Nature of the alliance between Japan and Germany in WW2

[Graphic]

Maybe someone knowledgeable can fill me in, I can't find the right wording in google to get a result on this.

How exactly did Japan and Germany relate to each other during the war? Did they share intel during the war? Did they communicate with each other? I cant visualize how they aided each other aside from signing the treaty and pledging solidarity. Was that all it really was?

[PanzerJaeger]

The alliance was far more passive than that of the Allies, both out of choice and geographical realities. The two sides did communicate, and a linkage between the two empires was envisioned through the British controlled territories in the Middle East. In fact, Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese ambassador to Germany was quite a sensation among the Nazi elite.

The biggest opportunity for cooperation would surely have been a combined attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler always hoped for such a situation, and did all that he could to make it happen, including declaring war on the United States with the expectation of reciprocation. However, the Japanese, possibly even more arrogant than the Nazis, chose a southward strategy and avoided war with the Soviets until they were attacked in '45.

The two nations were able to engage in limited trade before the invasion of the USSR via the Trans-Siberian Railway. After that route was cut off, there was very little practicable exchange or coordination between the two.

[Graphic]

Interesting, that's about what I thought.

[drone]

For fun and speculation, you can create theories on U-234.

[Martok]

Not that much came of it in the end, obviously, but I thought I remember reading something about the Nazis supplying Japan with a small amount of material for the purpose/possibility of producing atomic bombs. I'm wondering now if that was just rumor, or if there was evidence to (at least partially) substantiate this claim.

[Tsar Alexsandr]

It was a pretty loose alliance. They had some common enemies, and needed more allies. I think both nations had plans on fighting the other in the end.

[Sarmatian]

It was a pretty loose alliance. They had some common enemies, and needed more allies. I think both nations had plans on fighting the other in the end.

Wut? Care to elaborate?

[Tsar Alexsandr]

Wut? Care to elaborate?

Well Hitler had made some statements about the inferiority of Japanese people, as well as other Asian peoples. So.... I doubt peace could have been maintained between them. And the Japanese knew this. But for the time.... it was a situation that would benefit both sides.

[ReluctantSamurai]

It's pretty much the way PanzerJaeger described except that the German invasion of the SU came as a complete shock and surprise to the Japanese, and one which they very upset about.

[PanzerJaeger]

It's pretty much the way PanzerJaeger described except that the German invasion of the SU came as a complete shock and surprise to the Japanese, and one which they very upset about.

Not exactly. The Japanese leadership were angered because they were not provided the exact date and time of the attack. IIRC, Prime Minister Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans did not trust them enough to warn them ahead of time.

However, Berlin made it well known to the Japanese that the Germans were going to attack the Soviet Union. Hitler courted the Japanese for nearly a year before the invasion, hoping to get a commitment. In reaction to that knowledge, there was a major strategic disagreement between the army, which wanted to pursue the Hokushin strategy of a combined attack against the Soviet Union with Germany, and the navy, which fought to keep the southern Nanshin doctrine. As I mentioned before, the southern strategy prevailed.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Not exactly. The Japanese leadership were angered because they were not provided the exact date and time of the attack. IIRC, Prime Minister Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans did not trust them enough to warn them ahead of time.

While Japan might have had an inclination to believe that Germany was going to invade the SU, the general consensus in the Japanese AGS was that the information coming from sources in Germany were nothing but misinformation. News of the attack came from press releases and caused Konoe to consider, for a brief time, withdrawing from the Tripartite.

The biggest opportunity for cooperation would surely have been a combined attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler always hoped for such a situation, and did all that he could to make it happen, including declaring war on the United States with the expectation of reciprocation.

Nothing truer could be said than the first sentence. It was indeed the best opportunity for Germany and Japan to actually have some sort of working relationship. But the rest of that statement is rather puzzling. If Hitler wanted active Japanese co-operation, surely he would have let them in on his plans? Or at least given some notification of H-hour? And Germany's declaration of war on the United States had nothing to do with the attack on the SU, and in fact could be considered counterproductive to Barbarossa because it now qualified the SU to begin receiving LL aid.

However, Berlin made it well known to the Japanese that the Germans were going to attack the Soviet Union. Hitler courted the Japanese for nearly a year before the invasion, hoping to get a commitment.

Could you expand a bit on how this was done?

[PanzerJaeger]

While Japan might have had an inclination to believe that Germany was going to invade the SU, the general consensus in the Japanese AGS was that the information coming from sources in Germany were nothing but misinformation. News of the attack came from press releases and caused Konoe to consider, for a brief time, withdrawing from the Tripartite.

It was far more than an inclination. There were many discussions between the two nations via diplomats about the upcoming German invasion. The anger was over not being told of the specific date and time, so as to prepare for possible hostilities with the Soviet Union.

Nothing truer could be said than the first sentence. It was indeed the best opportunity for Germany and Japan to actually have some sort of working relationship. But the rest of that statement is rather puzzling. If Hitler wanted active Japanese co-operation, surely he would have let them in on his plans? Or at least given some notification of H-hour? And Germany's declaration of war on the United States had nothing to do with the attack on the SU, and in fact could be considered counterproductive to Barbarossa because it now qualified the SU to begin receiving LL aid.

It may be puzzling, but it is the truth - as is often the case with Hitler. He hoped that Japan would feel obligated to reciprocate his solidarity by attacking the Soviet Union.

Could you expand a bit on how this was done?

There were never any specific agreements set up as the Japanese always remained non-committal, but Hitler continually made overtures to the Japanese through diplomatic channels.

[ReluctantSamurai]

There were many discussions between the two nations via diplomats about the upcoming German invasion.

Hitler continually made overtures to the Japanese through diplomatic channels.

I have never seen material to this effect, which doesn't mean it's nonexistent, of course. Could you perhaps provide examples?

He hoped that Japan would feel obligated to reciprocate his solidarity by attacking the Soviet Union.

Hoping that Japan would feel obligated is far different than 'courted...for nearly a year'.

I'd also be curious why Hitler would feel the need for Japanese participation given that in the original planning for Barbarossa the campaign was to be concluded within six months.....

[PanzerJaeger]

I have never seen material to this effect, which doesn't mean it's nonexistent, of course. Could you perhaps provide examples?

All of my information comes from books I have read. I do not have time to readily cite specific communiqué.

Hoping that Japan would feel obligated is far different than 'courted...for nearly a year'.

Indeed it is. That is because you are referencing two different events. Hitler courted the Japanese before the invasion without success. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he again saw an opportunity to get Japan into the war against the Soviet Union, which was especially important considering the failure to take Moscow.

I'd also be curious why Hitler would feel the need for Japanese participation given that in the original planning for Barbarossa the campaign was to be concluded within six months.....

Despite his reputation, Hitler always sought Allies, regardless of whether he felt he could win on his own or not.

Edit:

I did some searching for sources, and there is a wikipedia page specifically dedicated to the issue we’re discussing, which would have been helpful earlier. It seems well sourced and comprehensive. It provides some of the communiqué you requested, and supports my general assertions.

Specifically,

In order to directly or indirectly support his imminent invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler had repeatedly suggested Japan to reconsider plans for an attack on the Soviet far east throughout 1940 and 1941. In talks involving Hitler, his foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, his Japanese counterpart at that time, Yōsuke Matsuoka, as well as Berlin's and Tokyo's respective ambassadors, Eugen Ott and Hiroshi Ōshima, the German side broadly hinted at, but never openly asked for, either invading the Soviet Union from the east or by attacking Britain's colonies in South-East Asia, thereby preoccupying and diverting the British Empire away from Europe and thus somewhat covering Germany's back.[28] Although Germany would have clearly favored Japan attacking the USSR, exchanges between the two allies were always kept overly formal and indirect, as it is shown in the followng statement by Hitler towards ambassador Ōshima from 2 June 1941:

"It would, of course, be up to Japan to act as it saw fit, but Japan's cooperation in the fight against the Soviet Union would be welcomed if the [Japanese] advance to the south should run into difficulty because of supply and equipment."

Also,

Hitler chose to declare war on the United States and ordered the Reichstag, along with Italy, to do so on December 11, 1941, three days after the United States' declaration of war on the Empire of Japan. His hopes that, despite the previous rejections, Japan would reciprocally attack the Soviet Union after all did not transpire, however, since Japan sticked to its Nanshin strategy of going south, not north, and would continue to maintain an uneasy peace with the Soviet Union until 1945.

[ReluctantSamurai]

And the article also has this to say:

From Japan's point of view the attack on Russia very nearly ruptured the Tripartite Pact on which the Empire was depending for Germany's aid in maintaining good relations with Moscow so as to preclude any threat from Siberia. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans clearly trusted their Axis allies too little to warn them of Barbarossa, even though he had feared the worst since receiving an April report from Ōshima in Berlin that "Germany is confident she can defeat Russsia and she is preparing to fight at any moment." Foreign minister Matsuoka on the other hand vividly tried to convince the Emperor, the cabinet as well as the army staff of an immediate attack on the Soviet Union. However, his colleagues rejected any such proposal, even regarding him as "Hitler's office boy" by now and pointed out to the fact that the Japanese army, with its light and medium tanks, had no intention of taking on Soviet tanks and aircraft until they could be certain that the Wehrmacht had smashed the Red Army to the brink of defeat.

In addition to that article there is this from the Japan Research Documents as quoted in A.D. Coox's book: Nomonhan, Japan against Russia 1939:

The Japanese government, supposedly on intimate terms with the Germans, was visibly confused by the conflicting intelligence reaching it from overseas posts. Whereas Japanese sources in Germany were predicting war with increasing frequency, the Japanese embassy in Russia was steadfastly denying it. With few exceptions, the IJA High Command misjudged matters as badly as did Matsuoka and the foreign ministry. Until the beginning of June 1941 the AGS, suspecting bluff and misinformation, adhered to the opinion that there was a low probability of all-out hostilities in the near future.

It seems clear to me that despite a general "feeling" of wanting Japanese participation if only for diversionary purposes, Germany kept Japan basically in the dark about its plans.

Given the relative strengths of the Soviet Far Eastern Front and the Kwantung Army as of June 22, 1941, I'm sure the Japanese would've appreciated better advance warning

A more appropriate discussion in terms of relations between Germany and Japan might be: What could Germany offer the Japanese to entice them enough to attack Russia's Far Eastern Front?

[PanzerJaeger]

Well, at least we seem to have dispensed with all but one of the issues in contention.

And the article also has this to say:

"From Japan's point of view the attack on Russia very nearly ruptured the Tripartite Pact on which the Empire was depending for Germany's aid in maintaining good relations with Moscow so as to preclude any threat from Siberia. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans clearly trusted their Axis allies too little to warn them of Barbarossa, even though he had feared the worst since receiving an April report from Ōshima in Berlin that "Germany is confident she can defeat Russsia and she is preparing to fight at any moment." Foreign minister Matsuoka on the other hand vividly tried to convince the Emperor, the cabinet as well as the army staff of an immediate attack on the Soviet Union. However, his colleagues rejected any such proposal, even regarding him as "Hitler's office boy" by now and pointed out to the fact that the Japanese army, with its light and medium tanks, had no intention of taking on Soviet tanks and aircraft until they could be certain that the Wehrmacht had smashed the Red Army to the brink of defeat. "

Which is exactly what I said in my first response to you.

Not exactly. The Japanese leadership were angered because they were not provided the exact date and time of the attack. IIRC, Prime Minister Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans did not trust them enough to warn them ahead of time.

Even in that quotation it says that Oshima reported that:

"Germany is confident she can defeat Russsia and she is preparing to fight at any moment."

Not to mention Hitler's own communiqué 20 days before the invasion which was highlighted earlier.

"It would, of course, be up to Japan to act as it saw fit, but Japan's cooperation in the fight against the Soviet Union would be welcomed if the [Japanese] advance to the south should run into difficulty because of supply and equipment."

In addition to that article there is this from the Japan Research Documents as quoted in A.D. Coox's book: Nomonhan, Japan against Russia 1939:

"The Japanese government, supposedly on intimate terms with the Germans, was visibly confused by the conflicting intelligence reaching it from overseas posts. Whereas Japanese sources in Germany were predicting war with increasing frequency, the Japanese embassy in Russia was steadfastly denying it. With few exceptions, the IJA High Command misjudged matters as badly as did Matsuoka and the foreign ministry. Until the beginning of June 1941 the AGS, suspecting bluff and misinformation, adhered to the opinion that there was a low probability of all-out hostilities in the near future. "

I have not read that book, but it does seem odd to me that the Japanese would give equal weight to their Russian embassy as to their German one in determining German war plans, especially considering the rather obvious signals Germany was sending.

Again, though, you seem to be confusing anger over not knowing of the immediate German war plans with knowledge of German intentions, which was clear nearly a year before the invasion. As I said before, it even caused a rather large debate within the Japanese high command, which is also sourced in the wiki article.

Matsuoka, Ōshima and parts of the Japanese Imperial Army were proponents of "Hokushin", Japan's go north strategy aiming for a coordinated attack with Germany against the USSR and seizing East Siberia. But the Japanese army-dominated military leadership, namely persons like minister of war Hideki Tōjō, were constantly pressured by the Japanese Imperial Navy and, thus, a strong tendency towards "Nanshin" existed already in 1940, meaning to go south and exploiting the weakened European powers by occupying their resource-rich colonies in South-East Asia.

I'm not sure how one could argue that Japan did not know of an upcoming attack on the USSR by Germany if they were having a debate about whether to join in or not.

It seems clear to me that despite a general "feeling" of wanting Japanese participation if only for diversionary purposes, Germany kept Japan basically in the dark about its plans.

That strikes to the heart of the issue. If you define "in the dark" as not knowing the immediate time and date of the attack, then yes indeed they were. As I said in my original response to this thread, there was no coordination between the two nations at that level. If you define "in the dark" as not knowing that Germany wanted to attack the USSR in '41, then no, they were not.

[Meneldil]

I pretty sure Ian Kershaw's Fateful Choices mentions that the Japanese were well aware that Hitler was going to invade the SU but didn't know the exact time. And as PJ said, a large part of the army was in favor of creating a front on the eastern border of Russia.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Again, though, you seem to be confusing anger over not knowing of the immediate German war plans with knowledge of German intentions, which was clear nearly a year before the invasion.

No confusion on my part. The Japanese AGS was receiving mixed information from its intelligence and didn't know what was misinformation and what was not.

And as PJ said, a large part of the army was in favor of creating a front on the eastern border of Russia.

The staff of the Kwantung Army was in favor of such a thing, but there were just as many in the AGS that wanted no part of tangling with the Soviets again in light of the thrashing at Khalkin Gol.

In any case, the alliance with Japan was more paper than anything else. But much more could have been made of it had the two been more willing to set common goals. I doubt Germany knew the extent of the butt-thrashing administered by the Soviets at Khalkin Gol and therefore puzzled at the Japanese reluctance to make advances on the Far Eastern Front. I also don't think Germany realized the dire predicament Japan was in considering oil supplies. After all, that was the deciding factor for the Japanese to invade Indochina and the DEI.

I've always thought that if syn-fuel technology had been offered to the Japanese in return for their cooperation in slicing and dicing the Soviet Union, it just might have been enough to tip the scales. The Japanese had their own syn-fuel program and actually did some very good research on catalysts in the FT process. They also had access to large coal and oil-shale deposits in their Korean and China holdings. Where they failed was in the scale-up from laboratory processing to full-scale production. The impatience of Japanese researchers to get into production as quickly as possible led them to neglect the building of pilot plants to test out production methods. This is where Germany could have helped out the most, having already solved production problems in both the FT process and the high-pressure Bergius method. They also could have shared their research with cobalt-thorium catalysts (the Japanese were consigned to using less efficient iron catalysts due to supply problems) although I'm not sure they had enough to actually supply the Japanese with them.

The biggest problem with this scenario is getting enough plants built and into production quickly enough before Japan runs out of oil.

The Japanese could certainly have made life vastly more difficult for Stalin in the Far East despite the setback at Khalkin Gol. Rather than taking on the Soviets in the semi-arid steppes of Outer Mongolia (which is excellent tank and artillery country), an advance in the Khabarovsk vicinity, which is rugged, heavily forested terrain, plays to the IJA's strength of close combat with infantry. With support from the IJN, Vladivostok could probably have been taken, thereby closing one of the major LL ports to the USSR (which, of course, noone could predict, at the moment). Makes for an interesting scenario, IMHO.

I have not read that book

I highly recommend it. It's the definitive work on the Khalkin Gol incident, and the one most often referenced in other works devoted to that conflict. Be prepared for some serious reading, though. It's nearly 1300 pages You will not find a better sourced or referenced work. The bibliography alone is 70 pages long