Backroom Errata

[Pannonian]

The impression I've gained over time is that:

1. Most military men and politicians didn't really consider ethical questions at a remove one way or another, or not more than idly
2. The civilian population couldn't hold their leaders to account because they couldn't realistically have been aware of the details of the campaign (such as they existed), and in principle would not have tended to disagree with the general idea of bombing enemy cities to further the war effort/exact retribution
3. Some influential (Anglo-American) interwar doctrine put a lot of stock on air supremacy and materiel/industrial destruction from the air, and during the war the actual effectiveness of this doctrine would have been a lesser consideration compared to inter-service competition and the commitment of fixed infrastructure

Some tidbits I learned from Wellerstein:

1. The A-bombs were an order of magnitude deadlier than firebombs relative to area affected. It's not surprising, since the explosive yield in kilotons was about an order of magnitude greater than what could be achieved by a even whole bomber command of B-29s.
2. Everyone knows there was an internal ethical debate over the use of the weapons brewing among the Manhattan Project scientists before fruition, but even the general American public got into, even before the surrender had been finalized. The Japanese themselves had some awareness of the debate already as the process of occupation began, but I gather (understandably) we don't have much of their perspective on the issue. Other than the standard postwar line, potentially propaganda, that the power of the atom presented an unanticipated Sword of Damocles that could not be countered short of honorable surrender, but that doesn't imply an ethical valence to the bombing itself.

We should always keep in mind that a retrospective student can achieve a better grasp of both the big picture and the nitty gritty facts than almost anyone at the time could hope for. When you think about it, it's existentially terrifying how irrational, ill-informed, and uncertain so much human action is in real time.

Post-event students may be better able to grasp objective facts and the bigger picture. But it does not mean they should ignore details in order to paint the bigger picture they favour. At the time, Japanese behaviour was known to be contrary to the accepted western practice of war, eg. the unwillingness to surrender and the targeting of personnel western norms viewed as off limits. And after the war, as in Europe, details came out that justified further a ruthless and efficient degradation of the Japanese capacity and willingness to fight, eg. their treatment of prisoners and subject populations, and unit 731.

At the time, firebombing and by extension the nuclear bombs were justified methods of subduing the Japanese. Given further information available after the war, they were even more justified methods of subduing the Japanese. It is only with the indulgence of the victors and the distance of generations that we start to question this. There is plenty of information and context to show that, with a reversal of the situation, Germany and Japan would have used these methods without hesitation, and to a greater extent.

Here's a thought to consider. The USSR, which we have customarily thought to be abusive of its prisoners, actually treated its Axis prisoners with far more care than we are accustomed to think. The worst and most inhumane of the Allied powers treated its prisoners far better than either of the main Axis powers treated theirs. The Japanese notoriously used its prisoners for bayonet practice and scientific experiments while the Germans actively planned to exterminate its subject populations. In contrast, the Soviets, suffering from shortages themselves, had a death rate of 10-15% among its Axis prisoners (Soviet POWs had a death rate of 60%+ in German hands, mostly in the early days when Germany had control of Europe). That was the worst of the Allied powers. Germany and Japan were far, far worse.