What if the 20th of July 1944 Hitler has been "terminated"

[RabidGibbon]

To answer you point by point Brenus,

Stalin acting in concordence with his own interests is to my mind cynical when it involves leaving the polish Home Army to bleed to death over two months because of post war considerations. You say the Polish in Warsaw were anti-communist, but this is only true to the extent that anyone who did not completly accept Soviet policy was anti-communist, and Stalin (and the Lublin commitee) had already made it clear that they foresaw the future boundaries of the USSR as being the 'Peace Line' agreed with Hitler in 1939. Its hard to see how a Polish resistance (aware of the NKVD's activites during the 1939-41 period in occupied eastern Poland and of course the Katyn forest) could be pro-soviet. However Stalin deliberately passed up an opportunity to end the war earlier by halting Rossokovsky on the Vistula (I'm refering to the september actions, not the earlier August offensive, which admittedly was halted by a German counterattack).

Of course everyone acted in their own self interest at the expense of their allies, but I dont think everyone took it to the level that Stalin did. Were Free French Communist Groups arrested, disarmed and placed in detention by the Western allies, as the Polish Home Army were? (Serious, not rhetorical question - I dont know anything about this subject).

I dont know anything either about the 2nd Armoured Div not being allowed to land on D-Day, but I believe that the plan didn't call for the commitment of an armoured division. Monty wanted tank brigades to push out of the british zone towards Falaise, and 2nd French armoured was a US formation (In the sense that the Canadians were a 'British' Formation - I'm refering purely to organisational details). Of course these are operational rather than political considerations, but French troops did land at Ouistreham on the 6th of June.

Did Roosevelt really plan to occupy France? Its not something I've ever heard anything about before - It theirs any good onlie sources I'd appreciate you pointing me towards them.

The point I'm trying to make is that Stalin, whilst perhaps his appreciation of the situation was identical to Churchill and Roosevelt, the actions he took on the basis of this appreciation were certainly more ruthless than anything the Western allies would have considered.

Edit: It just occurs to me that a great counter point to everything I just wrote would be Mers - El - Kebir, a superb example of allies acting against the interest of their erstwhile ally. The only defence I could make is that the French Fleet was not actively fighting the Germans, (as the Home Army abandoned by Stalin was) and could potentially prove an asset to them, although this is a pretty weak argument considering what eventually happened at Toulon.

[Brenus]

Well, you put a moral judgement on a political decision.
Was Stalin cynical? Most probably, however the decision to halt (if it was a decision as the Russian claim they were at their logistical chain end so they couldn’t push forward –this wouldn’t explain the lack of support in ammunition and weapons/air support) was a pure political –perhaps immoral- decision.
From the Russian point of view, Poland was always an enemy.
From the Communist point of view, same: The Polish Dictator in charge prior 1939 was openly anti-communist and even supported Germany policy during the Spanish Civil War.
So Poland was anti-Stalin before Katyn (reason why Katyn happened, somewhere).
In term of politic and post war politic, and Stalin knew the war was won just didn’t know how much lands he would be able to do.
So resolving the Polish political future in letting the Germans to eradicate part of the Polish elite and in the same time denying to the anti-communist Partisan a propaganda victory in liberating their Capital was a typical communist decision.
What I learned in studying another Communist war (Indochina) is the Communists always favour the political (long term) effect even in a war. If a defeat gave them upper hand in the propaganda/media war, they will scarify men in order to achieve it.
If you judge Stalin’s decision from this, this decision makes sense.
Not a cynical decision but a plain battle field full of sense decision.

As the second point you can’t compare Democracy and Dictatorship. Of course no French Communist was deported or executed by the French Nationalist forces (even if some questions were raised on who betrayed Jean Moulin).
However, the idea to contain communism in France (and Italy) was always there.
And can I remind you what happened in Greece?
It took long time for Churchill to give weapons to Communist Tito instead of Mihailovic’s Cetniks (royalist) when it appear that the second one was more incline to wait in order to save civilian lives.
A I said Tito being a communist did scarify lives in order to gain political goals so he gave to Churchill was he wanted, at the price 100 civilians for one German soldiers killed (50 for one injured). It was implemented in October 1941 in Kragujevac.

The Kieffer Commando (Navy) was part of the British Commando No 10 was 174 men strong… It can hardly be seen as a French participation in the national territory liberation.
If you compare with Operation Anvil/Dragoon in August 1944, you understand that the decision to exclude French troops from the D-Day was indeed political.

About France treated as Occupied Territory, I’ve got this information in an interview I had with a French veteran when I was studying Indochina war. He was an officer in the French Corps Leger d’Intervention and met some US colleagues who show him their news shoulder insignia. It was the French Occupation Administration patch.

“Roosevelt’s feelings towards the French, at least regarding post-war talks, were chilly. While he’d harbored some distrust towards Great Britain, it was stronger with the French. When the American forces advanced into France, Roosevelt was sucked into the quagmire of French, wartime politics. Roosevelt and the US government had given backing to Vichy’s regime and refused to recognise the de Gaulle Free French movement. He saw him as someone who could raise the potential for a dictatorship in France. This strong dislike caused problems for the post-war planning talks. Without fully recognizing one of the main actors in the anti-Nazi movement, reaching a mutually agreed solution would be difficult to say the least. Indeed, Roosevelt would have preferred to keep de Gaulle from planning both the war and post-war plans. Requiring the French to disarm, in that case being treated similar to the Germans, made clear their place in the new world order that Roosevelt hoped to achieve; they would not be on the same level as the US, Great Britain, the Soviets, or China. France was to become another state in Europe that needed to be watched over by the stronger powers.”
In Tatiana McArthur, What Was Roosevelt’s “Vision of Europe”, November 30, 2009.

[Sarmatian]

I wouldn't say Stalin was cynical. In fact, that would be more applicable to Churchill and Roosevelt. When Italy surrendered, Soviets argued for a joint occupation. Italy was one of the countries that attacked the Soviet Union and was in war with both allies and the Soviets. They were flatly refused, more than once. So, after bitching about it, they decided to act according to the precedent set by the Allies - whoever occupies a territory decides what happens to it.

Lets not forget that there was a strong communist movement in Italy at the time and given the 100% free elections, it is not unthinkable that communists would have been placed in power.

So basically, what Stalin did in Poland was not different to what Allies did in Italy, and according to Glantz, Red Army was indeed at the end of their logistical supply and was unable to mount a huge operation of capturing a huge city such as Warsaw at such short notice...

[Louis VI the Fat]

The things one finds in archives...

Franco gave Nazis list of Jews in Spain

El País publishes order signed by Spanish dictator in 1941 instructing provincial governors to provide names of Jews to be handed over to 'final solution' architect Heinrich Himmler Ynet Published: 06.21.10, 08:45 / Israel Jewish Scene

P{margin:0;} UL{margin-bottom:0;margin-top:0;margin-right: 16; padding-right:0;} OL{margin-bottom:0;margin-top:0;margin-right: 32; padding-right:0;} H3.pHeader {margin-bottom:3px;COLOR: #192862;font-size: 16px;font-weight: bold;margin-top:0px;} P.pHeader {margin-bottom:3px;COLOR: #192862;font-size: 16px;font-weight: bold;} When former Prime Minister Golda Meir thanked Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco for his "humanitarian attitude" and for protecting the Jews in his country during the Holocaust, she was not aware that he had ordered his officials to draw up a list of thousands of Jews living in Spain to be handed over to the Nazis.

The list, which was published in the El País newspaper on Sunday, would have sent thousands more Jews to their deaths in the Nazi extermination camps.

Franco, whose apologists and supporters claim he gave protection to the Jews of Spain, ordered his officials during the Second World War to compose a list of some 6,000 Jews, both Spanish and foreign, living in his country.
The list was handed over to the Nazi architect of the "final solution", German SS chief Heinrich Himmler, at a time when the two countries were discussing Spain's possible incorporation into the axis powers that included Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan.
The Spanish newspaper published the original order, which was recently unearthed in the Spanish government's archives and instructed provincial governors to provide detailed lists of "all the national and foreign Jews living in the province… showing their personal and political leanings, means of living, commercial activities, degree of danger and security category."
The governors were ordered to keep a close eye on Sephardic Jews, as their language and appearance enabled them to blend in with Spanish society.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7...908170,00.html

Another find to rewrite history.

Put here for its 'what if' value.

[Pannonian]

So basically, what Stalin did in Poland was not different to what Allies did in Italy, and according to Glantz, Red Army was indeed at the end of their logistical supply and was unable to mount a huge operation of capturing a huge city such as Warsaw at such short notice...

According to Montefiore, Stalin was worried about the reaction of his allies, and pressed his generals (ie. Rokossovsky) to make that extra push, but was told it wasn't possible. Stopping short of Warsaw was a military decision, not a politically-based one.

[Cyclops]

Interesting hypothetical.

I suggest Germany would've collapsed immediately if Hitler had been killed in any of the mid-late war attempts (ie post Stalingrad).

The power lines in the German hierarchy all ran to Hitler's desk. By 1944 his principle heir Goering was in disgrace and high on drugs and the next in line Himmler was less able and more disliked by the generals than Hitler himself. I don't think there was a coherent power structure much beyond "obey the Fuhrer".

I think the Wehrmacht, SS and Luftwaffe forces would've been at one another's throats in the ensuing power struggle. The winner (the Wehrmacht surely) would have the honour of surrendering the reich to the first comer.

The notion of Germans killing Hitler was a suicidal one once the war was on. The punchline is Manhattan: if a seperate peace was just a pause on one front to finish the other before sweeping west again, then its nuclear winter on the Oder. Should Stalin prevail, make that nuclear winter in Moscow.

A seperate peace post-Stalingrad is pretty much unbelievable for any of the Allies. There were large portions of the German machine simply unable to surrender or make peace with anyone. The commitment ot race extermination, slave labour and total conquest meant total victory or total defeat was the only way to stop the fighting. If one part of the German machine made peace there were other parts that would simply break off and keep fighting.

In the unlikely event that a seperate peace occured in the West (leaving Germany in a fit state to fight that is) then Stalin is in massive trouble. A half dead Werhmacht is a match for the 3/4 dead Red Army.

I believe even in the worst months of Bagration the Germans still outfought the Russians "man-for-man": IIRC there were only 4 months in WW2 when German losses on the Ostfront exceeded Soviet: Feb 1942 (last collapse of the Stalingrad Kessel) and then Jan or Feb-Mar 1945. 70 extra divisions including a lot of armour would stop the Soviet advance I'd guess.

The economic cost of a seperate peace for Germany would be prohibitively high but if lend-lease ended I suppose there would be significant pain for Stalin too...

Whoever prevailed after a seperate peace then surely it would mean more war. The Soviets stumbled to the line in 1945 with manpower bled out and desperate for resources. A rested Allied bloc would find the challenge and provocation of Soviets in Mittel Europe irresistable, and a victorious German regime (either Nazi or Military junta) more so.

Patton might've got to spit on the Kremlin...the USAAF would've got him there.

[Brenus]

“A half dead Werhmacht is a match for the 3/4 dead Red Army.” Err, never. Germany succeeded some in some defensive battle, but in 1944, the Red Army had definitively the upper hand both in men and material.
The battle of Budapest would show your assertion a little bit exaggerated (24 hours to re-take what took 10 days for the German to take).

“lend-lease ended I suppose there would be significant pain for Stalin too...”, Not any more, as the help in logistic was not as vital in 1944 than in 1941-1942.

“The Soviets stumbled to the line in 1945 with manpower bled out and desperate for resources”
?. Did you read about the Siege of Berlin? What the Soviets were able to deploy in order to take Berlin before the 1st of May?

“A rested Allied bloc would find the challenge and provocation of Soviets in Mittel Europe irresistable, and a victorious German regime (either Nazi or Military junta) more so.”
Do you means that the Allies who had difficulties to win against mostly 2nd Rank German Division in France would have won in engaging the Red Army who defeated the most successful and most dangerous German Troops at the pick of the German Power, helped by numerous allies and well supplied?
I doubt that the Sherman would have many chances against the T 34/85, a JSU or KV 85. I have no doubt about the Allies soldiers’ courage, but I do think they were no match for the Red Army soldiers.
Then, in case of war between USSR and others Allies (and which ones?) what about the inevitable sabotage on the rear by the Communist Parties in France or Italy…
Would Tito’s Yugoslavia allowed the Red Army to cross then to attack Italy? And provide naval bases and Airfields?

“Patton might've got to spit on the Kremlin...the USAAF would've got him there.”: Oh. How? What the German didn’t succeeded to do in attacking by surprise a completely demoralised army (thanks to Stalin’s purges) with a mostly obsolete material and no capable Generals the Western Allies, some really fresh in the fight, speaking different languages and with less man power and lesser material would do? Yeah, right.
The Allies had one Patton. The Russian have Zhukov, Rokosovsky, Koniev, Vatutine, etc. What was a general under supervision in the Western Allies was what was at the Head of the Red Army.
The Allies would have been crushed (Red Army: 41.600 artillery pieces just for Berlin!!!!).
Facing this kind of fire power, the US and Allies would have difficulties to sustain the front. Then they would have to face not 2nd hand formations, by the elite of the Red Army, Red Guards and their superior material…
The Allies tanks out-numbered the German on the Western Front but this wouldn't be possible on the new eastern front. So, the only tanks able to face the KV, T 34 or JS would be the German tanks, which can’t be produced in mass. Even if the US decided to change their production chain from Sherman to Tiger or Panther, time would run out fast.

I suspect that Patton would have been thrown in the Atlantic and Europe would have been all under Communism rule for quite a long time…

You over-estimated the Air Power...

[PanzerJaeger]

You over-estimated the Air Power...

Agreed. It was not at all what some make it out to be.

[Tsar Alexsandr]

I think the war would have ended sooner. But it would leave a lot of problems. The allies would want terms from Germany, and Germany might not be willing to meet them. So the war could have carried on even without the psychopath. But I do believe a peace could be agreed upon. Russia under Stalin would be un-predictable. Maybe a whole new war would have sparked due to Germany's change of government?

[The Lurker Below]

was it ever known what the would be assassins intent was? were they hoping to attempt some diplomacy? did they simply want to conduct the war on their own terms? killing the chief is just a step, is their ultimate goal known?

[Cyclops]

I take the point that there's a pro Patton myth that he was the best and Shermans were invincible, whereas in fact he was possibly a merely competent commander (and insane) and Shermans were inferior and disliked by their own crews.

“A half dead Werhmacht is a match for the 3/4 dead Red Army.” Err, never. Germany succeeded some in some defensive battle, but in 1944, the Red Army had definitively the upper hand both in men and material.
The battle of Budapest would show your assertion a little bit exaggerated (24 hours to re-take what took 10 days for the German to take)....

I believe Soviet manpower was at an end in 1945 and factory capacity was being closed just to keep the increasingly mechanised Red Army up to scratch.

I believe the Red Army was smaller in 1945 than in 1939. Stalin could not keep his army at its great size and keep his war machine going.

I believe the brilliant advances in late 1943-1944 against army group centre and then the Balkans were mostly punching into thin air: the Soviet leaders sensibly "hit them where they weren't" and avoided concentrations like Warsaw and Courland.

Even then the Soviets were bleeding massively. Even when they decisively held the upper hand they bled like stuck pigs, and I believe the bood was almost all gone.

In the highly unlikely scenario that 70 divisions from France and more from Italy and the Balkans could be switched East I think the Russians might've been stopped before they reached Germany, or even before they cleared the pre 1939 Soviet frontiers completely.

Just a guess.

“lend-lease ended I suppose there would be significant pain for Stalin too...”, Not any more, as the help in logistic was not as vital in 1944 than in 1941-1942....

Fair enough, I guess all the trucks etc helped in the "dark days" pre-Stalingrad. I think allied strategic bombing might cause enormous problems for supply chain over a thousand mile long stretching back to the Moscow basin. Bear in mind it paralysed the Werhmacht less than 500 miles from the Ruhr.

“The Soviets stumbled to the line in 1945 with manpower bled out and desperate for resources”
?. Did you read about the Siege of Berlin? What the Soviets were able to deploy in order to take Berlin before the 1st of May?...

Yes. I also read they were shutting factories to do that. The extraordinary scrifices of the Soviets cannot be overstated, they lost nearly a whole generation of men.

“A rested Allied bloc would find the challenge and provocation of Soviets in Mittel Europe irresistable, and a victorious German regime (either Nazi or Military junta) more so.”
Do you means that the Allies who had difficulties to win against mostly 2nd Rank German Division in France would have won in engaging the Red Army who defeated the most successful and most dangerous German Troops at the pick of the German Power, helped by numerous allies and well supplied?
I doubt that the Sherman would have many chances against the T 34/85, a JSU or KV 85. I have no doubt about the Allies soldiers’ courage, but I do think they were no match for the Red Army soldiers.
Then, in case of war between USSR and others Allies (and which ones?) what about the inevitable sabotage on the rear by the Communist Parties in France or Italy…
Would Tito’s Yugoslavia allowed the Red Army to cross then to attack Italy? And provide naval bases and Airfields?...

All good points. In particular I agree that the Soviet army was a deadly, well lead and experienced force with excellent equipment by 1945. if the "second round" had happened in 1945-46 then Europe would've been reduced to ashes.

I think the Western Allies made up for a multude of tactical and tanknical (the "zippo" Sherman) sins with superb airsupport and massive supply capacity.

I think Great Britian was committed to war against a single power in Europe, whoever that was. I think the USA had 2 nukes and a strong willingness to use them.

“Patton might've got to spit on the Kremlin...the USAAF would've got him there.”: Oh. How? What the German didn’t succeeded to do in attacking by surprise a completely demoralised army (thanks to Stalin’s purges) with a mostly obsolete material and no capable Generals the Western Allies, some really fresh in the fight, speaking different languages and with less man power and lesser material would do? Yeah, right.
The Allies had one Patton. The Russian have Zhukov, Rokosovsky, Koniev, Vatutine, etc. What was a general under supervision in the Western Allies was what was at the Head of the Red Army.
The Allies would have been crushed (Red Army: 41.600 artillery pieces just for Berlin!!!!).
Facing this kind of fire power, the US and Allies would have difficulties to sustain the front. Then they would have to face not 2nd hand formations, by the elite of the Red Army, Red Guards and their superior material…
The Allies tanks out-numbered the German on the Western Front but this wouldn't be possible on the new eastern front. So, the only tanks able to face the KV, T 34 or JS would be the German tanks, which can’t be produced in mass. Even if the US decided to change their production chain from Sherman to Tiger or Panther, time would run out fast....

I agree the allies would probably have had to forgo war crimes trials to fill tank division ranks, and if they wanted to win tank battles then they'd need better tanks than Shermans.

I doubt they could win if they were fighting on open plains where vastly superior Soviet numbers and experience would destroy them.

Ib think if the Soviets were to win though they would have to do it extremely quickly.

USA went into the war with a "small" 80 division army. They had production capacity and manpower to spare. Britain was wrung out by the war but in no way was it as damaged as the Soviet Union.

If this unlikely scenario played out I imagine there'd be really savage hard fought wins along the line to the Soviets but their supply situation would be untenable in the face of Allied air superiority. Their forces would have the same options as the Germans 1943-1945 had in the west: few or no replacements, unable to attack except in short "no fly" periods and run out of fuel, or withdraw painfully, or sit in place and be slowly surrounded.

I suspect that Patton would have been thrown in the Atlantic and Europe would have been all under Communism rule for quite a long time…...

2 nukes in the hand and more in the pipeline (albeit a year or more away) says Stalin would not live to see that happen.

I quite agree the Soviet army was way too strong for the allies, but so was the German army.

Air superiority allowed D-Day, a ludicrous amphibious operation to succeed and prevented any meaningful response (bar a slow painful retreat).

You over-estimated the Air Power...

Every successful advance in WW2 was predicated on air superiority, from Barbarossa to Little Saturn to Bagration to Overlord. Zitadelle failed without air superiority, Typhoon cost Stalin far more than it cost Hitler without air superiority, Big Saturn was cut up when it out ran air-support. There are many other factors but air was a non-negotiable pre-condition to success.

The pacific war was essentially an air war conducted over the sea.

Another aspect is this: WW2 was ultimately a materielschlacht. The Nazis succeeded through loony surprise attacks with superbly organised but slightly under-resourced forces. The Soviets and allies ground them down.

I think the Allies had more grind left in them by 1945, but I think it would be a horror story whoever won.

[Tsar Alexsandr]

was it ever known what the would be assassins intent was? were they hoping to attempt some diplomacy? did they simply want to conduct the war on their own terms? killing the chief is just a step, is their ultimate goal known?

Hitler was called a criminal by the conspirators and by Erwin Rommel. They sought to end his criminal regime, and take control of Germany themselves. Or, that's what it seems like. Either way it'd be better than Hitler in charge.

[cegorach]

Elections in Poland occupy vast part of my spare time, but since I am already here (didn't log in for two weeks - I think) I will quickly refute some ideas which emerged in this thread.

[cegorach]

About the subject.

Hitler's termination would create shockwaves in Eastern Europe provided that no replacement was quickly found - which frankly was impossible.

I'd say a sort of I WW scenario could be replayed, but with whole nations quickly changing sides.

Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria are prime suspects in this case - I highly dout that it would be possible to occupy Hungary as it historically happened.
That would leave entire armies stranded in the south-east.

In Poland I am quite certain that the Uprising in 1944 would be successful.

It is nice that some people learnt there was any, but should be aware of the size of the entire movement - in addition to Warsaw Home Army launched over 20 similar actions in other places and majority was successful from military point of view e.g. Wilno (Vilnius), Lublin, Lwów (L'viv) were controlled by the Home Army for some time - and red Army launched no actions against those forces, NKVD did.

Anyway that was eastern half of Poland so what about western? Home Army numbered over 200 000 soldiers in this area and with Germany out of action in a way it would be a force with some combat value, especially considering it would be supported by civilian administration which was quickly recreated in 'our' history so it would be in this timeline.

I am talking about legal government taking power> Legal, recognised, supported by ALL political parties in Poland from right-wing nationalists to socialists and Jewish Bund and by the people of Poland.

So called 'Lublin commitee' was a rough collection of spooks, exiled comunists who survived Stalins liquidation of the communist party (small already) and various opportunists and ordinary traitors.
Really - I made extensive research recently from about 50 high commanders in Soviet controlled Polish Army only 3-4 were Poles from Poland with no incriminating past unlike for example future marschal of Poland Michał Rola-Żymierski who was discharged from the Polish Army after a corruption scandal and in 1932 became a NKVD agent attempting to provide information about Poland's defensive plans against the SU.

In other words - government supported by the people vs. bunch of guys noone knows or recognises transported in suitcases and ready to sign anything - just like they didn't protest in 1939 in any way.

The key moves would be political. Soviet offensive strenght was mostly spent in July in Poland after they suffered defeat close to Rembertów (to the east of Warsaw) and if the Allies acted quickly area to the west of the Vistula would be easily secured.

Frankly there were three divisions already there in a form of Hungarian corps including elite 1st Hussar Division who historically attempted to prepare an agreement with the Allies to join the Poles in 1944 as so called 'Legion of st. Stephen' and who for many reasons would be a great asset in the area.

If Polish government in exile would show its presence in Poland quickly - in a form of some notable character travelling through German airspace for example, this together with strong presence of the Home Army and united smaller organisations, Hungarians, and civilian administration should be enough to secure this area.

I strongly doubt that Stalin would dare to advance more than to the great natural obstacle which is the Vistula river. In any case from logistical reasons it would be possible only in a limited manner and rather not worth not trying to go for something else instead - e.g. Romanian oil.

After that?

Eastern Prussia would be divided since destruction of Prussia was one of goals which would be easy to achive, wouldn't hurt Germany so much, would be perceived as important to secure future peace and because the Soviets would be able to advance out there.

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia - occupied and annexed. Finland - not sure, maybe would be annexed to save some wounded pride.
Norway - maybe northern part would be annexed as well - after all if you can create Moldavians in a month, so much you can do with 'Soviet Norwegians' - why not?

Romania - tricky, but Stalin would like it and there was alread an army concentrating and ready to attack.

Bulgaria - probably sovietised because the British would be busy in Greece, but maybe they could count on a form of 'finlandisation' - after all they were not even at war with the Soviet Union.

Hungary - most likely saved.

Yugoslavia - Tito in power, but most likely more moderate. Albania - maybe as a part of Yugoslavia or a UN protectorate for a time - if the UN would be formed.


Czechoslovakia - probably spared sovietisation, but certainly would lose Ruthenia. In worst case scenario part of Slovakia might be grabbed and made a 'socialist' state as well.

Poland - two state solution.

One Poland with the capital in Warsaw with Upper Silesia, Greater Poland and (obviously) Danzig + maybe something else Poles could grab quickly e.g. coastal towns such as Słupsk and silesian Opole - Breslau was too large and too far away, and noone really wanted it.


Eastern with capital in Lublin or Lwów (L'viv) - Stalin really didn't care much about the nonsense with the Curzon line and he would need something to give this annoying creation - Lwów and Grodno would be perfect. Przemyśl would be cleansed from Ukrainians, so would Volhynia and Wilno (Vilnius) from Poles which would be 'given' Ukraine and Lithuania.

Borders - really similar to R-M Pact according to the agreement in August 1939 (so along the river), maybe 'eastern Poland' would get some ex-German port e.g. Elbig because Koenigsberg would be too important for any suprisses such as III WW.

Would be eastern Poland 'independent' or annexed? I'd say the first after all it was still in theory only allied country unlike 'aggressors' such Romania or Finland. besides we have the entire German case as an example we can use.


Unification? Maybe in 1989 after the fall of border wall dividing western and eastern Warsaw?





@Brenus

Well, you put a moral judgement on a political decision.
Was Stalin cynical? Most probably, however the decision to halt (if it was a decision as the Russian claim they were at their logistical chain end so they couldn’t push forward –this wouldn’t explain the lack of support in ammunition and weapons/air support) was a pure political –perhaps immoral- decision.

I'd leave the entire moral/immoral thing to a different discussion or at all because there is no morality which allowed something like this. After all trucks were used, but to transport arrested AK soldiers in eastern Warsaw while western fought.
Even Soviet fighters didn't show up untill late September.
In general - leave it because it is impossible to defend Stalins actions on any rational and moral grounds.

From the Russian point of view, Poland was always an enemy.

Soviet in this case - Russia is not the Soviet Union which included also Georgia, Ukraine, Belorus etc.

From the Communist point of view, same: The Polish Dictator in charge prior 1939 was openly anti-communist and even supported Germany policy during the Spanish Civil War.

Eeeee.... Not really.

First of all there was noone you could even call a dictator. Piłsudski died in 1935 so BEFORE the war started, besides calling him a dictator is problematic a bit.

Second - not anti-communist but not communist. That the communist tend to treat everyone else as enemy is really noone fault.

Communist party hovewer posed some danger to the security of the state and its existence - politically it was the ONLY entity which opposed independence of Poland, fought on Soviet side in 1919-20 and even managed to organise a series of terrorist attacks in later years such as the campaign of bombings in 1923.

It really is difficult to have a conversation with people who are attempting to ruin everything.

Nevertheless the party was allowed to exist and in fact was liquidated by Stalin himself, with a vast majority of their members (those high ranking characters who survived were usually in prisons in Poland such as Gomułka).

Third.

Not the authorites, but also a vast majority of population supported Franco which considering the big blob in the east is no suprise, BUT here is a suprise for you - Poland was the second largest arms supplier to the Republic after the Soviet Union!
I can give you numbers if you need them e.g. majority of hand granades used in the war on this side was from Poland, overall there was enough equipment for 10 full divisions.

Of course no political support and no volunteers - but to neither side while 90% of sold equipment exported by Poland was sold to the Republic.
For profit of course which greatly helped in modernization of the Polish Army, but a fact is still something which counts.

Poles in International Brigades mainly came from Polish community - mainly coal miners in France who BTW later joined the Podhalan Brigade fighting in Norway in 1940 whch was supposed to fight the Soviets in Finland.
Those guys actually learnt a thing or two about Soviet commisars and NKVD in Spain so were quite keeon on kicking Soviet asses in Finland.

So Poland was anti-Stalin before Katyn (reason why Katyn happened, somewhere).

That is true, but so was Finland and everyone else for that matter. Stalin simply chose one option which was not rational anyway.

I know that he knew who Poles are - he actaully had some reasonable (completelly immoral and inhuman, but still) ideas in 1920 which were overruled.

There are several examples that he was capable of rational desicions in this matter e.g. didn't decide to place a red star over the white eagle, change the anthem or similar opposing various ideas presented by his lapdogs so he had to understand that his inaction and actions during the Uprising would backfire.

In term of politic and post war politic, and Stalin knew the war was won just didn’t know how much lands he would be able to do.

There is no single approach Stalin followed during the war. First he openly refused Hitler to establish any form of 'rump state' under the name of Poland.
Next he annexes the eastern territories of Poland (sorry no bullshit about 'former Russian territories would hold here). Later he orders the Katyn 'solution'.
And after that he suddenly moves to create a rifle division from Poles to be sent to occupied territories of Poland - in early 1941.

I'd call his approach flexible with no obvious long term goal, even despite he openly hated Poles (several example in 'the Court of the red Tzar') and knew history well.


About territories - he actually opposed ideas to move Ukrainian SRR's border to the San river (so including mainly Ukrainian Przemyśl he got in 1939) or annexing Białystok with its sizable Belorussian minority claimed Russian by Lenin in 1918

So resolving the Polish political future in letting the Germans to eradicate part of the Polish elite and in the same time denying to the anti-communist Partisan a propaganda victory in liberating their Capital was a typical communist decision.

That is definetely true, but also typically stupid.
For later 45 years it was another recent minefield which required considerable resources and would backfire if Poland was not sandwitched in some way.

No danger of German revanchism + Katyn and the failure of the Uprising = anger directed at Moscow and 'saddling the cow' was as Uncle Joe already said impossible.

More clever would be to use Czechoslovakian scenario - after all German occupation was not a sunny day in a park so there would be some ground to built some support for the Soviets in the future.

That would be more clever and from my point of view more dangerous.


I guess he either overestimated Poles or underestimated them.

Recently I've read interesting interview with a Russian historian from Memorial organisation who explained Katyn as extermination of elite which in Stalin's eyes would be a seed of Poland whenever they came so whatever it would be - Siberia, Poland or Venus.
In this light not supporting Warsaw was a bit a gamble - he might think that let's say 1/4 was eliminated in Katyn, 1/4 is in London (more in Scotland actually) and Italy with Anders, 1/4 removed Germans and 1/4 is there in Warsaw.

Maybe together with loyal reports about 'thousands' of communist fighters ready to strike (indeed there were thousands - 300 in Warsaw, c. 6-18 000 overall compared to 600 000+ in the Underground) he thought it is almost there and everything is done...

But allowing a million large capital to be literally completely destroyed is something people tend to remember.

What I learned in studying another Communist war (Indochina) is the Communists always favour the political (long term) effect even in a war. If a defeat gave them upper hand in the propaganda/media war, they will scarify men in order to achieve it.
If you judge Stalin’s decision from this, this decision makes sense.
Not a cynical decision but a plain battle field full of sense decision.

Only if we take into account the world they were living in.
The world where everyone is conspiring against you, where multilayered paranoia supports certain decision and the state aparatus provides proofs that Switzerland is imparialist power trying to overthrow Soviet government.

Why? Because some 'duce' somewhere said so and any agent's report, any confession which didn't support it could end up badly for the agent or the persecutor.

So according to this world view it is indeed clever, but fails in reality which doesn't realise it should behave as some guy wrote in his report.






And now - really guys, this view is already obsolate. August can be explained, but September cannot - while complete lack of any other support or allowing such is just impossible to defend.

@Sarmatian
So basically, what Stalin did in Poland was not different to what Allies did in Italy, and according to Glantz, Red Army was indeed at the end of their logistical supply and was unable to mount a huge operation of capturing a huge city such as Warsaw at such short notice...

Capture from whom?

I wish I could imagine German troops defending Warsaw in August-September 1944, but I cannot.

@Pannonian

According to Montefiore, Stalin was worried about the reaction of his allies, and pressed his generals (ie. Rokossovsky) to make that extra push, but was told it wasn't possible. Stopping short of Warsaw was a military decision, not a politically-based one.

In July and August.

Not in September when eastern Warsaw was occupied quickly.

In any case even in August it was still possible because similar operations were launched later during the war in Slovakia and Hungary because political decisions were different.
Hard, but possible to link with the capital or endanger German positions out there with later success in mind.






@Panzerjeager

Stalin had the largest army in Europe. He had far greater quantities of armor, artillery and airplanes than Germany. He had brilliant military minds and a sound doctrine. Despite Western historiography, the Soviet military was second only to the Wehrmacht in quality, even in 1941. Due to his intelligent decisions, his brilliant officer corps was systematically murdered by their own leader directly before the war and the vast majority of this force was destroyed by the Germans in the first year of the war, having to be rebuilt from scratch. Stalin's best decision was when he decided to stop making decisions and leave it to the professionals.

My sources aren't Western and they portrait a different picture using Russian data I am afraid.

The Red Army was simply created large too quickly (so for example 80% of tanks would have to be replaced in 1942-43) and never came over numerous problems such as terrible technical support of fast divisions,
In short:

- Soviet paratroopers were numerous, but lacked proper transports, support to continue fighting for longer time and were poorly trained,
- Soviet armor had poor technical support resulting in numerous technical breakdowns in a matter of 24 hours,
- its logistic were very poor, especially fuel was running short very quickly because it was not delievered in time,
- Soviet soldiers were afraid to fight at night resulting in numerous incidents between different divisions camped close to each other identifying their neighbours as enemies with predictable results,
- poor recon of all branches of the military,
- poor training of important personell such as drivers or pilots,
- design flaws of equipment and poor reliability of mass produced weapons especially the tanks which suffered from very poor visibility,

And finally egomaniacs in power. How can you comment Tukhachevsky's plan to invade Poland with 150 000 tanks and 80 000 airplanes presented by him around 1932?
No, the numbers are all ok - he thought it is all all right and reasonable and there were similar 'great minds' everywhere making Stalin rather positively sensible.

And so on and so forth...


Definetely one of top three, but frankly speaking competition isn't too hard... because who else could compete?

Top 8 in 1939 would include Germany, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Poland, United States (because of the navy) probably in that order.
Top 12 in 1938 would also include Czechoslovakia (after Poland), Romania, Yugoslavia, Nationalist China - in no particular order.

[Brenus]

“I'd say a sort of I WW scenario could be replayed, but with whole nations quickly changing sides.”

Would have been so easy? Possibility of civil wars existed.
The Eastern countries are now denying it was even one communist at that time (as “nema comunista” from a song in which Serbia Group Riblja Corba just joke about this new reality in the Serbian Society).
And I have to say your description of the Polish Communists is not encouraging, as it seems that all of them was a real “believer” but just bench of opportunist. I met in Yugoslavia some of them (not Polish, of course) and they seem to be more sincere than what you describe.

And even if, in my view, it would have made the conquest by the Red Army of theses territories even faster. Without Germany support and the stubborn defence from the SS and the Heer, the national armies would have collapse even faster…

“Soviet in this case”. Yes, but same point of view for this one.

“Piłsudski died in 1935 so BEFORE the war started, besides calling him a dictator is problematic a bit.” He did take power by a Coup, didn’t he? So it feats in what I call a dictator. The fact that his system survived is just underlining he was a successful one.

“That the communist tend to treat everyone else as enemy is really noone fault.” Well, was not the truth that all the European Countries saw Communism as an enemy? The Allies intervention in the Russian Civil War against the Communist is hardly a proof a good neighbourhood…
And even the rhetoric used at the time… So, yes the Soviets were paranoid. Indeed, but they had good reason to be.

“That is definitely true, but also typically stupid.” How stupid? To use one enemy to kill another enemy is far from to be stupid. So can you explain you point?

“But allowing a million large capital to be literally completely destroyed is something people tend to remember.” Err, yeah, but it was what Gal. Eisenhower was ready to do for Paris being not Patton releasing the Free French 2nd DB to rescue the Parisians Insurgents as most of them were communist…

“Capture from whom?” Well, he avoided having to answer this question, did he?
One question: You don’t stop, with reasons, to tell Communists were enemies but you, in the same breath, reproach them to act as such.
So, in your view, the communists were at least a bench of traitors and USSR was the ultimate enemy BUT they should have helped the Nationalist Polish to fight the Germans. The ones who when in power put them in jail when they could…
Is there something I missed here?

[KrooK]

So, in your view, the communists were at least a bench of traitors and USSR was the ultimate enemy BUT they should have helped the Nationalist Polish to fight the Germans. The ones who when in power put them in jail when they could…

Sorry Brenus but you are not listenting or don't want to listen.
You are mixind nationalism and patriotism.
Every citizen of Poland, no matter if he likes government or not, is obligated to defend country.
Especially when enemy is sending people to death camps. If citizen does nothing - he is traitor.
Country Army were not polish nationalists - they were polish patriots. Many of them did not agree with
government before ww2 but they were fighting with common enemy.

[Brenus]

“Sorry Brenus but you are not listenting or don't want to listen.
You are mixind nationalism and patriotism”:
No I don’t. You do.

First observation: Cegorah is the one who deny to the Polish communist patriotism, as in his view (as much I understand what he wrote) Communist and Polish can’t do together…
Second observation: What is your point on the German fighting in the rank of the anti-Hitler armies? Or should they fight for Germany? What would be your definition during the WW2 of a Patriotic German?

You can’t in one hand claim that Russians/Communists are enemies of Poland and then reproach to a Russian/Communist not to take advantage of your defeat.
Let face it: The uprising of Warsaw was to deny the Russians/Communist to liberate the town and to establish a pro-Western Government that would be anti-communist as pre-war situation.
So it was logic in Stalin point of view to suspend the offensive and let the German do the dirty job.
I will remind you that in Viet man, the pro-US government cancelled the free elections when it appeared the Communists would have won them. That is politic. You don’t help your enemies….

[Cyclops]

Certainly there was a lot of pressure on Poland from Germany and the Soviets, and choices there were hard ones.

I thnk most communists (Polish and others) were very genuine in their beliefs and opposed Hitler for the good of humanity. Even in Australia (a very wealthy and safe place) we had and have communists who see the evils in our system and strive to fix them: Communism offers an alternative and Stalin seemed to be the agency to achieve this alternative. Australian communists (and I have meet some, young and old) really believe this, and see Stalin's evils as a mixture of "well nobodies perfect" and "he's been disparaged by propagandists".

Stalin's deal with Hitler would've been devastating to many Polish Communists: partition was almost every Pole's nightmare. The difficulty in accepting help or direct rule from Moscow would have taxed many hearts, but the real alternatives were few: Hitler and his camps, Stalin and his camps and what? Independence hadn't worked out too well in 1939.

The thing is Communism seemed to offer real internationalism, as opposed to the really viral nationalism which was sending armies to war in the name iof bood and race. I think Communists saw themselves not as traitors but as the acolytes of the new faith bringing the new peace.

I think it was close to a "no-win" situation for all Poles. They went down swinging at least: if there is a Polish national trait (and i know such characterisations are dodgy) its a willingness to stubbornly fight for their beliefs.

I believe Stalin was a cynical murderer and Communism was a cloak for his dictatorship to the same extent Hitler's insane beliefs served his dictatorship. I think Stalin came to rely on Great Russian Nationalism as a principle element in his rule, so the Soviet system was not free of a "Nationalist" element.

I think Stalin's brutal purges in 1937 were the reason there were less attempts on his life from within his military (we hear of none but how would we know?). Hitler purged very few generals and they kept their competence but also some degree of rebelliousness.

If Stalin had not purged the Red Army would they have folded so quickly in 1941? I think they would have held up much better, losing far less ground although still losing millions of dead. it might have shortened the war by a year.

And would there have been more attempts on his life if things went badly? I think so, especially if there was a "Kiev encirclement" type disaster.