ROMA ANATOLIKA


It is true that the last eight years have cost me my youth. Our campaign was not as glorious as the old Emperor believed it would be, nor as detrimental to the Arab reign as his son would have hoped. The victory won by Melissenos in battle was the catalyst of our decisive victory in war. I am reduced somewhat from my former ability but I will recover again now that we are nearly home - of this I am confident - and we will move again to serve on the frontier of the empire.
My body is desirous of nothing other than rest, and my mind is quite tempted to obey this, but so are all the men who followed me through the heathen lands tempted.

It is my responsibility to make an account here for posterity, that their actions and feats which have sapped them so may yield them the greatest of benefits in my view - the literal immortality.

Romanus Angelus, General of Byzantion, 1235 Rum

1228 - 1235 μ.Χ.


When we were south of Alexandria, it was reported to us by locals that a fleet of Arab baggalas had come up and destroyed the galleys which transported us. This meant that no contact was possible between ourselves and the homeland, and we resigned ourselves to quitting the coast entirely as we moved toward Kairo.

The city was heavily fortified with an impenetrable citadel, which was beyond the means of our single bombard and the engineers capable of such weapons as trebuchets were far too few. For this reason I began a forced march toward Gaza, where I hoped we would meet with a major Ayyubid relief force, but on arrival here in 1228 we discovered another well fortified keep, which seemed without value to me, as did the province, and so to the great discontent of the army, I ordered a continued march north.

The desert was fearsome to our infantry and progress was extremely slow. I was confident that any confrontation with the enemy, whose numbers included mostly camel riders of the Bedouin tribes, would lead to a victory. Even in the most difficult struggles with baggage through the salty southern districts, no Arab force was encountered, and even the influence of the Khalifah seemed far from the populations we approached. The fortifications were manned rather through fear of our army than loyalty to the sovereign.

News from the empire was still not forthcoming as we continued north into Palestine, where we halted having been informed of a great and long established castle dominating the province, well supplied and well manned by the Khalifah's African troops.

The army was beginning to become highly rebellious after such a numbing experience of the desert, and we had not been fortunate enough to carry off anything of significant value from any of the provinces we had passed through. Raiding was impossible and the foraging of the army was prevented by the constant danger of the watchful enemy well within his walls.

I was blamed for not having attempted the assault of any fortifications but I was simply unwilling to commit our infantry - our only solid combat arm - and the only troops reliable enough to be engaged in an assault, against such formidable defenses with no hope of effective assistance from so few engines.

Hopeful that we may at last by forced marches in a much more easily traversed country come upon the enemy before the had chance to withdraw into fortifications, we moved north into Tripoli. Here we found that the Armenian king had been forced to return home after a protracted siege only one year previous. We despaired of our absence from home when we realised that four years had passed since our departure from the homeland, and it was now the year 1230. Now within range of our own naval movements, we made contact with fellow countrymen at last as we approached the castle heavily defended in this Levantine province.

We were greatly saddened by the news that our old Emperor Constantine XI had died whilst relieved from command of the Imperial army by Melissenos, and also by the criticism which had surfaced against him after his death in 1227. Some, even amongst our nobility, had taken to calling him Constantine the Philistine in a most vulgar fashion.

If this is due to his initial decision to forsake the christian alliance for a contract with the Khalifah, I say that both his determination to deny assistance to King Hugh I and his timely rescue of the same were actions not in favour of any nation but our own - and this is to be praised in our old Emperor. Those who would think too highly of the Crusaders must remember that such fanatical and unruly men were most ungodly and treacherous to us, even as guests within our own country, not so long ago. The very men who escort me know this all too well, and although Constantine XI forbid recognition of the loss of the Capitol, nonetheless it is certain that this occurred, and taught us that the empire must look only after her own as we are envied even by christian brethren.

This much will I stray toward political argument.

We were now also told that the Armenian king had been forced to withdraw to his homeland when the Khalifah began serious offensives against his province. These had all been beaten back, and at one stage a reconnaissance in force was led by the Ayyubid crown prince Nasir into Rum herself. King Philip I, now in very advanced age, was at this time said to be retreated from Edessa after some initial success there.

Further information allowed us to ascertain the enemy positions, and we learned that the greatest concentrations were in Edessa and Mesopotamia, but that a religious war was being proposed amongst the Arabs in the south and we decided that we would intercept these fanatics before they could pass Palestine.

Eager to support our new Emperor Constantine XII then and Melissenos who was preparing heavily for defense in Rum by the recruitment of many infantry battalions, we carried off from Tripoli loot amounting to 1200 florins and moved again south for Palestine, refreshed and determined.

Upon reaching Jerusalem we discovered the fortifications similarly defended, but the 'Jihad' broke up in the face of our advance. I suspected that the lack of such religious support would severely undermine the authority of the Khalifah in his war against the empire.

I was equally zealous as the army to engage and remove some fortifications of the Ayyubid dynasty wherever it was prudent to do so. By this time significant intelligence was obtained from the locals, who reported to me that the inland provinces, particularly those comprising Syria and lower Mesopotamia and Arabia were less developed and certainly more loosely defended than the coastal fortifications.

Trusting this, a march was begun for Syria. And on arrival here, we met with no resistance as the Arabs here fled east to combine with the Khalifah's army. Victorious over a province at last, I loosed the men upon the land and more than 5000 florins of loot was recovered from the forts and townships.

We found here a substantial and fanatical catholic population, which had been subdued by the Khalifah following the death of Crown Prince Richard. I had decided to continue the march quickly east having removed everything of value from the province, since there was rumour that the Khalifah was gathering an army in Mesopotamia for use in the offensives against Rum.

As we left Syria, a wild and brutal rebellion spread throughout the land. Thousands of catholics came out armed upon the roads and eventually we believed that we had escaped great danger by moving eastward so early. These men, armed with whatever they could scavenge and led by the remnants of the old Orders, declared themselves loyal to the new Crusader kingdom. I later learned that a massive revolt had occurred in Kupros after the Venetian Doge Giovanni had secured the island for himself under the pretense of protecting the inhabitants from the muslim threat. William I, having come of age, declared his right to the throne of the Crusaders and asserted independence, causing the Italians to flee and our major ally to be reestablished.

It was the winter of 1234 then when we entered the province of Mesopotamia, and we found the immediate country overseen and guarded by a keep of relatively simple design. We were short of supplies and exhausted with travel. Behind us was a huge revolutionary army intent on regaining empire in the Levant and all bordering provinces, and one not to be mistaken for an ally. We had succeeded in causing the Khalifah and his forces to split and retreat, but we were now between two great muslim armies and still with a long march through the desert to reach Byzantine land again.

The commander of this fortification could not be contacted, and to the excitement of the infantry I resolved upon assaulting the fort, that we might have the loot and spoils of the province to speed us on our march home.

Mesopotamia 1234




Having been engaged for some time in transporting the bombard by cart onto the highest vantage, through the bogged dunes and many troughs which plagued movement distant from the road, we waited aside two of our infantry battalions and a small mercenary group armed for the assault, whilst the engineers prepared the weapon and similarly, down on the flats to the west of the keep a second team of engineers prepared a trebuchet.

A barrage was begun which lasted considerable time. The same sandstorms which had blighted our native troops throughout the march were also constant here, and our infantry appeared unable to reliably assault, though willing.

Unfortunately we found that the bombard was beyond a practical range and the crew were unable to sustain an accurate barrage. This led to a waste of time and eventually a lack of ammunition. I signalled for the billmen to begin the assault as soon as the timber wall which screened the keep had been breached.

Much to their credit, the billmen in two battalions advanced across the plain and up the rise toward the breach very swiftly, hardly halting as the numerous Arabs, mounted upon camels, came charging out to meet them. Cutting these off easily with their weapons, they stormed the first barricade and gained the first victory.



Our bombard crew informed me that they were without ammunition to continue the barrage and I somewhat angrily dismissed them. I was not aware from my position of the bill's success in the fighting and believed that this miscalculation would cause serious casualties, since it was believed crucial that the main stone wall of the keep be breached at the eastern end.

The mercenaries however ignored this problem and took it upon themselves to storm the gateway leading to the keep and confront the garrison with only a narrow head. I believe their weaponry and tactics, unique in my experience, caused victory on their part and they suffered very few casualties having entirely destroyed the Arab resistance.



I was most impressed by the performance of our troops in this action, and it was encouraging for the entire army. Another great bounty was found in the pillage of the central country, and we were so confident of our ability that we prepared to march south into Arabia and defeat the Khalifah in the lands of his origin.

News reached us though at this time which caused great desire to return home. In 1231 as we returned to Palestine, the old Crusader battalions in Antioch which had fought with us against al Haziz had allied themselves with the sons of the Khalifah against Armenia, hoping to gain land and restore peace to what they saw as their homeland. This was heartbreaking for these men when they discovered later that the old kingdom still lived, but they were by this time under obligation to the princes who guarded them carefully.

With this new military power, the princes Nasir and Adil had repeatedly attacked and skirmished with King Philip I until his resources were beyond recovery. In 1233 the Ayyubids simply marched into Kilikia, executed King Philip I and claimed the massive palatial citadel there.

Convinced that the Arabs were immeasurably more dangerous than the Turks, Melissenos brought the Imperial army out of Rum and immediately against the princes into Kilikia, who yielded the province without contest.

We received orders at last detailing a need for defence in Rum. The reasons for this were vague and relevant to a militant migration north of the Caucasus, but urgent enough that we decided to march north for our province without delay.

Further details of the situation as it evolved in the north I will leave to Melissenos, who was vastly more intelligent of affairs than we were, isolated for long periods and distant from anything which we knew as familiar.

I congratulate Lord Melissenos of Rum on the victory in Kilikia and also our Emperor Constantine XII, with whom I hope to become acquainted now that I am returned to the civilisation of our empire.

Romanus Angelus, General of Byzantion, 1235 Rum.