past decade
Though seeing that the Russians weren't expecting an actual fight the late winter timing of their attack hasn't helped them as the the current mud effect doesn't allow for the off-road ability to be take advantage of. Even the disunity and watered-down sanctions that myself and many others thought would be a result of a winter/Olympics timed attack haven't played out which means that Putin has conducted a disastrous attack in the worst time of the year for type of warfare his army excels at with no real political advantage from European winter fuel dependency.
Saw the same video you posted, good analysis.
Ukraine: Demoralised & incompetent, Putin’s army is doomed | Taras Kuzio interview
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2awysdmPhQ
Good interview, an hour long but excellent explanations from this guy, certainly more aware of the topic than I am.Quote:
Much like in Afghanistan the Russian army is becoming bogged down and broken. As we enter into the third week of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is Russia winning its war? To discuss the state of the Russian armed forces and the war in Ukraine Steven Edginton is joined by Ukraine expert Dr Taras Kuzio of the Henry Jackson Society. Watch the full episode above or listen on your podcast app by searching “Off Script”.