Germany to complete WWI reparations at last.

[Louis VI the Fat]

lack sufficent knoweldge on the Prussians to truly challenge your last point (Although I suspect hyperbole)

Hyperbole? Quod non.

German propaganda has been so efficient that when people read a more realistic account they suspect hyperbole.

Once it became clear that Germany had lost the war, the Prussian command ordered a policy of scorched earth for the retreating German army. What could be carried had to be send to Germany, what couldn't was to be destroyed. The object was to strategically weaken the industrial heartland of France and Belgium, even with an eye in preparation for the next war. Simultaneously, the German military command ordered that the peace negotiation would have to agree with the condition that 'France and Belgium were to receive full restoration for all plundered goods and civil damages'.

Like the 'solemn promise' of Prussia that it would honour and protect the neutrality of Belgium, the word of the Prussian was all calculated deceit, promises never intended to be kept.

The French were Gentleman like the Americans were after WWII. They were because it suited them to be.

Russia and Germany

Yes, in the final balance, the historical record shows a very clear difference between the conduct of the democracies, and that of the autocracies.

But no, not because it suited them, but because of the nature of a democracy. The very philosophical foundation of democracy assigns a higher value to human life and dignity.

[Louis VI the Fat]

The air in this thread is thick with French nationalism and it seems to be overpowering fact and reason.

Overall, I suspect Louis is voluntarily using hyperboles to debunk the whole "Germany had it hard after WWI" myth.

Meneldil is close.

What I agitate against, is a narrative that I consider fundamentally erroneous, and erroneous in a mannar that is grossly unfair on France. Something like this:

WWI started by encirclement, by revanchism, reckless alliances
France lost, saved by America
Germany did 'not really' lose the war
Despite that, duplicitous France abused temporary weakness of Germany
France had the harshest demands, the anglo powers moderate demands
France in this way responsible for German hardship, thus for outbreak of WWII
Which France lost again, again bailed out
Oh, and an invincible German Superarmy, that, despite twice losing a war as Europe's greatest power, massivley overachieved


Against all that, I protest. I started protesting when Brenus took offense one or two pages ago. Brenus described it as francophobia. I myself consider it more dangerous still: all of the above is stated so completely matter-of-factly, that even the francophile would unwitingly repeat it. That is why I brought out the sledgehammer, to bang away at it all. I know the big hammer irritates people more than that it convinces them, but it does aid two delighful purposes: 1, I get it all off my chest, and 2, uhm, there was a two but I don't remember it right now.

Clemenceau fought tooth and nail during the Versailles negotiations to weaken Germany and Austria-Hungary against the better judgment of Woodrow Wilson.

No, this is not supported by modern scholarship. The French delegation, on the contrary, must be regarded as the most moderate of the three main allies.

[Strike For The South]

Yes, in the final balance, the historical record shows a very clear difference between the conduct of the democracies, and that of the autocracies.

But no, not because it suited them, but because of the nature of a democracy. The very philosophical foundation of democracy assigns a higher value to human life and dignity.

Agreed but I do not think this is the intrisic vaule that spured the altruism.

America and France have acted with wanton disreagard for life and dignity many times in our histories.

To frame it so simply means one loses much of the context.

[PanzerJaeger]

Except of course that the German never paid the reparations

Germany paid roughly 20,000,000,000 marks, 1/8 of the sum.

Yes, in the final balance, the historical record shows a very clear difference between the conduct of the democracies, and that of the autocracies.

But no, not because it suited them, but because of the nature of a democracy. The very philosophical foundation of democracy assigns a higher value to human life and dignity.

Yes, if you completely ignore Allied partitioning of Eastern Europe, particularly pushed by the French, it is possible to conjure up such a romantic view of democratic values.

No, this is not supported by modern scholarship. The French delegation, on the contrary, must be regarded as the most moderate of the three main allies.

Unfortunately the modern scholarship I've seen you post in several threads in the past all too often confuses outcome with intent. It is relatively easy to form a cogent argument that Versailles and later treaties inadvertently left Germany in an advantageous position. It is much more difficult to form an argument that states that that was the intention of the French delegation, especially when reading primary sources from the negotiations.

In my opinion the treaty was a poor compromise. It left Germany powerful enough to pursue further aggression yet bitter enough to succumb to National Socialism. From the Allied perspective, Germany should have been broken back up into the states of the Confederation or wholly welcomed back into the world community without penalty.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Germany paid roughly 20,000,000,000 marks, 1/8 of the sum.

A mere pittance. All the more so considering only about a third was paid in cash.
At any rate, much less than the 27 billion German received in recovery loans, which Germany happily defaulted on and never paid back.

a romantic view of democratic values.

In the final balance of the twentieth century, I value the democracies over the other systems that have been tried, yes. Call me a romantic.

The perennial failure of democracy to live up to its own humanitarian ideals does not make it the moral equivalent of those systems that deny those humanitarian ideals to begin with.

Unfortunately the modern scholarship I've seen you post in several threads in the past all too often confuses outcome with intent. It is relatively easy to form a cogent argument that Versailles and later treaties inadvertently left Germany in an advantageous position. It is much more difficult to form an argument that states that that was the intention of the French delegation, especially when reading primary sources from the negotiations.

In my opinion the treaty was a poor compromise. It left Germany powerful enough to pursue further aggression yet bitter enough to succumb to National Socialism. From the Allied perspective, Germany should have been broken back up into the states of the Confederation or wholly welcomed back into the world community without penalty.

That's far too Taylor for me, I do not think his analysis that Germany was dealt either too harshly or too leniently is the most relevant.

Versailles indeed left Germany strengthened, and the victors weakened. France certainly did not intent this. However, this was not the necessary outcome, rather the result of the policies in the 1920's and 1930's.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Peace through law never materialised. International law and the League of Nations remained toothless.

Reconcilliation through cooperation never materialised. If one reads some of the objectives of France's post-war plans, one is struck with a mixture of awe and ridicule for the grandiose projects for economic reorganisation. I would deem all the plans bizarre and entirely unrealistic, were it not that I live in one, the EU. France's post-WWI policy was, albeit tentatively, not dissimilar to post-WWII. France sought French-German-Belgian economic co-operation. A pooling of resources would make war impossible. It failed in the 1920s - Germany was not interested. In the 1950s, it succeeded, and became the essence of post-war concilliation.

The Treaty of Guarantee never materialised. I for one follow MacMillan. The treaty's central element was that Germany would be left in an advantageous state, in exchange for which the peace would be secured by American involvement in Europe. But America never ratified. At this point, the entire treaty system was already dead, had become meaningless.
The European peace now had to be guaranteed by a France which was left ruined, destroyed, financially bankrupt, and which could never recover in time if Germany intended to use the peace as mere buying time for another war. Meanwhile Germany for its part escaped war destruction, interallied debt and the costs of reparations, and was kept in check only by its promise not to start it all over again.

Everybody failed everybody. The allies failed themselves in not securing the peace. The allies failed Germany in exposing it to nationalist agitation. For MacMillan, the main mistake was that defeat was not brought home to Germany. With the benefit of hindsight, indeed even a brief occupation of Germany, say some three years, would have prevented so much misery for the whole of Europe...

[/digressions]

As for the ancient Manichean 'Harsh France, idealistic US, realistic UK' - uh-uh, no way.

France was the most moderate of all three. Britain had the stiffest demands. Even Wilsonian idealism was 'harsher' than the realism of Clemenceau.

Primary sources can show anything. There are so many sources, expressing such conflicting aims and opinions, that one can ascribe any goal to any delegation and still base it all on primary sources. Much to the delight of partisan historiography. Analysis and a full record are what is needed.

All the smoke and mirrors of Versailles left the sources difficult to asses without a full reading and understanding of them. For example, France sometimes used enormous claims, unrealistic demands, for pr purposes, and to exert pressure on especially the US delegation. Privately however, and in actual aims and actual policy, French claims were very moderate and concilliatory. This difference escaped many a contemporary. Not surprising perhaps, because creating an impression of harsh terms was French policy - to delude the French public.
There is however no excuse for the historian, in the possesion of the full record, to be deluded. For decades, serious scholarship has been aware that the French delegation was the most moderate of all. Try for example Marc Trachtenberg:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877867?...rviceName=null

[Louis VI the Fat]

What I agitate against, is a narrative that I consider fundamentally erroneous, and erroneous in a mannar that is grossly unfair on France.

Historical revisionism has been extraordinarily succesful in blaming the democracies for the ills of the 1920's and 1930's.

This has been re-invigorated in the past decade. On the wave of francophobia popular anglo history, especially American history, eagerly embraced a German-nationalist narrative, substituing 'democracies' and 'Jews' for 'France'. Popular US history is now close to providing a simplified account of the 20's/30's that blames an irresponsible, avaricious France for plunging Germany into nazism, and thus for bearing ultimate rsponsibility for WWII.

Keylor's Legacy of the Great War goes a long way to present a different narrative:


Despite its shortcomings, the Versailles Treaty was potentially viable. But its successful implementation required wisdom and strength. Instead, divisions among the wartime allies, due at least as much to the United States and Great Britain as to France, augured ill for its survival.

What does Keylor’s anthology tell us about the victors? At the top of a pecking order of power, the Anglo-Saxon countries treated France shabbily, and their failure to honor their promises to France had long standing consequences. France’s enormous human losses and precarious economic and financial condition allowed its two allies to get away with this abdication of responsibility. Too often during the interwar years, the United States and Great Britain asked much of the French and offered too little or nothing in return. At Paris, both the United States and Great Britain first secured their own interests--naval security, trade, oil,--and then took the moral high ground in response to French demands for equal treatment.

The Treaty of Guarantee could have soothed French worries about security and provided a strong underpinning for Franco-German reconciliation--maybe even a peaceful revision of the Versailles Treaty before Hitler destroyed the postwar rules of the game. The lost Guarantee contributed significantly not only to the French catastrophe of May-June 1940, but to Great Britain’s lonely, desperate, heroic summer and fall of 1940. It also led to Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944. My students believe that the United States rescued France during World War II, which is partially true, but it is as accurate to say that the United States, by its failure to honor the Treaty of Guarantee and its absence in 1940, played a major role in making D-Day necessary. The Anglo-American misreading of power and the narrowness of their self-interestedness in 1919 and during the interwar years contributed as much as French policies to dooming the Versailles Treaty.

[Husar]

From the Allied perspective, Germany should have been broken back up into the states of the Confederation or wholly welcomed back into the world community without penalty.

Wasn't it Otto von Bismarck who said something along the lines of "If you're going to wage war with an enemy you should either make sure that they can save their face or that they won't rise again."?
Well, he was always a bit ahead of the French*.






*and arguably the german governments after him, too

[Louis VI the Fat]

Wasn't it Otto von Bismarck who said something along the lines of "If you're going to wage war with an enemy you should either make sure that they can save their face or that they won't rise again."?
Well, he was always a bit ahead of the French*.

*and arguably the german governments after him, too

No, contrary to German national-conservative narratives, the French in 1918 were not stupid.

In fact, France ensured both your options: Germany was spared and could save face, plus an alliance was forged in case Germany's post-war promises were as good as Germany's pre-war 'solemn promise' to guarantee Belgian neutrality.


Alas! Rather than save face Germany followed rabble-rousers in beer halls, who shouted that Germany had been stabbed in the back was now living in eternal slavery to Jews and foreigners and social-democrats. And as for the Treaty of Guarantee - well, Attlee never intended to keep his word, and Wilson couldn't convince congress to honour his.

In the end, everybody paid a heavy price, and it turned out France had been right all along. Still France tried to save democracy in 1940, as it had done the war before. Sadly, France, this time standing (nearly) all alone, lost.

[Husar]

No, contrary to German national-conservative narratives, the French in 1918 were not stupid.

In fact, France ensured both your options: Germany was spared and could save face, plus an alliance was forged in case Germany's post-war promises were as good as Germany's pre-war 'solemn promise' to guarantee Belgian neutrality.

Hint: When Bismarck made France pay a lot of money in 1871, he didn't have the "let them save face"-option in mind....
Alliances to keep Germany down alredy existed before 1914 so I don't see how that was some kind of novel idea, isolating a country or two also doesn't fit under the "let them save face"-option, quite the contrary...

[Louis VI the Fat]

Hint: When Bismarck made France pay a lot of money in 1871, he didn't have the "let them save face"-option in mind....
Alliances to keep Germany down alredy existed before 1914 so I don't see how that was some kind of novel idea, isolating a country or two also doesn't fit under the "let them save face"-option, quite the contrary...

There was no alliance to keep Germany down, because Germany was not kept down at all. That belongs to a discourse that speaks of eternal slavery, of exploitation, of foreign parasites.
What it really says, is that anything that prevents superior Germany from taking its rightful place as master of the entire universe, is 'keeping Germany down'. And because it is of course impossible that the superior German army could not achieve global overlordship at will, other, more insidious forces must be at work. Evil Jews, avaricious foreigners, internal enemies. Conspiring to 'keep Germany down'.

It is all nonsense.


Countries lose wars all the time. Nothing special about it. There was nothing special about Germany losing. All European countries have lost wars by the dozen. Peace settlements afterwards, in which customarily the winner wins something and the loser loses something, are not the same as 'keeping a country down'.


In fact, far from anti-German, the western alliance was the very means to make it possible that Germany would not be kept down!
The central element of the Versailles Treaty was that Germany would be left intact as Europe's greatest power, while the western alliance would be continued. This made it possible that the security of the victors was guaranteed, while Germany's territorial integrity and self-determination could be secured.

[Husar]

There was no alliance to keep Germany down, because Germany was not kept down at all. That belongs to a discourse that speaks of eternal slavery, of exploitation, of foreign parasites.
What it really says, is that anything that prevents superior Germany from taking its rightful place as master of the entire universe, is 'keeping Germany down'. And because it is of course impossible that the superior German army could not achieve global overlordship at will, other, more insidious forces must be at work. Evil Jews, avaricious foreigners, internal enemies. Conspiring to 'keep Germany down'.

To keep Germany down indeed, because when Germany rose and started a war, the alliance kept us down, there is no Nazi propaganda in that, it was a defensive alliance to keep Germany where it was.
That does not imply that Germany had any right to rise and attack the other powers, Bismarck also made alliances to keep France down but saying that doesn't make it french nazi propaganda, or does it?

[Noncommunist]

Wasn't it Otto von Bismarck who said something along the lines of "If you're going to wage war with an enemy you should either make sure that they can save their face or that they won't rise again."?
Well, he was always a bit ahead of the French*.

*and arguably the german governments after him, too

Or like Machiavelli with

"Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
Ch. 3; Variant translation: Never do an enemy a small injury."

[Louis VI the Fat]

You two tell tell it to the Romanian Jews, who humiliated Romania by throwing rocks at the retreating Romanian army in 1918, but who then didn't take control of Romania enough to keep it down forever.


Or some such I learned in another thread.