The 19 True Things Generals Can't Say About Afghanistan

[PanzerJaeger]

MRD, thanks for the perspective. It would be foolish to argue with someone with your specific hands-on knowledge and skill set, so I won't. I just can't help but think that 100+ thousand soldiers in 2003 would be doing pretty much what 100+ thousand soldiers are doing today - winning hard fought but essentially pyrrhic victories. And considering the soviet experience with extensive infrastructure investments, I'm not sure more development would have changed the fundamental issues working against the coalition. We can give them security, resources, development, and elections, but, as has already been said, their leaders have to want what we're selling - and representative democracy is a hard sell to people who are used to lording over their own private armies. Also, it is my understanding that COIN was developed for Iraq because the Iraqi insurgency grew in scope and intensity before the Afghani one did. The surge was developed in 2006 and announced in 2007, just as violence began to flare up in Afghanistan.

You have the testimony of your only special forces and generals about how Bin Laden and the Taliban were let escape from Tora Bora due to basically lack of resources.

If you had a caught them then you could have declared victory and drew down your forces at a time when the Afghan insurgency had not ramped up yet.

The battle at Tora Bora took place in December of 2001, iirc. The invasion of Iraq commenced in March of 2003.