Operation "Sea Lion"

[InsaneApache]

Beyond parady.

[Martok]

cuz like 1squad(4 men) can destroy like a hole Platoon of Nazi's.

Sure, if the squad was armor and the platoon was light infantry. Otherwise, that seems a bit far-fetched.

[A Very Super Market]

In combat, there are no rules like "Oh, 10 of my British infantrymen can take down that light tank". It's all circumstance and tactics. Obviously, there were times when 4 men could destroy a platoon, and other times when they would all get killed. I don't even want to begin explaining the deficiencies of the American army, so let's just leave it at this; you need to do some basic research before going on about WWII.

[Brenus]

“Apparently, the evidence usually cited for the Soviet pre-emptive strike theory is:
a. Armored forces deployed in exposed front-line positions
b. Creation of numerous airborne corps since the start of WW2
c. Improvement of roads close to the German-Soviet borders
d. Deployment of fighter squadrons near the border
e. Distribution of military maps that included Western Poland and parts of Germany “

Well:
a. Some Armoured forces were deployed in potential front lines (3 on a total of 10 1 on the Japanese Front): Nor really impressive, I should say.
b. The Russian invented the concept of Airborne Assault… So nothing is really surprising about this. Then, the real question is when did the Russian used airborne forces in their offensive…?
c. By the way, the Front Line is Poland in 1941… Did Stalin build roads in Poland?
d. Well, if you want to intercept bombers before their reach your industrial area, it is better to have far advance defence, especially if not are not equipped with radar…
e. To whom? The Russian, even in the 1980, had maps on high level on the hierarchy…

If you just see where the towns mentioned by Yerema are as proof than the Russians were on the borders on a map, his evidences are auto destroyed. Minsk is not a border town, nor Smolensk…

Yarema is some documents and maps and well, just ignores what the Germans themselves wrote and said.
Summary: Unprepared Red Army, no artillery coordination, lack of officers, no tracks at all for a “offensive” concentration of troops.
You have to remember than the Germans and the Russian developed together their tanks doctrine. This is why the Red Army from the start started counter-offensive which will end very badly for reasons mentioned above: Total lack of coordination between units, mediocrity of system of communication, incompetence of the Commanders. Is it the description of an Army ready to take a major offensive?

Note: A soldier is not ready for defensive or offensive, (or a unit, or an Army), he is ready or not.
The distingo between a Defensive or Offensive army is not relevant. The material is not relevant.
What is relevant is: “AFAIK there was nothing like a Soviet Directive 21”

[Tellos Athenaios]

Some simple observations:

Where are the most major centers of production/industry?
Where lie most major civic centers?
What are (traditionally) the major centers of political significance?
Where does the vast majority of party politicians; as well as dissidents come from?
Where does the CCCP draw most of its supporters from?
What regions are most reliant on food imports and hence are more likely to riot when food supplies fail?
What regions provide the bulk of armed forces as well as the bulk of armory stock?

The dependence of the USSR on its European territories goes so far at the time; that they cannot really rely on their Asian possessions to supply them -- even most major mining centers do no lie east of the Urals. Past the Urals is a country in which industry is still very much in its infancy.

So to sum up: what territories are most highly prioritized when it comes to exerting control over the populace and defending from [foreign] assault? I would not be surprised if you could find me a stat showing 95% of all Russian forces were congregated between Yekaterinburg and Warsaw at the time: such a deployment makes sense out of its own accord and does so even without a grand invasion plan.

[Caius]

Paratroopers are an OFFENSIVE weapon, right?

The fact that Paratroopers are an offensive weapon is not the same as Paratroopers are an EFFECTIVE weapon. That's called Operation Market Garden.

[A Very Super Market]

That's the effect of light infantry going up against armour for an extended period of time. Airborne assaults directly preceding conventional attacks worked wonders. It's called Varsity, Neptune, and Avalanche.

[G. Septimus]

The fact that Paratroopers are an offensive weapon is not the same as Paratroopers are an EFFECTIVE weapon. That's called Operation Market Garden.

Market Garden failed because of a british Inteligence Captain was killled, then a German Soldier was ordered to check his pockets. Then he found a document named "Operation Market Garden".
so the germans knew that the allies were going to take the 3 major Bridges into the Fatherland.2 Bridges were Captured by the 101st and 82nd Airborne. But the 3rd bridge, Arnhem was failed to capture by the brits. Another thing that made the Allies lose was the XXX corps did'nt reach Arnhem in time.




Operation Market Garden

[Tellos Athenaios]

What fatherland?

Anyways; Market Garden failed for numerous reasons, and the "Germans knew everything!" plot is kind of exaggerated. For starters the Germans seemed to consider it if anything more of a diversion than the ‘real deal’ -- they had themselves quite enough experience with the terrain to tell that it would 99% sure be a folly, and they also knew that the American members of allied high command were less than convinced about the plan and in particular that Eisenhower was very unlikely to give it all his support (and that turned out to be quite right, Eisenhower didn't -- Mr. Montgomery corresponded extensively about his disagreements with Mr. Eisenhower).

The rest is sort of ‘what did you expect’. Of course the airborne divisions did not hold Arnhem long enough: effectively cut-off from supplies and facing both machine guns and tanks...
Of course the reinforcements never made it on time: moving over ancient dikes a convenient 1m above the landscape so they were basically very slow moving sitting ducks for any kind of artillery; or any kind of armed forces really.

[G. Septimus]

What fatherland?

you dont know that???
Fatherland is Germany.
the Germans were not experienced in that area. the Panzer Corps that was sent there were most of the veterans of Normandy. the Paratroopers too (the americans)

[A Very Super Market]

Arnhem, Eindhoven, and Nijmegen are in the Netherlands. The map you posted clearly labels it as so.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Arnhem, Eindhoven, and Nijmegen are in the Netherlands. The map you posted clearly labels it as so.

Montgomery's strategic objective was to cross the Rhine at Arnhem and then use the bridgehead generated to punch into the Ruhr valley, which is most definitely (and at the time economically very important to) Der Vaterland.


Vertical envelopment is a fine concept, but using mass parachutings to accomplish it was and is a poor choice. Your troops land disorganized and very often far from where they were intended, their equippage is light, and they can barely muddle through to objectives if at all until after hours/days of re-organizing. Most of the paradrops prior to Market were not wholly successful. They did enhance the "confusion" factor, but that's about it.

The troops themselves were superb. Given a few days to get things together and they worked wonders with what little they had.

[Samurai Waki]

Agreeing with Seamus's Post;

The Allies also weren't aware of the actual size and strength of the Dutch SS, and Regular Wermacht operating in the area, which was much larger than anticipated, and hadn't expected much in the way of heavy armor, from their intelligence reports.

Instead they dropped "light" expecting similar results as they had during Overlord, what a terrible surprise for the British 1st, not only had they dropped their supplies right into the German's hands, but most of it would have been relatively useless against the Brunt of Army Force B, that they managed to hold out for so long against such overwhelming odds was a testament to their training, skill, and courage.

[Ludens]

The Allies also weren't aware of the actual size and strength of the Dutch SS, and Regular Wermacht operating in the area, which was much larger than anticipated, and hadn't expected much in the way of heavy armor, from their intelligence reports.

It's not entirely correct to say the Allies weren't aware, as there was intelligence and aerial reconnaissance that indicated the presence of SS heavy armour. However, it seems the operation's commanders were in denial about the risks, as they waved away the reports and the dangers posed by it. The only officer that tried to make them see the risk was packed of on medical leave.

Of course, this was just one of several major blunders in the planning of the operation.

[G. Septimus]

It's not entirely correct to say the Allies weren't aware, as there was intelligence and aerial reconnaissance that indicated the presence of SS heavy armour. However, it seems the operation's commanders were in denial about the risks, as they waved away the reports and the dangers posed by it. The only officer that tried to make them see the risk was packed of on medical leave.

Of course, this was just one of several major blunders in the planning of the operation.

the Allies did knew there was heavy resistance only in Arnhem, not in Njigmen, and Eindhoven. so they sent XXX Corps to engage with the heavy Resisstance. But the XXX corps came late and the operation failed.