Great Power contentions

[spmetla]

A little tough to interpret, since the BTG system is supposed to deprecate regiments and integrate two or three artillery batteries and one or two air defense batteries per battalion.

But let's see...

2 tank btn, 9 assault regiments, 5 brigades. Reported total force inventory of 160 tanks (T72).

Brigade = 3 battalions, regiment = 2? = 35 battalions... (Count the 4 AD, 4 arty reg separate or distribute among?) Yeah, I suppose it more or less tracks with 45 thousand personnel total. But then VDV battalions can't be structured just like Army battalions, because an Army armored battalion would have 3 tank companies, 3x10 = 30 tanks, and an infantry/mech battalion would have 1 tank company = 10 tanks. Either the VDV tank battalions are superloaded with tanks and the VDV assault battalions don't integrate tanks, or that contingent of tanks is not actively allocated in full.

The BTG system is like the US Brigade system but it is hard to estimate a strict heirachy and quantity because Russia, just like the US and most countries does 'force tailoring' and will add and take away units under Brigade "Task Forces" or BTGs for the Russias to add capabilities as needed.
I do agree on the assessment though, the VDV has taken a pounding and they've likely lost in KIA a Battalion at least and I think a brigade in casualties and equipment damage/loss.

This guy on twitter is doing a good job of mapping and is actually trying to estimate the Ukraininan forces as well which is something we haven't seen much of.
https://twitter.com/JominiW

More than destroying enemy forces, the Ukrainians have been doing well in destroying columns of trucks and artillery. The Russian military is agreed by all to be hobbled by logistics failures, and the more trucks and trains they lose, the more infantry they have to devote to securing rear areas, the slower they can build up supplies and replenish damaged or broken vehicles, the fewer axes they can advance along and slower... and so on. This buys the Ukrainians time.

Absolutely correct, and the Russian's being a mechanized/motorized force are tied to the roads and open areas for combat so their axises of advance are somewhat predictable now, especially so the supply lines.
This was a good video that educated me a bit on Russia's supply system and doctrine:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4wRdoWpw0w

At any rate, the Russian military is a sham and even its latest technologies (often based on final Soviet designs) aren't worth a great deal. Big win for Turkey's arms industry (they also make helicopters).

I wouldn't so much negate the value of their technologies but would instead emphasize their poor integration. The US and NATO in general focuses heavily on Joint operations and co-planning of air, sea, ground, and how to fully integrate all the enablers such as intel, artillery, air power, and so on. Apparently, the Russians have not been successful in that integration like NATO has and without it each system on its own is extremely venerable. Just seeing the numbers of tanks that have been knocked out due to lack of infantry and the convoys with no escort trucks shows a real failure to assess vulnerabilities and adapt, likely a result of being a no-failure tolerated leadership system serving a dictator.
Examples of poor integration of US technology is see very easily in the Saudi Army which has lost multiple M1A1 tanks to the houthis due to poor integration into other combat arms to provide mutual support, same with the Turkish use of Leopard 2 tanks in Syria.
The F-35 may be a game changing aircraft but if used by a country that doesn't support it as needed it's just a very expensive jet, same is true for Russia as we see daily.

Good interview with General McMaster:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iaqZ9ZYFP6U

[Pannonian]

The authorities of the Republic of Poland, after consultations between the President and the Goverment, are ready to deploy – immediately and free of charge – all their MIG-29 jets to the Ramstein Air Base and place them at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America.

At the same time, Poland requests the United States to provide us with used aircraft with corresponding operational capabilities. Poland is ready to immediately establish the conditions of purchase of the planes.

The Polish Government also requests other NATO Allies – owners of MIG-29 jets – to act in the same vein.

Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in connection with the statement by the US Secretary of State on providing airplanes to Ukraine

[Montmorency]

Ukraine has one of the most varied stocks of ATGM and RPGs in the world.

The BTG system is like the US Brigade system but it is hard to estimate a strict heirachy and quantity because Russia, just like the US and most countries does 'force tailoring' and will add and take away units under Brigade "Task Forces" or BTGs for the Russias to add capabilities as needed.
I do agree on the assessment though, the VDV has taken a pounding and they've likely lost in KIA a Battalion at least and I think a brigade in casualties and equipment damage/loss.

This guy on twitter is doing a good job of mapping and is actually trying to estimate the Ukraininan forces as well which is something we haven't seen much of.
https://twitter.com/JominiW


Absolutely correct, and the Russian's being a mechanized/motorized force are tied to the roads and open areas for combat so their axises of advance are somewhat predictable now, especially so the supply lines.
This was a good video that educated me a bit on Russia's supply system and doctrine:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4wRdoWpw0w


I wouldn't so much negate the value of their technologies but would instead emphasize their poor integration. The US and NATO in general focuses heavily on Joint operations and co-planning of air, sea, ground, and how to fully integrate all the enablers such as intel, artillery, air power, and so on. Apparently, the Russians have not been successful in that integration like NATO has and without it each system on its own is extremely venerable. Just seeing the numbers of tanks that have been knocked out due to lack of infantry and the convoys with no escort trucks shows a real failure to assess vulnerabilities and adapt, likely a result of being a no-failure tolerated leadership system serving a dictator.
Examples of poor integration of US technology is see very easily in the Saudi Army which has lost multiple M1A1 tanks to the houthis due to poor integration into other combat arms to provide mutual support, same with the Turkish use of Leopard 2 tanks in Syria.
The F-35 may be a game changing aircraft but if used by a country that doesn't support it as needed it's just a very expensive jet, same is true for Russia as we see daily.

Good interview with General McMaster:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iaqZ9ZYFP6U

I mean that Russian armored and air defense platforms, even of the latest vintage, look unimpressive, like so many tin cans, compared to cheaper, less operationally-complex alternatives. (They were losing their luster in Syria as well.) Defensive/denial platforms have been proving their worth in Ukraine relative to prestige legacy platforms. The customers of Russian arms tend to be smaller or poorer countries that can't rely on extensive combined arms tactics anyway - so at least buy at a discount from now on.

In Bret Devereaux's series on the history of fortifications, he made the comment that in the Modern System of dynamic warfare the advantage may now be shifting back to the defense. He wrote that a few months ago. I wonder.

So, leaving aside the BTG angle, what do you make of my attempt to calculate theoretically available Russian combat personnel? How are support personnel distributed in the Russian military and National Guard? What roles were covered by Western estimates of the Russian invasion force?

The best I could do within my assumptions is that anywhere from a quarter to a half of all Russian ground combat power (including paramilitary) readily available short of total war has been committed to Ukraine.

McMaster overreaches in way too many pundits have in assuming too much about Putin's goals and beliefs. Even if we can infer some things with extensive circumstantial evidence (such as swift neutralization of political resistance, excessive organizational/operational secrecy, intent on mass detention/murder of dissidents), we can't say that he's 'lost by not winning instantly.' The state of the Russian armed forces or economy at the end of this is beside the point, after all.

The Jomini map is yet another interesting design philosophy, but it's surprisingly-discrepant with other maps I've seen that include Ukrainian formations and dispositions, such as Militaryland's. Half the number of brigades is visible in this map for instance.

But in general every design philosophy can contribute to our understanding of the campaign. Weekly movement of the front/contested space:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

[Pannonian]

The US have said no to the Polish proposal.

[Pannonian]

Apparently, part of the problem for the Russians is that their actions have not been joined up with their equipment. Their brand new secure communications system relies on 3G to function. One of their priorities in the first days was to knock out all 3G towers. Which meant their secure communications was no longer functional, and they had to rely on commercial networks. If something as fundamental as this was failing at such a basic level, then their enactment of combined arms elsewhere probably isn't very joined up either.

[Montmorency]

No NATO for Sweden according to PM.

Ukrainians have done better than I expected in keeping Kharkiv and Donbas supplied, it seems. NLAWs arriving in Kharkiv.

The incapacity of the Russian air force has been a gift.

Recent US assessment: 4-10% material losses and 2-4 thousand deaths for Russians.


Ukrainians call a pilot POW's contact and threaten his well-being.
https://twitter.com/NovaGorlivka/sta...97040071766016 [VIDEO]



Same POW as in this video. Also seen in a photo-op with Putin and Assad years ago, but I can't pull that up for you. There have been a number of videos of Ukrainians threatening POWs, on top of some of the POW interview clips clearly being coached for public consumption (which is a Geneva Convention violation). And the earlier threat to execute artillerymen on the spot and the recent proposal to put POWs to work (which is permitted under limited, compensated conditions). I hope we don't see any excesses on the defense's part.

[spmetla]

The POW 'confessions' have been disgusting to see and I wish that Ukraine would be more professional about it. I know they're doing it as part of their info operations aimed at the Russian people but still inexcusable. Just like we've seen some Russian pilot's kit displayed in immaculate condition but the the pilot himself dead and a bloody mess, it points at beating and execution of some that should be POWs.
Given that it is a Russian invasion I can understand the emotions on the Ukrainian side but the need to try and be professional about it. Difficult to enforce when so many are reservists and part of the mass conscription combined with the massive loss of life on the Ukrainian side. The Ukraine should try harder to push the proper guidelines to its lowest level Soldiers in regard to POWs, war is hell but let's try and at least follow some of the rules even if the Russians don't.

The US have said no to the Polish proposal.

It is certainly a difficult situation to work out. The US would have to have the Ukrainian pilots train up on and receive them in Ramstein which would require the tacit okay from Germany too. Then the aircraft would have to be delivered somehow. If flown in they'd likely be tracked by the standard transponders all the way to a NATO nation on the border of Ukraine before they are trucked or flown over, both of which would open up the ire of Russia on said nation. Slovakia and Hungary are the least likely to need to worry about retaliation of Russia but this war is not done and can go any way.

McMaster overreaches in way too many pundits have in assuming too much about Putin's goals and beliefs. Even if we can infer some things with extensive circumstantial evidence (such as swift neutralization of political resistance, excessive organizational/operational secrecy, intent on mass detention/murder of dissidents), we can't say that he's 'lost by not winning instantly.' The state of the Russian armed forces or economy at the end of this is beside the point, after all.

He does overreach, but was a good interview anyhow.

So, leaving aside the BTG angle, what do you make of my attempt to calculate theoretically available Russian combat personnel? How are support personnel distributed in the Russian military and National Guard? What roles were covered by Western estimates of the Russian invasion force?

Honestly, I don't know enough about the Russian organization in the support echelons to comment. I think you're likely not too far from the truth. I'm curious about some things we can't calculate and will be hidden by the Russians for years such as how many of those troops were conscripts and how many are being withdrawn now that the Russian people are aware that conscripts were essentially tricked into a war.
I'm sure the Western estimates were of what they could observe via satellite in temporary bases and camps so that's not going to include the railroad troops, the air force operating out of at least the Russian bases and so on. Seeing as Russia hasn't done a large military operation out of its borders since Afghanistan in the '80s it probably has failed to build up the logistical side of operations as its major deployments have been internal or right on the border.

No NATO for Sweden according to PM.

Ukrainians have done better than I expected in keeping Kharkiv and Donbas supplied, it seems. NLAWs arriving in Kharkiv.

The incapacity of the Russian air force has been a gift.

Recent US assessment: 4-10% material losses and 2-4 thousand deaths for Russians.

The Ukraine has been surprisingly good at pushing supplies forward to the various sectors, priority of course is to Kiev but glad to see supplies reaching other fronts.
As for Russian losses, seeing as they have about 55% of their entire army in the Ukraine right now, I don't think they can continue to sustain these losses for several more weeks. The personnel and equipment losses are irreplaceable in the time period for which they're looking to get a victory.
If the fighting goes on into spring and summer when foliage returns and gives even more advantage to the largely leg infantry Ukrainian reservists/territorial troops the Russians will suffer even greater losses outside of the cities too. Especially as NATO/EU countries get more comfortable with sending equipment, weapons, and ammo.

The incapacity of the Russian air force has been one of the most surprising things of the campaign and looking at the losses they are taking and the heavy sortie rate I think we'll see an increasingly absent Russian Air Force. Pilots can't be replaced easily, and the equipment wear and tear, even outside combat will drastically reduce the availability rate. Something that will force them to either fly formations without the full complement of aircraft (what we see now) which will cause more losses, or to just hold them back for special surges and operations which will make Russian ground forces more vulnerable to attack.
With the donation of lots of MANPADS this should force Russian aviation to fly higher which makes them poorer for Close Air Support and makes them easier to track and target by the remaining Ukrainian legacy ADA systems such as S300 and SA8. Not to mention any MiG-29s if those do ever get to the Ukraine.

[Pannonian]

The Ukraine has been surprisingly good at pushing supplies forward to the various sectors, priority of course is to Kiev but glad to see supplies reaching other fronts.
As for Russian losses, seeing as they have about 55% of their entire army in the Ukraine right now, I don't think they can continue to sustain these losses for several more weeks. The personnel and equipment losses are irreplaceable in the time period for which they're looking to get a victory.
If the fighting goes on into spring and summer when foliage returns and gives even more advantage to the largely leg infantry Ukrainian reservists/territorial troops the Russians will suffer even greater losses outside of the cities too. Especially as NATO/EU countries get more comfortable with sending equipment, weapons, and ammo.

Do you think the Russians will look to interdict this supply of the Ukrainians with materiel? Considering we're in the Internet Age, would this operation be called Trolling Thunder?

[Montmorency]

I haven't seen the dead pilot one. Well, I've seen a dead pilot, but he was smashed by a failed chute, so that can't be it. Link?

The genuine POW performances I don't really get worked up about (such as the most viewed POW video on the Internet - you know the one). Like, I understand that in a networked digital world having one's face plastered all around the Internet in the status of POW can have all sorts of downstream complications, but compliance to GDPR privacy standards doesn't feel that important in wartime. On the other hand captors being verbally malicious and abusive is a bad sign that can spiral out of control if not checked. It's not like one has to be a sensitive bleeding heart at the sight of a humbled man.

And never practice categorical refusal to take prisoners.

Here's an exemplary interaction IMO.
https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/stat...05899461038081 [CLIP]

It is certainly a difficult situation to work out. The US would have to have the Ukrainian pilots train up on and receive them in Ramstein which would require the tacit okay from Germany too. Then the aircraft would have to be delivered somehow. If flown in they'd likely be tracked by the standard transponders all the way to a NATO nation on the border of Ukraine before they are trucked or flown over, both of which would open up the ire of Russia on said nation. Slovakia and Hungary are the least likely to need to worry about retaliation of Russia but this war is not done and can go any way.

One of the operations that, conveniently, would be much easier than Towers of Hanoi if Poland occupied a security corridor in Western Ukraine (including one airfield).

Speaking of which, do we know how many SRBM Russia has left after firing off so many hundreds? I keep reading that they can't replace any of them in the near future.

The incapacity of the Russian air force has been one of the most surprising things of the campaign and looking at the losses they are taking and the heavy sortie rate I think we'll see an increasingly absent Russian Air Force. Pilots can't be replaced easily, and the equipment wear and tear, even outside combat will drastically reduce the availability rate.

I read somewhere that the Russian arms industry has been producing around a few dozen fighter/strike jets a year for a long time. It's supposed to be worth it for getting the Russian Air Force to almost all new or modernized frames. (Whereas existing US facilities could surge an F35 a day in theory.)

With the donation of lots of MANPADS this should force Russian aviation to fly higher which makes them poorer for Close Air Support and makes them easier to track and target by the remaining Ukrainian legacy ADA systems such as S300 and SA8.

Ukrainian artillery units at the front are likely depleted. I don't know if this is current or sound doctrine, but I would permanently assign one or two MANPAD to each battery.

[Montmorency]

Audio clip allegedly of Russian soldier(s) bragging about looting luxury goods and executing people in the forest to his partner back home. I'm not sure which would be worse between the clip being authentic and being a propaganda fabrication. https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/com...ir_close_ones/

Germany is a key obstacle to EU sanctions on Sberbank and stopping purchase of Russian petro.

US has activated its strategic materiel stockpile in Europe. Before this is over, I predict we will sorty SSBN subs and swear retaliation against any military detonation of a nuclear device in Europe.

Great look at small-unit action. Anti-tank buffet.

The weapons we saw in this video range from regular RPG-7s over to Panzerfaust 3s, NLAWs, possible RPV-16 and even M141 BDMs.

It's almost odd to post it in this thread, but here's a brief published a month ago arguing that China doesn't have the tools or the institutional knowledge (nor does anyone) to "Overlord" Taiwan.

[spmetla]

Philippines ready to back US if it gets embroiled in war
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...?ocid=msedgntp

The Philippine president is ready to open the country’s “facilities” to American forces under a 1951 mutual defense treaty if Russia's war against Ukraine turns for the worse and embroils the United States in the fighting, Manila’s ambassador to Washington said Thursday.

Just an example of how Xi's short sighted policies and attitudes toward the neighboring 'vassal states' has backfired and sent Duterte and the PHI back to the US fold despite Duterte wanted to pivot to China.

Great look at small-unit action. Anti-tank buffet.

I was pleased to see the Panzerfaust-3s in there already, made it to the frontline very quickly. Crazy to see such a variety of anti-armor weapons in one anti-armor patrol.

I'm sure you've seen the clips of that BTG NE of Kiev that got driven back today. Crazy to see how poor the Russians are operating. Vehicles bunching up crazy close, no real advancing or retreating in covered bounds and come to find out it's part of the 90th Guards Tank division, just piss-poor training.
I'm just absolutely amazed that after a year of Putin sounding the war drum in ever increasing tone that his army just wasn't ready at all, with even the most basic elements of ground movement beyond their capability. I guess the Generals in charge pocketed the money for training and readiness and ensured that they could put on a good 'show' and make some 'hooah videos' for the fan boys.
I can't imagine the morale is even moderate of the units that have tried and failed repeatedly to surround Kiev or take any of the NE cities. I'm betting that the average RU soldier is just fighting to keep alive as opposed to a sense of patriotism or trust in their leader's orders. Perhaps that's why we see so many mid- high ranking Officers dying, there's no else that can get the troops out front without that personal example of at least a field grade.

It's almost odd to post it in this thread, but here's a brief published a month ago arguing that China doesn't have the tools or the institutional knowledge (nor does anyone) to "Overlord" Taiwan.

This inept Russian invasion is probably going to prove to be the biggest safeguard against any Chinese adventurism in regard to Taiwan anytime soon. The Russians actually have recent military experience and are doing abysmally, I can't expect that a PRC war for Taiwan would go well without some prior conflict to 'practice' how to execute a large scale military campaign.

[Montmorency]

I wonder if the transition to contract/professional soldiers - ~70% of current active military - along with downsizing of combat formations just enabled corruption and misappropriation along the way. The Soviet army was feared for good reason.

Unfortunately, the separatist militaries appear to overmatch their Russian masters, having been exposed to continuous low-grade combat for 8 years (whereas the large majority of Russian soldiers have probably never been shot at by opposition). They are reportedly primarily responsible for the large gains made east/northeast of Mariupol and northwest of Luhansk City. Just today they took out at least 5 Ukrainian tanks. And now multiple heavy cargo planes are transiting between Russia and Syria, according to Putin loading up thousands of Assad's goons. It's dirty, but I wonder if we have any assets remaining whom we can induce to escalate their operations.


EDIT: Mig 29 memes.
https://twitter.com/SubwayCubano/sta...44377872044035 [VIDEO]

[Pannonian]

I wonder if the transition to contract/professional soldiers - ~70% of current active military - along with downsizing of combat formations just enabled corruption and misappropriation along the way. The Soviet army was feared for good reason.

Conscript does not equal fearsome. The Soviet Army wasn't feared because it was a conscript army. It was feared because it was conscript army sized, battle hardened, and was at the cutting edge of warmaking technology. The current Russian army isn't conscript army sized, it wasn't battle hardened, and it's clear it's not at the cutting edge of warmaking technology. They can improve on any of these factors.

[Montmorency]

Holy hell, the fascist is legit clowning himself.

According to Yuri, by nationalizing foreign commercial properties and refusing to pay its debts in foreign currencies, Russia will revenge Western sanctions multiple-fold and even gain in the process. The Americans have fallen into a trap by giving the Russian state an excuse to reject the rules of America's game. By detaching itself from all international codes and institutions, Russia will achieve vigorous autarky.

It would be funny if people like this weren't alloted enough power to destroy humanity. I wonder if he would have enough self-consciousness of guilt to off himself in the bunker in the final stages of his dream society.

Conscript does not equal fearsome. The Soviet Army wasn't feared because it was a conscript army. It was feared because it was conscript army sized, battle hardened, and was at the cutting edge of warmaking technology. The current Russian army isn't conscript army sized, it wasn't battle hardened, and it's clear it's not at the cutting edge of warmaking technology. They can improve on any of these factors.

Or as the tweeter said:

Read this entire thread to understand why the Soviets were considered to be superior at operational art, despite being over-centralized and generally worse at the tactical level. This is the kind of insane detail needed to plan movements of entire army groups across continents.

[Pannonian]

Or as the tweeter said:

"Soviets were considered to be superior at operational art"

Operational art wasn't studied as intensively back then as now, and wasn't understood to such an advanced level. As such the Soviets understood it better than others at the time, but not as well as western militaries today. Also, the Soviets had the advantage of being supplied with logistics components by the US, and could thus rely on that all-important aspect of it which the US was always superb at. Without that crutch, the Soviets (and now the Russians) are much, much worse off.

[Pannonian]

Would it be fair to say that A-10s and other manned ground support aircraft are now obsolete?

[rory_20_uk]

Would it be fair to say that A-10s and other manned ground support aircraft are now obsolete?

Surely it depends on the foe and their current weaponry. The A10 especially was designed from the ground up to take a horrific amount of damage - one engine and half of one wing can be lost, there's two hydraulic systems to fly and a mechanical backup.

Sure, flying into an area where the S300 is deployed is probably suicidal, but there are probably cases where the risk is worth the reward.

Long term drones are almost certainly the way forward but as yet there are just not the numbers.

[spmetla]

Surely it depends on the foe and their current weaponry. The A10 especially was designed from the ground up to take a horrific amount of damage - one engine and half of one wing can be lost, there's two hydraulic systems to fly and a mechanical backup.

Sure, flying into an area where the S300 is deployed is probably suicidal, but there are probably cases where the risk is worth the reward.

Long term drones are almost certainly the way forward but as yet there are just not the numbers.

Were the US to do a 'no fly zone' the A-10 would certainly not be in the initial lineup, it'd have to be F-35s and more modern platforms at first. Once those S300s, S400s and so on were neutralized to a certain degree the A10 would then be an ideal CAS platform even with MANPADs in the area for the reasons you've listed.
Just like the B-52 isn't a frontline bomber anymore it is extremely useful in the various roles the USAF have for it, not all platforms need to be top tier high end at all.

Was the same in desert storm, it took F-117s to pave the way in the most contested air space together with the full support of EW platforms and simultaneous strikes on supporting radars, SAM batteries, and command nodes. This type of "Joint" operations is what makes the US so effective and clearly as we've seen by the Russians, hard to imitate as it goes beyond just having systems but the right planning to mesh it all together.

Drones are definitely the way forward but I don't think there will ever be a true replacement for manned aircraft in the CAS role as the descriptions from ground observers to the pilot can be very vague and sometimes take some creative actions to describe or mark where the enemy is and importantly where the friendlies are. Current drones with limited fields of vision can't have the full situational awareness a pilot of a manned aircraft can.

I wonder if the transition to contract/professional soldiers - ~70% of current active military - along with downsizing of combat formations just enabled corruption and misappropriation along the way. The Soviet army was feared for good reason.

The Russian leadership seems to not have really looked at their 'whole force' when doing reforms. They may have more professional soldiers but looking at their performance the last few weeks it looks like their training hasn't been anywhere near combat standards. From what I understand Russian and Chinese 'wargames' are not like US/NATO ones. In their armies the wargames are highly scripted and rehearsed which deprives them from identifying the problems and doesn't allow for the development of low-level leadership.
The US Army had similar problems in the post-Vietnam army but the development of NTC and JRTC for high level training at the closest possible to combat as can be safely replicated allowed for the US Army to become a 'learning organization' which is why the Army that went into desert storm did not look at all like the army that went into Vietnam or Grenada.
At NTC and JRTC, the opposing force (OPFOR) is designed to beat you, they are supposed to stress every element of whatever unit goes in for a rotation so that problems can be found and fixed. I doubt that the highly centralized and political loyal Russian and Chinese armies allow for such realistic training.

Looking at the poor combat formations, poor maintenance, and poor integration of all their various enabling capabilities (artillery, UAVs, engineers, other combat arms) I think the Russians focused too much on systems instead of their organization. They certainly have the technology but that's clearly not be spread to the lowest Soldier as we look at AK-74s with no optics, no night vision and so on. Same in the other branches, the amount of outdated hardware being sent into a major conflict is surprising. The T-72 tank was proved as obsolete decades ago yet they are more common than the T-80s and T-90s. The Russian air force has the capability to do EW like the US but we don't seem to see that so perhaps they are short on platforms too.

I read somewhere that the Russian arms industry has been producing around a few dozen fighter/strike jets a year for a long time. It's supposed to be worth it for getting the Russian Air Force to almost all new or modernized frames. (Whereas existing US facilities could surge an F35 a day in theory.)

At the losses they are taking right now that production rate won't be sufficient, especially when you consider the spare parts that need to be made just to keep the current airframes air worthy. That's of course assuming those parts aren't dependent on things in their supply chains that just got sanctioned, thinking microchips for avionics, navigation, and targeting systems specifically.
The F-35 is looking to be ramped up anyhow in production and as more nations have bought it the unit cost has reduced drastically though still much higher than legacy airframes.
Lockheed Martin will deliver “133-139 aircraft this year [calendar 2021], 151-153 aircraft in 2022, and anticipates delivering 156 aircraft beginning in 2023 and for the foreseeable future,” it announced. The company did not say how many of each variant will be delivered. Defense officials have said the pre-pandemic goal was to achieve deliveries of 155 airplanes a year by the end of 2022.
https://www.airforcemag.com/f-35-pro...ion%20facility.

Russia counts on sanctions help from China; U.S. warns off Beijing
https://www.reuters.com/markets/euro...na-2022-03-13/

But U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Washington was warning China not to provide it.

"We are communicating directly, privately to Beijing, that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions, evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them," Sullivan told CNN.

"We will not allow that to go forward and allow there to be a lifeline to Russia from these economic sanctions from any country, anywhere in the world," added Sullivan, who is due to meet China's top diplomat Yang Jiechi in Rome on Monday.

Watching how China plays out in this war will be extremely interesting. Russia supposedly asking for help from China in UAVs and other things isn't surprising but should be a giant sign to the Russian fanboys that Putin has misled Russia which is now needing help from what really is its biggest rival if they could just stop trying to recreate the USSR in Europe.
I imagine that China will of course support Russia but not in terms of hardware as this sudden show of western unity could backlash hard on China and lead to a serious 'de-coupling' in the future if given reasons to do so. I'd expect China to support economically, probably provide plenty of aid and buy as much Russian energy as they need but nothing beyond that. Risking western sanctions when China is economically precarious too risks internal unrest, something I think Chinese leadership will consider not worth the cost, especially for the last 'colonial power' in Asia.

[Montmorency]

Article on terror violence and killing in the villages of Ukraine.

Russian war power needs to be irreparably degraded expeditiously.

This isn't sentiment or bloodthirst. The simple truth is that the world must consider itself in a war of annihilation against the Russian military by any means. A hundred thousand dead regulars in short order, or better yet seriously WIA, ought to be enough to grind the Russian maneuver elements to a standstill as the losses are replaced by decreasingly-trained conscripts and reservists inferior to the Ukrainian territorials. And in terms of combat systems destroying artillery is paramount, since it's killing the largest share of Ukrainian regulars (see this brutal clip for just one example) and the Ukrainians usually have no response; at best they can expose their own artillery for counter-battery fire.
https://funker530.com/video/russian-...ainian-patrol/

Are there any sources of loitering drones out there that could push a few hundred units into Ukraine on short notice? Anyone know? A few dozen Bayraktar prove very cost-effective, but they're not enough.

Or...

@spmetla Do we have any Predator drones left on hand? We still possessed a few hundred when they were retired in 2018. If they're still in storage, operable, then a hundred Predators with a thousand Hellfire missiles would make it quite daunting for Russian artillery to operate anywhere in West or North Ukraine, given the 500-mile (I'm also reading 750-mile) combat radius. American operators, either ex- or "ex-"military, also training Ukrainians, whether operating from the Polish or the Ukrainian side of the border. Predators are completely disposable military surplus, so any losses are a write-off. While bulky and obsolete, it remains to be seen whether Russian IADS is competent enough to intercept them.

A better idea than A-10s. And if Turkey can ship their much-feared TB2s into a warzone, we can certainly deliver some retired equipment.

I think so far Ukraine has destroyed 5% of the Russian active military. While impressive, their own casualties are unsustainable, and lost ground usually irrecoverable. Destroying or capturing at least 10% of all Russian active-service T-80s by visual confirmation is illustrative: cool and all, but not nearly enough.

Also, why don't NATO forces on scene in Poland train Ukrainian militia and foreign volunteers in a safe environment before they head to the AO? A good way to keep themselves frosty just in case, moreover.


Recent news: Kadyrov himslf claimed to be in Hostomel (Antonov) Airport. Snipe the SOB and watch Chechnya descend into chaos, right? Would be great if the bulk of Russia's National Guard had to stay out of Ukraine to peacekeep in Chechnya for a bit.

The T-72 tank was proved as obsolete decades ago yet they are more common than the T-80s and T-90s. The Russian air force has the capability to do EW like the US but we don't seem to see that so perhaps they are short on platforms too.

Most of the active service models are modernized, though some models are older than others. The large majority of the T-72s were modernized in the past decade

T-72B3 model 2011 (~2010)
Upgrade for T-72B tanks, including Sosna-U multichannel gunner's sight, new digital VHF radio, improved autoloader, 2A46M-5 gun to accommodate new ammunition. Retains older V-84-1 840 hp (630 kW) engine and Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour, and lacks satellite navigation.[39]
T-72B3 model 2016 or T-72B3M
Upgrade for T-72B3, with Relikt explosive reactive armour on the sides, side skirts with soft-container reactive armour and slat screens, 2A46M-5 gun capable of firing 9M119M Refleks guided missile, V-92S2F 1,130 hp (840 kW) engine, automatic transmission, digital display and rear-view video.[40][41][42] Often incorrectly referred to as "T-72B4"

and are apparently considered to be superior to the Soviet models of the T-80, which was based on the T-64. The majority of Russian T-80s are Soviet models. Relevant video:

[spmetla]

This isn't sentiment or bloodthirst. The simple truth is that the world must consider itself in a war of annihilation against the Russian military by any means.

I absolutely agree, Putin/Russia need to be defeated to prevent further escalation down the line as well as secure the rights of neutral countries pursuing their own course.

Are there any sources of loitering drones out there that could push a few hundred units into Ukraine on short notice? Anyone know? A few dozen Bayraktar prove very cost-effective, but they're not enough.

Or...

@spmetla Do we have any Predator drones left on hand?

No clue on both of them, I'm sure the stockpiles exist but everyone in NATO is so worried about escalation to a degree that's extremely frustrating.
I wish our diplomats engaged in a bit of the tongue in cheek sarcasm of the Russians too in their retorts ie: "if you aren't really invading Ukraine and there's no war then there clearly is no reason to oppose our selling/giving weapons to an independent state."
The Russians know NATO/EU weapons and intel are killing their troops, giving Ukraine, drones, aircraft, and even ground vehicles is no more an escalation in my mind than the thousands of ATGMs and MANPADs we are currently giving. Where I'd see the line as too far would be if we were to give Ukraine ballistic missiles or strike capabilities to hit Russia proper.
But tools to defend their own borders should not be such a difficult situation. I think on this point the Biden admin is too weak, they've got the intel and all to guide their decisions but I don't think Putin would dare conduct strikes on NATO territory now that he's seen how hollow his vaunted Army is in dealing with a well armed neutral power. A no-fly-zone and direct action is a bridge too far but selling/giving weapons to the side we support is exactly what the US has always done. Arsenal of democracy and all that.

Also, why don't NATO forces on scene in Poland train Ukrainian militia and foreign volunteers in a safe environment before they head to the AO? A good way to keep themselves frosty just in case, moreover.

I personally think they are doing that on a very low scale already as I can't imagine those weapons systems are being handed over without some initial training on use and maintenance.

ost of the active service models are modernized, though some models are older than others. The large majority of the T-72s were modernized in the past decade

Modernized but still obsolete, sorta like the M-60s in Turkish service. The lack of crew survivability if the ammo is struck, lack of true'hunter killer' capabilities with better commanders independent sights, and the inability of reactive armor to makeup for the ancient passive armor against modern AT weapons is evident. I'm curious to see if the Russians will push any of their T-14's into the fight to see if that has a chance seeing as the T-90s upgrades don't seem to makeup for the weakness of the basic turret/hull design.

Though seeing that the Russians weren't expecting an actual fight the late winter timing of their attack hasn't helped them as the the current mud effect doesn't allow for the off-road ability to be take advantage of. Even the disunity and watered-down sanctions that myself and many others thought would be a result of a winter/Olympics timed attack haven't played out which means that Putin has conducted a disastrous attack in the worst time of the year for type of warfare his army excels at with no real political advantage from European winter fuel dependency.

Saw the same video you posted, good analysis.
Ukraine: Demoralised & incompetent, Putin’s army is doomed | Taras Kuzio interview
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2awysdmPhQ

Much like in Afghanistan the Russian army is becoming bogged down and broken. As we enter into the third week of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is Russia winning its war? To discuss the state of the Russian armed forces and the war in Ukraine Steven Edginton is joined by Ukraine expert Dr Taras Kuzio of the Henry Jackson Society. Watch the full episode above or listen on your podcast app by searching “Off Script”.

Good interview, an hour long but excellent explanations from this guy, certainly more aware of the topic than I am.

[Sarmatian]

Article on terror violence and killing in the villages of Ukraine.

Russian war power needs to be irreparably degraded expeditiously.

This isn't sentiment or bloodthirst. The simple truth is that the world must consider itself in a war of annihilation against the Russian military by any means.

This is an interesting take. Are you basing that on the assumption of threat to NATO's supremacy?

China is definitely a far greater long term threat in that regard.

[Montmorency]

To crosspost with the Trump thread, notice how aligned these psychological impulses are between American and Russian fascisms.

'Cosmopolitan elements are teaching Ukraine, which is Russia, to hate Russians, who are the Real Russians. We must secure a solution to the Ukrainian question before it is too late.'
'Cosmopolitan elements are teaching White children, who are the Real Americans, to hate [racism and sexism], which is our heritage and destiny. We must secure a victory in the Culture War before it is too late.'

It's always been about violent backlash from aggrievance toward loss of dominance, but it hits different to see it iterated up close and personal in so many places and with such escalating detriment.

It's a good time to admit that I was naive to expect for the past years that Putin's fascism would remain "moderate", that this was a stable category for 21st century great politics.

To preface my response to the quoted, the harder Putin fails - not that under any circumstances could Russia be deNazified like Germany or Japan - the less potentiated other authoritarians will be in their delusions.

This is an interesting take. Are you basing that on the assumption of threat to NATO's supremacy?

China is definitely a far greater long term threat in that regard.

My premise is that, as of now, both Putin and the typical Russian soldier are prepared to employ total war tactics against Ukraine, which both exacerbates the humanitarian aspect of the conflict during and after, and dims Ukraine's prospects in the conventional struggle. Of course I want Ukraine to win, and not at the cost of WW2-scale human or infrastructural damage.

Given some of the firmer numbers I laid out in an earlier post (cf. the Pentagon's estimate today that 10% of the pre-staged invasion force has been neutralized), the Russian manpower/formation pool capable of conducting major offensive operations - as opposed to holding villages - is limited. The more and faster come the Russian KIA and WIA, the sooner the front stabilizes. With bountiful UAV and strike fighters in Ukraine's inventory, equipment NATO is likelier to deliver the longer the conflict drags, a static Russian army can't win a war of attrition.

Therefore I wish Ukraine could kill Russian soldiers at a higher rate than it has been.

Remember the front line as it stands allows Ukraine to maintain lines of communication to all its cities somehow, except for the conquered south (Kherson, Melitopol, Mariupol.) Not even Sumy is truly cut off yet last I checked. The fight becomes much harder the more Russia can consolidate its front, at least until it reaches the Dnieper cities.

I'm frightened of the DNR/LNR fighters though. They started out more experienced than most Russian soldiers, have reportedly been responsible for much of the ground taken in Donbas so far, and are even pretty good at propaganda. No way Putin garrisons them in Donbas if they clear the provinces.


(I think the West should pressure Ukraine, in favorable scenarios, to abandon their claim on Crimea. At best it could be demilitarized.)

[Pannonian]

To crosspost with the Trump thread, notice how aligned these psychological impulses are between American and Russian fascisms.

I've seen an article which says that Putin talking points have crossed from English speaking alt righters to Russian speakers, with the added credibility of having come from English speakers. Who, of course, got their material from Putin. Also instructions from Russian agencies to emphasise Tucker Carlson and other bought alt righters as much as possible. Anglo-American politics has been thoroughly infiltrated by Russia, and their followers have invested too much pride in their beliefs to question their talking heads.

[Sarmatian]

My premise is that, as of now, both Putin and the typical Russian soldier are prepared to employ total war tactics against Ukraine, which both exacerbates the humanitarian aspect of the conflict during and after, and dims Ukraine's prospects in the conventional struggle.

On what are you basing this premise?

Given some of the firmer numbers I laid out in an earlier post (cf. the Pentagon's estimate today that 10% of the pre-staged invasion force has been neutralized), the Russian manpower/formation pool capable of conducting major offensive operations - as opposed to holding villages - is limited. The more and faster come the Russian KIA and WIA, the sooner the front stabilizes. With bountiful UAV and strike fighters in Ukraine's inventory, equipment NATO is likelier to deliver the longer the conflict drags, a static Russian army can't win a war of attrition.

Therefore I wish Ukraine could kill Russian soldiers at a higher rate than it has been.

Remember the front line as it stands allows Ukraine to maintain lines of communication to all its cities somehow, except for the conquered south (Kherson, Melitopol, Mariupol.) Not even Sumy is truly cut off yet last I checked. The fight becomes much harder the more Russia can consolidate its front, at least until it reaches the Dnieper cities.

I'm frightened of the DNR/LNR fighters though. They started out more experienced than most Russian soldiers, have reportedly been responsible for much of the ground taken in Donbas so far, and are even pretty good at propaganda. No way Putin garrisons them in Donbas if they clear the provinces.

I do not think Ukraine can win this conflict militarily. For Russia, this is not a quick land grab. They consider NATO in Ukraine a grave threat to their own security. If push comes to shove, chances are, they will up the intensity as much as they need to win.

There is a breaking point for Russia, certainly, but is much further than people believe it is, and I'm not sure reaching it would be a good idea anyway.

[Furunculus]

(I think the West should pressure Ukraine, in favorable scenarios, to abandon their claim on Crimea. At best it could be demilitarized.)

I tend to agree that Crimea is gone (and as a population is happy to remain gone!), but demilitarise Russia's only warm-water military port?

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Sarmatian:

Russia is the greater geopolitical threat because of its cultural traditions for authoritarian rule, it's cultural 'chip on the shoulder' about being viewed as kulturny, and its (admittedly not without some justification) quasi-paranoic attitude towards international relations.

China, by contrast, is prone to bureaucratic oligarchy, views itself as the acme of culture (turning it's focus inward from time to time for long stretches of history), and has a culturally 'long-term' outlook.

Mind you, that may leave China the eventual hegemonic ruler of all of us -- but not any time soon. For the most part China absorbs, it does not conquer. After all, the Mongols conquered China...right up through and until they became Chinese.

[Montmorency]

The West must push for a negotiated settlement to end the Ukraine war and may have only a two-week window to achieve it, Tony Blair says.

The former prime minister argued the key disputes – over Nato membership, the stationing of Western weapons and the futures of Crimea and Ukraine’s eastern regions – could be settled in talks.

Mr Blair said he understood the view that “Putin deserves nothing but total defeat”, but warned: “The burden of this struggle is being borne by Ukrainians, not by us.”

He pointed out that the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has pursued “ad hoc” talks – but called for the US and Europe to throw their full weight behind that effort.

And he warned: “The next two weeks may be the last chance to achieve a negotiated settlement before the assault on Kyiv becomes worse, the Ukrainian people become hostile to any negotiation, or Putin faces a binary choice between “double down” or retreat.”

However, “Ukraine would require binding guarantees from the West to contemplate giving up on Nato membership”.

Equally, it might be possible to “construct a process” to decide the future status of Crimea and the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, Mr Blair argued.

That was “provided Putin doesn’t add a demand to keep the territory he is currently taking with considerable brutality in the corridor between Rostov and Odessa, a demand Ukraine could never accede to”.

On Nato ruling out military involvement, Mr Blair wrote: “I accept the reasoning behind our stance.

God, Blair is always just such a nitwit. Putin committed the majority of his country's military to a conventional war against a country he claims is an existential threat to his own, and has backed up his position with nuclear threats that many authorities in the West insist are credible. Obviously whatever was on offer before the war did not satisfy Putin. Thinking it serious to offer it again is, what was the colloquial term...?

On what are you basing this premise?

The increasing violence of the invasion in terms of both conventional warfare and security techniques, as documented by changes in available video documentation and media reports, as well as the Russian government's intensifying post-textual rhetoric to justify the war. Namely, that not only is Zelensky a genocidal Nazi who may pose a nuclear threat to Russia in the future, he is already a nuclear, and chemical and biological, existential threat to Russia under the active management of the United States. Zelensky's cry of genocide against Ukraine was a ridiculous exaggeration, but it might well become reality soon. I'm seeing multiple recommendations on Russian TV to begin executing "provocateurs", which is to say anyone offering any resistance or unrest.


Some toplines from English-language media reports in the past couple of days:

Russia: 'The USA is harvesting Slavic DNA in Ukraine to develop bioagents targeted against ethnic Russians'
US/UK: "Both sides report progress in the fourth round of negotiations"
Russia: 'In light of the Kiev regime's desperate terror bombing of the people of Donetsk, there is no point in negotiating with such a ruthless group'

I do not think Ukraine can win this conflict militarily. For Russia, this is not a quick land grab. They consider NATO in Ukraine a grave threat to their own security. If push comes to shove, chances are, they will up the intensity as much as they need to win.

Depends on what you mean by winning militarily. Without direct NATO intervention the best outcome for Ukraine would be to keep Russia from the outskirts of Kyiv, secure Odessa, and maintain some foothold east of the Dnieper. Putin's breaking point is far from view, but what I'm trying to say is that the Russian military's breaking point is closer. Over the medium-term, Ukraine can replenish its supplies and equipment better than Russia, and train up quality replacements better than Russia. The main thing is to not lose major formations in pockets and sieges while giving up as little territory as possible. After that, the case is that Ukraine's parameters for "victory" loosen up as Russia will be unable to win militarily for their own part. The alternative for Putin is total mobilization of the Russian population and economy, which at this rate might genuinely imperil his authority.

In summary, stalemate is good for Ukraine while it is in total mobilization and Russia is not. It can't reach stalemate without inflicting horrendous losses to Russia in the coming weeks.

TLDR: It is easier for Ukraine to not lose than to win.

There is a breaking point for Russia, certainly, but is much further than people believe it is, and I'm not sure reaching it would be a good idea anyway.

I perceive that you're referencing Putin's nuclear escalation threats. My opinion on that is the US should set the rules of engagement publicly and transparently. That is, even a single nuclear detonation by Russia would be preemptively warned as prompting immediate and irrevocable retaliation against a single Russian target, probably a military target in Siberia. This is the only way to deter Putin (and moreover, his inner circle), since his moving first without the West settling on a plan would leave us visibly disorganized and weakened as we struggle for a meaningful response - so Putin might indeed leap as his adventure becomes more fraught. The violation of the nuclear taboo would be so catastrophic for world politics in the 21st century that we should be aggressive in preempting it. Otherwise, logically speaking, if Western governments are so concerned about "World War 3" then they should cease all military support for Ukraine and encourage its people to take an unfavorable settlement. But of course that's rubbish. We musn't be blackmailed.

A lot of leaders and analysts in the West seem to be willing to be blackmailed, based on how they've responded to the idea of NATO escalation. They prioritize not "inciting" Putin and take it for granted that he isn't bluffing. Well... if they're correct in their assessment of Putin's psychology, if Vladimir Putin is the sort to take this to the brink no matter what, as these Western analysts/governments are assessing, then of course we must eliminate him at some point as the unexaggeratedly-worst, most dangerous tyrant on Earth - EVER. By this characterization the existence of Vladimir Putin is an existential threat to the West (and the rest). So better act sooner than later, because if one believes all this about Putin, there will be a later. The only alternative in this framework is appeasement, cutting off aid to Ukraine to bring it to capitulation, because the foregoing analysis of Putin implies that he will go nuclear to protect his power whether NATO looks set to beat him, or Ukraine can do it on its own. So why support Ukraine beyond the extent to which it could lose as slowly, yet assuredly, as possible?

Yet as I said I'm not seeing that sort of logical process in those who fear WW3 above all, which leads me to believe that opponents of escalation are either deceptive or not calculating risk rationally.

(There are of course those advocating for the withdrawal of Western support to Ukraine in order to expedite the end of the conflict, but most of them are in China and India.)

I tend to agree that Crimea is gone (and as a population is happy to remain gone!), but demilitarise Russia's only warm-water military port?

Versailles demilitarization didn't remove all of Germany's military infrastructure. A demilitarization of Crimea would involve treaty limits on the number of troops and ships that could be based there. Again, in the best-case scenario for Ukraine.

Sarmatian:

Russia is the greater geopolitical threat because of its cultural traditions for authoritarian rule, it's cultural 'chip on the shoulder' about being viewed as kulturny, and its (admittedly not without some justification) quasi-paranoic attitude towards international relations.

China, by contrast, is prone to bureaucratic oligarchy, views itself as the acme of culture (turning it's focus inward from time to time for long stretches of history), and has a culturally 'long-term' outlook.

Mind you, that may leave China the eventual hegemonic ruler of all of us -- but not any time soon. For the most part China absorbs, it does not conquer. After all, the Mongols conquered China...right up through and until they became Chinese.

There is a more down-to-earth framing one could use, which is that, going by the near-consensus expressed by Western politicians and analysts, Putin is the type of autocrat who would go nuclear out of fear or out of sour grapes spite. That condition, if applicable, is a much more immediate geopolitical threat than civilizational analysis could identify.

I think this war reveals, as it is the nature of wars to be revelatory or even apo-calyptic, that Russia isn't much of a threat, outside the much-discussed 'nuclear madman' angle or the ability to manipulate elections (which is just a nudge to our internal fascist decay that China could reproduce equally well) particular to its current government.

[Montmorency]

Remake when?

[Sarmatian]

Sarmatian:

Russia is the greater geopolitical threat because of its cultural traditions for authoritarian rule, it's cultural 'chip on the shoulder' about being viewed as kulturny, and its (admittedly not without some justification) quasi-paranoic attitude towards international relations.

China, by contrast, is prone to bureaucratic oligarchy, views itself as the acme of culture (turning it's focus inward from time to time for long stretches of history), and has a culturally 'long-term' outlook.

Mind you, that may leave China the eventual hegemonic ruler of all of us -- but not any time soon. For the most part China absorbs, it does not conquer. After all, the Mongols conquered China...right up through and until they became Chinese.

Well, China certainly has had a much longer tradition of authoritarian rule.

Inward looking is a natural trend when there's lack of clear outside threats. Nevertheless, I can accept that it is a matter of opinion to a large degree. China might indeed prove to be less inclined to militarily oppose NATO.

The increasing violence of the invasion in terms of both conventional warfare and security techniques, as documented by changes in available video documentation and media reports, as well as the Russian government's intensifying post-textual rhetoric to justify the war. Namely, that not only is Zelensky a genocidal Nazi who may pose a nuclear threat to Russia in the future, he is already a nuclear, and chemical and biological, existential threat to Russia under the active management of the United States. Zelensky's cry of genocide against Ukraine was a ridiculous exaggeration, but it might well become reality soon. I'm seeing multiple recommendations on Russian TV to begin executing "provocateurs", which is to say anyone offering any resistance or unrest.


Some toplines from English-language media reports in the past couple of days:

Russia: 'The USA is harvesting Slavic DNA in Ukraine to develop bioagents targeted against ethnic Russians'
US/UK: "Both sides report progress in the fourth round of negotiations"
Russia: 'In light of the Kiev regime's desperate terror bombing of the people of Donetsk, there is no point in negotiating with such a ruthless group'

Outside the typical media hysteria, the numbers don't support that. Up to March 14th, there have been 691 confirmed civilian deaths. The number is likely higher but still very small for a military operation of this size after 20 days.

I do have access to some Russian media, like Sputnik and RT and I haven't seen such claims. Granted, I might have missed it, but I can state with a rather high degree of certainty that it is not the majority of their reporting.

Depends on what you mean by winning militarily. Without direct NATO intervention the best outcome for Ukraine would be to keep Russia from the outskirts of Kyiv, secure Odessa, and maintain some foothold east of the Dnieper. Putin's breaking point is far from view, but what I'm trying to say is that the Russian military's breaking point is closer. Over the medium-term, Ukraine can replenish its supplies and equipment better than Russia, and train up quality replacements better than Russia. The main thing is to not lose major formations in pockets and sieges while giving up as little territory as possible. After that, the case is that Ukraine's parameters for "victory" loosen up as Russia will be unable to win militarily for their own part. The alternative for Putin is total mobilization of the Russian population and economy, which at this rate might genuinely imperil his authority.

In summary, stalemate is good for Ukraine while it is in total mobilization and Russia is not. It can't reach stalemate without inflicting horrendous losses to Russia in the coming weeks.

TLDR: It is easier for Ukraine to not lose than to win.

I think your premise is flawed. You are assuming that Russia won't increase the intensity if need be. Their current pace is more due to the desire to minimize civilians casualties.

Time is on their side. They are prepared to withstand this for a few years, if need be. They have the ability to destroy most of NATO military shipments before they reach Ukrainian armed forced.

I perceive that you're referencing Putin's nuclear escalation threats. My opinion on that is the US should set the rules of engagemenpublicly and transparently. That is, even a single nuclear detonation by Russia would be preemptively warned as prompting immediate and irrevocable retaliation against a single Russian target, probably a military target in Siberia. This is the only way to deter Putin (and moreover, his inner circle), since his moving first without the West settling on a plan would leave us visibly disorganized and weakened as we struggle for a meaningful response - so Putin might indeed leap as his adventure becomes more fraught. The violation of the nuclear taboo would be so catastrophic for world politics in the 21st century that we should be aggressive in preempting it. Otherwise, logically speaking, if Western governments are so concerned about "World War 3" then they should cease all military support for Ukraine and encourage its people to take an unfavorable settlement. But of course that's rubbish. We musn't be blackmailed.

A lot of leaders and analysts in the West seem to be willing to be blackmailed, based on how they've responded to the idea of NATO escalation. They prioritize not "inciting" Putin and take it for granted that he isn't bluffing. Well... if they're correct in their assessment of Putin's psychology, if Vladimir Putin is the sort to take this to the brink no matter what, as these Western analysts/governments are assessing, then of course we must eliminate him at some point as the unexaggeratedly-worst, most dangerous tyrant on Earth - EVER. By this characterization the existence of Vladimir Putin is an existential threat to the West (and the rest). So better act sooner than later, because if one believes all this about Putin, there will be a later. The only alternative in this framework is appeasement, cutting off aid to Ukraine to bring it to capitulation, because the foregoing analysis of Putin implies that he will go nuclear to protect his power whether NATO looks set to beat him, or Ukraine can do it on its own. So why support Ukraine beyond the extent to which it could lose as slowly, yet assuredly, as possible?

Yet as I said I'm not seeing that sort of logical process in those who fear WW3 above all, which leads me to believe that opponents of escalation are either deceptive or not calculating risk rationally.

(There are of course those advocating for the withdrawal of Western support to Ukraine in order to expedite the end of the conflict, but most of them are in China and India.)

Not as such. I'm talking about a scenario where Russian economy collapses and the country with 1600 nuclear warheads descends into chaos. Such a scenario would be extremely unpleasant.

Even if Putin's existence is an "existential threat to the West", Putin is 70 years old. He won't live forever. Even if someone would subscribe to the narrative pushed by the western media and TV analysts, would escalating the conflict be the most sensible approach?

Then, there's the fact that outside media hysteria and politicians picking up brownie points, everyone knows that Putin and Russia are not existential threat to the West. Everyone understands why Russia did this. The surprise came from the fact that no one believed they had the balls to do it, and they will eventually back down and accept the fait accompli, like they did several times in the past. That narrative is a bit flawed, and one has to wonder who is in charge of US foreign policy regarding Russia, as Russia made good on the promise that Ukraine and Georgia are red lines twice before this already.

Of course, this conflict doesn't hurt US much. They can theoretically keep fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian. For Europeans, it is much less pleasant.

[Montmorency]

Inward looking is a natural trend when there's lack of clear outside threats. Nevertheless, I can accept that it is a matter of opinion to a large degree. China might indeed prove to be less inclined to militarily oppose NATO.

Well, the only NATO country China has militarized tensions with is the United States. After all, NATO is centered on the Atlantic Ocean. And the only points of concern the US really has in China's neighborhood are Taiwan and South Korea. The US would never go to war over Vietnam, and maybe not even over the Philippines (imagining a Chinese excursion there). There really is more contact area in Europe, which is why it is and was so useful to consolidate everyone into a single cooperative faction.

Outside the typical media hysteria, the numbers don't support that. Up to March 14th, there have been 691 confirmed civilian deaths. The number is likely higher but still very small for a military operation of this size after 20 days.

Ukraine has already reported many thousands of civilian fatalities (such as at least 2500 in Mariupol), and even that is a likely underestimate. Every day sees hundreds of deaths at a minimum. Casualty rates will increase even without Russian deliberate targeting as the conflict goes on and residential buildings get demolished, and we know they're deliberately targeting civilians, for example by their repeated shelling of humanitarian corridors. Clips are clips, but of course there are also a number of well and lesser-known clips of Russian soldiers killing individual civilians.

I do have access to some Russian media, like Sputnik and RT and I haven't seen such claims. Granted, I might have missed it, but I can state with a rather high degree of certainty that it is not the majority of their reporting.

Russians don't watch/read Sputnik and RT in Russia, those are for the international audience. Some of the sources for claims about bioweapons and the like are TASS and Major General Konashenkov, spokesperson for the RF Ministry of Defence. Look for the content promoted on their mainstream news programs, whose primary audience is Putin's natural social base.

By the way, a quick search on Russia Today and Sputnik English language pages reveals 10 (RT) and 7 (Sputnik) stories on bioweapons in the past week, and I'm not going to bother to look up the nuclear, chemical, or genocide/terrorism angles. The far-right in America is very loudly promoting these narratives, which noise in turn cycles back into Russian media.

I think your premise is flawed. You are assuming that Russia won't increase the intensity if need be. Their current pace is more due to the desire to minimize civilians casualties. Time is on their side. They are prepared to withstand this for a few years, if need be.

We'll wait for the evidence.

They have the ability to destroy most of NATO military shipments before they reach Ukrainian armed forced.

They haven't demonstrated that ability yet, and they may want to deploy it soon given the lower bound for their ground force fatalities has risen in 20 days to par with what the US lost in 20 years of the War on Terror.

Not as such. I'm talking about a scenario where Russian economy collapses and the country with 1600 nuclear warheads descends into chaos. Such a scenario would be extremely unpleasant.

Russia descending into chaos in this sense would be nothing more than some North Caucasian and Siberian ethnic territorialities seeking greater autonomy. Russia's nuclear arsenal won't be any less secure than it is now. The core Russian state has enough institutional and national identity that it wouldn't dissolve into feuding warlord statelets. Even Syria is by now almost entirely divided betwen two major factions, and Russia is a lot more cohesive than Syria.

Even if Putin's existence is an "existential threat to the West", Putin is 70 years old. He won't live forever. Even if someone would subscribe to the narrative pushed by the western media and TV analysts, would escalating the conflict be the most sensible approach?

If Putin's threats are taken as credible, deterring NATO intervention to avert Russian victory, then they would remain credible in the absence of a decisive victory in Ukraine even when Ukrainians are the ones doing all the fighting. In other words, the nuclear threat is essentially generated by the continuation of Ukrainian resistance. And to be clear, this resistance will persist regardless of NATO's actions.

Given that we want Ukraine to preserve its independence and integrity, if one credits Putin's threats, one should expect that threat to manifest eventually. The logic is pretty straightforward. If Putin is bluffing, we could lick him right quick. If Putin is not bluffing, he needs to be eliminated as someone too dangerous to live.

But I don't really want to escalate the conflict to war between NATO and Russia at this point, even if I'm more inclined to dismiss Putin as a bluffer or judge him deterrable (in nuclear matters). I just want everything short of war. The Cold War began with Russian pilots killing American pilots, and ended with American special forces killing Russian conscripts...

Then, there's the fact that outside media hysteria and politicians picking up brownie points, everyone knows that Putin and Russia are not existential threat to the West. Everyone understands why Russia did this. The surprise came from the fact that no one believed they had the balls to do it, and they will eventually back down and accept the fait accompli, like they did several times in the past. That narrative is a bit flawed, and one has to wonder who is in charge of US foreign policy regarding Russia, as Russia made good on the promise that Ukraine and Georgia are red lines twice before this already.

The US government warned everyone that Russia planned to invade, and given the widespread disbelief in the face of warnings to the morning of the war, I doubt everyone understands why Putin did this.

We have red lines too. If Turkey can have a security corridor in Syria, why doesn't Poland deserve one when it's absorbing the same number of refugees (2 million so far just in Poland)? If China's red line was the Yalu in 1950, why isn't Poland's the Bug or the Dnieper? Putin can still partition Ukraine with difficulty, but he would be an utter fool to think he has the power to take the whole thing. Foolishness isn't to be pardoned in geopolitics.

Of course, this conflict doesn't hurt US much. They can theoretically keep fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian. For Europeans, it is much less pleasant.

I think there are more Ukrainians than Russian soldiers to exchange, but the measures I reach out for in my musings are exactly designed to further imbalance the ratio in favor of Ukraine.