Military Strategies

[Baiae]

but it wasn't anything like a Napoleonic assault.

Yeah, sorry. I didn't mean Napoleonic tactically but the concept that you could march your troops across an open field into the teeth of the enemy was outdated by the 1860's and belonged to the Napoleonic era, when range and accuracy of weapons, especially infantry weapons, was much more limited.

[GFX707]

There's no time for strategy in this game when two armies meet on an open battlefield, you deploy your units, march them towards the enemy (taking maybe 3 minutes) then they clash and evapourate while you madly click on a bunch of unimpressive antlike dots from miles away and one lot runs away (all of which takes maybe 15 seconds) which sucks really....the only time you get to zoom in is when your army is chasing the other army away

As the greeks or romans my usual strategy was a semicircle of hoplites or legionaries around 6 or 7 archer units, with the general at the back....worked every damn time with 10 to 1 casualties for the enemy and mine were mostly from my archers shooting my own troops!

This game is kinda broken

[General_Sun]

I just realized that I cannot handle arguing on 3 forums at once....

So you can either take this as a white flag, or come to the stratcommandcenter, where I will be continuing this discussion. Many thanks.

[Didz]

There's no time for strategy in this game when two armies meet on an open battlefield, you deploy your units, march them towards the enemy (taking maybe 3 minutes) then they clash and evapourate while you madly click on a bunch of unimpressive antlike dots from miles away and one lot runs away (all of which takes maybe 15 seconds) which sucks really....the only time you get to zoom in is when your army is chasing the other army away

Funnily enough thats not my experience at all.

Admittedly in a real time environment there is only a limited reaction time but nevertheless I have managed to enjoy some quite epic battles. Mind you I think it depends on the game settings.

I'm playing Medium/Huge Units/No Timer, so I'm not under a time constraint which requires me to charge at the enemy bald-headed and can take the time to develop a position.

I have also been impressed by some of the reactions of the AI. I've noticed that it frequently uses its light cavalry effectively to drive in my skirmish lines before making its main assault, whenever possible brings forward its archers to harrass my elephants with fire arrows and frequently tries to drive in my flank guards with its heavy cavalry.

From what I've heard and read ancient warfare was not that tactically sophisticated anyway. I was watching a program on Alexanders famous Battle at Issus which was basically won and lost because both Darius and Alexander chose a tactical plan at the start and stuck to it. It didn't sound like any clever tactical ploys were introduced during play, everyone was too busy killing each other.

[Didz]

Yeah, sorry. I didn't mean Napoleonic tactically but the concept that you could march your troops across an open field into the teeth of the enemy was outdated by the 1860's and belonged to the Napoleonic era, when range and accuracy of weapons, especially infantry weapons, was much more limited.

The problem was of course that tactical doctrine and training had not evolved any alternatives.

Certainly much more use was made of line and extended line in the ACW than during the Napoleonic wars but lets face it men were still being ordered to advance over open ground into the teeth of the enemy fire in WW1. the only thing that began to break the mould was the invention of the tank and even then things reverted to norm whenever the tank was not available.

Japanese Banzai charges and the Chinese assaults in the Korean war to give just two examples.

[Marshal Murat]

Military Doctrine to Strategy???

Personally it lies in the merits of the general.

A very large well equiped, motivated army (Union army Civil War) led by a lousy general (Burnsides, McClellan, Hooker, etc.) the army would eventually fail.

(A argument against this can be that Lee was against them, but they all went to West Point, merit of the general)

A perfect example of many of the doctrines that fails in use are
Franco-Prussian War
WWI
WWII
American Civil War
probably many others,

In the Franco-Prussian War, the French seemed to have all the advantages (the machine gun at the top)
However, the use of the machine gun as a artillery piece, large cavalry charges, doomed to fail.

WWI With the large charges across no mans land, failed.

WWII with the Maginot line against the blitz, failed.

American Civil War (Cold Harbor) where thousands of Union troops charges the trenches of the Confederates, and were slaughtered.

Doctrine, even at Cannae (Hannibal could have adapted) Doctrine, when it becomes to far behind the innovation, or when used against a adaptable general, then it will fail.

Strategy, when applied correctly, along with the correct military doctrine will defeat the enemy.

For example, one army of Parthian HA and Catapracts (way to underpowered) against a equal of light Greek CAV, and phalanx. The Parthians will win (Sometimes not by the AI, but at least by me)

[Didz]

Personally it lies in the merits of the general.

A very large well equiped, motivated army (Union army Civil War) led by a lousy general (Burnsides, McClellan, Hooker, etc.) the army would eventually fail.

(A argument against this can be that Lee was against them, but they all went to West Point, merit of the general)

Personally, I have never bought this theory, but then I'm not from the US, so I'm looking at the war from the outside.

The way I see it the difference between the Confederate and Federal armies was not so much the quality of the generals as the quality of the men.

The avarage Conferate soldier was more motivated, determined and had better combat and survival skills than his average union opposite number. He was fighting to defend his homeland aganist a violent aggressor and he really hated his opponent.

The avarage Union soldier was better equipped, better fed and better armed. But he was fighting on foriegn soil. In many cases for a nation he hardly knew and in some cases had only just arrived in. He was lucky in some cases if he even spoke the language. He probably only had the vaguest idea about why he was fighting and in many cases those reason had more to do with a personal rite of passage for him and his family than any glorious intent. His main objective being to do the time and survive to reap the benefits.

The generals as you say mostly came from the same stock and many on the Union side were as highly regarded prior to the war as those on the Confederate. The real problem for the Union Generals was that they were constantly hounded by their political masters to 'do something' and thus many of their actions were driven by political motives rather than strategic ones.

By comparison the Confederate Generals were left a relatively free hand and were able to dictate both policy and doctrine and able to apply personal influence over their men. Generally, they were able to retain their personal honour code and standards of morality thus appearing both fair and just in the eyes of their troops which in turn enhanced the loyalty they received in return. My favourite example of this was Lee's proclamation that he would never force a Confederate soldier to trespass on the land of his brother, that they had joined his army to fight for their homeland not to invade the home of another and therefore those who wished to stay behind could do so. Statement like that show that the Condfederate Generals honestly beleived they had right on their side and were able to expliot that honest belief to motivate their men and enhance their own influence.

The final victory however was not dependant upon military or political superiority but upon economic factors. The South was merely blockaded to death denying it the resources to counter the production capacity of the northern states. It basicly got smothered and many of the final battles were the desperate acts of principled men refusing bow to the inevitable.

[Sinner]

Like Agravain I would say that General Sun's first point of confusion was refering to strategies when the subject should have been tactics given that he discussed battlefield command.

But back to General Sun's opinion that the key to success in battle is simply following military doctrine. In effect that's saying that anybody who reads this hypothetical doctrine will be able to command equally well in a given situation. I have a one word reply to that: wrong.

What is doctrine? It's nothing more than the collected wisdom of other commanders, the lessons they have learned in battle. It would be hoped that what those commanders have recorded is correct, but that's not certain. If the doctrine is incorrect, then the commander who just follows doctrine will fail. And what about situations not encountered by those other commanders? What do you do when operating in unfamiliar terrain or fighting a previously unknown foe or either side uses new technology? In those instances doctrine may help but equally might be totally wrong.

Within a simulation like RTW it is possible to eventually produce a closer attempt to a perfect doctrine since we have far less factors to deal with, having a very limited selection of terrain and troops, but the validity of what becomes doctrine does still have to be considered.

Then there's the question of the commander (player) applying that doctrine. We are not all equal, some of us can think faster, recognize situations quicker, see solutions others cannot, handle pressure better, the list goes on. And that's not counting that we all have bad days and we all make mistakes no matter how knowledgable or well trained.

A poor commander - one lacking intelligence or simply hesitant due to nerves perhaps - would struggle to apply the doctrine he has learned, perhaps applying the wrong solution to a particular battlefield situation or maybe the right solution but at the wrong time, and so would lose battles that should have been won.

A good commander would be able to think outside the doctrinal box, to adapt to unfamiliar circumstances, to recognize where doctrine is wrong and create a correct solution, and be better able to exploit mistakes of others and avoid or compensate for their own.

Military doctrine does have its uses, it can be of great help teaching the basics, but it's no substitute for a good commander.


Another issue General Sun addressed is quality, but what really makes one unit of troops higher quality than another?

Imagine two equal sized groups, of the same physical state and demeanor, and both armed with the same weapons. One group has been sent out to fight with no training while the other has been trained for months and has already experienced battle. The latter group will be far more likely to win, being more skilled in the use of their weapons and fighting as a unit, and suffering less shock at the effects of combat. From this we can deduce that training and experience make one unit higher quality than another.

Now repeat the experiment with both forces equally armed, trained and experienced, however one now has shields. The unit with shields would be far more likely to win, suffering less casualties due to their superior defences. So equipment also effects quality.

However, a unit well equipped in one situation would be poorly equipped in another, such as heavy infantry trying to chase down skirmishers, or archers after they run out of arrows. So even though training, experience and equipment are relatively fixed, quality has a fluid, subjective nature due to the changeable circumstances the troops find themselves in.

General Sun says that it's not possible to beat a phalanx force given fewer, lesser quality men, but given that quality is such a subjective term that's an invalid assertion. Take 300 hoplites, well equipped and trained, and veterans of many bloody battles. Then take 100 peltasts, skilled enough at throwing javelins but not experienced or well trained in melee, with just a light shield for armour and a handful of javelins. The hoplites are definitely greater in number and overall one would say that they're of greater quality, but deployed correctly the peltasts would still have a chance of defeating them, even moreso in the real world than in RTW where they wouldn't be limited by the artificial constraint or remaining in a regular unit formation.

[derF]

This can all be summed up by a great military saying: "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

This explains my view completely.

Everything has a weakness. Some weaknesses are less obvious than others.

The weakness of the phalanx os that it is - slow and vulnerable to missile fire. So an immediate remedy is to pelt it with arrows and charge from the rear with fast cavilry.

In relevance to the discussion about great generals, i understand your point. But a great general isnt so just due to his ability to win against impossible odds. A good general of the quality we are concerned with has to have many good characteristics.

- He needs to have a profound knowledge of the limitations and abilites of his men and the enemies men.

- He has to know that risk is largely unprofitable.

- He has to accept defeat and the impossible.

- But most of all, he fights battles that only he can win.

[Marshal Murat]

The way I see it the difference between the Confederate and Federal armies was not so much the quality of the generals as the quality of the men.

The avarage Conferate soldier was more motivated, determined and had better combat and survival skills than his average union opposite number. He was fighting to defend his homeland aganist a violent aggressor and he really hated his opponent.

The avarage Union soldier was better equipped, better fed and better armed. But he was fighting on foriegn soil. In many cases for a nation he hardly knew and in some cases had only just arrived in. He was lucky in some cases if he even spoke the language. He probably only had the vaguest idea about why he was fighting and in many cases those reason had more to do with a personal rite of passage for him and his family than any glorious intent. His main objective being to do the time and survive to reap the benefits.

The generals as you say mostly came from the same stock and many on the Union side were as highly regarded prior to the war as those on the Confederate. The real problem for the Union Generals was that they were constantly hounded by their political masters to 'do something' and thus many of their actions were driven by political motives rather than strategic ones.

By comparison the Confederate Generals were left a relatively free hand and were able to dictate both policy and doctrine and able to apply personal influence over their men. Generally, they were able to retain their personal honour code and standards of morality thus appearing both fair and just in the eyes of their troops which in turn enhanced the loyalty they received in return. My favourite example of this was Lee's proclamation that he would never force a Confederate soldier to trespass on the land of his brother, that they had joined his army to fight for their homeland not to invade the home of another and therefore those who wished to stay behind could do so. Statement like that show that the Condfederate Generals honestly beleived they had right on their side and were able to expliot that honest belief to motivate their men and enhance their own influence.

Although you are looking from the outside, there are many failures.


There were no differences in language, everyone spoke "American" be it the Louisana Bayou southern drawl, to the annoying speech of the New Yorkers, to the immigrant Irish.

Both of the armies were american, no differences in languages (save the occasional immigrant that spoke maybe German)

Another part is the idea of the Union soldiers.
He was just as motivated as his southern counterpart. Most were farm boys looking for adventure. Sometimes they went against thier parents wishes. Both sides, had thier own views as to why the other was the enemy.
Northern motivations-Unite the Union
Southern motivations-to peserve states rights.

Another part, was the Northern political hounding.
Lincoln only hounded a few generals, and those are Eastern theater generals.
Grant, Sherman, never needed hounding.

McClellan relied on Pinkerton, a faulty detective, inflated Confederate numbers three times the average numbers, and thus McClellan became very cautious (Antietam, when Mc had Lees orders, he moved slowly). All he ever did was train his men.

Burnside was just as cautious as Mc, and Hooker was taken by surprise. Lincoln had a good right to hound them.

The Confederate generals, there were those that were terrible. Most of the Confederates were revered for thier,
A. Personal Example
B. Ability to whip Yankees

Great examples of the Personal example were
Hood, Stonewall, Stuart, Forrest

Ability to whip Yankees,
Lee, Longstreet, Johnson, and Stonewall

Lastly, the reson that the South lost, was because of
the blockade,
the North (the north had many millions more men then the south and able to pound away at the Southern army)

[Red Harvest]

There are a lot of elements of truth in that, Didz, but I don't believe the inevitability was necessarily there. I don't see that the south could conquer the north, but it was possible for them to win a limited invasion well enough to force the Union to agree to a peace. For the most part southern armies were better led. The key was that the largest, most critical southern army was well led, while for much of the war the largest Union army was not. The same cannot be said for the war in the west where it was a mixed bag on both sides.

A problem with people looking at the American Civil War is the focus on the east. Things were very different in the west. In the west the Confederate armies had been largely defeated long before. Leadership and quality of troops was more closely matched early in the war. In fact, Conderate armies were often larger locally (look at Missouri/Arkansas) and Union armies were not supplied properly. Western armies were as likely to be mishandled by the rebels as by the federals. Grant's successes in the west led to him receiving total command of the Union effort. Grant was a fighter. He bumbled at times and was not wary enough when in close proximity of the enemy, but he understood that to win, one had to fight. His tenacity was the key to winning.

If you look at the war in the west you get a different perspective of the men and armies: Grant's capture of Ft. Donelson, the battles of Shiloh, Corinth, the siege of Vicksburg. In the west there were setbacks for the Union (Chickamauga, the Red River campaign, various short sallies by armies in Missippi, etc.) Leadership and troop quality were closer in the west. The death blow to the Confederacy was dealt from the west with the march through Atlanta.

Because of the improvements in weapons it was easier to fight a defensive fight than an offensive one. Despite the Union's greater manpower it did need overwhelming might to be sure of victory. The Union had little in the way of a cavalry arm at the beginning of the war and was very much outclassed by the quality rebel cav, but the Union developed good mounted infantry by the end. The shift from cavalry mentality to mounted infantry was key. Fighting from horseback made one a very big target. But mounted infantry had the mobility to sieze key positions and hold them as infantry while the regular infantry came up. As the Union mounted arm improved, the rebels found it impossible to prevent heavy incursions and raids.

Fighting for one's own soil certainly makes a difference. Plus the changes in equipment had made defense easier. But don't forget that the defender also has a considerable advantage in scouting/intelligence as well--less "fog of war." The attacker must also spend more resources protecting his lines of communication and supply, while the defender can utilize local militia and the like as a supplement. Antietam and Gettysburg were both invasions by the south that ended in defeat and near catastrophe, and I think they illustrate the problems posed by invasion (by either side) quite well.

[Red Harvest]

Murat,

A bit different view on some of the commanders:
Hood was a horrible general, one dimensional. He was certainly personally brave and did well with divisional command, but he should never have been put in charge of a whole army. He utterly destroyed his army at Franklin.

Jeb Stuart is over rated in my opinion. Hampton was better. Stuart was too enamoured of the glamour of cavalry sabre fighting and dashing about. He got caught with his pants down at Brandy Station and quite nearly lost--he was probably saved by one of the Union pincer commanders who proved utterly incompetent and failed to engage. Stuart failed Lee by gallavanting around the countryside at Gettysburg. Mounted infantry was the critical aspect of horse warfare in the ACW. Hampton and Sheridan understood, but Stuart was a cavalry man.

Forrest was a great divisional level/small army commander, but his fighting style and impetuosity made him unsuited for full command of much larger armies. He was a military genius.

Burnside probably isn't given proper credit. His Carolina expedition was well handled and showed he had some understanding of the logistics of an invasion. He had some imagination for conducting invasions as well. Unfortunately, he failed when given command of the Army of the Potomac.

[Didz]

Although you are looking from the outside, there are many failures.

Hmm! Then clearly my reading on the subject is misleading.

Let me quote just a few references from Davis' book Fighting Men of the Civil War.

There were no differences in language, everyone spoke "American" be it the Louisana Bayou southern drawl, to the annoying speech of the New Yorkers, to the immigrant Irish.

Both of the armies were american, no differences in languages (save the occasional immigrant that spoke maybe German)

Davis says on this subject:

"...tens of thousands of foreigners of every caste and nationalty. Company H of the 8th Michigan numbered 47 New Yorkers, 37 Michiganders, 26 Native Americans, 7 Canadians, 5 Englishmen, 4 Germans, 2 Irishmen, 1 Dutchmen and one man whose nationality is stated as "The Ocean".

Some camps were vurtual babel. In one Yankee regiment hosting fifteen different national origins, the colonel had to give orders in seven seperate languages.

Many immigrants spoke English indifferently at best making communication a nightmare. In Major General Franz Sigels command of 1864 his orders were given in German and had to go through three successive translations from German to Hungarian, to English, and back to German, before they filtered through his international staff to his German-born men in the ranks. He was never a great general but given the party game nature of his chain of command it was a miracle that all of his men even marched in the same direction.

Nearly a third of the male population of the North were foriegn born.

Over 200,000 Germans served in the Northern Army with several Regiments composed entirely of them. The 9th Wisconsin did not number a single non-German in its ranks. New York furnished 10 regiments that were predominantly German and Ohio did the same.

150,000 Irishmen also served in the Union Army and whilst many joined to save the Union the most often quoted sentiment of these men was that they had joined the army becuase they liked a good fight.

Felix Brannigan (79th New York) wrote: "There is an elasticity in the Irish temperament which enables its possessor to boldly stare fate in the face, and laugh at all the reverses of fortune."

20 Union Regiments were composed almost entirely of Irishmen. Meaghers Irish Brigade (9th, 63rd, 88th New York) was almost entirely made up of native Irishmen.

60,000 Englishmen and Canadians also served with the Union, plus Frenchmen, Scandinavians, Hungarians and even a few orientals. the 79th New York were mostly Scotsmen and even wore kilts at first.

Foriegn elements in the Conferate ranks did exist but in smaller numbers. There was one Irish Brigade, a few German Regiments and a Polish Legion. A European Brigade was raised in Louisiana and was commanded by Count Camille Armand Jules Marie, Prince of Polignac, a frenchman commonly referred to as "Polecat" by his men. He gave his orders in French.

One incredulous native Southern watching the European Brigade deploy noted "That-thur furriner, he calls our a lot er gibberish, an thum thar dagoes jes maneuvers-up like hell-beatin-tan-bark! Jes like he was talking sense."

12,000 Native Americans served with the Confederacy forming 11 Regiments of Infantry and 7 of Cavalry. 6,000 served with the Union.

Mexican's also served in the Union army, in the Martinez Militia (officially known as the 1st New Mexico and two of the Colorado Regiments contained more Mexicans that native born Americans.

On the Conferdate side the 33rd Texas Regiment was mostly Mexican.

Another part is the idea of the Union soldiers.
He was just as motivated as his southern counterpart. Most were farm boys looking for adventure. Sometimes they went against thier parents wishes. Both sides, had thier own views as to why the other was the enemy.
Northern motivations-Unite the Union
Southern motivations-to peserve states rights.

According to Davis two thirds of the Confederate recruits were farm boys, whilst only about half of the Union Army came from a rural background. The vast majority of the Union army were clerks, carpenters, labourers and students made up most of the rest.

The average Confederate recruit had been indoctrinated for generations with the belief that all Northerners were hypocritical fanatic's bent on destroying the constitution, and were thoroughly convinced on the righteousness of their cause. They were also naturally militant in their attitudes and confident that they were by nature better soldiers than Yankee shop-keepers.

They considered the defence of the South as no lesser crusade than that faced by Washington during the American Revolution.

Such military inclinations did not dwell in the North to the same degree as they did below the Potomac but mostly joined out of a sense of duty.

As to the respective value of their military skills Davis quotes Colonel Lyman of General George Meades staff who complained in 1864 "By the Lord. I wish these gentlemen who would overwhelm us with Germans, Negro's, and the off-scourings of great cities could only see a Rebel Regiment. In all their rags and squalor. If they had eyes they would know that these men are like wolf-hounds and not to be beaten by turnspits."

Another part, was the Northern political hounding.
Lincoln only hounded a few generals, and those are Eastern theater generals.
Grant, Sherman, never needed hounding.

I would not have classified Grant or Sherman as one of those Generals who were considered inferior to their Southern counterparts. They also inherited a Union army which by then had seen the elephant and contained a number of veteran troops.

Their predecessors had not been so lucky and whilst they have been critised for doing nothing but train their men the point is worth making that perhaps those men needed the training and being forced to commit them to battle too early merely caused needless losses.

Lastly, the reson that the South lost, was because of
the blockade,
the North (the north had many millions more men then the south and able to pound away at the Southern army)

Even in the final battles of the war the evidence suggests that all other things being equal a Confederate Unit would beat a Union one. The problem was that rarely were things equal, basically the Union had more of everything. But most of all it had more money and that in itself ensured that it could continue to field more men, more and better weapons and more and better ships.

Without that money the Union could not have explioted the millions of men it had at its disposal and if the Confederacy had had equal money it could have attracted the resources it needed to prevail. The reason for instance that immigrants flooded into New York and not New Orleans was because that was were the money was. The Union soldier was even paid $2 more than his Southern counterpart.

[drone]

What!?!?! The South lost?

Sorry, a little southern US humor, for some people here the war is still going.

The South is generally considered to have had "better" generals. The upper level officers were essentially southern nobility, this may have given them an edge at leadership over the troops. Maybe the men just had more faith in their abilities. Some Union general (can't remember, maybe Grant) even said the more southern officers killed during the war, the easier the occupation and subjugation would be. Something about "the flower of southern manhood", or some such crap.

There was some political interference from the southern side. Johnston was fighting a measured retreat towards Atlanta, outnumbered but delaying Sherman's advance. Davis replaced him with Hood, who promptly attacked, lost, and Atlanta was taken before the presidential election.

McClellan was much loved by his troops, probably because he kept them alive by not attacking. Grant knew the way to win was to keep attacking, eventually the northern supply/industry/manpower would grind Lee down.

At little trivia, you may or may not know this. Arlington National Cemetery is located on Lee's plantation in northern Virginia, right across the river from Washington DC. The North occupied the plantation in 1861, and in 1864 Gen. Meigs decided to turn it into a military burial ground so Lee could not use it after the war. Sort of a punishment for being so good at what he did.

[Marshal Murat]

Forward Stars and Bars!!!

Agreed Hood was no good at commanding large amounts of men.
Jeb, although a cavalier at heart and very impulsive to charge ahead, he did keep Lee resonably well informed most of the time, (Famous ride around McClellan)

Agreed, there were some camps that were Babel, but the highest percentage spoke English.

Okay, I forgot the shopkeepers, granted

But the last points are just insane.

Grant and Sherman both were at Shiloh where the second largest amount of men were lost during the entire war. Thats where most of the Union soldiers saw the elephant. After that, they won most of the battles, (Some exceptions, namely at Chickamauga where Rosencrans pulled brigades to help Thomas but was run over by Hood)

Hood was a fighter, but in the bigger scope of things, you need more than fight (Johnson would get points with his delaying actions)

And the last point about the money.
The North always had more money, because they had industry.
The immigrants came to New York because thats were the industry was. The only gunpowder mill in the entire south was somewhere in Georgia. The North could also have always exploited its manpower by draft. If the South had the same amount of money, they could rarely use it, because of the blockade.

[Baiae]

The South is generally considered to have had "better" generals. The upper level officers were essentially southern nobility, this may have given them an edge at leadership over the troops.

I always thought that by the end of the war the Generals on both sides were roughly equal in ability; it just took the North longer to find them.

Of the Southern Generals to command an army, Lee was exceptional, Joseph E. Johnson competent but uninspired, Albert S. Johnson was arguably too careless with his own safety, Beauregard didn't see much action and didn't always cover himself in glory when he did have the opportunity to command, Kirby-Smith never commanded a major army, Bragg was emotionally unstable and Hood simply incompetent when commanding an army.

So of the seven Confederate Army commanders only Lee was particularly good. The North eventually managed to produce two exceptional commanders (Sherman and Grant) and a whole cluster on competent ones (Meade, Thomas, arguably McDowell...) as well as some good generals unsuited to battlefield command (McClelland, Burnside, Rosecrans) and some truly hopeless ones (Banks, Howard, possibly Pope)

There was some political interference from the southern side. Johnston was fighting a measured retreat towards Atlanta, outnumbered but delaying Sherman's advance. Davis replaced him with Hood, who promptly attacked, lost, and Atlanta was taken before the presidential election.

I always thought Davis interfered with his generals rather more than Lincoln did because he was an ex-army officer himself.

[Marshal Murat]

What the F**k you forgot Stonewall Jackson, you shall die!!!
Kidding, hehe
Davis graduated from West Point along with the rest of the generals that fought during the war.

[drone]

Originally Posted by Baiae

I always thought that by the end of the war the Generals on both sides were roughly equal in ability; it just took the North longer to find them.

I didn't mean that the southern generals were better, just that they are considered better, at least here in the states. This may be a side-effect of people trying to figure out why it took 4 years for the Union, with much better strategic resources, to win the war. From a military-strategy standpoint, there were a fair share of boneheads on both sides. But what I meant was that the southern generals were better leaders (at least in the eyes of their men), and definitely got more out of the troops than the Union generals. Pickett's charge was a foolish move, but there were not many Union leaders who could have gotten his men anywhere near as far up the hill.

I wouldn't say Grant was exceptional, he just knew how to use his strategic advantage. He could afford a war of attrition, and forced Lee into fighting it that way. Sort of like the endgame of a TW campaign...

[Red Harvest]

Both of the CSA Johnston's were good commanders. They are not getting due credit because they were up against good Union generals. As a result, the disparities in men and material were telling. Against someone less tenaciuos than Grant, Shiloh would have been a tremendous CSA victory. You could make a valid comparison of Shiloh with Gettysburg--in both the CSA attack was repulsed. The difference was Grant not only hung on, he followed up. Lee's bacon was saved several times by a Union commander's failure to follow up: Gettysburg and Antietam were prime examples. He was fortunate not to be facing a commander like Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan on those occasions.

The Union was unfortunate in losing Nathaniel Lyon right at the start of the war at Wilson's creek. He was an aggressive, smart general, who secured Missouri from the very active insurgency, and he nearly destroyed the much larger confederate force before it could go on the offensive.

Language did play some role, but I think Didz has much overstated it. The biggest language issues I'm aware of came from the German's. There were several excellent German regiments who had drilled in preparation for war and Lyon relied on them. The loss of Lyon contributed to the rise of his subordinate Franz Sigel, who proved a very ineffective commander, and had muffed his flank attack at Wilson's Creek.

The Union had trouble with troop quality in the eastern armies, partly because they were more urban but also because they were often conscripted and NEW. The Union had suffered so many major defeats in the east that its volunteer units had largely been unable to gain experience and survive, and those that had were demoralized by a string of lackluster commanders and too frequent defeats. "Seeing the elephant" does you no good if you get squished under its feet. Their CSA counterparts survived, though depleted, to form a coherent veteran core.

[Didz]

My own view is that relationship between the Southern Soldier and the Southern General tended to be one of mutual confidence and thus they worked well as a team. If anything I think sometimes Lee had too much confidence in the abilities of his troops and often expected more from them than was reasonable.

From what I have read the Union soldier seemed to have confidence in his generals too, but I get the distinct impression that at least in the early stages of the war this confidence was not returned and that this led to the caution and reluctance to of Union generals to engage.

[Red Harvest]

Pickett's charge was a foolish move, but there were not many Union leaders who could have gotten his men anywhere near as far up the hill.

I disagree about that. Despite a lot of bad press about their valour, the Union soldiers made plenty of truly hopeless frontal assaults: Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, etc. When men are pinning their name to their uniform before an assault, so that their grave marker might bear their name, you have to admire their courage (they did so at Cold Harbor and elsewhere.)

I wouldn't say Grant was exceptional, he just knew how to use his strategic advantage. He could afford a war of attrition, and forced Lee into fighting it that way. Sort of like the endgame of a TW campaign...

Agreed. He understood what must be done, and like a pit bull, would not deviate from it.

[Baiae]

What the F**k you forgot Stonewall Jackson, you shall die!!!

I was trying to just include Generals who commanded major armies

He understood what must be done, and like a pit bull, would not deviate from it.

Isn't that the mark of an exceptional commander?

[Red Harvest]

Isn't that the mark of an exceptional commander?

Not in my book, but it is a subjective judgement. A good commander? Yes. To me an exceptional commander is able to take inferior forces/situations and regularly win with them (Jackson, Lee, Forrest.) Grant had larger forces, better supply, and a much better artillery arm. He made mistakes frequently enough, but he recovered from them. He was reliable, and a fighter--the right man in the right place at the right time. His strategic vision was exceptional, but he was not an exceptional field commander--although he certainly had some of the traits of one.

[Baiae]

...And we're back to the tactical/strategic discussion again.

[drone]

...And we're back to the tactical/strategic discussion again.

Exactly.

I've seen several posts by players saying they have huge fields of crossed swords in front of heavily contested cities. "The enemy just keeps coming and coming, and I keep slaughtering them". That is all well and good, but a really good player is going to get a troop stack together, sneak it into the enemy's backfield with some spies for scouting, and do a little "strategic bombing". Find the weak points and start damaging the enemy's ability to create these suicidal stacks. Take a city, loot it, destroy the buildings, and move on. Blockade ports, sit on trade routes. Attack small stacks before they can assemble into hordes. Destroy or seige cities that can create elite troops. You can do a lot of economic damage with dirty tricks (assuming the AI doesn't cheat with the cash).

That is the beauty of a game like TW. You don't need to be exceptional, just competent, on the combat map, if you know to exploit the strategic map. And vice-versa.

[Didz]

In my book an exceptional commander is the one who achieves his goals without fighting. Any commander who has to resort to military action has in my opinion already failed.

[Khorak]

In my book an exceptional commander is the one who achieves his goals without fighting. Any commander who has to resort to military action has in my opinion already failed.

Tell that to Eastern Europe when the Mongols arrived.
"Hello, welcome to Pola-"
*fwip* *fwip* *fwip*
*drops dead with half a million arrows in him*

[Didz]

Tell that to Eastern Europe when the Mongols arrived.

You mean they're coming back

[zhuge]

In my book an exceptional commander is the one who achieves his goals without fighting. Any commander who has to resort to military action has in my opinion already failed.

Well, in real life, I suppose I can agree. After all, Sun Tzu did say:
"to subjugate the enemy's army without doing battle is the highest of excellence."
But hey, what would R:TW be without battles, so I say, ignore the exceptional, on with the fighting and make more head soup.

[Mikeus Caesar]

Military stratagy? My strategy is either: When i'm defending a city, kill as many people as i can with the archers, and once out of arrows, i end out my greek cavalry to attack the enemies flanks. Once i have lost too many horses, i make them retreat to the city, and bring out my hoplites. The idiot enemy just walk up to me, i killed a few more of their men, and flabra-cadabra, i win. It never fails. When i'm in the field fighting a battle, i send in the cavalry first to attack their flanks and front, and once i've lost quite a few, i let them retreat back to my own lines. Then i start firing onagers at the enemy, for more demoralisation, and then i let the enemy run into my hoplites. This method has a 90% chance of success.