True enough, even if he actually did attack initially the fortress, taking rather heavy casualities in the process. The infiltration tactics of WWI were of course the tactical (becoming also partly the operational) mold for every intelligent offensive operation. However the concept ever called for heavy firepower directed ala' Bruchmueller. It was impossible to achieve against Tobruk given the small weight of the artillery and the even smaller of the available ammunition. Heavy mobile direct firepower in the form of well-armored assault guns and self-propelled artillery who proved to be of so great importance later in the war lacked completely. Airpower was also not available in even remotely sufficient numbers, nor to support the siege, nor to cut off the supplies. Seapower was not present.Rommel understood the difficulty of assaulting built-up positions. His service in Italy in 1918 would have been instructive. Still, it is obvious that such situations do limit tactical options. The 'stormtrooper' tactics used by Imperial Germany in 1918 were as good as it gets for taking built up positions by storm -- and they require high-quality motivated troops who will take significant casualties. Even knowing those tactics, Rommel may simply not have had the ability to absorb that kind of loss without the whole exercise being rather Pyrhhic.
All in all the defenders of Tobruk were brave but all but successfull defense under this circumstances would have cast a deep shadow on the capabilities of allied forces in a "conventional" setting.
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