Future of the European Union

[Husar]

NATO?

He threatened to just disregard it if the nations in trouble don't meet his standards in terms of military expenditure and potentially other things. So far he hasn't done anything, but he certainly didn't invoke trust by bringing up the possibility that he would ignore the invasion of a member state if he felt it wasn't "worthy" in his eyes.

[ConjurerDragon]

He threatened to just disregard it if the nations in trouble don't meet his standards in terms of military expenditure and potentially other things. So far he hasn't done anything, but he certainly didn't invoke trust by bringing up the possibility that he would ignore the invasion of a member state if he felt it wasn't "worthy" in his eyes.

Well, to be honest nearly all US presidents have brought up the clause that all NATO members have to expend 2% of their budget for the military. That is neither new, nor something that Trump made up. It even makes sense because if we look at the mess that the Bundeswehr is then even the old Spiegel magazine with it’s "bedingt abwehrbereit" articles from decades ago had no idea how low the standards and equipment of the german army could sink.

And "pacta sunt servanda" works both ways - by breaking the contract through not expending the promised amount of funds on military most european states have sacrificed their own ability to defend themselves AND their ability to come to the aid of their neighbours.

[Husar]

Well, to be honest nearly all US presidents have brought up the clause that all NATO members have to expend 2% of their budget for the military. That is neither new, nor something that Trump made up. It even makes sense because if we look at the mess that the Bundeswehr is then even the old Spiegel magazine with it’s "bedingt abwehrbereit" articles from decades ago had no idea how low the standards and equipment of the german army could sink.

And "pacta sunt servanda" works both ways - by breaking the contract through not expending the promised amount of funds on military most european states have sacrificed their own ability to defend themselves AND their ability to come to the aid of their neighbours.

Way to miss my point. How many of the others threatened to leave countries alone if they didn't pay up?
Trump and you also appear to miss the part where the budget is far from the biggest problem of the Bundeswehr.

https://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschl.../21204968.html

Germany's plans to increase the military expenditures also date back to Obama, here an article from shortly before the 2016 election:

http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-germany-...get/a-36054268

To reduce the problem to some one-dimensional "spend more money" is really silly when the army doesn't even use its entire budget because the industry just can't deliver and when the requirements for the gear are completely broken regarding its missions. Take the transport helicopters that can only land on very flat ground due to the low ground clearance or the Tiger that doesn't have a swivel gun and can barely hit the taliban with gun pods on the wings because we ordered a tank buster and wanted to save money on the gun.
Of course we could try to buy so many Tigers that they can fire so many gunpods that the bullet storm become inescapable, that would be one way to fix the issue...
And then maybe they can use the missiles to create a nice, flat glass parking lot for the transports to land on.

And besides, nobody forces the US to spend 4% of its GDP on defense, that is entirely their own choice to maintain force projection capabilities. If they can't defend us on a lower budget, maybe that would incentivize us to arm up by ourselves, but they want us to arm up to support their foreign adventures with more of our bullet sponges to make the adventures more palatable in the US.

We might just as well agree to a lower goal for all nations anyway.

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...elevant-target

According to that the British meet the 2% goal and I still heard lots of complaints about how they're ruining their navy.

And what exactly do we all need these large armies for anyway?

[spmetla]

According to that the British meet the 2% goal and I still heard lots of complaints about how they're ruining their navy.

And what exactly do we all need these large armies for anyway?

People like myself that complain do so because we anglophiles tend to see the hollowing out of the Royal Navy as a sad reflection of the UKs diminishing role in the world. For the purely NATO standpoint, the UK and France have long been the only NATO allies with navies capable of any force projection or long term sustainment at sea, having the UK give up that capability or let it erode means that for any NATO naval operation (like off the Somali coast) will take more US logistical support.

Though it sounds stupid, you need armies to keep a peace or to back up your positions. They don't need to be large, but they should at least be functional. The swiss haven't had to use their army in a long time but it's existence and it's being formidable enough kept it out of WWI and WWII. The Germans copying the the US model of logistics (based off the Walmart model) was supposed to save money which it does at the cost of equipment readiness. Not being allowed to stockpile parts means that maintenance shops have to wait for the ordering system to work back to depots and forward again meaning more downtime for even simple repairs.

In the longer term viewpoint, if Russia ever succeeds in the dissolution of NATO and the watering down of any collective EU defense then it's quite likely that they'd use outright force again to enforce political/economic disputes with their neighbors. As any student of history knows, building up an army does not happen quickly and any credible European military response to Russian aggression can't wait for the threat to become so real that public support demands it.
If the above seems unrealistic just think back how different to world was 30 years ago or 20 years ago. Things have gotten more peaceful for Europe but that is not irreversible. Remember, the strong tend to despise 'weakness' not respect it. Thankfully France has 'the bomb' so there is some independent deterrent (assuming the US abandons Europe again) within the EU following the departure of the UK.

[Pannonian]

People like myself that complain do so because we anglophiles tend to see the hollowing out of the Royal Navy as a sad reflection of the UKs diminishing role in the world. For the purely NATO standpoint, the UK and France have long been the only NATO allies with navies capable of any force projection or long term sustainment at sea, having the UK give up that capability or let it erode means that for any NATO naval operation (like off the Somali coast) will take more US logistical support.

Though it sounds stupid, you need armies to keep a peace or to back up your positions. They don't need to be large, but they should at least be functional. The swiss haven't had to use their army in a long time but it's existence and it's being formidable enough kept it out of WWI and WWII. The Germans copying the the US model of logistics (based off the Walmart model) was supposed to save money which it does at the cost of equipment readiness. Not being allowed to stockpile parts means that maintenance shops have to wait for the ordering system to work back to depots and forward again meaning more downtime for even simple repairs.

In the longer term viewpoint, if Russia ever succeeds in the dissolution of NATO and the watering down of any collective EU defense then it's quite likely that they'd use outright force again to enforce political/economic disputes with their neighbors. As any student of history knows, building up an army does not happen quickly and any credible European military response to Russian aggression can't wait for the threat to become so real that public support demands it.
If the above seems unrealistic just think back how different to world was 30 years ago or 20 years ago. Things have gotten more peaceful for Europe but that is not irreversible. Remember, the strong tend to despise 'weakness' not respect it. Thankfully France has 'the bomb' so there is some independent deterrent (assuming the US abandons Europe again) within the EU following the departure of the UK.

With the advent of Brexit, the UK's 2% may support a rather smaller military than previously. Efficiencies could have been sought with the UK and France specialising in different areas and forming a larger coherent joint force, but of course the UK has been busy burning bridges since June 2016.

[rory_20_uk]

With the advent of Brexit, the UK's 2% may support a rather smaller military than previously. Efficiencies could have been sought with the UK and France specialising in different areas and forming a larger coherent joint force, but of course the UK has been busy burning bridges since June 2016.

This could work in that the UK could have a force that is useful for what an island nation needs - a Navy and perhaps some Marines and all but disband the army completely and if France or others want to have a large army then we could work together. Perhaps then we might even manage to have planes for the lovely aircraft carriers and enough ships to form the accompanying fleet to use them for anything that is remotely dangerous.

And the greatest bonus is then the almost complete inability to get sucked into protracted military engagements in far flung places beyond some shoreline battery fire and perhaps establishing a beachhead.

[Montmorency]

More tooth, less tail: Getting beyond NATO’s 2 percent rule

The question of obsolescence seems to have been settled. But the debate on burden-sharing continues unabated. In his roundabout way, President Trump has done a notable job of raising the issue of the adequacy of European NATO’s defense spending. Criticism has focused almost entirely on the level of investment by member countries—whether they are meeting the 2 percent commitment—with far less attention paid to their actual ability to defend themselves and their allies. All things considered, the 2 percent rule is a poor way to measure burden-sharing. It came about in part as a convenience, as this was the level of NATO Europe’s spending in 2002, when the target was first agreed upon. It is one of the few things that NATO reports externally. It is useful, if a little crude, but it has a few methodological flaws and takes us only so far. Even the wider concept of burden-sharing, the desire for members to “pay their fair share,” is inherently flawed, since it focuses on inputs rather than outputs.

To keep metrics simple, the public focus should be on inputs (spending) and outputs (capabilities measured in deployable, ready, sustainable forces). Productivity metrics—the efficiency and effectiveness with which inputs are converted to outputs—should be provided for the benefit of member nations. Burden-sharing can then appropriately focus not simply on what countries spend, but on the forces they provide to ensure the security of Europe and the North Atlantic, as the treaty originally intended.

1.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

[MY OPINION] The burden on European countries of holding membership in NATO, allowing American basing, and the indispensability to NATO/America of the same, is not accounted for in allegations of "unequal burden-sharing".

Finally, some argue that the United States’ status as a global power means that its defense spending is not directly comparable to that of other NATO members. Of nearly 200,000 US forces deployed overseas, just over 99,000 of them are deployed in Europe, suggesting that roughly half of US deployed forces (and by extension roughly half its spending) are dedicated to non-European missions.15 By that measure, the US contribution to NATO would not seem nearly so disproportionate.

2.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The 2 percent figure dates to the 2002 Prague summit, when it was established as a non-binding target; it was reiterated in Riga in 2006. At the NATO 2014 summit in Wales, all states not meeting the target pledged to do so within the next decade (and states above 2 percent agreed to maintain that level). In the three years since the Wales summit, spending has started to move in the right direction, increasing by 1.8 percent in 2015, 3.3 percent in 2016, and a projected 4.3 percent this year.

To get to 2 percent, spending will need to increase by another $107 billion annually ($28 billion in Germany, $17 billion in Italy, $15 billion in Spain, $12 billion in Canada, $5 billion in France, and smaller sums elsewhere).

NATO members have committed to spending 20 percent of their annual defense expenditure on equipment

3.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

At the Riga summit in 2006, it introduced a target that NATO land forces be at least 40 percent deployable and 8 percent deployable on a sustained basis (raised to 50 percent and 10 percent in 2008).

The latest official figures from the EDA show that only 29 percent of EDA member forces are deployable, and less than 6 percent of them on a sustainable basis,19 with unofficial figures suggesting that fewer than 3 percent of European troops are deployable due to a lack of interoperability and equipment shortages.20

4.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

There is no shared understanding of what makes up defense spending. In its definition of “military expenditure,” NATO includes defense ministry budgets, expenditure for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and research and development costs. Significantly, it also includes pensions. For many states, military pensions represent a substantial proportion of their defense budget (in 2016, 33 percent of Belgium’s defense budget was spent on pensions, as was 24 percent of France’s and 17 percent of Germany’s). The trouble is that while pensions contribute to the 2 percent target, they do not contribute to a state’s fighting power.

5.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

For all of those problems, the 2 percent metric retains its appeal. It is simple, straightforward, and (relatively) easy to measure. Jan Techau, director of Carnegie Europe, argues that the 2 percent target is “flawed but indispensable” as a measure of “who is and who is not politically committed to NATO’s core task: Europe’s security.”

“Spending at 2 percent says very little about a country’s actual military capabilities; its readiness, deployability, and sustainability levels; and the quality of the force that it can field. It also is mum about a country’s willingness to deploy forces and take risks once those forces are deployed. It does not assess whether a country spends its limited resources wisely.”22

6.

The 1949 Strategic Concept called for this level of rigor: “A successful defense of the North Atlantic Treaty nations through maximum efficiency of their armed forces, with the minimum necessary expenditures of manpower, money and materials, is the goal of defense planning.”

ATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has recently suggested that member states publish plans detailing three elements: cash, capabilities, and commitments.

I propose a framework to meet the needs that NATO and others have identified.

A. Spend enough. NATO must measure and report total defense spending. A "real" percentage threshold - no pensions, no military aid, no intelligence spending...

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

This prompted the UK, in 2015, to add some £2.2 billion to its reported NATO figure by adding civilian and military pensions, contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, and a large portion of the Ministry of Defence’s income from other countries’ defense ministries to its reported figure.27 Although these inclusions were seen as legitimate, it seems likely that they do not contribute to the UK’s fighting power and should be removed from the NATO definition for all nations.

B. Spend it on the right things. NATO should measure and report what the money is spent on. The right mix of spending on personnel, operational costs, equipment, and R&D.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

“European defense spending has been consumed disproportionately by personnel and operational costs.”28 In fact, more than 50 percent of European spending goes to salaries and pensions. Roughly speaking, an optimal mix is no more than 40 percent on personnel and a quarter on major equipment. Yet NATO Europe forces spend only 15.2 percent of their budgets on equipment, versus a much healthier 25 percent in the United States (and 24.5 percent in France and 22.6 percent in the UK).29

The net result is that the US spends fully $127,000 on each soldier’s equipment, while NATO European members spend only one-fifth that amount, $25,200 per soldier

NATO should be measuring spending at a more granular level: military pay, civilian pay, major equipment acquisition, research and development, operations and maintenance, and infrastructure.

C. Spend it well. NATO should measure efficiency and effectiveness in each of these three categories: Personnel, Equipment, Operations & Maintenance.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Many forces waste precious resources, maintaining Cold War bureaucracies rather than prioritizing frontline forces. The people and infrastructure supporting the fighting force (the tail) has failed to shrink as fast as the fighting force itself (the tooth), resulting in an ever-deteriorating tooth-to-tail ratio (Exhibit 3). The force is at the same time too large, with too many non-deployable forces, and too small, with too few deployable fighting forces.

Compounding the problem of too few euros going to equipment, the purchasing power of European governments is dissipated by an inefficient industry structure. Alexander Mattelaer at the Institute for European Studies argues: “The present degree of fragmentation in the European defense markets and organizational structures virtually guarantees a poor return on investment.”30 McKinsey’s analysis shows 178 different weapon systems in service in Europe, versus 30 in the US.

Many forces have failed to spend enough to maintain what equipment they do have, and their overall maintenance productivity is low. In 2014, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen revealed major deficiencies in the operational capability of important German weapons systems. For example, only 42 of 109 Eurofighters, 38 of 89 Tornado fighters, and 4 of 22 Sea Lynx helicopters were ready for service, mostly due to a lack of spare parts.

Experience suggests that overall maintenance productivity is low.

D. Measure the outputs. NATO should measure capabilities and continue to measure the readiness, deployability, and sustainability of forces (and its will to use them).

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

During the Cold War, each NATO member had a commitment to a “self-defense plan” that specified a required force structure, a certain readiness level, and a deployability level for their forces. [...] Two critical and necessary steps to reform the notion of burden-sharing would be for NATO to craft an integrated defense plan, and for nations to commit to making force structure contributions to that plan, which they agree to fund.

[NATO] should take the next step and ask nations to publish the figures [on deployability of forces].

Finally, it would be useful to measure actual contributions to NATO missions as a measure of commitment to the alliance. Which nations are punching above their weight? Purely investment-related metrics have been a notoriously poor guide to predicting actual contributions to NATO missions. Denmark and a few other nations do not meet the 2 percent target, but when it comes to capabilities and contributions, they manage to outperform most other allies.

7. The US is not immune.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

...more than 20 percent of the DoD’s nearly $600 billion annual budget was dedicated to six back-office business processes (facilities management, HR, finance, logistics, acquisitions, and health management).

...the DoD has significant opportunity to improve its own tooth-to-tail ratio, focusing on achieving productivity gains in the back-office core business processes and support functions, and reinvesting the savings to fund mission needs.

[rory_20_uk]

Any system that has KPIs invariably leads to everyone aiming for the KPI and ignoring the "bigger picture" of what the overarching purpose is for - what exactly in Europe is the military there to do, where is it going to achieve this and who is doing what? Point D really summarises this well - when there was a real concern that things might be required for use there was an attempt to ensure it was fit for purpose. For the last 25 years it has become more politicised with decisions based on non-military realities (aircraft carriers without planes, anyone?) Perhaps even going to the better countries such as Denmark and seeing if there are any things that can be learned from their approach - perhaps it might boil down to a less corrupt procurement procedure.

[Pannonian]

Any system that has KPIs invariably leads to everyone aiming for the KPI and ignoring the "bigger picture" of what the overarching purpose is for - what exactly in Europe is the military there to do, where is it going to achieve this and who is doing what? Point D really summarises this well - when there was a real concern that things might be required for use there was an attempt to ensure it was fit for purpose. For the last 25 years it has become more politicised with decisions based on non-military realities (aircraft carriers without planes, anyone?) Perhaps even going to the better countries such as Denmark and seeing if there are any things that can be learned from their approach - perhaps it might boil down to a less corrupt procurement procedure.

The carriers weren't designed without planes in mind. They were designed with the F-35 in mind. The RN, trusting the US's estimates, scheduled the retirement of its Harriers to be replaced in short order by F-35s. The F-35 isn't ready because they've been delayed, but the carrier is because they've been less delayed. The USMC refused to put aside their still working Harriers until the F-35 was a working concern. So they still have planes for their carriers.

The lesson in this should be to assume that solutions aren't going to be perfect until they're shown to be so. Stick with the status quo until the changed situation has proven itself.

[Fragony]

He threatened to just disregard it if the nations in trouble don't meet his standards in terms of military expenditure and potentially other things. So far he hasn't done anything, but he certainly didn't invoke trust by bringing up the possibility that he would ignore the invasion of a member state if he felt it wasn't "worthy" in his eyes.

Well I can ubderstand the sentiment that we are freeriiding. We can cut it feom develiopment-bddget as it us vasucakt the sane thing

[Husar]

Well I can ubderstand the sentiment that we are freeriiding. We can cut it feom develiopment-bddget as it us vasucakt the sane thing

Freeriding what? Whom did the US actually defend us from since NATO was established?
And who asked the US to spend 4% of GDP? Why don't they just spend 2% and why did Trump increase the military budget if he thinks he's spending too much money on it? And why was the 2% goal only loosely set in the 90s?

On that note, why does the US demand us to see THAT goal as binding, but would never sign a climate contract with binding goals?
How about we accept that binding goal if the US accepts a binding goal that we like, such as a certain CO2 reduction (that we would also agree to of course)?

I mean, if we just accept some US wish and get none of our wishes granted, surely that would be a bad deal for us...Germany First!

[Fragony]

Freeriding what? Whom did the US actually defend us from since NATO was established?
And who asked the US to spend 4% of GDP? Why don't they just spend 2% and why did Trump increase the military budget if he thinks he's spending too much money on it? And why was the 2% goal only loosely set in the 90s?

On that note, why does the US demand us to see THAT goal as binding, but would never sign a climate contract with binding goals?
How about we accept that binding goal if the US accepts a binding goal that we like, such as a certain CO2 reduction (that we would also agree to of course)?

I mean, if we just accept some US wish and get none of our wishes granted, surely that would be a bad deal for us...Germany First!

We should be able to defend ourself. For a country like the Netherlans meeting the NATO-standard on spending doesn't make much sense, it's a small country with a huge economy, but in general NATO-partners could, and should, do better

[Furunculus]

He threatened to just disregard it if the nations in trouble don't meet his standards in terms of military expenditure and potentially other things. So far he hasn't done anything, but he certainly didn't invoke trust by bringing up the possibility that he would ignore the invasion of a member state if he felt it wasn't "worthy" in his eyes.

He did no more to damage nato than euro nations failing to do their bit for collective defense.

[Husar]

He did no more to damage nato than euro nations failing to do their bit for collective defense.

Can you name these failures in defense? Did anyone get overrun and I missed it?

[spmetla]

Can you name these failures in defense? Did anyone get overrun and I missed it?

Each time the Russians, Turks, or any other country violate EU or NATO airspace or maritime boundaries it could be considered a failure. It's not an overrun in a hot war but it is showing the weaknesses of the nations in questions. That doesn't mean that EU countries are about to be bombed in anyway but generally a nation that can't police its borders and stop foreign military incursions opens itself up to that possibility. That's why the airspace defense zones and island building in the South China Sea are such a big deal.

EU warns Turkey after it violates Greek airspace 141 times in one day
https://www.euractiv.com/section/enl...es-in-one-day/
Sweden confirms submarine violation
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...rine-violation
Cyprus protests to the UN Turkish violations of air and maritime space
https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/24/c...aritime-space/

[Husar]

Each time the Russians, Turks, or any other country violate EU or NATO airspace or maritime boundaries it could be considered a failure. It's not an overrun in a hot war but it is showing the weaknesses of the nations in questions. That doesn't mean that EU countries are about to be bombed in anyway but generally a nation that can't police its borders and stop foreign military incursions opens itself up to that possibility. That's why the airspace defense zones and island building in the South China Sea are such a big deal.

EU warns Turkey after it violates Greek airspace 141 times in one day
https://www.euractiv.com/section/enl...es-in-one-day/
Sweden confirms submarine violation
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...rine-violation
Cyprus protests to the UN Turkish violations of air and maritime space
https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/24/c...aritime-space/

Isn't Turkey a NATO member just like Greece? We sell Turkey weapons, so if they're considered a threat to us, that's really kinda weird.

And regarding the defense failure definition, that's really quite funny:

Russian bombers penetrated U.S. airspace at least 16 times in past 10 days (from 2014)
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news...e-least-16-ti/

4% of GDP and still a complete failure?!

[spmetla]

Turkey is the ally we need but don't really want and their (government's) attitude toward NATO is similar. They are a potential future threat, if they continue down the political path they have been on they will likely be kicked out of or leave NATO and either join the Russian sphere or attempt to lead a new 'non-aligned' islamist movement in the middle east (Neo-Ottoman). As it is right now we can only hope that Erdogan's changes can be reversed in the future.
As you said, it is really weird but looking at the relations they have with Germany and the EU especially I'm sure you agree that weird is probably an understatement too.

4% of GDP and still a complete failure?!

Yup, a complete failure of course..... a lot of airspace to cover for the US with a shrinking Air Force (though far more expensive and less cost effective). That 4% is a target, a goal, not a magic number that equals military might or invulnerability.

[Furunculus]

On a different note:

Buckle up chaps, we might be in for a fun ride! :D roflmao - This is what happens when you try to treat politics as a safe space. It isn't, you either trust voters or you don't!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44275010

I understand El-Presidente had no problem with the platform, merely the person proposed for the job. Lol:
No mention of leaving the Euro, but plan to cut taxes and increase spending, blowing deficit out to 7.5% and add to the 125%/gdp debt pile. Draw your own conclusion!

What he's really saying: we had confidence we could make you think again from enacting the implications of your program, unless this chap is at the helm, in which case we're not sure of our ability to manipulate the public-policy platform of the incoming gov't. So you can't have him, we want a puppet instead.

[Furunculus]

Can you name these failures in defense? Did anyone get overrun and I missed it?

let me rephrase that so it is more easily understood:

whatever damage was done to public acceptance of collective defence by NATO (as a result of trumps comment re Art5), was minor in comparison to the damage done to public confidence that collective defence actually meant something (when most of nato europe has atrophied its military capability so badly).
to the point where you might question whether many nations within nato-euope would add any sustantial military capability to collective defence.

i'd go further, and argue that trump's reaction was a political response to this atrophy of nato-europe capability; "you obviously don't take it seriously, so why should we?"

A much better view of where we stand:

http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/...ce-crisis.html

Notwithstanding the value of the report Monty listed above, in filling in the detail of what I link here.

[Montmorency]

let me rephrase that so it is more easily understood:

whatever damage was done to public acceptance of collective defence by NATO (as a result of trumps comment re Art5), was minor in comparison to the damage done to public confidence that collective defence actually meant something (when most of nato europe has atrophied its military capability so badly).
to the point where you might question whether many nations within nato-euope would add any sustantial military capability to collective defence.

i'd go further, and argue that trump's reaction was a political response to this atrophy of nato-europe capability; "you obviously don't take it seriously, so why should we?"

A much better view of where we stand:

http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/...ce-crisis.html

Notwithstanding the value of the report Monty listed above, in filling in the detail of what I link here.

Declaring things nonsense pat? But I take issue with "Peace through legitimate strength", channeled through vigorous armed forces.

Russia and China are most successful through asymmetric warfare and aggressive diplomacy and mercantilism. No amount of defense spending alone is going to deter these actions, because Russia and China (mostly China) know we're not going to risk pre-emptive war over their incremental strategies. You need soft power to contain them; else they'll recruit enough auxiliaries to contain us.

There's a discussion for the precise sorts of hard power we most need to support the soft power, but revamping and accumulating conventional force is actually irrelevant in the long-term unless we can collectively sort out our vision for the world.

Let me emphasize: you're never going to have the opportunity to wield shiny toys, because the adversary won't let you choose those those terms of contest.

[spmetla]

Russia and China are most successful through asymmetric warfare and aggressive diplomacy and mercantilism. No amount of defense spending alone is going to deter these actions, because Russia and China (mostly China) know we're not going to risk pre-emptive war over their incremental strategies. You need soft power to contain them; else they'll recruit enough auxiliaries to contain us.

Their methods of warfare can be countered but don't think for a second that they don't have substantial conventional capabilities as well. The collective lesson of Desert Storm to Russia and China were the marked advantage that quality currently has over quantity and hence their upgrades from massive armor/mechanized formations of medium quality (Russia) and massive infantry formations (PRC) to much more independent and qualitative formations.

The asymmetric warfare aspect however isn't new, it's essentially the same "Revolutionary Warfare" that the French encountered in Indochina and Algeria, that the US fought in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and the British in Malaya, Northern Ireland, and Iraq.

To counter what the Russians have done in Ukraine and what the Chinese are currently doing in the South China Sea would require the US to engage more in propping up regional militias like Vietnam is currently doing.
Vietnam's Fishing ‘Militia’ to Defend Maritime Claims Against China
https://www.voanews.com/a/vietnam-fo...a/4335312.html
To counter the constant cyber attacks should take a concerted and centralized US/NATO response to standardize and upgrade systems, as well as find a suitable countermeasure and response to ensure that such attacks can't go unanswered anymore.

The biggest thing the US and NATO need to figure out is 'messaging' or "propaganda" in selling what we're doing. We have trouble even convincing our own populations to support even standard peace time operations such as the Baltic Air Patrols and the relevancy of NATO, how can we possibly convince our allies or local civilians in any conflict. While it's good to know that the US hasn't been good at propaganda since WW2 it certainly doesn't help us be "The Good Guys" that we want to be when the chief competitors are the ones succeeding at putting their messages and themes out.

There's a discussion for the precise sorts of hard power we most need to support the soft power, but revamping and accumulating conventional force is actually irrelevant in the long-term unless we can collectively sort out our vision for the world.

If nothing else it's a deterrent, Britain hasn't had to have another Falklands War since Argentina has seen that those islands will be contested. France's remaining colonial possessions and ties with it's close African allies have been maintained by a credible and timely use of force.
In Côte d'Ivoire, a Model of Successful Intervention
https://www.theatlantic.com/internat...ention/240164/
Operation Serval Another Beau Geste of France in Sub-Saharan Africa?
http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Porta...231_art014.pdf

The above cases are of course not at all directed toward a peer competitor such as Russia or China but given their gradual escalation in getting their way on the world stage over the last 15 years I personally believe it's building toward a short sharp conflict over something like Taiwan, North Korea, or the Ukraine in which they will try to give us a bloody nose and then open talks. Given the current apathy/dislike in the US and Western Europe toward Russia, the PRC, and most importantly the roles of the US and NATO in the world it'd be easy to see the PRC or Russians make such a calculated gamble that would be short of an all out war but at the same time demonstrate that the US is no longer a Superpower capable of contesting a Regional Power and thereby undermine any remaining confidence in our resolve to support friends and allies (think Suez in 1956 or South Vietnam in 1975).
With cold war tensions gone and mutual annihilation off the table (in the public's mind) the threat of a limited war with a Regional Power is actually more likely than before.

Let me emphasize: you're never going to have the opportunity to wield shiny toys, because the adversary won't let you choose those those terms of contest.

The adversaries have those same 'shiny toys' and if they gain a qualitative edge of significance they will likely demonstrate it. Until then they'll use Revolutionary Warfare with "polite people" in crimea and patriotic fishermen in the South China Sea and off the Senkaku Islands to ensure that if/when we need to defend ourselves it will initially be portrayed as us attacking civilians without cause.

[Montmorency]

The above cases are of course not at all directed toward a peer competitor such as Russia or China but given their gradual escalation in getting their way on the world stage over the last 15 years I personally believe it's building toward a short sharp conflict over something like Taiwan, North Korea, or the Ukraine in which they will try to give us a bloody nose and then open talks. Given the current apathy/dislike in the US and Western Europe toward Russia, the PRC, and most importantly the roles of the US and NATO in the world it'd be easy to see the PRC or Russians make such a calculated gamble that would be short of an all out war but at the same time demonstrate that the US is no longer a Superpower capable of contesting a Regional Power and thereby undermine any remaining confidence in our resolve to support friends and allies (think Suez in 1956 or South Vietnam in 1975).
With cold war tensions gone and mutual annihilation off the table (in the public's mind) the threat of a limited war with a Regional Power is actually more likely than before.

I agree well with this.

The adversaries have those same 'shiny toys' and if they gain a qualitative edge of significance they will likely demonstrate it. Until then they'll use Revolutionary Warfare with "polite people" in crimea and patriotic fishermen in the South China Sea and off the Senkaku Islands to ensure that if/when we need to defend ourselves it will initially be portrayed as us attacking civilians without cause.

Whatever the potential capabilities of Russian or Chinese conventional force in the future, their use will remain a high-risk, high-cost proposition that detracts from their other vectors (diplomacy, economics, asymmetric war). If they can get their way in a situation by other means - which they almost certainly can - then they will shun direct confrontation. The one countervailing motivation could be that the buildup of goodies gives certain hawks a hard-on for blowing their load (Buck Turgidson syndrome), and they become a dominant faction over more patient and realistic types.

i don't understand? :)

He claims that pooled efforts with limited budget synergy is nonsense, and opposing forward deployment of EU member forces to bypass mobility challenges because it may increase vulnerability is nonsense.

[Furunculus]

Declaring things nonsense pat?

i don't understand? :)