Could Germany have won WWII?

[Brenus]

“that Stalin asked for a cease-fire” I read somewhere that, in fact, negotiations had been started but Stalin wanted a return to the 1941 borders, and Hitler disagreed. Citadel was to show that if Germany couldn’t win in the East, at least it could still bite.
Hitler had shown previously a good instinct for Political Aims whereas his Generals couldn’t grasp the reality outside of the battlefields. The only problem (err, one of) for Hitler was his politic was based on strength and intimidation, and he hadn’t theses any more. The skills and the will of the German Soldiers will avoid a total collapse, but in Kursk, the German Forces only succeeded to dent the Soviets, but they didn’t succeed to reach their initial target. Later one, Model did claim it could have done it, if, but even this wouldn’t have secure the victory as the second pince was stalled completely.
And the Soviet still had 2 Reserved ARMIES.

As the Soviet man power, can I remind here that it was NOT Stalin who had to call on the 55 and 14 years Old to go to war? So Nazi Germany was more on the edge that USSR for this matter, and each liberated territories was adding to the Red Army man power. And I imagine that the volunteers for the former Nazi Occupied Territories were as motivated as possible to take on Germans.

Fortunately, The German War Machine was not adapted to the task, nor her allies were. Lack of strategic bombers, lack of really modern infantry weapons (disregarded because very good one as MG42 and Sturmgehewr 44 but can’t hind the fact that most of the infantry was equipped with Mauser 98), lack of fighters with enough autonomy, absolute disorganisation in the war production and design in new material, rivalry within the army (Wehrmacht, SS), Intelligence (Abwehr, Gestapo), I can carry on… And we can speak about Germany’s Allies: Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy, and Hungary were used as cannon-fodder.

The entire concept of the Blitzkrieg was just flawed. As the Soviet Armies were not destroy at the borders as intended by Barbarossa, and succeeded to withdraw with heavy losses, but still managed to do it, the all Nazi Machine designed for one tactic didn’t adapt then collapse. The only hope was always “a last push” and the Russian would collapse. So the Germans pushed, and pushed, and pushed, and no collapse. But you can read here and there the same sentence.
The point is, nowhere in the Russian Front, after Moscow, you have a sign of a collapse in term of will to fight. The Germans did manage to win others battles and pushes, but the final collapse never happened.

[ReluctantSamurai]

As I previously stated, both the Russian and German armies were exhausted by '43.

I don't believe that they were, judging from the tremendous buildup on both sides before Kursk. Germany had rebuilt its' Panzer armies and brought many of the Grenadier Divisions to nearly full strength. The Soviets, besides the massive concentration of forces within the Kursk salient, had 6 entire armies in reserve including two new tank armies (the 3rd & 5th Guards). I don't think that the Soviets ran out of steam until after the completion of Operation Bagration. By then, both sides had suffered very high casualties, and needed rest and refit before continuing the conflict.

In contrast to the myth, the man certainly did not have a "steel" constitution, and it is conceivable that, facing a major reversal, he would have sued for peace.

In the late fall of 1941, this might perhaps be true IF the Germans had managed to capture Moscow. But by mid-1943, I doubt anything that the Germans could do would shake Stalin's confidence in victory. The Soviets had survived the dark days of 1941-42, had inflicted two major defeats on the Germans at Moscow and Stalingrad, and with the help of Lend Lease supplies and increased domestic production, were pushing the Germans back towards the original start borders of Barbarossa. Why would any defeat on the part of the Soviets cause Stalin to sue for peace?

The Germans mustered a very powerful force for Kursk, one capable of taking the fight back to the gates of Moscow under the unrestrained leadership of Manstein and Model and with a bit of luck.

This is just a pipe dream, I'm afraid. The Germans just barely got a glimpse of Moscow's tower spires in Dec 1941 before getting thrown back, and this under conditions of a badly organized and severely demoralized Red Army with a lot of dated equipment and poor tactics. What would lead you to believe it could be done against a now well equipped adversary both on the ground and in the air, who has good to excellent experienced leadership, with better organization (particularly in armor) and the confidence that the German could be defeated? And German logistics isn't any better in 1943 than it was in 1941...horse drawn methods were still prevalent.

a "backhand" operation could have achieved the kind of envelopment necessary to remove entire Soviet armies from the game.

Given the extent of Soviet mechanization (particularly with the ever-growing truck park) and the reorganization of armor into something resembling what the Germans were doing, I don't think you would have seen any 1941-42 style encirclements even if the Germans had not been the aggressor at Kursk. And Soviet generals had learned some very hard lessons in the previous two years to walk blindly into such situations anyways.

it is possible that the Germans could have delivered a powerful enough blow to reverse the fundamental calculus dictating the course of events on the Eastern Front. They had the forces and leadership in place to do so.

Without LRB's to do serious damage to Soviet industry, and LL cranking up to high proportions, I just can't agree with this. Germany just cannot slow Soviet production of weapons and material, and the ever-growing power of the VVS would ensure that no German offensive doesn't get severely punished by airpower.

Allied performance speaks for itself - while consistently overmanned and oversupplied, they also consistently underperformed as compared to their Russian and German counterparts. They lacked a sense of strategic and/or tactical urgency, consistently failing to take advantage of their material superiority or their enemy’s weakness.

At the risk of getting into a pissing contest, for every example you can put up that shows this, I can put up others that show the opposite

And yet, when the German assault exhausted the resources necessary to keep moving forward, the infighting and confusion/lack of situational awareness that characterized Allied operations throughout the war prevented a decisive response and the vast majority of German forces were simply allowed to withdraw back to their starting lines.

And such things never happened in the ranks of the Heer If Patton and Collins had been able sway Ike instead of Monty and Bradley, the counter-offensive would have been aimed at the shoulders with the intent of bagging the whole of the troops still in the salient.

but the offensive ground to a halt due to fuel and ammunition shortages and an inability for supply lines to keep up with the spearheads.

This only happened to a large extent to 6th Panzer Army and specifically Peiper's Kampfgruppe. 5th Panzer Army did not suffer nearly so much, and was able to reach as far as Celles before having to turn back.

by December 23 Allied air power was again fully operational.

Not according to Dupuy. Up until the January counter-offensive, air support was spotty, at best...a few good flying days here and there before the fog and snow settled back in. Besides, at the two critical junctions of Bastogne and St. Vith, the Americans inflicted high casualties on the Germans and slowed the advance to such an extent that by Christmas, most of the generals leading the advance had already conceded failure....all pretty much without air support.

And in reference to c) above....yep, the Allies fought nothing but the dregs from the bottom of the barrel, and won solely on the strength of overwhelming material.....

[ReluctantSamurai]

@ PJ

Something for both of our pov's concerning the use of airpower during the Ardennes Offensive:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-19.html

While I don't subscribe to the USAAF's bloated kill figures ( 1161 tanks and AFV's destroyed when the entire offensive contained roughly 1500 at best? seriously? ), it does show the impact of interdiction missions on the logistics of the operation:

Field Marshal von Rundstedt, upon conclusion of hostilities, summed up the effectiveness of these bridge attacks as follows:

The cutting of bridges at Euskirchen, Ahrweiler, Mayen, Bullay, Nonnweiler, Sirnmern, Bad Münster, Kaiserslautern devastatingly contributed to the halting of the Ardennes offensive. Traffic was hopelessly clogged up and caused the repair columns long delays in arriving at the destroyed bridges.

But it also points up my claim that the initial force of the attack was blunted by ground forces (St. Vith, Bastogne, 1st US Army defensive actions near Monschau) as there were very few good flying days in the period from Dec 16 to the 25th, and on the two favorable days of Dec 17 & 18, Allied FB's had to jettison their bombloads to dogfight with LW fighters in the St. Vith vicinity. Most German generals from Runstedt down to AG commanders all agreed that by Christmas, the attack could be considered a failure.

Enjoy

[PanzerJaeger]

I completely agree that the biggest impact Allied soldiers played on the ground was in blowing the bridges and dumping their fuel. (An outcome that all in the German leadership had predicted apart from Hitler's yes-men in OKW.)

My issue with the historiography surrounding the battle, which your post seemed to reflect, is that it has been almost exclusively been the purview of American authors writing good things about Americans for an American audience. The result is the exaggeration of the German’s strength, the discounting of the American aerial advantage and an attribution bias in the importance given to the combat actions of the American soldiers taking part in the battle – all, of course, predicated on the notion that the German commanders actually thought the thing would work.

The biggest example of such is obviously much overhyped action at Bastogne. Reading many contemporary works about the Bulge would lead one to believe that the “siege of Bastogne” was a singular moment in the battle and the major turning point – that the town and its crossroads were critical to the German offensive. In reality, while the Germans would have liked to have secured the town, they recognized it as a hard point and the bulk of the 5th’s spearhead bypassed it relatively easily, leaving behind a small containment force – as their doctrine dictated. The same overhyped importance is given to St. Vith.

The reality is that supply shortages, specifically fuel and ammunition, were the primary reason for the end of the offensive, trailed distantly by the clearing weather and the resumption of Allied air capabilities. Model and Rundstedt predicted that they would only be able to make it to the Meuse, and that’s essentially what they did. And despite all that’s been written about the major combat actions undertaken by the American forces, German losses were very light – much lighter than anticipated. By Christmas, the bulk of the German force remained relatively unscathed. It simply did not have the logistical capability to continue. The majority of German tanks lost, for example, we’re abandoned due to lack of fuel and not lost in combat.

As for the quality of the German troops, I agree with you in regard to Normandy. While the majority of German units were second line and of poor to very poor quality, they were much bolstered by the presence of a core of what could accurately be called ‘elite’ and first line divisions. However, by the time of the Bulge, I just do not see how one could call any of the German units ‘elite’, even as compared to their manifestations in Normandy, not to mention those of ’41 – ’43. The training, experience, unit cohesion, etc. simply wasn’t there.

None of this, by the way, is meant to disparage the American soldiers who fought in the battle. While many units broke easily, some did put up very stiff resistance and fought very well – demonstrating that lessons learned in Normandy were retained. However, it seems that the story of an elite German army defeated by plucky American resistence under no air cover has more commercial appeal than the story of a ragtag German army running itself out of fuel and withdrawing on its own accord.

[ReluctantSamurai]

And despite all that’s been written about the major combat actions undertaken by the American forces, German losses were very light – much lighter than anticipated.

German casualty list KIA/WIA/MIA (from Trevor N. Dupuy Hitlers Last Gamble):

Armored and Mechanized Divisions and Brigades: 30039 out of 159564 total (19%)
Fallschirmjaeger and Volksgrenadier Divisions: 44420 out of 170596 total (26%)

Totals: 74459 KIA/WIA/MIA out of 330160 troops committed (23%)

Notsure almost 1/4 of all troops committed to battle constitutes "very light". It doesn't in my book, at any rate....

The reality is that supply shortages, specifically fuel and ammunition, were the primary reason for the end of the offensive, trailed distantly by the clearing weather and the resumption of Allied air capabilities.

Really? The real reality of the situation is that the inability to secure the major crossroads at Bastogne and St. Vith caused huge delays in the German timetable, and exacerbated an already bad logistical situation by forcing German units into rough terrain to circumvent the Americans holding those strongpoints. Take a good look at a map of that area of the Ardennes. Besides the hub of roads going in and out of both towns, there are....no other roads available. Units have to go cross-country or make large diversions because of impassable steep terrain

The biggest example of such is obviously much overhyped action at Bastogne. Reading many contemporary works about the Bulge would lead one to believe that the “siege of Bastogne” was a singular moment in the battle and the major turning point – that the town and its crossroads were critical to the German offensive. In reality, while the Germans would have liked to have secured the town, they recognized it as a hard point and the bulk of the 5th’s spearhead bypassed it relatively easily.

Right. If Bastogne was so insignificant that the bulk of 5th spearhead "bypassed it relatively easily", then why did the Germans try for an entire week to take the place? You know something Manteuffel didn't?

a ragtag German army running itself out of fuel and withdrawing on its own accord.

This comment is so sophomoric, that it doesn't even merit a reply

[ReluctantSamurai]

The biggest example of such is obviously much overhyped action at Bastogne.[...]...that the town and its crossroads were critical to the German offensive.

The same overhyped importance is given to St. Vith.

I'm returning to these two statements and then to the opinions of the commanding officer of 5th Panzer Army, General Hasso von Manteuffel. I'll leave it to viewers as to which one to believe....

[From The German Generals Talk by Liddell Hart:

[The consequences of not capturing Bastogne]

"To cover these by-passing advances [by Panzer Lehr Division, and 2d PzD] I masked Bastogne, using the 26th VGD to surround the town, with the help of a panzer grenadier regiment from the Panzer Lehr Division."

"Even so, the masking of Bastogne entailed a weakening of my strength for the forward drive, and thus diminished the chances of reaching the Meuse at Dinant."

According to the German timetable for the attack, Bastogne was to be reached on the 2nd day, but it wasn't reached until the third day, and finally bypassed on the sixth. Now what American generals including McCauliffe at Bastogne, and Hasbrouck at St. Vith realized was that for every day the German advance could be held up or slowed, was more time for SHAEF to have to assemble a blocking force at the Meuse (which took the form of the British XXX Corps and the US 2d Armored Division), and a counter-attack (which was executed by Patton from the south, and Collins from the north). In Manteuffel's opinion, with the delays at both junctions, a forced crossing of the Meuse became impossible, and the entire salient was vulnerable to becoming cut off. The junctions were important to keep the momentum going that was gained in the first few days, and to keep the Americans off balance and struggling to halt the advance before it reached the Meuse.

So...myth and overhyped importance, or not

A final comment from Manteuffel:

"We had hardly begun this new push [referring to the transference of the main thrust from Sepp Dietritch's 6th Panzer Army to Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army] before the Allied counter-offensive developed. I telephoned Jodl and asked him to tell the Fuhrer that I was going to withdraw my advanced forces out of the nose of the salient we had made--to the line Laroche-Bastogne. But Hitler forbade this step back. So instead of withdrawing in time, we were driven back bit by bit under pressure of the Allied attacks, suffering needlessly heavy losses. On January 5th the situation was so serious that I feared Montgomery would cut off both our Armies. Although we managed to avoid this danger, a large part of them were sacrificed. Our losses were much heavier in this later stage than they had been earlier, owing to Hitler's policy of 'no withdrawal'. It spelt bankruptcy, because we could not afford such losses."

However, it seems that the story of an elite German army defeated by plucky American resistence under no air cover has more commercial appeal than the story of a ragtag German army running itself out of fuel and withdrawing on its own accord.

Doesn't seem to me that Manteuffel would agree with that assessment

[PanzerJaeger]

German casualty list KIA/WIA/MIA (from Trevor N. Dupuy Hitlers Last Gamble):

Armored and Mechanized Divisions and Brigades: 30039 out of 159564 total (19%)
Fallschirmjaeger and Volksgrenadier Divisions: 44420 out of 170596 total (26%)

Totals: 74459 KIA/WIA/MIA out of 330160 troops committed (23%)

Notsure almost 1/4 of all troops committed to battle constitutes "very light". It doesn't in my book, at any rate....

Check your dates. The vast majority of German casualties were incurred in the defensive battles over the next month and well after the offensive ran out of fuel as the Germans used the terrain to extract as much blood out of the Allies as possible. As I said, the German force was left relatively unscathed from their offensive operations.

Right. If Bastogne was so insignificant that the bulk of 5th spearhead "bypassed it relatively easily", then why did the Germans try for an entire week to take the place? You know something Manteuffel didn't?

Again, check your dates. The main German spearhead reached Bastogne on the 20th and left on the 22nd, leaving only the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, which launched probing attacks for the next several days. There was never a major assault on the town; the panzer divisions were only used to encircle it.

This comment is so sophomoric, that it doesn't even merit a reply

And yet, that is what happened. I do not have access to my paper sources, but I believe the wiki on such a major event can be cited with a degree of authority.

On the 'elite' German troops:

The plan originally called for just under 45 divisions, including a dozen panzer and panzergrenadier divisions forming the armored spearhead and various infantry units to form a defensive line as the battle unfolded. By this time, however, the German Army suffered from an acute manpower shortage and the force had been reduced to around 30 divisions. Although it retained most of its armor, there were not enough infantry units because of the defensive needs in the East. These 30 newly rebuilt divisions used some of the last reserves of the German Army. Among them were Volksgrenadier units formed from a mix of battle-hardened veterans and recruits formerly regarded as too young or too old to fight. Training time, equipment and supplies were inadequate during the preparations. German fuel supplies were precarious—those materials and supplies that could not be directly transported by rail had to be horse-drawn to conserve fuel, and the mechanized and panzer divisions would depend heavily on captured fuel.

On the German commanders' view of the battle:

Several senior German military officers, including Field Marshal Walter Model and von Rundstedt, expressed concern as to whether the goals of the offensive could be realized. They offered alternative plans, but Hitler would not listen.

Model and von Rundstedt both believed aiming for Antwerp was too ambitious, given Germany's scarce resources in late 1944. At the same time they felt that maintaining a purely defensive posture (as had been the case since Normandy) would only delay defeat, not avert it. They thus developed alternative, less ambitious plans that did not aim to cross the Meuse River; Model's being Unternehmen Herbstnebel (Operation Autumn Mist) and von Rundstedt's Fall Martin ("Plan Martin"). The two field marshals combined their plans to present a joint "small solution" to Hitler, who rejected it in favor of his "big solution"."

On "Siege of Bastogne":

However, the two panzer divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps—after using their mobility to isolate Bastogne, continued their mission towards the Meuse on 22 December, rather than attacking Bastogne with a single large force. They left just one regiment behind to assist the 26th Volksgrenadier Division in capturing the crossroads. The XLVII Panzer Corps probed different points of the southern and western defensive perimeter in echelon, where Bastogne was defended by just a single airborne regiment and support units doubling as infantry.

On the condition of the German force at the end of the offensive, the weather situation, the fuel/supply situation, and the typically poor allied response:

On 23 December, the weather conditions started improving, allowing the Allied air forces to attack. They launched devastating bombing raids on the German supply points in their rear, and P-47 Thunderbolts started attacking the German troops on the roads. Allied air forces also helped the defenders of Bastogne, dropping much-needed supplies—medicine, food, blankets, and ammunition. A team of volunteer surgeons flew in by military glider and began operating in a tool room.[93]

By 24 December, the German advance was effectively stalled short of the Meuse. Units of the British XXX Corps were holding the bridges at Dinant, Givet, and Namur and U.S. units were about to take over. The Germans had outrun their supply lines, and shortages of fuel and ammunition were becoming critical. Up to this point the German losses had been light, notably in armor, which was almost untouched with the exception of Peiper's losses. On the evening of 24 December, General Hasso von Manteuffel recommended to Hitler's Military Adjutant a halt to all offensive operations and a withdrawal back to the West Wall. Hitler rejected this.

However disagreement and confusion at the Allied command prevented a strong response, throwing away the opportunity for a decisive action.

Finally, on the orderly withdrawal of German forces and the Allied inability to organize a proper response:

Eisenhower wanted Montgomery to go on the counter offensive on 1 January, with the aim of meeting up with Patton's advancing Third Army and cutting off most of the attacking Germans, trapping them in a pocket. However, Montgomery, refusing to risk underprepared infantry in a snowstorm for a strategically unimportant area, did not launch the attack until 3 January, by which time substantial numbers of German troops had already managed to fall back successfully, but at the cost of losing most of their heavy equipment.

At the start of the offensive, the First and Third U.S. Armies were separated by about 25 miles (40 km). American progress in the south was also restricted to about a kilometer a day. The majority of the German force executed a successful fighting withdrawal and escaped the battle area, although the fuel situation had become so dire that most of the German armor had to be abandoned. On 7 January 1945, Hitler agreed to withdraw all forces from the Ardennes, including the SS Panzer divisions, thus ending all offensive operations. However, considerable fighting went on for another 3 weeks; St. Vith was recaptured by the Americans on 23 January and the last German units participating in the offensive did not return to their start line until 25 January.

I can expand on these facts with paper sources late next week if necessary.

[ReluctantSamurai]

You didn't address the comments made by someone who was intimately involved with the attack...namely Manteuffel. He clearly states that both junctions (Bastogne and St. Vith were necessary for a timely advance to the Meuse, and that having to invest Bastogne cost him both time and strength; time the US Army used to construct a barrier at the Meuse, and to organize a counter-attack.

Check your dates. The vast majority of German casualties were incurred in the defensive battles over the next month and well after the offensive ran out of fuel as the Germans used the terrain to extract as much blood out of the Allies as possible. As I said, the German force was left relatively unscathed from their offensive operations.

What is your point? 23% losses in men, and losing most of the 1500 AFV involved in the offensive is serious no matter at what stage of the battle they occurred. But just for S@#%s and giggles, here's a breakout:

Armored and Mechanized Divisions and Brigades

16-23 December 6620
24 Dec-1 Jan 11584
2-16 Jan 11835

Fallschirmjaeger and VGD

16-23 December 14421
24 Dec-1 Jan 12111
2-16 Jan 17888

Totals

16-23 December 21041 (6.4%)
24 Dec-1 Jan 23695 (7.2%)
2-16 Jan 29723 (9%)

The main German spearhead reached Bastogne on the 20th and left on the 22nd

The defense of Bastogne didn't involve just the town itself. First the defense perimeter had to be pushed back and this fight commenced on the 18th with elements of 2d PzD at Longvilly and Magaret just east of Bastogne. Noville to the north was attacked on the 20th.

There was never a major assault on the town; the panzer divisions were only used to encircle it.

You did not read my earlier post involving Manteuffel's comments. No German armor was used to encircle Bastogne...the 26th VGD drew that assignment. As for there not being a major assault on Bastogne:

There were repeated assaults on Senonchamps and Villeroux (west of Bastogne) and the first major assault on the town itself happened on 23 Dec by major elements of 26th VGD, the 901st PzGren Regiment, and tanks from the 130th Panzer Regiment of Panzer Lehr Division. On 25th Dec, lead elements of 15th PzGen Div joined the attack by assaulting Longchamps (NW of Bastogne), and 26th VGD attempted a break-in to Bastogne itself. On the day after Christmas, lead elements of Patton's 4th AD began arriving followed closely by other units of III Corps and by 26 December, the siege of Bastogne was over. But hey, an entire VGD, and parts of two PzGren and a Panzer Division don't count as a major assault I guess

Your sources for German armor losses are way off, as US TD's and tanks took a heavy toll in virtually every sector. Of the 800 or so AFV's destroyed, US TD's accounted for over 500 of them. The notion that most German tank losses were abandonment is....well, I'm trying to be polite here

I've already addressed the timid Allied response: Monty and Bradley. If Patton and Collins had had their way, not much would have made it back to the Fatherland.

As it stands, and as we all know, the whole affair was poorly conceived, poorly executed, and cost the Germans most of their effective armor formations in the West for the remainder of the war.

Now....can we move back to the topic of how Germany could've won the war, please, because one thing is for sure....the Ardennes Offensive was not one of those ways.....

[PanzerJaeger]

You didn't address the comments made by someone who was intimately involved with the attack...namely Manteuffel. He clearly states that both junctions (Bastogne and St. Vith were necessary for a timely advance to the Meuse, and that having to invest Bastogne cost him both time and strength; time the US Army used to construct a barrier at the Meuse, and to organize a counter-attack.

Apart from the fact that Hart cannot be trusted as an accurate and objective conduit of information, IIRC, there was more to that quote and I will not have access to my sources until later in the week. Do you mind quoting the text before "Even so, the masking of Bastogne entailed a weakening of my strength for the forward drive, and thus diminished the chances of reaching the Meuse at Dinant"?

Beyond that, you still do not seem to have an accurate understanding of the fuel situation. Find me a source that states the Germans had a) the fuel and b) the capability to transport it to the front to cross the Meuse and operate beyond it.

This is the problem with American aggrandizement of the battle. In order to make St. Vith and Bastogne important actions, one must take Hitler's plan at face value - ie, one must accept that the German commanders truly believed that they could take and hold Brussels, Antwerp, and destroy the entire British contingent in the Netherlands. If one buys into that notion, then St. Vith and Bastogne become incredibly important in delaying the much vaunted German timetable. If they hadn't have been delayed those few days, the Germans may have crossed the Meuse and destroyed three full strength British armies!

Of course, such a notion is ridiculous on its face and no one in the German command actually believed that. Model is well known for agreeing to Hitler's battle plans and simply ignoring them - part of why he had so much success. A more realistic perspective on the battle would take into consideration not yet another one of Hitler's wildly unrealistic offensives, but what the German commanders actually believed they could achieve. Luckily, we have clear documentation of their goals in the form of the plan they presented to Hitler - the small solution.

When examining the offensive based on Model and Rundstedt’s more realistic understanding of their operational capabilities, it becomes clear that the Germans accomplished nearly exactly what they believed possible – they shocked the Allies, inflicted an embarrassing defeat on them that yielded over 20,000 POWs, and advanced to the Meuse with few casualties. Had Hitler issued a withdrawal when Manteuffel requested, the battle would have been won outright and the Germans would have been in a better defensive position moving into the spring fighting season.

You see, to embrace the idea that St. Vith and Bastogne were actually of any real significance, one must also embrace a completely unrealistic view of the German’s operational and logistical capabilities that flies in the face of all data and reason, not to mention the very German commanders that orchestrated the battle. Not only did Model and Rundstedt not want to cross the Meuse (and expose German forces to being cut off), they knew it was not possible.

What is your point? 23% losses in men, and losing most of the 1500 AFV involved in the offensive is serious no matter at what stage of the battle they occurred. But just for S@#%s and giggles, here's a breakout:

Armored and Mechanized Divisions and Brigades

16-23 December 6620
24 Dec-1 Jan 11584
2-16 Jan 11835

Fallschirmjaeger and VGD

16-23 December 1442
24 Dec-1 Jan 12111
2-16 Jan 17888

Totals

16-23 December 21041 (6.4%)
24 Dec-1 Jan 23695 (7.2%)
2-16 Jan 29723 (9%)

My point is exactly the same point I've made from the beginning of this exchange - that the German forces were left relatively unscathed during the offensive portion of the battle. American resistance cause little actual material loss.

You did not read my earlier post involving Manteuffel's comments. No German armor was used to encircle Bastogne...the 26th VGD drew that assignment.

Sigh... not true.

However, the two panzer divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps—after using their mobility to isolate Bastogne, continued their mission towards the Meuse on 22 December, rather than attacking Bastogne with a single large force.

But hey, an entire VGD, and parts of two PzGren and a Panzer Division don't count as a major assault I guess

When examining such actions, it is important to understand not just the banners in use but the divisional strength and abilities at play. 26th was a horse drawn Volks division that was so under strength that it was forced to attack Bastogne piecemeal, and not in a major assault.

The 26th VG received one panzergrenadier regiment from the 15th Panzergrenadier Division on Christmas Eve for its main assault the next day. Because it lacked sufficient troops and those of the 26th VG Division were near exhaustion, the XLVII Panzer Corps concentrated its assault on several individual locations on the west side of perimeter in sequence rather than launching one simultaneous attack on all sides. The assault—led by 18 tanks carrying a battalion of infantry—pierced the lines of the 327th's 3rd Battalion (officially, the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry), and advanced as far as the battalion command post at Hemroulle.

Now that you have all of the facts, does it really sound like the Germans made a serious effort to take the town? This is yet another American myth built up around bastogne - rarely will you hear that the Battered Bastards were fighting primarily against a poorly trained, poorly equipped, undermanned, and exhausted Volks division.

Your sources for German armor losses are way off, as US TD's and tanks took a heavy toll in virtually every sector. Of the 800 or so AFV's destroyed, US TD's accounted for over 500 of them. The notion that most German tank losses were abandonment is....well, I'm trying to be polite here

You're asserting that over 62%... 62%... of all German tanks lost during the battle were the result of one weapons system, and you're laughing at me? Weren't you just quoting Allied Air Force claims in excess of 1,000 kills? That does not leave many losses due to fuel shortage, mechanical issues, other tanks, artillery, mines, terrain, infantry anti-tank systems, and the myriad of other reasons tanks are generally lost in combat.

Again, check your sources. You undoubtedly pulled that gem from Harry Yeide's "Tank Killers" page 255. I would be very impressed if you were in possession of Lonnie Gill's "Tank Destroyers of WWII", where the initial claim was made. Regardless, you will note that neither source says that the TDs knocked out 500 German AFVs during the battle, only that they were "credited" with those kills. Digging a little deeper into Gill's primary source work, one finds that those credits came from the TD crews themselves - and with no confirmation (and certainly with no corresponding verification to German records). As anyone who studies such things knows, kill counts for air aces, tankers, and snipers tend toward gross exaggeration.

On the other hand, we have actual German reports of mass quantities of tanks and other AFVs being abandoned due to fuel or other logistical issues. Again, I feel at a disadvantage being away from home and my paper, but a cursory look online offers support. For example, Panzer Lehr was a spearhead unit and involved in heavy combat from the outset. It not only fought during the offensive, but also on the defensive. If any division were to suffer disproportionately from the effects of these mythical American tank destroyers, Lehr would be it. However, according to Danny Parker, page 338:

The Panzer Lehr Division went into battle with 3,000 grenadiers and 104 tanks and assault guns. Fifty-three of their tanks and assault guns had to be left behind due ot lack of fuel or tank-recovery vehicles.

...

German armor losses increased during the retreat later that month, when large numbers of vehicles were lost due to mechanical failure, lack of tank retrievers and the chronic shortage of fuel. The problems were further aggrevated by Hitler's "no retreat" policy during the January campaign.

So we have a very representative Panzer division that fought continuously throughout the battle losing 51% of their tanks to abandonment. Even if these magical American tank destroyers knocked out every single remaining tank lost, the numbers simply would not work.

This is the problem with American pop history surrounding the battle - credited kills are turned into confirmed kills, insignificant actions are turned into major battles, and everyone solemnly pretends that, had it not been for those plucky Americans, the Germans might just have taken Antwerp - even though it is abundantly clear that the Fuhrer had no clothes.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Parker's material reveals part of the answer.

Some of those 53 tanks were not left behind for lack of fuel but for lack of a recovery vehicle. That would include a number of the tanks knocked out by US TD's (which they would have claimed as a "kill" since they saw the crew abandon the vehicle they'd just hit. The crew likely abandoned because of a mobility issue and not wanting to fight in an immobile target -- that fact that it was recoverable and could be returned to service with a few hours labor would have not made the TD crew's report). Perhaps there is a good element of truth in the claims of both sides.


EDIT: [Bragging] Please note that my thanks for this post comes from our resident trained tanker. Who probably had to check the tracks every time his track paused for longer than a gear change and who had to know EXACTLY how those kraut tankers would have reacted to being immobile while in somebody's gun sights. [/Bragging]

[ReluctantSamurai]

When examining the offensive based on Model and Rundstedt’s more realistic understanding of their operational capabilities, it becomes clear that the Germans accomplished nearly exactly what they believed possible – they shocked the Allies, inflicted an embarrassing defeat on them that yielded over 20,000 POWs, and advanced to the Meuse with few casualties.

This comment is so incredibly stupid that I will refrain from commenting on the Ardennes Offensive any longer. But.....

....it has been a very interesting, and lively discussion. Many thanks

***NEWS FLASH*** After defeating the Western Allies in the Battle of the Bulge, Hitler managed to negotiate a peace settlement with the war-weary Americans and British. The Soviet Union soon followed suit after the loss of its' stoutest allies, and Hitler and the love of his life, Eva Braun retired to a comfortable villa in Rio de Janeiro, leaving the Nazi government in the capable hands of Hermann Goering, Josef Goebbels, and Heinrich Himmler. After being accused of high treason by Martin Bormann, and subsequently dismissed from all of his formerly held offices, Goering committed suicide by cyanide poison. Goebbels then assumed the office of Chancellor but soon after the war, committed murder/suicide with his wife Magda and his six children after growing increasingly despondent over his wife's supposed infidelity. That left the leadership of post-war Germany squarely on the shoulders of Heinrich Himmler. Himmler, who had always harbored a secret desire for the life of a wandering minstrel, decided to leave the notoriety of German High Command and become a bard of some repute in the rural mountains of Bavaria. Nazi Germany collapsed under the pressures of post-war reconstruction due to soaring inflation and the lack of effective leadership. ***NEWS FLASH***

[Sp4]

Go talk about something else. This is entertaining to read.

[PanzerJaeger]

Parker's material reveals part of the answer.

Some of those 53 tanks were not left behind for lack of fuel but for lack of a recovery vehicle. That would include a number of the tanks knocked out by US TD's (which they would have claimed as a "kill" since they saw the crew abandon the vehicle they'd just hit. The crew likely abandoned because of a mobility issue and not wanting to fight in an immobile target -- that fact that it was recoverable and could be returned to service with a few hours labor would have not made the TD crew's report). Perhaps there is a good element of truth in the claims of both sides.

You're right. However, based on my understanding of the German inventory system in place at the time, the tank in your scenario would be tallied as a battlefield loss to enemy fire unless the Germans took or retook the area in question and held it long enough to have the tank reclassified by a quartermaster. That certainly happened at some points, but you're really playing at the margins. The 500 figure is patently absurd and not corroborated by any records, as are the USAF credits of 1,161. Added together, they would equal more AFVs than the Germans even had, much less those lost. Establishing accurate kill counts is a time consuming and difficult process that involves the comparison of multiple records from both sides and it can never be an exact science, but the one thing any historian worth his salt understands is that one does not take credits at face value as they are always exaggerated. IIRC, even during the war, in trying to establish accurate Soviet armor losses, the OKW reduced German claims by two thirds.

This comment is so incredibly stupid that I will refrain from commenting on the Ardennes Offensive any longer.

That may be best, as it was beginning to feel as though I was trying to have a civil discussion with a petulant child.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

The 500 figure is patently absurd and not corroborated by any records, as are the USAF credits of 1,161.

Nobody with any knowledge of USAAC claims in combat would have put much stock in the number. For example, a quick scan of the wiki (this one with triple sourcing) notes the following from the first shuttle mission (Regensburg Schweinfurt in 1943):

"Spitfire pilots claimed 13 German fighters shot down and P-47 pilots claimed 19.[19][20] Gunners on the bombers claimed 288 fighters shot down,[21][22] but Luftwaffe records showed only 25-27 were lost."

The German Air Force had only 400 fighters committed to intercepting the raid. Losing 75% in an afternoon would probably have been noticeable....not that that bothered the aircrews making the silly claims.

The USAAC consistently claimed far higher accuracy, far higher damage inflicted, and far higher kill totals than could be supported by anything resembling fact.

[Sp4]

Could Japan have secured a permanent pacific Empire?

Yes, that's actually interesting. I know nothing about that theater of the war. Go!

[The Lurker Below]

I offer General Marshall's VICTORY REPORT On the Winning of World War II in Europe and the Pacific published 1 September 1945 under the subtitle "Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 1943 to 1945, to the Secretary of War"

No claims are made regarding accuracy or authority of truth, I simply put this out to share what senior U.S. military staff were willing to share with the American public as their answer to the O.P. question.

The steps in the German defeat, as described by captured members of the High Command were:
1. Failure to invade England. (followed by a paragraph of fancy militaristic leadership words)
2. The Campaign of 1941 in the Soviet Union. (words as above)
3. Stalingrad. (words)
4. Invasion of North Africa. Allied landings in North Africa came as a surprise to the German High Command. (and more words. added first sentence to clarify whose invasion)
5. The Invasion of France. (lotsa words)
6. The Ardennes Counterattack. (words) was Hitler's personal conception....Other German officers believe that this operation was reckless in the extreme, in that it irreparably damaged the comparatively fresh armored divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army...(and more words)
7. The Crossing of the Rhine. (words)

This thing was pretty cheaply produced and very cheaply bound so I don't jump into it too often. But it's interesting to keep around. 123 pages of senior staff garbage mixed in with a few interesting maps and some interesting tables and charts. I know it can add no content to this discussion, but perhaps it will add a bit of context.

[ReluctantSamurai]

#1. Could be true, but I tend to think that it's over-hyped. A complete U-boat blockade would deliver the same result>>>the removal of the UK from WW2.
#2. Probably the most debated topic concerning Germany's chances to win WW2. I have never subscribed to attacking the SU as a mistake. In fact, I think Hitler could not have chosen a better time. After the Stalin purges and huge reorganization of army structure and equipment taking place, The Soviet Union was in an extreme state of unreadiness and coupled with Stalin's blind faith that Hitler would not attack, almost proved fatal to the Soviet Union's existence.
#3. Another over-hyped point, IMO. Yes, it hurt, but it wasn't necessarily fatal, and given proper direction, Germany could very well have fought the SU to a standstill.
#4. N.Africa was always a minor theatre of operations, and Germany only got involved because of the botched invasion of Egypt by its Italian ally. Now if Rommel had just followed orders and maintained a defensive posture after evicting the British from Libya, most of what happened in NA probably wouldn't have happened (again just my opinion).
#5, 6, & 7. The war was already lost by that point and really doesn't play into the OP of how Germany could have won

IMHO, the issue gets back to the saying that in order to win, Nazi Germany would have had to not act like Nazi Germany. In this respect, two things would have greatly enhanced Germany's chances:

1. Get their economy on a war footing much sooner than 1943. Germany believed it could defeat the Soviets quickly enough to avoid a war of attrition. The failure of Operation Typhoon should have been a wakeup call that the Soviets were not going to go down any time soon, and that an attrition war was now looming....one that Germany was capable of winning. After Stalingrad, it was painfully obvious that the Soviets were generating military power faster than the Germans despite their horrific losses, and by then it was too late for Germany to catch up.

2. One of the biggest "un-Nazi" things that could have been done after the invasion of the Soviet Union, was to not send in the Einsatz to the Ukraine to do their pacification/genocide thing. The Ukraine harbored a deep resentment for Russians, and Stalin in particular for the forced farm collectivizations of the 30's, and the widespread famine that killed millions of Ukrainians caused by overly burdensome grain quotas. Certainly after the "honeymoon" wore off, Ukrainians would not be feeling much love for the Nazi, but it seems almost certain they would have offered extensive assistance in labor and manpower to help defeat the hated Bolsheviks. An extra infantry corps or two or three might have been enough to tip the scales. And certainly help with constructing/rebuilding the transportation net would have had a tremendous impact in getting supplies and troops to the front. And then all those coal mines, and other local resources needed to be brought back to productivity.

Making mortal enemies of Ukrainians, and allowing Stalin to turn the invasion into The Great Patriotic War, was a huge political mistake, IMHO.

[Montmorency]

In fact, I think Hitler could not have chosen a better time.

What if the timetable had not been delayed for Barbarossa?

[ReluctantSamurai]

That is often mentioned as a cause for the failure of Barbarossa, but I tend to think it had little bearing on the outcome other than delaying the arrival of several divisions. In any case, it had been a very wet spring following the heavy snows of winter 1940, and many rivers, especially the Bug River in the critical sector of AGC were virtually impassable until the flood waters receded enough to permit bridging.

[Myth]

Great analysis, RS! Especially about the Ukranian people. I admit to knowing next to nothing about Italy in WWII. My only impressions are somewhat resembling Alo, Alo's captain Bertorelli - incapable soldiers with feathers in their hats. Why didn't Italy prove a better/more valuable ally to Nazi germany?

[wudang_clown]

Making mortal enemies of Ukrainians, and allowing Stalin to turn the invasion into The Great Patriotic War, was a huge political mistake, IMHO.

And killing other peoples wasn't a "mistake"?

Nazi Germany could never win the war precisely because war effort was subordinate to idiotic ideology which eventually resulted in idiotic choices. You can't win a war by making mistake after mistake after mistake. The biggest mistake of the Germans was that they believed in Hitler's racial supremacy theory and their superiority over everyone else. Other mistakes were derivatives of this fundamental one.

[ReluctantSamurai]

@ wudang clown

I don't believe that anyone participating in this discussion is extolling the virtues of Nazism, and I'm pretty sure that everyone involved is rather glad at the historical outcome.

That being said, to dismiss Germany's chances to have won the war simply because of their "idiotic ideology" both misses the point of this discussion, and is incorrect, IMO. Germany did have a chance to win (albeit a very slim one) and most of the things that would have had to happen to allow a German victory would require a Nazi Germany to not be a Nazi Germany (like my suggestion of enlisting the help of the Ukrainians instead of butchering them). That is what we are discussing here, hypothetically, of course.

@ Myth

Why didn't Italy prove a better/more valuable ally to Nazi germany?

I've found this place to contain a wealth of information on Italian military forces during WW2:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewforum.php?f=75

And of course here:

http://www.comandosupremo.com/

You have to do a bit of sifting, but many topics contain very informative and useful links.

Here's what Rommel (who probably had more direct contact with Italian troops than any other general, German, British, or American) had to say about the Italians fighting in the DAK:

“The Italian soldier is disciplined, sober, an excellent worker and an example to the Germans in preparing dug-in positions. If attacked he reacts well. He lacks, however, a spirit of attack, and above all, proper training. Many operations did not succeed solely because of a lack of coordination between artillery and heavy arms fire and the advance of the infantry. The lack of adequate means of supply and service, and the insufficient number of motor vehicles and tanks, is such that during some movements Italian sections arrived at their posts incomplete. Lack of means of transport and service in Italian units is such that especially in the bigger units, they cannot be maintained as a reserve and one cannot count on their quick intervention.”

[Brenus]

A short comment before to go to work: About Italians and German's allies: The German were quick to blame their allies for defeat and claim for themselves in Victory. The reality is nor the Germans or the Croat took Red October Factory in Stalingrad, and the German lines fall as quick as the Hungarian or Italian ones in front of massive Red Army Offensives despite having better equipment.

[Myth]

I have na ex-lover from Russia and another girl I know from there. Both tell me that outside of Moscow the ratio between men and women is skewered. There's usually 20 girls on the dance floor of a club and only 1 or 2 guys. They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII, not sure how accurate this is...

[Montmorency]

They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII

That, and there not being so many GPW vets left these days.

[Beskar]

I have na ex-lover from Russia and another girl I know from there. Both tell me that outside of Moscow the ratio between men and women is skewered. There's usually 20 girls on the dance floor of a club and only 1 or 2 guys. They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII, not sure how accurate this is...

Well, even on the premise that children are born 50/50, there has been at least three generations since the Great War. Any deficit would have recovered in the younger generations by now, so going to a club with a bunch of young adults will not the be the result of the Great War, unless these 20 girls on the dance floor are Old Age Pensioners.

[Montmorency]

As I said:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

[Papewaio]

Well, even on the premise that children are born 50/50, there has been at least three generations since the Great War. Any deficit would have recovered in the younger generations by now, so going to a club with a bunch of young adults will not the be the result of the Great War, unless these 20 girls on the dance floor are Old Age Pensioners.

1) Any deficit would have recovered in the first generation.
2) More boys are born then girls
3) Boys engage in more dangerous activities and are more like to use more violent (effective) suicide methods. So the ratio over time skews to girls.
4) Socially in a lot of countries men don't dance.
5) Or Myth's preferred date is in her nineties.

[Myth]

She is 30 currently Don't know about that though. Perhaps it's just more propaganda? A lot of it finds place in modern Russian textbooks. The other girl, whom I met while riding on a bus, took her time to explain to me about this issue. Also she explained that the Russians were the only ones who stopped the Mongol invasion of Europe so...

[ReluctantSamurai]

They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII, not sure how accurate this is

There is some validity to this. Of course, absolutely accurate numbers will never be known, but the Soviet Union lost about 20% of its population and 25% of its resources during WWII.

Mark Harrison states in Accounting for War that "supply-side shocks to Soviet population, fixed capital, and GNP were never made up post-war in terms of trajectory" (as of 1996 when the book was published).

He goes on further to say that "...the USSR began 1946 with an overall demographic deficit of 35 million...combining war deaths, emigrations, and wartime birth deficits."

As a comparison, combined Anglo-American civil + military losses were roughly 1 in 250; Soviet losses were 2 in 9 for military personnel, and 1 in 10 for civilians. And the Soviet Union was the only one of the victorious Allies to suffer significant post-war economic stagnation. All other nations (and in particular the US) experienced economic booms and high population growth.

Or Myth's preferred date is in her nineties

Let's hope not