Some points.
As Hugh Elton rightly states the Roman Frontier is not ONE impenetrable border, a frontier consists of many overlapping zones. Administrative, culturally, militarily and mercantile. These did not just cut off at the Limes (or any other border at those times), but went far into germany (in this case). Tribes living on both sides of the Rhine for example would not stop communicating with their kinsmen just because there was a Roman "Border" set up, a border not in itself impenetrable but permeable. The Roman Army would have expeditions, outposts and patrols far into enemy territory- it is attested in our sources and that is the way it has ALWAYS been till modern times in border areas.
I would definately advise reading
Frontiers of the Roman Empire (London: Batsford; Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1996) by Hugh Elton. It is scientific, not for the broad public, but people here should be able to enjoy it (after all by installing EB we have agreed to read more history, though in my case that would hardly be possible ;-) ) and it has much interesting scholarship. When I first read it in 1998 I thought, "Of course THAT makes sense!"
And for those of you who believes that Germania was nothing but vast forests, marshes and wilderness as described by good old Tacitus, it was not. Denmark at least- likely the rest- was fully agriculturally exploited from the First Century AD onwards. For elaboration on Denmark in the Iron Age- High Middle Age, PM me on
palle.rasmussen@gmail.com.
As for warfare in Germany I advice reading Tacitus' Annals, Book I & II, I suspect not even Caesar could have subdued the Germans for the very reason stated above, there were no population centres and no infrastructure (seen through Roman eyes). IE nothing for the Romans to occupy and integrate in their system. And the population was fiercely against Roman occupation. With time the Romans could have done it, but it would have been a huge investment with no payoff worth mentioning, a deficit. If we come down to it no state sustains any operation of any sort that gives a deficit for long...
Thus Tiberius Caesar ordered Germanicus to desist his operations when it dawned on him that the Germans would NOT surrender and that keeping eight legions (~28% of the Roman Army) in the field against them was costly in men and money and would yield nothing.
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