SYRIA thread

[Montmorency]

To put it baldly then, as things stand, Syria seems to be heading not towards a "quagmire" as many western politicians have suggested, but rather to a clear military outcome. As one knowledgable commentator noted, the negotiating table is not in Geneva. The true negotiations are taking place on the battlefields of Idlib and Aleppo -- and what has just been negotiated is the near encirclement of rebel forces into a cauldron.

That's rather silly, and it makes out 5-year-old news sound as a brilliant analysis. There will be a clear military outcome, just as there was a clear military outcome in some other states in the region. The military component is not in question - the quagmire has simply been the fact of the matter. There is no indication that this will change.

As for the "cauldron", that has more to do with what territory those rebels are actually based in. rather than any particular facts of military deployment on the ground. Are they expected to break out into the arms of IS?

Nor, it seems, is Syria heading toward a low-intensity guerrilla war in the aftermath of any military victory on the ground.

Clever equivocation, but the question is less of "low-intensity guerrilla war" in this or that city block, but of such throughout reclaimed areas.

I also expect Syria to soon again constitute a strong regional state. The meaning of this will be evidenced in a powerful, cohesive northern arc through the region -- and perhaps closer relations with Iraq. Correspondingly, certain Gulf states will find themselves eclipsed.

Now the author dives into pure fantasy. For Syria to reassert power in the region to the point of overshadowing Iraq and "certain Gulf states", all IS territory in Syria-Iraq would have to be overrun with main force, followed by long-term occupation and mop-up of resistance from the hinterland and sporadic terrorist activity. Then, the Syrian government would have the task of re-establishing governance and authority over all this area, reintegrating refugees, rebuilding infrastructure, and attracting foreign (not just Russian or Iranian) investment.

At this point, forget about rebels or IS - Turkey could break Bashar's regime simply by repatriating a million refugees.

Peoples who undergo the kind of trauma to which Syrians have been subjected either emerge as a psychologically defeated nation or they are strengthened by the crisis through which they have passed.

It's clear that Iraq's experience in the war against Iran strengthened its regime and its nationhood. Nevertheless, both were still far too fragile to survive more pressure. Syria's catastrophe, on all levels except perhaps debt incurred and proportion of armed forces service members killed, is considerably worse.

The 4+1 coalition (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia and Hezbollah)

The basic error here is that these no more constitute a coalition than do: Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the United States.

Assad is happy to align with Iran for survival, but he is much more comfortable as a client of Russia, as Russia can bring more international influence and Iran is just too close to home to tolerate its dominance. Iraq is a rump state in its current form, and to that extent a client of Iran. Most importantly, Iran is not inclined to be friendly with Russia. Russia counts as a major competitor to Iran in terms of its national security, and where it aligns with Russia it does so to counterbalance American coercion. Russia is no more a partner of Iran than it is a partner of China.


In fact, the author of the article is not merely sloppy and ignorant, but is an active advocate for political Islam.