But then why would I have quoted the part in the first place, twice no less, if I wanted it de-emphasized?
I bold the most relevant part as a courtesy to the reader, who may not want to read the entire bit but does want to be able to quickly follow the conversation. I quote the entire bit for those more interested, that they can understand the larger context. I give links, for those who want to follow up on that, plus for those who want to check my sources.
The bit shows contuining historical debate, yes. disagreement. It also shows that Ferguson and in particular Feldman are an increasing minority, and that Ferguson's midway position is not without incongruities.
I do hear you.Originally Posted by Fisherking
One could argue that the allies should have taken the moral high ground. Even disregarding modern morality ('we don't do that stuff anymore'), by the standards of their time it was possible to understand that industrial scale warfare was a dead end. That realpolitik, power politics, if those are the words, were a dead end.
One should be noble in victory, respectful to the loser. One wins some, one loses some. It could be the other way round next time, it has been the other way round in the past. Events could've unfolded differently.
And noble, no, this Versailles was not.
But noble is the exception, not the rule. One does not hold the absence of nobleness against someone, one admires it when it is present.
Even so, Versailles was full of idealism. It did not seek to supress Germany, never mind suck it dry or humiliate it. Versailles was not even a mixture of realpolitik and humilation. Versailles was a mixture of realpolitik and idealism.
Versailles was not harsh. It was perhaps not directly conciliatory either. However, where it was not conciliatory, it left open the possibility of concilliation. Germany was not crippled. Germany was left Europe's most powerful state. Many provisions were conditional in the first place, or could easily be revised at a later date.
Versailles was not meant as a system to keep Germany down forever. It was meant as a system that would eventually incorporate, once passions had settled down, Germany as a peaceful state, as the largest power in Europe, in a system that sought to overcome differences in a peaceful manner.
In the execution of this Versailles failed. Why? Because Germany cried bloody murder from the start, never reconcilling itself with defeat. Because the allies - who had too much, not too little, sympathy for Germany - bought into this from the start, because the allies lost track of what they set out to do and let Germany play them against each other. The atmosphere became one of overthrowing the peace system, rather than preserving the peace. With the powers trying to maintain the peace becoming the agressor in public opinion, and the power trying to destroy the peace the victim.
Twenty years of allied concilliatory efforts were only ever met with a reprisal of the entire war.
Germany did not want re-concilliation. Germany wanted not to undo the peace treaty. Germany wanted to undo the war itself.
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