Nature of the alliance between Japan and Germany in WW2

[ReluctantSamurai]

And the article also has this to say:

From Japan's point of view the attack on Russia very nearly ruptured the Tripartite Pact on which the Empire was depending for Germany's aid in maintaining good relations with Moscow so as to preclude any threat from Siberia. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans clearly trusted their Axis allies too little to warn them of Barbarossa, even though he had feared the worst since receiving an April report from Ōshima in Berlin that "Germany is confident she can defeat Russsia and she is preparing to fight at any moment." Foreign minister Matsuoka on the other hand vividly tried to convince the Emperor, the cabinet as well as the army staff of an immediate attack on the Soviet Union. However, his colleagues rejected any such proposal, even regarding him as "Hitler's office boy" by now and pointed out to the fact that the Japanese army, with its light and medium tanks, had no intention of taking on Soviet tanks and aircraft until they could be certain that the Wehrmacht had smashed the Red Army to the brink of defeat.

In addition to that article there is this from the Japan Research Documents as quoted in A.D. Coox's book: Nomonhan, Japan against Russia 1939:

The Japanese government, supposedly on intimate terms with the Germans, was visibly confused by the conflicting intelligence reaching it from overseas posts. Whereas Japanese sources in Germany were predicting war with increasing frequency, the Japanese embassy in Russia was steadfastly denying it. With few exceptions, the IJA High Command misjudged matters as badly as did Matsuoka and the foreign ministry. Until the beginning of June 1941 the AGS, suspecting bluff and misinformation, adhered to the opinion that there was a low probability of all-out hostilities in the near future.

It seems clear to me that despite a general "feeling" of wanting Japanese participation if only for diversionary purposes, Germany kept Japan basically in the dark about its plans.

Given the relative strengths of the Soviet Far Eastern Front and the Kwantung Army as of June 22, 1941, I'm sure the Japanese would've appreciated better advance warning

A more appropriate discussion in terms of relations between Germany and Japan might be: What could Germany offer the Japanese to entice them enough to attack Russia's Far Eastern Front?

[PanzerJaeger]

Well, at least we seem to have dispensed with all but one of the issues in contention.

And the article also has this to say:

"From Japan's point of view the attack on Russia very nearly ruptured the Tripartite Pact on which the Empire was depending for Germany's aid in maintaining good relations with Moscow so as to preclude any threat from Siberia. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans clearly trusted their Axis allies too little to warn them of Barbarossa, even though he had feared the worst since receiving an April report from Ōshima in Berlin that "Germany is confident she can defeat Russsia and she is preparing to fight at any moment." Foreign minister Matsuoka on the other hand vividly tried to convince the Emperor, the cabinet as well as the army staff of an immediate attack on the Soviet Union. However, his colleagues rejected any such proposal, even regarding him as "Hitler's office boy" by now and pointed out to the fact that the Japanese army, with its light and medium tanks, had no intention of taking on Soviet tanks and aircraft until they could be certain that the Wehrmacht had smashed the Red Army to the brink of defeat. "

Which is exactly what I said in my first response to you.

Not exactly. The Japanese leadership were angered because they were not provided the exact date and time of the attack. IIRC, Prime Minister Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans did not trust them enough to warn them ahead of time.

Even in that quotation it says that Oshima reported that:

"Germany is confident she can defeat Russsia and she is preparing to fight at any moment."

Not to mention Hitler's own communiqué 20 days before the invasion which was highlighted earlier.

"It would, of course, be up to Japan to act as it saw fit, but Japan's cooperation in the fight against the Soviet Union would be welcomed if the [Japanese] advance to the south should run into difficulty because of supply and equipment."

In addition to that article there is this from the Japan Research Documents as quoted in A.D. Coox's book: Nomonhan, Japan against Russia 1939:

"The Japanese government, supposedly on intimate terms with the Germans, was visibly confused by the conflicting intelligence reaching it from overseas posts. Whereas Japanese sources in Germany were predicting war with increasing frequency, the Japanese embassy in Russia was steadfastly denying it. With few exceptions, the IJA High Command misjudged matters as badly as did Matsuoka and the foreign ministry. Until the beginning of June 1941 the AGS, suspecting bluff and misinformation, adhered to the opinion that there was a low probability of all-out hostilities in the near future. "

I have not read that book, but it does seem odd to me that the Japanese would give equal weight to their Russian embassy as to their German one in determining German war plans, especially considering the rather obvious signals Germany was sending.

Again, though, you seem to be confusing anger over not knowing of the immediate German war plans with knowledge of German intentions, which was clear nearly a year before the invasion. As I said before, it even caused a rather large debate within the Japanese high command, which is also sourced in the wiki article.

Matsuoka, Ōshima and parts of the Japanese Imperial Army were proponents of "Hokushin", Japan's go north strategy aiming for a coordinated attack with Germany against the USSR and seizing East Siberia. But the Japanese army-dominated military leadership, namely persons like minister of war Hideki Tōjō, were constantly pressured by the Japanese Imperial Navy and, thus, a strong tendency towards "Nanshin" existed already in 1940, meaning to go south and exploiting the weakened European powers by occupying their resource-rich colonies in South-East Asia.

I'm not sure how one could argue that Japan did not know of an upcoming attack on the USSR by Germany if they were having a debate about whether to join in or not.

It seems clear to me that despite a general "feeling" of wanting Japanese participation if only for diversionary purposes, Germany kept Japan basically in the dark about its plans.

That strikes to the heart of the issue. If you define "in the dark" as not knowing the immediate time and date of the attack, then yes indeed they were. As I said in my original response to this thread, there was no coordination between the two nations at that level. If you define "in the dark" as not knowing that Germany wanted to attack the USSR in '41, then no, they were not.

[Meneldil]

I pretty sure Ian Kershaw's Fateful Choices mentions that the Japanese were well aware that Hitler was going to invade the SU but didn't know the exact time. And as PJ said, a large part of the army was in favor of creating a front on the eastern border of Russia.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Again, though, you seem to be confusing anger over not knowing of the immediate German war plans with knowledge of German intentions, which was clear nearly a year before the invasion.

No confusion on my part. The Japanese AGS was receiving mixed information from its intelligence and didn't know what was misinformation and what was not.

And as PJ said, a large part of the army was in favor of creating a front on the eastern border of Russia.

The staff of the Kwantung Army was in favor of such a thing, but there were just as many in the AGS that wanted no part of tangling with the Soviets again in light of the thrashing at Khalkin Gol.

In any case, the alliance with Japan was more paper than anything else. But much more could have been made of it had the two been more willing to set common goals. I doubt Germany knew the extent of the butt-thrashing administered by the Soviets at Khalkin Gol and therefore puzzled at the Japanese reluctance to make advances on the Far Eastern Front. I also don't think Germany realized the dire predicament Japan was in considering oil supplies. After all, that was the deciding factor for the Japanese to invade Indochina and the DEI.

I've always thought that if syn-fuel technology had been offered to the Japanese in return for their cooperation in slicing and dicing the Soviet Union, it just might have been enough to tip the scales. The Japanese had their own syn-fuel program and actually did some very good research on catalysts in the FT process. They also had access to large coal and oil-shale deposits in their Korean and China holdings. Where they failed was in the scale-up from laboratory processing to full-scale production. The impatience of Japanese researchers to get into production as quickly as possible led them to neglect the building of pilot plants to test out production methods. This is where Germany could have helped out the most, having already solved production problems in both the FT process and the high-pressure Bergius method. They also could have shared their research with cobalt-thorium catalysts (the Japanese were consigned to using less efficient iron catalysts due to supply problems) although I'm not sure they had enough to actually supply the Japanese with them.

The biggest problem with this scenario is getting enough plants built and into production quickly enough before Japan runs out of oil.

The Japanese could certainly have made life vastly more difficult for Stalin in the Far East despite the setback at Khalkin Gol. Rather than taking on the Soviets in the semi-arid steppes of Outer Mongolia (which is excellent tank and artillery country), an advance in the Khabarovsk vicinity, which is rugged, heavily forested terrain, plays to the IJA's strength of close combat with infantry. With support from the IJN, Vladivostok could probably have been taken, thereby closing one of the major LL ports to the USSR (which, of course, noone could predict, at the moment). Makes for an interesting scenario, IMHO.

I have not read that book

I highly recommend it. It's the definitive work on the Khalkin Gol incident, and the one most often referenced in other works devoted to that conflict. Be prepared for some serious reading, though. It's nearly 1300 pages You will not find a better sourced or referenced work. The bibliography alone is 70 pages long