
Originally Posted by
Don Corleone
If I understand it correctly, Koga-san has posed a question in the broader sense of theory of law, not particular application. The question as I understand it is... if we are to confer human rights upon an embryo at the moment of conception, must we then instill all human rights we confer upon humans beyond just the right to life.
Well, first of all, "human rights" is a very nebulous discussion in the context of American theory of law. For one thing, many people 'think' there are certain human rights, I'll give you a hint, they're referred to as 'inalienable', that in fact do not carry the full moral force of a human right, under American theory of law.
Example? The right to the PURSUIT of happiness. The Declaration of Independence (which, by the way, has no legal weight under our legal system whatsoever), declares this to be an inalienable right. The U.S. Constitution, which is the bedrock of all American legal theory never mentions this difficult to define term. (Note to all: it is the PURSUIT that is called for in the DOI, not a guarantee of Happiness itself).
Back to original particular question... would an embryo conceived within the borders of the United States therefore be entitled to citizenship, in light of the fact that we have no shifted the definition of a person from birth to conception.
I believe the argument could be made, forecfully, either way. Citizenship granted upon those born by happy circumstance within the borders of the United States is legally considered a privelege, not a right. It is something the U.S. Government chooses to do, yet is not obligated to do. Yes, I'm tapdancing on the head of a pin, but it's a valid point... we could change the law on this matter at any time we so choose, and I think that's what Rabbit was trying to get at... that it's not a legal requirement by the constructs of our legal system, it's a boon that he doesn't support, so he doesn't feel obligated to support it as it is transferred to an earlier state in the physical development process.
All of that being said, I personally always attempt to err on the side of consistency in the writing/interpretation of laws. Too much arbitrariness is bad, as it becomes impossible to fathom the logic of the legal system and you wind up with the modern equivalent of the Code of Hammurabi, "It is thus because I/we say it is thus". Not a good thing for Democracies (pure or represenative) that are comprised of people of varying familiarity with the particulars of the law.
So, while I would not argue for the abolition of selective abortion in the first trimester, were such a legal movement to gain ground, I would argue that in fact yes, the individual in question would be entitled to any/all of the rights hitherto granted upon those lucky enough to vacate the womb intact. In short, the embryo, and it's host, would be entitled to the rights of citizenship, should they so desire them, as well as the responsibilities conferred simultaneously.
One issue I have with the concept of 'anchor babies', as CR put it, is the rights of citizenship are conferred, but not the responsibilities. In my own personal philosophy of life, divorcing authority and responsiblity, or vice versa, almost always lead to untenable situations.
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