Great Power contentions

[spmetla]

I wonder if Merkel was still in charge if things would have played out the same. Reportedly Biden is trying to work out with the Gulf States to bring in natural gas to help keep Germany afloat, but I dont think it will be enough.

I think the German stance would be more or less the same just a clear stance instead of this dithering.

No argument here. I think a lot of the post-2014 thinking has been that Russia would try to do another hybrid war in Eastern Europe like they did in Crimea and the Donbas, not huge invasions. Additionally, with the pivot to Asia, the argument to keep huge amount of troops stationed in Europe has previously been a difficult one to make. But I do think whatever happens now we can be looking at expanded garrisons in Europe. Perhaps Poland will finally get that permanent US base they have been clamoring for. Last time they suggested Fort Trump. Perhaps they would be down with a Fort Biden

I'd prefer a Fort Kościuszko as he's got ties to the US Revolutionary War as well as Poland's wars against Russia prior to its partition.

I think the hybrid aspect of 2014 was in large part because Russia needed the deniability. If the US had at the time sent troops to help the Ukraine this aspect of deniability would allow it protest without escalating tensions. After the US and EU essentially just had accept the outcome apart from some sanctions there's no need for deniability.
As for the pivot to Asia, that's in large part a matter of focus and spending, not troop dispositions. No additional troops are going to Korea, Japan or elsewhere in the region. More Naval and Air Force presence and a lot more training exercises. But with the pivot to Asia, outside of the Korean peninsula there's really not much call for large, armored formations short of full fledged war with China or a heavy garrison in Taiwan.
Europe on the other hand is a useful place for armor. Armor was considered for use in the war against Serbia in '99, armor would have been useful if intervening on behalf of the Ukraine in '14, and if something ever happens in the Baltics or Poland you'll need armor again. Stationing heavy units in the US is strategically pointless but good economically.

I'm more inclined to think it will begin with an attack in the southeast to link Crimea with the Donbas region. Which is why they are bringing those landing ships to the Black Sea. It would be followed by (or done in coordination with) an assault by the forces in the north on Kyiv to overthrow the government. Supposedly, according to US and UK intelligence, there's a plan to install a new government in Kyiv, which is in line with this prediction. To me it makes sense for the Russians to want this done as quickly as possible. Especially before the roads turn to mud.

Also should be noted that the terrain of Ukraine isnt the most conducive for an insurgency outside of the cities. Not many mountains, nor are large portions of the country heavily forested. It will be no Afghanistan or Chechnya for Russia.

I agree with your assumptions there.

I could be wrong. I think 100,000 soldiers aren't enough to invade Ukraine. Putin might be hiding more near the border. Or maybe this is just a distraction, and his main intention was on Kazakhstan. Or maybe he's just distracting his people away from his domestic problems by raising tensions on the western border.

100K is plenty to invade. The Ukraine has a long frontier to protect with a much smaller full-time army, Russia just needs to put enough force in the right area to affect a break-through and march on the few major cities. With Russia dominance of the air and sea and so much surrounding land it's not like the Ukraine will be able to mount successful second and third lines of defense. Ukrainian forces trying to deploy into other sectors would be interdicted from the air without much interference.

Although I'd be more than happy to see the USA choosing to supply troops to Europe, there would be much smaller problem if NATO and the wider EU spent at least 2% of GDP on defence in a meaningful way to deter likely threats.

Absolutely agree, but as we've debated here it'd also require political will to use. If the Germans with their current token military were to take a strong stance on behalf of the Ukraine with weapons support, recall its reservists to boost numbers, and start positioning its various heavy units in Poland and Romania it would be a huge deterrent to Russia despite its numerical inferiority and the inexperience of the Germans in modern war.
I'd rather our allies spent their 2% but if they're not willing to even think of applying hard power to support soft power within Europe itself then whats the point. As usual though, I think it's Europe looking to the US for leadership, if Biden were to start putting heavy units in Romania and Poland right now as a deterrent and build up then he could rally other NATO nations to do the same with probably more than just token support.

Look, WW2 was dreadful but if the USA stopped killing civilians and committing war crimes we'd have no one to protect the free world from threats such as democratic leaders they don't like...

While I agree that the US war on terror as thoroughly soured a lot of people on 'hard power' there's a huge difference between defending the borders of a free Europe as opposed to invading Iran or something. France and Germany selling themselves out is just mind-boggling and I don't think the GWOT is to blame.

Europe needs a strong Germany as frankly its still probably a lesser evil than Russia.

It's certainly a lesser evil as it's so afraid of being evil that it's at the point of being considered pathetic. An economic powerhouse happy to please whoever holds its leash so long as there's not hard choices to make.

I agree that we shouldn't appease. We'd see a more bold Putin now if none of the NATO members were supporting Ukraine.

If the Ukraine is invaded do you think we'll finally see other NATO members spend on their own defense too? If not then definatley a more divided world-politik for Putin to take advantage of.
For Biden though, he absolutely NEEDS to handle this right after his Afghan debacle but I think he's so adverse to another war just like everyone else that he's not willing to threaten the force that could actually prevent a war.
The strong despise weakness and I think this attitude guides Putin's worldview.

[Montmorency]

Good stuff Hooah.


Even ignoring that Biden had already overtly communicated multiple times the unwillingness of the US to go to war over Ukraine, no one could have believed ex ante that the US would commit ground forces against Russia in Ukraine. We shouldn't criticize politicians for stating the plainest facts. (The alternative, tough-guy bluffing without basis, was tried by Obama with Assad about a decade ago. It didn't end well.)

What are your thoughts of a 'creeping invasion' with a limited incursion in one area, defeat of Ukrainians and then expansion elsewhere, slow escalations are harder to galvanize democratic societies against than outright war.

The main considerations for Putin must be how many of their economic retaliative options the US and allies would be willing to impose (and for how long, with Ukraine potentially under Russian rule), but also how much resistance there will be from the Ukrainian polity. At one end, desultory unrest is of course no problem for an authoritarian regime - as demonstrated in Kazakhstan this month. But the need for a permanent military occupation, if it comes to that - and it would if Russia intends a closer arrangement than a new Yanukovych - is an imposing prospect both for the occupier and the occupied, yet if Russia managed just to establish a puppet government and pull out, what would be stopping the Ukrainians from overthrowing it in a couple months? Wouldn't they be intensely motivated to do so? That would leave the status quo unchanged at best, with dramatic expenditures to nought by both Ukraine and Russia. Any articles that address these questions?

On the other hand, my father - with deep familial ties in Ukraine and Belarus, but basically ignorant of all politics, foreign policy, and the principles of rational study beyond Fox News and web headlines - thinks the Ukrainian masses are readier to assent to Russian control than to fight it. (He also believes that the only thing stopping Russia from joining and dominating the EU/NATO is American dissent FWIW.)

In terms of a partisan element the primary social group willing to put up long-term resistance against Russian military presence is evidently the Ukrainian far-right and Neo-Nazis. It may be in everyone's interest to facilitate their resistance, under the onerous occupying scenarios, since fascists annihilating against Russian soldiers is - well, not like that, but you get the gist. Geographically, the north and west of the country are best suited to guerilla operations. I don't know what the Ukrainian army has trained for.



In our worst-case though, a successful Russian incorporation of Ukraine implies an inexorable progression toward invasion of the Baltics (since those are easier targets to take and hold military), and it's not an insane gamble to bet regime survival and sustained acquisition through a "limited" war with NATO. After all, there are few possible ways for a NATO thrust through 250 miles of Ukranian or Belarussian forests to the Russian border not to escalate into a century-defining WW3. Would the US and EU be willing to entertain more than a few skirmishes over Kaliningrad in that light? It's hard to believe Russia could reach such prerequisite success in Ukraine though.

[Montmorency]

Remember when I posted in this thread about Task Force 9 in Syria ordering drone strikes and other acts outside of military protocol and likely international law, killing buttloads of civilians and trying to cover it up? Another of their greatest hits:

The Tabqa Dam was a strategic linchpin and the Islamic State controlled it. The explosions on March 26, 2017, knocked dam workers to the ground and everything went dark. Witnesses say one bomb punched down five floors. A fire spread, and crucial equipment failed. The mighty flow of the Euphrates River suddenly had no way through, the reservoir began to rise, and local authorities used loudspeakers to warn people downstream to flee.

The Islamic State, the Syrian government and Russia blamed the United States, but the dam was on the U.S. military’s “no-strike list” of protected civilian sites and the commander of the U.S. offensive at the time, then-Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, said allegations of U.S. involvement were based on “crazy reporting.”

“The Tabqa Dam is not a coalition target,” he declared emphatically two days after the blasts.

In fact, members of a top secret U.S. Special Operations unit called Task Force 9 had struck the dam using some of the largest conventional bombs in the U.S. arsenal, including at least one BLU-109 bunker-buster bomb designed to destroy thick concrete structures, according to two former senior officials. And they had done it despite a military report warning not to bomb the dam, because the damage could cause a flood that might kill tens of thousands of civilians.

These haven't been the only stories I've posted on the Org on the subject of SOF wilding...



Returning to the Taiwan hotspot, here is an essay recommending a "porcupine" strategy for Taiwan's defense, a "distributed, survivable, and affordable defense" comprising a "large number of small things" oriented on area denial. This is pretty much what I advocated earlier, but I was surprised to learn that Taiwan has by and large not adopted this doctrine - the Overall Defense Concept - preferring to deepen its reliance on expensive legacy symmetric weapons platforms (such as Abrams tanks, Paladin SPGs, F16s, long-range cruise missiles, and diesel submarines, contrasted with Harpoon and Stinger missiles, UAVs, and missile boats).

To move to a force posture that emphasizes such distributed defenses, Taiwan’s future budgets should include funding for the acquisition of systems so numerous, distributed, and mobile that they could not all be targeted by Chinese missile strikes, along with the associated training and support needed to enable effective combat operations. These defenses would be able to survive and engage Chinese military ships, aircraft, helicopters, and drones attempting to cross the strait and land on Taiwan. Examples of specific ground-based systems that should be considered include the Phalanx close-in weapon system, the Hellfire missile, the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System rocket, the Israeli Spike missile, and additional Javelin and Stinger missiles, all of which are low-cost, proven short-range weapons that could be adapted and deployed in large numbers to make Taiwan more difficult to approach by sea or air. Small fast-attack missile boats, additional naval mines and minelaying capabilities, and additional land-based coastal defense cruise missiles could further threaten approaching ships. Drones could provide reconnaissance and targeting information.
[...]
In order to prepare for the evolving capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, Taiwan should pursue a longer-term development program in addition to near-term plans based on existing systems. Looking to the future, and recognizing Taiwan’s advanced technical capabilities, the large number of small things could include land-based coastal defenses employing advanced technologies against ships, aircraft, and swarms of drones; networks of small, fast, manned and unmanned surface craft and unmanned underwater systems to complicate Chinese naval operations; and drones to increase situational awareness.44 Such systems could be developed and produced in Taiwan with technical assistance from the United States and perhaps other states as well.

Taiwan should continue its legacy programs for conventional systems, but at a level that would free up resources for developing and acquiring distributed, survivable, and affordable defenses. Taiwan’s conventional systems, particularly its F-16s, are important for countering gray-zone provocations that fall below the threshold of armed conflict, have economic and industrial benefits, and enjoy military and political support. However, the opportunity cost of acquiring and operating conventional platforms is high. Taiwan’s leaders should make space in the defense budget to provide for the procurement of affordable short-range defenses and the personnel, training, communications, and situational awareness necessary to operate effectively and contribute to the deterrence of an invasion.
[...]
Nevertheless, the underlying concept of an asymmetric response remains sound: Rather than attempt to match China’s air and sea capabilities, Taiwan should leverage its strengths (especially its geography and technology) and exploit the People’s Liberation Army’s vulnerabilities (especially the need to move large amounts of men and equipment across 100 miles of contested water and airspace). The shorthand for this concept should be “a large number of small things.”

Here is another recent article criticizing Taiwan's military procurement and doctrine as too focused on prestige optics and political dealmaking.

Taiwan can and should do more — a lot more — especially when it comes to preparing to defend the island from attack. Responsibility for why it is not falls squarely on the shoulders of Taiwan’s military bureaucracy. Most notably, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has abandoned asymmetric defense reform in all but name and has not been reined in by President Tsai Ing-wen. Instead, the ministry is now planning to deter an invasion by threatening to retaliate with missile strikes against the Chinese homeland and by pitting Taiwanese units in direct combat against the vastly superior People’s Liberation Army. Moreover, the ministry has the audacity to tell American audiences that this dramatic shift is fully congruent with an asymmetric posture.
[...]
The explanation revolves around habit and institutional inertia. For generations, Taiwan’s military planned to counter an invasion force by meeting and defeating it head-on. The idea was that the island’s small fleet of technologically superior, American-made jets, ships, and tanks could offset the People’s Liberation Army’s numerical advantages. Unfortunately, this approach stopped making sense once China’s military modernization efforts gave it the edge quantitively and qualitatively.
[...]
Senior defense officials are fully aware that the United States still expects Taiwan to pursue asymmetric defense capabilities. But rather than acquiesce to these painful and costly demands, the ministry has instead coopted and repurposed asymmetry’s lexicon so as to rationalize their decidedly symmetric plans.

Take, for example, Taiwan’s decision to spend $5 billion upgrading its fleet of 141 F-16A/B jets. Although it inked a deal in 2011, the upgrades did not start until 2016. Five years later, the first combat wing of upgraded F-16s will stand up this month. The air force even spent another $140 million this year to try to speed the process up so it can hopefully finish the last upgrades in another two years — more than a decade after starting the process. Similarly, in a best-case scenario, Taiwan’s navy will not receive its first submarine until 2024 — but there are indications that the [$16 billion] program is about to be significantly delayed. The last of the M1A2 main battle tanks purchased in 2019 will not reach the island until 2027.

Nor will these shiny new weapons be ready to go into action the moment they arrive. Units will still need to learn how to use and fix them. The services will still have to develop the maintenance capacity to keep them operational. And the Ministry of National Defense will need to stockpile logistics to ensure that these capabilities will have enough ammunition, fuel, and parts to stay in the fight (at least those that survive a first strike). These critical but oft-ignored changes can take years to implement under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of purchases and platforms already coming down the pipeline, the risk that the Ministry of National Defense might choke on the glut of new toys is real.

In essence, these documents reveal that the Ministry of National Defense hopes to extend the battlefield deep inside of China in a way that justifies the pursuit of expensive long-range strike, air superiority, and sea control capabilities.
[...]
Yet instead of worrying about how to wage a prolonged defense of the island — especially in the all-too-likely event that invasion troops make it past the beaches — the 2021 review says that Taiwan’s military must find ways to achieve air superiority and sea control. Never mind the fact that even the U.S. Navy and Air Force are not sure they can attain these goals against a determined, capable, and proximate Chinese foe. The Ministry of National Defense is, with a straight face, committing itself to the pursuit of achieving air and sea control using fourth-generation aircraft, a few dozen major surface combatants, a handful of indigenously produced diesel submarines, and yes — main battle tanks and self-propelled howitzers.

If Taiwan doesn't go asymmetric shit's gonna look like Azerbaijan vs. Armenia, where Azerbaijan is China.

[spmetla]

Even ignoring that Biden had already overtly communicated multiple times the unwillingness of the US to go to war over Ukraine, no one could have believed ex ante that the US would commit ground forces against Russia in Ukraine. We shouldn't criticize politicians for stating the plainest facts. (The alternative, tough-guy bluffing without basis, was tried by Obama with Assad about a decade ago. It didn't end well.)

I'm not advocating bluffing as you only lose even bigger that way. I'd be more for sending in troops to help defend Kiev if the Russians cross the frontier together with a massive support of airpower to deny the Russians air dominance, of at least the Ukrainian interior. Sending in troops to try and defend Ukraine's frontier would be a lost cause but the moment US/NATO troops are there supporting Ukraine's sovereignty the calculus for Putin would change.
To save Ukraine you have to be willing to fight for it to prevent a war. Though in today's political climate I see that in the choice of "Why die for Danzig?" most of Europe favors appeasement.

Returning to the Taiwan hotspot, here is an essay recommending a "porcupine" strategy for Taiwan's defense, a "distributed, survivable, and affordable defense" comprising a "large number of small things" oriented on area denial. This is pretty much what I advocated earlier, but I was surprised to learn that Taiwan has by and large not adopted this doctrine - the Overall Defense Concept - preferring to deepen its reliance on expensive legacy symmetric weapons platforms (such as Abrams tanks, Paladin SPGs, F16s, long-range cruise missiles, and diesel submarines, contrasted with Harpoon and Stinger missiles, UAVs, and missile boats).

It's a good article but the smaller more survivable items would need to be alongside the larger 'legacy' items to work. The 'opportunity cost' for China to actually establish a foothold and gain air superiority needs to be high enough and capable enough to allow the US, Japan, and UK/AUS to actually get support to them. If Taiwan can't hold long enough for its allies to muster strength before a PRC landing I can't see any scenario in which the US would try to land and retake Taiwan.

These haven't been the only stories I've posted on the Org on the subject of SOF wilding...

Yup and I fully support these being investigated and it would be nice if for once the Officers making those decisions finally faced repercussions. The US is certainly too nonchalant about the lives of others. I get guys on the ground in 'heat of the moment' making poor decisions but those in the air-conditioned HQs approving these decisions should suffer some consequences.
Decisions like those may be tactical successes but certainly strategic failures as guys in the heat of the moment don't realize the 2nd and 3rd order effects. Pilots don't casually drop bombs, someone in some HQ gave them the okay, it is never just pilot and observer decision making, even with SOF involved.

[Montmorency]

I have asserted on these threads before and I still maintain...

Putin is old-school in many ways. He will stop when he knows you are willing to bleed to stop him. If NATO mobilizes and positions to intervene, THAT will tell him it is time to stop.

One can't help but observe that if such a mobilization were feasible in the first place, the fact might have laid a prohibitive threshold for escalation in Ukraine as a proximate concern. As Putin surely understands, one doesn't gin up a maximal response on the fly.

I'm not advocating bluffing as you only lose even bigger that way. I'd be more for sending in troops to help defend Kiev if the Russians cross the frontier together with a massive support of airpower to deny the Russians air dominance, of at least the Ukrainian interior. Sending in troops to try and defend Ukraine's frontier would be a lost cause but the moment US/NATO troops are there supporting Ukraine's sovereignty the calculus for Putin would change.
To save Ukraine you have to be willing to fight for it to prevent a war. Though in today's political climate I see that in the choice of "Why die for Danzig?" most of Europe favors appeasement.

Right, it wasn't in the cards and no US admin would make this a priority. Not that I think they should, beyond emphasizing that the fall of Putin's government will become the formal policy of the US government should he invade. To build on my comment to Seamus, Russia has been conditioning its military capabilities and the political ground for this eventuality for 8 years, not including historical predispositions. Sending thousands of soldiers into a foreign land with whatever heavy equipment is on hand to offer assistance without coordination or preparation would make them little more than a sacrificial gesture to be cynically exploited toward greater future entanglement. And this observation doesn't even support a retroactive argument for much closer defense coordination with Ukraine since 2014, since that would have brought up Putin's timetable and shortened his opposition's, if attributing him the absolute will to dictate matters in Ukraine by force.

It's a good article but the smaller more survivable items would need to be alongside the larger 'legacy' items to work. The 'opportunity cost' for China to actually establish a foothold and gain air superiority needs to be high enough and capable enough to allow the US, Japan, and UK/AUS to actually get support to them. If Taiwan can't hold long enough for its allies to muster strength before a PRC landing I can't see any scenario in which the US would try to land and retake Taiwan.

Once they achieve a foothold there is no opportunity cost for the PLA surely; almost by definition those legacy systems will have been thoroughly degraded at that stage, large (physically and logistically) and relatively exposed as they are. You're looking at this from a ground combat level, and as noted in the articles DoD takes the asymmetric view (even if they won't break the habit of enabling the most lucrative arms deals yet). Assuming some level of allied intervention in wartime, Taiwan's only logical option is to deny China any force concentrations on the main island by all means until help arrives. If Taiwan had to choose between zero tanks or zero missile boats, which would leave it less capable of self-defense? There's at least an argument for the F16s providing a few weeks' cover for total mobilization under interdiction, but other prestige systems...

Yup and I fully support these being investigated and it would be nice if for once the Officers making those decisions finally faced repercussions. The US is certainly too nonchalant about the lives of others. I get guys on the ground in 'heat of the moment' making poor decisions but those in the air-conditioned HQs approving these decisions should suffer some consequences.
Decisions like those may be tactical successes but certainly strategic failures as guys in the heat of the moment don't realize the 2nd and 3rd order effects. Pilots don't casually drop bombs, someone in some HQ gave them the okay, it is never just pilot and observer decision making, even with SOF involved.

It's impressive how components or individuals of the US military can veer from obtusely hidebound to wantonly genocidal in the same theaters and time periods.

[Hooahguy]

On a side note, I can't help but notice that 2022 is the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Union. It can't be a coincidence that Putin is seemingly trying extra hard to reestablish Russian influence in Eurasia.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I very much think it is coincidental. I believe Putin has been following this strategy, as resources and opportunity have permitted, every since his position of power was consolidated.

[spmetla]

One can't help but observe that if such a mobilization were feasible in the first place, the fact might have laid a prohibitive threshold for escalation in Ukraine as a proximate concern. As Putin surely understands, one doesn't gin up a maximal response on the fly.

No, it doesn't happen on the fly which is why the current mobilizations should have started a few weeks ago. I imagine that if Putin chooses to invade it will start well before those 8500 US troops notified to prep for deployment have all their equipment and personnel ready to ship. That's why I keep stating that we should have a larger permanent presence in Europe again.

Right, it wasn't in the cards and no US admin would make this a priority. Not that I think they should, beyond emphasizing that the fall of Putin's government will become the formal policy of the US government should he invade. To build on my comment to Seamus, Russia has been conditioning its military capabilities and the political ground for this eventuality for 8 years, not including historical predispositions. Sending thousands of soldiers into a foreign land with whatever heavy equipment is on hand to offer assistance without coordination or preparation would make them little more than a sacrificial gesture to be cynically exploited toward greater future entanglement. And this observation doesn't even support a retroactive argument for much closer defense coordination with Ukraine since 2014, since that would have brought up Putin's timetable and shortened his opposition's, if attributing him the absolute will to dictate matters in Ukraine by force.

You are right, no admin would have made this a priority since Bush Sr, we've been dealing with people pretending that Europe is at the end of history and bad stuff can't happen to it anymore despite the Yugoslavian civil war, the Serbian genocide of the Kosovars, the Russia-Georgia war, the Russian invasion of Crimea, and the warfooting tensions.

As for sending 1000s of troops, why do assume that it would be done without coordination or preparation? I know you think poorly of the US military but you really think it'd be as daft as just driving into the Ukraine and setting up a defense independent of any coordination with Ukraine itself? Really?

It certainly wouldn't be a sacrificial gesture, much rather an overt and undeniable statement of where the 'line in the sand' is.

Once they achieve a foothold there is no opportunity cost for the PLA surely; almost by definition those legacy systems will have been thoroughly degraded at that stage, large (physically and logistically) and relatively exposed as they are. You're looking at this from a ground combat level, and as noted in the articles DoD takes the asymmetric view (even if they won't break the habit of enabling the most lucrative arms deals yet). Assuming some level of allied intervention in wartime, Taiwan's only logical option is to deny China any force concentrations on the main island by all means until help arrives. If Taiwan had to choose between zero tanks or zero missile boats, which would leave it less capable of self-defense? There's at least an argument for the F16s providing a few weeks' cover for total mobilization under interdiction, but other prestige systems...

I'm actually not thinking of this from a ground-combat role at all, once a good PLA foothold is established the likelyhood of Taiwan/Allied success is pretty much nill. Like I said, I see no scenario where US troops would be sent to retake Taiwan, the only possibility of success is deterring an invasion and if one happens to fight enough of a delaying action to allow the US and Japan primarily to come to its aid.
I don't know what specific platforms you're thinking of as asymmetric but generally self-propelled artillery, SAM sites and so on are all mobile, the size of them is directly related to the capability. Smaller more survivable stuff is also far less capable, it'd be important alongside 'legacy' stuff in trying to push any invasion back into the sea.
That said, I actually agree that Taiwan trying to pretend it can achieve any parity at sea or in the air is insane and pursuing missiles for striking the mainland is a waste of resources. It does need a lot of more survivable stuff, yes, but it also needs those legacy items too. The procument may take a while but eventually the current slew of equipment does need to be upgraded. I'd want to see lots of missile boats, lots of drones, lots of antiship missiles and air defense systems but those need to complement other assets too.

It's impressive how components or individuals of the US military can veer from obtusely hidebound to wantonly genocidal in the same theaters and time periods.

Has the definition of genocide changed? As for hidebound, well the military is a big bureaucracy serving an even bigger bureaucracy. Systematic change and accountability is the way to change the current culture which is callous when considering collateral. I'm fully an advocate for holding people accountable as well as those in the chain of command that enabled or covered up said mistakes.

Ukraine: US troops on alert as West voices unity
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60118193

The Pentagon has said some 8,500 combat-ready US troops are on alert to deploy at short notice.

But they would only be deployed if the Nato military alliance decides to activate a rapid-reaction force, "or if other situations develop", said Pentagon press secretary John Kirby.

There are no plans to deploy to Ukraine itself, he added.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_190458.htm

In 2022, the VJTF will comprise a multinational force of several thousand troops. The Franco-German brigade of 3,500 troops will serve as the core of the force, drawing on the 1st Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Hussar Regiment. Led by France’s Rapid Reaction Corps in Lille, the Franco-German brigade is a bi-national unit, underlining the strong bond between NATO Allies Germany and France. Other NATO countries, including Spain, Portugal, and Poland will also provide forces. The majority of the force is comprised of units from the lead brigade.

Glad something is being done to at the least reassure the eastern half of the alliance. Interesting to see the Truman carrier group put under NATO directly, something that hasn't happened since the 1980s. The current Rapid-Reaction forces are led by France and the core unit is the Franco-German brigade so France and Germany would have to agree to action for NATO to be capable of reaction, something I see as extremely unlikely and a good highlight of the problems in achieving NATO unity, though putting them on alert and doing the planning for mobilizing will be a necessity to find the sticking points politically and militarily.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

One can't help but observe that if such a mobilization were feasible in the first place, the fact might have laid a prohibitive threshold for escalation in Ukraine as a proximate concern. As Putin surely understands, one doesn't gin up a maximal response on the fly.

You are correct, sadly. USA efforts to counter Russian ambitions over the last decade or so have been pretty feckless. Nor has NATO taken up the challenge of seriously ramping up its deployment capabilities and general readiness. Were we to attempt such a rapid deployment now it is fairly likely that it would be a bit of a flustercluck.

The NATO powers would do better to accept that Russia is a resurgent power and enable themselves to set up a credible deterrent. It may not be the "halcyon" days of the Cold War reborn, but the Russian push for power and for the status of a (the?) premier European power predates the CCCP by a long time. Russia is no longer a Soviet state, but it remains Russia.

[Shaka_Khan]

100K is plenty to invade. The Ukraine has a long frontier to protect with a much smaller full-time army, Russia just needs to put enough force in the right area to affect a break-through and march on the few major cities. With Russia dominance of the air and sea and so much surrounding land it's not like the Ukraine will be able to mount successful second and third lines of defense. Ukrainian forces trying to deploy into other sectors would be interdicted from the air without much interference.

According to this link, Ukraine has 200K active (150K of them army).
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbo...y-and-security

I don't know... I'm an expat in a country that's in a state of war, although the ceasefire since 1953 has made the interior of this country quite peaceful. I live just 45 minutes away from the border of a hostile country that has over a million soldiers and has tested hypersonic missiles recently. The country that I live in has 555K active soldiers and 2,750K in reserve. It used to be 650K during the 1990s when the length of military service was longer. In addition, both sides have thousands of tanks and large air forces. And 28,500 US soldiers stationed here act as a trip wire, which makes our northern neighbors think twice before attacking again. I can't help feeling that 100K is a small number to invade with, especially when NATO is supporting Ukraine. This is a very different situation from Crimea. Of course, Russia could increase the number near the border in the near future. I think Putin is increasing his military at the border in increments, seeing how NATO would respond each time.

For Biden though, he absolutely NEEDS to handle this right after his Afghan debacle but I think he's so adverse to another war just like everyone else that he's not willing to threaten the force that could actually prevent a war.
The strong despise weakness and I think this attitude guides Putin's worldview.

I said the same thing about the Afghan debacle when it happened. Many thought that world peace had finally come, and they didn't understand what I was worried about. Now I think they know. You know, many of them assumed that the WWII generation just followed orders to war without questioning, and that the current generation would be different. In reality, most of the Americans opposed participation in the war prior to Pearl Harbor. I've talked to a lot of people who remembered that era, and I found them to be not that different from us. Some of them mentioned that the US should've warned Hitler strongly early on. (Then maybe Tojo would've been more careful). And act soon after if Hitler took Czechoslovakia, instead of after his military became stronger. Of course, Russia is stronger than Germany was in 1938-1939, but Putin won't act rashly if NATO positions to intervene.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I have asserted on these threads before and I still maintain...

Putin is old-school in many ways. He will stop when he knows you are willing to bleed to stop him. If NATO mobilizes and positions to intervene, THAT will tell him it is time to stop.

[Hooahguy]

Unfortunately, few in the west are willing to bleed for Ukraine. Or fortunately, depending on how you look at it.

Also this is an excellent map of where Russian units currently are:

source

Edit: seems like Russia is already laying the groundwork for a casus belli for invading, claiming that Ukraine is massing for an attack on the Donbas.

[spmetla]

According to this link, Ukraine has 200K active (150K of them army).
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbo...y-and-security

I don't know... I'm an expat in a country that's in a state of war, although the ceasefire since 1953 has made the interior of this country quite peaceful. I live just 45 minutes away from the border of a hostile country that has over a million soldiers and has tested hypersonic missiles recently. The country that I live in has 555K active soldiers and 2,750K in reserve. It used to be 650K during the 1990s when the length of military service was longer. In addition, both sides have thousands of tanks and large air forces. I can't help feeling that 100K is a small number to invade with, especially when NATO is supporting Ukraine. This is a very different situation from Crimea. Of course, Russia could increase the number near the border in the near future. I think Putin is increasing his military at the border in increments, seeing how NATO would respond each time.

My point wasn't the overall numbers but that the Ukrainians need to spread their numbers out to cover a large frontier. As the Russians are not likely needing to defend against a Ukrainian counterattack into Russia itself that allows them to mass that 100k so they have local numerical superiority and achieve a breakthrough.
The biggest and most important disparity is in the air power, the Russians have a much larger and more modern air force together with arguably the best ground based air defense system in the world. Once the limited Ukrainian Air Force is destroyed there's very little that the ground based units can do. Areas that put up strong resistance will either be isolated and bypassed or just reduced by Russia's many modern artillery/rocket units.
The entire Ukrainian Air Force is about 120 aircraft including transports and trainers and all of the stuff is essentially cold war equipment with modest upgrades. The Russians have thousands of aircraft available, much more experience and while they also have a lot of cold war era stuff they also have very modern aircraft too.
How The Russian And Ukrainian Air Forces Stack Up Against Each Other
In an air war, Ukraine and Russia can bring to bear many similar aircraft types, but in vastly different quantities.
BY THOMAS NEWDICK DECEMBER 23, 2021
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...orces-stack-up

Ultimately, Ukraine possesses a relatively tiny military force staring down a much larger one, and it has very little real means of counter-striking against Russian airpower facilities near the border. For Moscow, air superiority is likely assured, and Russia has shown that it is willing to accept combat losses during its campaign in Syria. Aside from the various manned air assets discussed here, Russia would likely make extensive use of lower-end drones for artillery spotting and for directing airstrikes, and loitering munitions are also now being employed, including in combat trials in Syria.

Whatever course a Russian intervention in Ukraine might take, there is little chance that it would not involve significant participation by the air assets of the WMD, SMD, and the wider VKS. Despite the gulf between the Russian and Ukrainian airpower in terms of numbers and modernity, Moscow’s defense planners will be well aware that a confrontation with the Ukrainian military would involve no shortage of hazards and that the control of the air will likely be crucial to developments on the ground.

Were there to be a new and large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv could perhaps try to impose enough attrition in the air over a long enough period for Moscow to rethink its actions. But the odds in the sky are very clearly weighted against Ukraine. As such, another strategy could be for Ukraine to forfeit air sovereignty over the war-torn eastern part of Ukraine and fortify everything to the west, especially around Kyiv, in preparation for what could be a long and arduous conflict.

South Korea, especially in the North is mountainous terrain that constricts attacking forces, South Korea has a large and modern air force. South Korea is more than a match for the North in all but the nuclear realm. North Korean convential forces only have a advantage in quantity.
South Korea is ready enough to defend itself that the US forces there are really only a tripwire to ensure that the US remains committed as well as to coordinate the various US assets needed.
Ukraine on the other hand has been fighting an 8 year war against separatists, it has not had a massive conventional buildup and is no where ready to take on Russia by itself.
I think it has the capability to put up a hell of a fight but without the US/NATO coming to to help protect the western regions and Kiev and especially to help in the realm of airpower a Ukrainian defeat seems extremely likely.

Sadly though, even if intervention was done as I would like a South Korea scenario would probably end up a best case end result for the Ukraine with The West/South as a NATO ally/zone and the East occupied and annexed by Russia with Cold War 2.0 in full effect if we can somehow restrict the war to just the Ukraine and not allow a WW3 like what happened with Korea in regards to the PRC and USSR in that war.