how to use advance and fire?

[al Roumi]

Actually the reason Frederick the Great army was so successful was that he introduced the iron ramrod which allowed his men to reload far faster than his opponents.

Don't mean to undermine you at all here Didz, but surely the introduction and adoption of iron ramrods wasn't the only reason why Frederick's army was so great and successful.

[Mystiqblackcat]

I am making my way through a book about warfare in the Napoleonic age and it cites that a common British tactic was to from up two ranks deep for increased fire power and fire off two volleys at close range followed immediately by a bayonet charge for shock value. Apparently it worked fairly well, I don't have the book with me otherwise I would quote soem specifics.

I tend to save bayonet charges until the enemy unit is about to break. If not I seem to take too many casualties in addition to having to worry about friendly fire.

[Marquis of Roland]

Before any sensible bayonet charge was mounted, the section of line to be attacked should have been weakened and/or disoriented by artillery and musket volleys. If you're charging into a solid line of muskets, of course you are going to lose.

[Didz]

I am making my way through a book about warfare in the Napoleonic age and it cites that a common British tactic was to from up two ranks deep for increased fire power and fire off two volleys at close range followed immediately by a bayonet charge for shock value.

I would not say it was common, it became more prevalent as the Napoleonic Wars progressed. However, even in 1815 there were regiments formed four deep on the Waterloo ridge and bayonet charges were rare during that battle simply because the French were to well organised and supported. One Battalion of the Kings German Legion did attempt it near La Haye Sainte and were promptly cut to ribbons by supporting cavalry.

As I said earlier in the debate the romantic ideal of 'cold steel' appealled to everyone except the soldiers who were being asked to put it into practice. In 1794 Carnot ordered the French Army to seek 'action with the bayonet on every occassion', and Napoleon had a festish for the idea of cold steel. One French officer commented wryly to another that if asked 'one must be killed by a bayonet, as the Emperor has a fondness for those who die in this manner.' Official French Army doctrine, as expounded by the Ecole Polytechnique, claimed that only the first volley of musketry was effective, 'after which the bayonet and the sword may charge without sustaining great loss.'

Austrian and Prussian regulations also stressed the role of the bayonet in the attack, and Archdukle Chalres considered it the best weapon for use in close combat. In Russia the 'Precepts for Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle', issued in 1812, still advocated the bayonet charge delivered in deep column formation as the preferred tactic.

Yet, in practice very few soldiers actually fought each other with cold steel.

At Austerlitz the Russian Guards made a classic 300 yard bayonet charge, but were so exhausted after breaking through the first French line that they were easily driven off by musketry fire from the second. Generally, it was the threat of the bayonet, rather than its actual use that decided an issue. General Larry, of the Grand Army noted that in all his years of service with the French Army he had only ever seen five bayonet wounds, and concluded that the effect of the weapon was largely psychological.

Whilst Guthrie a senior medical officer in the British Army noted that 'troops charging with the bayonet never actually meet and struggle hand to hand and foot to foot; and this for the best possible reason, that one side turns and runs away as soon as the other comes close enough to do mischief.'

General Lejeune supports these views stating that in his expereince it is 'very rare, for as a rule one of the the corps is demoralised to begin with by the firing, and draws back before the enemy is close enough to cross muzzles.'

Jomini declares on the same subject 'I never saw such a thing on a regular field of battle.'

Extracts from 'The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon' by Rothenberg

The only occassion when bayonets were used in the Peninsula Campaign was at the battle of Roncesvalles on 25 July 1813 as described by Captain Tovey of the 2oth Foot.

'The division had been expecting an attack that morning and the twentieth were lying in column by their arms. It was daylight however, when a german Sergeant form the Brunswick Corps, who had been out in front, came in haste to tell us that the French had made the Spainish piquet prisoner without firing a shot. The left wing of the Twentieth were moved instantly to form on some strong ground in the direction they were coming, and while doing so the enemy light troops opened so galling a fire that Major Ross, who was on the spot called for a company to go in front and drive them off. Without waiting for further orders, I pushed out with mine, and in close order and double quick march cleared away the skirmishers from a sort of plateau to our front. They did not wait for us, and, on reaching the opposite side, we came so suddenly on the head of the enemy's infantry column, who had just gained a footing on the summit of the hill , that the men of my comany absolutely paused in astonishment, for we were face to face with them, and the French officers called on us 'to disarm; I repeated 'Bayonet Away!', and rushing headlong among them, we fairly turned them back into the descent of the hill; and such was the panic and confusion occassioned amongst them by our sudden onset that our small party, for such it was compared to the French had time to regain the regiment. The enemy had many killed and their leading officer fell at my feet with two others, all bayonetted. The company, with which I was the only officer present on this occasison, did not amount to more than seventy or eighty men, and we had eleven killed and fourteen wounded....a powerful man by the name of Budworth returned with only the blood-soiled socket of his bayonet on his piece; and he declared that he had killed away until his bayonet broke; I am confident, from the reckless and intrepid nature of the man, that he had done so.

Extract from 'Wellington's Army' by Glover.

[Warhammer3025]

While i can see how the Napoleonic Era had less bayonet fighting due to increase in effectiveness in musketry and disciplined formations, how about earlier eras (say 1550-1700) during the height of the Musket and Pike? Were there times where there were tactical ramifications of plugging your musket with a bayonet and before receiving or attempting a charge? Was close in fighting more prevalent due to firearms being not all that refined yet? Were there many if any instances of situations where bayonet wielding troops got caught up in a pike push?

[Didz]

While i can see how the Napoleonic Era had less bayonet fighting due to increase in effectiveness in musketry and disciplined formations, how about earlier eras (say 1550-1700) during the height of the Musket and Pike? Were there times where there were tactical ramifications of plugging your musket with a bayonet and before receiving or attempting a charge? Was close in fighting more prevalent due to firearms being not all that refined yet? Were there many if any instances of situations where bayonet wielding troops got caught up in a pike push?

Exactly, there must have been some sort of progression from ancient and medieval warfare which was very much close up and personal, to the horse and musket era' of massed musketry. Certainly, in he mid-17th century one still got the 'push of pike', but perhaps it was the decline of the pikeman that triggerred the change in doctrine. When everyone has something to use that kills from a distance it begins to get less appealing to stand too close.

I've never actually seen anyone cover this transition in a methodical way, most books concentrate on weapons and ignore soldiers attitudes.

[nafod]

Exactly, there must have been some sort of progression from ancient and medieval warfare which was very much close up and personal, to the horse and musket era' of massed musketry. Certainly, in he mid-17th century one still got the 'push of pike', but perhaps it was the decline of the pikeman that triggerred the change in doctrine. When everyone has something to use that kills from a distance it begins to get less appealing to stand too close.

I've never actually seen anyone cover this transition in a methodical way, most books concentrate on weapons and ignore soldiers attitudes.

I intend to keep this argument civil and in no way insult anyone.

If we are talking about the Napoleaonic wars I would have to agree with those that discredit the use of the bayonet as a viable tactic, as it remained a predominate part of US military doctrine and was used extensively in the early battles of the US Civil War and generally met with disastrous results. As the doctrine failed to realize the advancements in firearms that had occured between then and the war of 1812.

As far as the 18th century covered by this game I'd have to disagree.

Simply put a line advancing in the American Revolutionary war wasn't in real danger from musket fire until closing to within 50 yards, and nothing significant until around 30. By the 1860's these ranges had increased to 100 and 50 yards respectively.

Also consider that most firearms of the 18th century did not have sights (by most I'm implying the arms provided in mass to a nations army). Not even a pip at the end of the barrel like a modern day shotgun.

Volleys were not necessary to score hits, but rather project a wall of lead in unison, in an instant in a hope of causing a route. A bayonet charge functioned the same way. Of course if the defender stayed it would be a bloodbath. It always is with an enemy that simply will not give up ground.

I'd wager the bayonet charge faded into military history romantically the same way the calvary charge did. As infantry men gained the ability to accurately place fire further and further away it became a much more difficult task to get ever closer without taking on immense casualties. As there was no longer a need to "wait until the last second." This largely did not occur until the early 19th century however.

I'd also comment that soldiers attitudes matter little. Either they followed orders or they routed. Obviously any fighting man would prefer entrenchment on good ground but ultimately if a unit will not follow orders, be they advance or otherwise, it is no longer an effective fighting unit.

[Didz]

As far as the 18th century covered by this game I'd have to disagree.

Thats fair enough...I mean none of us actually know what happened so everything we are discussing is personal opinion and conjecture.

However, what I'm trying to explore is what people who were there actually said happened, rather than what drill manuals, drunken generals and boastful old vets said ought to have happened.

I mean there is the 'They don't like it up 'em, Mister Manering.' attitude towards the use of cold steel that still persists in some military attitudes today, and there is the actual attitude of the troops in the battle on the day and how they reacted.

To be honest I'm interested in both, but I like to keep a clear distinction better 'What was supposed to happen, what people said happened afterwards, and what actually happened.' Thats really what we are discussing here.

I'd also comment that soldiers attitudes matter little. Either they followed orders or they routed. Obviously any fighting man would prefer entrenchment on good ground but ultimately if a unit will not follow orders, be they advance or otherwise, it is no longer an effective fighting unit.

I have to disagree with this simply because it contradicts itself. As has been commented on numerous occassions 'In battle the Morale is to the Physical as 10 is to 1'. In other words it is what the solider is thinking and what he beleives to be true which matters much more than any orders being shouted at him.

The battle being fought on the drill squares and in military training camps around the world is to try and turn soldiers into unthinking machines that will indeed follow orders without thinking and repeat their drills instinctively even when they no longer make any sense. However, personal accounts of show that this is a lost battle before it even starts. The sights and sounds of battle are so alien to humanity that men who are exposed to them do think, and so its what THEY think that matters, not what orders are being shouted at them. History tends to gloss over the facts when trying to make sense of the results, it likes to report the orders and tries to explain how they were carried out, but it also tries to ignore when they patently weren't followed becuase it has no explanation in the official record of what happened instead or why.

You say, a fighting man either followed orders or they routed, but that in itself is far too simplistic. There is a process of transition from order to chaos and from cohesion to rout, and that process is driven by what it going on the heads of individual soldiers and the impact their behaviour has on those around them. Units do not suddenly go from being under command to routing, the process probably begins before the unit even comes under fire. A seed of doubt perhaps planted in the minds of the soldiers a perception of chaos and disorder on the part of their officers.

Tolstoy actually captures this perfectly in his description of the Battle of Austerlitz, where he describes the attitude of the Russian soldiers waiting to go into action. That is of course a fictional account but I have a few eyewitness accounts from the same period which suggest that the same sort of process was taking place in every soldiers mind.

This from a French Sergeant talking of the famous French column attack against a British line.

'The Britsh did not move, they just stood there with their arms at the recover and ignored us. We were getting closer and closer and still the British stood like a wall across our path, they did not move, the men began to get nervous. I was worried about how close we were getting, the effect of their fire when it did come would be terrible. The men began to shout 'Vive I'Empereur', 'En Avant' they were thinking the same as I. We could see the enemies faces, we could see the buttons on their uniforms, and still they did nothing. The men began to falter, to take shorter steps, they did not want to get closer. The officers began to shout 'keep moving, forward, forward' a musket was fired then another, men began to push each other. Then the British moved, in one sudden movement they raised their weapons to the shoulder. That movement alone stopped us and for a second there was total silence. Then the world exploded around me and everyone near me was flung backwards down the slope. There was a groan and I looked around to see nothing but chaos everywhere and as I turned back and looked up the slope the British were marching out of their own musket smoke their bayonets lowered and howling like wild animals. There was nothing to be done, they are not human.'

It's the 'what actually happened' aspect that I'm mainly discussing here, there must have been a point at which soldiers ceased to consider the use of cold steel to be feasible and that should be capable of being plotted by looking at actual events on the battlefield.

You mentioned the American War of Independence, are there examples of troops actually crossing bayonets in any of the battle of that war. My own memory is more familiar with stories of the long range fire and retire tactic's used by American irregulars which were a constant frustration to the British.

[Didz]

Don't mean to undermine you at all here Didz, but surely the introduction and adoption of iron ramrods wasn't the only reason why Frederick's army was so great and successful.

Obviously, not. The Prussian Army at this period was at the peak of its efficiency as a fighting force. Frederick introduced a whole new drill system based upon a standard cadence that ensured perfect precision, discipline and speed of movement, he also introduced a new battlefield strategy based upon a rapid oblique march which allowed his army to place pressure on a single point of the enemy line whilst still pinning the rest of the enemy force in place. This coupled with the overwhelming firepower afforded by his iron ramrods mean't that his army could literally blast a hole through any point of the enemy line he choose to direct it against.

...the iron ramrod, increasing Prussian firepower, and the slow march, or goose-step. The new king trained and drilled the army relentlessly, focusing on the firing speed of their flintlock muskets and formation maneuverability. The changes gave the army flexibility, precision, and a rate of fire that was largely unequaled for the time period.[15] Through drilling and the iron ramrod, each soldier was expected to fire six times in a minute, three times as fast as most armies.