Military Strategies

[Baiae]

I think that there are some very good points made in this thread but as usual, everyone tends to overstate their points somewhat.

On the original point that "there's no military strategy. Only military doctrine", This is true to a point, that you can base your tactics purely on standard military dogma and be a successful general but there is room for improvisation and the application of inspiration. For example the battle of Ferozeshah

You said: Going by what you just said, you could simply march at an enemy with a group of well supplied, well trained men with high morale and expect to win. This is nonsense.

I say: You're wrong. Name 1 instance where it did not occur.

Ferozeshah is one instance where a highly motivated, well trained and supplied army failed to defeat a numerically inferior foe. Why? There were two key moments where a moment of tactical genius altered the course of the battle. Firstly when the British infantry were taking severe damage from Khalsa artillery, Hugh Gough, the British commander drew the cannons' fire but galloping away from the main battle line. This act, pretty much at contrast with any standard military doctrine, bought valuable time for the British infantry to recover. Secondly, when the Khalsa heavy cavalry were charging towards the British line, the pitifully small British cavalry brigade, outnumbered and exhausted, charged the Khalsa cavalry in the flank, disrupting their attack and demoralising the Khalsa sufficiently for them to withdraw.

"Ah", you say "but that was just applying standard mlitary doctrine by using a flank attack". This is true to an extent but the real reason for the success of the charge was not where the attack hit but when it did. The split-second timing of the charge was a example of true tactical genius.

Another good example of non-standard military tactics bringing great success is Robert E Lee's daring division of his forces at Chancellorsville. In that case the Confederate Army, undernourished, poorly supplied and outnumbered, inflicted a significant defeat on the Union Army, who, I would argue, were as motivated as their enemy.

Furthermore you ignore the possibility that over time good military doctrine can become bad military doctrine. Exceptional commanders can spot this before it becomes problematic. Good examples of this include the horrific frontal cavalry charges of the Franco-Prussian War. Perfectly standard tactics for the previous major European wars, suicidal in 1870. Similarly Lee's massed Napoleonic assault at Gettysburg led to the conclusive defeat of the Confederate forces.

So that's my arguement. Thanks for starting an interesting and challenging thread on the org. Congratulations.

P.S. I've got to agree with Arrowhead on the ROTK thing. Too many people use it as an example of what happened "in real life".

[Somebody Else]

Dare I mention Alcibiades, who captured Selymbria with fifty men? He had had peope within the city open the gates for him - when the signal was given (a bit early) he still rushed in, with fifty men. Once inside, he was completely surrounded and outnumbered. He merely asked them to surrender and they did, by the time they knew what was happening, the rest of his army had turned up.

Does speed count as standard military doctrine? Or can it be admitted that certain generals may well have a flair for being able to judge when turning up in the right place at the right time can tip the balance.

[Vanya]

GAH!

"In soup, the head of a great general tastes the same as that of a grubby peasant."
-- Vanya

"The vanquished constantly whine about their strategic and tactical shortcommings, while the victors march on collecting heads in their triumphal campaigns without giving much thought to anything."
-- Vanya

"The difference between winners and losers is one simply dies sooner."
-- Vanya



GAH!

[Red Harvest]

GAH!

"In soup, the head of a great general tastes the same as that of a grubby peasant."
-- Vanya

I've always found the peasant's head soup a bit gamey and thin with the occasional off taste. General's head soup has a cleaner more subtle palette and it seems much more filling. But when one is very hungry, either will do just fine.

[drone]

Originally posted by Baiae

Furthermore you ignore the possibility that over time good military doctrine can become bad military doctrine. Exceptional commanders can spot this before it becomes problematic.

I think this says it all. Yes, there are set tactics that have been proven to work, many of them listed in this thread. These tactics are the result of trial and error, research in military history, and a lot of wasted blood. They work, and this is why we use them in the game. But situations will arise where they will not work, and new technology/fighting methods can supercede them. The good commander recognizes that things have changed, and does not keep trying to pound the square peg into the round hole. If he doesn't alter his tactics, he gets his men killed. I think World War I is a very good example of the latter. Lot of dead soldiers, not many famous (but many infamous) generals.

From a R:TW standpoint, do you use the same tactics against the Greeks as you do against the Parthians? Of course not. And as the game goes on, troop types become available that make certain tactics obsolete. This seemed to be more apparent in M:TW, but it still applies.

[Vanya]

I've always found the peasant's head soup a bit gamey and thin with the occasional off taste. General's head soup has a cleaner more subtle palette and it seems much more filling. But when one is very hungry, either will do just fine.

GAH!

What kind of peasants do you use in your recipes? Do you use farmed, cultivate peasants, or wild ones?

Vanya finds the genetically enhanced farmed species to be more bulky and heavier. But they also tend to be laden with a lot of extra fat. And not to mention, those farm heads also tend to be stuffed and soaked in all kinds of bizarre preservatives and chemicals to make them stay "fresh" longer. Personally, Vanya not like the taste of formaldehyde in the morning. Vanya prefer organically grown heads, prepared in the traditional ways, and served fresh at the moment of harvest. Sure they are leaner, and require much more work to prepare, but they are also tastier.

Vanya suggest Red go out and skip the "Sizzler" and "Applebee" type places, as they tend to use farm heads.

Lastly, Vanya suggest that for Easter, youz avoid painting eggs and instead paint and hide heads. It will make for great fun when your neigbors find their cat's or son's head painted with woad stuffed under a bush.

WARNING: Heads left out in sun may soon acquire funky aroma. Do not eat unless you need to cleanse your bowels thoroughly!



GAH!

[AquaLurker]

Sorry off topic a little

P.S. I've got to agree with Arrowhead on the ROTK thing. Too many people use it as an example of what happened "in real life".[/QUOTE]

I think that a lot of people misuse ROTK in their examples, most or the battles strategies describe in ROTKs are 'Psychological' warefare. When it comes to field battles tactics it was very unclear, in fact we do not really know what really happen on the field other than who won and lose, usually due to the success of certain plans. So it is really irrelevant to use ROTK as an example in any cases regarding battlefield tactics unless we are talking about general strategies.

But like General Sun said, ROTK is a real historical event, the people and battles describe in it is real minus the exagarations and over dramatics combat scenes. The 'empty city trick'(sorry direct translation here) is not real because it was clarified by some chinese historian that it was just another real event dramatised to make Zhuge Liang look good(in ROTK), what really happens is that Zhuge Liang made a successful withdrawal from the city without incurring heavy loses and while keeping his army intact.

There are actually two version of it, the actuall historical Three Kingdoms and the dramatize literature version 'Romance of Three Kingdom' which is very entertaining and more popular to us common folks.

[Didz]

Perfectly standard tactics for the previous major European wars, suicidal in 1870. Similarly Lee's massed Napoleonic assault at Gettysburg led to the conclusive defeat of the Confederate forces.

I've always felt that the defeat of the Confederate Army at Gettysburg was actually brought about by Lee's decision to fight the battle at all and to take the offensive.

I would also challenge the imagery that Pickets charge was in any way realted to Napoleonic infantry tactic's. My reading of the deployment and tactic's employed suggest that it was conducted in a total different way. It was not for example a massed column attack.

On the left Pettigrew's division of four brigades advanced in one line, with Trimble's two brigades of Lane and Scales in the rear and right as supports.

Pickett's division on the right advanced with the brigades of Kemper and Garnett in the front line and Armistead's brigade in rear of Garnett's on the left.

Twenty minutes after these two division began to advance the brigades of Wilcox and Perry were to join them by advancing on Pickett's right to repel any attempted flanking movement from the Union position.

Thus looking at the delpoyment one can see immediately that this assault was being made on a two divisional frontage and that at its deepest was only two lines (4/6 ranks) deep. This therefore was not a concentration of manpower aimed at overwheming a single piont in the enemy line. In fact some histories claim that Lee had always intended Picketts assault to be supported on an even broader front by A.P.Hill.

To make matters worse in the smoke and confusion of the advance Picketts line drifted left leaving Wilcox and Perry's advance twenty minutes later totally isolated.

Pettigrews Division had more distance to cover (1300 yards) whilst Pickett was only (900 yards) from its objective and yet the advance began in Echlon with Pettigrews division deployed further back. Nevertheless by the time Pickett reached the Emmitsburg Road Pettigrews Division had caught them up and the entire two division line crossed the road together. Presumably if Pickets line was drifting left then Pettigrew's must have been doing like wise for the two formations to avoid becoming intertwined.

Soon after this Pettigrew's left brigade, began taking flanking fire from Hays' troops and Woodruff's battery and after the loss of only twenty-five killed, this Brigade stalled and either retreated, surrendered, or threw themselves on the ground for protection, taking no further part in the attack.

However, Pettigrews, others brigade as well as those of Trimble, advanced as far as the stone wall, and stayed there until they finally surrendered.

The drifting of Pickett's division had exposed his right brigade (Kemper) to the fire of Doubleday's division, a part of which moved to conform to Pickett's movement, thus continuing its deadly volleys, while Stannard's Union brigade actually, changed front to the right, in order to open a most destructive fire upon Kemper's flank which could not be covered by Wilcox and Perry because of the earlier drifting during the advance.

Under this fire Armistead's, Kempers and Garnetts, brigades focussed their advance upon the angle of the stone wall held by Webb's Philadelphia brigade dressing their ranks on the left and thus drifting even further in that direction and no doubt trying to distance themselves from the flanking fire on the right. Two guns of Cushing's battery at the wall were silenced and the two companies, of Webb's regiment overwhelmed. The union line was driven back at this point on a frontage of some one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet.

The three brigades then attempted to cross the wall, Armistead, putting his hat on his sword and rushing toward the other guns of Cushing's battery, fell dead almost immediately. The Union forces now began a counter-attack against both the front and flanks of the Conderate troops cowering behind the stone wall. Pickett was still on the far side of the Emmitsberg Road, Garnett and Armistead were already dead and Kemper was wounded and captured. The men now cowering behind the stone wall fought for as long as the could and then fled or surrendered.

If one compares that imagery with say D'Erlons assault on the Ridge at Waterloo, its quite different. The key doctrinal difference being the abasence of a cavalry threat, which, if it had existed at Gettysburg would have forced Pickett to use a much denser formation. But the main tactical difference was the absence of any attempt to gain numerical dominance over a limited frontage. The advance was made on a broad front by Divisions in line and therefore presumbly brought no more men to bear on any given point of the defenders line as the defenders had themselves.

In fact the capture of the angle of the stone wall by Armistead, Kempers and Gernett's Brigade was attributed to the fact that the Union line at this point had been weakened by the insertion of Cushing Battery into the middle of Webbs regiment which left the defenders with only two companies available to defend the wall against the survivors of three Brigades.

I'm not suggestng for a minute that Pickets assault would have succeeded if he had formed two divisional columns and stormed the ridge with the bayonet. In fact I suspect that with the advances in artillery technology and increased use of rifled muskets would have resulted in even greater slaughter. If anything I think the Conferate tactic's made the best of an impossible situation, but it wasn't anything like a Napoleonic assault.

[Agravain of Orkney]

Interesting discussion. I think it comes down to making a distinction between strategy and tactics. Strategy is the process of deciding who you are going to fight, when you are going to fight, where you are going to fight, what kind of units you are going to bring to the fight, your initial deployment of troops, and your overall plan for how you want to engage your enemy once the fight begins. Tactics is everything that happens after you push the "start" button on the battle screen, until the fight comes to an end.

[Didz]

Yep! I think its generally accepted that Napoleon for instance was a great strategist but a lousy tactician.

Wellington by contrast tended the other way frequently managing to pull his fat out of the fire through his attention to tactical detail.

[Ptah]

It's usually this way around;

economics > politics > strategy > tactics

[GFX707]

There's no time for strategy in this game when two armies meet on an open battlefield, you deploy your units, march them towards the enemy (taking maybe 3 minutes) then they clash and evapourate while you madly click on a bunch of unimpressive antlike dots from miles away and one lot runs away (all of which takes maybe 15 seconds) which sucks really....the only time you get to zoom in is when your army is chasing the other army away

As the greeks or romans my usual strategy was a semicircle of hoplites or legionaries around 6 or 7 archer units, with the general at the back....worked every damn time with 10 to 1 casualties for the enemy and mine were mostly from my archers shooting my own troops!

This game is kinda broken

[Didz]

There's no time for strategy in this game when two armies meet on an open battlefield, you deploy your units, march them towards the enemy (taking maybe 3 minutes) then they clash and evapourate while you madly click on a bunch of unimpressive antlike dots from miles away and one lot runs away (all of which takes maybe 15 seconds) which sucks really....the only time you get to zoom in is when your army is chasing the other army away

Funnily enough thats not my experience at all.

Admittedly in a real time environment there is only a limited reaction time but nevertheless I have managed to enjoy some quite epic battles. Mind you I think it depends on the game settings.

I'm playing Medium/Huge Units/No Timer, so I'm not under a time constraint which requires me to charge at the enemy bald-headed and can take the time to develop a position.

I have also been impressed by some of the reactions of the AI. I've noticed that it frequently uses its light cavalry effectively to drive in my skirmish lines before making its main assault, whenever possible brings forward its archers to harrass my elephants with fire arrows and frequently tries to drive in my flank guards with its heavy cavalry.

From what I've heard and read ancient warfare was not that tactically sophisticated anyway. I was watching a program on Alexanders famous Battle at Issus which was basically won and lost because both Darius and Alexander chose a tactical plan at the start and stuck to it. It didn't sound like any clever tactical ploys were introduced during play, everyone was too busy killing each other.

[General_Sun]

I just realized that I cannot handle arguing on 3 forums at once....

So you can either take this as a white flag, or come to the stratcommandcenter, where I will be continuing this discussion. Many thanks.

[Baiae]

but it wasn't anything like a Napoleonic assault.

Yeah, sorry. I didn't mean Napoleonic tactically but the concept that you could march your troops across an open field into the teeth of the enemy was outdated by the 1860's and belonged to the Napoleonic era, when range and accuracy of weapons, especially infantry weapons, was much more limited.

[Didz]

Yeah, sorry. I didn't mean Napoleonic tactically but the concept that you could march your troops across an open field into the teeth of the enemy was outdated by the 1860's and belonged to the Napoleonic era, when range and accuracy of weapons, especially infantry weapons, was much more limited.

The problem was of course that tactical doctrine and training had not evolved any alternatives.

Certainly much more use was made of line and extended line in the ACW than during the Napoleonic wars but lets face it men were still being ordered to advance over open ground into the teeth of the enemy fire in WW1. the only thing that began to break the mould was the invention of the tank and even then things reverted to norm whenever the tank was not available.

Japanese Banzai charges and the Chinese assaults in the Korean war to give just two examples.

[Marshal Murat]

Military Doctrine to Strategy???

Personally it lies in the merits of the general.

A very large well equiped, motivated army (Union army Civil War) led by a lousy general (Burnsides, McClellan, Hooker, etc.) the army would eventually fail.

(A argument against this can be that Lee was against them, but they all went to West Point, merit of the general)

A perfect example of many of the doctrines that fails in use are
Franco-Prussian War
WWI
WWII
American Civil War
probably many others,

In the Franco-Prussian War, the French seemed to have all the advantages (the machine gun at the top)
However, the use of the machine gun as a artillery piece, large cavalry charges, doomed to fail.

WWI With the large charges across no mans land, failed.

WWII with the Maginot line against the blitz, failed.

American Civil War (Cold Harbor) where thousands of Union troops charges the trenches of the Confederates, and were slaughtered.

Doctrine, even at Cannae (Hannibal could have adapted) Doctrine, when it becomes to far behind the innovation, or when used against a adaptable general, then it will fail.

Strategy, when applied correctly, along with the correct military doctrine will defeat the enemy.

For example, one army of Parthian HA and Catapracts (way to underpowered) against a equal of light Greek CAV, and phalanx. The Parthians will win (Sometimes not by the AI, but at least by me)

[Didz]

Personally it lies in the merits of the general.

A very large well equiped, motivated army (Union army Civil War) led by a lousy general (Burnsides, McClellan, Hooker, etc.) the army would eventually fail.

(A argument against this can be that Lee was against them, but they all went to West Point, merit of the general)

Personally, I have never bought this theory, but then I'm not from the US, so I'm looking at the war from the outside.

The way I see it the difference between the Confederate and Federal armies was not so much the quality of the generals as the quality of the men.

The avarage Conferate soldier was more motivated, determined and had better combat and survival skills than his average union opposite number. He was fighting to defend his homeland aganist a violent aggressor and he really hated his opponent.

The avarage Union soldier was better equipped, better fed and better armed. But he was fighting on foriegn soil. In many cases for a nation he hardly knew and in some cases had only just arrived in. He was lucky in some cases if he even spoke the language. He probably only had the vaguest idea about why he was fighting and in many cases those reason had more to do with a personal rite of passage for him and his family than any glorious intent. His main objective being to do the time and survive to reap the benefits.

The generals as you say mostly came from the same stock and many on the Union side were as highly regarded prior to the war as those on the Confederate. The real problem for the Union Generals was that they were constantly hounded by their political masters to 'do something' and thus many of their actions were driven by political motives rather than strategic ones.

By comparison the Confederate Generals were left a relatively free hand and were able to dictate both policy and doctrine and able to apply personal influence over their men. Generally, they were able to retain their personal honour code and standards of morality thus appearing both fair and just in the eyes of their troops which in turn enhanced the loyalty they received in return. My favourite example of this was Lee's proclamation that he would never force a Confederate soldier to trespass on the land of his brother, that they had joined his army to fight for their homeland not to invade the home of another and therefore those who wished to stay behind could do so. Statement like that show that the Condfederate Generals honestly beleived they had right on their side and were able to expliot that honest belief to motivate their men and enhance their own influence.

The final victory however was not dependant upon military or political superiority but upon economic factors. The South was merely blockaded to death denying it the resources to counter the production capacity of the northern states. It basicly got smothered and many of the final battles were the desperate acts of principled men refusing bow to the inevitable.

[Sinner]

Like Agravain I would say that General Sun's first point of confusion was refering to strategies when the subject should have been tactics given that he discussed battlefield command.

But back to General Sun's opinion that the key to success in battle is simply following military doctrine. In effect that's saying that anybody who reads this hypothetical doctrine will be able to command equally well in a given situation. I have a one word reply to that: wrong.

What is doctrine? It's nothing more than the collected wisdom of other commanders, the lessons they have learned in battle. It would be hoped that what those commanders have recorded is correct, but that's not certain. If the doctrine is incorrect, then the commander who just follows doctrine will fail. And what about situations not encountered by those other commanders? What do you do when operating in unfamiliar terrain or fighting a previously unknown foe or either side uses new technology? In those instances doctrine may help but equally might be totally wrong.

Within a simulation like RTW it is possible to eventually produce a closer attempt to a perfect doctrine since we have far less factors to deal with, having a very limited selection of terrain and troops, but the validity of what becomes doctrine does still have to be considered.

Then there's the question of the commander (player) applying that doctrine. We are not all equal, some of us can think faster, recognize situations quicker, see solutions others cannot, handle pressure better, the list goes on. And that's not counting that we all have bad days and we all make mistakes no matter how knowledgable or well trained.

A poor commander - one lacking intelligence or simply hesitant due to nerves perhaps - would struggle to apply the doctrine he has learned, perhaps applying the wrong solution to a particular battlefield situation or maybe the right solution but at the wrong time, and so would lose battles that should have been won.

A good commander would be able to think outside the doctrinal box, to adapt to unfamiliar circumstances, to recognize where doctrine is wrong and create a correct solution, and be better able to exploit mistakes of others and avoid or compensate for their own.

Military doctrine does have its uses, it can be of great help teaching the basics, but it's no substitute for a good commander.


Another issue General Sun addressed is quality, but what really makes one unit of troops higher quality than another?

Imagine two equal sized groups, of the same physical state and demeanor, and both armed with the same weapons. One group has been sent out to fight with no training while the other has been trained for months and has already experienced battle. The latter group will be far more likely to win, being more skilled in the use of their weapons and fighting as a unit, and suffering less shock at the effects of combat. From this we can deduce that training and experience make one unit higher quality than another.

Now repeat the experiment with both forces equally armed, trained and experienced, however one now has shields. The unit with shields would be far more likely to win, suffering less casualties due to their superior defences. So equipment also effects quality.

However, a unit well equipped in one situation would be poorly equipped in another, such as heavy infantry trying to chase down skirmishers, or archers after they run out of arrows. So even though training, experience and equipment are relatively fixed, quality has a fluid, subjective nature due to the changeable circumstances the troops find themselves in.

General Sun says that it's not possible to beat a phalanx force given fewer, lesser quality men, but given that quality is such a subjective term that's an invalid assertion. Take 300 hoplites, well equipped and trained, and veterans of many bloody battles. Then take 100 peltasts, skilled enough at throwing javelins but not experienced or well trained in melee, with just a light shield for armour and a handful of javelins. The hoplites are definitely greater in number and overall one would say that they're of greater quality, but deployed correctly the peltasts would still have a chance of defeating them, even moreso in the real world than in RTW where they wouldn't be limited by the artificial constraint or remaining in a regular unit formation.

[Marshal Murat]

The way I see it the difference between the Confederate and Federal armies was not so much the quality of the generals as the quality of the men.

The avarage Conferate soldier was more motivated, determined and had better combat and survival skills than his average union opposite number. He was fighting to defend his homeland aganist a violent aggressor and he really hated his opponent.

The avarage Union soldier was better equipped, better fed and better armed. But he was fighting on foriegn soil. In many cases for a nation he hardly knew and in some cases had only just arrived in. He was lucky in some cases if he even spoke the language. He probably only had the vaguest idea about why he was fighting and in many cases those reason had more to do with a personal rite of passage for him and his family than any glorious intent. His main objective being to do the time and survive to reap the benefits.

The generals as you say mostly came from the same stock and many on the Union side were as highly regarded prior to the war as those on the Confederate. The real problem for the Union Generals was that they were constantly hounded by their political masters to 'do something' and thus many of their actions were driven by political motives rather than strategic ones.

By comparison the Confederate Generals were left a relatively free hand and were able to dictate both policy and doctrine and able to apply personal influence over their men. Generally, they were able to retain their personal honour code and standards of morality thus appearing both fair and just in the eyes of their troops which in turn enhanced the loyalty they received in return. My favourite example of this was Lee's proclamation that he would never force a Confederate soldier to trespass on the land of his brother, that they had joined his army to fight for their homeland not to invade the home of another and therefore those who wished to stay behind could do so. Statement like that show that the Condfederate Generals honestly beleived they had right on their side and were able to expliot that honest belief to motivate their men and enhance their own influence.

Although you are looking from the outside, there are many failures.


There were no differences in language, everyone spoke "American" be it the Louisana Bayou southern drawl, to the annoying speech of the New Yorkers, to the immigrant Irish.

Both of the armies were american, no differences in languages (save the occasional immigrant that spoke maybe German)

Another part is the idea of the Union soldiers.
He was just as motivated as his southern counterpart. Most were farm boys looking for adventure. Sometimes they went against thier parents wishes. Both sides, had thier own views as to why the other was the enemy.
Northern motivations-Unite the Union
Southern motivations-to peserve states rights.

Another part, was the Northern political hounding.
Lincoln only hounded a few generals, and those are Eastern theater generals.
Grant, Sherman, never needed hounding.

McClellan relied on Pinkerton, a faulty detective, inflated Confederate numbers three times the average numbers, and thus McClellan became very cautious (Antietam, when Mc had Lees orders, he moved slowly). All he ever did was train his men.

Burnside was just as cautious as Mc, and Hooker was taken by surprise. Lincoln had a good right to hound them.

The Confederate generals, there were those that were terrible. Most of the Confederates were revered for thier,
A. Personal Example
B. Ability to whip Yankees

Great examples of the Personal example were
Hood, Stonewall, Stuart, Forrest

Ability to whip Yankees,
Lee, Longstreet, Johnson, and Stonewall

Lastly, the reson that the South lost, was because of
the blockade,
the North (the north had many millions more men then the south and able to pound away at the Southern army)

[Red Harvest]

There are a lot of elements of truth in that, Didz, but I don't believe the inevitability was necessarily there. I don't see that the south could conquer the north, but it was possible for them to win a limited invasion well enough to force the Union to agree to a peace. For the most part southern armies were better led. The key was that the largest, most critical southern army was well led, while for much of the war the largest Union army was not. The same cannot be said for the war in the west where it was a mixed bag on both sides.

A problem with people looking at the American Civil War is the focus on the east. Things were very different in the west. In the west the Confederate armies had been largely defeated long before. Leadership and quality of troops was more closely matched early in the war. In fact, Conderate armies were often larger locally (look at Missouri/Arkansas) and Union armies were not supplied properly. Western armies were as likely to be mishandled by the rebels as by the federals. Grant's successes in the west led to him receiving total command of the Union effort. Grant was a fighter. He bumbled at times and was not wary enough when in close proximity of the enemy, but he understood that to win, one had to fight. His tenacity was the key to winning.

If you look at the war in the west you get a different perspective of the men and armies: Grant's capture of Ft. Donelson, the battles of Shiloh, Corinth, the siege of Vicksburg. In the west there were setbacks for the Union (Chickamauga, the Red River campaign, various short sallies by armies in Missippi, etc.) Leadership and troop quality were closer in the west. The death blow to the Confederacy was dealt from the west with the march through Atlanta.

Because of the improvements in weapons it was easier to fight a defensive fight than an offensive one. Despite the Union's greater manpower it did need overwhelming might to be sure of victory. The Union had little in the way of a cavalry arm at the beginning of the war and was very much outclassed by the quality rebel cav, but the Union developed good mounted infantry by the end. The shift from cavalry mentality to mounted infantry was key. Fighting from horseback made one a very big target. But mounted infantry had the mobility to sieze key positions and hold them as infantry while the regular infantry came up. As the Union mounted arm improved, the rebels found it impossible to prevent heavy incursions and raids.

Fighting for one's own soil certainly makes a difference. Plus the changes in equipment had made defense easier. But don't forget that the defender also has a considerable advantage in scouting/intelligence as well--less "fog of war." The attacker must also spend more resources protecting his lines of communication and supply, while the defender can utilize local militia and the like as a supplement. Antietam and Gettysburg were both invasions by the south that ended in defeat and near catastrophe, and I think they illustrate the problems posed by invasion (by either side) quite well.