Results 1 to 30 of 54

Thread: Is EB 1.2 the most sophisticated turn based computer strategy wargame to this date?

Threaded View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #34

    Default Re: Is EB 1.2 the most sophisticated turn based computer strategy wargame to this dat

    Quote Originally Posted by Gaius Sempronius Gracchus View Post
    Many good points Geticus, and its particularly telling - within Caesar's Gallic Wars - that he refers to the martial cultures of the Gauls being corrupted, to varying degrees, by luxury. He refers to the Belgae as "the bravest of all the Gauls", for example, because they eschewed the luxury imports (Roman trade, essentially).

    At some point, there was a cultural shift within Gaul, away from martial 'ethics' and toward trading. Luxury, in other words. And the nobles of various tribes were attracted to that luxury, and so the Aedui, who were 'friends and kinsmen' of Rome, and so who likely had the greatest trading rights with their merchants, gained influence and power among those simlarly placed nobles within other tribes. Their confederacies and 'senates' were in place to avoid warfare - hence the limits on holding office referred to by Caesar. It was to avoid raiding and other martial pursuits. The nobility who lead many of the tribes at this time had become remarkably squeamish about war. It is telling that the main focus of what warring was occurring was regarding toll rights and trade routes. The Arverni were disrupting and interfering with the trade routes of the Aedui, and the Sequani and Aedui were at war over the toll rights to the Arar which ran between them - which resulted in them bringing in Ariovistus in to aid them in subjugating the Aedui...

    This deterioration of the martial aspects of the culture of the Gallic nobles is probably what allowed those less 'civilised' Belgae, under the suzerainty of Diviciacus of the Suessiones, to gain ground in Gaul as a whole.

    What was lacking in Gaul was a centralised 'rallying' point. Rome had managed to attain that. But, they could so easily have gone the way of Gaul.... the Social Wars was won not just by military means, but also by giving way on political power within the Senate and the assemblies to those outlying Italian tribes.

    It is telling that Roman culture saw land-owenership/farming as acceptable pursuits for their noblemen, while trading for the ruling classes was frowned upon. So, what differentiated the Roman Senate at this time from other 'civilisations' was that the members of that Senate were expected to possess martial skills and knowledge, so that political decisions would support military campaigning. We see the opposite with the Gauls, and also a marked difference with the Carthaginians - whose own senate often undermined military campaigns.

    As to the idea that it is not 'accidental' that Rome persisted while others fell by the wayside.. for the reasons given here that's true to an extent. But the geography of Rome's position helped. In the middle of a peninsula. Once they'd gained hegemony over the Roman peninsula, and naval power through the Med and the Adriatic, they were not subject to attack from all sides - so it's interesting that the USA should be brought up as a modern day example (and the wars against the French, the war of independence, the wars against Mexico...all play a significant part in US power, as does the defeat of the secessionist South in the civil war). The Gauls were facing pressure from the North, from the distinct culture of the Belgae, from the East and North with the expansion of the Germanic tribes and from Rome. Rome's other enemies were also subject to incursions on many fronts. The various Greek factions were all merrily weakening each other, the Persians/Eastern Greeks were involved in their own blood-letting...

    Rome's great political nouse was in understanding how to use existing political structures within conquered towns - both prior to and after - to facilitate their expansion; a strategy used later by the church in it's spread across Europe.. and how politics and military matters were one and the same thing. If the political will is not there, any military success will, ultimately, be futile.
    Well martial law can, at least for a time, substitute for political will :)

    Concurred as to the advantages of Rome's position, Polybius spoke at length about the fecundity and abundance of Italy, with timber, livestock, great produce, rivers, and all other needful things for great power in that day.

    Your observation about Roman injunctions against Senators owning many commercial vessels again confirms the unique character of the Roman nobility, which enabled Rome to fuse arts of civilization and statescraft with the brute art of war to such a rare degree, perhaps only rivalled by Sparta in its heydey under the Lycurgan constitution. For my part I like to side with Caesar and accept the mythical notion that this character was of Trojan provenance. For those who laugh-- laugh at Caesar as well!

    As to Gaulic martial cultural remissness, indeed I have read Hellenic historians of the late Republican era relating the famous wealth of Gaulic kings of that day, and their extreme alcoholism and overfondness for Hellenic wine, even going so far as to trade human slaves for amphorae of wine on a one to one basis. This sort of lifestyle surely detracted from martial virtue.

    Was it necessary for Gallic statescraft to follow a similar trajectory to the Roman during the social wars and lead to liberation/inclusion of other states in some sort of Pan-Gallic identity? Makedon was pretty effective at conquering the world, and Alexander did use pan-Hellenic ideals to fill out the ranks of the army, certainly what he did was inspired in part by Xenophon's Anabasis and other Hellenic philosophers who advocated pan-Hellenic ideals and unification against Persia. Later Makedonian kings tried to ride the fine line between popularity with the Southern Hellenic states, and preservation of autokratic power, and wasted a lot of strength in wars against other Hellenic nations as a result.

    But I think it can go both ways, inclusion can lead to popular support which can be of advantage. But the Roman Republic was generally successful during its first 400 years pursuing a policy of Roma uber Alles. Latin urbes that disputed the primacy of Rome were ruthlessly quashed, notably during the beginning of the Samnite War c. 340 during the consulship of Manlius Torquatus and Decius Mus. Mus rather sacrificed himself to the infernal gods in battle than lose a battle to the Latin confederacy, likewise Torquatus executed his own son to preserve Roman military discipline with the utmost severity-- and his decision was successful, the Latins political will was pretty well permanently crushed, they didn't even dare revolt in meaningful numbers when Hannibal reached out his hand, and it took another 250 years and a united Italy to finally break the strength of Roman ethnocentric bigotry.

    As to the martial equation of Gauls vs. Romans, I think the major weakness of the Romans was in its equestrian class, especially after the shift of equestrian culture towards commerce following territorial and economic expansion after the Samnite Wars. The total route following the battle of the Anio has all the markings IMO of an atrocious cavalry route, I don't think that the plebs would have given up the city if the pursuit was a slow affair, they couldn't even reenter the city or do a well ordered defensive retreat- only cavalry can accomplish this. So to me the question is, what cavalry/chariotry advantages did an optimized Celtic army possess over the Romans? Since technical literary evidence is lacking I can only speculate. But consistent with Caesar's observations that you cite from De Bello Gallico I.1., it is clear that the Gauls were growing martially remiss. Gaul was dominated by a forked aristocracy of horsemen and druids. Vercingetorix tried to optimize the cavalry numerical advantage but he failed in his day. But I suspect that back in the day the Gallic aristokrats, when chivalry was uppermost in their daily priorities, were capable of fielding cavalry forces beyond any Roman capability and I think that this is the key to the debacle at the Anio, and the great dread of Gallic invasions that persisted for 150 years thereafter. At any rate in speculating on Celtic chivalry capabilities we are definitely dealing with a different culture, one that confirms Mr. Fred's observations on the fact that culture doesn't always improve, and knowledge is not always preserved.
    Last edited by Geticus; 07-19-2010 at 20:46.

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •  
Single Sign On provided by vBSSO