CANZUK

[Pannonian]

history can be a prison, my friend.

the last 250 years have been the atlantic centuries, where european geopolitics touched the world.
We are now a backwater.

The next 250 years will be the pacific centuries, where asian geopolitics will touch us.
Any european nation that see's itself as a do-er (rather than a taker) will be going there.

That list of european do-er's can be summed as; Britain and France.
As long as we maintain useful expeditionary capability, relative to that offered by the rest of the world (and the will to use it), then will be of interest to those asian nations.

We're continuing to downsize our military. Our economy is also going down, even relative to where we were a couple of years ago. How are we going to be a doer? If you really want us to be a doer, you should have been looking to maintain our economy at as high a level as possible.

[Furunculus]

We're continuing to downsize our military. Our economy is also going down, even relative to where we were a couple of years ago. How are we going to be a doer? If you really want us to be a doer, you should have been looking to maintain our economy at as high a level as possible.

Lack of knowledge can equally be a prison, my friend:

http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-co...ies-part-1.pdf

[Montmorency]

Lack of knowledge can equally be a prison, my friend:

http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-co...ies-part-1.pdf

Seems solid, but it doesn't address the question of decline. This is an attempted ranking of global powers today according to their ability to actively maintain narrowly-defined strategic status quo.

All as opposed to a framework of mere capacity for territorial defense, the paper lays out - however, it doesn't characterize dynamic adaptation around constraints into actual exercise of power, such as power toward denial of competitors'/adversaries' strategic aims and priorities; a limitation when this is perhaps where China and Russia are presently most potent with respect to the US and the rest.

Canada certainly will not stand up to Russia and secure it's rights to resources in the Arctic circle but CANZUK might.

https://www.opencanada.org/features/...as-not-coming/

Russia wouldn't have much to squabble over with Canada. Alongside other elements of the mooted Anglo partnership, it seems like the US interest from the panoramic view exceeds any one country's parochial interest.

What interest or capacity does the UK have in projecting power in the Pacific independent of the US, is the big question.

You know what would really be the most powerful military and economy on Earth, bar none? A union of North America and the EU (including UK). I don't see why it's much less reasonable in the long term than CANZUK, since feelings of "cultural similarity"* eo ipso don't, I believe, motivate concrete foreign policy once the government no longer cares about the old-fashioned imperial posturing (the like which you see foremost in China and Russia).

*We can note with humor to the contrary, that some white nationalists include a "white bloc" among their fantasies

[Furunculus]

Seems solid, but it doesn't address the question of decline. This is an attempted ranking of global powers today according to their ability to actively maintain narrowly-defined strategic status quo.

All as opposed to a framework of mere capacity for territorial defense, the paper lays out - however, it doesn't characterize dynamic adaptation around constraints into actual exercise of power, such as power toward denial of competitors'/adversaries' strategic aims and priorities; a limitation when this is perhaps where China and Russia are presently most potent with respect to the US and the rest.

Our decline is principally caused by defence inflation - which outstrips oridnary inflation by some measure - and all hi-tech militaries are subject to the same pressure. Problems are usually relative, this one certainly is.

I don't think there is any expectation of the UK/CANZUK taking on china in area denial overmatch. that role would always fall to the US.

What interest or capacity does the UK have in projecting power in the Pacific independent of the US, is the big question.

You know what would really be the most powerful military and economy on Earth, bar none? A union of North America and the EU (including UK). I don't see why it's much less reasonable in the long term than CANZUK, since feelings of "cultural similarity"* eo ipso don't, I believe, motivate concrete foreign policy once the government no longer cares about the old-fashioned imperial posturing (the like which you see foremost in China and Russia).

The Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre has got you covered:
https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...ions_sasia.pdf
https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...eb_Secured.pdf

I disagree about the similarity in the degree of congruence between CANZUK and NA-EU.
France still sees NATO as a vehicle of US dominance.
And Germany has a crippling lack of trust in America and Americans:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...-a7562276.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German...ti-Americanism

[Pannonian]

Our decline is principally caused by defence inflation - which outstrips oridnary inflation by some measure - and all hi-tech militaries are subject to the same pressure. Problems are usually relative, this one certainly is.

Hammond proposed last year to cut the British Army by 30k. Any updates on that? The last I can find is the chancellor maintaining this line in December 2017.

[Furunculus]

Hammond proposed last year to cut the British Army by 30k. Any updates on that? The last I can find is the chancellor maintaining this line in December 2017.

what are you leading at?

[Pannonian]

what are you leading at?

The British military isn't just weakening in relative terms. It is also significantly weakening in absolute terms. If the British economy contracts substantially post-Brexit as economics experts predict, then what kind of military do you think we can afford?

[spmetla]

A union of North America and the EU (including UK). I don't see why it's much less reasonable in the long term than CANZUK, since feelings of "cultural similarity"* eo ipso don't, I believe, motivate concrete foreign policy once the government no longer cares about the old-fashioned imperial posturing (the like which you see foremost in China and Russia).

The US doesn't trust the EU outside of NATO and the EU doesn't trust the US. NATO is the extent that the US will join any other alliance and unfortunately we have enough 'nativist' Americans that somehow don't see the value in NATO. Any bloc or union that the US would join, the US would fully expect to dominate. Short of the US annexing the the CANZUK nations and incorporating the provinces as States it would be unpalatable to most Americans.

*We can note with humor to the contrary, that some white nationalists include a "white bloc" among their fantasies

That's be a pretty stupid bloc. The Maori, Aborigines, and Native Americans would certainly be opposed. Not to mention it'ed be abhorrent and completely opposite to the values of most of those CANZUK citizens. If there were to be a CANZUK I could imagine a few other countries joining. Singapore perhaps? All other potential candidates have too much crime, corruption, and too low a GDP.

[Montmorency]

Our decline is principally caused by defence inflation - which outstrips oridnary inflation by some measure - and all hi-tech militaries are subject to the same pressure. Problems are usually relative, this one certainly is.

I don't think there is any expectation of the UK/CANZUK taking on china in area denial overmatch. that role would always fall to the US.



The Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre has got you covered:
https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...ions_sasia.pdf
https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...eb_Secured.pdf

But this is a broad overview of regional characteristics and trends, not an argument for specific British interests and what strategy and resources could or should be deployed in their maintenance (from which we could then extrapolate in assessing the viability of CANZUK). Other than a few pages in the 2040 South Asia paper:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

• The US Military Industrial Complex (MIC), and by association the UK MIC, will be much smaller compared to the Chinese MIC capability by 2040

• Global GDP levels are likely to ‘equilibrate’. The increasing economic growth and prosperity of South Asia could lead to the stalling and subsequent decline of many western economies as global GDP per capita levels approach the same level. This may lead to long periods of recession and rising disaffection within the UK population. This could subsequently lead to increased incidents of internal unrest, a rise of nationalistic groups and a demand for protectionist economic and defence policies. The western way of life with cheap access to a wide variety of consumer choice and cheap energy will be increasingly challenged as lifestyles follow GDP levels and balance across the globe[...] The economic and industrial rise of China and India will increase the cost and reduce the availability of UK energy supplies.

• ‘Multipolarity’ is likely to drive the formation of a new diplomatic context. The growth of the Chinese and Indian economies in South Asia coupled with the ‘relative’ decline of the West is likely to lead to a new power framework where alliances are constantly reassessed and negotiated based upon ‘transactional principles’.33 In such cases, the UK cannot assume dominance and is likely to remain one option among many. It is however, likely to offer considerable insight and experience in foreign policy and influence, so is likely to remain an attractive potential ally.

• Countries like the US, the UK and Russia, could have influence in strengthening the resilience of such systems [i.e. conflict management between India and China] to help prevent potential incidences of conflict.

• International organisations may decline in significance. The founding of new international organisations which reflect a new ‘multipolar’ world would radically impact on the UK’s position in the world. The Five Powers Defence Agreement (FPDA) therefore is likely to be of increasing importance for the UK as the century progresses.

• International law and conventions may become less relevant. On common issues, China and India may circumvent UN rules. Such a development would have a significant impact on the current diplomatic context and how many countries administer overseas territorities.

• Turbulence, especially terrorist activity, in South Asia will continue to adversely affect the UK

• Sudden sea level rise would impact on international migration and the use of Diego Garcia as a permanent operating base.

• The demand for humanitarian support to climate change related crises in South Asia are likely to increase[...] The UK will be required to support humanitarian crises across South Asia.]

• The UK will be part of a world that expects China to engage on collective issues such as global financial crises and climate change. The UK will be pursuing its interests in an international context that is no longer shaped to the same degree by the interests of the West.

• The UK’s physical geography and close associations with the US and Europe enable significant economic, military and political ties with the established western powers. Its shared history with India and emerging trade linkages with both China and India could strengthen its position as a global financial hub

• The UK as a ‘junior partner’. As the political and economic ties between India, China and the US strengthen, there is a risk that UK influence will decline due to its relatively small size. This is especially so with defence, where a lack of engagement with rising South Asian powers, especially India, and declining investment in UK military technologies could reduce the UK’s influence in the region. UK influence in South Asia is likely to decline. While the UK’s military influence in the region is likely to reduce, conflict or instability would impact on the UK’s prosperity and security, and would therefore require some response. A routine lack of presence in the South Asia region by UK defence assets is likely to increasingly reduce Her Majesty’s Government’s influence in the region. How much influence the UK can have is debatable. But, continued military engagement in the region, for example through the Five Powers Defence Agreement, may be a possible means through which the UK can retain influence. The establishment and maintenance of strong regional bilateral relationships is likely to offer the UK long-term benefits that would far outweigh the likely cost.

What does all that tell us about the possibility of the UK undertaking an active naval expeditionary strategy in the Pacific in association with Commonwealth members, in a larger framework of economic synchronization - and a new alliance or multilateral organization as the vehicle? If not that, then aren't we just discussing a continuation or intensification of pre-existing British engagement, i.e. more of the same?

I disagree about the similarity in the degree of congruence between CANZUK and NA-EU.
France still sees NATO as a vehicle of US dominance.
And Germany has a crippling lack of trust in America and Americans:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...-a7562276.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German...ti-Americanism

We've all seen how the Reagan/Thatcher shift has pulled left-wing and social democrat parties across Europe toward a market consensus of "grow and give (less and less over time)". As you highlight, Europeans are mistrustful of the US, and with generations of tension between American and local priorities it's an understandable mistrust. However, a concrete mistrust can be replaced over time just as it was inculcated over time.

http://peoplespolicyproject.org/2017...arly-achieved/

A string of hard-left governments in the United States are potentially what could reverse that tide and reinvigorate the European left. Then, if both the United States and the EU are controlled by left-wing governments, along with partners throughout the rest of the world, that permits a global inflection point and a (final by the West) redrafting of the international order in the face of profound upheaval and resistance. At that point a trans-Atlantic union of some sort isn't so far-fetched.

I put forward that scenario not because it's likely or foreseeable but because I also believe it's the only path for left-wing reforms to succeed. Yes yes, how typical of me to feel that America is the world's only hope, but if it isn't Russia, China, or India (too autocratic and insecure), and Europe will follow America's lead but not vice-versa - then who?

[Furunculus]

But this is a broad overview of regional characteristics and trends, not an argument for specific British interests and what strategy and resources could or should be deployed in their maintenance (from which we could then extrapolate in assessing the viability of CANZUK).

A string of hard-left governments in the United States are potentially what could reverse that tide and reinvigorate the European left. ....
I put forward that scenario not because it's likely or foreseeable but because I also believe it's the only path for left-wing reforms to succeed. Yes yes, how typical of me to feel that America is the world's only hope, but if it isn't Russia, China, or India (too autocratic and insecure), and Europe will follow America's lead but not vice-versa - then who?

It doesn't.
But it seemed a perfectly adequate answer to the question you posed:
"What interest or capacity does the UK have in projecting power in the Pacific independent of the US, is the big question."

It's an interesting hypothesis, but it does not adequately demonstrate that there is anything remotely similar in the congruence of interests, aims and expectations between NA and Europe vis-a-vis the same calculation made for CANZUK countries.

[rory_20_uk]

There would be nothing wrong with such a tie-up. All the countries have quite a few areas they agree on, and all are frankly rather weak individually. Together they would be less weak as a military power but between them speak with a bigger voice and a UN veto. They potentially would be able to persuade others to areas where they have a joint position rather than working individually.

Whether that then has agreements to try to standardise equipment (as Canada / UK do in NATO), to reduce tariffs in a trade deal it would be a good platform.

Whenever the UK tries to do anything except for doing what the US or the EU says they're trying to "rebuild the Empire". When in some respects that is the Commonwealth - except that as opposed to Governors appointed by the UK to extract wealth from the countries they've often their local thug who extracts wealth for himself (invariably himself) and his cronies. If some of the other members would like to join and are not some sort of Dictator or ridiculously corrupt then I'm sure they could. As yet, none fit these two really simple criteria.

[Montmorency]

It doesn't.
But it seemed a perfectly adequate answer to the question you posed:
"What interest or capacity does the UK have in projecting power in the Pacific independent of the US, is the big question."

It's an interesting hypothesis, but it does not adequately demonstrate that there is anything remotely similar in the congruence of interests, aims and expectations between NA and Europe vis-a-vis the same calculation made for CANZUK countries.

As an answer to that question, it's definitely glib and superficial.

The thing is, nearly any type or configuration of political unionism has at least some benefits - yet we haven't got one government for the species, which in theory maximizes all benefits of government. The substance of the analogy was, one might really like to see it happen, but is there any geopolitical impetus to make it so, against opposite or orthogonal force (beyond science fiction)? If you're pedantic you might try to demonstrate in detail why CANZUK is relatively more plausible than the other thing, but a realistic comparison wasn't my ambit.

[spmetla]

We're continuing to downsize our military. Our economy is also going down, even relative to where we were a couple of years ago. How are we going to be a doer? If you really want us to be a doer, you should have been looking to maintain our economy at as high a level as possible.

The UK may not be what it was decades ago but it is still a leader in science-technology, a voice for more moderate foreign policy without the timidness of Germany. It's still a cultural leader (my PBS Masterpiece theater seems to be nothing but British programming), with the decades going by the Victorian era is seen more and more as a nostalgic period with the problems and racism being largely ignored. Hong Kong as no shortage of people that miss being a commonwealth member now that they've seen that the PRC doesn't intend to stick by one nation two systems forever.

For Australia, the UK would bring a fair number of things to the table. For one it's military, it has trouble getting enough people to join up despite it paying extremely well and having nearby regional threats (Indonesia was not a friendly neighbor not too long ago).
http://www.visabureau.com/australia/...-overseas.aspx
Australia's skill shortages are not just confined to civilian life with the Australian defence forces looking overseas to help fill thousands of vacancies.
By themselves Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have massive coastlines, exclusive economic zones, and fisheriers but nearly no ships to assist. It's been decades since Canada or Australia could afford aircraft carriers (HMCS Bonaventure and HMAS Melbourne). The UK will soon have two operational again. A military union of some sort would certainly justify maintaining those navies and make it a more credible partner for securing allies in Pacific and Indian oceans. The internet revolution has made distance far less of an obstacle than it was before, especially as it's spawned its own industries in technology that the UK is still a leader in.
If the current IT, AI, and robotic revolutions keep making massive cheap labor more obsolete for manufacturing it does create the potential for Canada, Australia, and the UK to be resurgent manufacturing nations but global instead of regional markets to supply. A CANZUK would be the largest nation on Earth and have access to massive resources, something the UK and even EU nations don't have access to.

Australia may be a regional power of sorts economically but that's largely as a raw goods and agricultural exporter. It's not a global financial center, it's not the cutting edge of research, or manufacture. A CANZUK style led Trans-Pacific Partnership would bring in a big player economically if the UK were part of such an effort instead of the current situation where South Korea, Japan, Canada, and Australia all look to somebody to lead but individually are too weak or vulnerable to really stand against Chinese economic bullying of TPP members.
http://fortune.com/2017/12/06/us-china-asia-tpp-trade/
The U.S. Abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Now What?

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

In 2015, Donald Trump was unequivocal in describing his thoughts on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP.

“The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an attack on America’s business,” he tweeted at the time. “This is a bad deal.”

Trump went on to repeat the sentiment many times on the campaign trail. Soon after he landed in the White House, he issued a memo calling for the United States to permanently withdraw from the landmark trade agreement, signed by his predecessor less than a year before Trump took office, and which carries a number of mechanisms intended to make trade between its 12 signatories easier and more economically beneficial. (Trump argues that it destroys American jobs.)

The remaining countries have since agreed to revive the partnership without the U.S.

So where does that leave global trade? Are multilateral agreements dead?

“I don’t think so,” said former U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker at the 2017 Fortune Global Forum in Guangzhou, China. “I think there’s a yearning for multilateralism.”

The TPP helped “knit together 40% of world’s GDP,” she added. It helped shape trade in Asia, a place where much of the economic action in the 21st century is expected to take place. President Trump may prefer bilateral agreements because they give the U.S. more power in that negotiation, Pritzker said, but America’s move away from multilateralism “leaves a void that allows for the lowering of standards in the region.”

Andrew Robb, the former Australian minister for trade and investment, agreed.

“The most destabilizing influence in the region is the fact that the United States pulled out of TPP,” he told Fortune’s Nina Easton before a room of executives. “The United States said for years that this is a demonstration of its commitment to the region…the small countries in Asia feel that no one has got their back. They like the balance of two big powerful groups.”

The U.S. under Trump has an obsession with containing China, Robb added with a tinge of frustration. It’s the wrong approach.

“The world is going to change…and the U.S. better get used to it,” he said. “We need to find ways to share power in the years ahead and do so in a peaceful, stable matter.”

Zhang Xiaoqiang, CEO of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, extolled regional cooperation on top of bilateral agreements. Speaking through a translator, he said that China and the U.S. should continue to work together on global trade—particularly as China becomes the world’s biggest trade partner. In the meantime, China won’t hesitate to forge regional agreements in Asia.

Pritzker put it in geopolitical terms. “The United States and China need each other,” she said. “We have a lot of issues we’re dealing with, like North Korea, where we have common interest.” So it’s important to engage on trade and economic issues—and the U.S. needs market access in Asia.

Robb and Pritzker agreed that many levels of American government are engaging in multilateral activity even as the federal level shuns it. TPP is “the most ambitious trade agreement that’s ever been put on the table in the world,” Robb said. With so many smaller Asian countries involved, “it just shows you how the rest of Asia is liberalizing trade” at a time when the U.S. is moving to isolationist policy. And small countries aren’t big enough to negotiate fairly with big ones like China or India.

“The U.S. left the stage in Asia, in a geopolitical sense,” Robb said. “at the moment, [small countries in Asia] feel that America’s turned away.”

In the meantime, look out for China’s One Belt One Road Initiative. A development strategy proposed by Chinese president Xi Jinping that focuses on connectivity and cooperation between Eurasian countries, it underscores China’s desire to be the center of gravity for global affairs through infrastructure that stretches from Asia to the Middle East to Africa.

“One Belt One Road will be a big mechanism for global trade,” Zhang said. It’s meant to enhance communication, trade, finance and help developing countries that need the support and resources of larger ones. “This is a free trade concept that we’re promoting,” he said. “And we’re connecting people—exchanging education, technology, science.”

“It’s the Marshall Plan all over again, but bigger, because it respects the sovereignty of countries,” Pritzker said.

Said Zhang: “This is the direction we’re heading. This is a global world.”

Any of the CANZUK nations independently are weak but there is a potential for strength. If combined into a single market with few restrictions between the member nations it'd be the 3rd largest economy only after the US and China. That combined with being a Pacific and Atlantic power would give it a bit more of a broad focus than the UK, Canada, or Australia independently. Canada certainly will not stand up to Russia and secure it's rights to resources in the Arctic circle but CANZUK might.

I personally feel that if the UK leaves the EU and doesn't strength it's ties economically with it's commonwealth partners in some way (not necessarily a union such as CANZUK) that it will slowly decline into a massive Singapore of Europe. The UK however always has had a global outlook which is why it'd be a good leader of sorts in such a Union but it wouldn't necessarily be a superior to the other nations either. Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the UK all actually complement each others weaknesses in some aspect. The UK has the will to be a doer, a union or union-lite of some sort could be the means.
As said in my OP I don't envision a CANZUK as likely at all but I for one as an anglophile would be sad to see the UK depart from international politics and importance, especially if that leaves an increasingly isolationist US that only cares for itself, a timid and unsure EU, and revisionist China and Russia to secure the world for free trade and liberal ideals.

No one in Australia or Canada would probably want to answer to London but if they were equal partners in a union of some sort they wouldn't need to look to London for leadership but be partnered as equals. Due to the cultural, historical, and legal similarities the partners would certainly have more in common that the EU nations which really only share geography and a history of fighting each other.