a question:
if there is no rational mind which makes choices do people still have free will? and if not, when a person has no free will, are they no longer free?
Printable View
a question:
if there is no rational mind which makes choices do people still have free will? and if not, when a person has no free will, are they no longer free?
It depends on what you mean by free will :juggle2:
e.g. guidance control vs regulative control
As Sasaki went into, it is Semantics.
Define free will.
Is having predictable behaviour classed as free will? such as, you enjoy pepperoni pizza, therefore if I gave you pepperoni pizza, I predict you would enjoy it, and when I gave it you, you did.
As well as personalised tastes, people follow rituals. People generally do the same things all the time, we are creatures of habit. You don't suddenly randomly put on a pink dress and walk out the door just because you chose to, though given circumstances and your behaviour patterns, you might.
Hypothetically speaking, if I had all the data to how you would respond to something, I could hypothetically tell you your entire life story and how you would react in certain situations. Does this mean you process no free-will? No freedom to make a choice?
Answer is, you do have the freedom to pick up that pizza and eat it or not, however, behaviour is inherently predictable given if you know a certain about of information about a person, so I could predict what you would freely choose.
Re-reading the OP, I think it might be more towards people with learning disabilities or mental illness. Yes, they still have free-will, if it is that.
Of course there is. Because I will it, as do you (all). Without it, there is no randomization or chaos or anarchy, only rock-solid predictability. It is, after all, the Original SIN of Judeo-Christo-Muslo philosophy and tradition, which we are all supposed to be cured of by LAW (a subservience of our free will to a greater good), or a savior.Quote:
is there free will?
mentally impaired, small children is what i think he is hinting at as beskar has answered.Quote:
Who says there is no rational mind? I need more context.
There may be limited conceptual and educated choices in comparison, but there is still free will.
I follow Sartre on this one, and say that yes there is free will and that we can know this through angst and anxiety.
to avoid confusion, the question is hypothetical. i dont conclude there is no rational mind, but if there is none, what would be the case.
Sasaki i will come back to your question soon. and as to beskar, that is not what i meant. i mean more, do we have control over our own actions or are they determined. if you can predict my actions but not alter them than you have no control, so my will is still free if already was in the first place.
the modern definition of free will, at least in the dictionaries includes the requirement of rationality.
Free will is the purported ability of rational agents to exercise control over their actions, decisions, or choices to such an extent that they can be held responsible for their selections. (wikipedia)
“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. (stanford)
and so the list continues.
maybe i should add another question, does an animal have free will. an animal like a pig per example.
meh but sartre's idea(l) of freedom and free will is unliveable. more over its unrational. so if we would apply the modern definition of free will to it, we would still not have free will according to the definition while sartre does contribute free will to the person in such cases.
Actually his branch of existential thought is far more practically applicable than any other form of philosophy. I follow it, for instance. The simple idea is "we have free will and with that comes all the responsibility in the Universe to do what is right by our standards." That is a very workable and liveable philosophy.
If you lay out five different objects that have been rated as equally appealing by test groups, they will pick one and say they picked it because they liked it the best, pointing out some feature of the object that made them pick it. But in actuality they pick the one on the far right 80% of the time.
So you have to ask: in all of our "choices" are the reasons we think we have the actual reasons?
But then, what do you call our capacity to resist our basic urges at times, and the effect our thoughts can have on our actions?
I would replace free will with "will", the urge to follow a set of beliefs rather than our "lower" (for lack of a better word) urges.
I don't understand this...Quote:
I follow Sartre on this one, and say that yes there is free will and that we can know this through angst and anxiety.
This is always exactly what I have thought on the issue. People then say that if the path you choose is always inevitable due to your own nature, then this makes you a robot. But surely with this logic all that 'free will' would mean is that we were robots with a random element in decision making.
im also trying to find a definition of will or free will in which the rational element is excluded. we are free as a body i believe. i will explain more after dinner.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism#Angst
its sartre's philosophy based mostly on kierkegaard and heidegger's philosophy.
There's a simple psychological mechanism for that "dread the possibility of throwing yourself off" bit though. The only way to make sure you don't do something is to have like a process running that checks to see if you are doing it. But the awareness of that check can be anxiety inducing.Quote:
Originally Posted by wiki
That's the trouble with trying to answer psychological questions with philosophy. I don't find it to be an argument for free will anyway, because in that situation I wouldn't really be worried about my choosing to throw myself off the cliff of my own free will, but of something making me jump off the cliff against my will.
Of course!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpCASVFyQoE
Everything is predestined from eternity even one's choices, so they don't have free will in the commonly thought sense of being able to choose differently.
If you take a (naively) non deterministic view of the world, then human actions aren't caused or influenced by anything, "rational" considerations or not. So if you wish to go that way you can have it.Quote:
Originally Posted by TheStranger
This has always been an interesting point of view especially with religion such as Christianity which believes in redemption. Hypothetically, if there is no free will then what is the point in redemption? As the end result, the Lord Almighty will know that we will commit sin and in the same breath the Lord Almighty would know if we will redeem ourselves or not. then the act of redemption becomes trivial as ultimately we are slaves to our destiny and we do not have the choice to redeem ourselves, as our fate has already been decided.
The problem comes because many people seem to require a sense of free will for moral responsibility (in both secular and religious contexts).
Aquinas made a really good case for double predestination (of the elect and the damned), even though I don't think it's an idea the Catholic Church endorses (correct me if I'm wrong Catholics).
Aquninine determinsim, itself essentially Augustinian in nature, was rejected as heterodox by the Catholic Church, and remains so today. Interestingly, Aquinas also proposed that beings are capable of independent agency seperate from God's direct control. From my persepctive, it seems that every attempt to remove Free Will from the Christian worldview is born of angst over relatively minor questions regarding how God's own nature and Divine Knowledge interact with the world he created.
broadly speaking, determinists usually feel the need to explain away one of two logical inconsistancies. The first is that God is all powerful, but that Free Will allows beings to rebel against God's power; the argument is easily undone by stating that God allows rebellion (Sin), but does not condone it. The second argument relates to God's constancy and his Onnicience. While this is harder to answer, it is easy to ignore because, bluntly, the Bible contains numerous instances of rebellion, so it clearly does happen.
On to the more philosophical question:
Why must the exercise of Free Will require reationality, and how do we define who is "rational"? For me, Free Will is apparent because if there were no Free Will or Random Chance the universe would be a perfectly ordered and regular place. It would also be a lot less interesting.
Well, I claim there is random chance, and it therefore follows that there is random chance in our decision making. This being so, our decisions are not pre-determined, ergo Free Will is possible.
As to the Universe being orderly, Quantum Theory tells us that a situation has a variety of possible outcomes with varrying probability, not one pre-determined outcome.
i just am not in the mood to continue where i left of yesterday so ill just post the things i do have. sorry if its a bit fragmented or inconsistent.
Freedom in its most radical form is when one is subjected to nothing but oneself, meaning that nothing outside the individual controls his choices. This type of radical freedom would only exist in a situation when the individual is all there is, usually only Gods are attributed this type of freedom. Yet somehow this type of freedom, which is a divine freedom is also the standard to which humans are sometimes held. We must return freedom to the humans, it must become a human freedom, not an animal one, nor a divine one.
With neurosciences on the rise, more insight is being gained into the biochemical processes of our body. So while our conception of what a human is, is changing rapidly, our concepts which apply to humans are not changing at the same rate. This results in a Cartesian concept of free will, e.g. the idea that there is a rational faculty in each human being which controls it from a centralized point in the body, being pitted against a modern conception of what a human being is, e.g. we can conclude as much as that there is no such centralized rational faculty in our body. From the absence of this centralized rational faculty some people like to conclude the absence of free will. This is not a valid conclusion however. Free will may very well still exist, but instead of just one part of our body deciding for everything else, parts of our body decide for their own jurisdiction and as a body together they decide for the body as a whole. So human bodies are not a dictatorship or an autocracy but more a federal constitution. However it is still very much possible that our body as a whole has free will, because there are (many) situations thinkable in which nothing from outside this body influences the body in such way that the body has no choice left but to obey. The point I'm trying to make is that our concept of freedom must evolve alongside our conception of human beings. Since the idea the mind and body are separated is fading in our conception of human beings it should likewise fade in our conception of free will.
To say that a person has free will because he (in this case is soul or mind or any similar phrase) makes his own choices, amounts to as much as to say that, a person is free because nothing outside this person influences him so that he has no choice but to obey that external influence. So if our conception of what we are as human beings changes from the soul to the body than so must it change in our conception of free will. Thus the 'he' is no longer soul but body, yet the concept of free will applies to the body as well as it did to the soul before.
The objection can be made that we are not aware of these choices at the bodily level and thus the choices are not rational and so one is not free. Yet why is rationality a requirement for freedom? Are animals not free, or rationally impaired human beings? And if it is truly so that our current conception of human beings is the right one, than it has always been so. Why should the actions we would have labeled as an act of free will not years ago be labeled as determined only because it turns out we are not aware of them.
if this: "a decision or situation is often called rational if it is in some sense optimal, and individuals or organizations are often called rational if they tend to act somehow optimally in pursuit of their goals." is the definition of rational. i dont see why the body cant be rational. and thus when the body is rational and the body makes choices, then the body must have free will.
I don't see the relation between random chance and free will. Imagine that you are in an ice cream shop picking your favorite ice cream. In a largely deterministic world you would probably pick your favorite, unless you have an urge to go for variety, or something else like that. Your favorite was predetermined, possibly be some combination of genetically coded taste buds, what kind of ice cream you had first, etc. Is this really a bad thing? Your choice may be predetermined, but it's based on who you are and what you want.
If there is random chance, then how is that different from you flipping a coin to decide between two flavors? It doesn't sound like a choice at all.
I mostly agree, but disagree with the direction you took it. Saying that the human body is not a dictatorship would lead me to the conclusion that free will doesn't apply to the body as a whole. I can't choose not to be hungry, right? If we have any sort of free will, it rests in the part of our brain that is conscious, that thinks and has urges to overcome our "basic" urges. It's not very powerful, but it's what separates us from most animals.Quote:
Originally Posted by TS
Determinism would mean that whether or not the coin landed heads or tails would be determined before you flipped it, with 100% certainty. Random chance is a prerequisite for Free Will because wihtout it the universe has no room for divergence from it's ordained course.
No, it's only a prerequisite for a certain conception of free will. And certainly not sufficient. Random chance cannot possibly equal free will, because when you flip coins to determine your actions it is the coin that decides, not you. In an extreme random chance scenario, everytime you pass someone on the street you have a chance of flipping out and killing them. All it takes is the right coin flips.
no it can't choose not to be hungry. but i dont see hunger as some influence from the outside. it is part of the bodily functions. it is part of life. life needs to be sustained or otherwise it will die. no free will can alter that. the body though is free to choose not to eat, to ignore this hunger, or to eat and choose what it eats. its probably much more complicated, i have to get more into biology. i already foresee difficulties with allergies and stuff.
the brain which is conscious, or the conscious activity of the brain is very limited, i believe the entire body thinks, but just not everything is translated into the conscious part of the brain. only those actions that cannot do without.
Well, it's true that people have starved themselves to death. Some monks in Japan used to practice self-mummification. You could, I suppose, see that as the ultimate expression of free will.
But it still seems like it's the one part of the brain that exercises it. If you quit smoking, then your "body" (including parts of the brain) was very strongly pushing to keep smoking. There is conflict within the body. And I don't feel that that part is really "you". It's sort of like an outside influence.
I think what PVC means is that the random element is necessarily in order to make you able to pursue more than one course of action, and it is this ability that makes your will 'free'. With a random element, you have the ability to weigh up your options in any given scenario, and from this give each their own probablity for actually taking them. Without a random element, you will only ever choose the one path. You may 'will' to do it, but your will was not free - there was no random element, hence what you did was inevitable, hence your will was not 'free' in the sense that it could ever have done anything differently.
So say you can pick two flavours of ice cream, one vanilla, the other chocolate. Vanilla is your favourite. It was the first flavour you ever tried, it tastes nice and creamy, and it reminds you of your holidays. Chocolate has less going for it, but it does satisfy your sweet tooth.
Now, if your decision making has a random element, the above factors may lead you to lean 80% in favour of vanilla, and 20% in favour of chocolate. On average, 4 times out of 5 you will go for vanilla. But in each case, you were able to choose chocolate, and some times you did. Chocolate wasn't just a flavour that was taken into consideration and then overriden every time by vanilla - there was in each case a very real chance that you might go for chocolate.
But in a deterministic world where there isn't a random element to decision making, every single time you will take vanilla. Sure, you want to take vanilla. You 'will' to do it, and you get what you want. But you could never have chosen the chocolate, without first changing your own tastes. Therefore, you do not have 'free will' as the term is generally used, since there was only one course of action you could take, the one which you 'willed' to do.
I believe the latter scenario is the reality we live in, and that's why I said earlier why I believe we have a 'will', but not a 'free will'.
But that isn't at all implied by quantum randomness (as far as I understand it). If something is random, it isn't by choice, that's part of the definition.
That's not true though. Say that you like vanilla better, but chocolate reminds you of the holidays. The song in the ice cream shop might also remind you of the holidays and then you buy chocolate. You may feel that you have to much consistency in your life and go for something different. Just because it's deterministic doesn't mean it isn't complex.Quote:
But in a deterministic world where there isn't a random element to decision making, every single time you will take vanilla. Sure, you want to take vanilla. You 'will' to do it, and you get what you want. But you could never have chosen the chocolate, without first changing your own tastes. Therefore, you do not have 'free will' as the term is generally used, since there was only one course of action you could take, the one which you 'willed' to do.
I think you misunderstood what I mean and it's my bad for using naive as the adjective. It still fits, but the better word would be a simple non determinism (a la Lucretius). Human actions aren't caused or influenced by anything, including "rational" considerations. I was just answering your question.Quote:
Originally Posted by TheStranger
Of course, one could then argue that this kind of model doesn't allow for free will either, as their is no choice anyway (it is 'random' for lack of a better term).
--
God.
First thanks for the clarification with Catholic doctrine. :bow:Quote:
Originally Posted by Philipvs Vallindervs Calicvla
The QM argument against determinism is probably the (mildly) promising one, but it does run into some problems. First the interpretations of QM by many scientists I believe is one that embraces ontological randomness and denies determinism, but their are definitely others which don't answer the determinism question or answer positively and my view is firmly that there isn't any ontological randomness.
Furthermore, you can find many arguments that while granting the particular interpretation of QM with micro-indeterminism, do not grant that it amplifies to the macro level (read neurons) thus making the discussion of QM irrelevant.
You misunderstand, I merely meant that random chance is a pre-requisite, i.e. that without a random element in the universe that Free Will would be impossible, the idea can't even get off the ground.
Clearly you and I have been arguing for too long.
Ok, so the weight of Scientific opinion is against determinism. Why do you dissagree.
The point about Quantom Theory is that it demonstrates that Physics generally does not actually support a deterministic worldview, as was previously claimed. Ultimately we know very little about how the universe works, we just have a lot of theories that fit the (very limited) data.Quote:
Furthermore, you can find many arguments that while granting the particular interpretation of QM with micro-indeterminism, do not grant that it amplifies to the macro level (read neurons) thus making the discussion of QM irrelevant.
it is free will... but there is one problem. is it rational? i doubt it is when you take rational in the optimal sense. but on the other hand it might be rational because it is thoroughly thought through. or maybe that just makes it reasonable? if it is not rational, than how can there be nonrational free will? and how can a rational body willingly wish and practice its own demise?
i dont see why those parts of the body are not you? they are certainly part of you, or do you believe we, as a rational soul or whatever, are chained within a body, which we use but not are. in the same way we use a car perhaps. the body can be in conflict, just as your desires can be in conflict. will i buy a new tv or a new playstation? will i date this girl and forsake my friends? etc
Non-deterministic interpretations of QM don't feel right at all. As I mentioned in that post, there are other interpretations that do support determinism. (Furthermore it has yet to be shown that any kind of indeterminism is distinguishable from determinism at anything above the Quantum level).
TS: yes
Don't "feel" right? That sounds like just a personal opinion. You yourself admitted that the majority of Scientists support nondeterministic interpretations.
Irrelevant, the whole edifice is still little more than a theory, that's like me saying, "It has yet to be demonstrated that there is any form of determinism".Quote:
(Furthermore it has yet to be shown that any kind of indeterminism is distinguishable from determinism at anything above the Quantum level).
I would also note that The Stranger's earlier musings on a shift between body/soul in terms of our understanding of conciousness is somewhat odd, as greater understanding of the mechanical body has no bearing on the existence of a soul, nor have we yet been able to define conciousness itself.
I think yall are looking at the forrest when you should be more focused on the trees
Yes, but I don't see the point in saying that because
1) The are conceptions of free will compatible with determinism
2) randomness is not control
Generally, newtonian physics works on the large scale, but not on the micro scale. It seems reasonable to say that determinism is accurate on the large scale.Quote:
The point about Quantom Theory is that it demonstrates that Physics generally does not actually support a deterministic worldview, as was previously claimed. Ultimately we know very little about how the universe works, we just have a lot of theories that fit the (very limited) data.
All you made was an assertion :tongue3:
You are saying that free will requires regulative control, i.e. that you have to be able to choose between different alternatives. Other people would argue that you have free will if you have guidance control, i.e. you bring about your actions even if you don't have any alternative. I was talking about this in the ice cream example. Do you define freedom as the ability to do anything? I would think not, because then no one could have free will, since we are all fettered by gravity. Some might say that a freely taken action originates in a certain way from your psychological self.
Well yeah it's a personal opinion. Anyway, I frequently disregard the opinions of many people with the scientific mindset especially on metaphysical issues (such as scientific realism). Many scientists today are scientific realists, but there's a very good argument that constructive empiricists stand on firmer ground, for example.
The interpretation of QM that I support for example (or other interpretations that others support), is as consistent with the results of QM as the main one. Just because many scientists today don't like it is as irrelevent as the fact as Einstien did like it. :shrug:
But it's absolutely relevant. It shows that invoking QM and interpreting the results as proof of ontological indeterminism does not do anything to the argument for determinism that is made in respect to free will.Quote:
Irrelevant, the whole edifice is still little more than a theory, that's like me saying, "It has yet to be demonstrated that there is any form of determinism".
Determinism certainly has some extremely strong arguments for it however. Cause-effect relations abound. Determinism above the Quantum level has a much stronger argument for it than any kind of indeterminism.
Free Will requires options, if you have only one option then your "Will" is being externally directed and is totally unfree. Since it certainly appears we have Free Will (otherwise we would not have started this agument) I tend to think the burden of proof must lie on determinism.
Me too.
I decided to post in this thread today. Prove to me that I did not post out of my own free will but that I did it because I was determined to do so. And even if you can prove that everything is determined: does it matter? I certainly don't feel like everything I do is determined. If my free will is but an illusion, then it's a damn good one. Maybe it's so good because it's not an illusion?
Filosophy is nice and fun and it offers good thinking exercises, but it often occupies itself with fruitless questions, "do we have a free will?" being one of them. Who cares if what I'm doing has always been determined or not?
Of course, there are some things we can't control. Some call it "luck" or "bad luck", others "coincidence" and others "destiny", but the fact that there are some things beyond our control doesn' mean that we don't have free will. I have a free will.
Feel free to convince me otherwise.
Quite, but why bother to try and prove us wrong if the world is deterministic. Then it doesn't matter either way.
:inquisitive:
I agree that the fact that we started this argument is evidence that we have free will, a certain kind of free will. But I disagree with your definition. It is entirely possible for the world to be deterministic and for us to have started this argument.
With determinism, your actions are merely predictable, not "externally directed". And why would you want to live in a world where your actions weren't predictable? Would you want to be unpredictable? Would you want "I'm perfectly normal now, but could go crazy at any moment if a certain random event occurs"?
Essentially it seems like your concluding determinism to be false based on the assumption that it's incompatible with free will. But why do you assume that?
That's fatalism.Quote:
Originally Posted by Andres
Then the word determism is poorly chosen. Our actions are predictable (only to a certain extent, certainly if you look at the individual level), not determined.Quote:
Originally Posted by Sasaki
Semantics.
The difference is not that big.
Determinism:
"I'm lazy, but so what, everything is determined anyway, so I can just as well be lazy."
They are predictable to the extent that they are determined. The idea being, that if there was some demon who understood perfectly the laws of nature, and had exact information about the world, he could predict exactly what choice you would make. If it was up to you entirely, then your actions wouldn't be predictable. If there is an element of randomness, then it isn't predictable either, but since randomness isn't choice it's generally best to just leave the complicated physics out of the discussion.
There would be no predictability without some level of determinism. Now we as people can't predict very well, but that's because we have a limited capacity. You can't predict where all the balls will go when you break on a pool table, but do you think that some thing that had more capability couldn't predict where each ball would end up, based on information about the cue ball?
That's fatalism, a nice definition of it by the way. Determinism is the "idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature".Quote:
Semantics.
The difference is not that big.
Determinism:
"I'm lazy, but so what, everything is determined anyway, so I can just as well be lazy."
Why don't you think there is a significant difference? Fatalism is a kind of "it doesn't matter if I wear my seatbelt, my date of death is predetermined". But of course, it does matter if you wear your seatbelt.
And yet, we had the Calvinist work ethic.
Why should the burden of proof lie on determinism as opposed to the free wil argument? Determinism is the simplest explanation of why things are the way they are today. Free will requires all sorts of abstract reasoning for alternative timelines, allowing different paths through time for different choices.
With determinism, you chose to post in this thread because given the conditions which you took into consideration when deciding whether or not to do so, you went with the option that appeared best to you. With free will, you need something that goes beyond the way science sees our brains as being sorts of computers that run by generating electric signals, and you have to add it some sort of spiritual/metaphysical element that we have no proof of whatsoever.
You say that your participation in this thread is proof of your free will. But surely all you can know is that you wanted to participate in the thread. Can you provide any evidence to suggest that you might ever have not participated in this thread?
science is not as a whole in favor of determinism. or free will for that matter. what science says about the brain or sees it etc is not a valid argument in this discussion untill more is known.
if there is free will cause and effect will only situate your freedom, not determine it. e.g. the effect will cause your scala of choises, but which choice you make is still yours. wether the choices available are all rational is something different.
you should google the deciscion inducer thought experiment.
thats actually not true. Human Freedom is always bound. unless you believe there is a radical schism between body and mind or soul, and such mind or soul is pure active intellect. but then it is still bound, if not in the body. because as pure intellect it is not possible to touch the material world. or you would argue that all is pure energy but then we get into another discussion entirely.
u make a mistake here. if the world really was determined they have no choice. they just do it and why they do it is something we and they dont understand. i agree with you that if it was divinely determined there would be no sense in this argument, why would a god let his subjects talk possible heresy etc. but if its more bodily determined than there are no reasons only causes for what we do.
what kind of determinism is that? they are not merely predictable, they are predictable because everything is cause and effect, so if you know that cause and of everything you can logically determine its effect and so on. so its indeed not neccesarily externally directed... hmm...
double post sorry.
Surely if we are able to say that we have free will, then we have free will?
This one?
Well, I agree that not having the ability to do otherwise is not a threat to free will. I don't think you need the thought experiment though, although I guess it helps.Quote:
Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened.
I say "merely" because it's simply not bad thing if our actions are completely predictable by some sort of omniscient thing, even though people present as if it is a bad thing. The fact that you can predict what I'm going to choose, that I was always going to choose it, simply isn't that relevant. It doesn't change the fact that I'm the kind of person who would choose it in that circumstance, just as it doesn't make Jones not a murderer.
yes that is an example of the experiment. i like it, though its a bit ethically related.
just a note, free will applies to the will of humans so far this discussion is concerned and indeed does allow for other parts of the world to be determined. such as when you drop a stone or when somethning happens on cellular level. there is a difference between that determinism and a determined will, ergo no free will at all.
Actually, I made a naughty rhetorical flounce and you caught me :bow:. However, if one admits that everyone here actually believes they have free will (otherwise why are the determinists arguing with me, regardless of whether their belief is determined they clearly believe they can argue with me.) then that begs the question of why we should think the world is deterministic. Cause and Effect does work, broadly speaking, but it's not reliable.
Increasingly we find that answers beget more questions, formulae end in curves rather than finite results.....
there's clearly something fishy going on.
I think i found a way to say what i want about free will and irrationality. i had to read sartre for it so if things sound familiar thats why. its still unpolished, so spill your thoughts about it.
Rationality is not prerequisite for free will. Because it is the capability of humans to be irrational which is also part of our free will. Animals cannot be rational, but they cannot be irrational either. Their nature coincides entirely with their being, thus they always act optimally for their cause, which is the survival of their being. No animal will starve himself for a noble cause other than its own survival. Human nature however does not entirely coincide with their being, they have the ability or the choice so to speak, to be of another nature. Humans have the possibility, the choice, to be irrational. To not act optimally in regard of their cause, to play games while they should study, or to starve while the body demands food. This is because human nature allows for more causes than the survival of its being. However the survival of its being is the cause from which all other causes derive, so it is the primal cause. If one would (knowingly?) something which would harm this cause, like smoking cigarettes, this would be irrational, even though it is optimally in pursuit of a secondary cause, pleasure.
i also have a whole part about being conscious of these cause and desires but that part needs some more work. it all was very clear untill i started to right it down and got lost in the words...
You keep starting with the assumption that having free will must mean that determinism is false...
Consider:
1) Unless there are special circumstances, people should be held morally responsible for their actions
2) If you can't reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, that would be one such special circumstance (e.g. if I pat you on the back and you die, I should not be called a murderer)
3) In order for you to be able to reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, the world can't be random, it needs to be causally determined
Therefore: Moral responsibility requires causal determinism.
I just don't get why you are intent on dismissing determinism :juggle2:
The more random the world is, the less you can hold people responsible for their actions. If my choices are random, I'm not choosing them.
*****
Our actions being causally determined is no reason to say we don't have free will. Generally the argument goes something like
1) determinism means that under circumstances X, you must do A
2) if you must do A, you have no choice in doing A
Therefore: if determinism is true we have no free will
When really it should go
1) determinism says that under circumstances X, what will happen is that you will do A
2) if you must do A, you have no choice in doing A
Therefore: under circumstances X, you will do A (premise 2 is irrelevant)
So cause and effect doesn't force us to make the choices we will make, it simply describes the choices we will make. For comparison take Greshem's law:
So when a government starts printing money like bad, people will hoard gold. Do they do so because of Greshem's law? No. Greshem's law simply describes what people do in that situation.Quote:
[Gresham's Law is] the theory holding that if two kinds of money in circulation have the same denominational value but different intrinsic values, the money with higher intrinsic value will be hoarded and eventually driven out of circulation by the money with lesser intrinsic value.
I know, which is why people cannot be held responsible for their actions in a deterministic system. No one ever acts, or chooses they merely react. Further, it goes against what we percieve to be true, that we make choices. To borrow a Calvinistic principle, and thereby undercut Rhy, Free Will should be accepted against determinism because of utility. If we truly believe our choices are pre-determined by our environment we have no reason to act morally, or act at all.
Under a genuinely dterministic philosophy a human being would be unable to make choices and would simply grind to a halt.
I just explained why determinism is required to hold people responsible for their actions :stare:
They can both be accepted because they are compatible with one another. :stare:Quote:
No one ever acts, or chooses they merely react. Further, it goes against what we percieve to be true, that we make choices. To borrow a Calvinistic principle, and thereby undercut Rhy, Free Will should be accepted against determinism because of utility.
That's fatalism, not determinism. They aren't the same thing :stare:Quote:
If we truly believe our choices are pre-determined by our environment we have no reason to act morally, or act at all.
Under a genuinely dterministic philosophy a human being would be unable to make choices and would simply grind to a halt.
But is having "good intentions" enough? I don't think so. You have to have good reason to back it up. And without causal determinism, you can't be reasonably expected to know what your actions will do.
And even your intentions would change randomly without causal determinism...
The free will you would have without determinism is the type no one would really want.
Well, if you are going to use smileys to be rude I could just leave, you know.
Causation is required to reasonably determine the outcome of a proposed course of action, but in order for someone to be held responsible they must have a choice, i.e. at least two options.
No.Quote:
They can both be accepted because they are compatible with one another.
Fatalism is the directing of events by an outside force, i.e. God. Determinism assumes the system directs itself. Your "causal determinism" is absolute and its results are therefore the saem as a fatalistic system.Quote:
That's fatalism, not determinism. They aren't the same thing :stare:
In the UK there is a defence against murder called "autonomy" where the accused's faculties and decision making are deemed to have been bypassed by an outside agent. In your system:
"determinism says that under circumstances X, what will happen is that you will do A"
So, under the correct circumstance Harry will murder his wife, and under those exact circumstances Harry would always muder his wife. Therefore he cannot be held responsible because he is subject to the external circumstance.
So Free Will in your system merely appears to exist because you cannot accurately measure all the variables and therefore accurately predict the outcome of a situation.
Generally morality accounts for both, so you would need a regular mbut not wholly deterministic system.
I object to the idea that the inevitability of our actions removes personal responsibility. Maybe you could not have done things differently, but that does not change the fact that you are what you are. If you are a sinner, you sin. If regenerated, good works should follow. The notion that in order to be responsible for something, we must make a rational choice to do it, is a very modern one based on the idea of all people being rational agents with free will. If someone gets drunk and kills a guy in a bar fight, he is still held responsible, even if he was unable to use his rational faculties, and acted purely on his animalistic instincts. If a dog bred for fighting mauls a baby, you put it down. It didn't make a reasoned decision, it was just being what it is.
To put a more theological perspective on things, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" (Romans 9:20)
@Sasaki: I think maybe part of the confusion we are all having is due to what we mean by free will. When PVC and myself debate the issue, we always tend to refer to the idea of 'libertarian free will', where freedom is defined as the ability to take more than one path. I get where you are coming from in your arguments, but the issue is that with compatabilitist views, they don't tend to make allowance for the possibility of alternative time lines, or different paths through our lives.
In the reality you describe, everything is inevitable. I was always going to be here typing this post, not one detail of it could be different. This is freedom insofar as we can act according to our nature and our will, but it is not freedom in the sense that the term 'free will' has always been used in philosophical circles, since that suggests a choice. With your view of freedom, everything is inevitable. With libertarian free will, there are countless possible outcomes for the future.
i agree with you. i believe free will is causally determined in this way. you get born into a situation, one you dont pick, you get thrown into it. and the descisions that are made for you and you will make later will determine the course of your life. you cannot choose the situation you get into, but you can choose freely from the options your situation presents you. so to speak with sartre, the enviroment (taken very broadly) never limits your freedom, it only situates it. but you never wholly reasonably foresee the outcome of your actions, so even though you can somewhat guide the course of your life you cannot entirely direct it, and its not determined from the moment you are born. i simply dont believe that you can foresee the future (you can definitly not predict it in this system) because time is not constant.
how can you be responsible for something you have no power over? you are not responsible for being a human, nor being a man or a woman, even though that is who you are, in the sense that that is your being. you have responsibility for being born in a certain place and time. and only if you have a choice to change your nature, (eg how you are) than you can be held accountable for that. but you have no choice about how you are, than how you are is similar to who you are. and you cannot ever be held accountable for who you are.
we hold him accountable for drinking too much in the first place and therefor he knowingly put himself in a situation he could no longer hold himself in check. no one holds a lion accountable for killing a gazelle. we only put down the dog because we reasonably foresee that the dog, who is not rational might kill again because he is not capable of controlling or changing his nature.Quote:
If someone gets drunk and kills a guy in a bar fight, he is still held responsible, even if he was unable to use his rational faculties, and acted purely on his animalistic instincts. If a dog bred for fighting mauls a baby, you put it down. It didn't make a reasoned decision, it was just being what it is.
im not sure whether that the possibilty or the illusion of free will might be enough to account for responsibility. such a situation as the descision inducer are difficult, and i have to think more about it. in a logically ordered universe with a rational omniscient and omnipotent deity i think the possibility is enough, but in a causal determined system without a rational reason but only cause and effect, i doubt that is enough. however, if that illusion or even the possibility cease to exist than there is no reason to hold people responsible for their actions.
How so? If someone is evil then they are evil, the fact they can't choose to do good doesn't make them any better. In the world of the Gnostic sects where there is one good god and one bad god, is the bad god any less evil simply because it is purely a matter of his nature, rather than him being rational and able to choose between good and evil?
If that was the case, shoudln't there just be a blanket legal punishment for being drunk, regardless of what the person does afterwards? If being drunk is the only thing we are held accountable for when a crime follows, why should someone who drink drives and kills someone get a longer sentence than someone who smashes a window on a night out or whatever?