Great Power contentions

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Boris Romanchenko, 96, who lived through imprisonment at Buchenwald, Peenemunde, Dora and Bergen-Belsen, was killed by bombing or shelling in Kharkiv last Friday. Definitely a new world order being built by Russia.

The Russian tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda yesterday printed the following, before it was hastily edited out.



9861 people killed, 16153 people injured would be below Ukrainian estimates (themselves unclear as to whether they are restricted to the Russian armed forces alone) but on the higher end of US estimates.

The entire Russian armed force in active service, including conscripts in advanced training, was 900000 at the start of the war, or 360000 when comprising just the Army, Airborne, and Marines. Losses among Rosgvardia, mercenaries, and separatists are not figured.

10% losses from total national maneuver elements in less than a month would have been staggering in WW2. Today it is paralyzing.

Nice Post

[spmetla]

Spmetla, Ukraine maintained an arsenal of 100mm AT cannons before the war. Is there any point in keeping them crewed these days? Have they managed to kill anything?
https://twitter.com/i/status/1504390459296305167
.

There's not really too much point in 100mm AT cannons. They can kill anything but MBTs but require a crew, can't track moving targets well, and are vulnerable once found. They do have a good a rate of fire. They could be used as direct fire short range artillery or attacking things behind walls and a few other specialized tasks. Modern disposable rockets and ATGMs are much better but in this type of war AT guns may used for territorial forces and other lower tiered forces or maybe even for training.

I'm not sure I have confidence any longer that the Russians retain sufficient fresh and capable mobile elements to develop and exploit any breakthroughs toward a rapid double envelopment of the Donbas front

Looking at the videos of the Russians moving hardware out of South Ossetia and the Kuril islands I think they're scraping the barrel for serviceable equipment with some levels of modernization.

Also, considering losses of vehicles, the replacements for crew members will degrade crew proficiency if they don't get a chance to work together a bit before combat so I think with the casualty rate as it is will still end in a net result of degraded combat ability for their armored platforms of all types.

The laying of minefields and digging trenches and fighting positions are certainly proof that in most areas the Russian attack has culminated and outside the Eastern front it will be a battle of attrition as each side tries to gather enough offensive ability to mount an effective attack.

The Ukrainians still can't muster enough armor and artillery in reserve yet to conduct anything more than company sized local counter-attacks and considering the lower numbers of these weapons in their hands the losses are felt a bit more firmly than the Russian losses. The Russians can still rely on overwhelming artillery power to stop any effective larger attacks.

I think the Russians are most vulnerable NE of Kiev on those thin lines but seeing the reinforcement of their positions west of Kiev I think this is where the Ukrainians will concentrate most of their newly raised forces. Getting the Capital out of artillery range and eliminating the threat of encirclement seems to be the main effort for the Ukraine while they hold on other fronts with secondary efforts to the NE front to keep lines open to the East. The southern front seems to be a economy of force mission to just deny the Russians an advance North along the river or West toward Odessa.

The shipping of more capable ADA systems like the S300 will go a long way in denying the Russians use of CAS and CCA though the Russian capability with even better systems denies the Uk AF the ability to mount sorties near any border regions.

Soviets/Russians are not much better, but they do have a shorter list.

In the end, I'm not excusing Russian aggression. I am a pacifist and I detest wars. I'm just explaining why Russia felt this was necessary. I also think the Ukraine's neutrality is the fastest and safest way to end the crisis and return to some semblance of normalcy for the foreseeable future.

Seeing as you listed plenty of cases in which the US sent troops in support of an existing government and by their request can you really count those as invasions? The US defense of South Korea was not an offensive war for just one example on your list and this was also a UN backed mission against the North Korean aggressors that were backed by the PRC and USSR.

And once again those are not NATO wars, by your same logic every US war is a UN war too.

Ukraine was already neutral and was not on the verge of joining NATO despite its urgent appeals. Russia is the aggressor, that is indisputable, the victim nation is not the one that must cave to demands of its bully neighbor.
WWI could have been avoided had Serbia caved into Austro-Hungary's outrageous demands however they were right to reject them. WW2 could have been avoided/delayed had Poland caved into Germany's demands, but they were also right to reject them. Peace by appeasement has not demonstrated any success in realizing long term peace when dealing with autocratic states like present day Russia.

It is not fair. Unfortunately, it is how the world works. I personally detest NATO, but I would still be opposed to Serbia taking any hostile actions towards it, even if they were legally and morally right. The discrepancy in power is hundreds of times bigger than between Russia and Ukraine, of course, but it is the principle. Could Russia place missiles in Serbia to bypass NATO missile shield in eastern Europe? Legally, why not. Serbia is a sovereign nation, we have every legal and moral right to decide our own alliances. Realistically? Of course not.

Anyway, I think we have exhausted all avenues of dialogue here. I like to visit backroom from time to time to gauge what slightly more informed westerners think of a given issue. Granted, the sampling size is too small right now, but, it's a force of habit.
It's been a nice trip down the memory lane. Have fun guys and stay safe.

It's fine if you detest NATO, I'm not trying to convince you that it is good and all else is bad, especially as your nation was at war with NATO not too long ago which tends to not help its reputation.

Russia's ICBMs, geography around the Arctic circle, and boomer submarines already bypass any missile shield but yeah, Serbia could have Russian missiles. Serbia could outright ally with Russia or China too, no one will invade it for doing so.

You haven't really engaged in much dialogue though, you claim the Russians campaign is going fine despite proof to the contrary. The Russians have much more capacity for war, this is true, however do the Russian people want to make the blood and treasure sacrifices necessary to legalize what they already had defacto?

NATO expansion didn't lead to this war as there was no change in status in regards to NATO and the Ukraine prior to the start of this war. The Euromaiden revolution was pro-EU not pro-NATO, only the subsequent Russian invasion of Crimea and stoking of revolution in the east has lead the Ukraine toward pursuing NATO membership, something that has been repeatedly rebuffed by NATO.

Time will show this war will go but based on what's evident on the ground right now the Russian invasion has been a strategic failure that recognition of Russian ownership of Crimea and a few other provinces don't seem to justify. It has only strengthened NATO and EU unity and resolve and recalibrated the West's views toward the US away from the negative effects of the Afghan debacle last year.

The blood and treasure expended by Russia is immense and though this is true of Ukraine too it has resulted in more Ukrainian unity and sense of national identity as the winter war did for Finland and Gallipoli did for the ANZAC countries.

The Ukrainians may still lose this war and even larger swathes of their country, but Russia has lost several future generations friendly ties by a brother east-slavic nation while severely damaging its own reputation as resurgent great-power to challenge declining US super-power.

All in all though, I will miss your responses even if I do vastly disagree with them. I'm usually here to read the contrary views though declining membership has made the number of different posters far fewer.

[Pannonian]

@spmetla or anyone else who can answer. There have been reports of Soviet ships moving out of the far east with materiel. How are they going to get them to the battlefield? Haven't the Turks closed the straits?

[Montmorency]

Most powerful confirmation yet that Putin thought the boys would be home by — by now.
https://twitter.com/sentdefender/sta...67647125319681 [VIDEO 2/28]

A Russian Armor Vehicles in the town of Bucha that was Broadcasting the Propaganda Message, "Citizens, stay calm, everything is under control" was blown up by a Ukrainian Paramilitary Member earlier today with an RPG.

Yuri the fascist is alarmed that the Russian occupation does not appear to be providing adequate food and economic relief to the denizens under Russian control. He hopes his government will rectify this oversight before the occupied grow disgruntled. I'm surprised he would publish this sort of thing, and by the looks of the comments so are his viewers, who aren't having the notion that the special military operation could have a flawed implementation in some regard.

Nice Post

Unfortunately, there's little cause for excitement. DoD estimated recently that despite more than 10% of in-theater Russian combat power being lost, Ukraine had lost a similar proportion of its own combat power. The biggest killer for Ukraine's forces is artillery, which is very hard to counter when Ukraine has less artillery and almost no air cover. Both sides have drones, but the increasing fielding of Russian drones is most prominently a multiplier for the pre-existing Russian advantage. DoD also assessed that Russia retains the majority of its inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles, despite having fired over 1100 in a month. Knowing more about Russia's military now than I did previously, I suspect Russia's ability to simultaneously strike at critical infrastructure in all NATO countries except the US is a factor in Biden et al. ramping things up very deliberately and gradually. Maybe this is still too low a risk tolerance when a few hundred Russian missiles reaching their targets spread across a continent is barely a nuisance - Ukraine is comfortably in the fight despite having absorbed a thousand - but it would be politically undesirable to suffer more damage than necessary through haste. Ultimately Ukraine needs, besides more ammo and fuel, a hell of a lot more UCAV, to make it untenable for Russia to operate extended bombardments.

As Russia's campaign takes a pause for refit and reconstitution, and the Russians adapt their assault tactics and spend more time attriting Ukrainian defenses with artillery, the danger for all of Eastern Ukraine remains high (as I have repeatedly emphasized).

Moreover, if Ukraine does substantially "win" by their own efforts, that is without direct NATO intervention, the patriotic fervor infusing the war could combine with success to inculcate undesirable sociological tendencies. It has come to the point that in a short period of time Putin subverted a "brotherly nation" into pure loathing for Russians. This isn't just bad for Russian cultural reach and prestige; it could lead to the kind of animosity that Russians, for example, felt for Germans after WW2. One of the best available cases would be Ukraine becoming another Poland, which is notorious for its suspicion and resentment toward Russia.

There's also so much anger in Ukraine that it would take a lot of time and suffering during war for it to wane naturally. The implication is that Zelensky might not even be politically licensed to broker a deal returning Donbas but not Crimea to Ukraine. The political imperative is to liberate all occupied land. Sentiment plus abundant weapons plus the brutalization of war could foster insurgent and terrorist activity well into the future if Ukraine can only manage to restore the (territorial) status quo ante.

The reality, as Zelensky himself said, is that neutrality vis-a-vis NATO was always the easiest concession Ukraine could offer - yet also the one Putin is least interested in.


Someone finally experimenting with no-man's-land formatting, as expected from Ruser. Is Konotop (the blue blob NW of Sumy, itself the larger blue blob surrounded by red near the NE border w/ Russia) still holding out? Holy crap, IIRC it's only been defended by local militias (Territorials). Let's have a reminder of the mayor cinematically exhorting the townsfolk to resist at the beginning of the war. There's even a humorous aside from 0:16-19 where the filmer asks the mayor why he didn't want to fight the day before; the mayor tells him to shut up before resuming his rabble-rousing.

[spmetla]

@spmetla or anyone else who can answer. There have been reports of Soviet ships moving out of the far east with materiel. How are they going to get them to the battlefield? Haven't the Turks closed the straits?

I imagine they'll just go to Vladivostok and then over the trans-Siberian railroad, should take weeks if true but a indicator of Russian high command's resolve to keep fighting.

As Russia's campaign takes a pause for refit and reconstitution, and the Russians adapt their assault tactics and spend more time attriting Ukrainian defenses with artillery, the danger for all of Eastern Ukraine remains high (as I have repeatedly emphasized).

That's where I'm cautiously optimistic for the Ukrainian situation now. The Russians in country aren't being allowed a pause for refit or reconstitution as the UA is able to take the fight to them though on a smaller scale. US intel doesn't seem to report any new BTGs lining up as reinforcements anywhere outside the Ukraine so that seems that units are being fed right into combat or the troops and equipment are being used purely as replacements. Both are indicators to me that Russia won't be able to adapt their tactics at the lower level Company and below and are going to be forced to rely on artillery.
This artillery reliance would usually be a good thing but considering the poor logistics situation as well as the security of those supply lines I think front line units won't be able to use their artillery as liberally as their doctrine would like. We haven't been seeing the massive rocket barrages of the first few weeks pop up in a while so that to me says they're being used at Battery and lower level as Battalion and greater sized barrages aren't sustainable right now.

The danger in East Ukraine is absolutely high as you've mentioned, Mariupol can't hold forever but it amazes me how well they've done so far.

If the UA is actually threatening Kherson as the rumor mill suggest this may draw more Russian units off of Mariupol too.

Also, I'm hearing through OSINT rumor mill of increased UA counterattacks NW of Kiev which makes me wonder about the situation if several BTGs get cut off from their lines of supply. Without air superiority they can't rely on aerial resupply, it's winter and they've already alienated the population so they can't forage off the land. It'd be a Stalingrad type of omen for the course of the war that even the staunchest pro-Putin supporters would struggle to paint as positive or a fluke.
If the UA somehow pulls off an encirclement of any BTGs in the NW Kiev salient that'll be a huge loss for the Russians and may eliminate any potential goading of Belarus into the conflict. Not to mention it'd enable the UA to have some strategic reserves to affect the same elsewhere.
This is all way too optimistic at this point and I get ahead of myself though the above is what I hope for. The war is far from won by any means but us armchair generals get excited when seeing vulnerable salients to cut off.

Moreover, if Ukraine does substantially "win" by their own efforts, that is without direct NATO intervention, the patriotic fervor infusing the war could combine with success to inculcate undesirable sociological tendencies. It has come to the point that in a short period of time Putin subverted a "brotherly nation" into pure loathing for Russians. This isn't just bad for Russian cultural reach and prestige; it could lead to the kind of animosity that Russians, for example, felt for Germans after WW2. One of the best available cases would be Ukraine becoming another Poland, which is notorious for its suspicion and resentment toward Russia.

I'm actually not too worried about this aspect as so many Ukrainians are part Russians or have close ties there so that they won't blame the Russian people just the government. Same for Russian citizens, this gamble and potential loss is clearly at the feet of Putin and his corrupt cronies. Sorta how the Nazis blamed the 'stab in the back' and 'the Jews' rather than acknowledge their defeat.

I could see the Russians angrier at the US specifically and the West generally than at Ukraine for somehow 'tricking' Putin into this war. I just wonder what this means for the future political environment of Russia. Will it be revanchism and meddling in Europe or will they do their historically turn eastward and focus on their influence in Central Asia and the Far East.

[Montmorency]

They still haven't been able to excavate the rubble from the Mariupol Drama Theater, which was bombed a week ago. Nevertheless hard to imagine civilian casualties in Mariupol though.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1506630965766070272 [VIDEO]

It's about time for transgovernmental management of the global food supply and its distribution (almost all Yemenis and Afghans are suffering food scarcity).

Is it the general consensus by now that making battalions with 4 maneuver companies, integrated artillery and AD batteries, recon, engineering, etc. the primary operational unit of a military overloads the battalion commander and leaves the unit non-resilient to disabling casualties?
https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/e...g/2Fiore17.pdf

Tangential brigade success story (Patton's wet dream).

Zubrowski’s Raid: In early August 2014, Ukraine’ 95th Air Assault Brigade (Mechanized) conducted the largest and
longest armored raid behind enemy lines in recorded military history. The 95th was comprised of
two mechanizedinfantry battalions, one tank battalion and a battalion of self-propelled artillery. The brigade attacked on multiple
parallel axes of advance, and combined-arms company-sized teams penetrated the thinly defended separatists’
positions and regrouped in the rear. The brigade then penetrated in depth along the two separatist regions’
internal border and maneuvered 200 kilometers east along the southern border of the Donbass. They destroyed
and captured Russian tanks and artillery, relieved several isolated Ukrainian garrisons and, finally, returned to their
starting position near Slovyansk. They marched 450 kilometers behind enemy lines and brought back captured
Russian armor and heavy artillery as well.
17 The raid achieved its objective of relieving Ukrainian forces in the
separatist provinces, and it proved that Russian regular units were operating in Ukraine. However, the gains were
undone in November 2014 when Russia deployed BTGs to the conflict in overwhelming numbers to support the
separatists directly.
 Lessons for a BCT: Look for opportunities to penetrate and inflict maximum damage. Even though 95th was
inside enemy lines for days, the unit consistently surprised enemy units, including Russian regulars. This
suggests the absence of theater-level battle tracking, cross-unit communication and a difficulty transmitting
orders to create a coordinated response to the marauding Ukrainian brigade.

That's where I'm cautiously optimistic for the Ukrainian situation now. The Russians in country aren't being allowed a pause for refit or reconstitution as the UA is able to take the fight to them though on a smaller scale. US intel doesn't seem to report any new BTGs lining up as reinforcements anywhere outside the Ukraine so that seems that units are being fed right into combat or the troops and equipment are being used purely as replacements. Both are indicators to me that Russia won't be able to adapt their tactics at the lower level Company and below and are going to be forced to rely on artillery.

This artillery reliance would usually be a good thing but considering the poor logistics situation as well as the security of those supply lines I think front line units won't be able to use their artillery as liberally as their doctrine would like. We haven't been seeing the massive rocket barrages of the first few weeks pop up in a while so that to me says they're being used at Battery and lower level as Battalion and greater sized barrages aren't sustainable right now.

Depends on what your interpretation of a pause is. Going by the ISW reports, for a couple of weeks now the Russians have generally only been fielding companies and battalions on the offensive along any given axis, albeit frequently overall, with offensive operations now almost at a total standstill in the northern half of the AO. (It's been reasonable to persist in Donetsk/Luhansk.)

To be precise, Putin would have to be really stupid to keep attacking piecemeal in net excess of Russia's capacity to resupply and reconstitute comprehensively, but we'll see... Winter has ended, so assuming there is a low-intensity stalemate until May, both sides will build up their operational reserves. For Ukraine this will mean training up their territorials to replace lost regulars and National Guard, as well as recruiting new territorials and organizing the partisan element for stay-behind and for areas already occupied. For Russia it will mean summoning as many reserves as combat units can absorb and/or be removed from the economy, and refreshing their training. Russia would also recruit as many mercenaries as possible and perhaps flood the rear areas with them alongside Rosgvardia and other internal security in order to stamp out resistance. This would be necessary since if Russia ever does bring the bulk of their force to bear against the Dnieper, having at least twice the area behind them that they do now, their LOC will be that much more vulnerable. Especially so given past performance, and the fact that they would be investing major cities from across the river (i.e. high expenditure of bulky supplies).

US intel doesn't seem to report any new BTGs lining up as reinforcements anywhere outside the Ukraine

Various sources since early in the month have been referencing Russian reinforcement units being brought up to the AO. I can't say I remember details, but for the most recent examples there were elements of naval infantry from around the country (ISW), an engineering detachment (Militaryland), and elements drawn from international deployments such as in the Caucasus and Syria (various sources).

If the UA is actually threatening Kherson as the rumor mill suggest this may draw more Russian units off of Mariupol too.

Kherson is like the holy grail for armchair generals, because of how overstretched the Russian advance is on that front. If a covert squad could properly blow the bridge, the only bridge over the Dnieper for 150 miles (Zaporizhzhia), and the only bridge the Russians control, then anywhere from 7-14 BTG of regulars (from what I've read), a bundle of artillery brigades, some air defense units, and some Spetsnaz and Rosgvardia in the AO will be cut off by ground. At least until the Russians can get bridgelayers on the scene (if they're good, they already have bridgelayers in Kherson in reserve). Best of all would be to blow the bridge at both banks, so a risky diversionary Ukrainian attack out of the Mykolaiv salient wouldn't even be needed and any restoration by the Russians would take weeks too long to rescue trapped assets.

If an uprising in Kherson could be triggered, it would be worth hundreds of lives to trap up to 20K Russian forces as well as an enormous quantity of artillery and AD systems.

Many of the Russians could still be evacuated by air while abandoning their equipment, but something like half their contingent is operating forward near Mykolaiv or at the provincial border near Kryvyi Rih, 50 or more miles out from Kherson. Thousands would be forced to surrender en masse.

Re-anchoring along the Dnieper while liquidating an entire Russian corps at low cost would be a watershed victory for Ukraine. It would also allow the transfer of several brigades to Kyiv (though the captured heavy equipment would take a long time to repurpose).

It would be legendary.

Sadly for the fantasy the Ukrainians probably don't have the capability.

NB. To my recollection the nearby bridge at Nova Kakhovka was blown at the beginning of the war. If it wasn't then the tactical picture is rather more complex for Ukraine.

I'm actually not too worried about this aspect as so many Ukrainians are part Russians or have close ties there so that they won't blame the Russian people just the government. Same for Russian citizens, this gamble and potential loss is clearly at the feet of Putin and his corrupt cronies. Sorta how the Nazis blamed the 'stab in the back' and 'the Jews' rather than acknowledge their defeat.

Almost all Ukrainian speakers a decade ago were Russian speakers, and heavily acculturated to Russian hegemony. Now, while the dust will take a long time to settle regardless of outcomes, I'm picking up on a very intense hatred of Russia and all things Russian among the Ukrainian populace. This sensitivity was cultivated over the past 8 years as well to be sure, but something has boiled over and a profound delinking with Soviet/Russian heritage is being carried forward. Just one video that captures the sentiment is a Ukrainian soldier surveying a destroyed Russian column and vowing, in Russian, to forswear the Russian language after the war. The universal resort to the framing of "orcs" and various highly-antiquated ethnic slurs isn't something that gets buried easily.

Let's not forget that part of the Russian ultranationalism that led to this war was the self-glorifying, unrepentant categorization of "fascist" as denoting "German", and then just anything couched as anti-Russian. If the Russian military, the one that singlehandedly saved the world from "fascism", can turn any opponent in the world into radioactive dust - as Russian TV personalities crowed - then of course Great Russia has the right and the means to do it again.

Notice how former President Medvedev, and Russian state TV, have been running trial balloons on the need to invade all of Eastern Europe in order to teach it some respect, and to renew deNazification.

(For another glimpse at the successful Fox-Newsification of the Russian people:)

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Unfortunately, there are some [pro-Russian] minded people in Kharkiv. They hide in the shelters and eat the humanitarian aid that comes from Europe and is distributed by Ukraine. And they still sympathize with Russia — it’s just delusional, if you ask me. I know [these kinds of people personally], of course. They think Ukraine is bombing itself.

I’m friends with some of my relatives from Crimea on [Russian social media site] Odnoklassniki. It’s my dad’s sisters and their children. I wrote: “We don’t need to be saved from anyone. We live on our own land and we want to live in Ukraine. Please get out of here.” Then came a barrage of negative comments. “It was different in the Soviet Union,” “You’re Nazis,” “You worship Bandera.” “I want to get in a tank myself and come greet you all.” And those are my relatives. So we cut them off. I’m not going to talk to them anymore. I don’t see the point.

My dad is currently in Crimea serving in the army; his wife and his wife’s son are there with him. I messaged him, “Did they send you to ‘save’ Ukraine, too?”

“Yes,” he responded.

“You don’t need to save us from anybody,” I wrote.

“You don’t understand anything," he wrote back. "People want us to save them from the Nazis."

Beyond specific national relations, my point was that Ukraine winning the war 'on its own' could combine to engender a certain chauvinism or overconfidence. Chauvinism and brutalization are a toxic brew. The West must invest in normalcy and peaceful flourishing in Ukraine, pull it away from the likes of Poland and, to quote Rod Dreher again, "make the Donbass safe for genderqueers and migrants."

I have no thoughts on what shape the program of disarmament would take, but additionally an immediate practical necessity for a victorious Ukraine - besides clearing away mines, ordnance, and rubble - will be to account for and confiscate as many small arms, RPGs, and heavy weapons from the general population as is feasible. Recall how the resistance movements of occupied Europe prominent included all sorts of unsavory political types, as well as gangsters and opportunists; it took years of diligent work to keep that threat to the state from festering.

I could see the Russians angrier at the US specifically and the West generally than at Ukraine for somehow 'tricking' Putin into this war. I just wonder what this means for the future political environment of Russia. Will it be revanchism and meddling in Europe or will they do their historically turn eastward and focus on their influence in Central Asia and the Far East.

Any further Russian Dolschtosslegend-ing is a whole other subject. It will never be possible to impose a comprehensive military defeat upon them. It's yet another crying shame; before the war most Russians were at a minimum neutral about American influence on their society.

[Pannonian]

They still haven't been able to excavate the rubble from the Mariupol Drama Theater, which was bombed a week ago. Nevertheless hard to imagine civilian casualties in Mariupol though.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1506630965766070272 [VIDEO]

It's about time for transgovernmental management of the global food supply and its distribution (almost all Yemenis and Afghans are suffering food scarcity).

The problem in many areas with food supply issues is war, not the general availability of food. As long as that's not solved, you're not going to solve the local food supply problem.

[rory_20_uk]

Food and water are tools of control in many countries in the world. Used correctly it can even be a way to monetise one's own population who are too poor to pay conventional taxes - but when the UN comes a-running with fee food that can be stolen, permits and other import taxes can be demanded and things can be sold to their staff. All that lovely hard currency - and the poor, starving peasants are unlikely to revolt.

And this of course is excluding when just starving people to death is the aim.

Lack of access therefore isn't a problem to be "fixed", it is something to use.

[Montmorency]

Holy crap, the Russian military has released a war map. It's surprisingly conservative, in some places even compared with most Western mappers. Meanwhile, Yuri insists that Makariv is under Russian control and the Kyiv regime is momentarily to flee the city.





Kherson is reportedly contested again.

DoD's cutting F-35 procurement?

Seems like Azerbaijan is officially recommencing its designs on Karabakh while Russia is distracted. Restraint is just too much to ask for in the Degenerate Age. I can't think of anyone else on the planet who wants this, other than Turkey, who always takes an opportunity to kick down at Armenia by all appearances.

The problem in many areas with food supply issues is war, not the general availability of food. As long as that's not solved, you're not going to solve the local food supply problem.

True, but only to a point - and Afghanistan and Yemen are in a 10-year lull for internal warfare anyway. There's a difference between persistent nutritional insecurity and mass famine, and these are very particular times for global and regional food supplies.

Food and water are tools of control in many countries in the world. Used correctly it can even be a way to monetise one's own population who are too poor to pay conventional taxes - but when the UN comes a-running with fee food that can be stolen, permits and other import taxes can be demanded and things can be sold to their staff. All that lovely hard currency - and the poor, starving peasants are unlikely to revolt.

And this of course is excluding when just starving people to death is the aim.

Lack of access therefore isn't a problem to be "fixed", it is something to use.

The usage is that we don't have a mechanism for controlling millions of starving people. I know Europe is relatively enthusiastic about absorbing millions of Ukrainian refugees, but one would think the lesson was learned by 2015. Or else, you'd better be sure that all those people will croak before they get a chance to cause impinge on you if there's no money or resources to take care of them abroad.