The Anniversary of Fall Weiß: Operations, Battles, Misconceptions

[Louis VI the Fat]

Fall Weiß

[Strike For The South]

USA USA USA USA USA USA USA USA USA

[PanzerJaeger]

One of the main myths surrounding the invasion is that it was the first use of the Blitzkrieg doctrine. Leaving aside the argument over whether 'Blitzkrieg' itself was ever a formalized doctrine in the same way as, say, the Soviet's 'Deep Operations', the Polish campaign does not fit the traditional understanding of how it was used in places like France and Russia - large armored encirclements. The real advancement in warfare demonstrated in the Polish Campaign was the German's use of air power. That crucial third element - tanks - came later.

Manstein's plan only envisioned a support role for tanks, and Guderian - who had spent so much time and effort developing the Panzergruppen - worried over the thought of their unprotected flanks. Also, unlike campaigns such as those in France and Russia where maneuver and encirclement was vital to overcome material differences, the Germans had the numerical upper hand.

Matthew Cooper writes: "Throughout the Polish Campaign, the employment of the mechanized units revealed the idea that they were intended solely to ease the advance and to support the activities of the infantry…. Thus, any strategic exploitation of the armoured idea was still-born. The paralysis of command and the breakdown of morale were not made the ultimate aim of the … German ground and air forces, and were only incidental by-products of the traditional manoeuvers of rapid encirclement and of the supporting activities of the flying artillery of the Luftwaffe, both of which had as their purpose the physical destruction of the enemy troops. Such was the Vernichtungsgedanke of the Polish campaign.

John Ellis, writing in Brute Force asserted that "…there is considerable justice in Matthew Cooper's assertion that the panzer divisions were not given the kind of strategic (emphasis in original) mission that was to characterize authentic armoured blitzkrieg, and were almost always closely subordinated to the various mass infantry armies."[86] Zaloga and Madej, in The Polish Campaign 1939, also address the subject of mythical interpretations of Blitzkrieg and the importance of other arms in the campaign. "Whilst Western accounts of the September campaign have stressed the shock value of the panzers and Stuka attacks, they have tended to underestimate the punishing effect of German artillery (emphasis added) on Polish units. Mobile and available in significant quantity, artillery shattered as many units as any other branch of the Wehrmacht."

The result was a far more traditional style of warfare based on attrition and brute force, which cost the Germans relatively heavy casualties compared to larger campaigns.

That leads to a second big myth that should be rectified - that the Poles rolled over. Fall Weiß, which lasted only a week less than Fall Gelb, was actually a very hard fought campaign that only came to a definitive end when the Russians invaded from the East. The Poles were preparing the Romanian Bridgehead, which would have surely prolonged the campaign even more.

How long could the Poles have held out? Would the British and French have ever come through?

As with Western portrayals of Normandy and Market Garden, Poland has been used as a scapegoat for British and French failings. The geopolitics surrounding the Polish defense plan - Plan West - deserves attention.

The Polish political determination to deploy forces directly at the German-Polish border, based on the British Government's promise to come to Poland's aid in the event of invasion, shaped the country's defence plan, Plan West. Poland's most valuable natural resources, industry and population were located along the western border in Eastern Upper Silesia. Polish policy centred on their protection especially since many politicians feared that if Poland were to retreat from the regions disputed by Germany, Britain and France would sign a separate peace treaty with Germany similar to the Munich Agreement of 1938.[47] The fact that none of Poland's allies had specifically guaranteed Polish borders or territorial integrity certainly did not help in easing Polish concerns. For these reasons, Poland disregarded French advice to deploy the bulk of their forces behind the natural barriers such as the Vistula and San rivers, even though some Polish generals supported it as a better strategy. The West Plan did permit the Polish armies to retreat inside the country, but it was supposed to be a slow retreat behind prepared positions and was intended to give the armed forces time to complete its mobilization and execute a general counteroffensive with the support of the Western Allies.[48]

The British and French estimated that Poland should be able to defend itself for two to three months, while Poland estimated it could do so for at least six months. Poland drafted its estimates based upon the expectation that the Western Allies honor their treaty obligations and quickly start an offensive of their own. In addition, the French and British expected the war to develop into trench warfare much like World War I. The Polish government was not notified of this strategy and based all of its defence plans on promises of quick relief by their Western allies.[49][50]

Polish forces were stretched thinly along the Polish-German border and lacked compact defence lines and good defence positions along disadvantageous terrain. This strategy also left supply lines poorly protected. Approximately one-third of Poland's forces were concentrated in or near the Polish Corridor, leaving them perilously exposed to a double envelopment from East Prussia and the west. Another third were massed in the north-central part of the country, between the major cities of Łódź and Warsaw.[51] The Poles' forward concentration largely forfeited their chance of fighting a series of delaying actions since their army, unlike some of Germany's, traveled largely on foot and lacked the ability to retreat to their defensive positions before being overrun by German mechanized formations.[52]

Although the Polish military had prepared for conflict, the civilian population remained largely unprepared. Polish pre-war propaganda emphasized that that any German invasion would be easily repelled. Consequently, Polish defeats during the German invasion came as a shock to the civilian population, who were largely unprepared.[52] Lacking training for such a disaster the civilian population panicked and retreated east, spreading chaos, lowering troop morale and making road transportation for Polish troops very difficult.

[rory_20_uk]

The Allies best time of early assistance was before the fall of Czechoslovakia which would have spread the Germans thinner and bought the west more time.

The British continued to have a small Army and the French were obsessed with defence as a strategy. I don't see how these two could have cohesively moved into Western Germany in any meaningful way - let alone managed the logistics of a protracted campaign. Germany also had a superior air force which would have made the Western advance even more costly.

[KrooK]

France had time to mobilise whole army and GB to send some corpses. Most of German units (practically all of best units) were on eastern front (lets call it eastern front - will be simplier). It means that on west were only reserves. If France attacked Ruhrgebiet, German army would have no ... ammo, tanks, flanes, ball bearings. Especially last one is very important. Really. How long do you think would Germany hold?

[Franconicus]

Panzer, you are right, of course. But let me add another point of view.

Blitzkrieg was not only a let's say tactical idea from German generals like Guderian, Manstein and Rommel. There was also a Blitzkreig as a political-strategical concept from Hitler. Due to the fact, that Germany would not be able to stand against all enemies, esp. if Engl. and France have time to mobilize their resources, the Blitzkrieg concept was a "one-at-a-time" strategy with fast campaign against isolated enemies.

It worked excellent at the Rhineland, Austria and CSR. Even without fighting. But then the allies began to prepare for war and Hitler became nervous.
Poland was somehow a failure, because Engl. and France entered the war, but at least the campaign was finished before they became active. France was a good example for Bltizkrieg strategy, but England was out of range. Germany could not end the war against England and Hitler started another one against Russia - Fall Weiß (well and against Greece etc.).
From then on the Bltzkrieg as a strategy was a complete failure, although the tactical Blitzkrieg went well for a while.
The new concept was, that Russia had to be defeated within one year - don't know if Germany would have had a chance with this conceppt but as we know it failed too.
From then on the allies became stronger and stronger, and the Blitzkrieg concept turned to be a desaster.

[King Kurt]

This is an interesting thread. It provoked me to have a look at the detail - all be it a read of the Wiki coverage - and to consider what happened. Here in England, the campaign is considered as one that happened quickly and was a foregone conclusion. Looking at it again I think this is not as true as we had always considered. It seems to me that arguebly the intervention of the Russians was critical. The Poles were out numbered by the Germans, but by using the size of the country and favourable terrain, they could have hung on defensively - certainly long enough for French and the English forces to attack in the West. The invasion from the East by the Russians meant that there was only going to be one result.

As this forum thrives on "what ifs", it is interesting to ponder what might had happened if the Russians had remained neutral - and the Allies had been a bit quicker off the mark. Then it would be Germany facing a war on 2 fronts. I have read that the Russians were keen to make an alliance with the French and English, but we turned them away as they were Communists. The Russians, their forces shattered by the officer purges of the late 30's, were desparate for a diplomatic solution so turned to the Germans. The consequences of such a train of events could have created a different world to what we have now - or certainly during the Cold War. If instead of conquering most of mainland Europe, Germany ended up stuck in a slogging match in central Europe, WW2 might not have got going. Something similar to WW1 might have happened instead - but fought in central europe instead of the low countries. That leads to no domination of Eastern Europe by Russia at the end of the war, possibly no war in the pacific, no atom bomb, no cold war. Like all "what ifs" - it is fascinating to guess what might have happened.

Final thought - Franc, I like your take on Blitzkeig - I think there is much to what you say and is a different take on the concept which is painted as the wonder strategy of WW2. In the end the success of any strategy must be judged on the end results - and Germany lost. As the saying goes, the only battle it is vital to win in any war is the last one.

[Kagemusha]

I agree with Panzer that the Polish campaign was if anything a triump of tactical airpower.The use of Stuka´s as flying artillery was something not seen before. For example in the Soviet/ Finnish Winter War that followed soon after this Campaign, the Soviets were not able to use their airforce in such manner at all, which pointed out a crucial weakness in their doctrine of mobile warfare during the time. Soviet airforce was not able to destroy the relatively weak Finnish artillery formations, not it could hamper Finnish side from moving their reserves behind the lines. Similar shortcomings were spotted in the quality of Soviet fighter doctrine and strategic airforce. The former was in world of hurt with the puny Finnish airforce and the latter had huge problems coordinating mass bombings against Finnish cities, railroads and other infrastructure.

Also what should be pointed out in the Polish campaign was that the quality of German armoured forces compared to Polish was not clearly in German favour and to me Polish used their own armoured forces and anti tank capabilities with superior skill compared for example to Western Allies in French campaign. I also agree with Panzer that the Polish put up a fierce resistance with the resources they had and calling that "rolling over" is bit more then misinformed.

[Brenus]

The use of the Stuka as forward artillery was absolutely a success in Poland.
However, against the French in the battle of Hannout - Gamblou, they failed to attack successfully the French positions and the French Artillery was able to stop the Panzer divisions, combined with strong but improvised Infantry Defensive Positions.
The Artillery/Infantry one defeated the combination Planes/Tanks.

The lesson given to Hoepner (XVI.Panzerkorps (3.PzD and 4.PzD)) was forgotten due to the fall of France and the Blitzkrieg was credited for this success.

The success of the German Offensive against the BEF and the French Army is due to the fact that they didn’t had to fight the Allies but cut their lines of Supplies and attacked on units in disarray.
In Russia, the Red Army had space to recover…

[Meneldil]

The Allies best time of early assistance was before the fall of Czechoslovakia which would have spread the Germans thinner and bought the west more time.

The British continued to have a small Army and the French were obsessed with defence as a strategy. I don't see how these two could have cohesively moved into Western Germany in any meaningful way - let alone managed the logistics of a protracted campaign. Germany also had a superior air force which would have made the Western advance even more costly.

As far as I know, the German were vastly outnumbered and outgunned on the western front while they were fighting in Poland. Had the allied (Franco-Brit) headquarters not been stuck in a completely outdated mindset, an allied offensive on the western front could probably have stopped the war.

[cegorach]

I am a bit engaged with my new business activities, but recently I've become fascinated with pre-war Polish military.

Frankly after over 20 years of 'marriage' with history (ok - add law to that - is it a triangle already?) I am rediscovering the entire thing.

Because in recent years the subject is gradually being revised by new generation of historians in Poland my knowledge is fresh.


I am a bit occupied, but if you have any questions I might answer them so shoot.





Here is a list of facts you might find interesting.
General

1. Poland's military was 7th strongest in the world at that time - obviously there is a large difference between nr 1, 2 or 3 and 7, but let's keep this number in mind.

2. Poland spent c. 1/3 of its budget on military needs during the Interbellum which is slightly less (in percent) than Belgium which in theory made it more militaristic than Soviet Union or Germany.

Even more - even 50% of the budget was spent during the final years before the war - oficailly and unoficially because weaponry was exported to gain funds and pay for modern weapons for the Polish Army also unoficially.
For example Poland was the second largest supplier of the Spanish Republic (the public supported the Nationalists, but they had little money) - that included 80 tanks, 300+ cannons, 4000+ machine guns, 120 000+ rifles, 1 500 000 - 2 000 000 hand granades etc.

Polish made weaponry was exported to Britain (40 mm AA cannons), Romania, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria (with expert help for aircraft industry), China, Estonia etc.

This lowered the cost of equipment for the Polish Army and some units were simply created from the funds gained this way. For example the second tank battalion was funded by the money the Republic paid for obsolate and almost useless FT-17.

3. The army was seen as the backbone of the state, before the Piłsudski's coup and after it. Actually all political parties supported the effort to create strong and well equipped army.

4. The idea 'Nation at Arms' was more than a phrase because the army gained the status of a major employer and education institution - in 1918 over 50% of the population was illiterate and every group of conscripts had to be educated, especially in eastern areas.
The Nation at Arms gave the army great influence in political life - which is a known fact, but there is another angle.
Simply as newly independent country which fought 6 wars between 1918 and 1923 the army continued traditions of XIXth century uprisings - January Uprising (1863-64) veterans were especially respected so the army attracted many best educated people. Piłsudski's Legions which fought during the Great War were even called 'the smartest brigades in the world' because of a number of artists, scientists, doctors and lawyers it included.

All that results in a large number of paramilitary organisations, large number of volunteers etc. For example there were almost 700 000 women trained to perform auxiliary duties.

5. Minorites in the army were treated with some distrust. Poles were favoured, especially as officers - quite similar to the situation in pre-war Czechoslovakia.

Germans were seen as reliable but only against the Soviets so they were sent to the eastern border. In 1939 at least 8 000 of them were in the army with 4 000 deployed in the east - they fought well against that enemy.
There was a small number of officers coming from this minority including at least one general (Otton Kirsch commander of artillery in SGO 'Narew') and most amazingly admiral Unrug - co-founder of the Polish Navy - an U-Boot commander born in Berlin whom the British even tried to prosecute for 'war crimes', but gave up.
Funny enough he led the defence of Hel garrison which capitualted on the 2nd October and in captivity 'refused to understand' German demanding translators' presence even during visits of his relatives from Germany.

Belorussians were considered good soldiers. Several of the best divisions in 1939 fighting in the Polish Army included them.
There were very few Belorussian officers owing that to several factors - one is the decision to discourage them from getting into officers schools, second powerty of the population in least developed area of the state (many landless peasants).

Ukrainians were a problem because the authorities supported Ukrainian exiles hoping to create free Ukraine. There were detailed (I know them well) plans to mobilize allied force consisting of Ukrainian allies (5 divisions in first phase!).
So Ukrainians from former Russian Empire were supprted in many ways (so far that in 1930-33 Piłsudski toyed with an idea to invade Soviet Union - floods of hungry refugees from Soviet Ukraine were crossing the borders and that spurred the exiles to lobby for a preventive war), but those from former Austria-Hungary or red Ruthenia were seen as possible enemies, separatists who could undermine peace in the territory seen as rightfully Polish ( mainly it is about Lwów/L'viv beonging to Poland from the XIVth century).
In 1939 they were suprisingly reliable following Ukrainian political leaders dismayed with German handling of short lived Ruthenian state in Czechoslovakia grasped by Hungary in 1939 and with the R-M Pact.

Jews were clearly the most favoured minority (but still misrepresented) who reached 6,5% of officers in the army (compared to 12% of the population they formed) - espcially favoured as doctors.
I know two Jewish generals - Bernard Mond commander of 6th (Cracov) Infantry Division
and Mieczysław Norwid-Neugebauer heading Polish military mission to the UK in 1939. Both owe that to their activity in the independence movement before 1918.
Opinion about them was often rather bad as unreliable soldiers, but I believe that might have something to do incidents with avoiding service before the war.

Georgians, Tartars and various exiles (Russian, Azeri, Armenians even some Dagestani, Checens etc) performed usually admirably. There was even one Italian.

I am still studying this subject - very interesting stuff.




Air force
======

1. There were c. 900 combat airplanes with 400 in first line (the rest were reserve, transport and in repair) + c. 1000 trainers and utility.

2. The airforce followed years long development plans based on specific calculations limited to the number which could be supported by expanding infrastructure and should consist of models produced in Poland.

3. The bomber force was supposed to be strong enough to act as a 'force in being' forcing the enemy to deploy large air defensive formations tied which wouldn't be immediatelly available to support the ground operations.

Of course its main task was to perform specific duties and that for example included a tactical bombing operation against Konigsberg, Stettin, Breslau or Berlin in the west (in response of similar attacks on cities in Poland) or to paralyse Soviet logistics in the east where for example just destruction of 7 key bridges would demolish supply system for the entire Belorussian theater of war.

That exaplains the existence of central forces for this task - with 3 bombing brigades in plans - one existed in 1939.

Because of a number of unexpected accidents modern PZL 37 Łoś was developed together with LWS Żubr which was supposed to be an interim solution or even buckup.
From 1940 Łoś would be replaced by PZL 49 Miś - heavier, faster and better armed model sharing the same, successful design.

4. Tactical support was to be left to local groups assigned to each army.

Because recon was seen as especially important (based on experiences from the war against the Soviets in 1919-20) a line of recon-bomber airplanes was developed and produced - PZL 23B Karaś is the model present in 1939 (from late 1939 would be replaced by PZL 46 Sum and that by PZL Łosoś or extravagant PWS-46 in 1942-43).

5. Fighter force was supposed to cover key industrial areas, but its priority was to protect mobilizing troops, especially central reserve forces around Brześć in case of the war against the Soviets.

In 1939 Poland's air defences were relatively modern in Warsaw area and proved effective to 6-7 September when observer stations had to be evacuated.
It was supposed to cover COP industrial area later and eventually a large part of the state to 1942-43 following expansion of AA artillery, air bases and most likely inclusion of new radar systems.
In 1939 first prototype radars were being tested either by the TKND or PIT (the latter was developing radars after the war) so it is reasonale the new equipment would find use later.

6. In 1939 the air forces were redeployed to field bases which saved it from destruction, but eventually resulted in a shortage of spare parts and supplies which grounded many planes in the second week of the campaign.

I'd like to mention that if the Pursuit Brigade defending Warsaw is quite well known the efforts of the air group covering armies 'Pomorze' and 'Poznań' and their counteroffensive at Bzura is not.
It is quite interesting, but this small force (c. 50 airplanes) contributed a lot to covering movement of those two armies to the north of German 8th Army hunting down a number of recon Hs-126 flying in the area.

7. Aircraft industry is one of the most impressive achievements of the pre-war 2nd Republic because from almost nothing a group of strong companies was born, especially favoured state-owned PZL.

People in charge of the Polish Airforce, especially Ludomił Rayski (interesting - ws flying in Ottoman forces during the 1st WW) believed that this branch of industry should be under state's controll and actually forced Lublin aircraft manufacturer PiL into bankrupcy in 1935 trying something similar with DWL (RWD brand).
The idea was to transfer technology and gradually develop each major company - PZL in Warsaw, PWS (trainers, mainly wooden) and LWS (created from nationalised PiL) in Lublin. LWS for example was to be ready in 1941 to produce modern models.
PZL itself was expanded with a new industrial complex in Mielec-Rzeszów (presently manufacture Blackhawks, parts for F-16 and a number of local designs including An-28 Skytruck purchased recently for US Special Forces).
All-wooden airplanes from the PWS would be ready for frontline, combat service with production of PWS-46 in 1942 or a light fighter model earlier).
Private owned DWL/RWD specialising in light civilian, sport and utility models from 1939 - as a matter of urgency and desperation - gained more attention with light fighter model PWD-25 developed by this company (naval bomber RWD-22 is a design for later years to support expansion of the Navy).

About 4 000 airplanes were produced in Poland

8. Training was reorganised into two main centers - CWOL 1 around Dęblin (central Poland) and CWOL 2 around Warsaw (included schools moved from other areas such as the one from Grudziądz - in 'the corridor').
Polish fighter pilots are well known and highly valued, but bomber crews were also judged well. According to British studies from the war only Polish navigators were considered worse prepared. I guess that owes to the fact the navigaton over water features was less important.


9. Naval airforce consisted of a small number of locally produced models or light floatplane recon and training planes.
In 1937 a deal was signed in Italy to purchase a number of CANT airplanes after some negotiations which would have to include a equipment manufactured in Poland.
After many delays because of German interference and due to some scandals (such as an incident were a storehouse with equipment from Poland was almost robbed - of course oficially because it was likely a case of industrial espionage) only a singular example reached Poland - with no weaponry because torpedoes were only in production in Poland.
Eventually to 1942 naval forces would use c. 24 foreign produced models and a number of bomber-trainers RWD 22.


NAVY
=======

1. C. 80% of Poland's export and import went through expanding, modern Gdynia seaport or through Danzig.
During the period it would be mainly coal from Silesia sold to Scandinavia.
That includes also high quality metal ores from Sweden and unavailable in Poland or things so basic as cotton from the USA which was also an importer of finished textiles.


2. Gdynia was quickly deloveping starting as a port to bypass unreliable (in 1920 transports of weaponry were blocked) Danzig.
Actually it is the second (together with Katowize in Silesia) modernist architecture jewel in Poland and still one of most important ports in the Baltic Sea.
In 1939 first merchant vessel was being constructed in Gdynia (m/s Olza - finished by Germans eventually became raider 'Michel' operating in the Pacific).
There were three important military shipyards.
One in Gdynia where four modern minesweepers (with good ASW equipment which is recent discovery) were finished and two, large, modern (Grom-mod class) were supposed to be built to 1942 - OORP 'Huragan' and 'Orkan'.
There were also plans to build one submarine using expert help from France and the Netherlands (engineers trained there during the construction of OORP Orzel and Sęp) from planned Orzel-mod class to 1942-43.

The second and the third were river shipyards - in Modlin north to Warsaw and in Kraków where river monitors were built.

3. Gdynia was considerd extremely important to the survival of the state, that is why the city itself wasn't defended because its destruction during the fighting would mean a disaster for years afterwards.

4. Coastal defences were developed after the fleet itself was operational which was a priority so only in 1930s coastal batteries were created with plans for 305 mm battery in Hel for 1941, maybe 1940.
In 1939 Poland asked Britain to lend one old monitor or two to use it as a coastal defence following British promises of military aid which was refused.

5. The Navy was a very important weapon in case of a war against the Soviets and was developed to face them.
This explains why all destroyers were large models supposed to deal with the most likely opponent to reach Poland's trade lines - large Soviet destroyers.
That is why Grom class destroyers (OORP 'Grom' and 'Błyskawica') were armed so well (7 x 120 mm).
The navy was also supposed to perform aggressive missions with the main task to block the Finnish Gulf to Soviet battleships and other capital vessels.
The idea was to deploy minefields in the zone between friendly countries - Estonia and Finland where submarine minelayers, destroyers with minelying capabilities and large minelyer ORP 'Gryf' (up to 600 mines in one go) would play important part.
To support the barrier large submarines were ordered in the Netherlands - the Orzel class (and for later years Orzel-mod class) with massive punch from its 12 torpedo tubes nicknamed 'Gangut-killers' by some enthusiasts nowadays.

The plan was most likely consulted with Estonia and Finland because both of them had similar designs in mind with addition of coastal batteries and small submarines such as Estonian 'Lembit' and 'Kalev'.
Certainly Estonia would serve as an information source if it stayed neutral.

Plans for 1942 included expansion of the navy to 8 destroyers (2 built in Poland) from 4 in 1939, one light cruiser and at least 8 submarines (3 from Orzel-mod, 1 likely constructed in Poland, construction of two started in France) from 5 in 1939, another 6 minesweeper-light miniers with ASW capabilities and at least 16 light torpedo boats.

6. Coastal defences from an attack from the land were least important in those plans so only around 1938 they were given support.

Gdynia would be pretty much useless in any conflict with Germany - that is why light torpedo boats were only purchased in 1939 (and some of them used by Polish Navy during the war in Britain). Large vessels would be sent to the UK or France to escort convoys to friendly Romania - Soviet attacks would close down that route of course.

The ground forces could be small at first to defend beaches against nearly impossible Soviet coastal invasion (rather suicide), but with growing probability and necessity to engage as large German forces as possible they were developed around two 'marine' rifle battalions and National Defence units (territorial guard).

In 1939 it was formed around Morska (Sea) Obrona Wybrzeża and Lądowa (Ground) Obrona Wybrzeża (coastal defence) commanded by admiral Unrug (yep the 'german').

It would consist of a number of lower and greater quality units supported by volunteers.

Border Guard Corps (KOP - Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza) units from the east and 'marine' battalions (expanded to small regiments) would be the best part, third rate militia units to guard beaches of Hel against unlikely German assault the worst.
The last were so bad that the officers assigned to them discovered those guys probably served the list time... in Kaiser's army and their morale proved probably the worst in the entire Polish Army.
In late September (after Warsaw surrendered) they started a mutiny pacified by only by KOP forces.

Because MOW and LOW were quickly separated they can be treated as separate entities. MOW barely had to fight because German assaults on Hel were first weak, later repelled, next succeed to capture some ground so that KOP units retreated and blown the part of the penninsula up isolating the area.
Coastal artillery was more busy and managed to 'discurage' both Kriegsmarine pre-dreadnoughts from doing anything important so that Hel was the last town in Poland with regular train departures and working post office.

Lądowa Obrona Wybrzeża fought very well. Colonel Dąbek who literally built if from some barely functioning units proved to be excellent commander, especially with his numerous night operations which proved one of those aspects of the whole campaign where Poles proved more than good.
Isolated the LOW capitulated on the 19th September after Colonel Dąbek ordered it and commited suicide.


7. River flotillas - second, large and important part of the navy - yet often overlooked.

Good for tomorrow together with the land forces part.





Ground forces
===========

I'll do that tomorrow and because I have an unintended habit to abandon threads due to notorious lack of time I'll write as much as possible in one post using information I remember.


If you have any questions about anything I might answer them - though not something too detailed.



Here are some images for the air force - naval bit

propaganda poster about industrialization plan which I am quite certain would work because parts of it were adopted after the war and many people in charge of it (e.g. Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski) were very reasonable and quite brilliant.





Warsaw air defence sections and zones. Interesting, but those guys used 'the big wing' formation during the defence.



Image from a women training, summer camp from 1939



A shot for PZL manufacturing plant and PZL 37B in production



PWS-46



Badge of 1st Air Regiment (from Warsaw). Regiments were peacetime structures, there were 6 of them - in Warsaw, Poznań, Torun, Kraków, Lwów (Lviv) and Lida (close to Wilno/Vilnius)



passenger and transport plane PZL 44 Wicher



PZL 55 vs. Ju 187 in 1942 - 'what if'



propaganda poster



poster of the 1 million large colonial movement (supported expansion of the navy and bought ORP 'Orzel' submarine)



Light fighter PZL 45 Sokół (light fighter, never built)



PZL 50A Jastrząb (two prototypes - 1,5 year of unexpected, accidental delays!)



Finnish-Estonian plan to block the Finnish Gulf






And small appetisers:

Another stage of reconstruction of a mysterious tank developed in 1939
sometimes nicknamed as '34TP'.



Polish riflemen c. 1941 with semi-automatic ('Maroszek') rifle



siege mortar tested in 1939



the man in charge of mobilization plans for allied Ukrainian army



exiles from Caucasus submit their condolences after Piłsudski's death





Information tomorrow if anyone wants it - including colonial initiatives, secret weapons, black ops of K-7 special service, special tactics in 1939 and best commanders of the POL army (according to me after considerable time I've spent over it).

[cegorach]

How long could the Poles have held out? Would the British and French have ever come through?

As with Western portrayals of Normandy and Market Garden, Poland has been used as a scapegoat for British and French failings. The geopolitics surrounding the Polish defense plan - Plan West - deserves attention.

With all my present knowledge and information I can find I am willing to say with much certainty that without the Soviet invasion Fall Weiss would end... in October and another operation would have to be prepared for November - much like in France Wehrmacht wasn't capable to deal with the enemy in one single move.


My opinion is based primarily on German logistical situation around 17th September, their deployment and the size of remaining Polish forces and their size depots.


Simply recently discovered and revisited accounts tend to increase the number of remaining Polish forces.

For example just the armies concentrated as so called 'Central' and Northern Front - Armia 'Kraków', 'Lublin', 'Modlin' didn't include c. 80 000 men as previously thought, but over 180 000 with 100 armoured vehicles.

Soviet attack disrupted communication on highest level and the forces in Lublin area never met and rushed their attacks reacting to the Soviet threat.

That together with sudden and not planned move to redeploy 2nd Panzer Division (its sluggish move eastwards was stopped due to Soviet attack) might have as much as much save 4th Light Division from destruction during the battle at Tomaszów Lubelski, but for sure sealed the fate of at least the Northern Front.


On the 17th September over 100 000 soldiers were amassed in the area close to the Romanian Bridgehead with another 150 000 very likely to reach the zone and c. 200 000 in other areas of eastern Poland - inluding those transported in trains later captured by Soviet forces.


Simply completely unexpected battle at Bzura gave the Poles about one week to reorganise large forces in central Poland (around Lublin) including several regiments which were supposed to form reserve Armia 'Prusy' which never fully mobilized.

For example 39th Infantry Division suddenly became 4 regimental division with enough artillery for two divisions.


Wehrmacht didn't have enough divisions to deal with over 60% of Poland's territory in shorter time and redeployment would take time.

Besides some orders bordered wishfullthinking - such as plans for 5th Panzer Div. to 'capture Lwów' just on its own, in three days as if it wasn't struggling with muddy roads and lack of fuel and as if the city wasn't defended by 30 000+ force.
Exhausted 1st Mountain Division couldn't offer any help - was at that time cut off by retreating three divisions of Armia 'Małopolska' of Kazimierz Sosnkowski while colonel Maczek was attacking with success from the suburbs of the 300 000 large city.


November would seem a safe bet remembering about weather, more difficult terrain, supply problems and all those 'moving pockets'.

[cegorach]

Ok - ground forces


I thought I should describe it in more organised, easier to read manner and not to double known, relatively extensive sources so I will limit myself to the issues which are currently still unavaileble in English.



1. The size of the army

Most common mistake made about the Polish Army is to count divisions rather than battalions.

Polish Army was no Czechoslovak force where independent (fortifications) battalions formed as much as 30% of the armed forces, but after initial calculations are made there is still several units which are often ignored.

In 1939 the army included over 50 independent battalions and at least 20-30 unplanned battalions formed from volunteers, from mobilizad remnants or completely improvised.

Not counting battalion sized units which were understrenght or partially or inadequately armed.

That is another 8 'divisions' to think about.

The most spectacular and best known example is from Warsaw.

It might be a suprise, but when 4th Panzer Division attacked the city it was repelled by small forces which were a part of almost completely improvised 'division' formed from reserve troops, border guards, police etc.
Three regiments were formed in Warsaw during thefirst days of combat it faced alone.
Later it received even more men and equipment and a force of a size of a large brigade was created.

Similar situation took place in Grodno (currently Belorus) and so called 'Grodno Rifles Division' was transported to defend Lwów/L'viv.

While Grodno itself was defended (against the Soviets) for three days by even more ad hoc formed forces - basically volunteers, teenagers, old veterans and entusiastic civilians with a support of a small cadre of professionals - an AA battery, some cavalrymen and reservists.


Of course improvised formations are one thing and some of the independent battalions another.

These consisted of elite Border Guard (KOP) battalions transported from the east, heavy machine gun battalions - 7 planned and a number improvised (from AA machine gun companies), fortification battalions and ON (National Defence) territorial defence units

In some cases it was as planned - some areas should be defended by small forces acting independently, but in many it was a step to create more divisions - reserve infantry divisions such as 55th ID created in Upper Silesia from local ON units.

Many experts believe that far too many of those battalions were wasted - ON units especially - because were assigned to normal divisions and cavalry brigades and often 'dissolved' during the fight because lacked training to fight properly on their own as a part of formations they were unfamiliar with.

For example several ON battalions (planned to form 48th Division in 1940) in Pomerania were decimated during the fighting, left stranded or fall apart.

ON units are often the first to fall into captivity of advancing Germans or to simply go home after the area they are from is abandoned by retreating army and they are left without orders in confusion.

I believe that in the majority of such cases it was a matter of leadership because ON units formed into well commanded formations such as the mentioned 55th Division fought often very well.




Another part of those, often ignored battalions are local forces formed under patronage of local commanders or authorities. That would be the case with several volunteer units counted above (especially in Warsaw) with one quite important formation I didn't mention yet.

So called OOP (Ochotnicze Oddziały Powstańcze - Volunteer Insurrection Units) in Upper Silesia were formed under the patronage of autonomous government of this region (Upper Silesia had its own treasury, parliament and in some ways was close to a semi-independent state) and commander of the 23rd Upper Silesian Infantry Division general Jan Jagmin-Sadowski.
As many as 22 battalions were planned with 500 men in each unit, maybe half of them were formed, half of those armed.

A side note - Poland definetely had the manpower, so could field even 3 000 000 army with Yugoslavian or Greek level of armament (or if Soviet manner to count everything was implemented), but that was seen as useless and dangerous to the economy.

The OOP forces were formed by veteran associations and various, local para-military groups. many of them later joined retreating regular army, but many stayed and fought for another 3-4 days engaging German 'brandenburgers', freicorps and landwehr forces.

When German special actions during the campaign are mentioned Silesia is sometimes mentioned as an example of successful use of such troops - hardly true. Such sources never even mention the fact these 'special forces' were fighting mostly against the OOP, often after the regular army started their retreat.

2. Evolution of infantry

There were 30 'first wave' infantry divisions each with 3 regiments of infantry, a light artillery regiment with three battalions (12 pieces in a battalion) and a small heavy artillery battalion with 6 pieces.

Around 1924 the nationalist government planned to create (Haller-Sikorski plan) 60 infantry divisions, but after 1926 Józef Piłsudski dismissed those ideas as unrealistic.

Simply the size of the force was shaped by three facts

- alliance with France which demanded existence of 30 divisions during the time of peace,

- and railways which couldn't transport more forces than c. 30 divisions,

- constant threat of Soviet invasion with never ending incidents on the border and need to keep relatively strong peace time force,

This meant that any army formed in similar way as in Yugoslavia or Romania where massive infantry forces with few artillery pieces were a norm would simply become half useless - difficult to concentrate, problematic to supply - easpecially in the east.

The conditions of the eastern front could hardly provide enough transport routes to supply more than 40 large units.

So 30 divisions it stayed and from 1930 onwards the number remained while the quality of the divisions would be improved.
Each division was supposed to receive (gradually) more and more modern equipment starting with artillery, engineer equipment and ending with assigned recon tanks and better communication equipment.

The timetable followed industrialization plans - simply the army was too big to equip it with imported weaponry and equipment, not to mention it would bankrupt the state so each piece of weaponry would be produced in Poland.

Cannons first - in Starachowice (close to Kielce in the center), in Pruszków (next to Warsaw) and in completely new, modern factories in Stalowa Wola, Rzeszów and Nowy Sącz - in so called security triange in the south.

More complicated and expensive equipment later - motorcycles from Warsaw, Legionowo and Kielce, radiostations from Warsaw and new factories in the Central Industrial Zone and new recon tanks to replace the tankettes.

From those 30 divisions it is difficult to count any of them as elite units - in theory all of them should be armed acording to the same specifications with only local and unplanned adjustments such as to defend fortifications.

In the reality the process of modernization wasn't finished so some divisions were better armed than the other.

The fact is in general ignored in older sources about the campaign.

Presently we know that:

18 divisions received more howitzers replacing one of light artillery (76 mm French cannons) battalions with the second battalion of 100 mm howitzers (Skoda license produced in Poland from early 1930s in Starachowice and Stalowa Wola) so had 24 100mm howitzers instead of 12.

A number of divisions received an AT motorized company with 12 37mm cannons (Bofors license production from Pruszków and Rzeszów), we don't know how many, but for now 5 are identified. That would give them 39 AT guns instead of 27.


And that a number of divisions formed improvised motorized AT platoons with 3 cannons as ordered in mid 1939 by the high command.

Of course there are also other aspects of being elite - leadership, traditions, special training etc.

From this point of view among elite divisions 2 'mountain' divisions could be counted (mountain only in traditions - received moderate mountain training, often limited to some companies) as well as 3 'legionary' divisions continuing traditions of three brigades in Piłsudski's Legions, but frankly 'ordinary' diviisons were equally capable and could fail or succeed just as much as any of the 'elite' units.
Leadership and combat conditions mattered more - you have 3rd Legionary ID failing as half mobilised unit and completely ordinary 25th ID which performed admirably defeating 1st Panzer Division during later phase of the battle at Bzura thanks to its commanding officers and new 'hedgehog' tactics.


So there were 30 infantry divisions, any plans to motorize them?

Nope. Motorization was supposed to be gradual and follow a wider scheme - mainly improved ifrastructure, tax exemptions to promote motorization amongst the population and would start with specialised units insede a division - starting with completely motorized units of engineers, combat engineers, AA artillery, divisionary AT companies, recon tank companies etc.

About the recon tanks.

In theory there were 18 independent tankette companies assigned to infantry divisions.
Polish Army never really planned to form armored divisions as those would be horribly expansive - besides what is the use to have one tankette based division if infantry units are underequipped and this weak 'tank' unit cannot be everywhere at the same time.

Four mechanized brigades were planned (about it later) while independent recon companies were supposed to support cyclist and cavalry units inside each division and sometimes support infantry attacks.

Tankettes were initially chosen because of two reasons - low cost and low capabilities of Poland's military industry at that time. From the beginning they were supposed to be used as training vehicles, an interim solution before true recon tanks are available.

Because armoured steel plates were difficult to manufacture and because artillery was given the priority - the budget was already stretched - tankettes remained in use even in 1939, though with improvised improvement (armed with new 20 mm automatic cannon) they would later become tank destroyer companies. It is interesting, but around 1939 anti-tank defences of all divisions almost doubled and first (very few) 'tank destroyer' tankettes were one of new tools to stop enemy panzers.




In addition to 30 'active' divisions there were so called reserve infantry divisions, however they were quite different than reserve divisions in other countries.

Initially 7, in 1939 nine would reach a number of 11-13 eventually (1941).
It seems that in later 1930s Polish authorities felt confident enough to expand the army because the budget of the state could afford it.

Unlike in other countries all those reserve divisions were eventually planned to transform into 'active' divisions armed according to the same standards and the process already started in 1939.

Another important fact is that the divisions received a large share of professionals - some of those 'reserve' divisions were actually better trained than 'regulars', especially those which were formed by KOP units from the east.



In 1942 Polish Army would have 40-43 regular divisions and a number of local battalions supporting the infantry.

Each division would receive new 76 mm cannons (in testing in 1939), new 100 mm howitzers (production from autumn 1939) and new heavy artillery pieces for divisionary artillery.
Regiments of infantry would be armed with infantry guns (most likely the same type of 76 mm guns as in battalions of artillery) and new 120 mortars.

AT defences would probably still consist of some 37 mm Bofors license cannons with majority formed by new 47 mm pieces from Starachowice and Stalowa Wola.

AA would receive new 20 mm automatic cannons (in production in 1939 - 50 were ready) and keep larger number of 40 mm Bofors cannons from Rzeszów.

Recon tanks would be likely replaced by 7TP or 9TP tanks removed from mechanized brigades and army level tank battalions. AT tankete based tank destroyers were an ad hoc creation unlikely to stay for long, but some might be still around unless someone would decide to develop the idea further.

Infantry would be partially motorized, but the country couldn't afford full motorization. Besides roads in the east would be still bad limiting use of such equipment - horses and men are easier to feed after all.




some images

road map of Poland - better roads in red, as you can notice in the east it was really bad



'mountain' units and Polish forces in winter outfits




future 155 mm long range artillery tested in 1938-39



tankette with 20 mm cannon



the cannon itself - was designed for airplanes, AA defence, new Polish destroyers built in Gdynia as well as for some armored vehicles



4TP recon tank in testing - abandoned because was becoming obsolate and it was decided to produce less models of tanks at the same time




armored forces, cavalry, paratrooopers (yes, yes), secret weapons, special operations, support of terrorism along with the best commanders and units (according to me), strenghts and weaknesses of the army in 1939 later - at the moment I have to go.

such as those