In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.
-Dwight D. Eisenhower

Battle of Agosa 57 BC

A history of Rome, by Prof Alfred Kennard, 2002 New York

From the Seleucid king Koilesyriakos point of view things turned out differently then he planed, when Caesar invaded his territory. He passed the Cicilian Gates in the Taurus Mountains with only some 10.000 men. Clearly he did not count to fight against Caesar. Why should he? There was no reason for Caesar to intervene. Politically the Phrygians were still part of the Seleucid Empire and Koilesyriakos only intention was to quell the rebellion. When he heard that the Romans “invaded” his Empire he was left with no option but to go to war. The main problem was that Caesars legion consisted of some 30.000 men, thrice the number he had. Koilesyriakos asked the Galatians and the Cappadocians for help and they sent mercenary captain Lagoras Babas Lydikes with some additional 12.000 troops. In all, Koilesyriakos was underpowered, but he was more experienced then Caesar. The Seleucid King had served in many battles during the Syrian wars against the powerful Ptolemaic dynasty. The Seleucid king also hoped to win the battle by the use of early Cataphracts, heavy cavalry with Parthian origin.

Commentarii de Bello Asiatico

XXV.


Caesar set up his legions some miles east of Ipsos, waiting and studying the movement of the enemy. For that he ordered Spurius Tullus, his centurion with praetorian powers to ascend the nearby mountains and guard the old Persian road that leads to the east. With the excellent weather provided the scouts would alert Caesar early enough to prepare the right measures for battle. Furthermore the Romans made good use of the helpful Phrygians who would also scout the terrain and tell them all the secrets of the nearby hills.

XXVI.

In early July local peasants sent news to Caesar that Syrian scouts were sent in the name of Koilesyriakos, while most of them were sent away, some Phrygians claimed to have killed a few of the horse riders. But this news was warning Caesar that despite the summer heat the Seleucid King was marching westwards towards the Romans. The news was sent to Phrygians and preparation for battle started. The corn supply was secured secretly at the foot of a local hill, so that in defeat it would not fall into enemy hands. Centurion Spurius Tullus was sent to scout for a good position to face the enemy army. Caesar told Tullus: “Be aware that the enemy might bring formidable cavalry, something our legions lack. Therefore it would be to our benefit to draw the Seleucid king into steep terrain, something Anatolia provides for us.”

XXVII.

Two days later it was reported to the Romans that the Seleucids were camping in the woods eastwards, several miles from Caesars camp. Either Koilesyriakos was not aware of the Roman presence or the King was trying to win more time. The Seleucids did not take the initiative to strike.

XXVIII.

The next day Caesar made the troops ready and marched eastwards to a valley along the old Persian road that the Phrygians call Agosa. Two legions were sent on the open field to bait the Seleucid king out of the nearby woods, while Caesar positioned him with another legion further up the hill, overlooking the whole Agosa valley. While the Seleucid king had strong cavalry, he lacked the necessary numbers of troops to outflank Caesar. The latter was aware of Koilesyriakos weakness, therefore he tried to draw the whole bulk into close combat. The small amount of auxiliary Phrygians was ordered to protect the flank on the lowest point of the hill.

XXIX.

The Seleucids joined the sight of battle and formed a large phalanx in the first line and impressive looking heavy cavalry on the second line. Their flanks were protected with Galatian light infantry. The Roman legionaries became insecure at the sight of the Seleucid heavy cavalry, which the Greeks called Kataphraktos. Their heavy armoured coats and the protections of the horses glittered in the hot summer sun. Caesar also acknowledged the impressing sight of the enemy force despite their numerical inferiority.





XXX.

Much to surprise of the Romans Koilesyriakos quickly changed their formation, putting his most impressive Kataphraktos in front, suddenly charging on to the Roman line. The soldiers began throwing javelins at the armoured riders, but there was little penetration and very few Seleucids fell before the first contact. The impact of heavy cavalry clashing against Roman men was severe, but the line held their position, much to the credit of the centurions who kept the moral of the soldiers high.





XXXI.

Koilesyriakos was quite surprised how well the Romans held their line and ordered to withdraw from battle and reform.



Once again they charged, but this time the much slower Phalanx formed infantry attacked with the Kataphraktos. Caesar himself had to move up to the front rows to secure the spirit of his men, for he knew that if one Cohort (Roman tactical unit) would break away, the whole army would be on the run. Thus he took danger of all equal, encouraging his men joining him in battle.







As the fighting went on the slow Seleucid Phalanx was not able to protect their mobile cavalry and the numerous Roman soldiers pinned down the enemy infantry in hand to hand combat. Koilesyriakos and his men were pushed down the hill southwards, while the northern flank was breaking away. The mercenary captain Lagoras Babas Lydikes tried to move around the southern flank and slay down more vulnerable Roman targets from the back, but soon Caesars Praetorians (tent guards/body guards) secured the rear and made Lagoras attack in vain.







Having achieved high ground Caesar and his men were in no doubt that they would eventually win the battle. At length, worn out with wounds, the Seleucids began to give away choosing to flee. Seeing his whole army turn around and run towards the valley behind them Koilesyriakos, beaten and wounded, joined his men running from the battlefield.