Great Power contentions [Archive] - Page 3

Montmorency

07-04-2022, 04:55

It's been so long that I've forgotten what I wanted to post about here. Might have been the role of LDPR fighters.

Unlike the 1930's headcount isn't as important as equipment. You might have noticed that drone warfare is increasingly common and requires few soldiers to oversee.

Wrong lesson. The Ukraine War proves the opposite, that headcount is still essential. One of the worst drags on Russian performance is that they have too few infantry, which is why most of their (successful) assaults have been spearheaded by elite infantry behind masses of untrained separatist conscripts, and most of Ukraine's (successful) defenses have been secured by similar masses of untrained volunteer militias. Until the mythical battlefield of autonomous swarms of drones and rovers emerges, relying on tech solutions (tech-fetishism) is self-destructive unless you're the USA. NATO countries could do worse than establishing robust reserve systems capable of rapidly mass-mobilizing civilians to "mere" moderate competency across all specialties from infantry to intelligence, since "moderate" is always better than "untrained."

Did you miss the part where the UK is going to give another ?1 billion in military aid? What is the EU doing? How many billion? To be fair, the EU has given the Ukraine a piece of paper as opposed to weaponry, tanks, planes etc so I guess that is almost as useful.

Poland alone has delivered more in valuation than the UK. You are deeply underestimating cumulative EU contributions so far, or overestimating British ones, even if everyone's contributions have fallen short of adequate (excepting the Baltic states).

If the UK should be spending on the Armed Forces, it should be on the Navy, since we are an Island and money is extremely limited.

NATO should be developing its doctrine and force structure on the assumption of tight future joint operations, which would be best fitted according to comparative advantage. In that case the UK could invest more in its navy. In the more likely scenario that everyone continues to avoid the hard choices and sovereignty-limiting collaboration that the world's challenges require, the UK would be better off just scrapping their navy and investing most of the returns in anti-shipping platforms and standoff fighters.

The elephant in the room is the dozen countries in between who it might be nice if they could do... something useful. Even if it was giving the USA a load of cash to send over their equipment. Germany is very slowly doing something, but their Defence companies export c. 75% of what they make due to all the red tape.

The sad - though double-edged - reality is that in the 21st-century, high-tech and capitalist-efficient military manufacturing has a lead time of years. Spare capacity does not meaningfully exist, machine tools are irreplaceable, and there is no more suddenly retooling a nail factory and its workforce to produce airplane parts, or whatever. I'm not sure, if the EU and US leaderships had committed in March to stand up a new complex for the Soviet-grade artillery calibers that Ukraine cannot replenish, that they could have under any circumstances reached the production stage before 2023 - and at thousands per month at that. Where basic artillery ammunition is some of the simplest war materiel that exists, behind bullets. If you want spare or scalable capacity, you have to pay for it well beforehand.

Furunculus

07-04-2022, 12:11

Poland alone has delivered more in valuation than the UK. You are deeply underestimating cumulative EU contributions so far, or overestimating British ones, even if everyone's contributions have fallen short of adequate (excepting the Baltic states).

https://twitter.com/radeksikorski/status/1543870366816391168

rory_20_uk

07-04-2022, 13:36

Wrong lesson. The Ukraine War proves the opposite, that headcount is still essential. One of the worst drags on Russian performance is that they have too few infantry, which is why most of their (successful) assaults have been spearheaded by elite infantry behind masses of untrained separatist conscripts, and most of Ukraine's (successful) defenses have been secured by similar masses of untrained volunteer militias. Until the mythical battlefield of autonomous swarms of drones and rovers emerges, relying on tech solutions (tech-fetishism) is self-destructive unless you're the USA. NATO countries could do worse than establishing robust reserve systems capable of rapidly mass-mobilizing civilians to "mere" moderate competency across all specialties from infantry to intelligence, since "moderate" is always better than "untrained."

Poland alone has delivered more in valuation than the UK. You are deeply underestimating cumulative EU contributions so far, or overestimating British ones, even if everyone's contributions have fallen short of adequate (excepting the Baltic states).

NATO should be developing its doctrine and force structure on the assumption of tight future joint operations, which would be best fitted according to comparative advantage. In that case the UK could invest more in its navy. In the more likely scenario that everyone continues to avoid the hard choices and sovereignty-limiting collaboration that the world's challenges require, the UK would be better off just scrapping their navy and investing most of the returns in anti-shipping platforms and standoff fighters.

The sad - though double-edged - reality is that in the 21st-century, high-tech and capitalist-efficient military manufacturing has a lead time of years. Spare capacity does not meaningfully exist, machine tools are irreplaceable, and there is no more suddenly retooling a nail factory and its workforce to produce airplane parts, or whatever. I'm not sure, if the EU and US leaderships had committed in March to stand up a new complex for the Soviet-grade artillery calibers that Ukraine cannot replenish, that they could have under any circumstances reached the production stage before 2023 - and at thousands per month at that. Where basic artillery ammunition is some of the simplest war materiel that exists, behind bullets. If you want spare or scalable capacity, you have to pay for it well beforehand.

I'm 100% civilian so I'll not embarrass myself in arguing the make up of a military army. I was thinking that for a defensive force, a levee en masse armed with anti armour can quickly make attacks extremely costly whereas investing on high tech stuff is all very well and good until the Russian cruise missiles cripple the bases before the next "definitely not a war" happens - you can't disperse tanks / planes / helicopters that much.

So the UK is number 2 in value of aid. Of course another way of looking it is percentage of GDP and then the Baltics and Poland shoot higher as do all the countries who were behind the Iron Curtain. funnily enough. Who isn't high on the list are Germany, France and Italy - the Tin Man, the Lion and the Scarecrow respectively - although all three countries vie for each role. Craven, cowardly apologists and deniers seems so far to be a good summary.

Yes, creating some F-35s out of thin air isn't going to happen overnight. BUT Germany has many (a few hundred I think) tanks that they pretended didn't exist (Rheinmetall had to call bullshit on that one) and I am sure they are not alone in having heavier weapons mothballed that relatively quickly can be brought up to scratch. Certainly in Europe there is no greater threat than Russia - and they'll never do more good than now. The USA National Guard and even the police departments have a vast amount of older equipment which they frankly don't need (in the case of the police, positively shouldn't have) and logistically a lot might be easier to make new than collect some is probably worth the effort. Finally, there is The Rest of the World who have a lot of weaponry, most of it is either Russian or NATO compatible and again could be purchased.

This really shouldn't be something the USA should have to do the heavy lifting on - they are paying for Ukraine's weaponry whilst the EU pays for Russia's. Congress has demanded more troops to be station over in Europe and of course I'm delighted since NATO has increased the number of troops on high alert... without saying and specifics. And high alert is anything from 2-3 days to 6 months this does rather matter.

~:smoking:

spmetla

07-04-2022, 18:57

NATO should be developing its doctrine and force structure on the assumption of tight future joint operations, which would be best fitted according to comparative advantage. In that case the UK could invest more in its navy. In the more likely scenario that everyone continues to avoid the hard choices and sovereignty-limiting collaboration that the world's challenges require, the UK would be better off just scrapping their navy and investing most of the returns in anti-shipping platforms and standoff fighters.

The sad - though double-edged - reality is that in the 21st-century, high-tech and capitalist-efficient military manufacturing has a lead time of years. Spare capacity does not meaningfully exist, machine tools are irreplaceable, and there is no more suddenly retooling a nail factory and its workforce to produce airplane parts, or whatever. I'm not sure, if the EU and US leaderships had committed in March to stand up a new complex for the Soviet-grade artillery calibers that Ukraine cannot replenish, that they could have under any circumstances reached the production stage before 2023 - and at thousands per month at that. Where basic artillery ammunition is some of the simplest war materiel that exists, behind bullets. If you want spare or scalable capacity, you have to pay for it well beforehand.

I think NATO is adjusting correctly to the Russian threat. The UK is investing much more in its Navy and I hope continues to do so, having a capable UK ground force and RAF though are equally important as they provide significant contributions to the Baltic security rotations, which as a nuclear power and as a 1st rate military in quality is significant.
The slow lead time in manufacture is sad and expected, NATO countries would have had to continue maintaining their large stock piles in the post war era and continue to keep manufacturing lines open despite the last 20 years of war being a counter-insurgency focus. No excuse really but people like me that are advocates for a strong defense are usually seen as war mongers and ignored in favor a 'peace dividend.' The stupid but correct logic in a well-armed military for deterrence is that it is doing its job well if it never has to be used for war if the deterrent is credible enough. A hard sell for almost every government which would rather spend money on education and health care which have much more visible returns on investment short of war breaking out.

I think we're seeing the start of a proper Western rearmament though; the corporate cultures being forced to decouple with Russia and probably recalculate their investments in China will see a more polarized and economically independent factions over the next decade, especially as we try and restrain China's demands for its place under the sun.

Yes, creating some F-35s out of thin air isn't going to happen overnight. BUT Germany has many (a few hundred I think) tanks that they pretended didn't exist (Rheinmetall had to call bullshit on that one) and I am sure they are not alone in having heavier weapons mothballed that relatively quickly can be brought up to scratch. Certainly in Europe there is no greater threat than Russia - and they'll never do more good than now.

I think there's some sort of unofficial EU/NATO policy against supplying German tanks, even the older Leopard 1s. I recall about two weeks ago Spain was mulling sending its Leopard 2A4s that have been in long term storage and then backed out with a line of 'they're in too poor shape to send' which is a piss-poor excuse because that really to me means disposable so send them to be refurbished and then onto Ukraine. Same with the older Leo1s, like you wrote, Rheinmetall has quite a few but no okay to send despite having made clear since a few days after Feb 24th that they can be refurbished and sent. The Germans seem to have quite a hang-up about German "Panzers" fighting the Russians in the Ukraine again, simply ludicrous.
At least the older warsaw era inventories of eastern and central europe are being cleared out for donation including finally some Slovak MiG-29s while the neighboring countries make up for capability gaps like the Czechs covering air policing for the Slovaks and the Germans providing their own German manned patriots for air defense.

The USA National Guard and even the police departments have a vast amount of older equipment which they frankly don't need (in the case of the police, positively shouldn't have) and logistically a lot might be easier to make new than collect some is probably worth the effort. Finally, there is The Rest of the World who have a lot of weaponry, most of it is either Russian or NATO compatible and again could be purchased.
As a member of the National Guard, I'd rather not give away the functioning equipment we have, the US Army doesn't use us as a last resource branch but rather an 'operational' militia/reserve force so every four years each Brigade deploys in some capacity (training or peacekeeping missions due to the lack of wars now) so we actually need that equipment. Also, as the US is the major deterrent force for the 1st World in Europe and East Asia it's best we don't erode our capability too much.
As for police forces, well for one the equipment they have that is 'military' are really just wheeled APCs, tall ones at that to be good against mines/IEDs, honestly not very good for a straight up fight like in Ukraine. There's no police armor or artillery forces (let's hope we stay sane and keep it that way). There's also the thing that even if they had good equipment for Ukraine that it'd be owned at the County or State level and not within the capability of the Federal government to gift to a foreign power.

If it were up to me there'd be Ukrainian pilots training on export versions of the F-16s, JAS-39 Gripens, Leopard 2A4s- 2A6s, CV-90s and Marders, as well all older cold war stock Leopard 1s and M60s MBTs while continuing the supply of rocket and cannon artillery in all forms. Former warsaw bloc members of NATO probably don't have the manufacturing capability for boosting production of ammo and spare parts in the quantity needed by Ukraine so I think we need to try and switch them to NATO equipment during the war so that the effort can be sustained longer.

This really shouldn't be something the USA should have to do the heavy lifting on - they are paying for Ukraine's weaponry whilst the EU pays for Russia's.
I think it is key though that the US continues to do the heavy lifting as it is the least vulnerable to Russia's hydro-carbon diplomacy and has the benefit of everything we do for Ukraine is watched by Beijing in regard to gauging US support for Taiwan. Europe's weening of Russian energy should have started eight years ago but better late than never and hopefully the promised investments in defense (especially Germany) lead to a revamping of much atrophied industries.

EDIT:
Excellent look at the problems of German rearmament.
https://youtu.be/8jDUVtUA7rg

Montmorency

07-04-2022, 23:24

I'm 100% civilian so I'll not embarrass myself in arguing the make up of a military army. I was thinking that for a defensive force, a levee en masse armed with anti armour can quickly make attacks extremely costly whereas investing on high tech stuff is all very well and good until the Russian cruise missiles cripple the bases before the next "definitely not a war" happens - you can't disperse tanks / planes / helicopters that much.

Notably, Russia has fired up to 3000 (?) ballistic, cruise, anti-ship, and anti-radar missiles at Ukrainian ground targets over 4 months. Just Ukraine. We have relearned the lesson that strategic bombardment must be truly massive in scale - much more than a few thousand missiles - or concentrated with other means in a short timespan to effect more than a nuisance to the target (*cough*Tomahawks*cough*).

So believe me, even a thousand Russian (conventional) missiles spread across all of NATO, to the exhaustion of their stocks, would hardly be worth noticing beyond the original media outrage.

I think NATO is adjusting correctly to the Russian threat. The UK is investing much more in its Navy and I hope continues to do so, having a capable UK ground force and RAF though are equally important as they provide significant contributions to the Baltic security rotations, which as a nuclear power and as a 1st rate military in quality is significant.
The slow lead time in manufacture is sad and expected, NATO countries would have had to continue maintaining their large stock piles in the post war era and continue to keep manufacturing lines open despite the last 20 years of war being a counter-insurgency focus. No excuse really but people like me that are advocates for a strong defense are usually seen as war mongers and ignored in favor a 'peace dividend.' The stupid but correct logic in a well-armed military for deterrence is that it is doing its job well if it never has to be used for war if the deterrent is credible enough. A hard sell for almost every government which would rather spend money on education and health care which have much more visible returns on investment short of war breaking out.

Cumulative armament did of course make this war feasible, as it did the world wars... Russia can never escalate from saber rattling in the absence of its enormous Soviet-era stockpiles of countless thousands of missiles and millions of shells. Europe by and large does not need to expand its armed forces, but it does need effective scalable industrial base and reserve capacities, as well as further doctrinal and command integration. I remain convinced that even the US military can expand its capabilities by reviewing its procurement and doctrine even if it freezes its budget for a decade.

This article (https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/the-army-risks-reasoning-backwards-in-analyzing-ukraine/) makes some good points. Why does Army doctrine remain that

The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy?s armed forces by battle?Decisive results are obtained only by the offensive.?

when the material advantage has shifted back to the defense in war and the US military itself expects all potential peer conflicts to have a defensive nature?

Russia: Defensive battle to exhaust Russian material advantage and initiative until NATO is sufficiently mobilized, then air-based reduction of Russian forces concluding with a ground offensive to push them back into Russian borders (tens to low hundreds of miles of movement).
Taiwan: Minimal contribution of American ground forces.
North Korea: South Korean defensive battle at DMZ fortifications until Northern artillery and airpower are neutralized. I should actually look up what the doctrinal purpose of the current American contingent in South Korea is in the event of a Northern invasion, but I'm pretty sure the South Koreans are supposed to do the bulk of the ground combat, including offensive ops.

No one's stupid enough to license an invasion of Iran, and we're not deploying brigades to Israel or the Indian subcontinent. Does the army expect to bound across the African savannah in the future?

Also, as the US is the major deterrent force for the 1st World in Europe and East Asia it's best we don't erode our capability too much.

See above. Our deterrence factor is not affected by running a deficit in some Army or Marines heavy platforms this decade. Off the top of my head, France has given away ~20% of its Caesar SPGs to Ukraine (12 units), and the US has donated well over a hundred of its 1000 M777 howitzers. Even if I don't hear correctly that the Marines are supposed to transition away from M777s anyway, if we've given this much, we can afford to give more. We're surely not going to miss another hundred artillery pieces anytime.

I think there's some sort of unofficial EU/NATO policy against supplying German tanks, even the older Leopard 1s. I recall about two weeks ago Spain was mulling sending its Leopard 2A4s that have been in long term storage and then backed out with a line of 'they're in too poor shape to send' which is a piss-poor excuse because that really to me means disposable so send them to be refurbished and then onto Ukraine. Same with the older Leo1s, like you wrote, Rheinmetall has quite a few but no okay to send despite having made clear since a few days after Feb 24th that they can be refurbished and sent. The Germans seem to have quite a hang-up about German "Panzers" fighting the Russians in the Ukraine again, simply ludicrous.

AFAIK there's a policy against supplying Leclercs and Challengers and M60s as well.

As for police forces, well for one the equipment they have that is 'military' are really just wheeled APCs, tall ones at that to be good against mines/IEDs, honestly not very good for a straight up fight like in Ukraine.

We've sent Humvees and Bushmasters, it would do.

Former warsaw bloc members of NATO probably don't have the manufacturing capability for boosting production of ammo and spare parts in the quantity needed by Ukraine so I think we need to try and switch them to NATO equipment during the war so that the effort can be sustained longer.

Whether in Europe or the US, some NATO government really should have tried to launch new manufacturing capacity for Soviet-grade ordnance by now, even if it wouldn't come online until next year. There's no sense in leaving Ukraine to shelve hundreds and hundreds of perfectly good pieces for lack of ammo; it just commits to overreliance on NATO platforms, increasing their attrition and war-and-tear.

I think it is key though that the US continues to do the heavy lifting as it is the least vulnerable to Russia's hydro-carbon diplomacy and has the benefit of everything we do for Ukraine is watched by Beijing in regard to gauging US support for Taiwan. Europe's weening of Russian energy should have started eight years ago but better late than never and hopefully the promised investments in defense (especially Germany) lead to a revamping of much atrophied industries.

It would be fine if the US prioritized the military, logistical, and training components, and the EU offered its checkbook for economic sustainment and reconstruction. Financial losses in Europe from this war are very real and could escalate by the end of the year, but Germany should be paying for refugees in Poland and Moldova and the UK should be covering Ukraine's loans (grants). Or just the EU itself (see below). Regardless, I would prefer to see the EU countries collectively or bilaterally taking up the great preponderance of non-military support for Ukraine from now on.

https://twitter.com/radeksikorski/status/1543870366816391168

I had seen this one.

25905

But notice:

25906
25907

Pannonian

07-05-2022, 00:31

And let's not forget that the most valuable component of a multi-million pound tank is not the weapon, the armour, or the engine; it is its crew. Equipment production can be scaled up. Efficiencies can be found to produce things more quickly. But personnel cannot be trained more quickly than they are, and practical experience is priceless. Hence arguments of drawing down manpower because of new warfare doctrine misses the point.

I point anyone who's interested to a youtuber called Nicholas Moran, aka the Chieftain. Employed as a tank historian by World of Tanks, he is also highly prized by the US military, being one of the last active members to have seen action in both an Abrams and Bradley. IIRC he was fast-tracked for promotion to his current rank (Colonel) for precisely this reason: experience of old school warfare.

Montmorency

07-06-2022, 05:59

Shower thought: Technically the history of "drones" is much longer and more winding than this analogy allows... but the timespan between the public emergence of powered flight as a hobbyist technology (~1906) and its mass-industrial application in combat (1915/16) mirrors the trajectory of light/medium drones a century later.

Whoa

https://i.imgur.com/A9uswto.png

And let's not forget that the most valuable component of a multi-million pound tank is not the weapon, the armour, or the engine; it is its crew. Equipment production can be scaled up. Efficiencies can be found to produce things more quickly. But personnel cannot be trained more quickly than they are, and practical experience is priceless. Hence arguments of drawing down manpower because of new warfare doctrine misses the point.

I point anyone who's interested to a youtuber called Nicholas Moran, aka the Chieftain. Employed as a tank historian by World of Tanks, he is also highly prized by the US military, being one of the last active members to have seen action in both an Abrams and Bradley. IIRC he was fast-tracked for promotion to his current rank (Colonel) for precisely this reason: experience of old school warfare.

Mind the balance!

Strictly speaking,what we've seen in this war is that crews and infantry rapidly mustered and trained over a few weeks are good enough to take to field, sometimes to greater effect than ought be expected (e.g. Ukrainian NATO artillery). Yet lead time on new runs or new capacity to produce the weapons systems can drag on into years. (For example, the Russians reportedly have only a handful of machines for boring artillery cannons, and might not be able to produce new ones in the war's timeframe.) A crew or infantryman trained at high expense to exquisite standards in all individual, unit, technical, and combined arms dimensions are a great thing to possess, but they have to be supplemented by mass-mobilized recruits and reservists; remember the fate of the British Regular Army in 1914. These need to have access to equipment and vehicles in order to join the fight in anything but the most trivial application, whether the equipment is sourced from storage or a fresh production line (technically import is another source but not a reliable or deep one these days).

Thus the throughput of equipment to the point of use is the bottleneck in war planning and execution - it remains so after all these years. War evidently hasn't changed enough for quality to decide all.

Which isn't to imply an inevitable return to WW2 levels of output - it's just no longer feasible even in the context of another world war, despite the increase in gross population since then. But maybe it calls for a return to late Cold War military-industrial capacity and storage (such as when global arms manufacturing and surplus permitted Iran and Iraq to source hundreds of new tanks and planes off the market in short order.

The readiest rebuttal is to avoid going too far in the other direction from quality of men and materiel, or you end up in the same place as the Russian Armed Forces - loads of equipment, crappy manpower, and not enough of it. That's why I recommend a European emphasis on mid-grade surge capacity in both.

Of course, one might also point out that the crash course lead time for the stuff that really matters to specifically American expeditionary power - ships and planes - is so hopelessly protracted that all of the above doesn't even matter that much as long as we don't plan on becoming enmeshed in a years-long ground war in Asia...

Pannonian

07-06-2022, 09:57

Shower thought: Technically the history of "drones" is much longer and more winding than this analogy allows... but the timespan between the public emergence of powered flight as a hobbyist technology (~1906) and its mass-industrial application in combat (1915/16) mirrors the trajectory of light/medium drones a century later.

Whoa

https://i.imgur.com/A9uswto.png

Mind the balance!

Strictly speaking,what we've seen in this war is that crews and infantry rapidly mustered and trained over a few weeks are good enough to take to field, sometimes to greater effect than ought be expected (e.g. Ukrainian NATO artillery). Yet lead time on new runs or new capacity to produce the weapons systems can drag on into years. (For example, the Russians reportedly have only a handful of machines for boring artillery cannons, and might not be able to produce new ones in the war's timeframe.) A crew or infantryman trained at high expense to exquisite standards in all individual, unit, technical, and combined arms dimensions are a great thing to possess, but they have to be supplemented by mass-mobilized recruits and reservists; remember the fate of the British Regular Army in 1914. These need to have access to equipment and vehicles in order to join the fight in anything but the most trivial application, whether the equipment is sourced from storage or a fresh production line (technically import is another source but not a reliable or deep one these days).

Thus the throughput of equipment to the point of use is the bottleneck in war planning and execution - it remains so after all these years. War evidently hasn't changed enough for quality to decide all.

Which isn't to imply an inevitable return to WW2 levels of output - it's just no longer feasible even in the context of another world war, despite the increase in gross population since then. But maybe it calls for a return to late Cold War military-industrial capacity and storage (such as when global arms manufacturing and surplus permitted Iran and Iraq to source hundreds of new tanks and planes off the market in short order.

The readiest rebuttal is to avoid going too far in the other direction from quality of men and materiel, or you end up in the same place as the Russian Armed Forces - loads of equipment, crappy manpower, and not enough of it. That's why I recommend a European emphasis on mid-grade surge capacity in both.

Of course, one might also point out that the crash course lead time for the stuff that really matters to specifically American expeditionary power - ships and planes - is so hopelessly protracted that all of the above doesn't even matter that much as long as we don't plan on becoming enmeshed in a years-long ground war in Asia...

Germany produced loads of AA guns in the last year or so of WWII, despite it being known that the best anti-aircraft defence was fighter planes. Why? Because Germany was so short of fuel that it couldn't afford to properly train new pilots. Leading to new pilots being practically cannon fodder for the decently trained allied fighter pilots. Rather than produce more fighter planes that were to be manned by inadequate pilots, they turned instead to AA guns which required lower levels of training to be effective (albeit nowhere near as effective as fighter planes).

Montmorency

07-10-2022, 06:53

lol I substituted the name of the British politician in the other thread

Dailykos has a particular bias in its Ukraine analysis, but there are some useful nuggets, such as that the HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur). Explains why allegedly the Allies don't intend to contribute more than 15 cumulative HIMARS to Ukraine (with up to 12 currently in or on the way to Ukraine).

Meanwhile, news since early May suggested that Excalibur contributions to Ukraine were minimal, but this week's US aid package to Ukraine lists "1000 high-precision 155mm shells", almost certainly Excalibur, so in the context of the dozens of Krab, PzHaubitze 2000, CAESAR, M109 Paladin, and other platforms Ukraine has already received, it seems plausible that the Allies have developed a considerable respect for Ukraine's needs in artillery parity. I don't know if ATACMS rockets for HIMARS (the 300km range ones) have the power to break up the Kerch Strait bridge, but if they do, it would be a fantastic allocation.

You'll probably never get the post on LDPR fighters I once planned to write, but I see ISW noted that "140 thousand" conscripts have been mobilized since the beginning of the war, which presumably does not include the standing separatist armies from the outset. On one hand, Russia has probably exhausted the readily accessible pool of conscripts in occupied Donbass below the level of total war. The population under Russian control must be around 3 million, so they're at half of WW2 Soviet mobilization levels. On the other hand, it means the Ukrainians face over a hundred thousand more separatists than they did at the beginning of the war. Once more, either side would be at a standstill without its respective horde of minimally-trained paramilitaries. Also why I don't think Russia attempts to annex the Donbass unless it can secure an armistice while the full oblasts are under their control; designating them as first-class Russian citizens would come with more legal rights from military coercion.

spmetla

07-11-2022, 04:03

Dailykos has a particular bias in its Ukraine analysis, but there are some useful nuggets, such as that the HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur). Explains why allegedly the Allies don't intend to contribute more than 15 cumulative HIMARS to Ukraine (with up to 12 currently in or on the way to Ukraine).

Certainly, expensive munitions but looking at the ammo depots and C2 nodes hit since these have arrived, I'd say worth the cost. Even with Western support Ukraine won't get a quantitative edge over Russia in artillery but if range and precision are better for Ukraine, they can cause a lot of hurt.

I don't know if ATACMS rockets for HIMARS (the 300km range ones) have the power to break up the Kerch Strait bridge, but if they do, it would be a fantastic allocation.

I agree, however if I were the commander on the Southern front, I'd do night strikes against docked naval ships, subs, and harbor facilities in Sevastapol first alongside their airbases too. This together with a destruction of Kerch Strait bridge would really hurt Russia logistically. I imagine over the next few weeks we'll see a lot of railyards going up in smoke as Russia still seems bound to these for supply. I also think that if the Black Sea fleet ends up forced to hole up along the Caucasus coastline that'd limit the ability to do effective cruise missile or shore bombardment roles if the Ukrainians end up successfully pushing south and east of Kherson.

Curious if we'll see a larger and more successful offensive by Ukraine in the south given that Zelensky has ordered it to be liberated. So far Ukraine hasn't been able to muster the numbers and effects to do more than nibble away at village after village.

Also, curious as to Russia's next offensive, I think they'll preserve what strength they have right now to try and blunt any Ukrainian counter-offensive and then push to take the whole of Donetsk and if possible, push on Mikolayiv.

Fall and winter aren't too far away and I'm worried what further gas supply shenanigans Russia will do to Ukraine and Europe as a whole.

Montmorency

07-11-2022, 04:14

HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur).

I screwed that up, "less than 50 thousand" was supposed to refer to GMLRS; Excalibur inventory is in the 4 digits as far as I know (e.g. IIRC one of the last few years the procurement was just over 900 units).

Pannonian

07-11-2022, 17:04

Certainly, expensive munitions but looking at the ammo depots and C2 nodes hit since these have arrived, I'd say worth the cost. Even with Western support Ukraine won't get a quantitative edge over Russia in artillery but if range and precision are better for Ukraine, they can cause a lot of hurt.

I agree, however if I were the commander on the Southern front, I'd do night strikes against docked naval ships, subs, and harbor facilities in Sevastapol first alongside their airbases too. This together with a destruction of Kerch Strait bridge would really hurt Russia logistically. I imagine over the next few weeks we'll see a lot of railyards going up in smoke as Russia still seems bound to these for supply. I also think that if the Black Sea fleet ends up forced to hole up along the Caucasus coastline that'd limit the ability to do effective cruise missile or shore bombardment roles if the Ukrainians end up successfully pushing south and east of Kherson.

Curious if we'll see a larger and more successful offensive by Ukraine in the south given that Zelensky has ordered it to be liberated. So far Ukraine hasn't been able to muster the numbers and effects to do more than nibble away at village after village.

Also, curious as to Russia's next offensive, I think they'll preserve what strength they have right now to try and blunt any Ukrainian counter-offensive and then push to take the whole of Donetsk and if possible, push on Mikolayiv.

Fall and winter aren't too far away and I'm worried what further gas supply shenanigans Russia will do to Ukraine and Europe as a whole.

What's the most effective way of isolating Crimea, and is it feasible for Ukraine to do it?

Montmorency

07-12-2022, 17:42

A series of (https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/resilient-ukraine) polls by Rating Group show that Ukraine and Russia are now very different societies. Ukraine does not share Vladimir Putin’s complexes about the last 30 years. Over the last decade, positive answers to the question ‘Do you regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991?’ have been on a rising trend in Russia, up from 55% in 2010 to 63% in 2022. In Ukraine, the number was not too far behind in 2010, at 46%; but it is now only 11%. Moreover, under Zelensky and his predecessor, President Petro Poroshenko (2014–19), Ukraine has successfully shifted to a ‘more European’ way of commemorating the Second World War. In contrast to Putin’s pobedobesie (‘victory frenzy’, the obsession with 1945), 80% of Ukrainian respondents defined 9 May as a day for ‘remembrance of war victims’ in 2022, while only 15% saw it as ‘Victory Day’. In 2012, the figures were the other way around in Ukraine: only 18% referred to remembrance, while 74% still thought of victory. Victory in ‘World War Two’, rather than the Great Patriotic War – the Soviet framing – is also placed in a broader and more national context. All historical ‘fighters for independence’ are now placed in the same pantheon, including not only nation-building stalwarts like the Cossack hero Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, but also previously more controversial figures like Ivan Mazepa, who lost the Battle of Poltava in 1709 (up from 44% in 2012 to 76% in 2022); Symon Petliura, the controversial leader of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918–19, who allied with Poland and whose supporters committed pogroms (up from 26% in 2012 to 49% in 2022); and even the interwar nationalist leader Stepan Bandera (up from 22% in 2012 to 74% in 2022).

Reminder of how utterly and irrevocably Putin and the Russian ultranationalists wrecked Slavic unity and, ironically, all positive vestiges of the Soviet legacy.

If one looks at it objectively, Putin is one of the worst Russian leaders of all time. Little needs to be said of the plundering and feudalization of Russia's long-term socioeconomic prospects, but just refer to Russia's foreign relations with its former co-republics.

Belarus: Puppet state, so long as the extremely-unpopular local strongman can be kept in power
Ukraine: Mortal enemy
Baltics: Mortal enemy
Moldova: Worsening relations
Georgia: Adversarial
Armenia: Trapped between Turkey and Azerbaijan, desperate for any Russian assistance, offers little in return
Azerbaijan: Increasingly distant, increasingly self-assertive in the region
Central 'Stans: All openly balancing Russia with China AFAICT

Russia is in a worse position with essentially every former SSR compared to the beginning of Putin's rise to power. To be fair to him, he wasn't alone in devising Russia's course; the entire elite power structure of Russia has long deserved the 1918 treatment.

spmetla

07-13-2022, 19:55

Russia is in a worse position with essentially every former SSR compared to the beginning of Putin's rise to power. To be fair to him, he wasn't alone in devising Russia's course; the entire elite power structure of Russia has long deserved the 1918 treatment.

His fixation on "hard power" and trying to oppose 'the West' instead of use its better aspects for advancement have been really hinderances for Russia's sphere. I don't think he gets that a bit more soft power and using the cultural and historical ties could lead to a much more voluntary set of nations looking to Moscow. He's just gathering allies that are in opposition to the US lead world order, not allies working toward any other goal at all.
Looking at Kazakhstan's recent statements in opposition to recognizing Russia's breakaway 'republics' in Ukraine are a good indicator of how awry the invasion has gone. Even if Putin took all the Ukraine at this point it'd still be a strategic loss as Russia will remain in a poorer position in the world than it was a year ago. It's only a stronger position if he looks at the map of Europe like a 'Hearts of Iron' player which is not realistic for today's world, something that caused most of Europe to completely mistake posturing for negotiations which were actual preparations for invasion. Russia is not North Korea.

The PRC has definately played the game better.

Montmorency

07-15-2022, 05:07

I hear Romania is restarting 152mm production. edyzmedieval

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CH8o9DIIXqI

oooooo

Tangential rant: Let's be frank re: the "simplicity" (cf. quantity) argument that the essayist dismissively touches on. Aircraft, given their cost, numbers, and absolute complexity, are currently just platforms where technology is going to produce more of an edge than in almost any other military application. While for the sake of example there's probably no real procurement, technical, or logistical cost advantage at scale for, say, buying 5 T-64BV over a single T-90M, as ground vehicles the former can probably perform at 80% relative to the latter in a cumulative sense for intended MBT roles. They will both have similar speed, maneuverability, and vulnerability on the full-spectrum modern battlefield, and they both even arm the same 2A46M 125mm cannon. So in abstract there's a case for maintaining a cheap old workhorse for mass mobilization in a domain like armor to supplement the crack gear and personnel.

But if you could substitute a wing, or even two, of F-104 for a squadron of F-35, would you make that choice? The technological leap between second-generation and fifth-generation jet computer and missile technology (and especially stealth where available) is simply incalculably greater than that between second-gen tanks and topline 3rd-gen tank armament, armor, and countermeasures, which combat would undoubtedly reveal. What would be the point of, for example, swarming F-104s against a squadron of F-35s if it's not implausible that the F35s can standoff engage and destroy all of the F-104s with zero loss? Because that's what technological disparity can bring in the air.

(These might be videogamish matchup examples - one more than the other - but they serve to illustrate the cross-differences between Quality vs. Quantity branches)

Arguments about the need to recall the lessons of industrial warfare are essential without taking them to literally require a return to thousands of turboprop plane and welded-steel tank units! It just indicates a need to rebalance between desired capabilities and expected aggregate survivability and availability (or lack thereof) in large-scale conflict. Contemporary doctrines will have moved on properly with extant conditions in most respects.

edyzmedieval

07-15-2022, 10:53

I hear Romania is restarting 152mm production. @edyzmedieval (https://forums.totalwar.org/vb/member.php?u=12104)

Correct, we still use the 152mm howitzer so restarting production for those shells is something that's also in our benefit at least temporarily.

ROMARM (Romanian arms manufacturer - owned by the state) is producing a good number of ammo supplies, shells & other equipment, both for old standards (7.62) and also for NATO standards. (5.56)

Montmorency

07-21-2022, 05:35

Surprised Mark Sumner (https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/7/19/2111289/-Ukraine-update-Russian-Navy-bravely-runs-away-FIRMS-isn-t-firm-and-an-unlikely-secret-advance) at DailyKos was the one to put out this notice, but it's welcome.

Early in the invasion of Ukraine, those interested in following the war discovered that they had some friends in high places—places anywhere from 200 to 800 miles above the ground. Not only has intelligence been available in terms of satellite imagery (some of it from free sources), but NASA’s FIRMS Fire Map has become a staple in tracking what’s happening on the front lines and behind the front lines. However, at this point, the value of FIRMS has plummeted and the possibility of misreading this data has reached an all-time high.

The FIRMS Fire Map, which is created from two types of instruments spread across multiple satellites, is intended for tracking exactly what the name implies: fires. Technically, it spots “thermal anomalies” or “hot spots.” The hot spots located by FIRMS infrared tools are points that stand out, temperature-wise, from the background, and have been literal life savers when it comes to tracking wildfires in both the U.S. and around the world. That the FIRMS data also turned out to be aces at picking up flashes from artillery and the explosions of missiles was a happy accident—“happy” only in the sense that it provided much-needed support for people engaged in Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), not for anything actually happening on the ground.

But at this moment, using FIRMS data as an indicator of anything happening in Ukraine takes a good deal more scrutiny and expertise than it did a month ago. Here’s why.

First, take a look at this map of the area in eastern Ukraine.

At first glance this aligns pretty well with what we know is happening when it comes to conflict. Russian forces are trying to get to Bakhmut, near the center of this image, so it makes sense they would be bombarding Ukrainian forces in the area. Ukrainian forces are surely trying to take out Russian artillery. So they’re probably shooting up the backfield. Except … that cluster of shots over near Alchevesk is a good 40km into Russian-held territory. The spots south of Krasnyi Luch are even farther in the red zone. So … High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) seeking out artillery stockpiles?

Before you answer, take a look at this war-torn battlefield.

This looks pretty bad. However, a quick glance at some of the names on this map will show that this is actually on the Romania/Bulgaria border. It’s an area where, so far as anyone knows, Russian artillery is not engaged in shelling towns and not a single HIMARS is firing missiles. Why is the map so spotted with hot spots? Because … hot spots.

First of all, it’s summer. FIRMS is not immune to being thrown off by a reflective surface or toasty bit of asphalt (though the system keeps a list of known/fixed hot spots and filters them out, so sure false spots are transient). Second, it’s dry. So there are actual fires. Some of those hot spots are FIRMS doing its duty and reporting places where trees are ablaze. Third, it’s summer, and it’s hot, and it’s dry. So farmers all over Europe are burning off the stubble left after the harvest of spring crops.

Most of that winter wheat that was greening up Ukraine back in April was harvested in May or June. Farmers like to burn off those fields in the summer to kill off weeds, prevent the spread of diseases, and drive out pests. Burning also helps put some of the nutrients from last year’s crop back into the soil for the next year. In any case, fields in many areas are burned in the summer in preparation for planting in the fall. Take a close-up look at these hot spots, whether in Romania or Ukraine, and the great majority are out in a patchwork of farm fields. And yes, Ukrainian farmers are still farming right through all this mess. Those guys who were towing tanks with their tractors are not going to get intimidated now.

This doesn’t mean that FIRMS is useless. However, it does mean that a casual glance at the FIRMS Fire map is a dangerous way to spot military activity at this time.

This was pretty obvious when I first peeped FIRMS mapping back in March: all of Ukraine, and Europe, was smattered with anomalies. I actually first realized the nature of the interpretive challenge when trying to sort out whether anomalies in the area of occupied Chernobyl were supposed to be reported forest fires or military activity.

But the abuse of FIRMS only seemed to reach epidemic levels over the past month, when a number of commentators, even good ones, were trying to apply facial assessments to FIRMS maps to determine volume of artillery fire in this or that Ukrainian or Russian-held piece of territory. I'm not going to say that's totally illegitimate, but... like with reconstructing fragmented ancient scrolls, one has to be cautious not to exceed what one already knows for sure coming in, yet also refrain from commiting source incest in a circular fashion. FIRMS can more properly be used to corroborate video evidence and ground reporting, or at most suggest the geographical extent of confirmed combat at a tactical level.

Which classic authors or contemporary media properties does this put you in mind of?
https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1548992984946974720

Montmorency

07-23-2022, 04:27

Wonder what role this month's Russia-Iran summit (among other MENA pressure) played in Russia's formal submission to Ukrainian agro exports. Or maybe it's also that Russia wants to restore its own exports and accompanying revenue, on the assumption that expected Ukrainian revenue flow is low enough that it would have been made up by NATO grants/credit anyway in the short term.

spmetla

07-29-2022, 02:32

Pannonian

07-29-2022, 09:15

Montmorency

07-30-2022, 16:04

Nothing too critical in this, just revisiting the use of anti-tank guns that we had discussed a few months ago.

Seems they're being used as indirect fire AT guns, quasi artillery I guess, I guess with the right spotters it can be done. Interesting to see them digging so they breach can recoil enough as AT guns are much lower in profile. At this high angle of fire for an AT gun they should get good penetration of most vehicles assuming its a good hit, even with dated 100mm AT guns.

Guess in a war, guns are guns, best use em.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4HOqLDIDOT4

Notice the reference later in the video to the earlier-discussed practice of commuting to the frontline: "We spend most of the day at work and come back in the evening, take a shower, have dinner, and go to bed... If we're not called up, it's a day off."

I have no idea how AT cannons could be useful as indirect artillery, but then again, we've seen footage of both Russian and Ukrainian tanks in makeshift batteries providing indirect fire (effectiveness unclear to me). Maybe it just lends more support to the argument that the armor arm must evolve back in the direction of the assault gun or SPG archetype.

This war has exposed a lot of categorical myths about the nature of 21st century warfare. Fixed fortifications and semi-trained infantry, tankers, and gunners have all re-emerged to play a fundamental role, with lesser but surprising contributions from anti-tank mines and centralized partisan and stay-behind operations.

Montmorency

07-30-2022, 22:15

Lol. "European Decolonization," Serbian Brotherhood edition. (Yugoslavia is just flatly named Serbia here. Not just Serbia even, but "Serbian Tzarate.")

https://i.imgur.com/WmzPG9q.jpg

Montmorency

07-30-2022, 22:15

...

Pannonian

07-31-2022, 22:46

Notice the reference later in the video to the earlier-discussed practice of commuting to the frontline: "We spend most of the day at work and come back in the evening, take a shower, have dinner, and go to bed... If we're not called up, it's a day off."

I have no idea how AT cannons could be useful as indirect artillery, but then again, we've seen footage of both Russian and Ukrainian tanks in makeshift batteries providing indirect fire (effectiveness unclear to me). Maybe it just lends more support to the argument that the armor arm must evolve back in the direction of the assault gun or SPG archetype.

This war has exposed a lot of categorical myths about the nature of 21st century warfare. Fixed fortifications and semi-trained infantry, tankers, and gunners have all re-emerged to play a fundamental role, with lesser but surprising contributions from anti-tank mines and centralized partisan and stay-behind operations.

Just a note. Stugs in WWII were under the command of artillery, with crews consisting of trained artillerymen, whereas tanks were crewed by tankers. Stug sights included ranges for indirect fire. AFAIK their guns were the same. So my guess is the use of AT guns for indirect fire consists mainly of training.

Montmorency

08-02-2022, 01:09

Another 'D'oh' moment: Why wouldn't AT mines be worth their weight if IEDs are?

Hooahguy

08-02-2022, 01:23

Lol. "European Decolonization," Serbian Brotherhood edition. (Yugoslavia is just flatly named Serbia here. Not just Serbia even, but "Serbian Tzarate.")

*snip*

There's a US version too, which is hilarious.

25955

Unironically Id love to see a Republic of Lakotah. Also its clear that the author knows less than nothing, because a) if it truly was decolonization then it would all be Native land (which at this point I support tbh), and b) the Republic of Mormons would be called Deseret before anything else.

Also France randomly being in there made me laugh. Like what is France going to do with Missouri lol. At least them taking back Louisiana makes sense.

Montmorency

08-02-2022, 02:09

There's a US version too, which is hilarious.

25955

Unironically Id love to see a Republic of Lakotah. Also its clear that the author knows less than nothing, because a) if it truly was decolonization then it would all be Native land (which at this point I support tbh), and b) the Republic of Mormons would be called Deseret before anything else.

Also France randomly being in there made me laugh. Like what is France going to do with Missouri lol. At least them taking back Louisiana makes sense.

Decolonization means the restoration of old colonies. Although it's unclear how this could happen in the United States if the European states are themselves decolonized.

The most egregious history fail is a Confederate States without South Carolina or Georgia.

It's telling that some of the only full countries this account would prefer to exist are a Serbian empire and the Confederate States of America.

Montmorency

08-07-2022, 03:52

Something I don't understand. While I've spend distinctly less time closely following the Ukraine war over the past month, and some analysts such as Henry Schlottman have been disengaged, there has been a lot of commentary about possible redeployments of Russian troops from southern Kharkiv oblast (i.e. Izyum bridgehead/Lyman area) to the general southern theater, with the assessed purpose of providing an operation reserve

As of August 2 JominiW had 12 BTG in the Kherson bridgehead, which is in the realm of reported strength over most of the past 4 months.

Already some Ukrainian government sources (whom I don't deem reliable for such details) claimed 30 BTGs in the Kherson bridgehead since a few days after the first Ukrainian bombardment of the bridges in the area (~July 19).

A less well-known OSINT account (https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1555513448506736640), commonly cross-cited, finds up to 50 BTGs in Kherson oblast alone, with a slight majority cis-Dnistrian.

https://i.imgur.com/IqSZEGs.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/QSqrf2n.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/NeDgNq4.jpg

But this seems unbelievable to me on several counts. First, that RuFor would have transferred so many units deep behind their lines in the south, when the obvious means of reinforcing against an expected offensive, such as in Zaporizhzhia, is to build defenses in depth close to the frontline. Second, that RuFor could have up-to-doubled their fully-formed complement of forces in the Kherson bridgehead either within just a couple of days once the bridges came under fire, or over time after the bridge's ability to support extensive movement, let alone of heavy equipment, had been badly compromised. And does rail capacity to move multiple brigades along a single, single-track line through the south uo to the river even exist? Or if it was by motor transit, such vast convoys would have easily been detected by satellite, presumably to be disseminated throughout the Internet.

Third, though tangentially I believe this analyst is severely lowballing the quantity of separatist combat elements, if there were only a brigade or two left to contest the Bakhmut front against the Ukrainians, RuFor would absolutely not suddenly have retained the combat power to restart the process of gradual territorial gains in the past week.

The reports of Russian retrenchment from the Izyum bridgehead are too much to ignore, but there's something off here. Like, if the embedded analysis were true in describing the allocation of forces between Melitopol and Izyum, then the Ukrainian counteroffensive, whenever that is, would be better off trying to contain RuFor to Kherson province while swinging east to join an eastern advance from Kharkiv to perform a pincer around the entire separatist zone - rather than playing to the expectation of some sort of southern offensive.

Montmorency

08-11-2022, 03:37

Seems the Ukrainians blew up some facilities and at least 8 planes in a Crimean airbase. American and Ukrainian authorities have put forward a number of vague and/or contradictory explanations for how this might have occurred, suggesting Ukraine wants to obscure their capabilities to a degree.

I knew from the beginning of the war that estimating crew or passenger casualties from vehicle losses was going to be tricky. Even when vehicles aren't destroyed or captured when parked with no or minimal crew, even a record of a catastrophically-destroyed vehicle allows the possibility that the explosion occurred at a length from impact, allowing passengers to escape, or maybe even as a followup well after combat subsided. Crews and passengers abandon vehicles for all sorts of reasons, often related to panic - put even a tank under enough machinegun fire or small arms fire, or within some proximity to artillery detonations, and the human element might decide to take their chances elsewhere. (In case you ever feel like cursing a wargame's morale model.)

We've seen some crazy footage of the survivability of tanks. If you're not badly injured or disoriented, even a couple of seconds before detonation or deflagration can be enough to leap out of a hatch, depending on countless unique factors.

This clip might take the cake. A full-mounted BMP takes a pretty serious hit, perhaps from a missile. The front part - engine compartment? - immediately goes up in flames. Yet even so, I count at least 6 soldiers escaping the burning vehicle in decent shape, which amounts to up to an entire mechanized infantry squad associated with a BMP (vehicle crews are drawn from passenger squads) escaping a permanent vehicle writeoff more or less intact.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1557075448198303744

Pannonian

08-11-2022, 04:11

Montmorency

08-17-2022, 02:58

Ukraine might be flexing an ability to carry out attacks deep within Crimea.

If, as the hope goes, these attacks anticipate a large-scale offensive to sever Russian holdings through Zaporizhzhia, then regardless of just how many units RuFor has transferred to the west, one would really hope that the recent actions foreshadow a capability and plan to disable the Kerch Strait bridge with the kickoff. Russia loses perhaps the majority of its supply capacity into Crimea and southern Ukraine in that case. No matter how significant the obstacles to maneuver warfare, "trapping" a large force with a limited logistical chain in Crimea/Kherson genuinely could lead it to 'die on the vine' beneath a campaign of attrition in a way that couldn't be accomplished under extant circumstances.

But as before, if it doesn't develop soon then I don't see how Ukraine can take advantage of the disruption before it's remediated (as many of the logistical issues in Donetsk have been by now).

Montmorency

08-17-2022, 23:51

Good demonstration of the probabilistic nature of fragmentary explosions. Those artillery hazard radii you see are more like 'this can theoretically happen if you're very unlucky.' What I don't understand is why... the subjects act like NPCs.
https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1559619856999268352 [VIDEO]

Pannonian

08-18-2022, 01:32

Montmorency

08-18-2022, 02:31

What do you mean?

*sigh*

A grenade or mortar round fell within a couple meters of every man in a section, leaving one badly wounded. The rest scramble, but almost immediately de-aggro and keep walking as though nothing happened, while the third at least stops to look back at the injured comrade.

Seems like anomalous behavior for humans.

Hooahguy

08-19-2022, 04:29

NPC behavior is exactly what it is. Its a kinder explanation than they just dont give a rats behind about their comrades. Im not sure which is more disturbing tbh.

CrossLOPER

08-19-2022, 18:16

It's very difficult to know how you are going to react, even if you are trained. However, footage like this leads me to believe that they either have not had sufficient training, are exhausted, and/or don't really care. It mostly looks like a total lack of leadership or direction.

Montmorency

08-20-2022, 07:39

Pannonian

08-20-2022, 13:20

Russian tanks in Kyiv (https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/wt2kya/russian_tanks_finally_reached_the_center_of_kyiv/)

CrossLOPER

08-20-2022, 18:01

It's also possible (https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/1559561508803301378) that a dictator likes to screw around with world leaders just to feel important (cf. tthe 5-hour Macron-Putin meeting or whatever it was). Would be hilarious if any of these events had some connection to Trump's Macron dossier.

https://i.imgur.com/CUGmfCS.jpg

I was referring to the preceding posts, but it is indeed alarming that world leaders seem to have difficulty reading human beings. If someone spoke to me that way, I would interpret it as a subtle "f*ck you". I am not sure this is a cultural thing, although Putin's words seem to have been tailored in such a way that a typical western male would receptive.

"I'm at the gym. I'm going to watch the game. I'm just a bro like you. We're buds. Catch you later."

Hooahguy

08-24-2022, 22:18

An excellent article (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/kyiv-battle-ukraine-survival/) about how the Russians were defeated around Kyiv. (if its paywalled let me know).

Montmorency

08-31-2022, 22:01

Seems like Ukraine has launched its expected general offensive in the South. The strategy may be to squeeze the Kherson bridgehead until it runs out of supplies. Other aspects may include bisecting the bridgehead to cut the Kakhovka dam off from Kherson, or to push from Zaporizhzhia toward Tokmak, the only rail junction linking Kherson with occupied Donbass. Almost nothing solid has yet emerged about events on the ground.

The Ukrainian sergeant (https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/30/world/europe/ukrainian-soldiers-weapons-front-line.html) slid the captured Russian rocket launcher into the center of a small room. He was pleased. The weapon was practically brand-new. It had been built in 2020, and its thermobaric warhead was deadly against troops and armored vehicles.

But the sergeant, nicknamed Zmei, had no plans to fire it at advancing Russian soldiers or at a tank trying to burst through his unit’s front line in eastern Ukraine.

Instead, he was going to use it as a bargaining chip.

Within the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, Zmei was not just a lowly sergeant. He was the brigade’s point man for a wartime bartering system among Ukrainian forces. Prevalent along the front line, the exchange operates like a kind of shadow economy, soldiers say, in which units acquire weapons or equipment and trade them for supplies they need urgently.

Most of the bartering involves items captured from Russian troops. Ukrainian soldiers refer to them as “trophies.”

“Usually, the trades are done really fast,” Zmei said last week during an interview in Ukraine’s mineral-rich Donbas region, where the 93rd is now stationed. “Let’s just call it a simplification of bureaucracy.”

“We have hopes for Kyiv,” said Fedir, one of the brigade’s supply sergeants and an understudy of Zmei, referring to military commanders in the capital. “But we rely on ourselves. We aren’t trying to just sit and wait like idiots until Kyiv sends us something.”

Such was the case in early May, when the 93rd — a renowned unit that had fought in almost every major battle of the war — was operating around the Russian-occupied city of Izium. Zmei, who before the war owned a small publishing house that specialized in dark fantasy novels, received an innocuous text message from a nearby Ukrainian commander.

“Hi,” the message read. “Listen, here’s the thing, we have a needless tank, a T-72 a bit damaged.”

“And we’d exchange it for something nice,” the commander added.

[...]

The commander’s requests were modest: a transport truck and a couple of sniper rifles in return for the Russian trophy tank. But Zmei told his customer, “This is too few things for a tank, write down what else you need.” The commander responded that he had plenty of tanks and wanted only the items requested.

When the commander mentioned all the tanks in his unit’s possession, Zmei sensed an opportunity to expand the trade. He wanted more tanks, and noted that the 93rd had foreign-supplied anti-tank missiles and U.S. portable surface-to-air missile systems available for a swap.

“Can get the launchers for a Stinger, NLAWs, various large stuff for a trade — and a lot of that,” Zmei said, referring to some of the Western weapons, which cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece.

Of the more than half-dozen soldiers interviewed for this article, most said that this underground economy was driven by the need to survive. Sometimes, they said, that meant circumventing a clumsy bureaucracy.

Although soldiers said that they were supposed to send captured equipment up the supply chain back to Kyiv, they noted that there was little effort to investigate the underground exchanges, let alone punish anyone for doing it.

In Michael’s squalid kitchen are printouts tacked to the wall listing the Western equipment his battalion desperately needs: encrypted radios, semiautomatic grenade launchers and Polish 155-millimeter howitzers, known as Krabs.

A Krab unit commander named Andriy said that his howitzers were not available for trade, though he might consider a swap if offered a French self-propelled artillery piece in exchange.

The 93rd currently only possesses old Soviet-era artillery pieces that have worn out barrels and are low on ammunition.

“I have to go and buy everything and trade things, and bring it all here,” Michael said.

The same kind of informal trade, or otherwise 'borrowing' of personnel and crewed vehicles, was observed during WW2. But not to this degree, I feel like.

Throughout the war it's been reported of both sides, from Ukrainian militia to Russian Spetsnaz, how heavily they have relied on crowdfunding and individual procurement of basic infantry equipment, drones, and even vehicles.

It's not quite a pre-modern way of war, but it's hard to find a truly applicable modern term, including "capitalist" or "neoliberal." Gamified?

spmetla

09-02-2022, 02:49

Montmorency

09-04-2022, 23:41

Omegalul (https://t.me/rybar/38193): Popular Russian milblogger celebrates an alleged Russian artillery strike against a Ukrainian military hospital (a war crime), hopes that it was deliberate, complains that it wasn't routine for the past 6 months.

We repeat once again: as a result of the strike, the wounded servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were liquidated. [Ed. Formatting from source]

We do not understand why in Syria the field hospitals of Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State were massacred, while in Ukraine only (inshallah) they begin to reach this after six months of SVO. [Ed. Formatting mine]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cY2xBNWrBZ4

But it's no secret what I believe should be done with fascists.

Hooahguy

09-05-2022, 23:29

Been watching it closely too. Wishing them the best of luck, however, if they cannot retake Kherson it bodes ill for their ability to retake any dug in part the Russians hold. Assuming they do take it though it would change the calculus on Russia's part significantly as their 'land-bridge' to Crimea would once again be under threat and the Kherson/Crimea canal could be blocked again further putting the Russians in Crimea in a sorta of siege, especially as artillery gets in range of Crimea itself.

Looking at the videos of the Ukrainian army operating there I'm still of the mind that those older Leo1A5s and Marder1s should be sent over. If the Ukraine has to assault dug in Russian positions supported by Dutch YPR-765s (just modified M113s APCs really) then they'd be much better served by the more capable Marders and the support of light MBTs like the Leo1A5.

Agreed on all points. From the latest maps (https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4) we have, it looks like the Ukrainians are trying to split up Russian forces into a pocket northeast of Kherson while maintaining pressure on the road to Kherson itself. If they can achieve that, it would be a huge blow for Russian forces in the area. Theres a great podcast (https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/into-the-breach-ukraines-counter-offensive-begins/) recently posted about this by people much smarter than me. Only about 30 mins long but very informative and even-keeled. From their analysis the strategy seems to be slow but steady progress forward, with Ukrainians routinely rotating forces to keep them fresh rather than an all-out offensive that would be high-risk, high reward. I also agree with their analysis that this could very well be the decisive offensive of the war. As we head into winter and a European energy crisis sets in (or even a recession), we could be looking at reduced Western support. A Ukrainian victory in Kherson could ensure continued support while a defeat could drive Ukraine to the negotiation table sooner than it might have wanted to.

spmetla

09-06-2022, 09:27

Yeah, the slow steady progress seems a good tactic for Ukraine in this area. Russia is restricted in how it can supply its troops, Ukraine has been excellent in targeting logistical and C2 nodes while Russia hasn't had much to answer to HIMARS. The recent appearance of HARM missiles that work with Ukrainian MiG 29s is a game changer as it allows Ukraine to conduct suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions as well as target Russian counterbattery radars too. That together with the increasing capabilities of Ukrainian air defense and artillery make the idea of Russian victory in the time period of the next few months a none-factor.
Ukraine's lack of armored vehicles though sadly restricts them to only doing this very slow and deliberate creeping offensive. It may get them Kherson and perhaps even cut off Crimea but I can't see how such an approach will work in the east of the country. Ukraine needs more tanks and IFVs to increase their offensive capabilities too though at this point such donations would really only be in time for winter and spring.

Gotta say though, I'm happily surprised at how more or less together the EU has remained during this energy crisis.

Montmorency

09-07-2022, 03:54

I have some old and new thoughts to share on the offensive, but I'll sit on it for another day or two. It seems Ukraine husbanded the resources to at least probe Russian defenses throughout Kharkiv Oblast while advancing in Kherson. Russian bloggers have speculated on a Ukrainian buildup in Kharkiv for a while now, but all simultaneously shat themselves on the 6th so hopefully it's a real dog's dinner for them. Meanwhile, Ukrainian SOF keep raiding across the Siversky Donets in northern Donetsk and vlogging through villages (3 or 4) on the Russian-occupied side.

https://i.imgur.com/mQDXtkq.jpg

According to the latest news, Russia plans to procure millions of rockets and shells from North Korea, which will buy Russia's artillery arm months of stable performance (range for Russian cannon ammunition consumption in 200 days, not counting mortars or wastage, should be 3-7 million according to my mental meta-analysis of estimates). At least it would leave NK as even less of a security concern. We've seen Russia documented dipping into Belarus's depots before; how much did they leave for Lukashenko?

Gets the point across without fiddling with additions to or subtractions from real Chinese defense spending.

https://i.imgur.com/v0LXUYl.jpg

rory_20_uk

09-07-2022, 10:03

It appears that Ukraine have something of an advantage until they reach the river where assaulting will then become much more difficult. Of course I hope that Russia's army shatters and we see mass surrenders etc etc.

I imagine that North Korea can create the low tech munitions that really hasn't massively changed in c. 50 years - and they'd be delighted to be paid in oil / food / vaccines for it. They could send the older stuff from storage which helps them keep their stock nice and shiny. How quickly they can send material is a question - but they can probably prioritise arms trains and even ships would be slow but would work. Again, whether China will use this as a back-door way of supplying Russia (in the well worn "the enemy of my enemy is a problem for later") or whether bleeding Russia's army white is just a good thing and any issues they have with the USA is predominantly a Naval issue.

The best defence of Taiwan is that China would be the proud owner of a large island with almost all infrastructure has been destroyed and millions of shell shocked civilians who are extremely hostile to the new regime, having suffered hideous losses getting there and having widespread unrest in mainland China as so many only children have been killed. Probably all high tech equipment was either destroyed in the invasion or destroyed to prevent China getting it - and of course all company money has long gone abroad. In short, sabre-rattling continues to be more useful than the destabilisation that an invasion would cause - ignoring whether there'd be a wider war and the associated trade embargoes.

~:smoking:

Montmorency

09-07-2022, 22:26

Yeah, it's time. We underestimated Ukraine again.

I wrote the following on the Kherson Offensive almost a week ago for my personal notes.

1. In the end UFOR didn't spring any fancy maneuvers across theaters. It seems analysts were correct to dismiss the existence of such capabilities. This is about as straightforward and limited an offensive as could be designed within organizational constraints while still aiming at any significant objective.

2. There was some discussion as to whether to contemplate these attacks as a "real" offensive or as a Great Raid or as an enhanced shaping operation, but I don't personally see much meaningful distinction at this juncture.

3. UFOR initiated with unsophisticated frontal assaults up and down the Kherson Front. These were of course costly to the vanguard, but they sufficiently captured RuFOR attention and disorganized the defenders' dispositions that UFOR could isolate forward villages and pin down some RuFOR reserves (mostly various VDV elements) while tightening up their axes of advance at the most promising junctures in the bridgehead, thereafter applying more conservative tactics. The preponderance of forces are committed in the general direction of Nova Kakhovka.

4. With such an offensive concentrating on the Kherson bridgehead, the expectation is only secondarily that UFOR would maneuver to seize territory around RuFOR strongholds and push towards the river. Rather, the strategy of pressuring the gestalt bridgehead is paramount (thus the two months of shaping by damaging bridge crossings and RuFOR logistics, air defense, and command & control). Ukrainian authorities have indicated as much themselves. The object is to try to exhaust local stockpiles of munitions through intense engagement while doing one's level best to throttle continuous resupply over the river, with an effect comparable to, I guess, exhausting one's opponent in a game of Mercy. At some point, the theory goes, RuFOR should lack the fuel and munitions to effectively react to UFOR advances, at which point the defenders experience cascading failure.

5. Relative RuFOR losses have also been high, but we won't know the balance for a long time. However, it seems their throughput into the bridgehead by airlift and ferry amounts to dozens of vehicles and who-knows-what else daily, despite the bridge crossings coming under much heavier and more regular fire than ever before. It is clear that despite the UFOR pre-offensive campaign to degrade RuFOR logistics in the region, the bridgehead defense had been well supplied. Most of the defenders, in particular the VDV divisions, appear motivated and have offered stiff resistance. More maneuver will be needed to pocket RuFOR defenders and expedite the degradation of lines of supply and maintain tolerable inputs of personnel and materiel for the attacker.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y96ivA9s0bo

6. The ultimate success of the Kherson campaign in leaving the bridgehed untenable for RuFOR depends on how long and consistently UFOR can maintain this level of pressure while interdicting or constraining opposition resupply. More specifically, how well the RuFOR munitions throughput and expenditures have been calculated, their effectiveness in degrading UFOR assault elements, and UFOR's operational budget & reserves. Unless UFOR leadership has badly miscalculated, the bridgehead will<i>eventually</i> be reduced to a Stalingrad/Severodonetsk-type city garrison.

7. It is also possible that UFOR does maintain a certain shock force in operational reserve to break through somewhere around the area of main effort at a decisive moment and exploit towards the Dnieper, but this is purely hypothetical. In such a case the disorderly collapse of a large sector of the RuFOR line is conceivable.

Revising the first bullet entirely, I don't believe it's premature to say that things are proceeding in form for Ukraine. Their forces appear to be steadily advancing along much of the front in Kherson, as well as (at least) probing in Zaporizhzhia and near Izyum, and have just opened a Russian-anticipated yet still surprising axis in Kharkiv that has produced dramatic advances in a day. Ukraine has in the past days already displayed more operational acumen than Russia at anything, and achieved a more effective advance than anything Russia has enjoyed since the beginning. It seems the plan was to feint substantial Russian reserves toward Kherson, effect inevitable logistical degradation (being achieved by the offensive), and then opportunistically attack along key axes against dilute Russian resistance.

That's a pretty good reason for Ukraine's apparent decision not to commit a decisive balance of forces to Kherson at the outset. Indeed, a decisive attack into Zaporizhzhia with fresh formations is not out of the question.

I'd like to add that if Ukraine did reach Beryslav or Bilozerka in Kherson, it could begin to cover much of the downstream river itself with direct fire and barrel artillery, making the bridgehead immediately unsustainable with respect to the operation of vehicles or artillery. I would consider this an urgent priority given the rate at which GMLRS rockets for HIMARS are being expended to keep the bridges and river crossings under constant interdiction (HIMARS fire missions against river crossings during the offensive have reached a level of daily intensity equivalent to a week's worth pre-offensive).

In other news, according to my current estimate against Oryx (using a 1.25-1.5x multiplier range, assuming a proportional distribution of unspecified recorded losses), Russia has lost at least a quarter of its post-Cold War T-72 models (T-72B3), and at least a third of similar T-80 variants (T-80BVM). T-72B3s alone represented about half of all active Russian tanks before the war. Tough to replace when Russian hardware makes systematic use of Western advanced and off-the-shelf electronics. No wonder they basically pulled all T-90s from combat duty after April. The material situation continues to justify the prioritization of reactivated and refurbished Cold War models. (I'll believe 3rd Korps has any significant number of T-90s assigned when I see them show up in the loss sheets.) Hopefully with the Kherson offensive Ukraine can return to repleneshing its armor inventory with captures.

Montmorency

09-08-2022, 01:12

Cursed.

https://i.imgur.com/sJEhFxF.png
https://i.imgur.com/LkEp8xM.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/1VHA2d5.jpg

Seamus Fermanagh

09-08-2022, 19:57

Military history tends to repeat itself a bit because of the dominant impact of terrain. This has long been a known (https://suntzusaid.com/book/10) element of warfare.

Montmorency

09-09-2022, 00:17

Ukrainian vanguard said to be on the outskirts of Kupyansk.

Parody of Russia's Baghdad Bob-esque kill claims throughout the war:

https://i.imgur.com/PXmusWj.jpg

I wouldn't be surprised if Ukraine is back to 200 KIA daily with these offensives, but you gotta love recent Oryx updates:

RuFOR, added today: 5 tank; 23 AFV; 6 arty
UFOR, added today: 1 tank; 1 BMP

In principle the Russians should eventually lose something on the order of 200 tanks and 1000 AFVs just defending the Kherson bridgehead (based on my understanding of initial strength) since the loss of all that equipment is inevitable and reinforcements continue to trickle in even now.

If this war protracts like Iran-Iraq, both Ukraine and Russia will be fielding suchlike by the end of 2023:

https://i.imgur.com/4SxOmTL.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/etyoHSP.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/zk7qa4s.jpg

Military history tends to repeat itself a bit because of the dominant impact of terrain. This has long been a known (https://suntzusaid.com/book/10) element of warfare.

The German OOB in that map was 18 ID and 3 AD, whereas as of the beginning of the week the Ukrainians had, I don't know, 15 brigades in the same AO? Many of them militia or irregular. The active elements of the offensive this week were just 3 brigades according to Zelensky. Somehow very few seriously anticipated an attack in an area where Russia had maybe 2 or 3 soldiers per square kilometer. :creep:

I love the way classical authors did ontologic philosophy.

There are 6 types of person:

1. Friendly
2. Mesomorphic
3. Allergic to wool
4. Former enemy
5. Not yet born
6. Emperors
7. Bonus kind who are seventh

EDIT: Reportedly a French documentary (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSMxGlqx5Gk) that puts Macron in a better light for his Russia policy. Non-French speakers would need to paste the French captioning into a translator. There's also a clip from it floating around presenting part of a phone call between Macron and Zelensky on D-0 in which the latter pleads for [Macron] and the NATO leadership to ask Russia to back off.

spmetla

09-09-2022, 19:30

The Ukrainian success at Kharkiv is certainly great to watch right now. Izium cut off and if they retake Kupyansk then the major rail and roadways supplying most of that front for Russia are cut off.

I'm so pleased that Ukraine can time and time again pull off some great military feats that prove my naysaying and pessimism as wrong. The war isn't won but these successes after so many months of war will have huge effects on Russian morale and combat effectiveness. When propaganda can no longer explain away the movement of the frontline in the losing direction the pressure on Russia and Putin's regime as a whole will increase substantially.
Soldiers can and will fight but if the cause looks lost and the motivation was already questionable then risking your life for the benefit of your corrupt chain of command breaks down. The current Ukrainian successes will likely have unit morale and cohesion effects (on the Russian soldiers) as negative as after the pullout of the Kiev front (or feint lol...).

I just hope Ukraine can maintain this momentum before fall and winter, best of luck to them.

I'm curious if Sarmation is still lurking in here and would like his perspective some. His viewpoint on Russia's failures this many months in would be interesting as they'll have huge effects on the Balkan region as a whole if this continues. His view as anti-NATO and pro-Russian would be an interesting perspective to see how this conflict plays out in the Balkan region. Serbia may remain pro-Russian but it'll be an increasingly difficult position if Russia looks like the new 'old man of europe.' Future Russian revisionism and revanchism will remain threats but this will likely be the cement that maintains the dissolution of the Soviet and Russian empires and perhaps finally discredit strong man rule in Russia enough to allow some sort of democratic institutions to finally creep in to hold the power structure accountable.

Montmorency

09-10-2022, 00:26

Ukraine: *doesn't sicc the Grand Army of the Republic on Crimea*
Russians: Must be because 200000 of the chemically-enhanced neo-Nazi supersoldiers have already been slain by our boys.
Ukraine: Yes, do think so.

For now this is a pure rumor that will be clarified by the time I check on things tomorrow, but Ukraine is said not only to have largely sealed the Izyum pocket, but also charged into the city itself from behind. Almost all Russia's combat personnel are across the river south of the city, or were as of the beginning of the week. For this development to be possible as described, the Russian command would essentially have had to completely fail to reorganize its Izyum grouping's dispositions to react to its progressive envelopment.

The thing is, they're so incompetent I can believe it; throughout the Kharkiv Offensive they've been running limited attacks out of Izyum towards the villages south of it that Ukraine recaptured last month (and which it took 2-3 months for Russia to capture in the first place). As though nothing had changed. On the other hand, Russian commentators tend to assure us that Ukraine's momentum has run out and a devastating backhand awaits from Kupyansk. I'll be checking in tomorrow.

CrossLOPER

09-10-2022, 17:41

If the defenses are collapsing as soon as they fail past the front line, then the Russian military is in even worse shape than anyone thought. Will the northeast fall in the same way as the north did? Will the east be able to hold on with those losses?

Montmorency

09-10-2022, 22:56

I'm going to have to do a lot of catching up, but I gather that the Izyum pocket is in the process of surrendering...

There are few comprehensive military history analogies but you could almost call the past two weeks a low-rent replication of the two hooks by Army Groups A and B in Fall Gelb. The Third Republican Army and the Russian Army appear to have quite similar pathologies of command, control, and communications (not to say that the Russian force composition has been looking increasingly like a potpourri of feudal levies, client auxiliaries, mercenaries, and palace guards, and it already gave that impression from the beginning).

The Ukrainian success at Kharkiv is certainly great to watch right now. Izium cut off and if they retake Kupyansk then the major rail and roadways supplying most of that front for Russia are cut off.

I'm so pleased that Ukraine can time and time again pull off some great military feats that prove my naysaying and pessimism as wrong. The war isn't won but these successes after so many months of war will have huge effects on Russian morale and combat effectiveness. When propaganda can no longer explain away the movement of the frontline in the losing direction the pressure on Russia and Putin's regime as a whole will increase substantially.
Soldiers can and will fight but if the cause looks lost and the motivation was already questionable then risking your life for the benefit of your corrupt chain of command breaks down. The current Ukrainian successes will likely have unit morale and cohesion effects (on the Russian soldiers) as negative as after the pullout of the Kiev front (or feint lol...).

I just hope Ukraine can maintain this momentum before fall and winter, best of luck to them.

I'm curious if Sarmation is still lurking in here and would like his perspective some. His viewpoint on Russia's failures this many months in would be interesting as they'll have huge effects on the Balkan region as a whole if this continues. His view as anti-NATO and pro-Russian would be an interesting perspective to see how this conflict plays out in the Balkan region. Serbia may remain pro-Russian but it'll be an increasingly difficult position if Russia looks like the new 'old man of europe.' Future Russian revisionism and revanchism will remain threats but this will likely be the cement that maintains the dissolution of the Soviet and Russian empires and perhaps finally discredit strong man rule in Russia enough to allow some sort of democratic institutions to finally creep in to hold the power structure accountable.

Useful article (https://johnganz.substack.com/p/some-thoughts-on-ukraine), and commentator generally:

But how about the people who buy it, repeat it, and create their own variations on its themes? What could possibly account for all these contradictory and absurd positions, which have been uttered at different times by the same people? All these sentiments are all the product of a single proposition: the Western democracies are always wrong, both morally and practically. When the West struggles and fails, it’s because of its decadence and senility, a sign of its imminent collapse, when it prevails, it’s because of its dastardly wiles and the limitlessness of its ill-gotten resources. Russia’s appeal in the West, which crosses the traditional boundaries of right and left, is irresistible for those who believe the worst crime imaginable is Western hypocrisy. Since this hypocrisy is the only unforgivable sin, Russia’s crude and cynical exercise of power, it’s barely plausible justifications for its actions, its overt gangsterism at home and abroad, is seen as a virtue.

Contra the bold, unfortunately, the opponents of the "West" tend to be generally fascistic, either national socialist or national bolshevik in their outlook, and they really hate the "liberal" version of American cultural hegemony (see also Hitler's declamations against Mickey Mouse and jazz). Thus they support Cuba and Venezuela at their worst, brutal despotism in Syria and Russia, Serbian revanchism, persecution of Muslims throughout Asia, and so on. They have no other political models to look toward after all, and they lack the soundness of principle and conscience to adopt new ones. The West deserves a lot of criticism, but just recklessly hating it from a reactionary perspective - also quite common a framework among the American Right, who hate America more than anyone else - is, well, deplorable.

The cynical pose, which flatters itself on being always undeceived, is in practice highly gullible and distinguishable from naivety only in the sour churlishness of its affect. These attitudes should be expected in the nether regions of the press and intelligentsia, where people make their livings writing semi-pornographic conspiracy literature and closely identify with the mob. But these stances have infected the broader intellectual climate as well. The whole pamphlet literature of the demi-monde provides a new language that sounds provocative and fresh compared to the stale banalities of bien-pensant humanitarian liberalism. It is tempting material for those who treat both life and politics as an irresponsible flight from one pose to another. Even among the putatively more serious, there’s just the simple need to find some take that appears oppositional and critical.

Hehe

Hooahguy

09-11-2022, 01:26

There are rumors (https://twitter.com/olex_scherba/status/1568564891287523329?s=20&t=zc9lrP_sujXKQG3B-mNZwA)flying around that Ukrainian troops have entered the remains of the Donetsk International Airport. While the airport itself probably isnt functional anymore, its symbolic value (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Donetsk_Airport#Symbolism) is legendary within the Ukrainian armed forces. And if the rumors end up being true, well, we could very well be looking at the end of the DPR/LPR in the not too distant future.

CrossLOPER

09-11-2022, 19:37

airport itself probably isnt functional anymore
It is one of the most destroyed sites throughout the conflict from 2014. It is not even recognizable.

Montmorency

09-11-2022, 22:36

Seems most of the forces in the bridgehead south of Izyum have actually escaped over the two crossings near the confluence of the Oskil and SD rivers over the past 3 days unfortunately, though perhaps not with most of their vehicles (e.g. infantry packed into trucks and AFVs). The UA bridgehead near Lyman couldn't break out in time to seal the gap between rivers, and the Ukrainian forces along the Oskil River (inc. Kupyansk) have been more or less paused on the west bank, consolidating gains.

Unrelated:

25994

Actually, that netrocentric warrior crap or whatever would be good to have for this sort of Kharkiv chaos. Both the operations room and sergeants on the ground having near-perfect situational information of the state of a staggered and rapid advance would generate a lot of efficiencies, potentially. Though a single soldier's loadout falling into enemy hands seems like a serious vulnerability vector.

spmetla

09-12-2022, 08:45

I'm totally okay with soldiers fleeing without the heavy equipment.
Poor morale is contagious, if they left their equipment and fled to safety it's going to negatively affect them and other units in the future. Units that held together and withdrew will despise those that fled or speak out creating further divide. Leadership that may have acted in the interest of saving trained bodies of men will be questioned and made to pay for the national embarrassment.
Those that are 'professional' soldiers in it for a career will be less likely to risk their lives in attacks for a war that looks increasingly hopeless.

Putin's regime is on shaky standing, at some point he may have to make calculations like Lukashenko and have to withdraw in order to save the military structure before that structure can turn on him. WWI led to the Russian Revolution, what will this special military operation lead to?

Wonder how the PRC feels about shackling themselves to the sick man of Europe?

Montmorency

09-12-2022, 23:54

This can't be allowed to happen in Kherson, though in principle it's harder to escape in such a manner. Certainly wading-depth fords over the Dnieper are lacking that area. But when it comes to the chance to remove most of the extant VDV - almost the RuAF's last remaining reliable infantry formation - from play, that's indispensable.

Meanwhile it sounds as though the Russians are just going to double down on frontal assaults into Donetsk, redeploying from Kharkiv and the south to increase the mass there. Reports of Ukrainian attacks into Donetsk and Horlivka and Lysychansk were someone's disinfo or propaganda, by the way. The reality is that there have been a handful of desultory Ukrainian probes of Russian lines in those areas. The Ukrainians routed a few overstretched brigades and triggered the flight of a few more, that doesn't mean the entire opposition is going to panic arbitrarily.

While it's easy to hindsight an operation, and this was a clear victory, if the Chuhuiv-Balakliya battle grouping had had one more brigade available - to exploit aggressively along the Oskil River - and the UA defensive force between Izyum and Slovyansk had collected the means and initiative to drive through the Russian flank just 5 kilometers against the SD River through Pasika-Studenok, then that entire bridgehead would legitimately have been sealed off. Such a compromised position would almost certainly have forced Russia to cede post-February gains in Luhansk and retreat to the old line by the end of October. Ah well.

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1569408302085177345 [VIDEO]

Example #231 on why it's absolutely senseless to use vehicle losses (even "destroyed") to estimate casualties.

rory_20_uk

09-13-2022, 10:16

Wonder how the PRC feels about shackling themselves to the sick man of Europe?

If you're right behind someone it is so much easier to stab them in the back.

Shackling? They trade mainly in dollars and heavily with both the USA and the EU / the West generally. Most of their resources also come via routes that the West could interdict rather than Russia's sphere. Frankly, beyond saying they'll help what have they done? They could have already sent vast numbers of IFVs / Tanks / etc (especially since most Chinese material hasn't been tested in war) - even if for money and not as a gift - but it appears they've not.

China and Russia share enemies but equally are intense rivals. China would prefer if everyone lost and focus continues in Eastern Europe rather than let's say the China Sea.

~:smoking:

Montmorency

09-14-2022, 00:00

China and Russia share enemies but equally are intense rivals. China would prefer if everyone lost and focus continues in Eastern Europe rather than let's say the China Sea.

~:smoking:

That is so, but by entailment China does not want Russia to lose, badly.

Chinese Firms Are Selling Russia Goods Its Military Needs to Keep Fighting in Ukraine (https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-firms-are-selling-russia-goods-its-military-needs-to-keep-fighting-in-ukraine-11657877403)
Rising exports of microchips, aluminum oxide, other dual-use items undermine Western push to stall Russian war effort

Chinese exports to Russia of microchips and other electronic components and raw materials, some with military applications, have increased since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, complicating efforts by the U.S. and Western allies to isolate the country’s economy and cripple its military.

Chip shipments from China to Russia more than doubled to about $50 million in the first five months of 2022 compared with a year earlier, Chinese customs data show, while exports of other components such as printed circuits had double-digit percentage growth. Export volumes of aluminum oxide, which is used to make the metal aluminum, an important material in weapons production and aerospace, are 400 times higher than last year.

The rise in reported export values may partly be explained by inflation. But the data shows that many Chinese tech sellers have continued to do business with Russia despite U.S. scrutiny.

The Chinese exports, while just a sliver of the country’s overall exports, are a source of concern for U.S. officials. The Commerce Department added five Chinese electronics companies to a trade blacklist last month for allegedly helping Russia’s defense industry, both before the invasion and after it began.

Montmorency

09-15-2022, 00:20

Turkey and Azerbaijan seem unsatisfied with anything short of the total conquest of Armenia, so Pashinyan has invoked Article 4 (ha. ha. ha) of the CSTO and put Putin in a hard place. Honestly I would have Biden advise the Armenian government that as long as they unofficially abandon any plans of ever relieving NK, NATO forces will tutor tens of thousands of their professional personnel in combined arms defense and irregular warfare.

Ukrainian air assault (https://twitter.com/i/status/1570031629527121921) in Kharkiv (could just be transport?) [VIDEO]

As war began, Putin rejected a Ukraine peace deal recommended by aide (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-war-began-putin-rejected-ukraine-peace-deal-recommended-by-his-aide-2022-09-14/)
Vladimir Putin's chief envoy on Ukraine told the Russian leader as the war began that he had struck a provisional deal with Kyiv that would satisfy Russia's demand that Ukraine stay out of NATO, but Putin rejected it and pressed ahead with his military campaign, according to three people close to the Russian leadership.

The Ukrainian-born envoy, Dmitry Kozak, told Putin that he believed the deal he had hammered out removed the need for Russia to pursue a large-scale occupation of Ukraine, according to these sources. Kozak's recommendation to Putin to adopt the deal is being reported by Reuters for the first time.

Putin had repeatedly asserted prior to the war that NATO and its military infrastructure were creeping closer to Russia's borders by accepting new members from eastern Europe, and that the alliance was now preparing to bring Ukraine into its orbit too. Putin publicly said that represented an existential threat to Russia, forcing him to react.

But, despite earlier backing the negotiations, Putin made it clear when presented with Kozak's deal that the concessions negotiated by his aide did not go far enough and that he had expanded his objectives to include annexing swathes of Ukrainian territory, the sources said. The upshot: the deal was dropped.

I don't know, maybe, but it's hard for me to see what Putin can spin as a win if he cuts bait now. An American/EU promise to veto Ukrainian NATO/EU hopes in exchange for observable demobilization in the east (Crimea is a lost cause) is certainly a compromise that I hope our governments have sounded out for what it's worth. But if it were that simple wouldn't the deal have been finalized and publicized long ago? If he just returns troops home following the conclusion to the scheduled exercise with Belarus, what exactly does he tell the public in closing?

Well understood by those without partisan interest in lying or playing the fool.

https://i.imgur.com/KctVzDI.jpg

Very quick check (not differentiating between fronts, but likely >90% from Kharkiv): In the week+ 9/6 through 9/13, Oryx recorded roughly 110 tank and 210 AFV* losses by Russia. This includes probably 50 T-72B3 variants (post-Cold War), the pre-war skeleton of the VSRF tank force making up at least 50% of all active service tanks. And remember, the Kharkiv front was arguably Russia's lowest priority for armor deployments given the distribution of forces (other than the 1st Guards Tank Army remnants). The critical piece confirming the semi-organized nature of the abandonment of the Izyum bridgehead is that whole depots stocked with tanks in various states of repair have been found scattered throughout the liberated territory, yet SPGs come in dribs and drabs. If we're speaking of all barrel artillery, my very rough assessment of the force composition of Russians in Kharkiv is that there should be about as many tanks as cannons - yet the documented losses of the former far exceed those of the latter. Perhaps even more telling is that zero Russian SAM systems have been recovered in Kharkiv. Russians really prioritized saving their artillery and air defense (pending the documentation of some prodigious cache). Nevertheless, there's at least another few hundred AFVs and tanks remaining to be logged from Kharkiv.

If it comes down to human waves of Russian conscripts with AK47s backed by North Korean shells, Ukraine can still retain the balance of power.

*I categorize all APC, IFV, and IMV as AFV

spmetla

09-16-2022, 03:40

Guess all the countries in the former Soviet Union are seeing the writing on the wall regarding this current incarnation of Russia and off to do their own things. Beside the Azeris attacking Armenia there's all this:

China to support Kazakhstan in defending independence, sovereignty
https://tass.com/world/1507313

China?s leader Xi Jinping said that his country will resolutely support Kazakhstan in defending its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity during a meeting with his Kazakh counterpart Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Nur-Sultan, the Kazakh president's press service reported on Wednesday.

Guess the Kazakhs have found their new friends. Guess in China's view their partnership without limits meant more no limits on how much to infringe on the other partner's 'turf.'

Two reported killed in clashes between Kyrgyz and Tajik border guards
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/world/fresh-clash-erupts-between-kyrgyz-tajik-border-guards-2022-09-14/

Kyrgyz and Tajik border guards exchanged fire in three separate incidents in a border dispute on Wednesday, killing at least two people, officials on both sides said.

The clashes came on the eve of a regional security summit, and a day after new fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan raised fears of instability spreading to other parts of the former Soviet Union while Russian forces fight in Ukraine.

Kyrgyz border guards accused the Tajiks of having taken positions at a part of the border that has not been demarcated. The Tajik side said Kyrgyz guards had opened fire on a Tajik outpost without any provocation.

Clashes at the border occur regularly, and last year almost triggered an all-out war between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both allies of Russia that host Russian military bases.

With Afghanistan in Taliban hands it'd be nice if the rest of the region could keep it together. Hope this isn't escalated as Russia is in no position mediate as it did last year.

I know the rumor mill has also got stuff about Georgia eying up South Ossetia and Abkhazia again though that'd be a real dumb move unless Russia really collapses though it was equally dumb last time too. Georgia certainly hasn't been preparing so it'd probably go worse than last time despite Russia's current problems.

A new Great Game in Central Asia but more a balance of Turkey and India (not united together but generally against China) versus China vying for new influence as Russia's decline continues. Think the US/EU role will really be more investments to try and limit China's influence from the New Silk Road project as neither are really positioned to do more.

Armenia trying to invoke Article 4 of the CSTO with no response from Russia will certainly be the nail in the coffin for that agreement as Russia is the only member with the means to help Armenia.

Montmorency

09-16-2022, 20:51

Would be a hell of a thing to have three conventional wars raging all at once in the post-Soviet space. Consequences of Russian instability. If we have a full war between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, I also wouldn't be surprised to see Uzbekistan opportunistically join in over Ferghana claims. And then the Taliban decide on a quick foreign adventure and China exerts a police action to clean up the mess huehuehue.

Contemporary relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1:27:

https://youtu.be/hBklfXd9ra4?t=87

The Armenian nationalists really should have used the leverage from their own bout of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s to secure autonomy for NK within Azerbaijan. Now it's far too late and the long-term security of the Armenian state itself is in question. The nationalists still don't seem to recognize this however.

Guess the Kazakhs have found their new friends. Guess in China's view their partnership without limits meant more no limits on how much to infringe on the other partner's 'turf.'

It has been pointed out that Kazakhstan has been a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization since 1996 (as has Russia), and Chinese leadership has been reiterating its stance on the "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" of its neighbors for decades. The drift of Kazakhstan toward China's orbit should be expected to be gradual. All the same, the quoted phrase does carry special significance in the context of - now. Not "during-the-Ukraine-War"-now but "at-this-very-moment"-now, during the annual SCO conference, with Russia floundering, the CSTO a dead letter, and violence flaring in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

A new Great Game in Central Asia but more a balance of Turkey and India

Iran and India, you mean? Pakistan complicates thing as well.

Montmorency

09-17-2022, 02:50

History (https://twitter.com/hausibek/status/1154675754652852226) of the Soviet borders/maps of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan if you're interested.

Montmorency

09-20-2022, 00:45

To reinforce (https://twitter.com/GJStathakis/status/1571960068408745984) my comments on the smaller relative increases in capability between tank generations and airfighter generations (Slovenia to supply 28 M-55S tanks to Ukraine):

T-55S thread for those shocked that this is being sent. Ok 1st and foremost these tanks were updated by a Slovenian Company STo Ravne and engineers from Israeli ELBIT. This was a complete overhaul from new engines and transmissions increasing HP from 500 to 600HP in a tank …
2/n that isn’t very heavy to begin with appx 36 tons. The main gun is now a L7 105mm NATO standard with a thermal sleeve. A new breech is designed to speed firing having been developed by ELBIT.
The hull armor is greatly improved using Israeli Rafael ERA blocks that are …
3/n backed by composite armor of ELBIT design. Completely modern optics and thermal sights. Digital ballistic fire control computer with the gunner having a 2 axis stabilized sight with rangefinder. The commander cupola has the ability to lay and fire the gun independently…
4/n of the gunner if need be. The driver also has state of the art optics. Here’s the cool part. These tanks are equipped with laser illumination warning system. ie if it’s being targeted by a ATGM or enemy tank that uses laser guidance it warns the crew and can independently…
5/n fire smoke grenades to allow the tank to maneuver out of hostile weapons sight. All crew comms have been upgraded to allow clear communication. The tank tracks are completely new and have rubber blocks to facilitate road travel. So what does this all mean for the crews ..
6/n getting these tanks? Well they can engage T-72 on a pretty much equal playing field but most importantly the optics and gun stabilization guarantee that their 1st will be much more accurate. The 105mm L7 can do in a T-72 & I know this from 1st hand experience. Any APFSDS..
7/b developed after 1985 will send that turret into orbit. Lately the Belgium company MECAR and Israeli IMI have developed rounds that Slovenia uses that match 120mm kinetics. So these upgraded T-55s are better than anything the Ukrs are fielding except for their t-84s and the…
8/b Polish PT-91 Twardys. Sometimes it’s good to get into the details.

spmetla

09-20-2022, 07:55

If you're at the receiving end of an old tank's main gun you don't care how dated it is unless you're in a tank that can take the hits, everything else on the battlefield remains vulnerable. With the Russians fielding T62s, that's only one generation after these T55s, both are modernized so at least not total relics and against each other both are capable of knocking out the other.

If nothing else it frees up other tanks from lower priority areas such as along Moldova and Belarus. All the more reason for Germany to send those Leo1s and Marders, though I saw that they're sending 50x Dingo APCs and 4 more PzH2000s so that's something at least.

Montmorency

09-20-2022, 23:19

https://i.imgur.com/rlMA34d.jpg

Reviewing the list of upgrades again, it presents a real Ship of Theseus riddle. If the engine, transmission, armor, tracks, and cannon are all new, then what exactly remains of the original platform?

Kazakhstan's capital's name has been changed back to Astana. Tokaev has a Politico op-ed (https://www.politico.eu/article/kazakh-president-we-must-flip-the-switch-of-reform/) in which he claims to seek a more open, liberal, and democratic future for Kazakhstan with an empowered and accountable parliament.

Russia now seems likely to attempt to escalate the war effort and annex Ukrainian territories in the next two weeks. Scour the news.

Poll (https://chinapower.csis.org/survey-experts-china-approach-to-taiwan/) of "64 leading experts on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and cross-Strait relations." Some results at face value:

*War this decade unlikely, possibly toward or after the mid-century
*Blockade could be a coercive tactic for the CCP
*Xi prioritizes non-kinetic methods toward unification
*China would choose to invade if Taiwan declared independence
*China would provoke a crisis with its reaction to the US making an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan (do Biden's multiple statements this year count?)
*Experts unanimously believe that Chinese leadership believes the US would join a war on Taiwan's side to some extent

(Note that there was a recent official statement from the CIA that claims Xi wants a Taiwan Strait invasion plan to be a feasible option by 2027)

He has not made the decision to do that, but he has asked his military to put him in a position where if that's what he wanted to do, he would be able to. It's still the assessment of the IC as a whole that Xi's interest in Taiwan is to get control through non-military means

Montmorency

09-21-2022, 22:43

The Kremlin’s annexation plans are primarily targeting a domestic audience; Putin likely hopes to improve Russian force generation capabilities by calling on the Russian people to volunteer for a war to “defend” newly claimed Russian territory. Putin and his advisors have apparently realized that current Russian forces are insufficient to conquer Ukraine and that efforts to build large forces quickly through voluntary mobilization are culminating short of the Russian military’s force requirements. Putin is therefore likely setting legal and informational conditions to improve Russian force generation without resorting to expanded conscription by changing the balance of carrots and sticks the Kremlin has been using to spur voluntary recruitment.

Putin may believe that he can appeal to Russian ethnonationalism and the defense of purportedly “Russian peoples” and claimed Russian land to generate additional volunteer forces. He may seek to rely on enhanced rhetoric in part because the Kremlin cannot afford the service incentives, like bonuses and employment benefits, that it has already promised Russian recruits.[2] But Putin is also adding new and harsher punishments in an effort to contain the risk of the collapse of Russian military units fighting in Ukraine and draft-dodging within Russia. The Kremlin rushed the passage of a new law through the State Duma on September 20, circumventing normal parliamentary procedures.[3] This law codifies dramatically increased penalties for desertion, refusing conscription orders, and insubordination. It also criminalizes voluntary surrender and makes surrender a crime punishable by ten years in prison. The law notably does not order full-scale mobilization or broader conscription or make any preparations for such activities.

ISW has observed no evidence that the Kremlin is imminently intending to change its conscription practices. The Kremlin’s new law is about strengthening the Kremlin’s coercive volunteerism, or what Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called “self-mobilization.”[4]

The Kremlin is taking steps to directly increase force generation through continued voluntary self-mobilization and an expansion of its legal authority to deploy Russian conscripts already with the force to fight in Ukraine.

Big oof from ISW yesterday. It's funny that so many Twitter handles were reporting sources or other indications of mobilization concurrently. But really ISW's assessment that annexation is intended to boost patriotism just contains a logical flaw, or oversight; naturalizing Donbass would give Donbassian conscripts rights. It's the opposite of stop-loss. It's why I've long maintained that Russia would never annex territories unless it was close either to "winning" or to losing.

Unfortunately ISW has always put its resources into collating Russian and Ukrainian statements for its war chronicle, with curation filling most of the space, whereas its in-house analysis has often ranged from trivial (e.g. 'there will continue to be battles for X town in the coming days') to flat wrong (e.g. early war Russian strategy and pacing).

Montmorency

09-23-2022, 00:44

The Kremlin has warned Ukraine that if the country goes ahead with a planned agreement on free trade with the EU, it faces inevitable financial catastrophe and possibly the collapse of the state.

Russia is making a last-minute push to derail the integration agreement, which is due to be signed in late November. Instead, Moscow wants to lure its neighbour into its own alliance, a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan that critics have referred to as a reincarnation of the Soviet Union. Russia has made it clear that Ukraine has to choose between the two options and cannot sign both agreements.

Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine's former trade minister, gave Sergei Glazyev, adviser to President Vladimir Putin, a public dressing down in a discussion session during which the Kremlin man was faced with jeering and catcalls for demanding that Ukraine abandon the EU pact and turn to Russia. The minister said that it was the Kremlin's heavy-handed tactics and threats of a trade war that had made European integration inevitable.

"For the first time in our history more than 50% of people support European integration, and less than 30% of the people support closer ties with Russia," said Poroshenko. "Thank you very much for that Mr Glazyev."

Radek Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, accused Russia of a "19th-century mode of operating towards neighbours", and said that it was only when Ukraine was properly allied with Europe that Russia would begin to respect the country. "Poland's relations with Russia are better now that we are a member of the EU and Nato," said Sikorski. "When the question is open people feel entitled to exert pressure; when the question is closed they have to live with a sovereign country."

Glazyev, speaking on the sidelines of the discussion, said the exact opposite was true: "Ukrainian authorities make a huge mistake if they think that the Russian reaction will become neutral in a few years from now. This will not happen."

Instead, he said, signing the agreement would make the default of Ukraine inevitable and Moscow would not offer any helping hand. "Russia is the main creditor of Ukraine. Only with customs union with Russia can Ukraine balance its trade," he said. Russia has already slapped import restrictions on certain Ukrainian products and Glazyev did not rule out further sanctions if the agreement was signed.

The Kremlin aide added that the political and social cost of EU integration could also be high, and allowed for the possibility of separatist movements springing up in the Russian-speaking east and south of Ukraine. He suggested that if Ukraine signed the agreement, Russia would consider the bilateral treaty that delineates the countries' borders to be void.

"We don't want to use any kind of blackmail. This is a question for the Ukrainian people," said Glazyev. "But legally, signing this agreement about association with EU, the Ukrainian government violates the treaty on strategic partnership and friendship with Russia." When this happened, he said, Russia could no longer guarantee Ukraine's status as a state and could possibly intervene if pro-Russian regions of the country appealed directly to Moscow.

I mean (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/22/ukraine-european-union-trade-russia), I'm old enough to remember back in 2013 when realists and Russophiles alike would openly admit that Russia's paramount priority was to maintain political and economic domination of Ukraine, and those were the facts of life (though I didn't realize the Russian government literally said the quiet part out loud). It's just no one thought Russia would prove too weak to finish the job, in 2014.

So weakness was helpfully retconned as strength or savvy, then as entitlement, then as a matter of (someone's!) self-determination. By now the first and only resort is the plain and plaintive, 'Let me win or I nuke you!'

Many of us memory-holed calculated lies out of deference to discursive coexistence. Lies aren't just a gentleman's game, they're a matter of power. Don't disempower yourself by respecting and tolerating liars in your interactions, domestic or foreign.

Shaka_Khan

09-23-2022, 01:37

Meanwhile in Iran...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1Y2p-ISFvw

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bIJ_TQytOE

spmetla

09-23-2022, 08:07

I wish the protesters in Iran the best of luck. Unfortunately they've had moments like this several times over the last twenty some years but perhaps this will be more successful though I imagine this is primarily a movement in major cities with not so much support in the more conservative countryside.

As for Russian mobilization, it will be interesting to see how Russia approaches this. That's a lot of personnel to need to train, equip, and support. With the current force in Ukraine already using up the lion's share of modern equipment and already down to 2nd tier stuff in some areas I wonder what the the recruits will be given.

This I think will be paired with the referendums to annex the occupied parts of Ukraine after which they will be "Russian" territory and by Russia's standards legal for employing conscripts, at least I think that's how it can work.
If Russia's battlefield performance continues to be as lackluster and poor even with the influx of new personnel (and who knows on what timeline and quality of training) this may further galvanize dissatisfaction with the prosecution of the war and perhaps Putin himself. I don't think this will lead to any threat to the regime just yet as it looks like the majority of heavy conscriptions are being done outside the urban West of Russia with a focus on Russia's minorities.

I personally don't think we'll see the effects of these recruits for a few weeks but I imagine that from fall into winter the manpower advantage of Ukraine will be offset. With that, the Ukraine will need to achieve some more significant victories before winter and then somehow get a decisive qualitative advantage in training and equipment on certain fronts by the spring. I hope that the western dithering over more modern tanks and IFVs can come to an end with much more support for Ukraine in these categories.

Fingers crossed the Ukraine can retake Kherson sometime soon and create another local victory like a few weeks somewhere in the East or South East too.

Montmorency

09-24-2022, 06:27

On paper, the most accessible draftees for Russia would be:

1. Conscripts who served out their terms by the past April (April '21 cadre)
2. Conscripts who finish their terms in a week (October '21 cadre)
3. Contractors who finished or cancelled their contracts during the war

These alone would fill out a nominal 300K cap 50-90% of the way, depending on assumptions.

Since like with many governmental functions in Russia, mobilization is highly devolved to the regions, and the federal government has a poor ability to identify individuals who are not available at their last updated address, the Russian government will have an overall difficult time identifying the best prospects for drafting, but the above categories should in principle be easy to work with because all addresses are current as of sometime in 2022.

OTOH there have been lots of anecdotal reports over the past two days that Russia is executing - in contravention of reported guidelines - a randomized, haphazard draft drawing in everyone from industrial workers to students. If this is the case systematically - and we can only hope so - then Russia will have embarked on the most alienating and least effective variant of conscription, no less since the 2-week training course is presented as a refresher for "fully" trained veterans.

I don't understand why NATO countries haven't been training literally all non-militia Ukrainian military personnel for the past 6 months, however. Or alternatively, offered 20 brigades' worth of Ukrainian civilian volunteers a full basic and advanced course in infantry and combined arms warfare, maturing as of now, to be disposed as needed. Big L for NATO. 'Free trial' sessions for groups of thousands in such a long timeframe, as has been the case, is a significant missed opportunity. It's not like NATO troops throughout Europe, including American ones, were so busy or otherwise preoccupied.

"Iran deploys female special forces to quell anti-government [gender inequality] protests" (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/09/22/iran-deploys-female-special-forces-quell-anti-government-protests/)

In top postmodern headlines.

EDIT: A day ago the thought struck me that part of the motivation for mobilization may have been the instability flaring in the Caucasus and Central Asia a week ago, in that Putin saw a need to regenerate some Russian expeditionary capacity with which to intimidate Tajikistan and Azerbaijan, so to speak. The Russian political analyst Atomic Cherry (https://t.me/s/atomiccherry) just offered a broader, geopolitical, account:

Mobilization is a response to the refusal of further support for Moscow from China, India, Turkey and the monarchies of the Middle East. An attempt to resolve the growing international crisis, loss of weight in the political arena and growing economic isolation by moving to a new round of conflict escalation.

spmetla

09-24-2022, 08:31

Mobilization is a response to the refusal of further support for Moscow from China, India, Turkey and the monarchies of the Middle East. An attempt to resolve the growing international crisis, loss of weight in the political arena and growing economic isolation by moving to a new round of conflict escalation.

It is possible but I see it really as Putin is trying to find a way to end the war on his terms and extract a believable 'win' for domestic consumption and more importantly his own life. The retirement prospects for dictators that lose wars is never long if they even make it to the end of the war. Mobilization is unpopular and may be the end of him but continuing the war with his current manpower pool will certainly result in a loss so he must mobilize, though to what extent and how effective it will be remain to be seen.

I do think Russia certainly sees itself as more isolated and undoubtedly Putin is upset by the war not going as he wanted, the unexpected unity of the west and the apparently surprising lack of unity by his allies.

This lengthening war is certainly causing the west to de-couple Russia economically and with China continuing its saber rattling over Taiwan I imagine that investment there will be discouraged from the top down though probably not overtly for now.

I don't understand why NATO countries haven't been training literally all non-militia Ukrainian military personnel for the past 6 months, however. Or alternatively, offered 20 brigades' worth of Ukrainian civilian volunteers a full basic and advanced course in infantry and combined arms warfare, maturing as of now, to be disposed as needed. Big L for NATO. 'Free trial' sessions for groups of thousands in such a long timeframe, as has been the case, is a significant missed opportunity. It's not like NATO troops throughout Europe, including American ones, were so busy or otherwise preoccupied.

Whole heartedly agree. Once Russia retreated from Kiev and it became clear that Ukraine has a possibility to win NATO, but the US especially, should have gone whole hog on supporting Ukraine. The debate about escalation over MiG-29s a few months ago seems silly now but understandably it did take a while for decision makers throughout the West to feel comfortable that support for Ukraine is not likely to escalate to general war with Russia or any sort of nuclear war.

Some of the NATO troops in Europe though I'd say are busy, Russia still does need to be deterred, especially to prevent any adventures into Finland or Sweden once they announced their intentions to join NATO. Same on the Black Sea coast, Romania has legitimate security concerns that its partners need to help with.
Still more than enough capability to help Ukraine though.

Furunculus

09-24-2022, 11:06

I don't understand why NATO countries haven't been training literally all non-militia Ukrainian military personnel for the past 6 months, however. Or alternatively, offered 20 brigades' worth of Ukrainian civilian volunteers a full basic and advanced course in infantry and combined arms warfare, maturing as of now, to be disposed as needed. Big L for NATO.
It is a shame that training wasn't expanded, by a greater number of nations, sooner, but the british army has been at it since 2014 on a pretty industrial scale:

Provided training to over 22,000 Ukrainian military personnel before it was suspended ahead of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Orbital

BoJo offered Ukraine a new training programme located within the UK, with the aim of training up to 10,000 Ukrainians every 120 days:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Interflex

Montmorency

09-24-2022, 19:26

It is a shame that training wasn't expanded, by a greater number of nations, sooner, but the british army has been at it since 2014 on a pretty industrial scale:

Provided training to over 22,000 Ukrainian military personnel before it was suspended ahead of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Orbital

BoJo offered Ukraine a new training programme located within the UK, with the aim of training up to 10,000 Ukrainians every 120 days:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Interflex

As always, any leadership on the issue by the British is appreciated, but still rather limp.

If I wasn't clear in my comment, the '30-day free trial NATO membership' courses don't and haven't sufficed. Properly: Since April, on German and Polish bases, many tens of thousands of civilians (inc. from refugee populations) ought to have been recruited, transported to NATO and local military bases, and provided a full professional training course in mass combined arms warfare. Especially officer candidates. These trainees ought to have been coming into service only just now, as a block. And no, NATO/Euro soldiers were not so preoccupied as to be prevented from undertaking this training operation, and doing so would not have fatally injured their readiness to an attack by - Belarus?

If I'm being harsh, it's only because NATO still hasn't offered that level of commitment, even with the Russian draft setting an admissive environment.

Montmorency

09-26-2022, 22:29

DRM Journal's Iranian protest map:

https://i.imgur.com/rctim7d.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/hQExp1h.jpg

Unsurprising.

Shaka_Khan

09-28-2022, 02:00

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HAzfOYDssko

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqUv16iQNdk

It seems that even Russian men who are over 40 are being forcefully conscripted according to him:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgf1tcbdIFo

Shaka_Khan

09-29-2022, 16:39

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D2zrI8V0FEE

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7W2uGTfysoE

CrossLOPER

09-29-2022, 18:27

Looks like things are going great.

At the very least, governments can finally sever foreign dependencies on critical infrastructure like energy. I never understood that particular aspect of globalism, since it it creates massive security issue, especially for a country that does not possess diplomatic or military leverage, or even infrastructure for reserves.

spmetla

09-30-2022, 04:01

Think there was a lot of naivete in thinking that a large scale war in Europe was impossible after the end of the Cold War. That together with thinking that economic ties with illiberal governments might reform them instead of what we've see of it really just enabling the top to entrench themselves.

CrossLOPER

09-30-2022, 19:48

It was impossible until people ceased paying attention and doing their work for 20+ years. It is incredible that nearly a quarter of a century of diplomatic posturing and economic architecture was based off of "everything is fine and will never go wrong ever again".

Montmorency

10-09-2022, 00:51

Kerch Strait Bridge damaged, very likely either by kamikaze boat or sappers at the bridge piers. Look at how clean those breaks are. A Zaporizhzhia offensive may be imminent after all, though if not then this event is just another nail in the coffin for the Russian presence in Kherson.

Ukraine looking shiny (https://twitter.com/ragnarbjartur/status/1578793382603726848).
EDIT: For reference, Russia claims (https://crimea.ria.ru/20221008/vs-rf-otrazili-popytki-nastupleniya-vsu-na-trekh-napravleniyakh---minoborony-1124778941.html) to have destroyed 5500 Ukrainian tanks, which is greater thanthe number of all active-service Russian and Ukrainian tanks at the beginning of the war.

My calculations: Russia has the spare/stored armored vehicles to outfit a theoretical maximum of about 50 new brigades, accounting for a modest reserve for replacements. But AFAIK the extremely inefficient ongoing Russian mobilization is almost exclusively dedicated to pushing draftees with 0-4 weeks of training to existing formations anyway. Still, assuming that over 2023 the bulk of storage is reactivated, and at historical loss rates, with a certain amount of new production, Russia as a country will loss all ability to conduct even mobile defense at operational scale by the beginning of 2024, if the war goes on that long. This is also around the time Russia will suffer critical shortages of artillery ammunition and systems in the context of their way of war. The prospects of a long war are increasingly politically and financially untenable for Putin, but if this is one then both sides will be forced to rest and refit throughout 2024 until wholly new production arrives at scale starting from 2025.

https://i.imgur.com/RPsvHrH.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/AmIBWcV.jpg

spmetla

10-09-2022, 08:02

Crazy seeing Iranian riot police marching with the protesters. Perhaps this will lead to something positive!

https://twitter.com/dpatrikarakos/status/1578916102633304064

Edit:
My personal prediction for the next significant Ukrainian offensive should be toward Melitopol. I think the Ukrainians will push here to cut the supplies for the current Kherson front and then instead of pushing to the river Dnipro make for Crimea to get a foothold there as fighting through the isthmus would be extremely difficult if the Russians are allowed to set in.
It'd be a push of about 260km just moving along the roads, with that I think they're currently trying to preserve their strength to build up the forces needed to do a push lasting about a week and half as well as build the op environment by continuing to create multiple crises for the Russians to divert troops to in Kherson and northern Luhansk.
It's a significantly larger area than the Kharkiv offensive pulled off but given the few railways and means for Russia to resupply it is extremely tenuous if Ukraine even gets to Melitopol. Ukraine would probably need double the maneuver forces used in Kharkiv to make this happen and significant forces to fix the current Russian troops in their positions but would work with the current Ukrainian method of fixing strong points and capturing them by forcing a surrender or withdrawal by threatening their ground lines of communication.
Getting to the shore of the Azov Sea again would allow the new anti-ship capabilities of Ukraine to make the port of Rostov essentially cut off and restrict the Black Sea fleets operation to the south of Crimea and the Eastern shore of the black sea.

Montmorency

10-11-2022, 04:52

Maybe it was a truck bomb after all. Or, the truck bomb theory displays the fewest gaps and contradictions. But then, one of the weirdest aspects of the theory of the case would be that someone set up an Azerbaijani suicide bomber against Russia.

Montmorency

10-13-2022, 06:10

US Department of Defense announces that future Abrams and Bradley/Stryker models and will have a hybrid-electric drive, and there will be full-electric utility vehicle models.

By an arch-realist on Twitter (https://twitter.com/RealCynicalFox/status/1576204232671141890):

B/c the ?rules based order? has always been an illusion promulgated by the Wilsonian school. It doesn?t exist, it never did. US/NATO might forced others to play by rules we preferred. Now that that might seems to be waning, that system is under attack.

Something critics of US foreign policy have always pointed out, but this fellow (a particularly ? frustrating voice of inconsistent insight) openly exemplifies a super-narrow emphasis on an extremely limited and almost-universally counterproductive conception of American power and interests. It's impossible to calculate how much damage this perspective has imposed onto American interests even as self-described, to say nothing of general human welfare.

But as he admits, the system has always been under attack by the US itself. No more or less so is it under attack by China, which benefits from the American-built architecture but unsurprisingly seeks to gain more influence over it to bends its benefits to the CCP's preferences. (It's only Russia that is recklessly revisionist, maybe because they have more ideology-poisoning over there than most places.) Maybe if there were a robust and vital international system from the outset there wouldn't be such a controversy over who gets to set its conditions! Analogically, such exploitative philosophies are also partly why more and more states across the West are failing internally from a lack of public-conscious and accountable governance and civil society.

To further call attention to the lack of a coherent vision on interests beyond lack of resistance to the contemporaneous whims of the American executive, this fellow has previously in his interactions condemned the EU for lacking the capacity to set a common agenda and rejected the proposal to establish a common European security architecture on the grounds that if successful it would theoretically increase the scope for dissonance with American security priorities - that is, lessen American primacy in Europe. Yeah... so?

A strong, stable, unified, confident EU that pays for its own defense and is totally supine to your version of American interests? What, do you want an on-call blowjob service too?

Pick your "poison" as they say. :shrug:

My personal prediction for the next significant Ukrainian offensive should be toward Melitopol. I think the Ukrainians will push here to cut the supplies for the current Kherson front and then instead of pushing to the river Dnipro make for Crimea to get a foothold there as fighting through the isthmus would be extremely difficult if the Russians are allowed to set in.
It'd be a push of about 260km just moving along the roads, with that I think they're currently trying to preserve their strength to build up the forces needed to do a push lasting about a week and half as well as build the op environment by continuing to create multiple crises for the Russians to divert troops to in Kherson and northern Luhansk.
It's a significantly larger area than the Kharkiv offensive pulled off but given the few railways and means for Russia to resupply it is extremely tenuous if Ukraine even gets to Melitopol. Ukraine would probably need double the maneuver forces used in Kharkiv to make this happen and significant forces to fix the current Russian troops in their positions but would work with the current Ukrainian method of fixing strong points and capturing them by forcing a surrender or withdrawal by threatening their ground lines of communication.
Getting to the shore of the Azov Sea again would allow the new anti-ship capabilities of Ukraine to make the port of Rostov essentially cut off and restrict the Black Sea fleets operation to the south of Crimea and the Eastern shore of the black sea.

I?m not so sure, despite the level of speculation focused on that sector since July. It?s obviously a target, with a number of tiered objectives present towards staging the endgame of the war (Tokmak, Mariupol, Melitopol, axis into Kherson, axis into Donetsk), but the prerequisites as I see them just aren?t there.

So far Ukraine has demonstrated a strategy of attacking where RuFOR is weakest or most vulnerable, and those places are still the current open fronts for UFOR, with about 12 brigades allocated to each by my best guess. The condition of the strategic reserve is still consciously or materially limited enough that the holding forces in Donetsk have continued to cede ground to DPR and Wagner. They've never stopped doing so during the entire war really, except for brief periods in April, July, and late August/early September. It would only be a testament of decisive Ukrainian superiority if the RuFOR advances in the center were permanently halted even as UFOR maintained an advance elsewhere, and we're clearly not there yet.

By now Ukraine has probably bogged down as well following a month of intense activity, as it struggles a lot against prepared Russian defenses and always has, while the Russian defenses in Kherson and Luhansk are getting firmer than they have been and the supply situation in Kherson remains unexpectedly decent. Moreover, UFOR has repeatedly failed to execute the pursuit phase of maneuver warfare, leaving retreating or routing RuFOR time to consolidate, whether out of command failure, lack of skill or will among maneuver elements, sustainment limitations, a lack of confidence, or other reasons.

Zaporizhzhia specifically has been getting reinforced continually since August by relatively-strong units, and there's still that substantial strategic reserve between Kherson and Melitopol that's been out of combat for months. A couple NATO-standard divisions with Abrams would be ideally deployed to this front, and I still haven't seen any indication that we're helping stand up such a force.

It?s just not likely from my understanding of the fundamentals that the resources exist for a third open front that by its attributes in terrain and space demand at the very least a fresh 10 brigades, probably 20, to make significant progress.

My informal checklist, with presumptuous illustration, for setting conditions to a Zaporizhzhia offensive:

1. Liberate Starobilsk; clear the west bank of the AidarRiver; clear the north bank of the Siversky Donets River.
2. Isolate/besiege Kherson City, at the minimum.
3. Isolate Lysychansk; cross the SD River in force to threaten Alchevsk and Popasna from the rear and block the road to Luhansk City.
4. Finally execute the Great Zaporizhzhia Schlieffen Plan.

26029

spmetla

10-14-2022, 01:38

US Department of Defense announces that future Abrams and Bradley/Stryker models and will have a hybrid-electric drive, and there will be full-electric utility vehicle models.

It will certainly be exciting when that happens. To have tanks sitting in the defense on electric drive mode with the engine off will keep the heat signature low making it much more difficult to find with thermals (assuming that thermal blankets are used to make the hull not grow hot from the sun).
Also, the reliability of electric drive so long as you have some battery power may save crew members if their main power pack is knocked out.

But as he admits, the system has always been under attack by the US itself.
I think the biggest portion of the rules-based world that he US and the West in general has upheld was the concept that war should not be used to resolve issues of borders/sovereignty. From the start it was never about not using force as there are ample examples even in the decade immediately following the establishment of the UN.

The biggest outlier to this is Kosovo, which was made independent of Serbia against the consent of Serbia.

The secondary outliers would be the borders of Kashmir and Israel/Palestine. Both of which have histories since their inception that make the opinion of the UN or its member states secondary to who hold the actual land.

No more or less so is it under attack by China, which benefits from the American-built architecture but unsurprisingly seeks to gain more influence over it to bends its benefits to the CCP's preferences. (It's only Russia that is recklessly revisionist, maybe because they have more ideology-poisoning over there than most places.)

China has pushed it the limits whenever and wherever possible in areas such as Tibet, Korea, its borders with Russia, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Vietnam/Indochina. The only thing that has changed is that China now has the maritime strength to do that for its maritime claims too. The grey zone tactics are a good way to skirt the international order by using non-military force with the Blue and White hull fleets as the first line of defense.

Russia's recklessness was based of assumed weakness and disunity in the West. I too thought the EU and NATO wouldn't have the will to stand up to Putin, endure the gas shortages, and support Ukraine while erasing economic gains and going back into recession. If Zelenksy hadn't galvanized his country and the West in general in the days after Feb 24th through personal example then Putin's gamble would have paid off.
I personally think the PRC has more ideological poisoning as its population is in general much less exposed to foreigners compared to Russia which has been consuming Western products and ideas for decades. Russia's recklessness is from trying to regain its former status as under the USSR, the PRC's threat will be when and where they decide to create their own 'Danzig crisis' to determine if the US remains a stakeholder in East Asia/West Pacific.

The Rules based order does exist, if it didn't more of the world would be in a state of armed uncertainty as all nations were prior to WW2. The threat of intervention by outside countries has deterred most attempts at conquest since WW2.
The ruling nuclear power/security council permanent members have always had a separate set of unwritten rules of course but part of that was not invading and conquering your neighbors. In general, you were allowed to overthrow countries within your 'sphere' or force them to remain but there seemed to be a statute of limitations.

It?s just not likely from my understanding of the fundamentals that the resources exist for a third open front that by its attributes in terrain and space demand at the very least a fresh 10 brigades, probably 20, to make significant progress.

My informal checklist, with presumptuous illustration, for setting conditions to a Zaporizhzhia offensive:

If the resources don't exist then yeah, you're totally right. However for your checklist, I don't think number 2 can be accomplished without starting number 4 first. I think the Ukrainians continue to apply steady pressure on areas 1 and 2 to try and accomplish as much as possible there. Any major action by Ukraine in the Zaporizhzhia area dislodges and threatens the defense of Kherson and Donetsk. I see number four as the area with the biggest danger to overall Russia's objectives. Threatening this area while Russia is still trying to hold northern Luhansk and Kherson with its forces on the far side of the Dnipro could cause a collapse of both those fronts. If Kherson is taken first then an economy of force defense south of the Dnipro should allow Russia to focus its defenses to retain the land bridge. The current Russian effort to defend north of the Dnipro is much more vulnerable and takes far more of its resources.

Who know for sure though, fall here and the winter snows aren't long off. I'll be curious as to the ability of both sides to sustain limited offenses in winter conditions. I can't see a scenario in which Ukraine lets off any pressure though as news of victories is what guarantees continued Western support and denies Russia time to train its troops properly for next year.

What do you guys think about the nuclear threat. I personally don't think this threat is real and that it's for the ignorant public to fear and therefore lessen support Ukraine and try and force for a (Elon Musk Style) negotiated settlement. Macron's statements certainly match that of the rest of NATO. I like the current US stance that any nuclear use will result in large scale, decisive, US conventional forces intervening. I'd reserve the nuclear option for only any actions against NATO proper.

Montmorency

10-14-2022, 04:14

It will certainly be exciting when that happens. To have tanks sitting in the defense on electric drive mode with the engine off will keep the heat signature low making it much more difficult to find with thermals (assuming that thermal blankets are used to make the hull not grow hot from the sun).
Also, the reliability of electric drive so long as you have some battery power may save crew members if their main power pack is knocked out.

I think the biggest portion of the rules-based world that he US and the West in general has upheld was the concept that war should not be used to resolve issues of borders/sovereignty. From the start it was never about not using force as there are ample examples even in the decade immediately following the establishment of the UN.

From such a realist's perspective as his, the US properly works to enforce its will on the international stage using all available tools, and the problem with Russian actions isn't that they violate some fake independent stabilizing order but that they challenge US primacy across orders. IMO it's all self-fulfilling if you take that sort of realism as prescriptive rather than as a model to help describe state relations. Of course I doubt this person would apply the framework of strict legal realism or critical studies to the domestic realm even though he comports according to their predictions...

26030

A true international order does require some voluntary mutual accountability of state actors according to democratic processes. There is some extant level of sub-democratic voluntary accountability that he wouldn't acknowledge in those terms, such as in the possibility of states acting within agreements or rulesets that don't 100% benefit them in the short term for the sake of a broader stability or participation (also a component of social compromise and integration within societies), but very little overall and often undermined by large states such as the US.

If Zelenksy hadn't galvanized his country and the West in general in the days after Feb 24th through personal example then Putin's gamble would have paid off.

I tend to agree with the structural bent here that individual leaders can't really have that level of independent influence on historical scale. Other possible Russian rulers may not have been likely to pursue the specific controversial approach Putin took - including the alternate possibility of a more limited and effective war plan! - but the Ukrainian response was inherently driven by collective societal factors in a way that isn't responsive to any individual's proximate action. At best we could speculate that Zelensky helped focus and lock in Western aid early.

I personally think the PRC has more ideological poisoning as its population is in general much less exposed to foreigners compared to Russia which has been consuming Western products and ideas for decades. Russia's recklessness is from trying to regain its former status as under the USSR, the PRC's threat will be when and where they decide to create their own 'Danzig crisis' to determine if the US remains a stakeholder in East Asia/West Pacific.

Of course almost by definition the Russian elite has been heavily steeped in Western material, political, and high cultures since birth in a way that has never been characteristic in China beyond like missionary communities and diplomatic children, but the issue of ideological motivation is separate from cultural familiarity. I could be wrong but my impression of the dominant factions of the CCP is that they aren't consumed by the same sort of mythopoetic superiority complex (very much a post-WW2 construction) as in Russia. The 'eternal civilization' meme is just far from the Russian equivalent. It's also very much worth keeping in mind that the 'sticking points' between China and the US are actually fewer than those between the US and Russia/FSU; China may maintain some unpopular and/or unethical domestic and diplomatic policies, but the game only becomes high-stakes over the singular fate of Taiwan. Think of it this way: if the CCP defused the Taiwan question tomorrow, in what sense could they be considered to rise to the level of an enemy? Whereas the Soviet Union was implacably in opposition to the American-led system during the Cold War (even if there were in fact many missed opportunities for detente). To an extent it's also significant that the pre-existing Russian hawk ideology has only calcified post-Cold War into bitter revanchism and resentment of the US, including open contentions of Russian power in the global arena, while the CCP has historically emphasized a self-image at home and abroad as inward-looking and relatively pacifistic. It's not obvious that this is obscuring Russian-style pathologies.

All of these comments have been to directly and obliquely criticize the quoted perspective, which is that the US has a specified "interest" that it must always seek to roughly impose on everyone else, and China is uncomplicatedly our enemy that we must invest resources in suppressing because they come at cross-purposes to some variants of US foreign policy. Substance and values are irrelevant, all that matters is the US getting its way in every instance. This ideology is short-sighted and self and allo-destructive. Just compare its proven record to, for example, Marxist-Leninism.

If the resources don't exist then yeah, you're totally right. However for your checklist, I don't think number 2 can be accomplished without starting number 4 first.

The bridge strike does make sense in combination with imminent operations to cut the other supply route, as I noted a few days ago, but that's on paper, and there may be too many other factors militating against opening another front, including the unnamed factor of worsening weather. Note that levels of rain and mud will probably be lower than average given this year's weather patterns (hot and dry, who'da thunk it?), as they were during the spring, but at the scale of Ukraine's grandest maneuver yet it will be a relevant limitation for the next two months in particular. And while the Kerch rail line seems to be closed for now, by the end of the year the entirety of the damaged road and rail sections will probably have been replaced or repaired (in the absence of ATACMS).

And yes, restricting LOC to the bridgehead have proven extremely difficult with the inherent weakness of HIMARS against infrastructure and the reality that the Kakhovka dam-bridge essentially cannot be closed without destroying the dam itself, which is not an option. Large-scale supply and reinforcement columns have not been prevented from crossing the river entirely over the past 3 months. But this difficulty can be resolved for the most part by accomplishing another 30km advance and seizing the littoral around the dam, including Beryslav. At that point the rest of the river comes under PGM fire control and regular direct observation, sealing the bridgehead's fate for good.

I think the Ukrainians continue to apply steady pressure on areas 1 and 2 to try and accomplish as much as possible there. Any major action by Ukraine in the Zaporizhzhia area dislodges and threatens the defense of Kherson and Donetsk. I see number four as the area with the biggest danger to overall Russia's objectives. Threatening this area while Russia is still trying to hold northern Luhansk and Kherson with its forces on the far side of the Dnipro could cause a collapse of both those fronts. If Kherson is taken first then an economy of force defense south of the Dnipro should allow Russia to focus its defenses to retain the land bridge. The current Russian effort to defend north of the Dnipro is much more vulnerable and takes far more of its resources.

To be clear, in reality all available information shows that Stages 1 and 2 have been proceeding contemporaneously and will probably culminate successfully on a similar timeline, or maybe even non-linearly. I don't want to convey a rigid timeline or process to implementation.

Stage 3 is actually essential because by crossing the river to entering the rear of the longstanding central frontline in Donetsk a collapse of that front becomes much likelier and forces a redeployment of Russian formations to defend a growing frontline that stretches into territory that has no established defenses or fortifications, and is of paramount political priority. Moreover, the vast majority of forces operating in Donetsk are separatist, not VSRF, and if they were brought to surrender then the entire Russian presence in Ukraine beyond Crimea would collapse with the loss of ~100K personnel across 100 miles. It's also why I envision an eastward hook to any campaign in Zaporizhzhia, to cut off the Donetsk-Horlivka urban agglomeration (representing the majority of the Russian-controlled population in the province) and promote panic among north-facing opposition forces along the line there.

Separatist forces in aggregate have proven surprisingly resilient, but if their main cities and the main body of their forces are enveloped their position should be untenable to non-fanatics. These separatists aren't just Russia's Italy or Romania, their exit would singlehandedly push Russia out of most of Ukraine, whereas the war probably can't end for Ukraine so long as the separatists field a viable force. We're talking about up to 10% of the pre-war Russian-controlled population that have been put to service, without whom the war would have functionally ended for Russia already by April.

Meanwhile, if prosecuted properly - and this is an open question given the difficulty UFOR has had in sealing pockets - the Kherson campaign would eliminate the majority of Russia's remaining VDV formations, which are its most capable. Simply put, capturing or destroying tens of thousands of combatants with vastly more fighting spirit than any analogous ten or hundred reservists could ever have will be a net benefit to Ukraine in any economy of force calculation, even without recalling that transferable Ukrainian forces on the west bank in Kherson outnumber transferable Russian forces on the east bank.

There's also the observation, according to reporting from August/September, that joint US-UA war planning has deliberately avoided high-risk large maneuvers in favor of pressuring Russian weak points. E.g. the alleged wargame that led UA centcom to reject a single large counteroffensive for two smaller ones. By all indications this orientation still holds. They might calculate, by the principle also embodied in the original expectations for the Kharkiv Offensive, that continual small attritional-maneuver progress is preferable to a great gambit that drains resources from current areas of success only to crash underwhelmingly against prepared Russian defenses (which to reiterate have always been and observably remain a serious challenge for Ukraine to overcome) or the limits of UFOR's logistical or C3 capacity.

Separately, just to recap some Russian advantages we've observed so far:

1. Institutional resilience.
2. Strong at prepared defense with artillery.
3. Usually able to retrieve formations from desperate circumstances at the last minute in semi-orderly fashion (Kyiv, Izyum, Lyman and Kherson this month).

What do you guys think about the nuclear threat. I personally don't think this threat is real and that it's for the ignorant public to fear and therefore lessen support Ukraine and try and force for a (Elon Musk Style) negotiated settlement. Macron's statements certainly match that of the rest of NATO. I like the current US stance that any nuclear use will result in large scale, decisive, US conventional forces intervening. I'd reserve the nuclear option for only any actions against NATO proper.

Worth a read (https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vernite-strah/) for the Russian ultra perspective.
[The Google translation broke at some point, which is concerning, but the title is "Return fear."]

In the Anglosphere there have been many good Twitter threads contextualizing Russian bargaining strategies. The bottom line is that nuclear is only on the table if you can envision a scenario where Putin believes that, say, battlefield deployment is the only remaining option he has for freezing or terminating the conflict in a way that is personally survivable.

Shaka_Khan

10-17-2022, 00:06

France is going through a fuel crisis:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TulKmxecWik

Montmorency

10-19-2022, 05:07

Reposting here since it's more appropriate:

Unrelated scandal (NYT, Sky News): Large numbers of British - and perhaps other NATO - specialist veterans have been recruited by the Chinese government to train and advise the PLA. Actually this is a common practice with NATO countries, including the US - officers and specialists by the hundreds hire themselves out as advisors to all sorts of shady countries (WaPo). Sometimes they even advise coups, of which Africa may have experienced a record number in the past year. Indeed, Africa has been getting non-stop more violent and terroristy the more we've gotten militarily involved in it, and I'm pretty sure none of this instability is even a deliberate policy. The US mil-sec establishment is terrible at doing anything other than winning conventional wars. Maybe the government should think up alternative policies to promote stability abr

I legitimately don't understand how the decision-making of the Russian government could lead them to invest in a military mobilization less well-trained and resourced than the Soviet one of 1941. They still haven't even sent the (by Russian standards) fully-trained conscripts (as distinct from mobilized reservists) into Ukraine yet! Note that I'm not even referring to the wholly-untrained draftees.

According to the Russian government, repairs on the Kerch Bridge are scheduled for completion in way more than half a year, which is longer than I expected and suggests a serious medium-term reduction in ground transit through Crimea, probably including total stoppage of rail trainsit. Recently I have also heard that there is actually no rail connection between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts, having been disestablished after 2014 and not repaired since. Throughout the war I had based my analysis on railroad maps that included the Donetsk-Volnovakha-Polohy connection. If the information on the post-2014 changes is accurate, this totally changes the strategic picture for southern Ukraine. Polohy, Tokmak, and even Melitopol lose most of their significance if not transit hubs but net supply sinks and destinations, terminating nodes. Although if the rail lane of the Kerch Bridge is unusable then there's no alternative to the Mariupol-Melitopol road. Lack of a Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia rail link leaves the Kherson bridgehead accessible only by long-distance truck and ferry given the loss of rail service through Crimea. If rail transit is out of commission to Kherson for the foreseeable future, then the only mainland ground route is 500km by truck from Donetsk City (Mariupol-Melitopol), a challenge for any military logistics and insurmountable given the foreseeable loss of the Kakhovka Dam route before the end of the year. The maintenance of rail service to Nova Kakhovka from July through this month is probably singlehandedly what threw off UFOR's expected timetable for the reduction of the bridgehead; without it the anticipated supply depletion of RuFOR would have paid off.

Although it's worth noting that now that the barge-bridge adjacent to the Antonivsky Bridge has reportedly been completed, a lot more equipment will be able to be evacuated when the time comes. The priority will almost certainly again be special engineering, EW, and SAM platforms. Hopefully GSUA can anticipate this chokepoint and be ready to cover both ends with fire when it is put into mass utilization.

The one bright spot for Russia is that Iran will supply them with thousands of drones and missiles, over the length of the war. Russia probably retains no more than 2000 PGM missiles in total, maybe even 1000, even when including the strategic reserve against NATO, for nuclear delivery, or for a potential mass strike against Ukraine's power, water, and bridge infrastructure (would require a bare minimum of 500 missiles). Iranian throwaway drones and missiles are a good munitions sink against Ukrainian IADS and a potential tool for overwhelming that IADS before a mass strike with PGM. Even with just a month's worth of steady bombardment Ukraine's energy network has sustained some damage. (The Ukrainian government reports 600 Russian PGMs remaining in stock but I suspect this only applies to missiles allocated for operations in Ukraine.)

The double-edged sword of modern strategic bombardment is that there are so many targets. It's a disadvantage for the attacker for obvious reasons, but it's also a disadvantage for the defender if the attacker has cheap munitions in bulk (non-PGM) since so many targets can't be shielded by modern air defense branches. Poetically, the best weapon against drones or slow cruise missiles is just WW2-era AA cannon coupled with advanced radar and targeting. The German donation of Gepards seemed laughable during the summer, as they have little place in active combat today, but they're overqualified to defend fixed locations against the likes of Shahed-136. Even so, the problem of too many targets reasserts itself, though in Ukraine's case it's theoretically solveable by combining their excess human resources with some lower-tech targeting upgrades on all the surplus Soviet 23mm cannon they have lying about - but I don't think either Ukrainian or NATO leadership have got on this ball yet. It's promises much more and more effective coverage for a much lower opportunity/financial cost than million-dollar AMRAAMs.

This translation (https://twitter.com/fatimatlis/status/1581111180059611137) is not very good, but it's sufficient.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0plRt5-eUE

Rakhmon to Putin sum up: All we hear is sharing information, but what information? Everything is fake, everything is a cover up. Europe and U.S. must know what is happening in reality, and what is happening is that we have problems, we, the Central Asians have problems with you.

Rakhmon to Putin: We have 2 million ethnic Russians. Russian language is a required study from kindergarten to university. But we don’t have Russian language text books, we ask, and ask, and ask, and I don’t want to offend you, but you don’t care.

Rakhmon to Putin: Your businessmen come and rob us of our natural resources, they are not interested in anything but oil, gas that will enrich them. But how about our industry? Our national strategic interests? You don’t care!

Rakhmon to Putin: I was there when the Soviet Union collapsed, I’ve witnessed it. I know why it has collapsed- it is for the same things you are doing now. It did not support the small nations, did not help them develop economically, preserve culture, traditions. Same as you!

Rakhmon to Putin: We are not a big nation, we are not a hundred million nation but we have our history, we have our culture and traditions and we love them. We do not want your money, we want to be respected as we deserve.

Rakhmon to Putin: We host your military bases, we do everything you ask for, we really try to be what you pretend to be to us “strategic partners.” But we are never being treated like strategic partners! No offense, but we want to be respected! (Loose translation summary)

We've heard this language before, pointedly. But according to the campists, the Russian government is the only one in the world who can claim grievance from disrespect.

spmetla

10-21-2022, 03:58

Agree with just about everything you put up there. The vulnerability of logistics for Russia in the South but in Crimea specifically is why I'm hoping/thinking that the major Ukrainian attack will happen toward Melitopol as that land route is vital to all their efforts, even if the railways aren't in use. I know they are currently attacking in Kherson but nothing open sources seems to indicate that the pressure is more significant than in the past few weeks.

The recent threat of false flags is worrisome as Russia has a long history of such claims for their future actions. If that dam is blown then the nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia loses its water for cooling which together with all the downstream flooding events creates an additional crisis.

The threats of Mykolaiv having a nuke already staged there for false flag is equally worrying, though I don't think Putin is crazy enough to go nuclear yet, if he does then I don't see how we confine the conflict to Ukraine, and I could see a general state of war in Europe. I'm glad the US has a strong posture against any such attack and has warned Russia fairly clearly of the very real US response such an attack would result in.

The German donation of Gepards seemed laughable during the summer, as they have little place in active combat today, but they're overqualified to defend fixed locations against the likes of Shahed-136. Even so, the problem of too many targets reasserts itself, though in Ukraine's case it's theoretically solveable by combining their excess human resources with some lower-tech targeting upgrades on all the surplus Soviet 23mm cannon they have lying about - but I don't think either Ukrainian or NATO leadership have got on this ball yet. It's promises much more and more effective coverage for a much lower opportunity/financial cost than million-dollar AMRAAMs.

Just want to throw out there that Gepards are actually still very effective and potent weapons. As longer ranged weapons push aircraft to the deck the engagement window for fast movers shortens significantly. Enough so that Gepards are some of the few platforms that are a threat to CAS such as Su-25s when positioned on likely ingress/egress routes, especially when paired with a longer ranged platform like Pansir (the Germans would pair these with the French Roland ADA system). Flat land like Ukraine makes it more difficult to predict flight paths compared to western Europe but it remains a useful though not game-changer on the battlefield.
Absolutely right about AAA with radar or something, that's all it really takes. would really have to saturate around modern urban sprawl which would take hundreds of such systems to really protect Kiev or any major city in Ukraine.

Montmorency

10-21-2022, 05:40

I don't actually know if the rail link between Melitopol and Donetsk is cut; I'd like to see it confirmed in more detail. It would explain the erratic actions of Russian forces in Kherson lately however. If the rail link is not operational, then it really seems pointless to me to invest in a Zaporizhzhia offensive before units can be freed up from Kherson and while humid weather will be more of a problem than usual for the next month.

Blowing the dam seems to harm Crimean water access quite a lot. Thankfully a deeper investigation of the expected spillage and topography of the area suggests that only thousands rather than tens of thousands will be killed, but anyway most of the flooding would occur on the east bank of the river, destroying quite a lot of Russian ordnance unless they've thoroughly evacuated the whole area. I still think this is all just getting ahead of siege conditions by removing the civilian population of the bridgehead.

The limitation of Gepards is that they are very expensive (though SPAAG in general could be cheaper) and present a larget target profile, whereas MANPAD squads, while less able to react left of boom than a radar-enabled platform, can better saturate an area with limited self-exposure by their nature. Either way with these short-range solutions you have to wait for a deck-flying plane or helicopter to just happen to pass over the effective radius, and unless it's an open area a tracking missile will have a better chance to perform than the AA gun. But if it's an open area you exacerbate the vulnerabilities of the AA gun as a platform. This is why a Gepard or other AA gun is best suited for defense of fixed emplacements or infrastructure, where in principle it is possible to achieve excellent preparation and coverage with just a few units and enemy ground or artillery forces are not a threat.

The number of targets or potential targets to defend does call for many units, but only a few hundred for all of Ukraine IMO, not thousands as in WW2. This is because of the synergistic effect of a comprehensive IADS incorporating AAA, SHORAD, and LORAD/HIMAD. The powerful overlapping radars of long or medium-range systems, if well-integrated by C3, can prioritize and assign incoming targets economically while achieving near-total coverage of all truly essential objects (it's a bad idea to try to protect everything). So while Ukraine has probably been exaggerating its intercept rate for Russian drones and missiles, it may not be far from 50% as it is.

Even a quick and dirty digital upgrade package for existing 23mm AA in Ukraine would probably take a year to roll out at scale (assuming someone were actually getting to work on it), minimum half a year, so to be clear this is all theoretical and probably won't be demonstrated in this war unless it drags on for years. But if these packages were ready off-the-shelf, I do believe just a few hundred would be enough to offer an overall 90+% intercept rate.

As it is the Russian bombing campaign is more successful than I initially understood, with Ukrainian authorities claiming damage to something approaching half the power system (mostly transmission). I have a strong feeling we could have avoided this situation with Iran...

Perun has a good video just out on SAM systems in the Ukraine War, and something I didn't know is that Ukraine started out with a reported 250 S-300 systems (HIMAD), which must have been the overwhelming factor in keeping the Russian airforce low or at bay. Imagine how many Russia must have started with, not to mention S-400s, the new S-350s, or all the mid/short-range platforms? It's no wonder Ukraine has been slowly, over weeks, shifting HIMARS tactics from low-effect logistics/infrastructure strikes to counter-arty and counter-SAM (what it was designed for). I also didn't know that the inoperation of Russian SAM radars during the first weeks was ordered by opcom to avoid friendly fire (which we have seen recorded on both sides throughout the war). The NATO SAMs such as IRIS and NASAMS are only mid-range, and few in number, but they're desperately needed to take pressure off the limited S-300 missile stockpile, even if the NATO missiles are more expensive (a reminder that sticker price is less important than physical availability).

Clutch cruise missile intercept just hundreds of meters from a power plant, though seemingly following a prior hit on the facility (that's the coin flip for you).
https://twitter.com/War_Takes/status/1582943511904538624 [VIDEO]

Montmorency

10-22-2022, 22:59

Some developing stories to track:

1. As early as the immediate aftermath of the last Ukrainian breakthrough in Kherson around Oct. 6, Russian forces were reported to be preparing to relocate heavy equipment out of the bridgehead. Now it seems a large-scale withdrawal from the current contact line is underway.
2. Ukrainian probing attacks have been noted throughout Zaporizhzhia, which has been relatively quiet for at least 3 months.

If the substantial collapse of the Kherson bridgehead is imminent, a Zaporizhzhia offensive does become more plausible. Let's wait and see.

Hell of a thing if the Kerch Bridge incident does in 2 weeks what HIMARS couldn't in 2 months.

Montmorency

10-25-2022, 05:19

To update the foregoing:

There have been some minor Ukrainian gains in Kherson, but it wasn't a Russian retrenchment, just normal ongoing combat. Most of the evidence still points to the Russians evacuating pro-Russian civilians and a lot of heavy equipment, making good use of the Kakhovka Dam while they still can and continuously fortifying Kherson City itself. There are some troop rotations with murky objectives, in that it's unclear what the quality of troops on either end of the substitution is (viz. high for high, low for low, low for high, high for low).

Strange happenings continue in Zaporizhzhia, but still at at an absolute level not much higher than the northern international border of Ukraine.

From what I understand of Internet chatter, and I may be wrong, Ukraine is using at least some Gepards in a cleverer way than we imagined here. Since some Shaheds are used against battlefield targets (besides recon or grenade drones), or otherwise have to fly a long cross-country route relatively slowly, Gepards stationed not far from the front can be in a position to vector themselves to an intercept, to use terminology loosely.

spmetla

10-25-2022, 18:58

I haven't seen much happening there or along any front, at least not noteworthy. The repulse of the Russians at Bakmut seems the only item of real interest but I think right now for both sides the autumn rains are the big factor. Offensive action would be restricted on the road networks, getting ready for the winter is probably a major factor. When the frost starts to harden the soil perhaps, they'll be some action on either side.

From what I understand of Internet chatter, and I may be wrong, Ukraine is using at least some Gepards in a cleverer way than we imagined here. Since some Shaheds are used against battlefield targets (besides recon or grenade drones), or otherwise have to fly a long cross-country route relatively slowly, Gepards stationed not far from the front can be in a position to vector themselves to an intercept, to use terminology loosely.

From what I understand, they proved vital during the Kharkiv offensive too as the ground gained was too fast for the larger systems to keep up safely so they needed to rely on the Gepard, MANPADs when dismounted from vehicles to provide some point air defense. Same with the Tungsukas and Shilka systems of soviet vintage.

I'm curious if the system has had kills besides drones.

On the political side, I'm irritated at the progressive wing of the US Democrats asking Biden to engage in negotiations with Russia directly. The worst thing that can happen is to throw Ukraine under the bus or make deals about them without them. I know the US did the same in the Korean War but in that we were the major combatant contributor for the South, in this case we are just the major backer and are not shedding blood at all. If the Ukrainians are ready to negotiate then so be it, giving in to Putin's nuclear threats is a slippery slope. Could mean that in future conflicts like Taiwan that China just says that any arms shipments will be sunk and any effort to stop those actions will be met by nuclear force to hold the US back.
Scholz criticized over China's Cosco bid in Hamburg port
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-scholz-hit-with-backlash-over-plan-for-chinese-investment-in-hamburg-port/a-63505648

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz came under fire from both allies and the opposition on Thursday over a reported plan for Chinese investment in the Port of Hamburg.

The deal, which public broadcasters NDR and WDR say is being promoted by Scholz, will allow Chinese shipping firm Cosco to acquire a major stake in a container terminal at the port.

There is reportedly a dispute between Scholz and several government ministries over the bid, amid concerns that it would give Cosco too much of an investment share in the port. Cosco, which is headquartered in Beijing, is already the Hamburg port's biggest client.

NRD and WDR reported that all six ministeries involved in reviewing the investment deal have rejected the plans.

I'm pretty disappointed in Scholz so far. The German 'rearmament' has been halfhearted and slow, the support for Ukraine has been there but always a step behind other allies so to see him still have advocated for the biggest Authoritarian threat of the future to make further inroads in German infrastructure seems to continue the naivete of the past.
There's no need to completely decouple from China but surely there should be a reconsideration of how making big deals with potential rivals puts one's own national security at risk.

Montmorency

10-25-2022, 20:31

We already knew this, but in an interview a Ukrainian intel chief admitted that the Kakhovka Dam bridge has remained fully operational throughout Ukraine's fielding of HIMARS (because it's a dam). He called it the only fully operational LOC the bridgehead has maintained. So indeed, the loss of the Kerch Bridge will very likely prove the decisive factor in this drawn-out battle displaying unexpected Russian strengths.

I'm pretty sure someone jumped the gun on the Progressive Caucus statement, as it was drafted in June and basically all signatories either rejected the statement or denounced its release. Hence by the time of your posting it had been publicly retracted. Regardless, it is embarrassing to the US and damaging to the Democratic Party in the run-up to the election.

People need proper context on weather in Ukraine, so I wrote the following for general use (adding the observation that this week is about as wet as Kherson has been or will be in a while):

Some points on weather in Ukraine...

Weather is a concrete effect of temporal and local conditions, not a videogame-like global status effect (-25% movement). Too often when I see discussion of mud effects in Ukraine it is being treated as the latter, as though one moment Ukraine is frozen or dry and the next a 10-foot wall of mud covers everything for weeks.

Ukraine's mud effects usually manifest around March-April and October-December. There is mud before and after these months, but less of it in aggregate. Ukraine is muddier overall during these months not necessarily because they are wetter months - Ukraine is rainiest in May through July, and precipitation trends vary by region - but because they are very *cloudy* months. To simplify, if we can think of Ukraine's solsticial days as being 16 and 8 hours long respectively, around these benchmarks the days are 50% clear or overcast, respectively. Soil and air retains more moisture under cloud cover, and skies are clearest during summer (besides warm).

Ukraine is warmer now than it was during those famous years of WW2. That should be no surprise. See the image: average annual temps are up by 2-3 degrees Celsius. While the climate has brought somewhat more precipitation in the long run since the 40s, the trend has been declining since the late 20th century, and climate disruption should also have reduced cloud coverage and will allegedly increase the frequency of both droughts and extreme precipitation events. (I'll just mention that I have seen passing comments that Ukraine is set to become climatically wetter in its marshy north & sub-Carpathian west and drier in its south.) There are also many more roads and urbanities scattered about than in the bygone peasant-dirt era, and it's super-important to foreground the well-chronicled German difficulties with mud in the macroregion against their reliance on horses, foot infantry, and more primitive motor vehicles on paths through hundreds of miles of sheer dirt.
https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/ukraine/trends-variability-historical

https://i.imgur.com/PQbmC1J.jpg

I discussed some of this at the beginning of the war. At the time, I predicted a limited mud effect because that winter was reportedly (https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/08/europe/ukraine-russia-weather-climate-intl/index.html) warm and dry. Indeed, visual and primary accounts indicated that both sides had little trouble moving off-road, and Russia's mission-killed vehicles were usually lost to crew abandonment and inadequate fueling rather than terrain. Of terrain effects, driving into water might even have been comparably common to bogging down. Although part of the Russian strategy at the time, pushing large armored columns through towns without preparation, relied more on road-bound movement than normal, I don't believe this was an intended adaptation to mud since GSRU didn't really plan the invasion as such, rather a triumphant march or a crude shock and awe rush. Indeed, we saw more off-road action from late March through April as the Russians began to fight seriously, when mud ought to have been peaking.

So... Ukraine's summer was also warm and dry (https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2022/05/26/ukraines-summer-weather-forecast-hot-dry-and-bloody/?sh=63a3ac3257c5), as it was throughout Europe; *most* days in the area of Lysychansk were in the 80s or 90s! This fall and winter (https://ukranews.com/en/news/886714-ukrainian-weather-center-promises-ukrainians-warm-winter) may promise to be as well (https://www.barrons.com/news/europe-heading-for-unusually-warm-winter-forecaster-01665650107). It has, to reiterate, been a warm and dry year for Ukraine. You can see where this is leading. Or I did, and so checked the monthly forecasts when the counteroffensives began in late summer and again recently. While the Ukrainian and Russian commands no doubt pay more attention to weather than I do, I could already sense the limits of the autumn weather effect.

According to the extended weather forecasts I checked, key proxy towns like Kupyansk/Svatove would primarily see rain in late September, late October, and mid-November. Recall how the recent breakthrough and mobile phase around Lyman occurred in the last week of September and the first week of October, when the ground should have been relatively muddy. Kherson, IIRC the most arid and canalized region in Ukraine other than Crimea, has been and is forecast to just be pretty dry and even partly or fully sunny most of the time. Moreover, I've read that the soil of Kherson is more sandy than clay-like and therefore inherently less susceptible to muddiness than soil in the east, although I don't know how much confidence to place in this or how it interacts with the canal architecture. Kherson should experience wet weather in late November through early December this year however.

NB. Because the root of seasonal mud is insufficient evaporation by solar radiation, the level of muddiness can be cumulative over time before freezing temperatures predominate (thus spring tends to be muddier than fall).

Now, winter will come before long. On the home front, the months of January and February will be the hardest for Ukraine and the people of Europe, and there will likely be at least one major offensive on each side during this period. But don't be all like 'huehuenhue deep freeze endless tundra Mother Russia General Winter plbplvpfdfp.' The climate of the foreseeably-contested parts of Ukraine - Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk - is, from my point of view, well comparable to New York City, downstate NY, and Albany, maybe. Winter temperatures will usually range from high teens to low 30s, and many if not most days will see afternoons above freezing. Ground often won't have a chance to freeze thoroughly, especially not in the South, but it will be cold, damp, and compact. Depending on localized temperatures and rain/snowfall levels, compact will sometimes transition to loose. This should continue to not be enough to disrupt planned offensives, though it will be taken into account both downrange and as it comes up.

In summary, climate variation, climate change, modern infrastructure, technology, and techniques are all things, and weather effects on terrain are temporal and local rather than comprehensive and uniform. Don't digest a video clip of a tracked vehicle with unsoiled road wheels driving over mild mud to conclude that 'a curtain has descended across the country.' None of this is to dismissively contend that mud in Ukraine has no tactical or strategic implications. It has and it will. Vehicles will be slower off-road and will require more maintenance. But it's less than many seem to imagine, and it will manifest at different times in different places and with varying levels, which commanders on both sides will anticipate and react to as it comes up. It will often be surmountable, especially since neither side is liable to be attempting sweeping coordinated maneuvers across many kilometers of open ground.

For reading on the effects of cold weather on materiel and personnel, see MilitaryLand's recent primer. (https://militaryland.net/news/ukrainian-winter-is-coming/)

Shaka_Khan

10-26-2022, 12:19

This is intense!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34-4D-MmR4I

Montmorency

10-26-2022, 21:12

Yes, very videogamish.

Speaking of games...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wx6ZNjxC7SA

Now that would be quick, cheap, and dirty, but I wonder how successful it can be against maneuvering drones larger than commercial quadcopters. Also, the effective range surely can't be beyond a kilometer, which is so last-ditch as to not be worth the trouble in defending fixed infrastructure from attack.

rory_20_uk

10-27-2022, 09:34

Cheap clouds of attackers really require cheap, clouds of defenders. If software could be developed to mesh a load of simple articulated mounts together and was able to use both for detection as well as AA this could be effective (or at least effective enough to justify the outlay) against the small, slow, simple attacks that would just overwhelm current systems. Clearly having it all manually operated is bordering on a joke.

~:smoking:

Montmorency

10-27-2022, 21:12

Clearly having it all manually operated is bordering on a joke.

Oh, we need manual operators to monitor and maintain the equipment to begin with, or it'll almost certainly misfire or malfunction in like 5 minutes. Even basic tech like small arms has that habit when left unsupervised.

But really what is needed is this kind of guidance system coupled with manned flak cannons. Modern weapon systems from tanks to artillery already tend to have digital fire control or targeting assistance for human operators anyway; trying to foist the entire mission onto subpar algoritihms right now would be a needless downgrade. And Ukraine for one is not experiencing a desperate manpower shortage.

In the future, if mini-drones can achieve a high level of machine swarm intelligence, then defense systems will have to respond by becoming more automated in turn, but that's a ways off. Once we see mass drone terror attacks we'll know the military applications are approaching.

spmetla

10-27-2022, 22:44

You'll still want manual operators of a sort to decide whether or not to engage. Think AI making kill decisions is something I'm not comfortable with yet.

Think there will be a lot more high-end systems like this too. While investing in the ultra cheap is useful it'd be suddenly very impotent against slightly better drones.
I imagine we'll see these less capable systems assigned to Companies and Battalion levels again while proper air defense goes to Brigades and above.
Friendly/foe markers or beacons will certainly be vital and I imagine that spoofing as friendlies will be used by threat Drones too.

https://youtu.be/pb5_F4_Eod8?t=78

Montmorency

10-30-2022, 00:23

So according to Shoigu, probably 100K draftees have been rushed in-theater by now, half in combat roles. The nominal remaining 200K would probably all arrive by the end of November, but we'll likely get evidence if some are being withheld for proper training. To be clear, 300K can only be treated as a floor on mobilization over the past month given its indiscriminate character, and it yet continues at a slower pace. Moreover, the deferred round of routine conscription is about to begin, and I suppose we find out whether the conscripts will finally be committed to combat and whether serving conscripts will be stop-lossed onto indefinite contracts.

The UFOR advance on the Svatove Line early in the month has been bitterly stalled for the past 3 weeks as the RuFOR defense had been consolidated enough to maintain constant spoiling attacks west of the P66/07 highway. The initial UFOR failure after September 10 to pursue and exploit the collapse of the Izyum bridgehead, and the contemporaneous failure to take Lyman by storm, left UFOR with no option but to grind the flanks of the Oskil River defenses village by village for 3 weeks. The subsequent UFOR failure to exploit and pursue the collapse of the Lyman Pocket may by then have been baked in, as the backup line along the Krasna River and its western bluffs (east of P66/07) had plenty of time to entrench. There was at least some attempt made, with UFOR crossing the Krasna in at least one location between Svatove and Kreminna, but the bridgehead was forced back almost immediately.

Weak exploitation is kind of a pattern with Ukraine, since there was also the failure to exploit RuFOR's sudden retreat following the breakthrough along the Dnieper River contemporaneous with the capture of Lyman. This deficit spells trouble for UFOR's operational prospects, and suggests Ukraine will never be able to force the surrender of large numbers (>1000) of RuFOR in a single battle (even granting that 21st century warfare may be too mobile to commonly accomplish this in the normal course of maneuver). In related news, Ukrainian losses in armor/AFV seem to have been quite elevated this month.

One way or another these sequenced underperformances in exploiting breakthroughs allowed RuFOR defenses to remain organized, and strengthen, in Luhansk and have arguably greatly extended the timetable for territorial reclamation overall (and increasing flows of Russian draftees will only contribute to stability). Evidently Ukraine will not secure the west bank of the Aidar River this year, and probably not even Kherson City (though the city should be besieged by then).

So OK, we know what Ukraine has to accomplish in Luhansk. It's the same process as earlier, moving village by village until the main defensive line can be compromised and gradually outflanked. The downrange UFOR strategy likely relies on crawling along the Siversky Donets River to secure the oxbow up to the confluence with the Aidar River tributary - in order to set conditions to open a heavy flanking maneuver into Luhansk SE of Lysychansk, towards Alchevsk in LPR territory (as opposed to the extremely inefficient alternative of recapturing all of northern Luhansk and attempting a direct assault of Luhansk City across the Siversky Donets). Therefore UFOR will maintain the goal of securing a bridgehead between Kreminna and Svatove in the coming weeks.

But this is a difficult environment, relatively-compact with a lot of open ground to assault over. Lately the more productive area has been in the north, on the outskirts of Svatove itself and to the town's northwest. Obviously UFOR has an imperative to couple any southern penetration and flanking against the Svatove Line with a northern counterpart. Proximately, one would expect a location between Svatove and Nyzhnia Duvanka. But UFOR also might see a benefit in moving cross country toward Troitske.

A deep flanking maneuver toward Troitske has a number of benefits. First, it captures the most transport-critical border town under Russian control for a couple hundred miles, anchoring UFOR's northern flank. Second, it cuts one of two rail routes through Starobilsk. Third, it opens a number of routes along highway roads either in the southern direction along the Svatove Line or eastwards toward Starobilsk, enabling further operations. But it's not easy terrain with exceptionally poor infrastructure, so I suspect UFOR might try penetrating both north and south of Nyzhnia Duvanka, and using the P66 highway to roll both north and south (towad Troitske and Svatove respectively).

Meanwhile, UFOR still clearly intends to use Bilohorivka (south of the SD, just west of Lysychansk) as a springboard to retaking Lysychansk and Popasna. If this could be accomplished alongside the bypassing of Kreminna and Severodonetsk, all of these major urban concentrations could be cut off from resupply (examine the map) and captured at leisurely pace. Thus RuFOR's great Donbass Front would have its northern flank unhinged and the stage would be set for the later operations into the LPR core.

https://i.imgur.com/THn5ZHe.jpg

If the assault into LPR (southern Luhansk) is bound to be realized only in 2023, that extends the timeframe for a Zaporizhzhia offensive with eastward hook into the DPR, because the greatest threat to the Donbass Front would be to pressure it from both flanks, in a reversal of what RuFOR endeavored with little success back in the spring. Moreover, if the Kherson bridgehead persists for so long, those forces can't be transferred to Zapo. But there is an alternative to one great Zapo offensive (too much to bite off). If Kherson City itself cannot realistically or in remotely-timely fashion be carried without storm (during a siege the civilians would suffer more than the occupiers anyway), then so be it - capture it from the EAST instead.

Beryslav and the Kakhovka Dam absolutely need to be secured in the coming weeks as an unbreakable supply line for Russia. Despite the loss of the Kerch railway, UFOR is still not attriting and interdicting the defenders' supplies sufficiently. Removing the dam route compacts the bridgehead while placing the Dnieper under much better fire control, constraining the throughput of the ferries and the the barge bridge. This is more or less all pre-requisite to compacting the bridgehead to just Kherson City. Then, we remember that the loss of rail transit through Crimea affords UFOR half a year to run wild in the South (and hopefully by then ATCMS would be available to extend that). In other words, a difficult siege can be obviated by devoting all reserves, and most of the Kherson battlegroup, to a westwards Zapo offensive. The latter will no longer be needed to finish the job west of the river in this scenario, becoming available for other uses. A successful operation to recapture or bypass Melitopol has to take place at some time anyway, and it would inherently force a departure from or surrender of Kherson City without a proximal fight.

Since UFOR's strategy has been visibly motivated by political considerations at various times, this approach may further be indicated with regards to reaching the Crimean isthmus and attempting a bridgehead into the peninsula before its defenses can be perfected (and of course before the connection with Russia can be fully repaired). As a mirror to RuFOR political considerations, this approach might also cost Luhansk the focus of GenStaff-RU/Putin and thereby weaken its defenses at a crucial juncture downrange.

Just a few words on what shape such a Zapo offensive, perhaps executed in January, might take. It would be the most operationally-complex UFOR offensive to date, having to secure very long flanks along the axes of advance.

The indispensable first-phase target has to be the road-hub of Tokmak, for obvious reasons. Vasylivka also has to be taken, because it opens a main highway straight down from Zapo City, and also enables a relatively-easy westward march to isolate Enerhodar. The whole area NW of Melitopol is pretty insignificant strategically, but it does contain the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, whose reclamation is a non-military priority for Ukraine. Vasylivka might be important enough to approach directly, or it might be cut off from the south by a push out of Tokmak. Either way, UFOR would then be able to open multiple axes toward enveloping Melitopol from the north and NW. This would almost certainly be the most important sector of any Zapo offensive.

UFOR would have to advance south and SW of Tokmak to encroach on Melitopol itself, and hopefully begin to envelop it from the south.

Another road hub, Polohy, right on the frontline, would also likely have to be captured to establish the extreme flank of the entire offensive. Optimistically, the highway between Polohy and Berdyansk would be a major axis of advance and might eventually form the obverse line securing the rear of the offensive and defining future offensives toward Donetsk and Mariupol.

Just UFOR reaching Melitopol might be enough to get Kherson City abandoned, although in practice UFOR could reach Crimea itself and Russia would arguably still leave a few thousand men trapped in Kherson to fight to the death/surrender.

Russia would make heavy use of the coastal highway connecting Melitopol and Mariupol in this scenario. It's kind of the only transverse major road in the entire region, besidse the very vulnerable Mariupil-Polohy highway, so there would be little alternative (also why UFOR would have to sever it somewhere). If UFOR can achieve an initial breakthrough the defense would have a generally difficult time in this region, but if UFOR is bogged down then it could easily take a month or more of determined offensive action just to reach Melitopol.

To reiterate, the premise for these scenarios is a continued lack of conventional success in Luhansk and Kherson.

https://i.imgur.com/t94u5jq.jpg

Note that the distance from Svatove to Starobilsk is 50km, and the distance from Mariupol to Melitopol is 150km. The length of the Svatove Front is 100km, as would be the maximum depth of a Zaporizhzhia offensive.

Montmorency

10-31-2022, 06:23

To go into a little more detail, for example on Svatove, these musings are somewhat readily evident, but I felt more confident speaking at length because it does appear to be what Ukrainian forces have been up to the past week, however slowly. It helps to take a closer look at the geography.

(For reference, Svatove is about 5km north to south.)

https://i.imgur.com/1lsoim3.jpg

Those ridge-like features you see, in particular to the west of the Krasna River, are bluffs overlooking the river valley. That highway P66, still under RuFOR control west of Svatove, runs along a sort of bare plateau. While possessing these heights would make observation of the Svatove Line across the river, they are also possessed of little in the way of cover or human structures, making them vulnerable to RuFOR artillery. Notice how the P66 represents rather difficult terrain for an attacker across several kilometers, whereas along the river - beneath the bluffs - is a belt of built-up areas. So if UFOR needs to make a penetration between Kreminna and Svatove, it has to be at Krasnorichenske [1], and in order to approach Krasnorichenske, UFOR needs a foothold in Ploschanka [2] and Chernopopivka [3] - consistent with repeated reports of attacks on those villages. Krasnorichenske would be a staging ground not just for attacks toward Svatove or Kreminna, but also toward the east; one of the few good eastward roads in the sector passes through the town. The boxed cluster of villages is also an objective, in order to secure the frontal approach to Svatove (even if frontal attacks on Svatove are unlikely to be the MO). UFOR's aims in this sector are in short to push up the hills to clear and make use of P66 to set conditions for attacks over the river, with the eventual goal of undermining the Svatove Line and forcing a retreat from Svatove and Kreminna. The bluffs being the real challenge to maneuver past, since the river itself is in places just a creek.

https://i.imgur.com/c0UHLfg.jpg

This is all relatively straightforward. The conditions north of Svatove are trickier to navigate. Similar geographies apply, and you can clearly see the value of Nyzhnia Duvanka for advances to the north, south, or east - just like Krasnorichenske. However, it's further behind the current frontline than Krasnorichenske, with more hills to cross. Therefore it's more difficult a town to bite off at once, which is why I figure UFOR will seek to envelop Nyzhnia Duvanka itself rather than just advancing on it from the west along the road through Kuzemivka [4]. That entails pushing cross-country through two belts of villages (boxed) to the NW of Nyzhnia Duvanka.

Recall that the Oskil River line only had its final disintegration with the fall of Lyman prompting the retreat from Borova. By analogy, Svatove would only be abandoned by RuFOR if it were outflanked to the extent that both the E-W highways feeding it were at imminent risk of being cut. So I doubt UFOR takes the effort to go deep cross-country between those highways east of the river. The conservative approach would be to just roll up and down the villages along the river and maybe to Travneve [5]. You can see how, at the current methodical rate, it would take until the end of the year to clear the Svatove Line.

In other news, joint Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation is trying to modify TB-2 to carry AA missiles. Anti-drone/missile patrol is a brilliant repurposing for a platform that is usually sidelined when the enemy has functioning IADS. Yet another obvious idea that heretofore basically hadn't been implemented.

Flak Cannon in Anti-Drone War

26056

Drone in Anti-Drone War

26057

spmetla

10-31-2022, 20:46

Those ridge-like features you see, in particular to the west of the Krasna River, are bluffs overlooking the river valley. That highway P66, still under RuFOR control west of Svatove, runs along a sort of bare plateau. While possessing these heights would make observation of the Svatove Line across the river, they are also possessed of little in the way of cover or human structures, making them vulnerable to RuFOR artillery. Notice how the P66 represents rather difficult terrain for an attacker across several kilometers, whereas along the river - beneath the bluffs - is a belt of built-up areas. So if UFOR needs to make a penetration between Kreminna and Svatove, it has to be at Krasnorichenske [1], and in order to approach Krasnorichenske, UFOR needs a foothold in Ploschanka [2] and Chernopopivka [3] - consistent with repeated reports of attacks on those villages. Krasnorichenske would be a staging ground not just for attacks toward Svatove or Kreminna, but also toward the east; one of the few good eastward roads in the sector passes through the town. The boxed cluster of villages is also an objective, in order to secure the frontal approach to Svatove (even if frontal attacks on Svatove are unlikely to be the MO). UFOR's aims in this sector are in short to push up the hills to clear and make use of P66 to set conditions for attacks over the river, with the eventual goal of undermining the Svatove Line and forcing a retreat from Svatove and Kreminna. The bluffs being the real challenge to maneuver past, since the river itself is in places just a creek.

Agree totally with your analysis, additionally with the current rains/mud those bare plateaus are unusable for effective mechanized warfare and too bare for infantry combat so the slow crawl of advancing to move up artillery and make a position untenable due to fires and return to WWI sorta combat seems the norm for now.

Weak exploitation is kind of a pattern with Ukraine, since there was also the failure to exploit RuFOR's sudden retreat following the breakthrough along the Dnieper River contemporaneous with the capture of Lyman. This deficit spells trouble for UFOR's operational prospects, and suggests Ukraine will never be able to force the surrender of large numbers (>1000) of RuFOR in a single battle (even granting that 21st century warfare may be too mobile to commonly accomplish this in the normal course of maneuver). In related news, Ukrainian losses in armor/AFV seem to have been quite elevated this month.

One way or another these sequenced underperformances in exploiting breakthroughs allowed RuFOR defenses to remain organized, and strengthen, in Luhansk and have arguably greatly extended the timetable for territorial reclamation overall (and increasing flows of Russian draftees will only contribute to stability). Evidently Ukraine will not secure the west bank of the Aidar River this year, and probably not even Kherson City (though the city should be besieged by then).

I think Russia's withdrawal took Ukraine by surprise too as well as the initial breakthrough being as effective as it was. To maintain and really exploit breakthroughs in this type of warfare I think Ukraine would need a much more robust logistical capability like the US with masses of HEMMT fuel and ammo trucks, palletized loads, lots of armored recovery vehicles and so on. Not to mention I still think that Ukraine needs better MBTs to create a breakthrough at all with combined arms warfare. When conducting SOSRA for effecting a breach there will always be enemy weapon systems that haven't been suppressed or destroyed. MBTs need to be able to provide direct fire support for engineer assets making a breach and then proofing lanes, MBTs need to be able to sustain some hits to do this effectively, something the T72 series hasn't proven capable of.
Also think that Ukraine may need a lot more of the less glamours but essential engineer capabilities like MICLICs.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XWipK_V6Gc

Come Spring, Russia's draftees should have been able to make up the training deficit so Ukraine will not likely have manpower superiority except for carefully resourced offensives.

Montmorency

11-01-2022, 00:31

We can forgive the shortcomings in the Izyum operation given that GSUA did not anticipate this much success, nor seemingly the Russian retreat. But they had literally a month to prepare the noose for Lyman, a small brigade-equivalent pocket with one road to safety. Yes, the US military would have dominated the entire battlespace, but if the Ukrainians could have pushed even a company of T-72s out onto the road from the littoral forested area along the north bank of the SD river, they would have been able to pick off fleeing columns from a distance essentially unopposed. It does require good communications and timing when the enemy is mobile enough to initiate and complete a retreat in a couple of hours, but still. We should also have mixed feelings about the Russian retreat in Kherson early in the month. Yes, it was all rather orderly aside from the rout along the river, but nevertheless this was great terrain for pursuit, UFOR was well-prepared in the area, and still the enemy was able to execute a 20km retrograde to seconary or tertiary positions basically unopposed. An all-in push might have been enough to cause a cascading rout and thus compress the bridgehead more, but instead the prepared RuFOR lines are with minor adjustments where things settled for the 3 weeks up to now. Ukraine's going to have to figure this one out at some point.

One thing I've noticed about both sides' advancing columns in drone footage is that they're very conservative under fire. They display indecision as to where to drive when shells start falling, or bunch up together (why?!), or just freeze. As always it's a question as to how representative such incidents are of the tactical baseline, but it does comport with another common observation that once, say, a mounted platoon or company tactical group starts taking any losses at all, they usually disengage and return to base soon after. I suspect it speaks both to a lack of discipline under fire and the fact that assaults in a given section of the line are usually not more than company-sized (and therefore more fragile).

If 100K draftees are currently serving in Ukraine already (including those lost already), half in combat roles, mostly in Luhansk, then the front there is actually already not too far from WW2 density. Even taking at face value some claims that draftees are still usually used to fill out rear echelons. Say 50K against 100K across 100km.

Speaking of trench warfare, here's a Ukrainian clip from the trenches showing some corpses lying just over the top (which side's is unclear).
https://twitter.com/i/status/1586189751715258368 [VIDEO]

This (https://www.tiktok.com/@deniskhrystoff/video/7159881700879699205) is the kind of mud the Svatove region presented with last week (a rainy week). You can't drive like this (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IWGYj3JuM4Q) (skip ahead) over it, but it's definitely traversable. But you wouldn't want to do it over a preregistered expanse.
(The poster's story is that he was taxied to a frontline town to assemble evacuees overnight, to be collected the next day.)

Lately Ukraine has been posting some wild kill claims on enemy equipment and personnel, almost unprecedented ones (e.g. 100 tanks and 200 AFV in the past week). Naturally with the stable fronts OSINT verification has reverted to earlier form, making the gap between claimed and observed quite remarkable. I can extend the benefit of the doubt to Ukrainian command by now, but I do wonder about what activity underlies these claims.

Interesting factoid: The average age of Russian draftees is 35, citing the same address delivered by Shoigu the other day. That's pretty much the mandatory retirement age for enlisted and NCO in the US military IIRC. Incredibly servile people, today's Russians. In one of Meduza's recent investigations, that on the well-known doomed reservist platoon sent to perform reconnaisance by fire, the surviving deserters actually made their way to Belgorod to complain about their mistreatment to the military commisariat there; they were immediately shipped back to the front.

Shaka_Khan

11-11-2022, 07:52

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skorea-says-us-will-be-end-user-ammunition-after-report-weapons-ukraine-2022-11-11/

U.S. in talks to buy South Korean ammunition for Ukraine, official says

Josh Smith and Mike Stone

SEOUL/WASHINGTON Nov 11 (Reuters) - Washington wants to buy South Korean artillery shells to send to Ukraine, a U.S. official said on Friday, even as Seoul insisted that the United States must be the ammunition's end user and that its policy against lethal aid for Ukraine is unchanged.

The U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing negotiations, confirmed that Washington wanted to send South Korean 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine.

The official said that Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds could be used to purchase the ammunition, but that it was unclear whether it would be shipped though U.S. territory.

South Korea's defence ministry, however, said that its position of not providing lethal aid to Ukraine is unchanged and that the negotiations are being conducted "under the premise that the U.S. is the end user."

"In order to make up for the shortage of 155mm ammunition inventories in the U.S., negotiations are ongoing between the U.S. and Korean companies to export ammunition," the ministry said in a statement.

The U.S. official warned that news of the talks could threaten the deal.

A U.S. ally, South Korea has sought to avoid antagonizing Russia, both for economic reasons and because of the influence that Moscow can exert with North Korea.

Citing U.S. officials familiar with the deal, the Wall Street Journal said the agreement would involve 100,000 rounds of 155mm artillery rounds that would be delivered to Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has called on South Korea to provide weapons, which he said would be "indispensable".

Last month South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol said Seoul has not provided any lethal weapons to Ukraine, after Russian President Vladimir Putin said such a decision would destroy bilateral relations.

U.S. National Security spokesperson John Kirby said last week that Washington had information that North Korea was covertly supplying Russia with a "significant" number of artillery shells of its own for use in Ukraine.

Moscow and Pyongyang have denied any arms shipments.

spmetla

11-12-2022, 01:43

Glad to hear it, South Korea is certainly turning into one of the key points of the modern defense industry as its new contracts with Poland have shown.

As for the other news of the day, Kherson in again under Ukrainian control, celebrating locals in the streets. The Russians look like they got the bulk of their personnel and a sizeable amount of equipment across the river but they have been setting conditions for quite some time. At the very least, this undoes the 'referendum' of a few weeks ago, takes dreams of Mikolayiv or Odessa off the table short of a complete reversal of the situation.
Militarily, it seems the right call, the far side of the river was an untenable position. The ground war is now essentially the South East, Donetsk, and the North East, all of which have been the scene of large scale construction of defensive works. It should give the Russian Army some breathing space. The morale factor is probably two fold, it does save manpower and troops will appreciate not being sacrificed for a precarious position, however those that had been sent in to hold the position and lots comrades in the months since Ukraine announced its Kherson offensive it will be bitter-sweet.
Politically, it seems extremely damaging to Putin. It seems that telegram and twitter are loudly decrying this surrender of 'Russian' territory. Revenge attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure won't cut it for messaging. I imagine he is demanding his generals get a significant battlefield victory this fall/winter and not wait to reap the benefits of properly training his mobilized personnel and replacements.

Glad to see such scenes of celebration as we see in Kherson and it happening on Veterans day too. Ukrainian Soldiers certainly have earned this victory, hats off to them. Just wonder what they do next, my predictions are always off so I look forward to their next surprise as I hope they try to take advantage of some momentum as Russian soldiers deal with the morale effects over the next few days.
At the very least, the 'land bridge' will be mostly under cannon and rocket artillery range with HIMARS able to target most of the routes in and out of Crimea, though I imagine Ukrainian precision munitions expenditure needs to be curtailed some. Even the vast US reserves of PGMs must be getting thin.

Montmorency

11-12-2022, 05:08

I don't really understand how the Polish government is proposing to pay for attaining one of the most powerful world militaries this decade. Frankly it's worrying. It would be one thing if Ukraine had fallen to Russia and Poland intended to be capable of going it alone.

Pretty much the situation in Kherson, as you describe. As soon as Ukraine had its local breakthrough near the long-standing frontline along the Dnieper around October 6, it retrenched sharply halfway to Beryslav, and reports surfaced even then that specialized equipment would be transferred to the east bank. Then shortly after the rail bridge to Crimea was disabled, rumors jittered about of an impending Russian retreat towards Kherson or even a full abandonment of the bridgehead. I didn't believe it then, but clearly the loss of LOC over the bridge was fatal to the bridgehead in time. Evidently Surovikin and/or Putin recognized the strategic unsustainability of the venture and unraveled it in such a way as to buy time.

It's worth noting that both with Kyiv and with Kharkiv I was surprised that GSRU cut all their gains loose rather than maintaining select footholds to distract UFOR with battles of attrition (as they had in fact done at small scale north of Kharkiv City in the spring). What has emerged as a rock-solid pattern with Russian command is that they're far more conservative and flexible on the defensive than on the offensive, and Putin himself is willing to give up highly-symbolic territory. While it might bode well for war termination in the future, it also make's UFOR's life difficutl and I don't think GSUA has a strategic answer to their opponent's force preservation posture on the defensive.

Anyway, in Kherson once again, for whatever reason, UFOR declined to closely pursue the enemy rearguard. Yes, the Russians had a month to prepare, but so did the Ukrainians. What I don't understand is why the Antonivsky Bridge and Kakhovka Dam at least weren't under constant rocket interdiction. I'm not aware of any Bilohorivka-crossing-tier concentrations of smashed Russian materiel along the river, which is what one would expect. From here on a winter Zaporizhzhia offensive of some type is foreordained, because the Luhansk front is now so dense and fortified. The survival of the VDV will complicate the scenario greatly. It will be a sign of Putin's desperation if Russian conscripts are finally committed to stabilize the theater, and so far the escape of the Izyum grouping and the Kherson grouping appear sufficient to maintain the integrity of Russian lines and hold the Ukrainians to a crawl-like pace analogous to Wagner in Donetsk.

As for GMLRS and Excalibur, IIRC the US inventory of the former was no more than 50K pre-war, and less than 10K of the latter. There are no reliable estimates of GMLRS deliveries, but I think all Excalibur deliveries have been specified in our aid documents - something like at least 2K. Of GMLRS, given the high rates of expenditure against fixed infrastructure I would estimate (keeping a few steps hidden) that at the very minimum 5K have been expended in 4.5 months, possibly many more.

If we produce an expected 10K GMLRS (some of which Ukraine should now have a claim on through contracts) and 1K Excalibur next year, that is adequate to keep Ukrainian precision artillery on life support. As for standard 155mm deliveries, the monthly allotments from the US have been getting smaller and smaller, having delivered at least 1 million so far IIRC (not counting allies). Hence the US is reportedly imitating the German Ringtausch proposal and requesting 100K shells from South Korea to replenish the US inventory (and thus free up more US stock for Ukraine).

The situation with ATACMS is much thriftier as noted previously, with estimates of our stockpile ranging from 1-2K - and we would be much more loathe to give these up for their range (from our doctrinal perspective of standoff missions). The scarcity of the system may be one reason for our refusal to deliver it to Ukraine. The only thing ATACMS would be good for, at an average delivery rate of 1 rocket per day, would be to keep the Kerch Strait bridge closed and strike a few of the largest supply depots in Donbass. That's not trivial however, so if UFOR succeeds in breaking past Melitopol the excuses really ought to fade.

The Russian Lancet kamikaze drone has come to field service in numbers recently (making a handful of appearances in previous months), and it is making a splash in successfully targeting Ukrainian artillery and SAMS. It is fulfilling exactly the mission we hoped in April Switchblade 600 would, being approximately similar in size and payload. But Switchblade 600 is reportedly not even in serial production yet and has not seen action in Ukraine, whereas the sanctioned Russians can put out batches of their own new models. I don't think we should be above duplicating the Iranian Shahed-136 at relatively-similar price, and just swarming some Iranian military bases with hundreds of them just to :daisy: around; it's easily within our capabilities. The sclerotic US military procurement/industry needs to enter a thorough reform process, including way more competition (including from the government if need be). No idea what Phoenix Ghost has been put through in Ukraine, since evidence for its usage is non-existent, but the US recently announced the delivery of another large batch, so I wonder what's going in with that.

CrossLOPER

11-12-2022, 19:41

Anyway, in Kherson once again, for whatever reason, UFOR declined to closely pursue the enemy rearguard.

Low-worth target? High risk in terms of losses and giving away hardware positions? Encouraging retreat? I could think of a few reasons, but I suppose someone ran the numbers and decided rapidly recapturing Kherson with minimal conflict was the best move. I can imagine most major city centers are going to have the same resolution, unless the Russian government/military decides to destroy everything completely on its way out and spend the next decade firing masses of low-quality rockets over the border every other week.

Montmorency

11-12-2022, 22:56

Low-worth target? High risk in terms of losses and giving away hardware positions? Encouraging retreat? I could think of a few reasons, but I suppose someone ran the numbers and decided rapidly recapturing Kherson with minimal conflict was the best move. I can imagine most major city centers are going to have the same resolution, unless the Russian government/military decides to destroy everything completely on its way out and spend the next decade firing masses of low-quality rockets over the border every other week.

None of these considerations apply in a straightforward manner. First, we should remember that Kherson City itself was far out of reach of UFOR - urban combat was not in the public agendas of either Russia or Ukraine. In a retreat, Ukrainian soldiers would always reach the city well after it had been cleared out of opposition. The issue here is the thousands of square kilometers of the overall bridgehead that Russia had held with tens of thousands of personnel, and had the task of wrapping up control over. In principle, we should ask why UFOR didn't follow the military textbook here (it also had not in the past), and attack into a retreating enemy in order to disorder them and make a retreat into a rout. Even if most of RuFOR had completed crossing over by then, it should have been possible to rout and perhaps even capture a few thousand of the rearguard and stragglers.

The generic reasons why militaries do this or seek to across history and especially in mass industrial wars are well-known and readily apparent. When examining the particulars of the Kherson bridgehead though, we can also see why your objections shouldn't apply.

The bridgehead historically was populated by Russia's best remaining skilled fighting force (other than arguably Wagner Group): the VDV, airborne. They proved their tenacity and skill on the defensive over many months, beyond that of their abilities on the offensive (*cough*). There were 2-3 divisions of these in the bridgehead, making the bulk of the remaining VDV globally and presenting one of the highest-value targets for destruction in the entire theater of war. Removing Putin's elite from the field by one or other means would weaken his ability to establish strong defensive networks or train new troops for the remainder of the war. Also, it would give the Russian nationalists a stroke.

I do not believe the risk of losses to enemy action is per se a barrier to Ukraine in this war, since for the past 3 months they've run continual Russian-style offensive actions and frontal attacks throughout Kherson and elsewhere, losing hundreds of armored vehicles and probably several thousand men in the process. In the case of a pursuit action, in all but the most bungled execution the enemy will suffer an order of magnitude higher losses (as we actually saw during the September Kharkiv offensive). If UFOR is willing to assault RuFOR trenchworks from the front, taking a retreating force from behind seems less onerous. Giving away hardware positions is similarly not relevant when the enemy is leaving the area.

UFOR's posture during these events doesn't have bearing on encouraging retreat or not (though their historical willingness to persist on the offensive must have been one factor in the Russian decision to retreat). Ultimately, as discussed, the strategic position in Kherson hinged on the defender's ability to sustain supply lines to their forces. The failure to do so is why a retreat was forced on RuFOR, and this wouldn't have changed if UFOR started attacking more vigorously over this week. Indeed, trying to send disorganized and retreating forces into a strong enemy advance would be a recipe for complete annihilation, which is why it doesn't really happen.

The one reason I can think of that would connect episodes in this war is that Ukraine's de facto decentralized command and control is such that GenStab still hasn't figured out a way to avoid heavy friendly fire and other such incidents in a, so-to-speak, uncontrolled advance. If this is the reason, maybe it's even a sound one, since it suggests UFOR would not be able to execute a general and rapid pursuit in a way that damages the enemy effectively, but if so it detracts from Ukraine's war effort to the extent it is not addressed. Like not being able to chase after a limping goon in flight because you'll trip over your shoelaces. Ukraine can't win the war without more breakthroughs and routs like the Kharkiv Offensive, unless we reach the 'sociopolitical collapse of Russia' scenario that it's unwise to count on.

But it is an absolute mystery why the Russians were not heavily bombed on the bridges and ferries out.

CrossLOPER

11-13-2022, 20:47

Maybe there was an agreement where they would not be attacked for a certain period if they agreed to abandon the city.

In other news, what comes after sledgehammer executions? The wheel? The rack? Gibbeting?

Montmorency

11-14-2022, 01:16

That has been suggested, but it's so hard to believe when the benefit ultimately rests with one side. But it may be a long time before we learn about the backroom dealings of the war.

A sledgehammer execution is typical mafia stuff, you need the right mindset to extrapolate.

CrossLOPER

11-14-2022, 03:12

Do you honestly think that Russian forces have a choice at this point?

Short of mass mobilization and attacking with >10 to 1 losses, I am not sure if there is any possibility of maintaining the campaign. Even if you do have some success, what then? With what are you going to hold? What are you going to hold?

Let's say that before spring, a massive campaign is launched and Russia suffers another hundred thousand to a quarter of a million losses. What would drive the economy? What would you do with the wounded? Could you exist without building primitive factories sending crude iron boxes to the front all across the territory? I don't think that anyone on the RF side has the appetite for the type of daily losses that Stalin would consider a rudimentary necessity. Could a society exist?

spmetla

11-14-2022, 04:50

The bridgehead historically was populated by Russia's best remaining skilled fighting force (other than arguably Wagner Group): the VDV, airborne. They proved their tenacity and skill on the defensive over many months, beyond that of their abilities on the offensive (*cough*). There were 2-3 divisions of these in the bridgehead, making the bulk of the remaining VDV globally and presenting one of the highest-value targets for destruction in the entire theater of war. Removing Putin's elite from the field by one or other means would weaken his ability to establish strong defensive networks or train new troops for the remainder of the war. Also, it would give the Russian nationalists a stroke.

I do not believe the risk of losses to enemy action is per se a barrier to Ukraine in this war, since for the past 3 months they've run continual Russian-style offensive actions and frontal attacks throughout Kherson and elsewhere, losing hundreds of armored vehicles and probably several thousand men in the process. In the case of a pursuit action, in all but the most bungled execution the enemy will suffer an order of magnitude higher losses (as we actually saw during the September Kharkiv offensive). If UFOR is willing to assault RuFOR trenchworks from the front, taking a retreating force from behind seems less onerous. Giving away hardware positions is similarly not relevant when the enemy is leaving the area.

It's an interesting conundrum, I too think they would have been better off pushing an advantage harder. The dynamic between fighting the enemy versus fighting for territory are often at odds in war. The Ukrainian leadership must have chosen to not push too hard and save that equipment and manpower for later, perhaps the political value of this type of victory now is worth it.

Additionally, the Russians if pushed too hard would likely stand and fight, a trapped enemy is sometimes the most dangerous as they have nothing to lose. I'm sure the Ukrainian command has a decent respect for the Russian fighting potential when properly motivated and led.

But it is an absolute mystery why the Russians were not heavily bombed on the bridges and ferries out.
If the rumors of Russians being told to change into civilian clothing before fleeing are true then it may have been to avoid the propaganda value of what would look like shelling fleeing civilians that are pro-Russian. This would have the potential to be used for propaganda in the remaining occupied areas to show those that have collaborated or at least been neutral-ish to side with Russia openly or face the wrath of the Ukrainian 'nazis' cleansing areas of ethnic Russians post liberation.
Being a maneuver warfare guy I'm not too up to speed on effective information operations but the past eight months have certainly been eye opening.

Do you honestly think that Russian forces have a choice at this point?

Short of mass mobilization and attacking with >10 to 1 losses, I am not sure if there is any possibility of maintaining the campaign. Even if you do have some success, what then? With what are you going to hold? What are you going to hold?

Let's say that before spring, a massive campaign is launched and Russia suffers another hundred thousand to a quarter of a million losses. What would drive the economy? What would you do with the wounded? Could you exist without building primitive factories sending crude iron boxes to the front all across the territory? I don't think that anyone on the RF side has the appetite for the type of daily losses that Stalin would consider a rudimentary necessity. Could a society exist?
Those are absolutely valid and rational points. The question really has to be, is Putin and the rest of the Russian leadership still totally rational actors at this point? Given how poorly the war has gone and the likely prospect of a palace-coup if they are fought back to pre-Feb 24th borders or worse (for the Putin regime) the 2014 borders I can believe that they would sacrifice a million losses to hold what they have and force another 'frozen conflict' ending to be continued in a few years after licking their wounds. Perhaps the WW2 example of how much the USSR sacrificed to stop and then beat back the Nazis makes the Russian leadership too dismissive of casualties as that would make them weaker than the 'Man of Steel' and not fit to lead Russian resurgence.

Montmorency

11-14-2022, 06:20

You heavily underestimate how much gas Russia has left in the tank however. Their forces in Ukraine might already double what they started with in terms of personnel, and even a high estimate of 2500 tanks and 5000 AFVs lost represents only a third of their reserves before it truly hits critical (when existing frontline forces can no longer receive replacements beyond Humvee/Tigr or T-55 tier). And I have to keep repeating, Ukraine - in Kharkiv, in Kherson, in Donetsk - has shown little ability to overcome dense, prepared Russian defenses through combat. We might have to hope for an internal Russian collapse, military or sociopolitical, before a forceful reclamation of territory, and that's not likely at all - yet.

The stage is now set for an exchange of one major offensive/counter-offensive between both sides during the winter. With rapid progress impossible in Luhansk, it's quite plausible both sides will choose to confront each other in Zaporizhzhia. That may be the ultimate test of Ukrainian military capacity. If Ukraine can make significant progress in maneuver warfare in Zaporizhzhia, then the issue is settled and we have good reason to believe they can reclaim all or most of their pre-2014 territory within 1-2 years. If they stall quickly and the operation devolves into a grind-by-village, then without substantial additional assistance (such as mass training to NATO standards including for officers) we should only expect a return to pre-2022 borders in that timeframe.

Of course there are those in the US administration, such as Gen. Milley, who believe we have done enough and should begin looking to freeze the Ukraine War in its current arrangement so as to reprioritize toward China. But while China might seem to be approaching its moment of last opportunity in the next year or two, all the experts say there won't be a militarily-serious crisis in the SCS until at least late-decade, so we really should tie up the loose ends in Europe first. (If we do it right, Ukraine will be supplying weapons on contract to Taiwan by that time.)

It's an interesting conundrum, I too think they would have been better off pushing an advantage harder. The dynamic between fighting the enemy versus fighting for territory are often at odds in war. The Ukrainian leadership must have chosen to not push too hard and save that equipment and manpower for later, perhaps the political value of this type of victory now is worth it.

Additionally, the Russians if pushed too hard would likely stand and fight, a trapped enemy is sometimes the most dangerous as they have nothing to lose. I'm sure the Ukrainian command has a decent respect for the Russian fighting potential when properly motivated and led.

I was envisioning a rout toward the bridges (which the Russians blew behind them), causing an overall panic and disorganized flight, creating more opportunities for striking massed personnel and a greater proportion of abandoned intact equipment.

Here's a question I've been chewing. You might have too little information to answer properly, but given what you know of both-sides' dispositions in Kherson this fall, how would the US Army have handled an imminent opfor withdrawal if the Ukrainian forces were replaced by equivalent American ones - and the Air Force were out of the picture?

If the rumors of Russians being told to change into civilian clothing before fleeing are true then it may have been to avoid the propaganda value of what would look like shelling fleeing civilians that are pro-Russian. This would have the potential to be used for propaganda in the remaining occupied areas to show those that have collaborated or at least been neutral-ish to side with Russia openly or face the wrath of the Ukrainian 'nazis' cleansing areas of ethnic Russians post liberation.
Being a maneuver warfare guy I'm not too up to speed on effective information operations but the past eight months have certainly been eye opening.

Hmm, but there's been no suppression of news even on official Ukrainian media of the *wink wink* disposal of remaining collaborators in liberated territory, such as Izyum. Collateral aversion might complicate things, but uniformed personnel or not Russia's military vehicles would remain identifiable from the air.

spmetla

11-14-2022, 10:13

I was envisioning a rout toward the bridges (which the Russians blew behind them), causing an overall panic and disorganized flight, creating more opportunities for striking massed personnel and a greater proportion of abandoned intact equipment.

Here's a question I've been chewing. You might have too little information to answer properly, but given what you know of both-sides' dispositions in Kherson this fall, how would the US Army have handled an imminent opfor withdrawal if the Ukrainian forces were replaced by equivalent American ones - and the Air Force were out of the picture?

I was hoping for a rout too but nothing of the sort appeared, though unlike Izium, the Ukrainians weren't about to cut them off so no rout necessary.

Taking the USAF out of the picture is difficult as it's a key part of our war doctrine, hence why the USAF gets so much funding. Without the USAF, well the US would likely be able to conduct an effective armored/mechanized attack. The US would certainly push its advantages in night fighting, using the fact that all our infantryman have NVGs and IR aiming devices as standard issue. Our vehicles have superior thermal optics to that of anything Russian so that would help a lot. The Abrams can take a lot more punishment than any T72 series can, the Bradley would show its age though still potent. The Strykers would be extremely limited in use though.
Our major advantage would be in using intelligence for effective targeting of enemy vulnerabilities on a scale the Russians can't imagine, including non-lethal means. Using this to create 'multiple dilemmas' should muddle the effectiveness of Russian counter actions leaving the fight to the lower level and whatever tenacity they care to put up, which if they were fighting actual US and NATO I think would up their morale and willingness to sacrifice a bit.
The major difference though is that if the US Army creates a breakthrough, it can sustain it deep into the enemy's support zone and continue the attack. This weakness on the part of Ukraine is unfortunate as it keeps most warfare in the realm of WWI or Italian theater WW2 levels of advances. I kinda feel like those fools in WWI when I keep hoping that each advance and breakthrough may allow for real exploitation of that advantage, something we've only seen in Kharkiv.

The major weaknesses for the US would be of course that we haven't fought a conventional war since we invaded Iraq in 2003 and they certainly were in worse shape than they were in the Gulf War. IEDs and occasional fire fights with insurgents won't have prepped any of our combat vets for sustained artillery attacks, minefields in depth covered with direct fire weapons, and in general an enemy that fights in cohesive units with a lot of fire power. I don't think the US public understands that we'd have a very significant casualty count, especially in the type of audacious attacks required to create break throughs and then attempt to exploit that advantage. I can only what if the gulf war if the Iraqis had been actually skilled and motivated to cause even a fraction of the 50k deaths that Bush Sr was worried about in the "mother of all battles."

With that, we are quite vulnerable to enemy attacks, ADA systems are few and far between, there's a reason we don't have Stingers in production anymore. Common tasks from before the GWOT era like digging in at each halt and integrating obstacles for defense are more practiced on paper than in the real world for fear of ruining training areas from too much engineer work. The US could use some large 'Louisiana Maneuvers' type events again to practice warfare with Divisions and Corps beyond mere simulations of that scale that simply can't capture all the friction of war.

The US Army would go on the attack because it's better to have the initiative and we're just not setup for defense like we were in the 80's ready to use Air-Land warfare to beat back the Soviet hordes coming through the Fulda Gap. Cutting them before they retreat across the river would be a definite goal as such a defeat of the Russians would eliminate their elite combat power as effectively as the USAF's interception of the Republican Guards retreat from Kuwait along the "highway of death" did. Not to mention every general since antiquity has been trying for another Cannae, a river on one side is a key factor to get that.
I could easily imagine we'd have pushed for a penetration east of Kherson and then branch east and west along the river to deny river crossing sites for retreat and then essentially clear pockets of resistance piece meal as they'd be isolated and ineffective without support from their Command nodes and artillery support.
The US Army though hasn't fought on home/allied turf in a long time though, so it'd be more difficult to claim 'collateral damage' when it's your own or allied/countryman for the most part, living on the battlefield.

CrossLOPER

11-14-2022, 23:51

Montmorency

11-15-2022, 03:52

I do recall reading of the First Gulf War that the US government and military leadership were via the media preparing the public for a hard fight and KIA on the order of thousands. Hyping up the Republican Guard for example. We didn't expect the Iraqi resistance to collapse the way it did as quickly as it did (we've always been rather poor at judging our opposition).

It's not controversial to contend that the cleansing of Vietnam Syndrome as a result of our curbstomp in Kuwait, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, went to our heads far too much, leaving the typical American's mentality more arrogant and detached from global realities than ever. For 30 years everything's looked like another variation of the Dream Team creaming the competition with one hand tied behind the back, especially to the militaristic mainstream media. It's been my opinion since the beginning of the war that far more than the risk of nuclear escalation, the administration's refusal to commit any US forces to combat in Ukraine has been guided by the fear of political blowback that would attend even hundreds of casualties.

Our biggest disadvantage if taking up the brunt of ground combat in Ukraine would be having to take a few weeks and a few thousand casualties to relearn the lessons of conventional warfare that the Russians and Ukrainians have been exposed to for the better part of a year. It would take a few incidents of platoons or encampments suffering under artillery fire to learn how best to deploy in the field. Or, on the other hand, maybe we would just bomb the Russians a heck of a lot and they would surrender en masse at first contact like the Iraqis - but it's not something to bet on.

Fear of collateral damage, or its public relations implications at least, might hinder operations, particularly air operations (even if in my - unrealistic - scenario only the UA air force is available)*. During WW2 we killed many thousands of French and Italian civilians without much compunction, though it would be hard to cause as much harm in skirmishes among already-depopulated villages. I would expect the Ukrainian government to stipulate non-aggression against urban centers, or maybe they would approve a heavily refined version of our Syrian ROE.

*Since in my scenario you would still have the extensive Army rotary aviation available, would the US attempt a Hostomel-like penetrating air assault package against the Kakhovka Dam to seal it to transit, or would commanders be too conservative following the Russian example?

Apparently DoD plans to upgun the Stryker to 30mm. I hope the Bradley replacement, whatever they're calling it now, will have a better ATGM than the TOW.

US IADS has never been as well-developed as the abundant and range-interlocking SAMs Russian doctrine calls for, because our air force was once again supposed to be the first line of defense/offense. And maybe that's fine. But there's no getting around the need for small-scale missile and drone defense, like a CIWS but smaller, cheaper, automated/AI-assisted and widely distributed. Within 20 years we should really be relying on solar-powered laser platforms for this.

You assume that the reserves are usable, and that parts, and technicians, are available to make them reliable.

Ukraine has no need to engage these positions, and it would be counter-productive to do so. Cutting off lines of supply, playing diplomacy, holding existing lines, and probing defenses until more force is mustered has been the primary strategy, and it is working.

I am far more concerned about civilian populations in Ukraine and how they will handle colder conditions with worse sanitation. I see no reason why defensive equipment and civilian supplies cannot be streamlined to flow forward. No chance of "escalation" there. Anyone who is still using that word in all seriousness is delusional anyway.

The way forward is to continue to enforce sanctions and close the gaps. No T-34s or T-14s in sight, so they aren't that deprived.

I mean, the reserves have been usable so far, so that's been a pretty safe assumption through today. Russa is thought to have replaced the large majority of its armored losses so far from active reserve and storage. That's the fact of the matter we have to contend with.

The stuff that worked for Ukraine before doesn't apply anymore. The circumstances on the flanks have changed. It's all frontal assaults from here on out.

We're actually loosening sanctions to allow Russia to export fertilizer and crops more easily, because the Third World wants the goods first and foremost. (Can we start using "Third World" again?) Probably has something to do with Russian negotiations on the grain deal, since part of the original deal was that Russia gets to export its agro products (but for some reason it didn't shake out that way).
https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/18470-un-scrambles-to-facilitate-russian-fertilizer-exports

spmetla

11-15-2022, 04:36

I do recall reading of the First Gulf War that the US government and military leadership were via the media preparing the public for a hard fight and KIA on the order of thousands. Hyping up the Republican Guard for example. We didn't expect the Iraqi resistance to collapse the way it did as quickly as it did (we've always been rather poor at judging our opposition).

In fairness to the Bush Sr administration, the Iraqis had been in a conventional war the previous eight years with Iran so they had assumed the Iraqis had learned some things and that the elite Republican Guard was something to respect. Both points ended up false and having looked at the bits of video available from the Iran-Iraq war, both sides had pretty awful Soldiers, no professionalism, engagements were at WW2 distances. One would assume that Saddam would have tried to learn the lessons of the Yom Kippur War and the Iran-Iraq war and professionalize but nope, just more corruption.
Side note, I imagine the Saudis would be just as awful as the Iraqis under Saddam, lots of cool kit but I doubt they take the training seriously. Looking at their performance in Yemen they look like awful soldiers too. Great at war-crimes though!

It's been my opinion since the beginning of the war that far more than the risk of nuclear escalation, the administration's refusal to commit any US forces to combat in Ukraine has been guided by the fear of political blowback that would attend even hundreds of casualties.
I think the risk of nuclear escalation is the number one issue. Once its the US directly involved, we'd have to commit completely, sending a contingent to fight on behalf a foreign government without the full force of the US military behind them would be a criminal misuse of Soldiers.
I don't the casualties would be the blowback, just the fact that the US is at war again, less than a year after leaving Afghanistan. Besides, it's clear that our defense industry needs to retool beyond just getting sweet contracts for limited runs of equipment. I think we have enough inventory to beat the Russian Army in Ukraine, an effort beyond that and global in scale would require the US to mobilize the nation again as in WWII.

*Since in my scenario you would still have the extensive Army rotary aviation available, would the US attempt a Hostomel-like penetrating air assault package against the Kakhovka Dam to seal it to transit, or would commanders be too conservative following the Russian example?

I don't think the US would do an Air Assault in this threat environment, just too many MANPADS around. Attack aviation though would be used enmasse like in the Gulf War to saturate areas with enough apaches to achieve destruction of the enemy and deal with short range air defenses.
Where I could see Air Assaults would be onto the far side of the river and into Crimea in support of SOF as well as to essentially a light infantry foothold prior to heavy forces coming in, sorta like the airborne drops before D-Day. Though without the USAF these would be of a success chance like Hostomel.

Apparently DoD plans to upgun the Stryker to 30mm. I hope the Bradley replacement, whatever they're calling it now, will have a better ATGM than the TOW.
Yup, the new Strykers will at least be capable of engaging BMPs and BTRs, something the previous gen couldn't do except the very troubled Mobile Gun System strykers which were POS. The Bradely replacement will be a long time coming due to budget cuts and the requirements keep changing. The dream of unmanned IFVs able to attack the enemy without risking US blood is driving us into another acquisition black hole. I'd like a capable IFV like the Puma or CV-90s but able to pack a whole squad in the back, alongside that have an unmanned weapons vehicle. Making one vehicle do both is a waste, an unmanned vehicle that has crew and passenger space is too big to be useful and will make the system too expensive meaning we keep using the Bradley for decades more.
As for the TOW it's a good system, just needs to be upgraded to not be dependent on the old guidance systems, would be nice to have top-attack capability.
I just hope the US can look at what the next MBT should be. The 'infantry mafia' have already determined that our new light tank isn't a 'tank' but Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle. They like so many in the US would like to be rid of tanks as we don't make great tanker movies and keep forgetting that tanks do more than fighting other tanks, like creating breakthroughs.

Montmorency

11-15-2022, 04:49

Yup, the new Strykers will at least be capable of engaging BMPs and BTRs, something the previous gen couldn't do except the very troubled Mobile Gun System strykers which were POS.

Funnily enough, this limited run of assault gun Strykers actually have a counterpart in the rare Russian Sprut system. It seems neither are very useful, but since MGS is supposed to be retired as of this year, why don't we send the lot of them to Ukraine?

EDIT: Also on the point of sanctions, I should have mentioned that the EU and the U.S. Treasury Department and State Departments are working with major banks to facilitate cooperation with Russian energy firms such as Gazprom, at least in the areas of "humanitarian aid, energy, and agriculture." Russia is even asking for its agricultural bank, Rosselkhozbank, to be reconnected to SWIFT, though it's not clear that this is even being considered.

CrossLOPER

11-15-2022, 18:34

I mean, the reserves have been usable so far, so that's been a pretty safe assumption through today. Russa is thought to have replaced the large majority of its armored losses so far from active reserve and storage. That's the fact of the matter we have to contend with.
Yes, the Russian military does a good job of leaving them all over the place for the Ukrainian military to capture and use. They clearly have enough to throw them away when they run out of fuel. Truly a decadent society like Japan in the 80s.

Shaka_Khan

11-15-2022, 23:42

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrAGDA6egDU

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VgZwSdWxPo

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PGjD4H7fxn4

spmetla

11-16-2022, 02:53

Certainly, a worrisome event, RIP to the two civilians killed.

This is more the scenario I was worried about but with the idea that Russia would have bowled over Ukraine and the war would have come right up to the borders of NATO countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania), as well a Russian move into Moldova.
Glad the above sentence is not the case and this seems to be either an embarrassingly bad miss or a deliberate provocation to try and it the nerves of various NATO countries that it is Russia they are opposing.

Think Poland probably invoking Article 4 and convening the NATO ambassadors for consultations seems the right move. Probably will see more NATO ADA units put on Poland's border area and an urge to get more top-shelf military hardware to Ukraine to enable them to win and do it soon as the longer it drags out the more potential there is for 'error's like these missiles.

Just like every North Korean barrage into South Korea doesn't set off a war, proportionality and cool heads seems the right attitude of the day.

However, if provocations like this continue or escalate and end up being deliberate, I could see NATO imposing a no-fly zone within certain distance of the NATO border with clear language the bases or units that fire into this area will face NATO strikes in response. It'd be a tight rope to walk between that and outright war but it could be done, short of Poland invoking Article 5 at which point WW3 is on.

Montmorency

11-16-2022, 05:19

Yes, the Russian military does a good job of leaving them all over the place for the Ukrainian military to capture and use. They clearly have enough to throw them away when they run out of fuel. Truly a decadent society like Japan in the 80s.

weh

Crandar

11-16-2022, 09:56

It looks like the missile was Ukrainian, so I don't expect any serious repercussions. If this is confirmed, Kiev should have taken responsibility immediately. It was a tragic mistake and part of the blame still lies with Russia for initiating hostilities. Their aggressive denials put the Baltic states in an embarrassing position and give the opportunity to Moscow to depict Ukraine as completely unreliable.

Montmorency

11-17-2022, 01:34

Another point I should admit being confidently wrong about is dismissing the possibilty that WW2-style decoys (e.g. arty, radars, SAMS) could be effective in the 21st century of high-resolution (sometimes) loitering optics and thermal and other enhanced imaging. Well, for months now clips have appeared of Russia attacking Ukrainain decoys. I've even seen a couple of Russian decoys. Seriously, can we pour one out for all the pre-2022 military experts who made their bones teaching that contemporary warfare was a heavily-technical pursuit that came completely distinct from what characterized 20th century industrial warfare?

Ukraine recently announced that it was restarting production on Soviet-caliber artillery ammunition, though it isn't clear to me if this is a plan in action or has already been achieved at some level. At any rate, I wonder how they're providing power to production, and if the facility is located in an underground or hardened location.

It looks like the missile was Ukrainian, so I don't expect any serious repercussions. If this is confirmed, Kiev should have taken responsibility immediately. It was a tragic mistake and part of the blame still lies with Russia for initiating hostilities. Their aggressive denials put the Baltic states in an embarrassing position and give the opportunity to Moscow to depict Ukraine as completely unreliable.

I'm pretty sure all of this was hashed out behind the scenes in a matter of hours if not minutes. The identity of the missile as an S-300-mounted missile was known to the public rather quickly, about 12 hours from the incident AFAIK. So we can assume it was known to the Polish and American authorities almost immediately. OSINT can identify missile wreckage almost on sight from photographs, and I don't imagine NATO governmental resources are any less in that respect. Radar and ballistic data would also have mathematically determined/excluded the origin of the missile once analyzed, maybe even faster than visual identification of wreckage. The Polish and American government likely had even more information than the Ukrainian one at the time.

To add a little detail, the S-300 is an air-defense platform used prominently by both sides, and while Russia has been reupurposing them as ground-attack artillery - we don't need to discuss the technical characteristics of a SAM missile when the distance from the nearest likely Russian launch site would have been the better part of a thousand kilometers, and Ukraine's AD was responding throughout the day to a nationwide bombardment by cruise missiles.

So I don't think there's any blame to apportion to Ukraine here with regard to potential international tensions.

Montmorency

11-18-2022, 01:02

The best way to describe the nature of battle in this war, if not still conventional warfare in general, might be the WW2 of minor powers, except everyone has loads of mobility, long-range fires, and ISR. That's it.

That Western countries only seem to be locking in expanded industrial capacity and orders after th better part of a year in, is just stupid. I haven't read these articles in full, so maybe someone can tell me if they contain any reference to an explanation from our authorities for this apparent oversight?
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/11/15/britain-significantly-ramp-production-artillery-shells-handing/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/16/ukraine-weapons-military-aid-stockpiles-nato-low-industry/

CrossLOPER

11-19-2022, 20:19

weh

If you saw a bunch of abandoned Abrams tanks in Iraq, you would get the sense something is not right.

Montmorency

11-22-2022, 00:05

Days after I commented on the successful deployment of decoys in Ukraine, evidence emerged of Russia striking its own radar decoy in Kherson, the west bank it abandoned. It set up the decoy 2 months ago and then attacked it last week, though Ukraine seems to have ignored it the whole time it was under Russian control.
https://twitter.com/JohnB_Schneider/status/1593416172191580160

A disloyal decoy.

The Oryx/Bellingcat OSINT people have done it again (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/03/27/saa-vehicle-losses-2011-2017/).

At the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, the SAA had on paper approximately the following number of armored tracked vehicles:

Tanks
T-55: 2 000
T-62: 1 000
T-72: 1 500

Armoured Personnel Carriers
BMP-1: 2 000
BMP-2: 100

Support Armoured Vehicles
BVP-1 AMB-S: 100
ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”: 400
armored recovery vehicles: 130

Self-Propelled Artillery
2S1 Gvozdika: 300
2S3 Akatsiya: 100

Note: The numbers of pre-war SAA armored tracked vehicles should be regarded as optimistic estimates. Some armored vehicles were lost in past decades without being accounted for, while many others were not operational (or even beyond repair) at the start of the Syrian Civil War due to being in long-term storage with minimal or no maintenance. Given these factors, more realistic initial numbers would be about 33% lower than what is listed above.

https://i.imgur.com/39DrvPz.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/HmCrZaL.jpg

Those are visually confirmed alone. The Iraqi Armed Forces could probably easily roll over the SAA. (The spike in early 2020 is from Turkey demonstrating why air defense won't save you from drones if it isn't turned on.)

CrossLOPER

11-30-2022, 20:43

Montmorency

12-01-2022, 00:13

https://www.pcgamer.com/russian-intelligence-shoots-and-kills-alleged-terrorists-that-were-probably-just-stalker-larpers/

Between this and the SIMs 3 saga, I am not entirely sure what the FSB spends the majority of its time doing.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/video-games/2022/04/26/russian-assassination-sims-3/

LARP became hyperreality. The Zone is a dangerous place for even the best-prepared.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BVueEr6GnHI

EDIT: Allegedly Ukrainian domestic production of Soviet-caliber artillery (https://t.me/Tsaplienko/21542) has finally launched. Every aspect of this is very, very secret, so we won't get much evidence for a long time - but given Ukraine's resource constraints and the substantial damage its energy grid has suffered, without more objective data it will remain hard for me to believe that this production is above the artisanal level. Increases in the availability of Soviet cannons in combat missions would be a form of evidence.

Montmorency

12-03-2022, 07:39

From the IEA's energy efficiency report (https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-efficiency-2022/executive-summary):

26154

Across Europe, 7 countries accounting for 80% of residential gas use plan to ban new gas heating connections.

For example, Germany plans to put in place an implicit ban on new fossil fuel heating from 2024, when all newly-installed heating systems must be supplied by at least 65% renewable energy. France plans to ban new gas connections to buildings from 2023, Austria intends to implement a ban from 2023 and the Netherlands will require heat pump installations or heat network connections in buildings from 2026. The United Kingdom has announced plans to prohibit new gas heating systems and boilers by 2025, and ban them for all buildings by 2035.

The worm is turning. This will bring Europe in line with the similar ban schedules of some states and cities in the US. Economics is a weak area for me, but I don't see the math for Russia to either diversify to other commodities in the next decade, or replace the majority of its revenues through new partners. Global gas demand will either zero out or reach self-sufficiency almost everywhere before 2040.

Only renewables (and nuclear fusion?) permit energy independence.

spmetla

12-05-2022, 18:59

The worm is turning. This will bring Europe in line with the similar ban schedules of some states and cities in the US. Economics is a weak area for me, but I don't see the math for Russia to either diversify to other commodities in the next decade, or replace the majority of its revenues through new partners. Global gas demand will either zero out or reach self-sufficiency almost everywhere before 2040.

Yup, Russia could have used its ample base of scientists, engineers, and large skilled workforce together with ample natural resources to become a balanced world class economy in the post-Soviet era.
Instead, the Oligarchs and political cronyism decided to enrich themselves, turn Russia into merely an exporter of petro-chemicals, fertilizer, and metals, and staunch revanchism for losing their 'place in the sun' in Europe.

The apparent OPEC solidarity with Russia though is of increasing interest. The US public has long soured on our having to protect and invest in Saudi Arabia and Co., now surely the professional diplomats and strategists in the US and Europe may finally see that the Saudis never were and never will be our friends.

This is where I'd like Biden continuing to invest in shale oils in the Americas and where I wish that the Republicans together with Democrats could find a way to bring Venezuela in from its current isolation. Big yes to investing in Green energy and Nuclear to eventually wean off oils for fuel but in the near term we have the ability to reduce the clout of OPEC while also allowing for that oil money to go right into the US and Canadian economies.
Yes, they'll always hate the US and be wary of US military intervention but there must a way forward with the Maduro regime to get them to liberalize a bit in order to get some rule of law concessions and allow sanctions to be eased. Seeing as we have to deal with the sanctions in the form of Venezuelan refugees on the border anyhow it is not something the US can ignore. Same as the continued anarchy in Haiti though that seems to be an unsolvable problem without military force to stabilize the capital and allow for a return to civil rule, something no one including myself wants to undertake as that civil rule will then require the US and France to prop it up indefinitely.

Montmorency

12-07-2022, 06:09

Private firms don't want to invest in expanding oil exploitation in the US, because they've made more profit in the past year than in most of the 2010s. It's against their economic interest.

Similarly, when it comes to KSA and many other oil/gas-producing countries, their concern isn't Russia but the Western hostility to the long-term viability of petrochemicals, which is more or less in contravention of the basis for the formers' existence as sovereign states. European countries are currently begging for one last hit of the supply, so that they can finally get around to cutting off their dealers forever (besides actively investing in driving them out of business). Various countries - China, Russia, KSA, etc. - see us as competitors, rather than partners, and when it comes to petro-economies you can't say it isn't for good reason. No wonder Chinese diplomats are currently doing the rounds, whispering that unlike Whitey they'll definitely promise to be loyal gas-guzzling paypigs.

So returning to American or other alternative production... just to simplify the processes on both ends, imagine we started producing 10 million more barrels of oil tomorrow (daily global production has long been roughly 100 million/day IIRC), or increased our refining capacity by some quantity. Why wouldn't OPEC+ immediately respond by cutting actual production by, say, 11 million barrels?

Oil is an extremely liquid and fungible commodity on the GLOBAL market. There is no such thing as "energy independence" on the basis of domestic oil production. It is against the most fundamental interests of petro-economy actors to facilitate the transition of countries away from petro-chemicals, so they're naturally not about to make it convenient.

These points are something I feel those who historically reach for "someone should invest more in domestic oil" don't grasp. It's against the stakeholder responsibility of (American) primary producers in a transitioning economy to do so without the government forcing them to ("Socialism!"), and OPEC producers can counteract any such investment step for step if it comes at sufficient scale to threaten global price trends; OPEC producers are usually in the market at lower break-even prices anyway.

Semi-related because gas more so than oil, but in the 15 years of the "shale revolution" in the US fracking has been routinely unprofitable for companies that undertake it, because the supply grew so high so fast that extractors often can't make back their investment. I reposted an investigation into how these companies manipulate bankruptcy law to dump debt and environmental duties, on the Org in the past few years. This is what oversupply looks like.

26181

Anyway, the next generation will be interesting as India will likely transition from a Russian to Western equipment base for its military, while the Gulf States may do so from an American to a Chinese base.

In other news, there was a big day for flak. Ukraine pushed a Soviet drone strike package into Russia that managed to penetrate to damage two Tu-22 strategic bombers on the ground north of Moscow, whereas one of Ukraine's Gepards shot down a Russian cruise missile.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1599806135850086410 [VIDEO]

Also, the Pentagon is reportedly finally beginning to draw contracts to bring 155mm shell production to 500K annually, I believe at least a doubling of the 2010s average, by 2025. Similar with other munitions.

Shaka_Khan

12-07-2022, 10:00

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDUHXwEBMFQ

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5kFgT9JRkc

Shaka_Khan

12-09-2022, 13:56

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cvhMCFzihZw

Shaka_Khan

12-14-2022, 00:20

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ve3Iexw2w1A

But I think those vehicles are using desert camouflage.

spmetla

12-14-2022, 00:32

They'll probably get resprayed in woodland camo when they get to Europe. Since the 2003 invasion all US vehicles come from the factory new/rebuilt in desert camo. Works out as it's still an easy light base to add woodland to if needed and since the premier armor training happens at the National Training Center in the desert between LA and Las Vegas and most of our armor is based out of Texas the desert works out for most stateside training events.
Mind you, a lot of our kit comes standard in desert now which is frustrating. My brigade's command post tents are all desert tan despite being in Hawaii which is not the best camo pattern here. A lot of our vehicles remain desert tan too as respraying to woodland seems a waste of money and man-hours when those maintenance people could be better used fixing broken vehicles.

Then again, they may end up just being used in desert tan in Europe. At the recent years tank competitions there our tanks were glaringly out of place in Europe in their desert tan color or plain olive drab instead of the old NATO woodland pattern. The US Army isn't the best when it comes to some of the basics of camo and uniform procurement efficiency.
https://youtu.be/FX-sf0UcJRI?t=468

Montmorency

12-24-2022, 14:08

A two (https://thelookoutn.substack.com/p/a-russian-winter-offensive-part-1)-parter (https://thelookoutn.substack.com/p/a-russian-winter-offensive-part-2) of some of the best analysis of operational prospects for a Russian winter offensive. GenStab-UA, for their part, has already hinted heavily that they are husbanding their resources for a counter-offensive, or perhaps a preemptive one, leaving some of the strategic initiative in Russia's hands. In my opinion, a serious thrust from Belarus would be the best case for Ukraine, as it would have the least potential for permanent territorial gains, would offer no strategic advantage to Russia, would redouble domestic and international resistance toward Russia, and would generally be a waste of resources towards any of Putin's stated objectives. An attack around the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk border, west of Donetsk City, could be the most dangerous; if very successful it could force a backward correction of the entire frontline by 5-10km. A quasi-offensive with resources split between central Donetsk (Bakhmut/Avdiivka) and the Luhansk border (Oskil-Krasna/Svatove area) may be the single likeliest scenario, though my confidence in the assessment is not that high.

A persistent limitation on Ukraine's side is the lack of complex tactical and operational skill and training, and a similar lack of refinement of command ability and administrative/technical expertise among the officer class. This has left Ukraine rather ineffective against prepared RuFOR defenses of any sort, when despite materiel shortcomings they should be able to achieve more with better tactics and better coordination of the artillery branch to shape local conditions. Of course this was common knowledge before the war, but even during the contribution of hands-on experience is not adequate to develop the appropriate skills. Battlefield experience alone teaches survival, not victory. More training is required for the latter, and NATO training programs during the war can hardly be called the bare minimum. The lack of skill and discipline among typical UFOR units (to say nothing of militias) has been commented on often by foreign volunteers, and is sometimes visible in footage of offensive actions that closely resembles analogous footage of defective Russian tactics.

In 10 months of hostilities, how the collective NATO alliance hasn't absorbed a couple hundred thousand Ukrainian civilians, leavened with a few thousand experienced serving Ukrainians, and offered them a full NATO-standard training course, is one of the great scandals/blunders of the war. Had this been accomplished, alongside training of officers up to general rank, as well as of technical and logistical specialists, the baseline of the Ukrainian military could exceed that of the VDV by now. It is within our capabilities, and would be an irreplaceable exercise and stress test of our capacity to mass-mobilize our own civilians in a world war. Not that we anticipate such a need anytime soon, but it's advantageous institutional knowledge to develop, well worth the initial cost of investing our military resources in such a large-scale program for Ukraine's sake.

Ukraine ends the year with one of the most powerful and skilled militaries in the world, and arguably the best-motivated or willful, but it's still very close to the Russian level in aggregate ability and individual combat power (trending gradually upward with the influx of penal and reservist elements), and just trash by American standards.

Also, apparently this is still happening.

https://i.imgur.com/sUharEF.jpg

Montmorency

12-25-2022, 03:22

Pursuant to the above...
https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

Yes, of course, it's ridiculous to try to turn the UA military into a NATO military on the fly, but the thing is that there is a definite lack of skills at all levels that hinders UFOR from reaching its full potential with the resources it possesses or specializes in. I don't think it's unreasonable to say that Ukraine is still poor at, for example, concentrating its technically-superior artillery against RuFOR defenses to suppress enemy artillery and fixed emplacements to achieve a breakthrough. A month's training and 6 months' field experience is great for basic artillery work, but at this point the high-value systems should have had their crews rotated out, at least partially, with personnel with 6 months' training.

I'm not saying it would be enough to ensure a breakthrough to Kharkiv-style deep maneuver in the south, or would have been enough against multiple defensive belts in Kherson in the fall, but it would probably be enough - in combination with better infantry and better officers - to maintain consistent initiative. RuFOR would not have time to dig in and erect sophisticated fortifications across hundreds of kilometers. Because UFOR lost its momentum in the north by early October, RuFOR took the next month to regroup, and more or less since the fall of Kherson they've been conducting more routine attacks than UFOR. And yet many people still speak as though Ukraine retains the initiative. That progression was a failure on our part as much as on Ukraine's, and this is the case whether or not we equip Ukraine with a NATO air force.

EDIT: Pursuant (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ydtt1ZHHdxk) to the previously-mentioned M-55S T-55 upgrades that Ukraine received from Slovenia, it turns out that in fact the upgrade does not come with thermal sights and Ukraine will not have access to the most modern ammo. It can still reliably match the older Russian T-72 and T-80 models if it comes to it however. According to the presenter it should only be considered equivalent to the Russian T-62M.

Montmorency

01-08-2023, 16:02

Enemy at the gates. One assumes penal.

20? 30?

https://i.imgur.com/9DRBaDI.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/kVQZ48M.jpg

rory_20_uk

01-10-2023, 20:07

Montmorency

01-10-2023, 23:25

NATO / The West seems to be treating the war as some sort of video game - when Ukraine gets to the next level new items are unlocked - IFVs now and perhaps tanks later.
Germany seems to view tanks as offensive weapons hence why they're not offered. Why they needed over 2,000 to defend earlier against the Warsaw Pact if they're offensive - and Ukraine does need to attack to recapture their territory.

~:smoking:

Yes, but. Well, over time we learn how complicated things are. Germany is not singularly miserly, since it has done quite a lot for Ukraine on a per capita basis compared to the rest of NATO, and the Scholz government has always been pretty clear about only taking steps in reaction to collective or American decisions (e.g. Abrams-before-Leopards pathway).

I believe Germany and some others can go without an armored branch, but upon examination it turns out (https://twitter.com/J_JHelin/status/1611209644524933122) that out of the countries willing to donate more than zero tanks to Ukraine, only a battalion or two of Leopard 2(~A4) could be mustered out of "surplus." Avoiding self-demilitarization is at least an excuse, if IMO a short-sighted one.

Some details I've learned about specifically tank combat in Ukraine are that both Ukraine and Russia rely on late-Cold War APFSDS projectiles for their 125mm cannons, such as the 3BM42 Mango, which achieves 500mm RHAe at 2k. The Russians do not use post-Cold War projectiles at similar scale because 4-500mm is enough to defeat common Ukrainian T-64BVs frontally. Ukraine does not have access to later projectiles in any numbers.

The Russian modernizations of T-72s and T-80s, and even T-62s, achieve considerable improvements in protection against both AP and HEAT shells. Maybe in practice these upgrades don't perform exactly as advertised, and corruption and ineptness sometimes leave Russian modernized tanks without regulation armor coverage, but in general we've seen Russian armor tech working well enough to be worth handling at face value.

It's to the point where NATO Cold War-era munitions of both 105mm and 125mm are simply obsolete versus their armor, since Russia invested in beating NATO tech and Europe mostly relaxed, I guess.

Except the US M829A1 for Abrams, which is what devastated Iraq's early-model T-72s in 1991 alongside the M829, which is comparable to its Russian age-peer the 3BM42. But even those are dated against Russian composites and Kontakt-5/Relikt ERA, which close to doubled effective resistance over early models. 500-600mm RHAe penetration is simply not enough to achieve reliable frontal penetration from 1 or 2km against T-72B3, T-80BVM, and the T-90 series (though there's some chance against various spots, and a decent one from the side). M829A2 I think was specifically tested on T-72B and T-90, that generation of Kontakt-5 and composite, and found to penetrate at 2km. M829A3 was developed specifically to counter Kontakt-5, and I assume A4 offers at least 1000mm penetration at long range, making it competitive against even the most contemporary Russian and Chinese tanks. But while I don't know enough to say, it's possible the US won't send later M829 models (A2/3/4) alongiside Abrams if and when that deal comes through, out of concern that Russia will capture samples and reverse-engineer toward better armor for themselves and China. And the US may be concerned for its prestige, since legacy M1 and M1A1 Abrams can easily be penetrated anywhere by contemporary Russian projectiles and common missiles, and of course any tank can be disabled by a direct blow to the top by artillery shells.

For example, the oft-touted donation candidate Leopard 1 was designed with notably thin armor even for the 1950s, and its ammo performance, similar to that of the just-committed AMX-10RC, is no good against anything but T-62s frontally, even in line with what we should expect from the legacy ammo available for the Slovenian T-55s donated to Ukraine. But the RC has the virtue of much better mobility, making it better suited for recon, infantry support and assault gun roles.

Keep in mind, the tanks and IFVs we send to Ukraine are 1960s-80s tech that the Russian fleet has been specifically upgraded against.

Thankfully, in this war the biggest killer of tanks is probably indirect artillery (!), followed by ATGM/MANPAT, and then by mines. Tank duels might be responsible for, I dunno, 10%? 5%? Less? More than drones though, since drones have been reserved for scrapping parked or abandoned tanks most of the time and that's not a traditional engagement. Just before the war, a joint Ukrainian-Belarussian venture developed the Stugna-P (domestic designation) ATGM, which is actually competitive for Top 10 ATGM and whose more advanced missile achieves 1100mm RHAe penetration and is rated to ride up to 5.5km, enough to defeat any tank in Russia's arsenal (and there's footage of it defeating lots of tanks). If only Ukraine could be helped to produce them in any significant quantity.

In good news, factors such as the successful alternative sourcing, global economic slowdown (manifested in downward price pressure), record winter heat (climate change silver linings), and unprecedented private sector efforts to increase efficiency of operations (they could have done that all along?), have kept natural gas storage in Germany and elsewhere close to full. Storages will likely not drop below 50% this winter. There will not be rationing in Europe after all.

Furunculus

01-12-2023, 11:04

poland seems to be playing a clever game with Leopard 2's:
they have them, and don't want them - as they play no useful part in advancing its geopolitical and industrial agendas.

working in cahoots with britain - who will trigger the detonation by sending 10 C2's - poland hopes to start an avalanche of leopard deliveries from the many european users.
presuming this hot war continues on for another five years then the entire used market of leapard 2 tanks (very large!) can essentially be seen as 'war attrition' stocks.

this aligns with their industrial strategy:
> local production of licensed K2PL tanks - which could become the default european tank for everyone but France/Germany, i.e. people who want a tank but don't need a $10m dollar super tank, which includes nations up to the scale of italy, and perhaps even (maritime) britain.

this aligns with their geopolitical strategy:
> creating an alternate power-bloc that cuts across its EU/Nato relationships, supporting Ukraine and probably see it become a formal member of the Three Seas Initiative. once all the war attrition stocks are burnt up, i fully expect to see Ukraine equipped with K2PL/K9/Borsuk.

late 2020's looks like a good time for polish industry!

Montmorency

01-13-2023, 00:56

Poland and the UK are going to supply symbolic MBT companies - one company each. Actually, as you'll see, Poland hasn't even requested permission from Germany to transfer Leopards, making their contribution even more symbolic so far. Still, this is the most movement on equipment transfers we've seen since the October strategic bombing wave and the Spring Offensive crisis.

It better all be leading to the announcement of an American-trained Abrams tank division next week (at Ramstein)

Chancellor Scholz says deliveries of heavy weapons depend on coordination ‘with our transatlantic partner.’ (https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-germany-us-battle-tanks-ukraine-war/)

The chancellor has repeatedly argued against sending Leopards by saying that Germany must not act alone in sending Western tanks

Like I said, this has been well-understood since last spring. I've already fulminated about the failure of the US and European NATO governments to have the foresight to invest in training up several hundred thousand Ukrainians, including officers and specialists, to NATO standards around at least some NATO-equipped formations. E.g. two overstrength divisions, one out of the EU, one out of the US. Imagine one Abrams tank division, and one Leopard 2/Challenger 2/Leclerc mechanized division, self-sufficient operational formations, trained to elite status by the standards of this war, getting ready to ship out to Ukraine right about NOW.

“The British army works off about 50 tanks,” says Mr King. “[They] are extremely old, and they break down all the time.”

You know, the fact that Russia spent the past decade modernizing two thousand of its tanks to be proof against Cold War-era NATO tank/AT tech, while NATO progressively demilitarized, is kind of a telling sign of malice.

The adage of the blade itself inciting to violence remains valid.

*side-eyes Poland*

On the other hand, George Friedman looking some way these days with Turkish assertiveness and a Polish partnership with an East Pacific country (though not a prospective "naval power" nor Japan).

Montmorency

01-13-2023, 01:16

Furunc, the theory is interesting but it's hard to see it working.

1. Since when does Poland want to dump its Leopard 2 fleet anytime soon? It's in the process of modernizing it. While the majority of the pre-war armor branch was composed of T-72 variants, not all of these have yet been sent. That is, media reports indicate they sent 240 by mid-2022, which constitutes a full third of Poland's pre-war fleet. Another third remains (or a quick search hasn't indicated any new deliveries), mostly PT-91 I believe. Is Poland going to suddenly donate the Leopard 2s it's paying to upgrade while holding on to some mid-grade T-72 models? Poland wants Abrams for any transfers of Leopards, as far as I understand it, which would take a little more time to arrange, but would certainly remain in service for at least another decade. One thing I'm sure of is that Poland is not literally going to divest itself of all its tanks before production of K2 replacements can replace them, which would take years. At the very minimum, even if you assume anti-Russian fanaticism, some, including the US admin, would impress that Polish tanks pointed at Kaliningrad and Belarus are more valuable than they would be in Ukrainian hands.

2. Poland has ordered 1000 K2s (for $10+ million per unit??). To be precise, most of them have not been contracted yet, but there is a memorandum of understanding so to speak. In the past decade, only a few hundred K2s have been produced. Last year Poland received a batch of 10 tanks. Even if SK prioritizes export over domestic acquisition, production capacity is likely to be preoccupied with the Polish and domestic orders for the rest of the decade. This is also why indications are that Poland will maintain hundreds of Abrams and Leopards for years to come (beside my recollection that their government has claimed an intention to maintain hundreds of Abrams and L2s for years).

3. As noted above, there are not really many surplus L2s in Europe - 100 for Ukraine this year might be optimistic - and even if in theory some countries such as Poland would demilitarize in exchange for a K2 backfill, there will not be any realization of K2 backfill as a physical factor for years to come. The war will not go on for that long, and there is no question that Abrams would meet Ukraine's needs in such an extended timeframe.

4. Germany isn't going to exchange Leopards for K2s. I don't see why Turkey would. It and Austria aren't even likely to give up any tanks to Ukraine. Czechoslovakia are sources of T-72 for Ukraine, but they seem to be ordering Leopard 2A4, and being small countries make small tank markets. Greece? Possible, but only well into the future, once reliability of production and the platform itself is demonstrated. Even so, Greek surplus Leopards would end up somewhere, likely in Europe. In the meantime, I doubt Greece would exchange Leopards for anything less than Abrams up front. Spain has a lot of Leopard 2, currently in pretty bad condition, but they are 100% of its tank fleet and I suspect it will prefer to restore and modernize its existing fleet - a very viable prospect - than replace it entirely. Moreover, Spain is rather insulated from the defense spending wave affecting Europe. Same applies for Portugal's small fleet. Canada has only a few dozen combat-variant Leopard 2s - doesn't seem like a K2 candidate?

5. That leaves Hungary. Hungary is currently expanding its Leopard force with 2A7s, but maybe they will replace T-72s with K2s. Still, 100 tanks by 2035 seems optimistic. Also, we have the Nordics. Denmark is currently modernizing to 2A7 and has a double-digit fleet; not a candidate. The rest have 300+ Leopard 2, not sure what they've planned for it. Unclear interest, not that much potential. Italy - Italy might just as well be a market for surplus Leopard 2 if divesting of indigenous hardware surely, especially if K2 does make inroads elsewhere. But it is one of the better candidates. Somehow I'm not seeing that K2 fits into the continental defense picture very prominently.

6. I haven't covered the likes of the Baltics - who are too small to matter and currently operate zero tanks as a deliberate doctrinal choice - and the Balkans other than Greece, because I haven't looked into them. K2 for Kosovo?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCG4hhS2v1w

In conclusion, the K2 and other aspects of the Polish-Korean joint venture represent an interesting inroad into the European market, but between the Leopard 2, the FrancoGerman Eurotank (Main Ground Combat System), and possibly surplus Abrams, there isn't much space for expansion. It's possible the Middle East or Africa become the real market, but I don't know enough to speculate, and that fruits well into the 2030s if it does. If being extraordinarily optimistic I can see European and/or NATO countries other than Poland fielding 500 K2 by 2040. Under 100 is just as likely. AFAICT this joint venture is more clearly a winning industrial strategy for South Korea, which can pursue opportunities globally, than for Poland, which is focused on its near-abroad.

I could be wrong if, like, the EU realizes that Ukraine lacks the resources to defeat Russia outright and goes all-in on Lend Lease to the point of obviating Abrams. But that just creates an opportunity for K2, one that may or may not be taken advantage of if Abrams, L2, and the Eurotank persevere in the face of K2's relative late-mover penalty.

Furunculus

01-13-2023, 10:57

There were about 3,600 Leopard 2's made, currently in about a dozen major upgrade tiers depending on when they were last tinkered with.

Poland had many hundreds of legacy soviet tanks, as well as a couple hundred of post cold-war hundred leopard 2.
Poland will have many hundreds of K2PL tanks under licence production, as well as a couple hundred of M1's for geopolitical reasons.

Many of the legacy soviet tanks have already gone to Ukraine, and these are essentially war attrition stocks. They have no long term future for Ukraine. They will be expended over the next few years, as will anything else gifted to Ukraine in the next few years.
Poland has no long term interest in operating Leopard 2s. It is an aging niche fleet when they will soon be operating multiples more of more modern types. I merely suggest here that it is advantageous for Poland for L2's to become war attrition stocks too.

There is no ambition to sell K2PL to Germany or France, they have their own tank industry and will seek to preserve it.
Their product will be v. expensive. Top tier tanks with a top-tier price.
Likewise, there is no intention of selling to Turkey, who will have their own variant of the K2.

Where the opportunity lies in europe for Poland is what the many medium/small nations do when their own aging niche fleets reach end of life. They won't want to spend top dollar for top tier tanks with a top-tier price from France or Germany (or the US):
They simply don't operate at a scale where they have the budget to buy them without soaking up their entire capital budget for a decade.
They simply don't have the ambition to resist - by which I mean having both an existential threat and a scale to do something about it.

They will want something cheaper and NATO standard and preferably 'european'.

KMW will certainly offer to upgrade their existing tank fleet if they operate Leopard 2's.
And other operators of L2 fleets will certainly offer to sell theirs on (as seen by Netherlands and Spain).

The Austrian Army acquired 114 Leopard 2A4s from surplus Dutch stocks.
The Canadian Army acquired 80 Leopard 2A4 and 20 Leopard 2A6 tanks from the Netherlands in 2007.
The Czech Ministry of Defence announced it will get 15 Leopards 2A4 from Germany as an exchange for Czech tanks that will be given to Ukraine to help defend against Russian invasion and may purchase up to 50 modern 2A7+ variants later.
The Royal Danish Army operated 57 Leopard 2A5DK (equal to Leopard 2A6 minus the L/55 gun).
Finland agreed with the Netherlands to purchase 100 used Leopard 2A6NL tanks for approximately €200 million.
The Hellenic Army operates 183 Leopard 2A4s and 170 Leopard 2A6 HEL vehicles.
Hungary did a deal for 44 Leopard 2A7+ and 12 second hand Leopard 2A4 was signed in December 2018.
The Polish Land Forces operate 142 Leopard 2A4s, 105 Leopard 2A5s.
The Portuguese Army operates 37 ex-Dutch Leopard 2A6s, acquired in 2008 for €80 million.
The Slovak Ministry of Defence announced it will get 15 Leopards 2A4 from Germany in an exchange for its 30 tracked BMP-1 IFV's.
The Spanish Army operates 327 Leopard 2s (108 ex-German Leopard 2A4s and 219 new-built Leopard 2A6+ (Leopard 2E).
Sweden has acquired 120 Leopard 2 Improved tanks, upgrading them as the Stridsvagn 122, with 42 Strv 122 tanks remaining in active service.
The Swiss Army purchased 380 2A4s designated Pz 87, 134 of these tanks have been modernised, with the remaining tanks are in storage.

And aside from the above, you have to wonder whether Italy will build a local designed replacment for the Ariete in the 2030's...? I suspect not. They made the ariete because they didn't want top-tier.
You also have to wonder whether the UK's challenger '3' upgrade is a long term solution, i.e. a fleet it intends to fight into the 2nd half of the 21st century. C2's biggest failing is a lack of upgrades, C3 will be the same.

looks pretty good for Poland.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yrbaAKZfjwg

Montmorency

01-14-2023, 02:08

But I covered that, including linking to a careful perusal of national L2 stocks. They are not as large as one may think, though that's somewhat tangential.

Poland by all indications will operate L2 at least through the rest of the decade.

K2 could take up to a decade to mature as a product with reliable delivery schedule outside the current early adopters, and in the meantime surplus L2 and ongoing production would be more readily available as well as cheaper for older models. (The contract prices you mentioned in your listing just further emphasize that ATM L2 is far cheaper than K2 ...) If you look at (almost) every European country as I just did, pick out the ones who are candidates to replace their current fleets with K2, and estimate the number of units they would absorb.

It just doesn't add up to a lot. And no, counting every Leopard 2 that exists and assuming that all those countries will affirmatively choose to pay to replace them outright as a rule can't make it work. That's not happening, and even if it were the K2 materially would not and could not fill that vast void. Countries currently fall into several categories, to simplify:

1. No prospect of Polish K2 sales (Germany, France, UK, Turkey).
2. Are not likely to expand their own fleets (no geopolitical need) and/or are currently investing in L2 expansion or modernization (Canada, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, reportedly Romania and Bulgaria).
3. Have money to choose any platform they like and currently operate large L2 fleets (Switzerland, Nordics).
4. Countries too small for tanks or to matter regardless (Belgium, Baltics, Moldova).
5. Italy and Greece.
6. Yugoslavia???

Italy and Greece are merely hypothetical customers, and Greece is currently heavily invested in L2.

Unless you explain how K2 overcomes its production schedule and cost limitations and beats out Abrams and Eurotank and L2 path dependence to make inroads into categories 2 and 3, the prospects within Europe are not strong. That's why I suspect a South Korean outpost in Eastern Europe is of more benefit to its own international arms sales, including looking forward to places like the Middle East, than it is for Polish soft power in Europe. There is already, after all, a proposed Middle Eastern variant of the K2(M).

OTOH I will give you that it is plausible that the current Norwegian bid competition between L2A7 and K2 could create more K2 momentum if Norway chooses it. However, this would at best prove of indirect help to Poland as Norway would license production of K2 domestically for a bespoke variant (K2NO) - following delivery of an initial batch from Korea. Norway might instead go the troll route and decline to purchase any tanks according to current information...

My impression of Latin America is that there is neither want nor need for expensive 21st century tanks, other than Colombia sucking up to the US through a looming Abrams tender (it currently has no tanks). Otherwise, Chile has a surprisingly large fleet of 200+ Leopard 2A4. It would take a hard sell for K2 to make inroads in Latin America. Are there any prospects for escalating regional hostilities unchecked by the US to be aware of?

Essentially it amounts to not a big role for K2 in Europe and not a big role for Poland in K2.

I watched the Perun video previously and recall it carefully avoids making a concrete analysis of K2's potential market penetration, just as it avoids analyzing Poland's payment mechanisms for its proposed arms race.

Montmorency

01-15-2023, 08:19

Interesting on the Leopard 2. In terms of armor and firepower, the common variant received by Ukraine, 2A4, would be pretty comparable to the T-64BV, sadly. This is why it was worth it to start revisiting actual protection/penetration values; even assuming superior fire control, optics, comms, and computing on the L2's part, late-Cold War MBT variants other than the M1A1 are just badly outdated in contemporary large-scale battle. I recall being amused at the performance of Turkish L2s in Syria, but that was misguided. Both Turkish L2s and Iraqi T-72s (and Saudi export Abrams) suffered as much from obsolescence of their technical characteristics as user error, and the lesson coming through this war is once again 'Only 21st-c. tanks are worth anything if you actually plan to fight a serious war.'

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_ot6uxyvvg

Extensive report (https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan) wargaming a China-Taiwan war using open-source data.

The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy
and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy
encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Tens of
thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian rollon, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads.

However, in the most likely “base scenario,” the Chinese invasion quickly founders. Despite
massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the
invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and
fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese
amphibious fleet. China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result:
Taiwan remains autonomous.

There is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. If Taiwan surrenders
before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.

This defense comes at a high cost. The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of
aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position
for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a
damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services. China also suffers heavily. Its
navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers
are prisoners of war.

I have no insight about the validity of the results, but the justification of the reliance on OSINT is cogent:

This project used only unclassified data so that its results can inform public debate. Some observers,
particularly within the government, might argue that accurate modeling is impossible without access
to classified data. However, classified data is not necessary for the construction of a credible wargame.
Although classified data might help tweak certain parameters (e.g., missile ranges, intercept probabilities,
and submarine detection capabilities), they would not change the fundamental structure of the game or
the outcomes. The reasons are threefold.

First, much information that was previously classified is now available from open sources. For example,
The Military Balance by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides detailed
equipment numbers, while Jane’s databases provide detailed information about equipment capabilities.
Google Earth provides information about facilities that required U-2 flights during the Cold War. The
team used Google Earth to determine the number and location of Chinese underground airfields, the
size of parking ramps, and other parameters of air bases. Although classified imagery might refine this
information, unclassified information is more detailed and accurate than ever before.112

Second, classified data is not necessarily correct data. It is vulnerable to a lack of probing and testing
because of restricted access. Indeed, bureaucratic and political forces may require government actors to
accept weapons testing data that does not account for the friction that can greatly diminish weapons
effectiveness in the real world. For example, classified Air Force testing projected a 92 percent hit
rate for the AIM-9J missile before its fielding in Vietnam; analysis after the war found that its actual
hit rate was 13 percent.113 A similar result was obtained in the infamous U.S. torpedo scandal of
World War II.114 These mistakes were possible because projections of future conflicts require making
assumptions about events that have never happened and classification prevented the usual vetting of
these projections. No squadron of F-35s has ever engaged a squadron of J-20s; predicting the result of
such an engagement relies on assumptions, regardless of classification level. Most of the parameters
in the project’s wargame are based on historical data; classified information might help refine these
assumptions but would not replace the importance of historical data.

Third, the appropriate use of historical data can sometimes be more accurate in modeling future
conflicts than classified information about specific weapons systems. Before Desert Storm, classified
models using accurate weapons performance data predicted 20,000 to 30,000 casualties. However,
private commentators predicted fewer casualties, based on data from Israel’s Six-Day War.115 Although
the classified models had more accurate weapons capability data, they modeled the Iraqis as fighting as
competently as the Soviets.116 The open-source models accounted for the poorer operational competence
of Arab militaries, which more than made up for their deficiencies in classified weapons performance
data. Thus, open-source models have value beyond their intrinsic transparency and public accessibility.

Montmorency

01-19-2023, 21:59

Montmorency

01-19-2023, 22:42

Only a fascist could play himself into prison abolition and mass amnesty.

spmetla

01-20-2023, 03:01

As I explained, and was well-known since early in the war, Scholz has now made it explicit that he will not consent to the transfer of Leopard 2 to Ukraine unless the US contributes at least a token quantity, even single digits, of Abrams.

Either way, the penny packet bullshit continues.

Yup, Scholz has shown himself as completely unfit to try and lead Germany in this crisis. I'll give him credit for getting Germany off Russian gas so quickly but the Zeitwende he announced in February has not come about.

Hope the new German Defense Minister can reform the Bundeswehr and its ties with industry some.
Also hope the US is willing to send a company of Abrams M1A2s just to force the Germans hands. The Ukrainians have show capable of handling multiple different vehicles and getting them some sustainment report. As for the fuel guzzling, the T80s they field also have gas-turbine engines so it shouldn't be unknown to them what to do with the Abrams. I've had to watch Abrams destroyed by poor use in the hands of Iraqis and Saudis, would much rather see them face the foe they were designed against by a country that has shown a knack for fighting.

Both Turkish L2s and Iraqi T-72s (and Saudi export Abrams) suffered as much from obsolescence of their technical characteristics as user error, and the lesson coming through this war is once again 'Only 21st-c. tanks are worth anything if you actually plan to fight a serious war.'
At the very least though, western tanks due have higher rates of crew survivability, something extremely valuable in order to first get crews to expose themselves to danger and secondly to retain that cadre of experienced tankers.
The Abrams are certainly not obsolete by any means but the Sep4 finally upgrades the FLIRs again, though the system is due for replacement primarily because it just isn't designed for all the networked warfare/data sharing that future systems can field.
I won't speak to the armor but it seems to have done well enough that the US just hasn't even considered investment in Reactive Armor as a supplement yet. The frontal arc of the Abrams M1A2s and Challenger 2s should be top notch, the Leo2s are probably damn good too though they don't use DU materials. All MBTs though will be vulnerable to the sides and top.

Was glad to see the Swedes sending over CV-90/4s and more artillery as well as the Danes, even the French are considering sending over Leclercs. Think Western arms industry are seeing that future sales of platforms and keeping their factories open for present day spare parts may depend on their performance in the only true conventional war since Desert Storm. The CV-90s are impressive IFVs, always thought the US should have used those for the basis of a Bradley replacement instead of opting for the Puma and then going for this new optionally manned boondoggle.
Would like to see how Leclercs hold up in combat, the French have always had a different approach to armor that hasn't had a chance to show itself since WW2 as the AMX30s in Desert Storm were obsolete even then.

There is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. If Taiwan surrenders
before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.

This defense comes at a high cost. The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of
aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position
for many years. While Taiwan?s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a
damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services. China also suffers heavily. Its
navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers
are prisoners of war.
Well, the PRC has certainly demonstrated to Taiwan's people that promises will not be kept as seen in Hong Kong so hopefully if it comes to blows the Taiwanese have the will to resist.

Haven't read the report yet but will do so. I still can't see a China that depends on maritime trade for food and fuel starting a war over Taiwan until they could garruntee to keep the US Navy beyond the Malacca Straits and and Guam.

Hooahguy

01-20-2023, 05:37

Im hoping that the western allies are starting to understand that since Russia is gearing up for a long war, the best thing for them to do is to not give Ukraine just enough to sustain themselves, but enough to actually end this. Which requires more advanced stuff. Like I see no reason why we shouldnt be giving them ATACMS now.

Montmorency

01-22-2023, 22:53

Tanks and APCs/IFVs will be critical for Kyiv to retake the rest of its territory, but they may not be enough. Kyiv needs to have superior combined arms capability to breakthrough prepared defensive positions. Hopefully, this change in thinking will extend to other capabilities.

I mean, there were people pointing this out many months ago, but the wrong lessons were taken from the September Offensives and talk drifted to the margins. I've specified since October that the reasonable approach is to refrain from sending up equipment in penny packets with half-trained crews and instead train up two NATO-equipped divisions from scratch, on NATO soil, preferably one mech (Leo2) and one tank (Abrams). Now Zaluzhny says he needs 300 tanks and 600 AFV or whatever; assuming the divisions are organized around 3 brigades or equivalent as maneuver elements, that tally is in the vicinity of two divisions' TOE.

This is exactly the shock force structure that could be productively assigned to Zaporizhzhia as their exclusive area of responsibility, and tasked to the offensive. Legacy ZSU formations would hold the flanks.

The US, in recognition of the need to build capacity, has promised to train a whole 500 Ukrainians in Germany in combined arms, which you may notice is not a division. The British have promised to train another 20K Ukrainians in at least basic infantry MOS throughout 2023, so they plus advanced US forces could easily manage the process of standing up a divisional formation and its replacement reserve (NB. the US Army is apparently in the initial stages of reverting from brigades back to "penetration" divisions, and so is the VSRF; brigades aren't as bad as battalions for elementary operational-scale units, but they're still evidently inadequate for sustained large-scale combat). In principle, European NATO could plausibly train 100K+ in various MOS, probably 80K as a minimum when accounting the UK, US bases, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and Poland alone. The Baltics and Nordics could handle the rest, leaving the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia as odds and ends (I don't know how willing or capable other countries would be wrt training missions).

Another division should be trained in the US itself.

100K individuals for a training mission in the US alone, from say May through December 2022, wouldn't amount to as much of a hurdle as one may imagine. 25K for a large divisional formation plus replacement reserve; 10K for separately-assigned specialists in SAM, artillery, radar, and other systems and their maintenance and repair crew (cf. 100 Ukrainians are heading to the US for training on the operation of a Patriot battery); 5K as the core for a future rebuilt Ukrainian air force once the extant one runs out of frames; several thousand officers up to colonel rank for training or retraining to NATO standards; 10K for training in logistical, administration, and assorted other specialties... Less than half the nominal figure would be training for individual replacement into existing frontline units. European NATO could have trained and equipped another full division. Non-training forces in the US active branches and National Guard would have to participate in order to maintain regular training resources for regular American recruits, but I don't see how it isn't mathematically manageable. The Ukrainian recruits would have to be sorted in such a way as to ensure minimal English-language proficiency to begin with among training cadres (heavily limiting the pool of recruits), but I figure half of Ukrainians age 20-40 have or could quickly reach minimal proficiency, and women volunteers could be leveraged as well. It's not like all of NATO's soldiers are preoccupied with something else. And as I said, the PLA could only dream of attaining this kind of hands-on institutional experience of mass civilian mobilization. As a fringe benefit, the program would bind Ukraine to the Anglosphere culturally and politically in the long-term.

This process should have begun last spring, but it's never too late I suppose.

On the other hand, Estonia and Denmark are ostensibly willing to transfer ALL their artillery assets to Ukraine, which may prefigure the kinds of thoroughgoing commitments that are needed.

Now if the US can squeeze South Korea's stockpiles to forward a few hundred thousand 155mm shells to Ukraine, and makes medium-term arrangements with Korean and Australian producers, then from 2024 onward we can ensure at least a million 155mm shells to Ukraine per year - probably 1.5 million - just with new production and sustainable stockpile drawdowns. As long as NATO is comfortable being short of their pre-war stockage as late as a decade from now. I don't believe there are as many DPICM shells in physical existence left as some believe however.

If you need it, more information on German escalation logic (https://twitter.com/minna_alander/status/1615971250039300096), which has been applied since the beginning and is generally in alignment with the German public's attitudes.

I chanced this Youtube rec even though I haven't played Combat Mission in over a decade, and it is the most insightful and perspicacious overview of Cold War Soviet doctrine I've ever seen in any form. It's also generally instructive in a number of key concepts in battle, such as tactical initiative, positional battle, the value of mass, mobile defense, and more.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yey6jil-sUM

Montmorency

01-25-2023, 04:31

What was the US DoD's 155mm shell production target for 2025, 500K total? As cited in December or November I think. Now they're announcing a target of 90K/month (https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/24/us/politics/pentagon-ukraine-ammunition.html) for 2025, a sextupling of 2022 or 2021 production.

Given what we've seen of Russian production surges in tanks and missiles, and recent estimates of new production of 3 million tube arty shells in 2023 (or already in 2022? I can't keep track, but pre-war I saw estimates of a surge capacity of 1 million annual), and the ability of Romania, Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland to spin up or even restart production of Soviet caliber munitions on short notice, and help Ukraine to establish its own production on their territory by the end of 2022,

I think we should take it as a rule that war industries in any given country have a lot more spare capacity than they let on. And this isn't even total war! Although now my former predictions, going back to last summer, that materiel exhaustion would force both sides to largely pause throughout 2024, may be out of step with the times.

US and NATO could easily train up those two divisions I go on about and donate a single lot of one million 155mm shells from stockpile and accumulating production. Ukraine's consumption of 100+K 155mm/month over 8 months or so has been something like the minimum needed to hold their ground, and has likely kept many of their 155mm systems idle for lack of ammo, while also encouraging the overburdening of advanced systems such as the PzH2000. A proper offensive needs to be well-resourced for concentrated and sustained firepower.

Hopefully Zelensky finally acts on that corruption this year too.

pushing conventional ammunition production to levels not seen since the Korean War

I'm pretty sure 90K/month would be typical of US production during the Cold War, maybe even low.

spmetla

01-25-2023, 19:45

What was the US DoD's 155mm shell production target for 2025, 500K total? As cited in December or November I think. Now they're announcing a target of 90K/month for 2025, a sextupling of 2022 or 2021 production.
I don't recall the original number but it is an impressive improvement. I imagine that the defense contractors see it vital to up their own capabilities and fast before those contracts for shells go to a combination of overseas firms. Hopefully, the US sees the importance of at least mothballing the machinery and tooling to ramp up production for all our vital wartime needs for the future. Why do we have to re-learn the shell crisis in every war?

I think we should take it as a rule that war industries in any given country have a lot more spare capacity than they let on. And this isn't even total war! Although now my former predictions, going back to last summer, that materiel exhaustion would force both sides to largely pause throughout 2024, may be out of step with the times

I imagine that all depends on if they've kept the capabilities to make stuff at least in warehouses and so on. Sorta like the US could never make the Saturn V rockets anymore as the tooling and individual expertise of the engineers faded together with poor document management.
These companies being private businesses I could see a lot just getting rid of tooling and machinery once they don't see prospective orders on the horizon. I look at also things like the F-22 for which the tooling was deliberately destroyed so that those manufacturing secrets can't leak out when placed in storage which is undoubtedly less protected than current production tooling.

US and NATO could easily train up those two divisions I go on about and donate a single lot of one million 155mm shells from stockpile and accumulating production. Ukraine's consumption of 100+K 155mm/month over 8 months or so has been something like the minimum needed to hold their ground, and has likely kept many of their 155mm systems idle for lack of ammo, while also encouraging the overburdening of advanced systems such as the PzH2000. A proper offensive needs to be well-resourced for concentrated and sustained firepower.

I don't think we'll see division sized training during this fight, something that the US and NATO just doesn't have the capacity for when it's for a country in which English isn't the primary or secondary language. Also, good trainers are hard to come by, especially ones that can bridge the cultural and language barriers to reach the students. As we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan the idea of just assigning people to be advisors and trainers without a special selection process leads to forged reports, poor training, and an unprepared military.
For all those artillery systems, I'm actually curious also as to the reset capabilities, barrels have lifespan which this current fight is exceeding monthly. A lot of these artillery systems need to be taken out of the fight and have their barrels rebored or replaced.

A proper offensive will need a heck of a lot or resources. In the short term though, I hope that we keep seeing a ramp of ADA support to Ukraine as to go on the defense those resources first need to be protected. The Russian strikes on infrastructure have moved a lot of Ukrainian ADA assets to protect their cities making those frontline troops more vulnerable.

Hopefully Zelensky finally acts on that corruption this year too.

I hope so too, can only imagine the strains he has to deal with. After a year of war and with the prospect of regaining the Feb23 borders less likely much less dreams of the whole of Donbass and Crimea he's undoubtedly got no shortage of people that would be game for a negotiated settlement. Whatever Russia's starting '23 offensive ends up being will need to be decisively defeated and followed with a counterattack that regains some significant ground somewhere for Zelensky to keep the factions within his government on side as well as keep international support on side.
I say so because even in 1940, the reason the US never undertook production of Spitfires or any British systems was in part because large parts of the US expected Britain to be defeated and would rather have production go into new systems like the British paid for development the P-51 Mustang.

Russia still looks unable to win outright but a frozen conflict or ceasefire such as the Korean War scenario is essentially a Russian victory as they keep what they have so far.

Looking forward to seeing how Challenger 2s, Abrams, and Leo2s perform in a conventional war without air dominance in place. Was pleased to see the Germans offer up the Leo 2A6 versions which have the improved armor and the longer caliber gun. Wondering what version Abrams will go overseas, I imagine M1A1s without the DU armor which is still not allowed for export, which would make them excellent systems overall but not as good as the latest Leo2s and Challenger 2s. The Leclercs being on the table is still very interesting as I mentioned earlier. The war-nerd in me wants to see what lessons are learned from this war in armor design. Will be interesting to see after this war what Ukraine does for tank production as they'll have access to the best of Western systems to develop something other than a T-64/T-80 based hull and turret.

Montmorency

01-26-2023, 01:44

I don't recall the original number but it is an impressive improvement. I imagine that the defense contractors see it vital to up their own capabilities and fast before those contracts for shells go to a combination of overseas firms. Hopefully, the US sees the importance of at least mothballing the machinery and tooling to ramp up production for all our vital wartime needs for the future. Why do we have to re-learn the shell crisis in every war?

Interesting (mark that date)......
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2307521-us-arms-maker-ends-production-of-controversial-depleted-uranium-rounds/

I imagine that all depends on if they've kept the capabilities to make stuff at least in warehouses and so on. Sorta like the US could never make the Saturn V rockets anymore as the tooling and individual expertise of the engineers faded together with poor document management.

We've already observed the Russians producing or restoring tanks, missiles, and munitions at what is very likely a faster rate than the highest pre-war estimates I had found for their production. So we should take this as a real thing, supporting the general concept.

These companies being private businesses I could see a lot just getting rid of tooling and machinery once they don't see prospective orders on the horizon. I look at also things like the F-22 for which the tooling was deliberately destroyed so that those manufacturing secrets can't leak out when placed in storage which is undoubtedly less protected than current production tooling.

AFAIK the US government owns most arms industry plants and leases them to the private firms, so maybe... At any rate, we wouldn't be hearing estimates of 1+ million 155mm shells in 2025, which is more than double the estimated target from last fall, if there weren't some basis to it. This latest estimate is not only more than double the recent targeted tripling on 2022 production, it is in excess of last December's NDAA authorization for multi-year contracting in 155mm shell purchasing. I haven't recalled US firms or the US government bluffing on production like that, if it were a bluff.

I don't think we'll see division sized training during this fight, something that the US and NATO just doesn't have the capacity for when it's for a country in which English isn't the primary or secondary language. Also, good trainers are hard to come by, especially ones that can bridge the cultural and language barriers to reach the students. As we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan the idea of just assigning people to be advisors and trainers without a special selection process leads to forged reports, poor training, and an unprepared military.

Would the US military really have no one beyond the training specialists to teach this stuff? Is mass mobilization another area where we have no protocols or capabilities to activate? I would ask who the British have been tasking with their training mission; granting that they only train Ukrainians as individuals and maybe very small units, and only in 3-month waves or whatever it was, but they've definitely trained more Ukrainians last year (20K at least) than they do British recruits in any given year. That seems like a relevant indicator.

Note that the aim isn't to match the US training cycle and its particulars 100%, but to instruct in and build the required proficiencies at scale, as every country did in WW2. Right now, the US is training what I understand to be a model combined-arms battalion - 500 soldiers - in Germany for up to 2 months. It's just hard for me to believe that with some organization the US and European NATO combined couldn't scale this up to a divisional formation. Perhaps our standing units could even elect/volunteer the best teachers among enlisted and officer ranks?

The recently-announced 100+ initial Leopards, btw, are a fine basis for a Euro mechanized division. The UK has promised to train another 20K Ukrainians this year. Italy, Spain, Germany, France, Poland, I see now reason why all could not handle at least 10K each, the Nordics another 10K... Seems like with calculated foresight we could have divvied up responsibilities among NATO and paired the Leopard pledge with a British-German divisional training program. Or still could as long as we initiate the admittedly long and involved process. At the very very least, if we legitimately cannot stand up divisions of any quality from scratch, why not brigades? Isn't it self-evidently superior to train an armored formation with accompanying mounted infantry elements for 6+ months rather than to train individual crews for arbitrary distribution for 1-2 months? It's not the spring of 2022 anymore.

I don't think language is that big an issue with the size of the Ukrainian volunteer pool. I doubt good statistics exist, but from what relevant tidbits I've found half of Ukrainians aged 20-40 should have the minimum English proficiency required to start basic training - and they can learn along the way, they do have 6+ months. Technical specialties and officers would need a higher starting level of English, but overall it's one of the more surmountable barriers.

For all those artillery systems, I'm actually curious also as to the reset capabilities, barrels have lifespan which this current fight is exceeding monthly. A lot of these artillery systems need to be taken out of the fight and have their barrels rebored or replaced.

The most recent figures I saw are 66% availability among 155mm systems at any given time. But this is exacerbated, as I was saying, by overreliance on certain platforms such as the PzH2000, which does seem to be less operationally reliable than advertised, but even so routinely gets pushed to a high tempo for any cannon with daily fire missions over 100 shells. Even with the humble M777, it seems to be common to park single guns or batteries near a hot zone and keep them firing steadily for days, something that has probably contributed to the relatively-poor survivability of M777s even aside from wear and tear. Fully-trained crews, more stockpiled/dependably-allocated ammo, and a larger pool of systems would help spread the burden and afford more fire support to a broad front.

A proper offensive will need a heck of a lot or resources. In the short term though, I hope that we keep seeing a ramp of ADA support to Ukraine as to go on the defense those resources first need to be protected. The Russian strikes on infrastructure have moved a lot of Ukrainian ADA assets to protect their cities making those frontline troops more vulnerable.

The large number of munitions is also a buffer against interdiction and attrition from enemy action, which has to be priced in. We hear a lot about HIMARS strikes on Russian depots, but the Ukrainians have lost depots too - just at a seemingly much lower rate.

I hope so too, can only imagine the strains he has to deal with.

Just one example of Zelensky's limitations, whether deliberate or hapless - of course these were much commented on in the year prior to the invasion - were his efforts from early in his term to protect the very crooked, but well-connected, Yanukovych judge Pavlo Vokv, chief judge of the Kyiv District Administrative Court. The US State Department actually went so far as to sanction Vovk last month. But if the alliance can lean on Ukrainian elites adequately, Zelensky's personal probity could be beside the point.
Gilrandir

Russia still looks unable to win outright but a frozen conflict or ceasefire such as the Korean War scenario is essentially a Russian victory as they keep what they have so far.

I mean, I notice stuff. I noticed all of Ukraine's flaws on the offensive in Kharkiv in last May, east of the Oskil River in the fall, in Kherson in the fall... I noticed their struggles repelling small-scale infantry wave attacks in Donetsk even while advancing elsewhere. I've noted how these tie into repeated complaints about the level of training, discipline, organization, and command across UFOR. I[ve discussed these matters in more detail elsewhere, but by the end of last spring it was clear to me that Ukraine had little hope of recapturing pre-2022 territory without dramatic escalation of aid (more than we've seen yet). But even I have ended up overestimating the Ukrainians and underestimating the Russians repeatedly. Pro-Ukraine cheerleading only serves to contaminate the information space and undoubtedly clouds decision-making even among many NATO governments.

I imagine M1A1s without the DU armor which is still not allowed for export,

I had heard that our designated major allies are categorically extended an offer to import DU Abrams as well as DU projectiles, but none of them have taken up the offer because of the environmental complications of DU.

spmetla

01-26-2023, 04:21

Would the US military really have no one beyond the training specialists to teach this stuff? Is mass mobilization another area where we have no protocols or capabilities to activate? I would ask who the British have been tasking with their training mission; granting that they only train Ukrainians as individuals and maybe very small units, and only in 3-month waves or whatever it was, but they've definitely trained more Ukrainians last year (20K at least) than they do British recruits in any given year. That seems like a relevant indicator.

Note that the aim isn't to match the US training cycle and its particulars 100%, but to instruct in and build the required proficiencies at scale, as every country did in WW2. Right now, the US is training what I understand to be a model combined-arms battalion - 500 soldiers - in Germany for up to 2 months. It's just hard for me to believe that with some organization the US and European NATO combined couldn't scale this up to a divisional formation. Perhaps our standing units could even elect/volunteer the best teachers among enlisted and officer ranks?

Mass mobilization hasn't been practiced in earnest in a long time in the US (WW2/Korea). The draft went out over forty years ago, the GWOT wars were all with volunteers or mobilized reserve formations.

Our training is very specialized, to be a drill instructor has high prerequisites. School house instruction in the various job skills for officers, a lot of the classes are from retired officers (contractors) with maybe a third being uniformed personnel. Also, our promotion system in the military looks for operational experience, people fear going to the training realm as they may fall behind their peers that stay on the line.

Up to BDE level, the US would be very good at teaching. Divisional though, that's a lost art as we undid our whole divisional structure post-Iraq invasion. Divisions become just admin HQs, don't know when we last practiced maneuvering divisions against divisions in Corps level exercises but probably not since the Iraq invasion itself. The US practices Division war and greater really through staff simulations which are damn good for a lot of friction of war but will never be as good as large-scale practices such as the Louisiana maneuvers in 1940.

The scale up potential is there but part of the problem with the bureaucratic nature of the US military is there exists no unit setup for that training function. There are SFABs for training up smaller sized units (BNs for example) but for larger training they'd either have to take a wartime MTOE unit and task it to train another unit instead of focusing on itself (like we did in Iraq and Afghanistan). Best option would be for the Army to create a new TDA unit (Congress would have to approve) setup for Corps and Division training of foreign units/allies. With a war that will go on at months/maybe years, relying on hodge podge training units like in GWOT will only hurt our own readiness while not providing the greatest training to our supported ally. Also, I'm sure it'd be best to have a special unit with vetted personnel as there are plenty of folks in the US military that believe the far-right media and don't want the US to support Ukraine if not out-right okay with Putin's actions.

I had heard that our designated major allies are categorically extended an offer to import DU Abrams as well as DU projectiles, but none of them have taken up the offer because of the environmental complications of DU.
The DU armor has no environmental complications, its the ammunition that can have problems, and that's more so from the DU micro dust created when it's piercing armor and then any subsequent explosions from the penetrated tank.
The armor itself though would only be an environmental risk if penetrated or if someone wanted to dispose of and just left sitting somewhere at which point the steel/composite casing would eventually expose the DU over decades of rusting.

But even I have ended up overestimating the Ukrainians and underestimating the Russians repeatedly. Pro-Ukraine cheerleading only serves to contaminate the information space and undoubtedly clouds decision-making even among many NATO governments.

I feel you 100% on this, though it is difficult to contain enthusiasm during ongoing victories. I think the last year has been eye opening for what public perception must have been like during WW2 in the US and elsewhere. The media talks about expecting Germany to collapse right after Paris fell and the eye opener of the Ardennes offensive. Same in Germany, I can only imagine the heights of their arrogance after the fall of France, having defeated the enemy they could not beat in four years during the last war, instead they did it in a matter of weeks, they no-doubt felt sure of success against the enemy they did beat in the last war.

The only real upside to this being a drawn-out war though is it really does away with the peace-niks. Peace at any cost really isn't worth it, there are things worth fighting for and in order to fight for those things one must first be capable of a fight. No need for Europe to return to a fully armed camp like the Cold War or the 1910s, but no need for naivete of the 1990s and 2000s either. Should be eye-opening for US foreign policy too, don't waste our good will on what may be lost causes (Iraq and Afghanistan) and save armed intervention for when the chips really are down (WW3) or to preserve the current world order (Kuwait in 1990, Ukraine now, or Taiwan in the future).

Montmorency

01-26-2023, 05:30

Alright, I'll acknowledge that recreating divisional - at the formation level - training capabilities would be much harder than training an equivalent force in brigades. But then, do you have any comment on the US (and Russia) reportedly planning to return to divisional structure and move away from brigades as core operational units? Seems like Ukraine would also be an excellent application and spur of that doctrinal shift in real time. We need to exercise our bureaucratic flexibility anyway.
https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/10/divisions-corps-replace-brigades-armys-wartime-formation-choice/378234/

The Army’s brigade combat teams may have been the signature units of recent wars, but service leaders believe future conflicts will be dominated by divisions and even corps, officials said Monday.
[...]
The secretary said this focus on larger formations would be part of the Army’s upcoming doctrine on multi-domain operations, Wormuth said.

“To realize this vision and build the Army of 2030, we are transforming our force structure and evolving how we fight. We must do this to prepare for the challenge of large-scale combat operations, strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and to be ready if deterrence fails,” she said.

Rainey pushed back on any would-be critics who say the Army is “going backwards” by going to a division. “And that is absolutely not the case. First of all, everything we're doing is threat-informed.”

The brigades will also have to get smaller in order to survive and move, he said—but did not say how much smaller or what kind of weapons and gear would have to be shed.

Relevant: (https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1616501452372955140)

Poland is able to train [UA] brigade and equip it with T-72 tanks and IFVs.
“We will be able to both equip and train [UA] soldiers by the end of March at the brigade level” - Deputy Prime Minister of Poland, Minister of Defense Mariusz Błaszczak

For realz, how is it all of NATO combined* couldn't have proceeded from last spring to establish OSUT for many UA brigades, or even those reinvented divisions, for deployment through Winter/Spring 2023?

*Not counting Turkey, Hungary or any of the Balkans

The phrase "where there's a will there's a way" is only cheap here because it's fitting.

A few more details on my thinking. We're all aware that unit training times have varied considerably across wars, stages of wars, branches, specializations, and countries. Six months is a bit of an arbitrary figure, but there are a few things that go into it:

1. IIRC that US Army infantry in WW2 were standardized to at least 26 weeks of basic and advanced training.
2. A 6-month one-station training mission would allow many of the inevitable kinks in the process to be caught and addressed in real time.
3. 6 months is a solid and predictable block of time for bureaucracy to organize everything that needs to happen on both sides of the Atlantic (accounting for pre-planning), and for Ukraine's GenStab to plan their operations according to a schedule.
4. The 6 months should be followed by at least a few weeks of capstone 'courses' taught by Ukrainian veterans (some of whom may have already been integrated into the unit) to synthesize US or NATO training with Ukrainian doctrine and real-world experience. This would happen to occur as the unit transitions toward deployment to Ukraine (though not necessarily direct deployment into combat), acting as a bridge between environments.
5. The replacement reserve trained alongside the core unit(s) would be calculated at a size sufficient to sustain a large-scale offensive for, say, one month. The NATO parties involved in the establishment of these units would subsequently have all the needed infrastructure in place to act as mid-term replacement training centers.

NATO-tank pledges so far:

https://i.imgur.com/99Cej9y.jpg

Furunculus

01-26-2023, 09:32

the flood of L2's begins. war attrition stocks.

spmetla

01-26-2023, 23:11

Alright, I'll acknowledge that recreating divisional - at the formation level - training capabilities would be much harder than training an equivalent force in brigades. But then, do you have any comment on the US (and Russia) reportedly planning to return to divisional structure and move away from brigades as core operational units? Seems like Ukraine would also be an excellent application and spur of that doctrinal shift in real time. We need to exercise our bureaucratic flexibility anyway.

The US has partially re-established divisional structures again, part if will be putting things like artillery, cavalry squadrons, engineer battalions under the division HQ again instead of divested to the BDEs. Brigades will be smaller again but will rely on Divisions for those supporting arms. It's a slow process though because you have rebase units and we still will only have a few divisions with multiple Brigades in a close area for training together.
I agree we need to exercise bureaucratic flexibility. A higher level training structure looking at operational and strategic levels of war would be very useful for partnering with our allies for future but would need this administration to advocate such a structure and then congress to approve its organization. As it is we'll continue with ad hoc training. The UK being a smaller country and military is more flexible in this regard, especially as what affects general European security affects the UK directly, a harder sell for our American isolationists.

For realz, how is it all of NATO combined* couldn't have proceeded from last spring to establish OSUT for many UA brigades, or even those reinvented divisions, for deployment through Winter/Spring 2023?

Think a lot of people with their heads in the sand. I'm glad it's Biden in charge and not Trump but Biden is certainly behind the curve in leadership for a lot of this too. But that's been a problem for a long time with the US, getting people in charge with a long view that also aren't shackled by scandals and domestic politics is rare outside of a few branches of government.
This is why I was so appalled at the limp and ineffective response of Obama and Merkel to the 2014 invasion. That should have been a cuban-missile crisis moment. In hindsight, the fact that the Russians used 'little green men' instead of outright uniformed Soldiers shows they were almost expecting intervention and wanted some deniability for a way to back down without losing face leading to a negotiation for probably Crimea at the least.
Instead, Putin got a fiat-accompli and it only galvanized his will. Glad the US and NATO were actually on the ball for supporting Zelensky once it was clear that Ukraine wouldn't fold.

the flood of L2's begins. war attrition stocks.
Will be interesting to their impact when they get on the battlefield in the next few months. One or two armor brigades with modern MBTs and IFVs and good artillery and engineer support could end the stalemate if employed correctly, especially as most of what their facing are modernized T72s and T80s, the few T90s are mostly A versions and not the latest M versions, of which even the latest production ones on the front seem to have had some shortcuts taken in lower quality reactive armor applied and probably shortcuts in the complex systems within too.

Hope Krauss-Maffei increase production capability to some sort of wartime footing. New hulls and lots of spare parts are going to be in great demand in a few weeks/months and likely to remain in demand for years in a general rearmament and restocking of Europe following this war.

Montmorency

01-27-2023, 05:25

If you want K2s to overtake L2s, pray for the latter to get creamed in Ukraine. Or I guess for the German government to shit the bed in its foreign relations and relationship with its arms industry.

Furunculus

01-27-2023, 09:35

If you want K2s to overtake L2s, pray for the latter to get creamed in Ukraine. Or I guess for the German government to shit the bed in its foreign relations and relationship with its arms industry.

they don't have to get creamed, they just have to be employed in the purpose of war. thousands of tanks are already burned out hulks in the last year alone. everything supplied up until now and in the coming year is war attrition stocks.

and germany has already shit the bed. the military is a tool of foreign policy - kellog-briand be damned - and every supplier that has tussled with germany over re-export licences will be thinking twice next time. all the way back to the ancient GDR towed artillary that germany prevented estonia gifting to ukraine in April 2022.

spmetla

01-27-2023, 22:32

and germany has already shit the bed. the military is a tool of foreign policy - kellog-briand be damned - and every supplier that has tussled with germany over re-export licences will be thinking twice next time. all the way back to the ancient GDR towed artillary that germany prevented estonia gifting to ukraine in April 2022.

Absolutely, but now that the status quo has changed it won't be as difficult for future governments to supply arms to warzones, same with the swiss finally allowing export of that Gepard ammo. Not need to try and be 'brave' if a precedent has been set.

Now if only my Austrian cousins could decide that they need to amend their constitutional neutrality as Russia's actions should show a need to take sides and allow better integration into EU defense planning and better integration into NATO short of actually joining.
Now would be a good time to be donating Uhlan and Pandur IFVs APCs as well though that's about all to be spared in the tiny Austrian inventory.

If you want K2s to overtake L2s, pray for the latter to get creamed in Ukraine. Or I guess for the German government to shit the bed in its foreign relations and relationship with its arms industry.

I don't the K2s will overtake L2s simply because the Germans though not a military heavyweight quantity-wise still build excellent equipment. The K2 is just slightly more modern than the Leo2s as it's designed with modern networked warfare systems and active/passive protection systems already in mind. The recent KF51 "Panther" testbed vehicle will likely serve as a baseline for the future Franco-German tank project, with those two nations building a fleet which combined will at least be low thousands we can expect many other European countries to hop on board with those or more used Leos.
I think the Leo2A5s and A6s will do very well though, very capable with very good frontal arc protection. Of primary importance though are the optics are some of the best in the world, should allow for true hunter-killer capability.

The K2s will probably have a good market in Eastern Europe once Poland sets up shop as there are a lot of countries that want tanks that are independent of Germany, the US, and Russia for various reasons. French and British ones are usually too expensive so if Poland is able to license export with Korea then the K2 will do well.

The talk of MBTs while important though, I think the CV90s and Bradleys will actually be of more significant impact, especially if the US sends significant quantity of Bradleys in the next few months, getting infantry through the dangerous open ground to assault the enemy infantry is what Ukraine has lacked. MBTs can provide the direct fire support necessary to get the IFVs up there but no MBT in the world will clear a trench line or enter and clear a building.

Which the Ukrainians were allowed to put in an order the Lynx IFV and more CV-90s and start getting those off the production line. If industry knows that they have an order for 500 of vehicle X they can actually ramp up production, this drip drip drip of donations without the donating country then placing a new order for rearming themselves doesn't allow industry to predict future orders and adjust their manufacturing capacity accordingly.

On a side note, I hope the US does the minimum of at least painting the donated vehicle OD Green, seeing those desert tan medical APCs evacuating casualties was frustrating as it showed how little planning went in on the US side for how to go about donations.

Now if only we can fast-track some F-16s for Ukraine and get them to place an order for a large number of Gripens (I think the ideal fighter/attack aircraft for them).

Montmorency

01-28-2023, 00:17

Think a lot of people with their heads in the sand. I'm glad it's Biden in charge and not Trump but Biden is certainly behind the curve in leadership for a lot of this too. But that's been a problem for a long time with the US, getting people in charge with a long view that also aren't shackled by scandals and domestic politics is rare outside of a few branches of government.

Ukrainian colonel Kostiantyn Mashovets (https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/423):

I don’t think that before the end of March the Ukrainian tank brigade on Leopard-2 will pass a full-fledged combat coordination and reach the minimum combat capabilities

. Moreover, we need at least three such brigades. [Ed. Huh, sounds like a division]

I wouldn't blame Biden too much here, as to my knowledge he has never been a 'military buff' (not that I am); the closest he came was being a military father and being specialized somewhat in foreign policy as a Senator and VP. I doubt war doctrine or the micromanagement of US military capabilities were ever remotely on his agenda. I'm not trying to aggrandize myself, but let's say the "cleaned up" version of my disconnected thoughts on advanced US assistance to Ukraine are ideas I have very rarely seen touched upon in the commentary of even generals. It demands a level of creativity, commitment, and initiative that probably isn't abundant among military tops - moreover, buffeted as they are by orthogonal currents of national (geopolitical) conservatism and optimism bias about Russian or Ukrainian progress. There were not a few arguing in 2022 that the most advantageous course of events for the US is for Russia to be trapped in a years-long quagmire that drains its military and economic potential, a viewpoint hardly conducive to decisive Ukrainian reconquista.

Now if only my Austrian cousins could decide that they need to amend their constitutional neutrality as Russia's actions should show a need to take sides and allow better integration into EU defense planning and better integration into NATO short of actually joining.

I'm badly misremembering the joke, but hasn't the Austrian military/government commonly been referred to as 'the fifth directorate of the FSB' for many years?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austria_and_Russian_intelligence

Now if only we can fast-track some F-16s for Ukraine and get them to place an order for a large number of Gripens (I think the ideal fighter/attack aircraft for them).

Congress authorized training for F-15 and F-16 platforms back in July, which I assume has been taken up already. Ukraine's government suggests more details will be forthcoming soon.

I saw someone suggest F-5s for Ukraine, and my reaction to that is that a platform whose most advanced hypothetical upgrade branch (not existing units) could put it on a level with Ukraine's obsolescent Mig-29s is just a deathtrap for invaluable Ukrainian pilots.

they don't have to get creamed, they just have to be employed in the purpose of war. thousands of tanks are already burned out hulks in the last year alone. everything supplied up until now and in the coming year is war attrition stocks.

and germany has already shit the bed. the military is a tool of foreign policy - kellog-briand be damned - and every supplier that has tussled with germany over re-export licences will be thinking twice next time. all the way back to the ancient GDR towed artillary that germany prevented estonia gifting to ukraine in April 2022.

If L2s are perceived to "perform well" then it's a boon to their reputation. So you wouldn't like this to come about. If they only come off a bit better than Ukraine's T-64BVs, then their long-standing shine wears off to some extent. Or if they perform well but still get knocked out by the dozens or more, then platforms who haven't been similarly tested have an opening for brand salesmanship to naive politicians.

There have always been export shenanigans - the cousin war to this one, Iran-Iraq, was a nightmare of them - and as long as Germany's industry is willing and permitted to produce, I would wait and see to confirm that there are any practical ramifications at all to Germany's blundering so far. Germany has very few L2 customers outside the broad Europe-zone, and the European customers tend to have strong incentives to continue with L2.

Now, if something drastic were to occur beyond the current record, to be vague, maybe. But in the end, Germany has passed the final test put before it, so there are now barriers to the future sensitization of the issue; where and when else are we left to expect Germany to aggravate its partners on Ukraine policy? Is Germany going to deny the use of Turkish Leopards in Syria suddenly? Before that next level approaches, this all reminds me of the idea that the international community was going to sideline the US because of the Iraq War, or because of how devastating the Trump administration was from the start - it's always more complicated than that.

Separately, we could also imagine a bunch of countries dumping their entire L2 stock (i.e. their entire armored branch) during the war and leaving an opening for a fresh start, but that's a see-it-to-believe-it scenario.

EDIT: I think this Russian article (https://www.mk.ru/politics/2023/01/25/ekspert-sprognoziroval-iskhod-tankovykh-dueley-vs-rossii-s-abramsami.html) is a little too pessimistic on the availability of contemporary Russian ATGM/AP tech, and more so if judged against export Abrams without DU armor, but here is yet another comment to the effect of my hobby-horse:

- An armored group of 30-50 Abrams tanks is unlikely to affect the situation in the operational sense, - the director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies is sure, - but if there are already 200 or 300 units, then they, if used correctly, can become a significant operational factor. In general, the point of the limited supply of Western weapons is not so much aimed at a “decisive Ukrainian victory” (which is most likely unlikely), but mainly at the exhaustion and gradual “grinding” of Russian forces.

Can we all agree that Ukraine needs an Abrams division and a Leopard 2 division - fully-trained - to retake the South? Also, ATACMS to suppress the Kerch Strait Bridge.

spmetla

01-28-2023, 04:27

I wouldn't blame Biden too much here, as to my knowledge he has never been a 'military buff' (not that I am); the closest he came was being a military father and being specialized somewhat in foreign policy as a Senator and VP. I doubt war doctrine or the micromanagement of US military capabilities were ever remotely on his agenda. I'm not trying to aggrandize myself, but let's say the "cleaned up" version of my disconnected thoughts on advanced US assistance to Ukraine are ideas I have very rarely seen touched upon in the commentary of even generals.

Fair enough, it is something to show though for the cultural divide between the military and the rest of the country.

The lack of a 'war doctrine' is part of a problem as a country, there is no guiding vision for what we should be in five years much less fifty years in relation to the world. There are domestic goals for each party and not much in the realm of foreign policy. A professional bureaucracy and some well written treaty obligations are the things that keeps the US more or less on track (the 'deep state') from looking completely rudderless.

It demands a level of creativity, commitment, and initiative that probably isn't abundant among military tops - moreover, buffeted as they are by orthogonal currents of national (geopolitical) conservatism and optimism bias about Russian or Ukrainian progress.
It's a fair point but in general that's what keeps the US strong is that our military doesn't try to guide national policy, the problem is when the two political parties cannot collaborate at least on what our strategic policies are as now no one is really making consistent policy choices.

There were not a few arguing in 2022 that the most advantageous course of events for the US is for Russia to be trapped in a years-long quagmire that drains its military and economic potential, a viewpoint hardly conducive to decisive Ukrainian reconquista.
I've heard those voices too. I'd much rather this end quicker and more decisively. I don't want Russia ruined by a decade long war against it's neighbor anymore than I want that for Ukraine as it makes rebuilding both as well as rebuilding trust that much harder.

I'm badly misremembering the joke, but hasn't the Austrian military/government commonly been referred to as 'the fifth directorate of the FSB' for many years?
You're remembering the joke correctly. I'm just wishing that they'd fully join the west instead of this quasi neutral but not neutral positioning. Even for their army my second cousin said there's a military saying of roughly "god help austria because we can't."

Separately, we could also imagine a bunch of countries dumping their entire L2 stock (i.e. their entire armored branch) during the war and leaving an opening for a fresh start, but that's a see-it-to-believe-it scenario.
That'd be a terrible choice as they'd lose a generation of armored warfare expertise, better to keep even a token capability to have some institutional knowledge retained rather than get rid of it completely and then try to rebuild. Military capability goes far beyond purchasing systems as we all know.

I think this Russian article is a little too pessimistic on the availability of contemporary Russian ATGM/AP tech, and more so if judged against export Abrams without DU armor, but here is yet another comment to the effect of my hobby-horse:
I think Russian ATGMs will perform very well against NATO Tanks if the Ukrainians get too close. Especially as they'll not be operational until there's some leaves on trees again and Russia has relearned the value of infantry in the past year so I expect Russian infantry to be quite potent in defense.

Can we all agree that Ukraine needs an Abrams division and a Leopard 2 division - fully-trained - to retake the South? Also, ATACMS to suppress the Kerch Strait Bridge.
I think they need a division's worth of IFVs more than MBTs but yes, large armored formations are absolutely necessary for them to have offensive capabilities again. The current commitment of western tanks is beneficial for counter attacks and limited penetrations, no true exploitations like at Izium.

Montmorency

01-28-2023, 22:26

Fair enough, it is something to show though for the cultural divide between the military and the rest of the country.

The lack of a 'war doctrine' is part of a problem as a country, there is no guiding vision for what we should be in five years much less fifty years in relation to the world. There are domestic goals for each party and not much in the realm of foreign policy. A professional bureaucracy and some well written treaty obligations are the things that keeps the US more or less on track (the 'deep state') from looking completely rudderless.

It's a fair point but in general that's what keeps the US strong is that our military doesn't try to guide national policy, the problem is when the two political parties cannot collaborate at least on what our strategic policies are as now no one is really making consistent policy choices.

Yes, and I appreciate their civic loyalty, but they do advise the POTUS. Based on the public commentary of representatives like Milley, I assume most of the advice the administration has gotten is more on the order of caution and gradual escalation. I mean, these are the stars who oversaw the War on Terror. Biden has always been able to call on common sense to push back in the latter domain, but to develop an alternative concept of Ukraine policy requires more than common sense, especially when almost every politician’s bones vibrate to the frequencies of domestic politics. I don’t know how POTUS and VPOTUS and SecDef have privately theorized this conflict over time; that is appropriately hidden information. But it seems to me they weren’t looking at Russian mobilization and the evaporation of Ukrainian momentum in early fall as a red flag moment, or they would have visibly acted on it. Or they would have briefed with heterodox staff officers who might have pointed them in the direction of a longer-term plan. To have the insight to overlook the assurances of the most authoritative subject matter experts in this context is a rare trait. At most you could say Biden should have learned to trust the judgement of ranking generals and spooks less after 2021, but that doesn't point a way forward either.

Or maybe the JCoS, or Austin, or Harris, or whoever, have advocated an aggressive role for the US all along and Biden is the one who demurred, who knows. The war will likely end before we learn the details. It's straightforward for a government like Poland's, which doesn't need to particularly reformulate any policy or implement sophisticated military tasks (before now).

I think they need a division's worth of IFVs more than MBTs but yes, large armored formations are absolutely necessary for them to have offensive capabilities again. The current commitment of western tanks is beneficial for counter attacks and limited penetrations, no true exploitations like at Izium.

Certainly, that’s why I called for the Leo division to be mechanized rather than armored. If there truly is a flood of L2s coming, the division could be reinforced or separate brigades established.

Montmorency

01-29-2023, 20:40

Developing a few observations scattered through previous posts on our strategic unseriousness: The Ukrainians don't have anywhere near enough 155mm shells stockpiled for an operational offensive - and that's why they didn't conduct one despite expectations.

To refine my previous estimates, still rather arbitrarily, the ZSU would have to have aggregated at least half a million shells globally. In the first place to achieve a provision of 10K/day for the theater of operations alone (say 2K/day elsewhere), extending to one full month in duration, while leaving slack for wastage, attrition, interdiction, as well as a strategic reserve of some nature as a contingency. At least half a million.

IIRC through the end of 2022 the alliance delivered at least 1.25 million 155mm shells, although more precisely the US delivered at least 1.025 million. According to DoD press releases, in November and December the US delivered 104.7K rounds, including Excalibur, RAAMS, and presumably non-combat rounds. During the fall various commentators were remarking on the gradual decline in overall military aid, partially reversed this month (besides the new armor and training we we have pledged 91.3K 155mm shells).

Regardless, it should be clear that ever since the September offensives Ukraine has been near-continuously drawing down its levels of 155mm ammo. We have been more generous than I expected with Excalibur PGMs, perhaps donating half our stockpile so far*, but at an average rate of depletion of 100K/month (well-attested as a kind of floor even) since May, Ukraine has used - probably at least - 900K of 1250K rounds delivered up to now. Of course, I shouldn't fail to mention such pledges as the British one from this month to procure 100K 155mm from third parties, but the reality is that if we would like to see a UFOR offensive around May, we ought to be looking out for another 500K in fresh pledges before then, to account for ongoing depletion.

Without a sign of that nature, we should assume UFOR will remain too exhausted to conduct operations beyond counteroffensives.

One of the finest Russian milbloggers (https://t.me/atomiccherry/538), after considering the prospects of future offensives on either side, somewhat convergently remarks:

I think it is necessary to separately pronounce an extremely important idea - there may not be offensives at all. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian.

Despite the fact that both sides of the conflict regularly declare that they are preparing for certain strategic-level operations, at the current time, neither the Armed Forces of Ukraine nor the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have any real opportunities to conduct such operations. This thesis is best confirmed by the very course of hostilities in recent months - it is characterized by exclusively local operations, which indirectly indicates the serious exhaustion of both armies.

Strike groupings for offensives are, first of all, logistics and command and control systems, training of personnel, competent officer cadres, and not just a concentration of masses of equipment and people. And here we are faced with a significant problem - not a single country in the world currently has not only training programs for officers in the event of mobilization, but even training programs for soldiers (with the possible exception of the People's Liberation Army of China).

For example, during the summer campaign (and specifically during the Kharkiv-Izyum operation), British advisers found an interesting solution by forming Ukrainian assault units by breaking down some personnel units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

They resorted to the model of using company-tactical groups - compact, manageable, equipped with trained personnel (for small units it is easier to find and train sergeants, officers and privates, bringing their training to a certain level of quality).
At the current moment in time, Ukraine sets itself the task of a completely opposite nature - to create a corps of tens of thousands of military personnel and thousands of pieces of equipment, which requires a completely different level of organization and resources.

In the army of the Russian Federation, things are similar; she adapted to fight in small units, and this allows her to achieve local successes, as, for example, in Soledar. But it is unlikely that such an approach can be applied within the framework of certain large-scale operations, where, on the contrary, massing is necessary.

The plans of the commands and military-political leaderships can be arbitrarily ambitious, but 2022 has demonstrated very well that ambitions often do not match reality.

For this reason, the denouement of the events of the current year may follow some completely boring scenario for the layman, which does not include either a repetition of Verdun somewhere in the swamps of Chernobyl, or the rapid march of the Abrams in the southern Ukrainian steppes.

But I disagree that Russia lacks the juice to assemble a serious army-echelon offensive at some point in the coming months, in pursuit of the supreme political goal of pushing to the Donetsk oblast line. Despite its continuous frittering of combat power and readiness in constant small-scale attacks up and down the front (whose main objective itself was to attrit and pin down Ukrainian strategic offensive resources).

*Unless the phrasing "precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds" includes something like HERA, but M549 HERA was recorded in use from at least May, whereas the first confirmed deployment of M982 Excalibur projectiles was around the beginning of September.

Montmorency

02-02-2023, 02:33

Also, it seems the US government is out of money to commit to combat aircraft transfers (as opposed to training). The only real way to implement such transfers directly from US stocks is via the Presidential Drawdown Authority (source of most American material aid to Ukraine so far). But as of now the PDA has no more than $5 billion remaining for the rest of Fiscal Year 2023. Given the probable valuation of even a few dozen jets + logistical train, Biden would rapidly max out his credit limit at a critical juncture for ground operations in Ukraine, even if the delivery would take place a year from now. Congress needs to handle this one separately. (For context, Biden approved more than $5 billion worth through PDA - half the Congressional limit for FY2023 - just in January.)

Rambling shower thoughts on how the image of war as a "young man's fight" came about. I think this really entered mass consciousness starting with WW1 and fledging by WW2, but the necessary factor was the 18th century advent of levee en masse in the context of young societies. Even in the first half of the 20th century, the European and North American populations were still skewed young, though perhaps already older than the typical contemporary society. In the US for instance, half the population was under 25 in 1915, and half under 30 in 1940, compared to a projected half under 40 in 2025. In a society with a downward-skewed age structure, mass mobilization without emphasis on young men is senseless and unfeasible, though as with Germany and the USSR you might get made fun of for recruting "boys and old men" if your pool of available young men shrinks enough. But even the US, during WW2, recruited at least a few million men in their late 20s and 30s, already comparable to the modern US military age structure (1/3 over 30).

Past societies with massive standing armies, such as the Romans, were also naturally forced to abide by this principle, but because their standing armies were a permanent feature of life, and veteran soldiers served until well into middle age, the linkage of a seasoned soldier with a mature man would have remained.

But in general, the image of a soldier or warrior in the minds of historical humans would probably have been something like a grizzled 30-year-old. I'm sure differences in the capacity for recruitment and retention, the level of economic specialization and value generated by mature workers, and the (non-)existence of social scientific fields such as statistics contributed as much as the inherent value of experience over youth.

If there are major wars 50 years from now, it is highly likely that large numbers of middle-aged men will be conscripted, unless Africa somehow doesn't follow the same demographic pattern or autonomous weapons systems become truly ubiquitous. At any rate, West's brief historical episode of imagining that older men can't perform on the battlefield is coming to an end (and yes, don't expect a different story with "overweight" or Class 1 obese people).

spmetla

02-05-2023, 08:39

But in general, the image of a soldier or warrior in the minds of historical humans would probably have been something like a grizzled 30-year-old. I'm sure differences in the capacity for recruitment and retention, the level of economic specialization and value generated by mature workers, and the (non-)existence of social scientific fields such as statistics contributed as much as the inherent value of experience over youth.

I'd agree that'd be the expectation but for most of history those grizzled warriors started into their professions as kids.

Past societies with massive standing armies, such as the Romans, were also naturally forced to abide by this principle, but because their standing armies were a permanent feature of life, and veteran soldiers served until well into middle age, the linkage of a seasoned soldier with a mature man would have remained.

I think that's because the current level of warfare and technology is again creating a barrier of expertise that conscripts can't fill. I think that's reflected throughout history too, melee combat with armor was a very specialized skill set which had warriors that would generally continue to serve for decades. The less 'skilled' or prestigious things such as skirmishers required plenty of bravery but were generally considered youth jobs.
The period of mass industrial warfare from bayonet muskets to bayonet bolt actions (really all 'skirmisher' style warfare when you think about it) had a very low training level to create acceptable minimums of effectiveness. Yes, there were pockets of elites but generally that 'eliteness' faded very quickly with attrition in regular combat conditions. The implementation of machine guns and explosive artillery then turned warfare into something much more complicated that required much more coordination between all those different 'arms' in a way that has not had to be so closely coordinated before.
The current era seems even more complicated though we see at the low end that waves of minimally skilled conscripts are of value still but not for decisive short campaigns/battles within a war.

I'm quite curious what thought processes are going on in the Swiss, Israeli, Finnish, S. Korean, and Taiwanese higher commands for their draft/militia systems. Is there any real point in drafting people for short periods unless that skill set is retained and polished or at least prevented from dulling by keeping servicemembers in various forms of reserve status after their period of service? Should the initial service period be lengthened but the pool of draftees inducted reduced? Should the reserve obligations occur more frequently and be of more technical natures?
The Ukrainians have definitely demonstrated the importance of a reserve system though Perun has highlighted some major bottle necks in its effectiveness. Additionally, the need for skilled soldiers will probably create lengthier reserve obligations for more technical fields ie: if you operated ADA systems or tanks in your regular service period then you need to serve XX number of years longer in the reserves or perhaps more often within a shorter period.

Montmorency

02-05-2023, 23:53

I'd agree that'd be the expectation but for most of history those grizzled warriors started into their professions as kids.

Well, if covering the 20s age range, yes, but experience has always been prized and there's inescapably a correlation with age in practice (and then capitalists invented the unpaid internship).

Yes, there were pockets of elites but generally that 'eliteness' faded very quickly with attrition in regular combat conditions.

There were certainly elite infantry units in the age of pike and shot, and during the Napoleonic era. Discipline, courage, and tactical acumen are universal target skills. Napoleon's Guards were famously old-timers.

But as you point out regarding veteran warriors/soldiers, in an industrial ground war the most experienced and professional core will face extreme attrition, so one has no choice but to lean into "lowered entry standards" in age, weight, health, prior experience, level of motivation, etc. (although I have no idea how this could be extended to a future air war, where airframe production will tend to outrun pilot production).

Just a week ago we had one of the most well-known Rubloggers (Rybar) admit on national television that 50% of the pre-war VDV (~35K actual standing strength) were lost by the time mobilization was launched, or within 7 months of fighting (peaking in the first and 7th months). In my attempt to validate these figures I arrived at 40% lost, 50% if including voluntary separation, resignation, and desertion. But still, the point remains - elite or no, the VDV could hardly survive as an organization without sipping at the mobilization tap. (I'll always return to the combat history of the Grossdeutschland Rgt. in Operation Barbarossa, pressed into action by command time and again until less than platoon-strength, then reconstituted as the elite PzGren. division we all know and, know.)

The bottom line is that social expectations changed once everyone got with the program - overdetermined by the demographics of modernity - that quantity has a quality of its own. The US Army, after all, could be formed around just 50K "operators", but that would be a pretty bad idea.

The current era seems even more complicated though we see at the low end that waves of minimally skilled conscripts are of value still but not for decisive short campaigns/battles within a war.

I think where we've seen the Western post-Cold War 'party line' on the inherent sophistication of the mission survive is in the realm of complex coordinated action, where both sides struggle most of the time. Lack of training and skill is a big part of the reason, alongside C4 constraints (which also involve training and skill, among officers), that the primary assault 'unit' of the war is the Company Tactical Group. Otherwise, this war has pretty much blown the theory that contemporary conventional warfare is pointless outside the remit of highly educated and specialized combat experts out of the water. For God's sake, in many ways the current Russian practice is more archetypically Stalinist than Stalin's USSR ever really engaged in, and even the German Volkssturm got probably 1-2 months' training (compared to mere days for thousands of 1st echelon militia and mobiks today).

As it turns out in real-world practical application for both sides, you can learn how to drive and shoot and tactically handle a howitzer, MLRS, or T-series tank in just a month after all, and on-the-job training trumps all. It's been commented repeatedly for example that many Ukrainian soldiers, militia and draftee, have had zero instruction on the usage of the many platforms of Western IMVs and RPGs that have filtered through to the frontline in haphazard fashion; sometimes the print-on instruction set (e.g. one LAW or AT-4 in a clip) might be all they have to rely on. It's amazing how much raw bulk still matters, even when in absolute terms it's not very present in concentrated form. Although there might be some negative repercussions to not taking the time to drill discipline, military regulation, physical fitness, squad cohesion, and suchlike, besides the referenced inability in massive-scale combined arms battle stuff.

I'm quite curious what thought processes are going on in the Swiss, Israeli, Finnish, S. Korean, and Taiwanese higher commands for their draft/militia systems. Is there any real point in drafting people for short periods unless that skill set is retained and polished or at least prevented from dulling by keeping servicemembers in various forms of reserve status after their period of service? Should the initial service period be lengthened but the pool of draftees inducted reduced? Should the reserve obligations occur more frequently and be of more technical natures?

The Finns and Swiss probably have it right that the priority in the conscription obligation is frequent and effective refresher training for maintenance of readiness. In this regard, a middle ground between pure conscription and a volunteer army would promote more optimal allocation of limited resources in initial as well as continuing training (this will vary in particulars by country). By the by, Finnish volunteers in Ukraine have apparently been known to claim that the regular troops of both sides are inferior in training to the Finnish conscript. I'm inclined to believe them, even if chauvinism might color the firsthand assessments, after the past year of warwatching, and hearing of how Finnish conscripts outsmarted US Marines in joint exercises.

Montmorency

02-06-2023, 00:08

https://i.imgur.com/VvzgQNm.jpg

Seems like the US has secured bases in the Philippines, compensating for the Solomon Islands.

Norway will buy 54 new generation Leopard-2A7 MBTs to replace its older versions of the same model, and has an option for 18 others, the government announced on Friday. The South Korean MBT K2 lost this competition.

Germany intends to transfer 88 Leopard 1 and 15 Gepard to Ukraine. The good thing about the Leopard 1 is that its armor is definitely not worse than the AMX-10RC, but its latest projectiles should have a decent ability to defeat the side armor of any Russian tank except maybe T-90M, assuming very, very careful deployment. But we should really be planning a general strategy around L2/Abrams going forward, rather than diluting Ukraine's limited tankist corps among scads of obsolete equipment.

Hopefully the arrival of GLSDB, even just a few dozen through the first half of the year, will neuter Russian initiative by disrupting their logistics as acutely as HIMARS did in July of last year. Unless the Russian offensive comes this month, we're going to see a lot of tectonic energy released around May-June.

The EU (https://rubryka.com/en/2023/02/01/yes-maye-namiry-podvoyity-kilkist-vijskovyh-zsu-shho-berut-uchast-u-navchannyah-v-yevropi-zmi/) plans to increase the number (https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2023/02/1/7155314/) of Ukrainian servicemen who will be trained by Western instructors and on European training grounds from 15 to 30 thousand.

As part of the EU mission, the Bundeswehr offers, among other things, combat training for companies and tactical training for the brigade headquarters and its subordinate battalion headquarters. The German proposal also includes instructor training, medical training and weapons systems training in close cooperation with industry.

According to initial plans, Germany wanted to train a brigade of up to 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers within the first few months. The number should also depend on how many soldiers the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will be able to send for training given the ongoing war.

Spurred by Russia, Germany rolls out 3-year plan to fully equip all armed forces personnel (https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/spurred-by-russia-germany-rolls-out-3-year-plan-to-fully-equip-all-armed-forces-personnel/)

Elsewhere, Germany has agreed to provide NATO with a first operational land division in 2025 to support the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), while long-term targets of providing a modern mechanized division by 2027 and a further two divisions, to the alliance by 2031, both remain.

?We are talking about 30,000 army personnel as opposed to 6,000 [to support the new land division plan],? noted the official. ?These are units that will have to go into battle, with what they have at their disposal, on a permanent basis.?

[US] Army network design for 2025 to focus on division level for first time (https://defensescoop.com/2023/01/12/army-network-design-for-2025-to-focus-on-division-level-for-first-time/)

The Army has adopted a multiyear strategy involving the incremental development and delivery of new capabilities to its integrated tactical network, involving a combination of program-of-record systems and commercial off-the-shelf tools. Those ?capability sets? now provide technologies to units every two years, each building upon the previous delivery. Capability Set 21 was primarily designed for infantry brigades, whereas Capability Set 23 is focused on Stryker brigades and Capability Set 25 is focused on armored brigades. However, Capability Set 25 will also focus on the division holistically for the first time.
[...]
?Like all things, we change, right? We change, we adapt, based on what our adversaries are doing, based on the environment around us. For many, many years now, we?ve been in a brigade-centric Army. As I?m sure everybody in this room is aware, we are now going back to the division as the unit of action,? Potts said.
[...]
With Capability Set 23, the Army for the first time will field its integrated tactical network equipment to a division headquarters as well as enabler units, creating a communication bridge from maneuver brigade combat teams, to their support elements, to the division headquarters. It will be fielded to the 82nd Airborne Division in Fiscal Year 2023.

Told you. It doesn't take a strategic genius to figure this out.

Gosh, mid-2023 is set to be the most brutal phase yet.

EDIT: jfc even the French (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ov6AUVUl0k) deploy Company (https://cove.army.gov.au/article/minimum-mass-tactics-mali-way-forward-australian-army) Tactical Groups (SGTIA (https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR770/RAND_RR770.pdf))

spmetla

02-06-2023, 04:31

Love that picture of the balloon reaction! The sheer quantity of airtime that stupid balloon got was incredibly irritating, hope all these are typically shot down as they enter US airspace instead of as they exit in the future.

Seems like the US has secured bases in the Philippines, compensating for the Solomon Islands.
Yup, and not by a great diplomatic action by the US but rather backlash in the Philippines by the PRC throwing its weight around.

Germany intends to transfer 88 Leopard 1 and 15 Gepard to Ukraine. The good thing about the Leopard 1 is that its armor is definitely not worse than the AMX-10RC, but its latest projectiles should have a decent ability to defeat the side armor of any Russian tank except maybe T-90M, assuming very, very careful deployment. But we should really be planning a general strategy around L2/Abrams going forward, rather than diluting Ukraine's limited tankist corps among scads of obsolete equipment.

If nothing else the Leo1s will free up modernized T-72s for frontline use and serve as training platforms for Leo2 turrets (the integration of the loader for the most part).
Leo1s do have the benefit of using a cannon with absolutely no shortage of stocks in NATO as well as very modern thermal systems. As infantry support in a light tank role they'll do very good work as it frees up proper IFVs to move forward with dismounts inside as well as free up the most modern tanks for destroying enemy tanks etc....

The general strategy should certainly be around the L2s though, the Abrams doesn't have repair facilities in Europe yet while Leo2 does so I think that'll be the most important factor as it becomes more common.

Told you. It doesn't take a strategic genius to figure this out.

Gosh, mid-2023 is set to be the most brutal phase yet.

Absolutely right, pity that the folks in charge took so long to wheel this out, too many people hoping that the war would be won by somebody within a year.

There were certainly elite infantry units in the age of pike and shot, and during the Napoleonic era. Discipline, courage, and tactical acumen are universal target skills. Napoleon's Guards were famously old-timers.
Yup, I'll point out though that most elite units were of course those that had the discipline and skill to close with and engage in melee combat leading to the 'cult of the bayonet' persisting well into WWI by which time it was no longer a tactical weapon for breaking the enemy but rather just another melee weapon for individual combat when necessary.

The bottom line is that social expectations changed once everyone got with the program - overdetermined by the demographics of modernity - that quantity has a quality of its own. The US Army, after all, could be formed around just 50K "operators", but that would be a pretty bad idea.
Yup, and the presence of several divisions more in the US Army National Guard is of strategic importance as the shrinking active component cannot provide enough of a deterrence on its own against near-peer enemies is now smaller than what was used to fight Desert Storm. That's why I get irritated at US Army boondoggle buying as for ground warfare it's best to focus on the basics when it comes to equipment instead of 'landwarrior systems' and so on. How about a very good modern IFV instead of some nonsense item, how about a replacement for the Abrams instead of hoping for a magical F-22 of the ground.
More importantly though, I'd like the US Army to try and 'grow' a division or two more too.

The Finns and Swiss probably have it right that the priority in the conscription obligation is frequent and effective refresher training for maintenance of readiness. In this regard, a middle ground between pure conscription and a volunteer army would promote more optimal allocation of limited resources in initial as well as continuing training (this will vary in particulars by country). By the by, Finnish volunteers in Ukraine have apparently been known to claim that the regular troops of both sides are inferior in training to the Finnish conscript. I'm inclined to believe them, even if chauvinism might color the firsthand assessments, after the past year of warwatching, and hearing of how Finnish conscripts outsmarted US Marines in joint exercises.

I'm inclined to believe the Finns in that regard too. The US and NATO plus EU members in general have put a premium in some basic fundamentals for infantry combat with night fighting, modern communications, excellent first aid instruction, and decent marksmanship as priorities employed by empowered NCOs that are able to make tactical decisions.
The right mix will certainly vary for each nation though I hope the bigger NATO countries do put a little more thought into it. Germany's goals are ambitious but military service is still looked down upon so I think they need some sort of conscription to enable it to be a large enough force overall though relying on a core of professionals.

As it turns out in real-world practical application for both sides, you can learn how to drive and shoot and tactically handle a howitzer, MLRS, or T-series tank in just a month after all, and on-the-job training trumps all. It's been commented repeatedly for example that many Ukrainian soldiers, militia and draftee, have had zero instruction on the usage of the many platforms of Western IMVs and RPGs that have filtered through to the frontline in haphazard fashion; sometimes the print-on instruction set (e.g. one LAW or AT-4 in a clip) might be all they have to rely on. It's amazing how much raw bulk still matters, even when in absolute terms it's not very present in concentrated form. Although there might be some negative repercussions to not taking the time to drill discipline, military regulation, physical fitness, squad cohesion, and suchlike, besides the referenced inability in massive-scale combined arms battle stuff.

Yup, basic level skills are easy to train on, especially in the realm of operating equipment. The more difficult things are training to work as a unit, sending and receiving accurate info in extremely stressful situations, calling for accurate artillery fire and making corrections, and most importantly the core of NCOs and Officers that make the plans to integrate and sustain all those capabilities. A reserve pool of potential leadership is arguably more important than a large reserve pool of riflemen.

Montmorency

02-12-2023, 11:13

Situation in the TO.

Since late January, there have been:

*the first large-scale probes in Zaporizhzhia since last spring
*a renewed reckless frontal assault on Vuhledar (first-wave brigades were wrecked, but more seem to be being assembled) even bigger than the disastrous attacks around the beginning of November
*numerous reports of a culminated Wagner being superseded by VSRF units long held in reserve (Prigozhin has announced that he will no longer be recruiting convicts - but the Ministry of Defense now is instead)
*some of the hardest Russian counterattacks out of Svatove and Kreminna since the front was last mobile in October
*relatively-heavy bombardment in the border areas of Sumy and near Kharkiv City

Two months ago I did predict that late January would be the best time of the winter campaigning season to launch large-scale attacks, but these are just small-scale attacks with greater regularity; I was figuring in the context of a traditional concerted push, because to do otherwise is to squander concentration and weather conditions more favorable for relatively-rapid movement. Instead this looks like a gradual elevation of temperature almost everywhere.

Bakhmut's operational circumstances have continued to deteriorate, after a lull in the second half of January. I had predicted at the beginning of the year the city would fall by the end of February at least, but a retreat within a week (mid-February) is now foreseeable without a more aggressive defense on the part of UFOR. For whatever reason, the fortress-town of Marinka, of which Russia controls at least half by now, is a case study in aggressive Ukrainian mobile defense and commitment of reserves to counterattacks. The city has been brutally-contested since last March, but because it is such a critical defensive node anchoring the entire line from the Dnieper to Avdiivka, UFOR seems to have invested in maintaining control. Something similar might be assessed with regard to Vuhledar. Whereas the story in Northern Donetsk has from the days of the Battle of Popasna last spring been one of UFOR conservation of reserves and maybe artillery coverage until the last minute. The relative reliance on Territorial Defense and National Guard units to hold frontline trenches in static defense has always contributed to higher losses and enemy gains in this sector, and I don't understand why. Targeted battalion-size counterattacks to restore the status-quo from time to time would hardly break the bank of the strategic reserve or limit; Bakhmut for one is also a critical defensive node and anchor, and at this rate a fallback line would have to be about 10 miles east of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk. For example, the loss of the village of Yakovlivka at the beginning of the year obviously allowed the flanking of the truly excellently-situated fortress-town of Soledar, which had withstood frontal assaults for up to 6 months by that time. Predictably, Soledar was immediately flanked and for the past month RuFOR used the breach to expand one of their most significant salients since last spring. All of that could basically have been nipped in the bud with a decisive counterattack to seal the initial, pretty tiny, breach.

Bakhmut will have held out 7 or 8 months, but the relatively-rapid breach of an excellent defensive network (which ultimately compromises the integrity of the whole defensive line of the central fronts) this year under apparent conditions of relative rationing of artillery firepower on the RuFOR side demonstrates continuing serious incapacities on the part of UFOR command, small-unit competence, or individua soldier motivation. Over the past couple weeks GSUA has affirmed several times that its paramount objective is maintaining control of Bakhmut. I'm not sure I've seen many concrete actions to secure that objective, with reinforcements and aggressive defense continuing to be deprioritized before the retention of the strategic reserve (there are some contraindications to this judgement in the past week however), yet announcing that you're going to redouble efforts to hold an area you're actually planning to cede is the kind of public relations stupidity one only really sees from Russia. IIRC even with Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, the government's posture was that it intended to protract the fight for as long as possible, not that it guaranteed full concentration on restoring a stable defense.

If I'm wrong about GSUA, we may finally see the enigmatic "Offensive Guard" shock corps commited to combat or whatever other formations exist in the strategic reserve.

But to return to speculation on the construct of "Russian offensive", while it's possible the Russians do something corny as hell like schedule one discrete offensive push to begin February 24, it's possible that another strategy is taking shape. Namely, they may be deliberately predicating on an upcoming UFOR retreat from Bakhmut as a trigger to expend all accumulated reserves and supplies in a general offensive from Zaporizhzhia to the end of the mutual state border. Basically, this would be an attempt to take advantage of a moment of disorganization to try to replicate most of the initial invasion OPLAN from a year ago, and overwhelm UFOR defensive throughput to the extent that a weak point to exploit opens up somewhere along the broad front. The near-term strategic goals would still be the occupation of Donetsk Oblast and to push UFOR west of the Oskil River.

Such a strategy would not be as favorable for Ukraine as a poorly-resourced attack out of Belarus, but it would still seem to disadvantage RuFOR considerably except in the low-probability, high-risk scenario where UFOR's lines collapse from the pressure or GSUA severely miscalculates in allocating resources between fronts. The only real advantage is the same as with the original, deficient, Russian plan, which had the virtue of creating uncertainty and surprise as to where to granularly prioritize defensive allocation. But both sides are more prepared than they used to be, even as RuFOR is overall weaker, making shock and awe even less viable than it was a year ago by all appearances. The losses to RuFOR in this OPLAN would in all likelihood be so severe as to relegate them to the low-rate attrition characteristic of last autumn for the rest of 2023, and it would ensure that Putin has to commit to a new wave of overt mass mobilization. If this is really the plan, then GSUA would be vindicated in withholding an extensive strategic reserve.

Still, it's another possibility to watch out for. A more traditional concentrated offensive remains my expectation, or at most a two-prong out of Luhansk and Southern Donetsk with a constant fixing component in the center (Avdiivka-Bakhmut axis). Whether this month or delayed until April (I do think GSRU will feel incentivized to act quickly to generate an advantage before NATO-equipped armored formations, and especially GLSDB, can be deployed).

https://i.imgur.com/eEdyBHi.jpg

What makes Bakhmut significant - besides being the largest town the two sides have directly contested since last June - is that allowing it to be outflanked as it has, and then captured, allows RuFOR to squeeze out the Siversk-Bilohorivka salient to the north, and to gradually roll up the remaining Ukrainian fortified line from Toretsk to Marinka to the south, which would force a reanchoring of the entire UFOR right wing back to Zaporizhzhia City.

The former is basically fatal to the UFOR effort to advance into Luhansk. The desire to establish mutual support for the flanks of a planned push into Luhansk on both sides of the SD River was strong enough that UFOR undertook a series of counterattacks in July to maintain a presence in Bilohorivka (the easternmost point of control for UFOR on the map), near the site of the destruction of a Russian battalion in May during a fording attempt. At the rate Bakhmut is being flanked, Siversk and everything east of it will have to be abandoned as soon as the end of winter.

The latter, though it would unfold over months, at least through the summer, deprives Ukraine of a whole network of highly-successful fortifications, pushes the defense toward more rural and open areas, subjects the major city of Zaporizhzhia to conventional bombardment, and drives the frontline back from the Sea of Azov in such a way as to dramatically complicate any future southern offensive, while potentially giving Russia space to restore rail logistics between Melitopol and Donetsk.

I've gently pointed out for months that Ukraine does not have unlimited space to cede, and in the context of the advent of mobilization it has obviously failed to attrit RuFOR's total fighting power, even if one optimistically estimates the ratio of irrecoverable RuFOR casualties at 2:1. Attrition has always been a dead-end long-term strategy for Ukraine, as opposed to the development of decisive maneuvers that bite and hold territory that Russia cannot recover. At some point GSUA has to be less conservative with offensive resources, even if it fears they can't be replaced with Western assistance in the future; this keeping the powder dry "until you see the whites of their eyes" business has gotten out of hand.

spmetla

02-13-2023, 02:51

Two months ago I did predict that late January would be the best time of the winter campaigning season to launch large-scale attacks, but these are just small-scale attacks with greater regularity; I was figuring in the context of a traditional concerted push, because to do otherwise is to squander concentration and weather conditions more favorable for relatively-rapid movement. Instead this looks like a gradual elevation of temperature almost everywhere.

I'm curious as to if the ability of both sides to strike obvious troop and supply concentrations is what's limiting the ability to truly concentrate combat power to what you suggest and I agree as more likely for success.

Bakhmut for one is also a critical defensive node and anchor, and at this rate a fallback line would have to be about 10 miles east of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk. For example, the loss of the village of Yakovlivka at the beginning of the year obviously allowed the flanking of the truly excellently-situated fortress-town of Soledar, which had withstood frontal assaults for up to 6 months by that time. Predictably, Soledar was immediately flanked and for the past month RuFOR used the breach to expand one of their most significant salients since last spring. All of that could basically have been nipped in the bud with a decisive counterattack to seal the initial, pretty tiny, breach.

I've also wondered at the lack of a substantial counterattack. Perhaps they are waiting for the Russian attack there to culminate or those concentrations of resources to be allocated elsewhere before doing so. Counterattacks are quite vulnerable and usually done by a reserve element so to do so may commit the area's last real reserves and risk a break through by the enemy, who knows though. Artillery superiority still works where the Russians are able to mass these systems.

Still, it's another possibility to watch out for. A more traditional concentrated offensive remains my expectation, or at most a two-prong out of Luhansk and Southern Donetsk with a constant fixing component in the center (Avdiivka-Bakhmut axis). Whether this month or delayed until April (I do think GSRU will feel incentivized to act quickly to generate an advantage before NATO-equipped armored formations, and especially GLSDB, can be deployed).

I figure the Russian planners are definitely worried about the battlefield effects of top-tier NATO equipment. HIMARS had an outsized impact, air defense donations have closed the skies in general to the Russian air force, perhaps they fear that modern MBTs will enable decisive penetrations of concentrated defenses and the end of the stalemate. I personally don't think the new MBTs will have that type of an effect as mines and modern ATGMs will still work well against any new tank especially as the numbers being donated are too small for whole BDEs to be similarly equipped. Challenger 2s with British HESH ammo though should be outstanding for destroying those pre-fab bunkers we've seen.
The GLSDB will have the biggest effect probably, just hope that we give Ukraine cluster munitions too. DPICM is a hell of thing and the arsenal of various fragmentation cluster munitions were all designed with the idea of countering numerically superior infantry.

I've gently pointed out for months that Ukraine does not have unlimited space to cede, and in the context of the advent of mobilization it has obviously failed to attrit RuFOR's total fighting power, even if one optimistically estimates the ratio of irrecoverable RuFOR casualties at 2:1. Attrition has always been a dead-end long-term strategy for Ukraine, as opposed to the development of decisive maneuvers that bite and hold territory that Russia cannot recover. At some point GSUA has to be less conservative with offensive resources, even if it fears they can't be replaced with Western assistance in the future; this keeping the powder dry "until you see the whites of their eyes" business has gotten out of hand.
Yup, attrition is a dead-end strategy for Ukraine. We'll see though if the GSUA's conservatism plays out in the end, I too hate the current strategy but without the info that they have I'm just a monday morning quarterback.

Montmorency

02-13-2023, 03:55

I figure the Russian planners are definitely worried about the battlefield effects of top-tier NATO equipment.

Remember that a winter offensive by both sides was touted widely and quasi-officially since November, so the Russians wouldn't necessarily be acting out of hand in what we observe. And political considerations that apply now would have applied in late 2022, when the winter campaigning season was being sketched out. To the extent anything is instigating Russian actions before time, it should be fear of GLSDB, because that would definitely stall any large-scale action in progress within days if deployed.

In the context of Russia's strategy to outlast Ukraine's alliance while maintaining constant offensive initiative to spoil Ukrainian counteroffensives, first let us be guided by this post by Russian political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov (https://t.me/v_pastukhov/544), which is in in fact applicable to the state of affairs since the beginning of last fall and doesn't actually state anything novel for us:

In my opinion, following the results of the first year of the war, the opposing sides have practically returned to their original position of complete uncertainty and unpredictability. Illusions that this war could end with a quick victory for one of the parties were nullified by the end of the year. Hopes for a possible quick outcome of the war, which a year ago had yet to be born, were, in my opinion, dispelled by the end of the year and remained behind the stern of history.
What do we understand now and what we did not understand six months ago? The populations of both Ukraine and Russia are not ready to give their governments a mandate to conclude peace at the cost of territorial concessions (for Russia, at the cost of giving up the occupied territories that it considers its own). And there, and there is a clearly expressed will to war. But:
- New mobilization no longer looks like an insurmountable obstacle for the Kremlin, while the continuation of mobilization in Ukraine requires more and more efforts;
- Economic sanctions against Russia have not led and in the near future obviously will not lead to the collapse of its economy, they create problems, but do not deprive the ability to continue the war for a long time, calculated in years;
- The readiness and ability of the West to provide military assistance to Ukraine is far short of the scale that would allow Ukraine to turn the tide of the war, and in connection with the upcoming elections in the United States, the chances of a sharp, multiple quantitative and qualitative, and most importantly, lightning-fast increase in this assistance are small. [Ed. Remember that Biden only has ~$5 billion in drawdown funding to work with until FY 2024]
Thus, Ukraine, faced with perfidious aggression from Russia, on the eve of spring 2023, finds itself in the same difficult situation as on the eve of spring 2022. But if at that time the Western allies were guided by the outcome of the battle for Kyiv as a criterion for the “survivability” of the Ukrainian state project, now such a criterion is the outcome of the battle for Donbass. This is actually in a sense really “Stalingrad of the 21st century”. Both Moscow and Kyiv understand this very well. No wonder Putin addresses the nation in the shadow of Mamaev Kurgan. True, he confused the parties a little.
Recent lightweight statements about the supposedly imminent and inevitable end of the war after the de-occupation of Crimea (it was promised by the summer) have subsided. Ukraine is bleeding, and it is not yet up to large-scale offensive operations. But most importantly, it becomes obvious that even if this happened (the de-occupation of Crimea), it would not be the end point of this war, but only a prologue to its next bloodier phase.
A purely military victory over Russia seems to be more of an illusory and disorienting goal, and the bet on a quick Russian revolution (the uprising of the oligarchs and other utopias), under which the entire current sanctions agenda was formed, obviously failed. Against this background, an extremely unpleasant alternative looms:
- either the West (primarily the United States) stops playing the game of "no peace, no war, but help to Ukraine "a teaspoonful three times a month"" and gets involved in the war in full, taking all possible consequences and risks, with this connected,
or Ukraine will sooner or later be pressured (and from both ends) to negotiate a truce on extremely unfavorable terms for it.
Moreover, the later this happens, the worse the conditions will be, since the negotiations now and the negotiations after the loss of the defensive lines created over the course of eight years in the Donbass will differ greatly in their agenda. However, the defeat of the Russian army in the Donbass will give Ukraine a significant head start. But inflicting such a defeat with the current level of support from the West is very difficult.
More about this - in the latest program of Vitaly Dymarsky "Road Map" with Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Whatever the specific Russian and Ukrainian plans ahead, it is understood that UFOR will rely on its reserves to, if not exactly deliver a backhand counteroffensive, then harry Russian flanks and logistics in a similar way to the tactics of a year ago.

I've mentioned this before, but to be complete I should have included in my previous post the one attritional factor that is of special value in this war, that being mass prisoner taking. Capture is the best form of attrition because it has the potential to eliminate much larger quantities of personnel than combat attrition and at lower cost, while also bringing in equipment that might otherwise be lost to all sides. A large POW event (i.e. >1000) also acutely forms holes in the front that the enemy may not have time to stabilize, unlike with even elevated day-to-day attrition. But on a mechanized battlefield this type of attrition has become very difficult to accomplish, on account of the unprecedented mobility and dispersion of combat elements. Usually geography that hinders mobility will be the primary enabler. The most successful example being the full siege and investment of Mariupol, where the defenders had nowhere to break out to. Ukraine had its best opportunities in Izyum and Kherson, but could not move fast enough to prevent successful withdrawals. In the case of Kherson, as I have belabored in the past, the lost opportunity was in a rapid advance toward the Dnieper to bring about the surrender of several divisions of crack VDV troops; in the end, GSRU followed their conservative pattern in ceding compromised territories and took a full month to execute an outstanding evacuation. From here on out Ukraine will have few opportunities to execute and benefit from mass surrenders, unless for example they prosecute such a successful campaign in the south that they somehow surround Melitopol or Mariupol, or press Russian formations against the coast of the Sea of Azov. But such a successful campaign is much less likely on account of the prior missed opportunities to remove the best RuFOR assets.

spmetla

02-13-2023, 21:46

Remember that a winter offensive by both sides was touted widely and quasi-officially since November, so the Russians wouldn't necessarily be acting out of hand in what we observe. And political considerations that apply now would have applied in late 2022, when the winter campaigning season was being sketched out. To the extent anything is instigating Russian actions before time, it should be fear of GLSDB, because that would definitely stall any large-scale action in progress within days if deployed.

The Russian offensive we've seen so far though has been rather lack luster though. It threatens the Svatove-Kremina area primarily and Bakmut as well though with tactics that don't bode well for the future as it's really mostly infantry/artillery numbers that allow for any success.

The disaster in their combined arms attack in Vuhledar shows a major lack of skilled coordination among the different parts of a combined arms attack. Most worrisome for the Russians should be that the seem to mindlessly continue forward into a minefield despite heavy losses. I get doing that if you're close to the enemy trench it nearly at the assaulting through phase but this just doesn't seem to be the situation. I imagine there's a lot of 'no retreat' orders going on as well as no alternative or branch plans developed if an attack doesn't go as planned.
I'm just curious if the Ukrainians will do better when the eventually go back on the offensive, I'm optimistic and hope they do so. Attacking a dug in an opponent after first breaching a minefield is difficult work, something the US hasn't done since Desert Storm so doing so without air superiority is quite a difficult problem.

Whatever the specific Russian and Ukrainian plans ahead, it is understood that UFOR will rely on its reserves to, if not exactly deliver a backhand counteroffensive, then harry Russian flanks and logistics in a similar way to the tactics of a year ago.

The did seem to work for the Germans from 1942 onwards fairly well. The pre-emptive attempts to take the initiative through offensives that couldn't be sustained burned our far more resources than well timed counter attacks with limited attacks beyond the previous line of contact.

Fingers crossed for the future though.

Montmorency

02-14-2023, 23:32

To elaborate on the limited counterattacks we've seen so far... I mean, for an example of the kind of counterattacks we have been seeing from UFOR in Bakhmut (spot the hidden object)

https://i.imgur.com/G1vYTCg.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/5IfHzHJ.jpg

:confused:

And I'm not even sure if this and other similar I've heard of are operational-level or just successful examples of tactical counterattacks (small-unit commanders have always been allowed to perform tactical counterattacks, but if they fail on the basis of their available assets they usually have to pull back without higher-echelon support).

At any rate, this was not the place UFOR needed to achieve a successful counterattack, IYKWIM.

It's just nothing like we see in the south, where GSUA immediately moves up multiple brigades whenever it looks like a fortress might fall, or the north, where UFOR has insisted on Russian-style relentless offensive actions for the past 4 months (to almost zero net gain). For the entire war, the Ukrainians have deprioritized their central front, and only their central front, to an extent I just can't find good justification for.

I'm always willing to be proven wrong by a brilliant gambit.

The Russian offensive we've seen so far though has been rather lack luster though. It threatens the Svatove-Kremina area primarily and Bakmut as well though with tactics that don't bode well for the future as it's really mostly infantry/artillery numbers that allow for any success.

Since they just keep accumulating fresh formations behind the front according to various reports, we should assume this phase hasn't reached its peak. The renewed assault on Vuhledar began around Jan. 23/4 for example.

The disaster in their combined arms attack in Vuhledar shows a major lack of skilled coordination among the different parts of a combined arms attack.

The Vuhledar episode is an interesting one. I assume there has been no change in command over this sector since the capture of Pavlivka in mid-fall that gutted the two Naval Infantry brigades present here. It also scores another point for the relative operational and tactical acumen of Wagner commanders and cadres over those of the VSRF marines, paratroops, motor infantry, and so on. Granting that the Wagner way of war only works on the basis of unlimited manpower, but the relative optimization of resources and capabilities is undeniable.

It's just not clear that there is any coherent VSRF plan in the south, only scattered frontal assaults on strongholds. There has been only the most token attempt to outflank the built-up area of Vuhledar, and that was more or less just moving the axis of frontal attack about 1-2 miles east or west from the dead-on assaults. And to be clear, the Ukrainian loss ratio is far more favorable at Vuhledar than at Bakhmut. If the average Russian unit was led/fought like the VSRF at Vuhledar, Ukraine might still be at its starting lines across Donetsk, and sporting a 1/3 global loss ratio or less. While anything could change in the coming days, the sustained disinterest in attacking at scale at multiple points between strongholds simultaneously is just odd. Why assemble a couple divisions' worth of motley forces at a single small town if you're just going to feed companies into a meatgrinder day by day?

To preface with some observations on the role of mines in warfare:

In WW2, many millions, even tens of millions, of AP and AT mines were used by all sides. I doubt more than a million mines, including RAAMS and other air-delivered, have been deployed in the Ukraine War (not counting individual minelets). Today many more engineering tools and platforms exist for clearing mines ahead of advancing elements. Yet both sides seem to have almost as much trouble overcoming minefields as they do suppressive artillery fire.

In WW2, due to the quantity of enemy forces and the lack of channeling infrastructure (e.g. roads), it was relatively easy to overcome minefields with mass and momentum. Taking a small fraction of casualties due to mines would not typically have an operational impact because the rest could simply keep moving. Because enemy forces would move over a broad front in large numbers, it also made sense for defenders to disperse their mines over a spread of potential routes in order to maximize the overall likelihood of tripping.

In the Ukraine War, there is a synergistic effect of low mass, high channeling, and higher ratio of mines to enemy fighting elements that keeps even dumb landmines surprisingly potent.

This is a low-mass war for its overall size. Even when there is a density of forces approaching WW2 levels, as much as a brigade per 3 kilometers, the typical size of a discrete offensive unit has been a company-sized battlegroup, maybe even a demi-battalion, of variable composition. These battlegroups usually do not conduct integrated maneuvers with other units over a given mutually-supportable frontage. Both sides have usually operated this way, though to be fair Ukraine did manage multi-battalion concurrent actions on a near-daily basis for about a month last year, whereas the Russians haven't able to manage that since the spring. Because these offensive elements have so little mass, it takes only a few losses to stop the whole group in its tracks. A disorganized or pinned group can then be boxed in by enemy artillery, tactical drones, or rapid reaction elements, and thus be routed or destroyed. Unlike in WW2, losing handfuls of vehicles to mines can paralyze all offensive action for the day across an entire AO.

It is easier to channel attacks in the current war than it was in the past. There are many more roads and built-up areas than there used to be. The Ukrainian plains often unfold until broken up by roads or treelines (which often run alongside roads). Modern motorized forces may naturally prefer to stick to roads without a conscious effort to do otherwise, compared to the infantry-heavy forces of yore. Mud effects are overrated, but they are one localized factor that can encourage an offensive element to stick to roads. Because of this channeling effect, an intelligent defender can usually predict where the primary enemy grouping will appear, optimizeand accordingly turn those stretches into killzones.

While, as with other categories of equipment, or numbers of personnel, there are far fewer mines in play in Ukraine today than in WW2, the absolute number is still enough to make mines ubiquitous.

Put it all together and you have a still-large quantity of mines, concentrated on narrower axes of advance, facing smaller offensive groupings. The result is fragility (and also an explanation of why commanders on both sides tend to converge on bunched-up columns on roads for offensive arrangements).

To be sure, offensive actions don't all have to involve 5 or 10 vehicles all moving up as a column along a treeline - and they don't. They could be spread out, cross-country, no problem. But then you run even harder into the limitations of low mass, which are that spreading out 5 or 10 or even 20 vehicles, and their accompanying dismounts, over say a kilometer is going to drastically reduce their ability to bring concentrated fire on an enemy position, or to mutually-support and sustain each other once losses start to register. And there are only so many feasible axes of advance; prearranging even a single mine kill on a detached platoon could take it out of the fight for all intents and purposes. Maybe there are clever ways that can be abstracted away from local conditions to keep a company bunched up without driving it over a likely minefield, but they certainly aren't widely known. The risk will always be present.

(It should separately be noted that air-delivered mines such as RAAMS - which may have been responsible for knocking out a T-90M recently - only further complicate the commander's operating environment since they can deliver mines minutes ahead of an attack to what may even have been a completely clear area.)

Unsurprisingly then, we see the same the pattern manifested among most of these dozens of attacks toward Vuhledar, even if they have to barge through the wrecked columns of their predecessors to continue. When the attackers do disperse, by the way, it tends to be after they've already made contact, which is to say taken losses... or so it seems to me after viewing countless videos of Russian attacks in progress.

As far as I can perceive it, the only reliable means* to overcoming minefields in Ukraine is to return to mass-reliant 20th century doctrines and concentrate overwhelming mass to break through into the enemy rear, regardless of losses (the mass should have been calculated to support maneuver and exploitation regardless of initial casualties). In Vuhledar for example, it might have overwhelmed the defense to advance a platoon-sized column every 100m for a 3-km frontage at once, with a full brigade moving up as tactical reserve. That does mean if one of your buddies gets nicked on the wrist by a stray splinter, you must keep attacking until you reach a predetermined stop point or there's no physical capacity to continue as a unit. I don't know how the US did it in WW2, but I do recall that in Stalin's Red Army it was strongly discouraged to stay behind to render aid to comrades. In their own way, determined mass is the doctrine exemplified by Wagner, reliant as it is on echeloned infantry shock forces and flexible field artillery. And yes, the Wagner doctrine looks awfully similar to 1918 German tactics, but we study those for a reason.

*One alternative might be to train sapper squads to run ahead of the main assault, maybe with those backpack-sized kits, but I don't have any idea of the details. Seems like there aren't enough mineclearing kits/platforms and reckless young men to make that a doctrinal functionality, since they'll suffer truly atrocious losses. Commanders will just have to accept some degree of mine attrition to core assault units no matter what.

kevinsstelly

02-18-2023, 19:10

All the news is already about this war between Ukraine and Russia! When will this war end! So many unfortunate people are dying!

Montmorency

02-20-2023, 01:46

Desultory escalation continues in the north and south (with negative gains). To paraphrase analysts, 'the maximum that can be achieved by such methods is to distract UFOR from counteroffensive preparations.' Whereas the persistent Luhansk counterattacks over the past 4 months had supported this goal with fewer casualties for RuFOR, and the Bakhmut/Central Donetsk Campaign has usually achieved relatively-high attrition against UFOR (while expending lives the Kremlin doesn't care about, viz. soldiers of fortune, separatists, and convicts), the north and south seem to be turning into areas of rapid exhaustion for RuFOR.

Rumors about the RuMOD suppression of Wagner circulating for over a month definitely seem accurate, as it is all but confirmed on both sides and all the way up to Prigozhin himself that Wagner has been removed from the first line almost everywhere. The only exception is said to be north of Bakhmut, which is after all the only place the Russians have been advancing the past week, not long since having regained momentum in the whole AO at the end of January. Not only has Wagner been stopped from participating in most offensive actions, it has been cut off from most sources of recruitment and progressively strangled of supplies.

There's still one week in which to watch for big developments, but at the moment a combination of late Ukrainian reinforcements, a Russian strategic decision to expend resources attacking everywhere in the TO, and factional infighting kneecapping the most successful ongoing Russian campaign and formation, may have staunched the bleeding Ukraine started the year with.

I'm very disturbed by US DoD's estimate of 9K KIA and 20+K WIA Wagner so far (mostly the past two months) though. My previous estimates had come out to, or would extrapolate to, double that (20K KIA, 40K WIA or otherwise discharged). And I'm usually conservative in my casualty estimates. I'm unsure of what to make of this assuming figures like at least 50K prisoners and 10K contractors recruited over the course of the war are accurate.
(To be clear, I had used higher recruitment figures than that wrt my casualty estimates)

Not sure if real (https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/hobby-clubs-missing-balloon-feared-shot-down-usaf).

small, globe-trotting balloon declared “missing in action” by an Illinois-based hobbyist club on Feb. 15 has emerged as a candidate to explain one of the three mystery objects shot down by four heat-seeking missiles launched by U.S. Air Force fighters since Feb. 10.

Furunculus

02-26-2023, 15:36

Poland and South Korea has signed a contract to create a joint consortium which will be tasked with producing 820 K2PL tanks and nearly 500 K9PL self-propelled howitzers in Poland:

https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1629548809314263042

Montmorency

02-27-2023, 02:37

spmetla What do you think of this? (1629722073487613953) The Russians have been relying on company-sized assault groups for a long time now, but this is the first in-depth breakdown I've seen of a variation. It seems Wagner really has inspired RuFOR to double down on the schosstruppen branch, as opposed to maneuver warfare doctrine. In American context, a detachment with up to 200 infantry, 13 AFV, and 6 tanks (not counting the two artillery batteries and other integrated arty) would be classified as a reinforced company, yes?

At any rate, this TOE places a very high emphasis on ranged suppression with close-quarters assault in close coordination.

The Assault Detachment is customizable to mission requirements and consists of 2-3 assault companies, a command unit, an artillery support unit, and other groups: recon, tank, EW, AD, fire support, UAV, Medevac, flamethrowing, assault engineering, reserve, equipment recovery

Assault unit armament:
- Three T-72 tanks
- Two Zu-23, and 3 MANDAPS
- 12 man-portable flamethrowers
- Six SPGs (2S9),
- Six Towed artillery guns (D30)
- Two AGS-17
- Two Kord HMGs,
- Two ATGMs
- Two sniper pairs.
- BREM-L

The main unit of the assault detachment is an assault company consisting of a command unit, a UAV team, assault platoons, an artillery support platoon, a tank group, a reserve section, artillery support platoons, medevac section.

Assault company armament:
- Four BMP or BMD-2
- One T-72
- Two AGS-17,
- Two Kord HMG
- Two ATGM
- Two sniper pairs
- Two mortars - either 82 or 120 mm mortar
- One D30 or 2S9

The primary component of the combat formation is the assault platoon, which may consist of an advance party, safeguard, command group, and fire support platoon strengthened by additional firepower: AGS, mortar, D-30 gun, armored group, and evacuation squad.

An assault platoon comprises 12-15 members, divided into tactical groups of 3 people, and equipped based on mission requirements. A reserve section can supplement the platoon with additional firepower - machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, riflemen.

Wagner seems to have regained a measure in the internal influence contest.

There have been only a few counterattacks, so given the acuity of the situation it's basically certain by now that Ukraine is unwinding its presence around Bakhmut.

spmetla

02-28-2023, 04:35

@spmetla What do you think of this? The Russians have been relying on company-sized assault groups for a long time now, but this is the first in-depth breakdown I've seen of a variation. It seems Wagner really has inspired RuFOR to double down on the schosstruppen branch, as opposed to maneuver warfare doctrine. In American context, a detachment with up to 200 infantry, 13 AFV, and 6 tanks (not counting the two artillery batteries and other integrated arty) would be classified as a reinforced company, yes?

At any rate, this TOE places a very high emphasis on ranged suppression with close-quarters assault in close coordination.

I imagine it does work, it's quite a mix of combat power and capabilities, though the lack of engineer assets makes me wonder if they have special 'breach' configured forces too. Before there were stosstruppen though there was the Brusilov offensive in which the Russians did use infiltration and assault tactics to great effect.
I just wonder if the scale this is being implemented at is too small or not wide spread enough to have greater effect as it just seems of limited use so far, nothing that will allow a break through or even a local disruption of the defense. A platoon of tanks and a platoon of BMPs seems rather small to deal with a counter attack though with the superiority of equipment I imagine most local Ukrainian counter attacks are predominately infantry affairs.

For the terminology, we'd just call it a Task Force which is a catch all for Company and Battalion sized units with significant enablers or other maneuver elements attached in some manner.
Do also wonder about the training regime and rehearsals, a task organization change isn't alone, close coordination needs to be practiced to be fast and effective.

Montmorency

03-01-2023, 02:53

Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of Ukraine’s Land Forces and Eastern Operational Command, ordered to send more troops to Bakhmut following his trip to the front line on Feb. 25.

I really wish I knew what the hell is going on. Is the plan here to allow the city to be operationally encircled before launching a relief counteroffensive to roll up the flanks of the besieger. (Maps from DefMon and David Lisovtsev respectively)

26366
26367

The only good news for the moment is that the Russian tactical mistakes of the quasi-offensive (since ~January 20) have by observable loss data once again opened up a huge gap in armor losses (Russia lost 7 times as many tanks and 4 times as many AFVs). But the problem is that the absolute number of losses in these categories is far too low to be unsustainable to Russia in the medium term, even if the same is true for Ukraine. The ratio in losses of artillery platforms is still mediocre for Ukraine, even if the medium-term prospects on munitions is favorable. At some point we have to hand over some of our hundreds of collective stored M109s.

To check in on the refugee situation, from current estimates I'm seeing I would calculate there are no more than 30 million citizens left in government-controlled territory (1/5 internally displaced), with 5-6 million refugees around the world and the rest in Russia-controlled areas.

stosstruppen

I was mispronouncing it all along.

Anyway, a clear lesson of battle in Ukraine is that forces driven to rely on small-unit action and organization on the attack are also constrained to defending in the same manner. In other words, mobile defense and defense in depth suffer when detached platoons, companies, or battalions have to carry their own weight.

A Cold-War-inspired heavy division built around Abrams or Leo2 could simply annihilate a series of such groupings in detail, granting heavy initial losses to the effect of enemy artillery and CAS. But once the first and second lines were broken, such a division could comfortably roll ahead at 5-10 km/day, causing cascading failures in enemy organization. Without excellent preparation, the defender would not be able to muster and concentrate sufficient reserves to deliver a decisive meeting engagement.

In an offensive scenario in Zaporizhzhia, the extensive deployment of HIMARS for counterbattery missions would be unavoidable like never before.

The most difficult element of constructing such a heavy division, one I lack knowledge to work through, is what NATO short-range SAM systems would be available for moving up just behind the maneuver units. The second most difficult, though more a matter of training, is how to optimize between safety and availability in the divisional artillery (SPG) assets as the divisional mass advances and diffuses out across territory.

Edit: Add Serbia to the list of countries quietly providing military aid to Ukraine. As I've noted since early in the war, despite Vucic's historically belligerent rhetoric, his policy set has usually strived to balance between the EU, Russia, and China. I wonder if Sarmatian is seething.

spmetla

03-01-2023, 19:32

I really wish I knew what the hell is going on. Is the plan here to allow the city to be operationally encircled before launching a relief counteroffensive to roll up the flanks of the besieger. (Maps from DefMon and David Lisovtsev respectively)

I'm curious too, I'm thinking they're just trying to exhaust Russia's short-term offensive power before reverting to the offensive themselves to reduce the danger of Russian counter-attacks etc... Though I don't know if the material/manpower ratios will allow for such a strategy.

The ratio in losses of artillery platforms is still mediocre for Ukraine, even if the medium-term prospects on munitions is favorable. At some point we have to hand over some of our hundreds of collective stored M109s.

Given that the West is still needing to ramp up 155mm ammunition production perhaps the mass of M109s will be shipped once we have the ammo to give that can match the barrels shooting them. The US should also give away its older M198 155mm towed howitzers as there's no point in keep those in inventory anymore with the M777 in service for years now.

Anyway, a clear lesson of battle in Ukraine is that forces driven to rely on small-unit action and organization on the attack are also constrained to defending in the same manner. In other words, mobile defense and defense in depth suffer when detached platoons, companies, or battalions have to carry their own weight.

That's why I'm wondering about the ability to mass power in the rear areas at all. The prevalence of drones and long range artillery makes it so difficult to keep reserve or attack formations near the line of contact that battles seem to devolve into these positional attrition fights.

A Cold-War-inspired heavy division built around Abrams or Leo2 could simply annihilate a series of such groupings in detail, granting heavy initial losses to the effect of enemy artillery and CAS. But once the first and second lines were broken, such a division could comfortably roll ahead at 5-10 km/day, causing cascading failures in enemy organization. Without excellent preparation, the defender would not be able to muster and concentrate sufficient reserves to deliver a decisive meeting engagement.

This is why the US is trying to devise what would form a modern 'penetration division' to do what you suggest. I imagine though that that even were such a force available to Ukraine right now the ability to attrite massing forces near the front line will probably require a penetration division to essentially stage tens of miles from the front-line conduct it's roadmarch, passage of lines straight into the attack in order to negate the ability of artillery, drones, and CAS to attrite them as they posture in assault positions.
Something like this would take the most precise planning and coordination on the front end and the most flexible command structure to exploit any effected penetration for a break through.

The most difficult element of constructing such a heavy division, one I lack knowledge to work through, is what NATO short-range SAM systems would be available for moving up just behind the maneuver units. The second most difficult, though more a matter of training, is how to optimize between safety and availability in the divisional artillery (SPG) assets as the divisional mass advances and diffuses out across territory.

The lack of mobile SAM systems is certainly a NATO weakness though I see that being rapidly corrected with the donation of new systems by Ukraine (Skyranger for example).
As for the artillery, the current construct would allow the brigades to use their own artillery for local support while DIVARTY supports the main effort, targets enemy in the deep fight, and conducts long range counter battery fires. The future divisional model takes artillery away from the brigades and puts it all with DIVARTY which will remove some the of the flexibility current brigades have making them more dependent on DIV support, something that may be unwise in EW contested battles.

Seamus Fermanagh

03-01-2023, 22:36

...I wonder if Sarmatian is seething.

I recall that being a frequent mode for him in the Backroom.

Furunculus

03-02-2023, 10:14

Edit: Add Serbia to the list of countries quietly providing military aid to Ukraine. As I've noted since early in the war, despite Vucic's historically belligerent rhetoric, his policy set has usually strived to balance between the EU, Russia, and China. I wonder if Sarmatian is seething.
would that be because Serbia is providing aid, or because they're doing it quietly?

Montmorency

03-04-2023, 15:54

As an example of what I mean about the inadequate absolute losses imposed on RuFOR:

https://i.imgur.com/bNJs6cq.png

8:1 in tanks, 4:1 in AFVs... These are great ratios, no less for what they imply about infantry exchange ratios. But it's been clear since last summer that an unsustainable rate of equipment loss for Russia would look more like 10 tanks and 20 AFVs per day on average. The data we have, if extrapolated optimistically, demonstrate half that rate. Other than the infamous first phase of the invasion, and September 2022, the average has been stuck at half of the target figure: In April through August, October through February, there's a pretty consistent range of materiel losses over time.

For Russia to just lose on its own, i.e. without any special effort on our part, it was always going to have to fight and execute as badly as in the first month of the war. And for the longest time the evidence has been that no matter how many individual blunders they commit, they will never return to that level of self-own.

Moreover, the artillery system exchange ratio has never been very favorable to Ukraine, at 2-3x against Russia, relative to the starting Russian advantage in inventory.

I'm curious too, I'm thinking they're just trying to exhaust Russia's short-term offensive power before reverting to the offensive themselves to reduce the danger of Russian counter-attacks etc... Though I don't know if the material/manpower ratios will allow for such a strategy.

That's always been the grand strategy, but what remains obscure is the intent regarding Bakhmut. How can the reinforcements to the city and the repeated assurances that it will be defended be reconciled with the very limited - and oddly placed - counterattacks, and the noticeably soft defense of the northern outskirts of Bakhmut.

The battle for Severodonetsk as historical context was quickly obviated by the increasingly compromised condition of the entire Lysychansk salient. Whether or not GSUA planned to fight there forever, they couldn't secure the deep rear; the plan would have had to change regardless. In Bakhmut, well, if they're fighting an extended delaying action that would just resemble what Russia did in Lyman at larger (riskier) scale. It's incredibly risky with the scale of manpower involved, but the cord isn't quite cut for Bakhmut, even with that pincer leaving a gap of only a couple miles. But given all the 'will they, won't they' speculation, and the repeated statements (up to this day) of Ukrainian high command that they intend to keep the city, I'm trying to sort out how the very limited reinforcements and counterattacks of the past month come together in a coherent strategy in light of the extremity of the salient in which the city (and the thousands of UA personnel concentrated there) finds itself. If there is an intent to rescue the defense and restore a stable line, we're very much in the eleventh hour. A complete withdrawal would have to commence no later than the end of the week at this rate. Unlike in Lysychansk moreover, there has been extensive time and reserve capability to devise a response to the deteriorating situation - yet we haven't seen anything of the sort.

I'm thinking the options are:

1. There is no coherent strategy.
2. They've never planned to relieve Bakhmut, and are performing a phased withdrawal as we speak, but for some reason they're willing to take a morale hit by repeatedly hyping their efforts and cutting things close.
3. They're going to launch a diversionary offensive elsewhere on the front, or even a strategic offensive (but March would be a strange time, and I don't see that they've enjoyed the needed influx of munitions recently), so the development of the Bakhmut salient is irrelevant.
4. They're eager to instigate a Kesselschlacht against Wagner/VDV while they're stretched around the city, using a lot of men as bait.

I'm guessing it's a mix of the first two.

Like I said, maybe they'll surprise us again, but it's quite hard to trust GSUA right now.

That's why I'm wondering about the ability to mass power in the rear areas at all. The prevalence of drones and long range artillery makes it so difficult to keep reserve or attack formations near the line of contact that battles seem to devolve into these positional attrition fights.

This is why the US is trying to devise what would form a modern 'penetration division' to do what you suggest. I imagine though that that even were such a force available to Ukraine right now the ability to attrite massing forces near the front line will probably require a penetration division to essentially stage tens of miles from the front-line conduct it's roadmarch, passage of lines straight into the attack in order to negate the ability of artillery, drones, and CAS to attrite them as they posture in assault positions.

The way Putin aimed to resolve this challenge a year ago was to optimize on surprise. He attacked everywhere at once with approximately a quarter to a third of the prestaged forces. In other words, by having concentrations everywhere, he gave up the advantage of a heavier concentration at a main effort.

Perhaps there are holes in the following, but my own speculative OPLAN along these lines begins with:

1. Assemble the two NATO-trained divisions, and other units, loosely throughout the expanse of northern Zaporizhzhia Oblast, preferably in proximity to the T0803, T0408, and T0401 highways.
2. Long-present line units commence probes between the Dnieper and Velyka Novosilka.
3. One brigade from each division is set to march on and open two of multiple preselected directions according to the information collected.

The object would be to create a rapid penetration at points not readily apparent to the enemy, and then to expand them with successive echelons moving up from the rear, until the whole enemy defensive network is compromised and maneuver warfare can begin, which would be a huge disadvantage to RuFOR at that point. This echeloned approach (dispersal prior to joining the forward line) would limit attrition and disruption due to Russian air support and missile strikes. Russia would probably also, in the moment of peril, attempt mass strikes on Dnieper bridges in the Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia regional capitals, as well as indiscriminate bombardment of those cities with the aim of causing chaos in essential rear supply and command nodes, but that's just something to be priced in.

Something like this would take the most precise planning and coordination on the front end and the most flexible command structure to exploit any effected penetration for a break through.

If the US/EU and all its generals and strategists can't train up the personnel and structures necessary for this on a timescale of say even a year, then Ukraine is definitely losing its occupied territory.

More (https://yle.fi/a/74-20020197?utm_medium=social&utm_source=copy-link-share) on the need for training of Ukrainian soldiers, officers, and specialists.

After a year of war in Ukraine, with no decisive Russian breakthrough, many western observers believe in a Ukrainian victory.

That's futile hope, according to one senior Finnish officer who has been in Ukraine since April, observing the war.

In the officer's opinion, troops in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) do not know how to attack and much of their training suffers from a hangover from the Soviet era.

"Ukrainians think that they are good soldiers. But being scared in the trenches for eight years does not make a skilled soldier. Soldiers are made through training," the officer emphasised.

That is why this Finnish officer has taken on the mission himself to improve the training of Ukrainian soldiers, especially that of non-commissioned officers (NCOs).

I cannot emphasize enough how recurrent this observation is, since the beginning of the war. And given the losses among the ranks of Ukraine's most professional, experienced, or motivated soldiers (it's very hard to estimate, but the very minimum should be a quarter, compared to around half for RuFOR) over the past year, the only factor that really allows UFOR to maintain any qualitative gap over the opposition is the ongoing NATO training program, small-scale as it has been so far.

So far this year, Perun noted that EU training committments for 2023 are 30K, and US 10K, on top of the British 20K catalogued in the thread.

Ukraine needs skills. It needs a high-quality Army. That is something we are well-placed to contribute, and which no one can generate on Russia's behalf. Our national leaderships and military establishments need to wise up already.

The lack of mobile SAM systems is certainly a NATO weakness though I see that being rapidly corrected with the donation of new systems by Ukraine (Skyranger for example).

I was thinking of shorter-range SAM, like Tor or Buk (Ukraine is sorely short of them by now), that would normally be a divisional or army-level enabler in Soviet doctrine. Not that this hypothetical division would be Soviet-style, but it really needs SAM moving with it to counter the Russian ace card, which is to just send waves of whole CAS squadrons of Su-24, Su-25, Su-30, Su-34, to stall any deep penetration in disregard of losses. They've done this a few times, notably during the Kupyansk Offensive, but the lower density and complex terrain seriously hindered VKS targeting efforts even as it incurred elevated losses. In Zaporizhzhia, the large armored formations driving over the southern steppe would be comparatively easy targets.

EDIT: I just remembered the US had Chaparral in the late Cold War, it being the equivalent of the Strela-10 on the Soviet side. Does the US have an answer to the Buk or Tor, something to defeat aerial targets out to mid-range and mid-to-high altitude as part of a mobile force? Are NASAMS or Patriot designed for that kind of mobility? The NASAMS launcher doesn't look too mobile.

If the effectiveness of this inevitable air campaign could be negated, Russia would very likely be unable to prevent a wide breakthrough.

As for the artillery, the current construct would allow the brigades to use their own artillery for local support while DIVARTY supports the main effort, targets enemy in the deep fight, and conducts long range counter battery fires.

It was more a question of how to safely and effectively implement integrated artillery within a constantly-moving salient. This would effectively be a first for the entire era of mobile warfare (WW2 artillery was rather short of range anyway). I do want some HIMARS batteries assigned exclusively to these divisions, but the main bulk of artillery assigned would probably be M109. Operating these in open terrain, say 20km behind the line of contact, along a front at least 10km across, when the penetration might be expanding 5+km per day, possibly even facing setbacks, is a scary prospect. An immense challenge of flexibility and communication.

Russian Lancet drones have many problems, but so far they have served as the US government probably hoped Switchblade 300 would.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/11/hit-or-miss-russian-loitering-munition.html

https://i.imgur.com/1gWQ0e7.png

I calculated recently that Ukraine should need to reserve half a million 155/152mm shells for a major offensive, accounting for an elevated depletion rate of 10-15K shells/day over a month in the AO alone, plus operational buffer (where the global average depletion has been as 3-4K/day). To repeat, this figure does not include normal usage elsewhere nor a strategic reserve. Realistically then, if Ukraine were to conduct a major offensive from the first day of a given month, it would really want to begin with 750-1000K large-caliber shells available globally.

Ukraine is officially (https://www.ft.com/content/75ee9701-aa93-4c5d-a1bc-7a51422280fd) asking for 250K 155mm per month, having received by my estimate around 1.5 million to date.

250K/month in deliveries without raising the ongoing rate of expenditure seems like it would be enough to support a mid-size strategic offensive by the summer, assuming expanded deliveries started ASAP. But worldwide accessible production is nowhere near those levels yet, so the US would have to hand over the remainder of its inventory, or really start raiding South Korea's stockpile.

“According to our estimates, for the successful execution of battlefield tasks, the minimum need is at least 60 per cent of the full ammunition set, or 356,400 shells per month.”

That amount, nearly 50% higher, seems like it would be enough for two or three major offensives per year if current expenditure rates were only doubled - permitting accumulation of up to half a million shells every 4 months. The bottom line is that in order to plan major operations UFOR needs to be able to depend on the presence of a large stockpile months into the future, something that it has been often repeated is not a visible precondition over the past year.

This is why we need long-term planning in developing a strategy for this war, centering the objective needs of the Ukrainian military in maintaining defense and discretely projecting offensive power. Fact is we're still entirely ad hoc in our decision-makingI'm just some keyboard general, but I feel I've long offered a good starting proposal on a mass training mission for standing up a strike corps.

would that be because Serbia is providing aid, or because they're doing it quietly?

Can you elaborate? If the aid weren't quiet, that would be a pretty blatant snub to Russia, but it's hardly the first example of balancing by Serbia, nor is their decision on Mig-29s (there are over 100 Mig-29s in Russia, and at least 500! outside Russia, Ukraine, and the EU, so there's no long-term shortage of spares or replacements to worry about that the decision could be based on, for a country the size of Serbia at least).

Montmorency

03-08-2023, 04:24

There is news of a potential covert arrangement blocking the Iran-Russia deal on ballistic missile transfers in exchange for the US blocking ATACMS transfers to Ukraine. At the very least, it fits into the mold of the report from last year that the US blocked Polish Mig-29 transfers to Ukraine in exchange for Chinese mediation on nuclear risks. If one story is accurate, it lends credence to the other.

There has been another slew of articles about the determination of Ukrainian high command to retain Bakhmut. Here's (https://twitter.com/i/status/1632860925727211521) Zelensky himself expressing it.

Prigozhin himself insists that Option 4 (Kesselschlact) from my previous post is the intent, that once Bakhmut is encircled GSUA will initiate an unblocking operation to fracture Wagner. Yet an anonymous NATO official was just quoted as saying that Russia lost at least 5 times as many KIA as Ukraine over Bakhmut; the geographic range is unclear, but the time frame is probably roughly early/mid-December through February. This is not necessarily a US official, but such a ratio, besides being inconsistent with the latest reports from the ground, is probably inconsistent with the recent US estimate of 9K Wagner KIA in one full year. Even assuming other formations were heavily involved in the winter fighting around Bakhmut, and attributing 100% of the estimated Wagner KIA, the derivative KIA figure for UFOR would be something like 20-25 KIA/day in or around Bakhmut. Other sources generally agree that the casualty exchange has usually been between 1:1 and 1:2 in Ukraine's favor.

I just got wind of a thought dropped by Perun in his video on "Russian Strengths & Capabilities":

You could do things like pull thirty or forty thousand Ukrainian recruits over to the United States and say, "I am going to spend 8 or 9 months turning these troops into a modern, capable, NATO-standard family of units. They are going to learn how to maintain the equipment, they are going to learn how to use it effectively, they are going to learn how to fight combined arms.

:thinking2::thinking2:

Montmorency

03-12-2023, 22:46

Apparently (https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/239-containing-transnational-jihadists-syrias), every faction in Syria is relying on the HTS Islamists to keep Idlib clear of IS and Al Qaeda.

On top of the Norwegian Leo2 decision, it seems Italy (https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/03/10/italy-is-increasingly-liking-the-idea-of-getting-leopard-2a7-tanks/) is going all-in on Leo2A7. Also, Romania (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romania-aims-buy-abrams-tanks-senior-army-official-says-2023-03-07/) is bidding on Abrams.

European tank market getting crowded.

Swiss neutrality is more important than ever, President Alain Berset said in an interview published Sunday, defending the controversial ban on transferring Swiss-made arms to Ukraine.

"Swiss weapons must not be used in wars," he told the NZZ am Sonntag weekly.

Preferably, they should only be used in a conflict where both sides are purchasing them.

One of the prolific Ukraine War commentators (https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1634644361643261953) offers a tactical breakdown of what a southern offensive of the sort I've discussed here would look like. IMO his vision relies too much on the optimization of grunts' safety through firepower, which Ukraine will never get in such massive quantities - the breakthrough element would always suffer high casualties to compensate with bodies and vehicles for lack of firepower. But schematically I agree with pretty much all of what he says. But:

So how would I attack? Depends on the available forces... with nine mechanized brigades, three artillery brigades, two engineer brigades & follow on forces to secure the rear, I would attack, break through & pursue three directions:
1) South to Mariupol
2) West to Bilmak in the rear of the russian front to panic the russian troops there
3) East to Amvrosiivka to make holding Donetsk city impossible for the russians.

Once these objectives are secured I would pursue limited attacks in the East to secure the border with russia and encircle Donetsk from three sides, while throwing most forces into a push towards Berdyansk & Tokmak.

https://i.imgur.com/jhPqQdG.jpg

I think this approach (put everything into a thrust south of Vuhledar) is overly concentrated, and in an area that lacks road infrastructure behind friendly lines and in the RuFOR close rear.

First, the advantages:

1. Depending on the circumstances, concentrating the entire OOB may be necessary to ensure success (compared to my preference of separating into two forces that attack at locations further west and independently pivoting east and west, respectively, when into the rear.
2. IF the Kerch Strait (rail) Bridge can be disabled just before or during the offensive, then time and resources may be saved in letting RuFOR in Zapo/Kherson wither on the vine, redirecting resources that would be used to confront them more directly toward achieving the largest possible penetration into Donetsk (the strategic endgame).
3. Puts a relatively-large distance between the offensive axes and the large RuFOR strategic reserve in Kherson and around Melitopol.
4. Prioritizes anchoring along the Ukraine-Russia state border ahd destabilizing the broader (Donetsk) central front.

Disadvantages:

1. The enemy will be almost-perfectly supplied so close to Donetsk, and with better situational awareness.
2. The offensive really shouldn't take place without means to disable the Kerch Bridge anyway, and pressuring the Melitopol direction is a good opportunity to cause a rout and secure mass surrenders during a disorderly RuFOR retreat toward Crimea.
3. There is no way to support a deep west-hook into the Zapo rear behind the prepared RuFOR line without the flanks being horribly threatened.
4. Instead of inviting RuFOR to stick their necks out in an effort to maintain the road LOC between Mariupol and Melitopol, all those resources would be devoted to stemming the UFOR opening in the first place.
5. The Donetsk-envelopment component is simply always going to be a bridge too far for a single offensive action to achieve.
6. Low-quality though they may be, I'm pretty sure there is a very large DPR/Rosgvardia cluster of security forces and third-tier reserves right there in the Donetsk City metropolitan area.
7. Higher concentration increases susceptibility to high-risk VKS ground-attack sorties.

In my view a major southern offensive should have the following conceptual goals above all.

1. Penetrate deep into the enemy rear in Zaporizhzhia, cutting off the land bridge to Crimea; if things have gone well then a race to the sea should be inevitable.
2. Ensure unstoppable but steady momentum that can keep RuFOR retreating westward without time to stabilize (e.g. to the gates of Crimea by D+30—60).
3. Achieve a lodgement east of the pre-2022 de facto DPR border in order to bypass the extensive border fortification network and facilitate future offensives.
(4). Cut off Mariupol by land.

Thus, building on ideas introduced in earlier posts (light-blue signifies 3rd-echelon movements): spmetla

https://i.imgur.com/hAPTYjA.jpg

Notes: The east branch from the Orikhiv-Melitopol axis would help ensure the neutralization of the major Russian base at Polohy before being assigned as needed to the push to envelop either Melitopol or Mariupol. The rendered branches of the Hulyaipole-Mariupol axis stop just at the pre-2022 border. The intent is to go somewhat further of course, but where and how would depend on conditions on the ground and more detailed operational planning than I am willing to attempt.

I can't definitively say the commentator's vision is worse, though I prefer my own. He is the one between us with military command experience. Maybe a compromise plan exchanging the thrust out of Orikhiv for one out of Vuhledar? I'm glad that there is finally serious mainstream (among war spectators) discussion of the resources Ukraine needs in order to prosecute a major offensive.

What we can be sure of is that Ukraine is nowhere near to possessing what it needs to execute on any version of the OPLAN. Both the 500K large-caliber shells (which I'm pleased to see the commentator also cites) and the NATO-standard 9+ brigades are necessary.

spmetla

03-15-2023, 23:23

1. Penetrate deep into the enemy rear in Zaporizhzhia, cutting off the land bridge to Crimea; if things have gone well then a race to the sea should be inevitable.
2. Ensure unstoppable but steady momentum that can keep RuFOR retreating westward without time to stabilize (e.g. to the gates of Crimea by D+30?60).
3. Achieve a lodgement east of the pre-2022 de facto DPR border in order to bypass the extensive border fortification network and facilitate future offensives.
(4). Cut off Mariupol by land.

I agree with all three of goals there, getting to the Azov Sea would also allow ground based missiles to threaten Russian shipping/naval efforts there essentially closing the port of Rostov ship may shape the efforts for a strike on the Kerch bridge that permanently closes it.

The subsequent defenses that Russia has been building on all fronts though make it difficult to keep momentum up. Exploitation forces need to be 100% capable of breaching/assaulting further defenses lines which will attrit the attackers rapidly.
Unstoppable momentum would require a much larger force as even if the losses are minimal and the equipment and ammo are available the Soldiers themselves can't really keep going beyond 96 hours of high-intensity combat.

I see re-taking Crimea as far more important than the Donbas region as doing so will cross that Russian redline sooner than later and if Crimea is lost or essentially an island I wonder if Russia will have the political will to fight over the comparatively unimportant Donbas region.

Very curious to see what Ukraine does in the spring, the new tanks, the probable MiG-29 donations and so on. Fingers crossed they have the right plan.

Montmorency

03-16-2023, 01:00

I see re-taking Crimea as far more important than the Donbas region as doing so will cross that Russian redline sooner than later and if Crimea is lost or essentially an island I wonder if Russia will have the political will to fight over the comparatively unimportant Donbas region.

While that's true to an extent, knocking the extensive manpower pool and military infrastructure (and presumably some separatist units) of Donbass out of the war would severely weaken Russia's ability to make future offensives or launch future wars, while not furthering the defense of Crimea in particular. Moreover, an initial assault into Crimea would inherently be the most challenging and costly initiative of the war (other than some stupid thing, like trying to fight frontally through the Donetsk metropolitan area). Finally, as I've mentioned before, I see Crimea as above all a bargaining chip; a referendum on sovereignty would almost certainly go against Ukraine without extensive ethnic cleansing, and even as war spoils without a referendum would see a lot of ethnic cleansing. While this could be said of any outcome to the war, Crimean irredentism would be assured of becoming a long-term bone of contention in Russian politics. In all of these optimistic war scenarios it would have been Biden's job to step in and find a magnanimous, treaty-bound compromise between the belligerents, probably secured by Russian demilitarization of the peninsula alongside a Ukrainian/UN compliance garrison and water rights. The situation with Donbass on the other hand is self-resolving given the political demography (with those who took up arms to be addressed according to something like the Finnish model of 1918).

I see we lost an entire air force's worth of frames last decade to accidents (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2020/ncmas_final_report_20201201.pdf). It does often seem like Western military establishments, with few exceptions, are only marginally less sclerotic than the likes of Russia's.

spmetla

03-16-2023, 20:46

While that's true to an extent, knocking the extensive manpower pool and military infrastructure (and presumably some separatist units) of Donbass out of the war would severely weaken Russia's ability to make future offensives or launch future wars, while not furthering the defense of Crimea in particular. Moreover, an initial assault into Crimea would inherently be the most challenging and costly initiative of the war (other than some stupid thing, like trying to fight frontally through the Donetsk metropolitan area).
It's because the Donbas is a manpower pool with a population that has actually been at war with Ukraine for eight years and will likely resist a Ukrainian reconquest that I think Crimea the softer target. The Donbas has been fortifying for eight years, the military infrastructure is closely tied to Russia already.
Crimea on the other hand has largely been spared the last eight years of hostility besides the water cut off from the Kherson Canal. It's population has not had to have a war mentality for the last eight years and though largely pro-Russian that lack of eight years of war has probably not hardened their stance toward Ukraine as much as in the Donbas.
Not to mention, Crimea's lines of communication (LOCs) can actually be cut off from Russia, the LOCs for the Donbas cannot short of retaking the Donbas entirely.

Finally, as I've mentioned before, I see Crimea as above all a bargaining chip; a referendum on sovereignty would almost certainly go against Ukraine without extensive ethnic cleansing, and even as war spoils without a referendum would see a lot of ethnic cleansing.

That's possible but it could also end up being somewhat like 1944-45 Europe with the ethnic Germans fleeing Westward to escape the Soviets. The Russian population that truly hates Ukraine and believes them nazis may flee of their own accord and just not be allowed to return.

There's also the look at Benes post-war Czechoslovakia's expulsion of the Germans which was done for obvious reasons but was paired with not demanding any substantial reparations from the post-war German states either once those were re-established. Something the Polish government should consider seeing as they got substantial reparations as well as territorial concessions from West/East Germany.

Might even end up with a vague sort of population exchange as happened between Turkey and Greece following the Greco-Turkish War/WWI, those Russians that do remain in Ukraine will likely further identify with them and assimilate into Ukraine, something this war has certainly sped up as not all ethnic Russians have love for the Russian State.

While this could be said of any outcome to the war, Crimean irredentism would be assured of becoming a long-term bone of contention in Russian politics. In all of these optimistic war scenarios it would have been Biden's job to step in and find a magnanimous, treaty-bound compromise between the belligerents, probably secured by Russian demilitarization of the peninsula alongside a Ukrainian/UN compliance garrison and water rights. The situation with Donbass on the other hand is self-resolving given the political demography (with those who took up arms to be addressed according to something like the Finnish model of 1918).

Russia could be given the whole Black Sea coast and they'd still be demanding more. Revenge against any independent Ukrainian State will assuredly be a policy of any future Russian government.
The only real protector against renewed hostilities would be UN manned demilitarized zones on both sides of the border or a formal defensive alliance between Ukraine and the US/NATO and EU.
A UN demilitarized zone would likely never be agreed to by Russia and it would require a substantial force to actually implement. Consider the size of the MFO force between Egypt and Israel was at its peak three full infantry battalions plus many other enabling forces. The major UN contributing nations that are more reliable and capable are typically from NATO countries too so Russia would see this more as NATO on and in their border than the UN.
A more formal defensive alliance and arrangement however is possible, Ukraine must still possess the means to defend itself. A pact with NATO or the EU though with potential future membership would be the best way to guarantee peace short of WW3.

I just look to 1936 Germany, if the will to resist German re-occupation of the Rhineland was there then perhaps WW2 could have avoided. Irredentist attitudes will take a generation or three to no longer be a threat to peace.
The Russian Federation has been a failure as a democratic state just as the Weimar Republic, I see the 2014 actions like the Anschluss of Austria and the Sudetenland and the current war as like the attempt to Occupy the rest of Bohemia and Moravia with a puppet state in Slovakia. If the Czechs had resisted in 1939 and the Allies intervened I see no reason why the Germans would have been allowed to keep the Sudetenland in a negotiated settlement. Though of course it's obvious I'm trying too hard to put the current situation into none-equal historical parallels there are similarities.

I see we lost an entire air force's worth of frames last decade to accidents. It does often seem like Western military establishments, with few exceptions, are only marginally less sclerotic than the likes of Russia's.
Considering that our pilots and air frames get a lot more flight time I'm not surprised we have high accident rates. Even with our volunteer force I'm sure there's problems in maintenance for aircraft due to the constant re-training of crews as well as any failures in leadership and management. Something needs to change for sure but that'd require more oversight which is difficult to implement.

Montmorency

03-17-2023, 01:07

Crimea on the other hand has largely been spared the last eight years of hostility besides the water cut off from the Kherson Canal. It's population has not had to have a war mentality for the last eight years and though largely pro-Russian that lack of eight years of war has probably not hardened their stance toward Ukraine as much as in the Donbas.

While this part is true, and could potentially signal difficulties for holding Donbass now that such a large part of the population has been involved in large-scale combat against Ukraine for so long, Crimea is still far more anti-Ukrainian. It tried to secede in 1992/3! Before 2014 you'd routinely - relative to the amount of Ukraine coverage of course - see articles about Ukraine in mainstream Western press musing about how much Crimeans hate Ukraine. While similar refugee outflow effects* would apply in the case of a battle into Crimea (especially of Russian immigrants of the past decade), by now we can expect the vast majority of the pro-Ukrainian population of Crimea, which itself was a smaller base to begin with, has been purged by Russia. Perhaps 90% of the population dwelling in Crimea today is ethnic Russian, and not just ethnic Russian but some of the likeliest ethnic Russians anywhere to be virulently anti-Ukrainian. That's a long-term problem no matter how the war ends.

It is worth analyzing that anti-Russian partisan activity in both the long-term Russian occupation zones has been nearly nonexistent during the war. But even hotspots like Melitopol would be crushed before long if the war ended. (Westerners who hype the power of insurgencies are so weird to me; it's extremely case-specific and insurgencies are usually not very viable).

*If the bridge is down and LOC are reserved for military supply, it really also depends on how much Russia wants to prioritize evacuating civilians

Not to mention, Crimea's lines of communication (LOCs) can actually be cut off from Russia, the LOCs for the Donbas cannot short of retaking the Donbas entirely.

That's why, historically, the only way to capture Donbass is around, not through. In this war Ukraine's maximal strategy would be a double envelopment from North Luhansk south of the SD River alongside South Donetsk north of Mariupol. Luhansk City could not be cut off, but Donetsk City and its metro area could be, thus removing most of the regional population from the equation. We come to recognize the northern front is a stalemate, so the southern offensive with eastward hook is the only viable approach. Donbass is less fortified than you think, from the Russian side - it's only the pre-2022 line of control that has seen extensive work. GEOSINT meanwhile shows that almost all wartime Russian fortifications and trench networks have been constructed near the line of contact in the newly-occupied areas, near Melitopol - as well as Crimea! The LDPR territory has hardly been augmented in the past year. If, in a southern offensive, Ukraine rapidly secures a lodgement beyond that old fortification network, the entire network becomes too compromised to be sustainable to future efforts (ask the Ukrainians fighting north of Bakhmut for reference!). From that point of course, UFOR would need to press the advantage toward gradual movement and not settle down long enough to be contained by new fortified lines, further limiting the resources that could be spared for Crimea.

I urge anyone to look into the geography of Crimea. In this type of war it is extremely easy to defend, as the entryways are only a couple bridges that can be blown, around 10 cumulative kilometers of land, and vast stretches of silty lagoons. If Ukraine had the firepower necessary to suppress Russian defenses (which could still be resupplied by sea and air even without the bridge), then why wouldn't it aim all that into a Donbass penetration? The majority of UFOR would need to be committed to a Crimean operation, along with a year's worth of Western production, all of which seems like it will always be unavailable anyway until the rest of the lost territories can be secured, because to do otherwise would leave too many vulnerabilities.

Russia could be given the whole Black Sea coast and they'd still be demanding more. Revenge against any independent Ukrainian State will assuredly be a policy of any future Russian government.

This is less likely IMO with a just solution to the Crimean question that aligns with "Western values." Such a solution is ultimately backstopped by the demonstrable (demonstrated) military capacity of Ukraine and NATO anyway, since there is no discussion to be had without force of arms delivering us Crimea to begin with. I would suggest that another 'little green men' operation into a demilitarized Crimea garrisoned by a Ukrainian division would go pretty badly for Russia in multiple ways - that's sound deterrence.

As long as we're talking about ridiculous world-war-style imperialism however, I would prefer something like forcible indepedence and demilitarization (including nuclear) for Kaliningrad in exchange for the concession of Crimea.

A pact with NATO or the EU though with potential future membership would be the best way to guarantee peace short of WW3.

NATO/Polish forces setting up shop is close to the ideal, as even Article 5 of NATO doesn't technically require any given country respond more than symbolically. But as I keep telling people, a NATO that is not prepared to equip Ukraine to win is not a NATO that will take up the liability of a Ukraine conceded to disadvantageous territorial losses and/or at permanent war with Russia. If NATO steps up and permits Ukraine to reclaim its territory, settling most of the issues (its not clear which of our views represents the intergovernmental consensus on Crimea most closely), then NATO track is a done deal; even Hungary would want to be on Ukraine's good side.

Currently we're still on track to pointless quagmire, as Ukraine receives only life support and Russia drains its own ability to achieve tactical successes. This is the scenario most favorable to China, of course; let's see how much progress they've made in turning the Gulf into their protectorate (not that I don't see it as a good opportunity to wind down our "ally" status with Saudi Arabia anyway).

spmetla

03-17-2023, 03:25

It is worth analyzing that anti-Russian partisan activity in both the long-term Russian occupation zones has been nearly nonexistent during the war. But even hotspots like Melitopol would be crushed before long if the war ended. (Westerners who hype the power of insurgencies are so weird to me; it's extremely case-specific and insurgencies are usually not very viable).

Counter-insurgency is difficult if you're actually trying to win the population over, sadly genocide and repression have proved very effective over the last century. Historical conquest has typically had a lot of post-conquest pogroms. Civil disobedience and disorganized armed resistance don't go very far in police states.

*If the bridge is down and LOC are reserved for military supply, it really also depends on how much Russia wants to prioritize evacuating civilians

I think the Russian State would sooner conscript them into local defense forces and invoke the Battle of Sevastopol in WW2. It's one of the reasons I'd want the Kerch bridge in place until the land bridge is cut off. If it and port activity were the only way for Russia to resupply Crimea it'd cause a flight of people as the AFU work toward Crimea.

I urge anyone to look into the geography of Crimea. In this type of war it is extremely easy to defend, as the entryways are only a couple bridges that can be blown, around 10 cumulative kilometers of land, and vast stretches of silty lagoons. If Ukraine had the firepower necessary to suppress Russian defenses (which could still be resupplied by sea and air even without the bridge), then why wouldn't it aim all that into a Donbass penetration? The majority of UFOR would need to be committed to a Crimean operation, along with a year's worth of Western production, all of which seems like it will always be unavailable anyway until the rest of the lost territories can be secured, because to do otherwise would leave too many vulnerabilities.

A Donbas penetration is certainly more viable, there's zero doubt about that. The Donbas though is just relatively unimportant in comparison. If Crimea were at least under siege it'd more likely drive Russia to negotiate than losing the Donbas.

Given the limited ability of Ukraine in the offense I'd be just happy to see them cut off the land bridge at all. The pre-Feb24th are probably doable the 1991 borders are certainly out of reach at present. The US and rest of NATO have unfortunately dragged their feet far too much on rearming Ukraine and themselves. That scores of Leo2s, hundreds of Leo1s and Marder IFVs aren't already in Ukraine is just inexcusable.

Montmorency

03-17-2023, 23:29

I've maintained from the beginning, even here I believe, that the minimum victory condition from the perspective of the West (and arguably also Ukraine) is the restoration of pre-2022 borders. Maybe our governments (other than the Eastern Flank of course) truly believed the minimum level of support we sent Ukraine would be enough to enable that - DoD just crowed about having completed a five-week training course in basic marksmanship and "combined arms" for a UFOR battalion, as though this were Spring '22 or some shit - but it's easier for me to believe in a lack of vision among political establishments, and a lack of competence among military establishments.

Crimea may be more geostrategically important than Donbass, but I do believe control of Donbass is more important to Ukraine as a state and as a society and as an economy. It is also more important for future military defensive arrangement. The status of Crimea is more important to American realist theories of geopolitics than it is to Ukraine's prospects tbh.

You have some cause to believe that a serious prospective threat to Crimea could bring Russia to negotiate, but Russia will never hand over territory it directly controls unless it becomes non-viable. We have seen it do that multiple times over, most climactically with the Three Ks (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson). The necessary factor is for the territory to become militarily compromised and 'more trouble than it is worth.' There is little reason to expect a repeat with the "people's republics" that Putin allegedly invaded to protect and later annexed, without large parts of those already being overrun or cut off.

Some more considerations:

1. Russians care a lot more about Crimea than about Donbass on a visceral level.
2. There are a lot more influential Russian citizens in Crimea than in Donbass, the kind who would make a fuss (Cuban-style) to the Russian mainstream about being turned into refugees.
3. The separatist die-hards, say 50-100K, are a significant military asset that are clearly willing to keep fighting forever. If they were somehow neutralized as an asset, for example through mass surrenders, it would be easier for the Kremlin to justify cutting their political echelon loose.
4. The ability, the position, to enforce a magnanimous disposition of Crimea would generate enormous goodwill toward the United States around the world, probably even among Russian elites. Ukrainian nationalists would be displeased, but most Ukrainians would support the effort given the decisive nature of American contributions in this scenario (the assumption too is that both DC and Kyiv would present a unified public position on the referenda issue).

ROFL Hungary and Turkey have agreed to approve Finland's NATO application. High-tier trolling. (Erdogan's comment was that with Finland in NATO Sweden is basically a member for all intents and purposes anyway.)

Montmorency

03-21-2023, 21:58

20-year anniversary of the Second Iraq War.

Lest we forget:
https://twitter.com/i/status/1637861078645235739 [VIDEO]

https://i.imgur.com/k1hpjdg.png

spmetla

03-22-2023, 04:16

I was one month out of basic training when we invaded. While at basic I saw the 3ID vehicles go from woodland camo to desert to then gone as they deployed over seas with several members of my basic training class immediately deploying with their newly assigned units into Kuwait/Iraq.
I was a big cheerleader of the war at the start though I was surprised it started. I'd though Bush Jr was playing hardball to get more from weapons inspections.
In hindsight, it was a strategic and humanitarian catastrophe with no benefit beyond the death of Saddam and his sons. As a semi-professional military man I'm still absolutely appalled at the lack of a post-invasion plan as well as the unnecessary decisions such as disbanding the Iraqi Army and outlawing the Baath Party.
I'm glad Iraq is in a better place now than in the decade after we'd invaded but still, it's a mark of shame on the country which is curiously mixed with some of the best times of my life as when I deployed there in 2005 I was only 20, turned 21 in country and with the optimism of youth, thrill of dangerous adventure, and comradery felt among our tightknit infantry platoon.

Lots of mixed feelings. Sadly, the way to avoid such things in future is for congress to reassert it's war powers, something our fickle and increasingly divided people don't seem apt or right to do as at the moment.

Shame also that the war allowed Afghanistan to turn into the Bush admin's forgotten backwater, we missed real opportunities to bring the defeated Taliban out of the cold and into the Afghan system instead of in opposition to it.

Montmorency

03-23-2023, 00:23

Importantly, not in hindsight! The people who got it right from the beginning were practically persecuted by their government and society, while the ones who - to greater or lesser degrees of involvement - advanced criminal mass carnage were ceaselessly rewarded in politics, media, and beyond. All the Org old-timers should recall.

The raspberry road (https://blog.danieldavies.com/2004_05_23_d-squareddigest_archive.html) that led to Abu Ghraib was paved with bland assumptions that people who had repeatedly proved their untrustworthiness, could be trusted. There is much made by people who long for the days of their fourth form debating society about the fallacy of ?argumentum ad hominem?. There is, as I have mentioned in the past, no fancy Latin term for the fallacy of ?giving known liars the benefit of the doubt?, but it is in my view a much greater source of avoidable error in the world.

No one today (https://johnganz.substack.com/p/how-start) can supply a simple reason for the invasion of Iraq that stands up to the slightest moral or factual scrutiny. Every attempt to provide a rationale for the war is patent sophistry or self-justification. This groundlessness, this inability to situate the war in anything tangible or concrete, is simply because it was based on a lie. More than a single lie, it was based on thoroughgoing hostility towards reality itself. It was based on an absurdly oversimplified ideological picture of the world. It was based on the willful ignorance and manipulation of intelligence. It was based on the fictitious and fanciful idea that Saddam was somehow connected to Osama bin Laden, a falsehood that played on the fears and anger of a wounded and humiliated nation, ready to lash out. It was based on indifference to the actual history and culture of Iraq, as if we could just easily shape another nation to our will. And, perhaps most disturbingly, it was based on the belief that projecting the image of power, of a tough and vengeful nation, was of paramount concern. The planners clearly thought about the war as it would play out on T.V.: in spectacular scenes that would impress audiences at home and abroad. ?There are no good targets in Afghanistan; let's bomb Iraq,? Donald Rumsfeld remarked to Richard Clarke ? There was just more to blow up. This indifference towards the constraints of reality, this drive to make a fantasy world real, this confusion between the creation of propaganda and war, or rather, the waging of war itself as a kind of propaganda campaign, are the type of things we normally associate with totalitarian regimes. So too the mobilization of vicious public abuse and slander against anti-war sentiment. This was done not out of fear of the secret police but out of sheer enthusiasm: Many of the nation?s journalists and writers gladly volunteered for that work. They set out to make sure an insane thing became common sense among the elite. In doing all this, they betrayed their role as intellectuals for the cheap rewards of clique, career, or conceit.

There is a tendency to try to portray the Iraq War as a ?tragedy,? as a mistake, brought on by hubris or zeal. One should reject this framing, for the reason that it is intrinsically ennobling... All this is improper in the case of the war in Iraq. It is an attempt to use heady incense to cover up a noxious stench. There is a revolting sense of self-pity in this conceit: as if the really important thing lost in the war was the innocence, honor, and reputation of our nation and its leaders. The lesson of Iraq is that it can happen here. We are not immune: The entire nation can lose touch with reality. We saw all this happen with our own eyes. Let?s face it now: We all knew it was a lie. Some people just wanted to believe it or cynically didn?t care. We went to war and killed hundreds of thousands for something that was just not real.

https://i.imgur.com/AyhGqVP.png

It's hard to imagine today that McCain was even allowed to show his face in public after campaigning - in 2008! - on killing millions of Americans and Iranians. Or:

Last month, at a town hall meeting in New Hampshire, a crowd member asked McCain about a Bush statement that troops could stay in Iraq for 50 years.

"Maybe 100," McCain replied. "As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed, it's fine with me and I hope it would be fine with you if we maintain a presence in a very volatile part of the world where al Qaeda is training, recruiting, equipping and motivating people every single day."

This collective failure/psychosis needs to be taught starting in primary school, worldwide. We need more instruction in mass psychology and its manipulation if we ever want to inoculate humans against perpetrating the same destructive mistakes time and again. How the "developed" world could produce the War on Terror, the Ukraine War, and climate change and pandemic denialism in the 21st century remains an urgent matter of scholarship and pedagogy.

First we have to overwhelm and neutralize the people who e.g. want to eliminate "secular math" from public schools (preceding the elimination of public schooling altogether)...

In other news, the UK intends to send DU ammo (CHARM 1/3) with its Challengers, probably as a signal to America. Putin vows to retaliate, presumably by permitting the Russian Army to receive DU ammo. So far they have only used tungsten-core rounds, predominantly of Soviet manufacture. But so far the availability and performance of tungsten APFSDS in Ukraine suggests DU will never play more than a symbolic role until M1 Abrams appear in large numbers.

spmetla

03-23-2023, 03:42

Importantly, not in hindsight! The people who got it right from the beginning were practically persecuted by their government and society, while the ones who - to greater or lesser degrees of involvement - advanced criminal mass carnage were ceaselessly rewarded in politics, media, and beyond. All the Org old-timers should recall.

They certainly were persecuted and laughed at, coming off the moral high in post 9/11 was difficult for the country. I think Colin Powell's speech though changed a lot of the fence sitters to pro-war, shame he ruined his integrity by doing so though he's still adamant that he didn't know the intel was based off a single source and a flawed one at that.
It is crazy though looking at the immediate post-9/11 talks at Camp David and how some in the administration were already focused on tying it to Iraq.

Once we invaded though, I still think we had an obligation to try and create some sort of stability before leaving. Crazy though that we're still there but this time to fight ISIS in Syria in a indirect support role.

This collective failure/psychosis needs to be taught starting in primary school, worldwide. We need more instruction in mass psychology and its manipulation if we ever want to inoculate humans against perpetrating the same destructive mistakes time and again. How the "developed" world could produce the War on Terror, the Ukraine War, and climate change and pandemic denialism in the 21st century remains an urgent matter of scholarship and pedagogy.

I don't think our nation of 'consumers' wants to be taught that, might not look forward to talking about the best Superbowl commercials. I think the increasing disconnect between the general population and the military is part of the problem. People were happy to support a war that didn't affect them in any meaningful way. This is also see in our elected representatives that truly do not understand anything about the military, it's their be all solution for so many things. Our politicians also don't have any understanding of what guidance the military needs for national policy and strategy, budget forecasting, basing and so on.

In other news, the UK intends to send DU ammo (CHARM 1/3) with its Challengers, probably as a signal to America. Putin vows to retaliate, presumably by permitting the Russian Army to receive DU ammo. So far they have only used tungsten-core rounds, predominantly of Soviet manufacture. But so far the availability and performance of tungsten APFSDS in Ukraine suggests DU will never play more than a symbolic role until M1 Abrams appear in large numbers.

What do you think of the news of what looks like trainloads of T-54/55s going West for likely use in Ukraine? If that's the case they are certainly scrapping the barrel as unlike the ancient hardware the West gave to Ukraine, these aren't modernized. It's still an armored vehicle with a 100mm cannon that can be of some limited use on the battlefield but vulnerable to all Ukrainian MBTs as well as all modern IFVs.
Can't be great for morale of crews that expected T90s and Armatas and get T-54/55s instead.

The battle for Bakhmut looks to be near the culminating point for Russia and Russia's other little offensives seem to be still ineffective too. I can only hope that Russia really is at a low ebb for ammo, equipment, and manpower so that Ukraine can have more success in the hoped for spring offensive.

Any thoughts on Xi's visit to Moscow? From my seat it looks like Putin is just accelerating his dependence on China for everything. Russia will be resource supplier to China, makes we wonder how long before China retakes the Russian Far East?
Japanese PM, Fumio Kishida's visit to Kiev was surprising as a counter-balance, wondering how else they intend to help Ukraine. They'd provided a lot of money for infrastructure support so I expect more of that. Wonder if Japan will try to get any non-lethal defense aid to Ukraine too as now that they can export military goods again.

Montmorency

03-24-2023, 04:10

Ukraine is getting Patriot faster than expected, but since NATO tank transfers are so few and so slow the US is also adding a commitment to deliver some M1A1s on a shorter timeline.

What do you think of the news of what looks like trainloads of T-54/55s going West for likely use in Ukraine? If that's the case they are certainly scrapping the barrel as unlike the ancient hardware the West gave to Ukraine, these aren't modernized. It's still an armored vehicle with a 100mm cannon that can be of some limited use on the battlefield but vulnerable to all Ukrainian MBTs as well as all modern IFVs.
Can't be great for morale of crews that expected T90s and Armatas and get T-54/55s instead.

Some OSINT (https://notes.citeam.org/t-54) on the T-54/5 movement. I would wait for more information. On the other hand, we have suddenly seen the reappearance of T-62M on the battlefield this month; previously I would say 99% of combat and loss reports for that platform were confined to the Kherson bridgehead between June and November '22. There are also rumors about the movement of BTR-50s.

We believe that removing such old military vehicles from storage may have two reasons. Firstly, it is likely that a large number of stockpiles were not properly maintained and turned out to be in even worse condition than many thought (similar to the third category munitions [unfit for use in combat] sent to the front). Secondly, armored vehicle factories do not provide the necessary pace of repairs and production that would correspond to the losses on the frontlines (there is no information about the commissioning of new repair factories, which was announced in the fall). It is possible that very old equipment, which is easier to bring into working condition, is being restored now as modern tanks require longer repair time.

I should note that in February the Economist reported on the opening of two new tank repair facilities expected in the immediate future.

Or they could use it as a brutal IFV, or swap turrets as a special weapons or engineering platform, or even as a training vehicle.

If they do deploy T-55s in tank role, with or without simple upgrades, then it still wouldn't be because of an overall shortage of tanks right now IMO. (It might mean the absolute limit has been reached on other Soviet tanks operable right out of storage without refurbishment.) But Russia will completely exhaust 100% of prewar active service, Soviet storage, and ongoing production, as well as whatever they can dig out of Belarus, if the war continues out to 2027 (besides the case of China/NK going all out and delivering thousands of T-62 variants, but see below). Using T-55s as cannon fodder to absorb Ukrainian munitions could delay that for a time.

The battle for Bakhmut looks to be near the culminating point for Russia and Russia's other little offensives seem to be still ineffective too. I can only hope that Russia really is at a low ebb for ammo, equipment, and manpower so that Ukraine can have more success in the hoped for spring offensive.

Latest weekly progress of RuFOR around Bakhmut (yellow line was RuFOR LOC as of mid-March). Mud could explain the issue initially, but they were still advancing in early March when it was muddy, whereas by now conditions should be much more solid.

https://i.imgur.com/98pS78J.jpg

Wagner Group doesn't have much longer before the outflow of convict 6-month contractors leaves it unable to maintain the role Prigozhin arrogated to himself. This point would certainly come sometime in May even if Wagner was pulled out of fighting entirely. I made some estimates in January, but irrespective of how one estimates casualties these quickly became too optimistic as they were still premised on continued Wagner access to prison recruitment.

I would keep an eye on the situation around Avdiivka however, where RuFOR has been advancing west of the H20 highway this month for the first time.

Any thoughts on Xi's visit to Moscow?

I don't think putative dependence on China is a big worry for Putin given the alternative for him.

My going assumption for China-Russia relations over the past year, and I think it more or less checks out with the coverage I've encountered, is that Xi is happy to find mutual benefit while distracting the West as China layers its partnerships around the world. So Xi should definitely be and remain averse to formally declaring on behalf of Russia, or extending aid beyond stable economic ties. On the other hand, to the extent a greater rupture between China and the West is coming in the aftermath of the Ukraine War, what we're also seeing is China working to shore up its overland access (including infrastructure) to raw resources, which Russia will be happy to provide so long as China is not overtly hostile to it. Xi still has bigger fish to fry than Ukraine.

Montmorency

03-26-2023, 01:24

It appears Russia failed to secure clear followthrough on its planned Power of Friendship-2 (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/does-china-need-more-russian-gas-via-power-of-siberia-2-pipeline-2023-03-22) gas pipeline during the latest summit.

Currently, China intends to import 38 billion billion cubic meters of gas from Russia by 2025, with the final capacity of Power of Friendship-1 (completed a few years ago) and a small pipeline from Sakhalin being 48 bcm by 2027. It would probably be buying similar quantities of gas from Central Asia by then.

Russia wants that second pipeline open by 2030, with a capacity of 50 bcm. In other words, the plan is to sell China 100 bcm of steeply discounted gas as early as 2030, following enormous capital expenditures in running a pipeline across Siberia and Mongolia. And there isn't even a final agreement.

IIRC Russia sold the EU over 150 bcm in 2021, and besides Hungary this must already have approached zero. If Russia's oil industry is on life support, the gas industry continues to appear moribund.

Checking the latest Military Balance catalog again, IFVs are a much bigger problem area for Russia than even tanks. Figure 1500 BMP-series alone lost in one year (net captures). Hundreds could be raided from Belarus in the future, but this is not a renewable resource. IIRC the only troop-carrying AFV of any type still in production in Russia is the BMP-3, which could perhaps reach 300 units per year later on. So far calls to restart BMP-2 production have been rejected as too materially cumbersome. Some number of stored BTR-series can be converted/upgraded to an autocannon design, but this is not meaningfully happening yet and will never produce many vehicles.

Military Balance 2023 reports ~3650 BMP-series in service at the beginning of 2023, revised down from 4600 in 2022, with 4000 in storage, revised down from 8500 (which was an inflated/outdated figure). Figure no more than 3500 in service right now, with 3000 usable hulls in storage (rest for parts or future modernization).

It's unclear how many stored AFVs can be refurbished in a given time period, but as with tanks, it appears to be the case that ready-to-use units are now rare and remaining stored equipment must generally undergo a reactivation process. Russia has not been able to work fast enough to replenish its aggregate, ongoing, losses in the field, and by now they're hopelessly underwater , with denoted-equipment levels in active service well below pre-war levels at this time (this is one of those major reasons why Russia cannot contemplate concentrated breakthrough operations any longer).

So properly standing up and equipping new units while maintaining the army in the field is basically unfeasible already. By the end of 2025 there should be a critical shortage of IFVs, including BMPs,

Introducing two NATO-equipped heavy divisions, at a 4X exchange ratio at least, given skill level, would thus clearly represent the destruction of all Russian offensive capability in Ukraine; losing a thousand tanks/IFVs in a month or two in a major offensive would simply be an order of magnitude greater than Russia's demonstrated throughput from deep storage.

On the other hand, given the slow rate of Western provision of SAM systems, and the gradual attrition of Ukraine's Soviet platforms, the Russian Air Force now seems to be reemerging in a tactical ground strike role, particularly around Avdiivka. Air defense and airpower are arguably the only areas in which Russia is more likely than not to improve its balance over time.

I can't help but emphasize how this war would be on its way to ending, this year, had the EU and US governments mustered keen military-strategic foresight in the aftermath of the Russian retreat from the north.

Montmorency

03-27-2023, 04:43

In recent days, UFOR has been carrying out successful counterattacks to regain hardened positions around Avdiivka (those lost this month). Just like in Vuhledar last month, and Marinka forever. Gee, it's almost like it's possible and desirable to invest in stabilizing defensive networks, and UFOR commanders south of Bakhmut (e.g. not Syrsky) understand that!

Montmorency

03-31-2023, 23:48

KSA and UAE purchasing Chunmoo. I'm telling you, Korean arms are the Middle Eastern buffer to American, Russian, and Chinese arms, so to speak.

Montmorency

04-03-2023, 11:45

Sweden is now surrounded by NATO, and the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake. The Swedish People's Party, which represents the Swedish minority in Finland, is likely to be excluded from government following yesterday's elections.

Sweden has no choice but to invade Finland to secure its interests.

spmetla

04-04-2023, 05:21

Lol, glad Finland finally made it into NATO. Sweden is essentially part of it now with it's pan-Scandanavian ties, EU membership, and current coordination with NATO.

Just hope the current European NATO members start to take rearmament a bit more seriously.

Montmorency

04-07-2023, 16:17

spmetla you're going to want to take a look at this. I can't speak to the authenticity, or accuracy, of the documents, but as you may have heard there may have been a major leak of US planning documents with regard to Ukraine's military force generation, training, supply, and other items. The documents are dated March 1, so treat them as (putatively) applicable to one full year of war.

Some excerpts (there are more documents scattered around social media):
https://twitter.com/StrategickeM/status/1644260395828363264
https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/1644139100407054336

Aircraft and vehicle loss claims match Oryx. KIA claims are 16-17.5K for Ukraine and 35.5-43.5K for Russia. I would have said 35+K for Ukraine and 50K for Russia. Listed total expenditure of GMLRS is 9600 (I figured 7-8K +/- 2K, so that's cool) and 953K 155mm (I figured 1.1 million). This suggests a much lower rate of daily consumption than previously attested by UA govt, though still ~100K/month, which is not wildly out of line. Previous 24-hour (i.e. Feb. 28) expenditures for GMLRS are 28, and 1104 for 155mm. Again assuming these are both authentic and accurate figures, we still can't extrapolate from a single day. But they do strike me as high for GMLRS (I'd been working out my estimates on the basis of average daily usage of 10+ rockets from October-February), and very low for 155mm (3000 is the traditional UA govt cited figure for daily usage; 1100 would be closer to my personal estimate of daily 152/122mm usage since mid-2022). It does also imply that Ukraine should have enough munitions stockpiled for one major offensive, since the quantity of 155mm acquired by Ukraine in 1 year (excluding subsequently) should be something like 1.5 million shells. Even if 10% are not HE...

Not sure what to make ofthe OOB for Kherson and Zaporizhzhia being assessed at 5250-10500 UFOR personnel in-theater at the time against ~39K RuFOR personnel, using a reference entity of "maneuver battalion" that seems to contain ~300 personnel. The document on combat power build also accounts for 12 UFOR brigades being generated (to be delivered by end of April). But from official UA channels on new units being stood up, the number is more like 20. Although perhaps some of those were already fully prepared by March 1, or have some other status that would exclude them from recording. One of the odder notes was the 47th Brigade supposedly being trained with both Bradleys and the Slovenian T-55s. What we can say is that pretty much all those brigades under construction are named have been named in public media before.

Can you read this circled bit?

26426

"PDA = USA _____ by 12 Mar"

At any rate, if all of those brigades as depicted with TOE are the spearhead for a Ukrainian offensive - I urge you to peruse the relevant images - and the offensive is undertaken as advertised in May, then it's just far too little, too poorly-trained, to achieve a major breakthrough. Just on paper maybe going as far as taking Tokmak is possible, but...

As for the document itself, my default suspicion is that it's a disinfo operation, even if a lot of the information may be accurate and/or someone's internal product (especially if, as seems to be the case, a lot of it was previously confirmable by public info or analysis). Points in favor of this interpretation are much-lower specificity in reporting UFOR OOB in the theater maps compared to RuFOR breakdowns, as well as the 16K figure for UFOR KIA, which sounds verbatim lifted from Ukraine's MOD.

Crandar

04-09-2023, 11:22

A bit late to the party, but yes, McCain was indeed an embarrassment. Sadly he was idealised in his last moments, because of his opposition to Trump, which was commendable, but doesn't absolve him of his past actions.

On the leaked documents (https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/08/world/europe/bakhmut-battle-leaked-documents-us-war.html). It also mentions that the US are spying on Ukrainian officials, which is expected I guess, although New York Time's positive spin seems a tad clumsy.

Montmorency

04-09-2023, 21:43

The mainstream media treatment is, as usual, not detailed or insightful enough for dedicated subject matter enthusiasts, albeit that the NYT is the preferred American outlet for FBI/CIA/DoD sources and communications. There are a few reasons to believe US actors engineered the leak as a false/no flag breach, or there were some reasons at least. A strong counterargument to the disinf op theory is that not only have these documents (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_documents_leak_of_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine) and similar ones (https://twitter.com/btr_fan21/status/1644384711576256538) been floating around (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/04/09/from-discord-to-4chan-the-improbable-journey-of-a-us-defence-leak/) since even earlier than once believed (lmao that I know one of the Youtube shitposters implicated here), but there has apparently been a large leak of all sorts of intelligence materials and serial analyses pertaining to most major global points of interest for the American IC. There is truly nothing in the content of the Ukraine-related leaks that could meaningfully deceive Russia to the point of justifying cover leaks of even more sensitive material.

I don't want to spend a lot of time hunting for the more obscure leaks in the crevices of the Internet, but if you know where some are hosted, or have them saved yourself, I would appreciate the tip.

Montmorency

04-11-2023, 21:54

https://i.imgur.com/kqlvdyb.jpg

I've seen this one before (https://twitter.com/i/status/1643760514395258884), it's a classic!

https://i.imgur.com/cqCil6W.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/pGNubTa.jpg

spmetla

04-14-2023, 19:21

Aircraft and vehicle loss claims match Oryx. KIA claims are 16-17.5K for Ukraine and 35.5-43.5K for Russia. I would have said 35+K for Ukraine and 50K for Russia. Listed total expenditure of GMLRS is 9600 (I figured 7-8K +/- 2K, so that's cool) and 953K 155mm (I figured 1.1 million). This suggests a much lower rate of daily consumption than previously attested by UA govt, though still ~100K/month, which is not wildly out of line. Previous 24-hour (i.e. Feb. 28) expenditures for GMLRS are 28, and 1104 for 155mm. Again assuming these are both authentic and accurate figures, we still can't extrapolate from a single day. But they do strike me as high for GMLRS (I'd been working out my estimates on the basis of average daily usage of 10+ rockets from October-February), and very low for 155mm (3000 is the traditional UA govt cited figure for daily usage; 1100 would be closer to my personal estimate of daily 152/122mm usage since mid-2022). It does also imply that Ukraine should have enough munitions stockpiled for one major offensive, since the quantity of 155mm acquired by Ukraine in 1 year (excluding subsequently) should be something like 1.5 million shells. Even if 10% are not HE...

Yup, quite something these leaks. I don't think this was planned disinformation as the impacts of how much our Allies trust the US to keep secrets is more damaging than any effect on Russian planning.

The losses are quite something for the Russians, not quite as high as I'd expected, the Ukrainian casualties are about what was expected though.
As for your major points, yes, I agree this does not bode well for a Ukrainian counter-offensive. Though the Ukrainians have overperformed per US expectations from Day-1. The limits in ammo and equipment though may be why the Ukrainians though intent on holding Bakhmut haven't conducted counterattacks as we'd have expected, those resources undoubtedly being held for a more strategic offensive on a larger scale.

On the leaked documents. It also mentions that the US are spying on Ukrainian officials, which is expected I guess, although New York Time's positive spin seems a tad clumsy.

That I don't find surprising, just like the US spying on its allies. When you've got folks like Merkel making deals with the Russians for Nordstream and Macron ready to have peace at any cost (Ukraine and Taiwan) then you've got to have access to those internal deliberations in order to better do US geo-politics. We saw at the start of the war that there were a fair number of Ukrainian officials that were ready to fold to the Russians for various reasons that largely being the reason Kherson fell to them so early. There's no doubt the smarter less obvious folks doing so remain within the Ukrainian government and may be hedging bets.

The big 'news' that there are US and allied special ops in Ukraine is not surprising in the least. Was expecting as much following the Russian withdrawal from Kiev. I doubt these operators are anywhere near the frontline and imagine they are much more in an advising/training mode as well as intel sharing and assisting in targeting. Certainly not being used in an undeclared war as being accused by MGT and other MAGA/Qanon trolls.

Love the photos of the modified mobile AT-gun. Saw a youtube on it a while back. Crazy to see such old kit put to good use. One advantage with an AT-Gun though is the speed of the round, ATGMs are relatively slow which is what gives active protections systems a chance. Against MBT and AT guns only thick composite armor can provide protection in the various onion layers of protection.

Thought the following video was interesting:
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1643287639187963904

Looks like mopping up operations after bypassing this trench system but looking at the trench itself, doesn't seem to be tied to terrain or other defensive systems, just to watch obstacles/ the road network. Can see the MBT and IFVs being used to clear the trench line. The defenders don't want to surrender which will require those dismounts to eventually have to do the costly and dangerous business of clearing the trench lines themselves. This is one of the situations for which the US uses a lot of under rifle grenade launchers and why we've spent so much money on 'air burst' munitions for infantry despite those never yet making it into service. A quality foxhole or trench is a lot of protection against direct fire weapons.

Germany: EU 'cannot be indifferent' to China-Taiwan tensions
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-eu-cannot-be-indifferent-to-china-taiwan-tensions/a-65298426

Was pleased to see Baerbock have a strong stance in regards to Taiwan and human rights. Given Macron's statements last week I've been hoping to see some direct EU member counters to Macron's stance.

Montmorency

04-14-2023, 23:56

As I said in my followup comment, once I realized that the leak was more than a single dump of 8 or 10 documents from a Ukraine briefing, I discarded the deliberate leak theory. If military intelligence somehow tricked a young, far-right wargaming gloomer into leaking a vast and varied, but curated, document dump, it would have to be the most elaborate disinfo op in history. I don't believe we have that level of competence in our ranks, particularly with respect to the realm of virtual culture (I've veritably posted at least one video from the Youtuber whose Discord was caught up in the chain on the Org before).

Macron was rather misrepresented in the headlines. If you read the original interview he was arguing - as he has in the past really - that there should be a coordinated European agenda helping set the pace of global affairs, that the EU shouldn't just be in a position to be trailing American whims. We should know by now not to put too much stock in media pull quotes.

I don't understand all the videos I've seen from both sides of tanks pulling up to within 50m or less of a trench and laying down fire to neutralize. I never thought I would see much of that outside videogames, since the danger of exposing the tank like that is immense and the whole purpose of contemporary optics is to allow such work to be carried out from beyond naked visual range. If the enemy squad or whatever has literally any friendlies nearby, a tank parked by a trench for 5 minutes is an easy target for artillery, drones, air support, ATGMs, anything really.

spmetla

04-15-2023, 03:49

Macron was rather misrepresented in the headlines. If you read the original interview he was arguing - as he has in the past really - that there should be a coordinated European agenda helping set the pace of global affairs, that the EU shouldn't just be in a position to be trailing American whims. We should know by now not to put too much stock in media pull quotes.

I read his comments as well but he articulated it poorly and did not strongly correct it. Yes, Europe should be able to have an independent course of the US and China, that would start by taking strong unified stands on issues. Macron's constantly trying to help Russia save face and not seeing the Taiwan straits as a European issue is ridiculous. Which nation or politician really represents Europe right now? Certainly not Macron, Scholtz, or anyone else at the moment.

I don't understand all the videos I've seen from both sides of tanks pulling up to within 50m or less of a trench and laying down fire to neutralize. I never thought I would see much of that outside videogames, since the danger of exposing the tank like that is immense and the whole purpose of contemporary optics is to allow such work to be carried out from beyond naked visual range. If the enemy squad or whatever has literally any friendlies nearby, a tank parked by a trench for 5 minutes is an easy target for artillery, drones, air support, ATGMs, anything really.

The way I see it is that's why the tank rolled up first, to assess if they have anti-tank capabilities after which it was followed up by the IFV and infantry.
Seeing as there is a drone filming this is one of those situations where a mounted Mk-19 grenade launcher would be absolutely ideal and that's one of the strong points of the older wester APCs where to have that capability you merely need the right CSW mount.

This unit must be tasked at that moment to be a mop up unit and I imagine the front line of troops is a few hundred or thousand meters away at this point with other units in contact with other Russian forces. That trench is certainly isolated and looks like it was given the job of essentially being a speedbump which it arguably did by delaying/distracting some UAF for a bit.

Montmorency

04-15-2023, 18:09

As a matter of national security, it's well past time to acknowledge that DoD needs a Dank Online Materiel Exploitation program to coopt the groypers and gamers (healthy young men who seek patriotic, violence-infused, and racially-charged companionship online, per the media (https://twitter.com/JeffSharlet/status/1646877386435166215)).

Just heard MSNBC live reporter say that there are no indicators Jack Texiera—hard right Catholic gun zealot & conspiracy theorist who hated government, called Ukrainians pigs, and screamed racist & antisemitic memes—has any “political motives.”

You're right, the footages we see of tanks in close with isolated trenches could be carefully-selected set-piece actions with bounded risk. I still hope it isn't SOP for Ukraine though (sending out poorly-supported tank platoons as screening or vanguard forces has been a common cause of Russian armored losses anyway).

But then, I also wonder why in these clips the tanks belch out what seems like half their HE allotment for a couple of guys in a trench, as fast as they can. What happened to MGs?

Montmorency

04-27-2023, 02:06

Investigative report by independent Russian media into why Putin decided to go to war.
https://verstka.media/kak-putin-pridumal-voynu

Montmorency

05-02-2023, 00:03

I'm beginning to come around to there being a serious case for expecting a Ukrainian offensive in the Bakhmut area. Relevant factors include the large Ukrainian grouping present since the winter and the arguable fact that RuFOR is weaker here than in any other sector of the contested front. If the offensive advanced the line 25km, it would erase Russian gains in most or all of North Donetsk since the beginning of the invasion (with Russia being unlikely to ever be able to, in the context of these hostilities, gather up enough strength to grind through this territory anew), and to advance 50 km would allow Ukraine to threaten the long separatist-held cities of Alchevsk and Horlivka, or more precisely Horlivka's primary GLOC to Russia.

However, I find it very hard to believe that UFOR would give up this year's opportunity to attack in the south for a crack at inherently-lesser gains in the central front. The only way I can see my way to it is in the case of a dual offensive, and yet I find it even harder to believe that UFOR could successfully and productively divide its whole, limited, strategic reserve (including scarce artillery and air defense ordnance) between two theaters.

Also, UFOR in the sector is itself seemingly-exhausted, even if not to the same extent as their counterpart, so strategic reserves would likely have to be routed there to support an offensive. Such a movement should be detectable to OSINT at any rate.

But maybe a secondary offensive to draw off and tie down Russian reserves, with the stretch goal of recovering the line of contact as of December, is feasible. Or maybe the entire discourse is disinformation of the sort we saw last summer.

spmetla

05-03-2023, 04:42

I personally think there will be a limited counterattack at Bakhmut beyond what we've seen today in order to keep those VDV and wagner forces fixed there to set conditions for an offensive elsewhere. Russia doesn't appear to have a large strategic or operational reserve given the forces wasted on fruitless winter assaults. Fixing their tier 1 forces at Bakhmut given that it's a prestige fight now, kinda in the line of Stalingrad may allow for greater success elsewhere.
Still think the major offensive will be in the south and not toward Svatove though, if the UAF can reach the Azov Sea and limit Crimean GLOCs to the kerch bridge they may be able to siege or if fast enough take the peninsula.

Sitting on pins and needles wondering how/where/when it will start though. Will it be a shock and awe rapid start or rather a gradual but relentless increase of pressure at multiple points before selecting the right point for penetration and exploitation?

Montmorency

05-04-2023, 05:38

AFAIK the core RuFOR present in the Bakhmut sector (S of Rozdolivka down to the canal W of Klischiivka) are no more than 10K Wagner bayonet strength, and between one and two nominal divisions of VDV. Simply put, the starting point for Ukraine is with own force better matched to opfor around Bakhmut than anywhere else, namely the equivalent of 10-15 full brigades as of now. As I've pointed out time and again since the beginning of the year in various parts, RuFOR has done a better job of pinning many UFOR formations in Bakhmut than vice versa (and UFOR could have avoided this by performing a brigade-size counterattack to stabilize the Soledar-Yakovlivka breach around New Year's...).

But UFOR around Bakhmut hasn't done that swell a job holding back the enemy since the period of peak strength (late February), and its pretty drained itself, hence my doubt as to whether it could mount a serious offensive in the sector without directing additional resources there - resources I don't believe they can spare from a southern offensive.

Kofman is a good analyst, though even he habitually tilts toward overestimating the Ukrainian side of the equation:

In Bakhmut UA sought to attrition Russian forces and fix them long enough to launch the spring offensive. But, the evidence is scant that UA still enjoys a significantly favorable attrition ratio, or that it is fixing a substantial Russian force... The reason Bakhmut matters is not because it will directly impede UA offensive prospects, but because force quality is difficult to regenerate (and ammo finite). What UA spends now it may miss later this year when the offensive is over, and may struggle to sustain momentum.

Given the totality of factors as I have recently assessed them, I have come to believe that it is not outrageous to expect that GSUA specifically will determine to conduct a feint, even if the prospect seems suboptimal to me. But if it occurs it really depends on the goals and subsequent costs. Optimistically, we could say that if there is a successful gradual break-in against the VDV that RuFOR frontline and reserve assets from Donetsk City northward will not be available to reinforce the south.

Another needless failure and drain on resources is of course not out of the question.

Svatove/Luhansk, as I detailed half a year ago or so, only makes (made) sense to pursue inasmuch as it could open an axis of attack into core Donbass from the north. Without that access it's a road to nowhere. It is also an area where RuFOR will simply always be better-supplied than its counterpart (as opposed to Bakhmut, where it's about equal at a good level, and Zaporizhzhia, where UFOR is better off with a major city in their rear). We know for sure that UFOR is distinctly outnumbered in Luhansk and has historically done a terrible job overcoming prepared defenses there. There's veritably been a pure stalemate north of the Severodonetsk River for more than half a year! I expect it to remain that way. I contextualize it in terms of the Italian theater in both world wars.

The Russians notably struck the Pavlohrad rail junction with missiles a few days ago, but that doesn't tell us much, since its location makes it essential to the supply of basically all active areas of the front.

Something that took me by surprise was the early-spring weather. Usually the advance forecasts available throughout the war have been pretty accurate a month or even two months out. Thus, in February and early March, I expected that there should primarily be rain along the frontline in late March and early April, and not too much thereafter for the rest of April. As it turned out of course, late March saw a major snowstorm and April was just an unremitting wall of rain. There seemed to be appreciable precipitation on the vast majority of days. And when it comes to Bakhmut, the city sits in a river valley... This week the rain has finally let up, and forecasts tell us to expect June and the second half of May to be dry enough. Hopefully the April forecasts were just a fluke.

My baseline prediction, against which to judge deviation: There will be a Ukrainian offensive within 2 months; at least 90% of it will be in the south; which will cover a frontage somewhere within 100km of the Dnieper (i.e. before the Zapo-Donetsk admin border, which is a longwinded way of saying "in Zaporizhzhia"); it will secure two of the theater close pivot points (Vasylivka, Tokmak, Polohy) before culminating.

Catalogues (https://militaryland.net/news/ukrainian-units-ready-for-the-offensive/) of full-strength brigades that might be involved in the offensive (https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/4/8/2162842/-Quick-Explainer-How-big-an-offensive-can-Ukraine-mount):

Montmorency

05-06-2023, 03:44

I'd like to talk a little about how I came to a figure of 10K Wagner "bayonet strength" around Bakhmut (in the given geographic definition). Note that I had not seen Prigozhin's (https://t.me/concordgroup_official/885) May 2 remark that 26000 convicts had completed their 6-month contracts at the time of my comment.

Some history of Wagner's participation in the war is required:

https://i.imgur.com/27zm0bl.jpg

https://i.imgur.com/ouRaojx.jpg

Wagner's strength at the beginning of 2022 was rather murky, and AFAIK no good estimates existed. But based on older estimates, it was a minimum of 5K globally, perhaps much more.

Wagner as I understand typically maintains several thousand, say 1-2K personnel, in Russia at any time as its training, recruitment, and admin base, as well as personnel on rotation. Some thousands are present at any time at Wagner's bases of operation in Syria and throughout Africa. I do not expect a significant level of rotation between Africa/ME and Ukraine, because of the difference in built-up expertise between branches, as well as the complications of long-distance travel. I have always excluded Wagner personnel outside Ukraine from my calculations.

Wagner first appeared publicly in Ukraine in March, right around the seasonal transition. AFAIK Wagner was considered to have 5K personnel in Ukraine by the height of the spring offensive in May (when it was relying on LDPR conscripts for bulk infantry, somewhat akin to the future role the convicts would fill). Wagner was fundamentally implicated in the Popasna salient, the outflanking of Lysychansk, the grind towards Bakhmut - more or less all RuFOR progress on the central front since the start of the invasion.

IIRC public information on the convict recruitment campaign indicates that Prigozhin was visiting prisons from June, clearly looking ahead. It took until late summer for recruitment to really pick up, during which time the separatists were given some form of reprieve and the Russian military's draft was initiated. July and August in general were the quietest months of the war up to then, as both sides regenerated their expended resources and HIMARS caused a temporary shock to Russian logistics. UFOR also fully integrated 155mm artillery platforms and RuFOR focused on preparing to meet future UFOR offensives.

Throughout the fall Wagner escalated its activity in Donetsk again, maintaining a heavy presence along the central front from Toretsk/Mayorsk all the way to Bilohorivka. Progress was very slow. The absorption of and transition to penal assault waves was not complete and UFOR still had some space to trade along the Bakhmut Line.

By December, US intel releases claimed that Wagner fielded 10K pros and 40K convicts. This is one of those curiously-low figures that comes out of US intel. For example, I seem to recall a US estimate last summer of 5K Wagner KIA, a number I can no longer locate cite for, and which I suspect includes casualties of separatists commanded by Wagner. As of early February this year, the estimate was at least 9K KIA total, most of which over the winter, obviously inconsistent with the earlier elusive estimate. This week's estimate was of around 10K Wagner KIA from either the beginning of the year or the beginning of December (unclear). 1K Wagner KIA in almost 3 months of fighting in Bakhmut is absurdly low and well below Prigozhin's intimations anyway, even if over the course of the year Wagner's area of responsibility in the central front has shrunk and shrunk until by the early spring they were pretty much only actively fighting in Bakhmut itself and its immediate outskirts, with regular military and a few minor/new PMCs (which may or may not themselves be offshoots of Wagner) supplementing them. 10K Wagner KIA January through April would at least be more consistent with the US February estimate. As of late March, Milley attested that "It's probably about 6,000 or so actual mercenaries and maybe another 20 or 30,000 recruits that they get."

But in the end we do know US intel relies heavily on media reporting and OSINT of varying quality to generate these reports, and as this article points out, the product is often flawed or even figmentary. So I only use those figures as another guidepost.
https://ridl.io/lies-damn-lies-and-statistics-how-many-prisoners-has-wagner-really-recruited/

Here are the figures I use that I think fit best with the totality of the evidence:

In December/January I entertained higher estimates of Wagner convict recruitment, such as 65-70K, but by now I've settled on 60K, with the last 6-month contracts signed in January.

Over the course of 2022, a total of 70-75K unique individuals served in (we could say "passed through") Wagner. 60K of these were convicts, 10-15K pros (Wagner has been recruiting heavily throughout the war). It should be clear that this does not mean that Wagner's available strength at any given time was 75K. I estimate 12-15K of the convicts were already 'irrecoverable' casualties consequent particularly to the fighting in October-December, along with 3K pros. Thus for 2022 I estimated at least 15K irrecoverable Wagner casualties (including desertions but excluding pros who declined to reup their contracts, who are discussed later).

I have always used a heuristic of two irrecoverable WIA for every KIA with RuFOR losses btw. Assessments from the US and many other sources use a 4x multiplier, which I halve to crudely exclude those returned to duty after recuperation. There may be a better argument for a 1.5x multiplier, the consequences of which I explore briefly below, but that's a matter for another day.

Based on the February US estimate of 9K Wagner KIA in total, a contemporaneous Russian media investigation documenting through paperwork a floor of 8K Wagner dead, and ground-level reports from both belligerents, I figure that on average in January-April there were 2.5K convict KIA and 0.5K pro KIA per month, for a total of 10+2K KIA and 20+4K WIA.

Total Wagner losses: Convict: 14-15K KIA; 28-30K WIA
Pro: 3K KIA; 6K WIA
KIA: 17-18K
WIA: 34-36K
SUM: 51-4K

Round to 55K to include short-term pros passing through the group, as I assume an outflow of 10-33% of pros per year of combat (Wagner contracts are usually 3 or 6 months and evidently more flexible than those with the MoD). Captures are negligible.

Subtraction leaves us with a range of 15-20K Wagner in Ukraine. So how did I get 10K at Bakhmut? Well, it is known that Prigozhin and/or Russian higher-ups like to keep some Wagner detachments scattered throughout the theater of war as security forces and perhaps a strategic reserve. For example, IIRC two Wagner battalions (500 men?) were dispatched to help stabilize the Luhansk front in September. Moreover, some proportion of Wagner forces will be involved in garrison and support duties, including Wagner's independent artillery branch. Wagner does predominantly receive its logistical and artillery support from the MTO and SVRF respectively, but it is known to have its internal capabilities.

So I rounded it down to 10K "bayonet" strength at Bakhmut.

An interesting question is whether the new information in Prigozhin's figure of 26K completed convict contracts includes those with significant, or even disabling, injuries. The output is affected quite a lot depending on the answer. Obviously 26+55 is a lot more than a cumulative strength of 70. We might compromise by assuming that convicts past some level of injury serve as support, transport, or other miscellaneous personnel, but that's highly speculative. Would Wagner bother to keep around or invest in individuals who may need weeks of rehabilitation just to become available for heavy manual labor? In this case, 30-26=4K heavily injured convicts retained by Wagner.

At any rate, if the 26K figure is truthful, it makes it unlikely that Wagner recruited only 40K convicts between June and January, although it is possible if the figure does include all the seriously wounded, and the very smallest KIA estimates are used. We can pretty much rule out that a light/moderate wound is grounds for amicable release on these terms, as that would only be compatible with very small KIA or recruitment figures, given that the majority of all convicts would have passed the 6-month threshold by now even had none of them died (half a year ago was already November).

Separately, I realized we should also add a few thousand, maybe 5K, to the number of unique Wagnerites to account for 2023 recruitment. This includes their extensive public campaign as well as some number, likely between 1-10%, of convicts who decided to join as pros following completion of their term of service (these not properly added to cumulative unique individuals but to active strength at a point in time).

If we try again with 1.5x WIA ratio this time:

Total Wagner losses: Convict: 14-15K KIA; 21-22.5K WIA
Pro: 3K KIA; 4.5K WIA
KIA: 17-18K
WIA: 25.5-27K
SUM: 42.5-45K

If we subtract all convict WIA from the cumulative fulfillment figure, we get a range of 3.5-5K, which we add to the sum as representing a small set of convicts outlasting their term without grievous harm, for the new range of 46-50K, comfortably rounding up to 50K to fudge the short-termer pros. In this case though there would be 25-30K total Wagner in Ukraine as of now (70 or 75 + 5 - 50 = 25-30). For reference, Milley's late March range of 26-36K would transform to about 16-26K as of early May if applying my cumulative attrition numbers.

According to the foregoing too, Wagner has run through 2/3 of all its convicts, and no more than 10% of convicts can expect discharge without death or significant injury. Sounds about right.

What I take away from this is that despite the wide plausible ranges in which we can tweak most of the variables (total recruitment, KIA, WIA ratio), my baseline estimates of at least 60K convicts recruited, and around 15-20K Wagner remaining active in Ukraine, are at least plausible. What I have previously been most tentative about is my treatment of the pros; it is admittedly daunting to conclude that anywhere from a third (7.5/20) to 90% (9/10) of everyone who passed through the core of Wagner in Ukraine left as a casualty in the war so far. The latter should be dismissed; I would bet the true figure is between 25-50%.

I would update my current estimate to 20K total Wagner in Ukraine in light of the additional information presented by Prigozhin altogether. But it doesn't greatly affect my assessment of Wagner strength around Bakhmut, especially as one to two thousand are still being drained by the week to all causes.

Read the wall above to get a better sense of why for the past 2+ months Prigozhin has been warning that he will remove Wagner from active hostilities before long. Just abstractly, it was obvious that since his shtrafbat campaign was cut off and coopted by the Russian military in January he only had at most until the midpoint of the year to conduct bulk infantry tactics (the first formal separations or fulfillments by convicts were around the time of the capture of Soledar) before his self-imposed contractual time limit left Wagner almost where it had started the war with no further sources of rapid expansion.

So it wasn't surprising that throughout February and March Wagner was reckless in trying to storm Bakhmut, a target with some strategic value but moreover immense prestige value to Prigozhin personally. The motivation also explains how as Wagner progressively shrank it largely abandoned (by the start of spring) its attempt to operationally encircle Bakhmut and instead focused on the conceptually-inadvisable approach of just grinding out UFOR from Bakhmut through frontal urban assaults. This was actually the best case for UFOR in staging a fighting retreat from Bakhmut and preserving the grouping there, in that the pace and axis of engagement did not threaten UFOR with a hasty retreat of compressed forces across a muddy plain. But Prigozhin did emphasize as far back as February that he literally just wanted to secure the city to declare his victory.

What does surprise me is that by available reports the Russian MoD is signing thousands of convicts on similar 6-month contracts. If you're going to go as far as abolishing your prisons at least squeeze as much performance out of the ex-cons as you are from your stop-lossed contractors and draftees! Not like prisoners have more leverage over the government...

Montmorency

05-07-2023, 03:49

https://i.imgur.com/I3ZDwLQ.jpg

Indeed, Prigozhin claims he is in the process of moving Wagner to the reserve and assisting Kadyrov's Chechens (most of whom serve formally as part of Rosgvardia AFAIK) in taking up the slack in Bakhmut.

Butthurt as he may about not fully capturing Bakhmut before the 'deadline', this is the best option for our budding Bond villain. Not only does he still get to keep up the PR rivalry with the Russian military, he can cultivate his year-old alliance with Kadyrov by allowing him the chance to win valor for his own personage (in taking the credit for "victory"). But moreover, Prigozhin as warlord gets to retrieve and reconstitute a much-enlarged and battle-hardened Wagner Group for all manner of profitable adventures in Africa. Wagner with the full support of another state sponsor would definitely beat up most African militaries and steal their slave labor colonies.

I predicted at the beginning of the war that one unintended consequence, besides increased unmonitored weapons flows around the world, would be the presence of many thousands of Ukrainian and Russian mercenaries around the world for decades to come. Clearly part of that inheritance is going to be more organized than I envisioned.

(A few weeks ago, Prigozhin did comment that Putin should place Russian forces wholly on the defensive and preserve territorial gains, and the US intel reporting seems to indicate that Putin is committing to that course. OTOH intelligent observers were pointing that this was Russia's best option back in the summer of 2022...)

Side note: Wagner confirmed difficulties with rotating personnel between Ukraine and Africa (one of my assumptions in working out Wagner losses above), but blames the MoD for a lack of assistance.

TIL that (https://twitter.com/tobiaschneider/status/1653670006176063489)the Bundestag is across the street from the Russian embassy in Germany.

A few years ago, working at the Bundestag's foreign affairs committee, I was told to please leave the windows unlocked during my break so the builders outside could use the restrooms on our floor. When I suggested this may be unsafe (computer passwords on post-its etc) I got a :shrug:

My supervisor then turned around, pointed at the embassy across the street, and - enunciating every word - said, "if they wanted to listen to us, all they'd need to do is read my lips." A few months later, the entire infrastructure had to be ripped out for Russian penetration :shrug:

The German security state has an amusing bifurcation of people so absolutely paranoid they haven't used their real first names in years, whose products it takes a week of bureaucratic wrangling to even read, and people who absolutely do not give a flipping :daisy:.

And naturally, these two feed each other. The paranoids find highly classified info in Spiegel or Russian diplomatic cables, and the ordinary bureaucrats spend undue time trying to get an intelligence briefing which turns out to be little more than a three week old news summary.

Montmorency

05-13-2023, 02:54

As some predicted, the Bakhmut sector has heated up; Ukrainian attacks have been conducted up and down the line over the past 48 hours, with some success. So Wagner won't get to extract itself one way or another. So far only locally-available UFOR assets participated according to public reporting, although I have seen rumors that two fresh brigades have just arrived. While it's not exactly an Operation Uranus so far, if local Ukrainian units can gain momentum against the local enemy units, then it may force GSRU's hand on the allocation of reserves.

Weather in the south - accounting for the gradual soil drying process - should be optimal starting in two weeks.

Montmorency

05-17-2023, 01:18

Following some battalion-scale attacks a few weeks ago around Bakhmut, UFOR gained some ground and the intensity has reduced somewhat - though smaller attacks continue around the flanks daily, while Wagner continues to grind forward in the city. It's honestly shocking and fantastic that (a) Wagner committed since the end of winter to frontal urban assaults instead of expanding the salient north of the city; (b) UFOR managed to secure the flanks to the city just as 90+% of it was in enemy hands.

Had Ukraine been able to fight at Bakhmut with such secure flanks for the past 3 months, the situation could have been called very good. Now there's practically no Ukrainian salient into the city, and for the first time in 3 months the LOC into the city and its outskirts are relatively free. So while the winter breach north of Bakhmut was an error on GSUA's part, it has functionally been corrected at last and there's nothing but frontal assaults in store for RuFOR in the sector. Also, reducing or removing the canal bridgehead between Bakhmut and Toretsk - maintained by RuFOR since around the start of the year - is important for denying them future opportunities and axes of attack.

https://i.imgur.com/sbifb1c.jpg

Given RuFOR's net progress of 10-15km in 6 months, it seems likely that they'll never have the capacity to even threaten Slovyansk/Kramatorsk ever again. Note that Prigozhin just now blogged the original OPLAN for clearing out the whole area south of Siversk east of the Donbas Canal (which, to be clear, was widely recognized at the outset because it's obvious); after the key tactical successes we witnessed in the winter almost everyone expected substantial progress towards this goal by now, as opposed to a costly urban combat quagmire. It's a dramatic underperformance from even relatively-low expectations. (And I'm not talking about the pro-Russian clowns who have been insisting for months that the final collapse of the Ukrainian lines is imminent, along with the encirclement of 15000, or other such very specific and implausible figures, in Bakhmut itself.)

So whether or not there are any further offensive moves around Bakhmut, the situation finally looks favorably stable.

https://i.imgur.com/FcjjipB.jpg

(Yellow circles represent areas recently cleared according to evidence from both sides)

Nearly 11 months' progress:
https://i.imgur.com/HVEUXe4.png

Graph purporting to show gross reported Russian missile (not drone) fires into Ukraine since last September (over 1000 including anti-ship and SAM in ground attack):

https://i.imgur.com/qiwHL9h.jpg

Montmorency

05-26-2023, 03:31

There was a raid into Belgorod, bigger than previous ones, but still of no importance, which currently seems to have been conducted more as a PR stunt than to achieve strategic misdirection.

Prigozhin just delivered a major interview. Unfortunately, I can't find a transcript and I can't access the original on Telegram or any video platform (I haven't gone to the trouble of verifying an account, and the webview platform I used to rely on seems to be out of business). This is an important concern, as media paraphrases often fail to accurately convey some or all of the message, and indeed there are many divergent reports and commentaries on Prigozhin's words.

So this is what I'm relatively confident about was claimed by Prigozhin without seeing the original source:

Wagner is in the process of leaving Bakhmut and will be mostly, but not entirely, in the reserve from June 1 for regeneration. Prigozhin did indeed wait until the final capture of Bakhmut (May 20) to proceed.

Wagner had 50K convicts available for the Battle of Bakhmut, which in Prigozhin's definition appears to include the area from the canal (~Andriivka) north to at least Soledar if not to the Donetsk-Luhansk boundary.
The timeline offered is unclear however, since it is possible to define a Battle of Bakhmut as beginning anytime from early summer 2022 to late winter 2023 depending on bounding;
or from the beginning of November if starting with the Battle of Opytne, Bakhmut's adjacent suburb; or from early January if counting from the fall of Soledar;
or from late December if starting with the first Wagner inroads on Soledar; or from late July if starting with the first attacks on Soledar - and so on.
If I had to guess though, I imagine Prigozhin counts from sometime in last December.

20% of convicts were KIA. Either a similar number or a similar proportion of contractors were also KIA. (As we'll see the latter is more in line with his other claims.)

Ukraine suffered 50K KIA in the battle, and 50-70K WIA.

Referencing his concrete claim on Ukrainian casualties, Prigozhin asserts that Wagner KIA were about three times fewer than UFOR KIA, and Wagner WIA were two times fewer.
This would equate to ~16K KIA and 25-33K WIA. I assume in this interview he uses WIA to refer to heavily wounded. Even then, I would note that these are outlandishly-low
KIA:WIA ratios for Ukraine (as little as 1), but plausible for Wagner specifically (i.e. roughly 1.5-2, mirroring my long discussion earlier in this thread).

This would also equate to ~6K KIA among contractors.

Comparing to my long analysis:

We have a claim of 50K convicts with 10K KIA; 30K contractors with 6K KIA (20% of 30K is 6K); +/- 30K WIA overall, all over a period of at least 5 months.

First point of order is that the implicit claim on the number of contractors is really high; it's hard to believe it can be true. And if we take some commentators' interpretation that Prigozhin said contractors took the same number KIA as convicts, rather than same proportion, then he would had to have possessed 50K contractors, which I categorically reject. Maybe Prigozhin's was improperly factoring in convicts who became contractors plus Wagner contractors around the world?

Regardless, what Prigozhin is saying about contractor death rates is definitely allusive to a higher death rate than I preferred to countenance.

And of course the stock figure of 50K convicts matches a lot of the wintertime reporting, lower than my estimate of as high as 65K.

Note however that a synthetic figure of 50K + 30K = 80K is extremely close to my former estimate of unique individuals who had passed through Wagner Group within Ukraine between March 2022 and the start of May 2023. Also, my estimate for total KIA was 17-18K, and 25.5-36K WIA in that period.

On Twitter today one of the Mediazona/BBC obituary researchers estimated with as-yet unpublished data at least 10K confirmed Wagner KIA.

This all makes a good deal of sense if you adjust Prigozhin's claims as follows, for example (they were never for taking at face value anyway):

55K convicts + 25K contractors unique wartime individuals (potentially counting convicts who became contractors)
5K irrecoverable convict casualties August-November '22 (e.g. 1.8K KIA + 3.15K WIA at 1.75x)
5K irrecoverable contractor casualties March-November '22 (e.g. 1.8K KIA + 3.15K WIA at 1.75x)
== 3.6K KIA & 6.3K WIA March-November '22 [Lower than my previous estimate to account for lower convict head count]
Ignore entirely any Ukraine-deployed contractors did not remain employed by Wagner in the course of the war; assume contract recruitment among ex-cons and the general public makes it all up
10K convict KIA December-May '23
6K contractor KIA December-May '23
28K WIA December-May '23 at 1.75x
== ==
19.6K KIA & 34.3K WIA overall (54K casualties)

This brings us down to 26K remaining Wagner in Ukraine before excluding convicts who have graduated without heavy injury. By the beginning of June, we can figure that a minimum of 80% of all convict recruits will have passed their 6-month milestone even had they all sat things out in Russia, playing bingo. We can guess from the estimates above that at least half of all convicts were either KIA or dischargeably WIA depending on how we play with ratios; the overriding thing is that, assuming attrition is evenly spread across convict cohorts - this can't be true but it's good enough for our purposes - there simply could not be more than 5.5K convicts remaining in Wagner employ.

That leaves Prigozhin with, as a broad estimate hinging particularly on how we interpret Prigozhin's contractor head count and distribute WIA between branches, 4K contractors and ~~5K convicts.

All those convicts will either be gone or contracted by early summer. RUMINT has it that the Russian military has meanwhile recruited 10K convicts for its own purposes.

I wouldn't be surprised if Prigozhin exfiltrates his professional core and leaves the depreciating asset of convicts behind in Bakhmut to face any Ukrainian moves.

The bottom line is that my earlier estimates comport surprisingly well with Prigozhin's claims on Wagner strength/losses, but leave my ultimate 20K estimate from 3 weeks ago too high by perhaps 5K - that is to say, my estimate of 15K prior to adjusting for Prigozhin's figures on convict discharges may have been inadvertently near-perfect.

NB. One thing Prigozhin could be lying about outright, with respect to own losses specifically, is the ratio of losses between convicts and contractors. In which case elements of my long analysis would be more correct instead.

Montmorency

05-27-2023, 04:06

This war has seen the development of improvised jousting between small observation drones as a method of neutralizing enemy assets.

In the absence of any good/available NATO kamikaze drones, and partially as a challenge to Russian kamikaze drones (e.g. Lancet), Ukraine developed a small cottage industry of makeshift kamikaze ("FPV") drones.

Someone put two and two together. At last, the problem of enemy tactical UAS observation has a systematic solution. (Note: DoD will not be funding this solution for the US military)

https://twitter.com/i/status/1661535520613183489[VIDEO]

EDIT: Just noticed the WSJ article mentioning offhand that the US has transferred "over 2 million" 155mm shells so far. As the US stopped publishing figures for PDA munitions transfers from February, the rate of 155mm donations between February and May (the latest PDA was a few days ago, so can't have been delivered yet) must have been at least triple that of the first full year.

Ukraine probably has more than 1 million 155mm stockpiled between all sources of donation and purchase, and 3-4 hundred 155mm cannon in active service. I had previously estimated around half a million.

I'm going to upgrade my prior forecast of the degree of success of the upcoming strategic offensive, though I'm unsure by how much that should be.

Montmorency

06-04-2023, 21:37

I've remarked before on numerous documented cases of tanks in this conflict, especially on the Ukrainian side, being used to attack/suppress enemy trenches at extreme close range, even 10-20m. On Twitter the Ukrainian officer Tatarigami offered his professional opinion that Ukrainian forces have no other means of covering the advance of mounted infantry across open fields. He also mentioned that it is hoped that bounding tanks very close to enemy positions will get them within minimum range of engagement of available AT platforms.

spmetla

06-07-2023, 00:53

Well looks like the counter-offensive has started to enough of a degree that Russia blew the Nova-Khakova dam. Wonder what the river level and floodplain will be like after the flooding ebbs. Tragic for the folks living downriver though, bad enough being the frontline of a war without a manmade disaster washing into your town.
Curious as to how this affects the water supply to the rest of Kherson and into Crimea, I'm aware of some canals that fed from the reservoir not sure how many will function with lower water levels. Same question for the Zaporozhe nuclear power plant's cooling system.

The reporting is difficult to follow on open source info right now so just hoping the Ukrainians do well in their attacks. Russian media has thrown out a lot of plainly false numbers and videos that are showing not-Leo2s under attack.

Best of luck to the Ukrainians in the fight!

Shaka_Khan

06-12-2023, 05:29

As someone who questioned the chances for Russia's quick victory early on, I'm impressed at what the Ukrainians have accomplished so far in their current counteroffensive. This is considering that the Russians were expecting it to start eventually and considering that the Russians had a lot of time to prepare their defenses. Ukraine still needs to be careful because there are multiple layers of the Russian defense lines. I find this to be similar to the tactic that the Soviets used during the Battle of Kursk. And Ukraine forces don't outnumber the Russian ones overwhelmingly. Looking on the bright side, I heard that the southern front is harder for the Russians to supply due to its geography. The location sticks out from the rest of the Russian positions. Behind them is the sea. As the offensive continues, the Russians at the southern front might run low on supplies.

I hope this war ends in Ukraine's favor, and I hope the war doesn't continue on for too long after this offensive.

Montmorency

06-13-2023, 23:58

The vast majority of the strategic reserve remains uncommitted. UFOR has been attacking in most sectors of the theater of war, for whatever reason, but the most resources seem to have been applied to the Orikhiv-Tokmak and Velyka Novosilka axes in the south. Almost all progress has come on the latter so far, and it's a decent candidate for main effort. I wonder if it's just a matter of keeping it small brained for GSUA; that is, the Novosilka axis is the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk provinces, and it's pretty much been long recognized as the least-reinforced sector of the southern front for RuFOR. The Ukrainians have placed the most pressure, and made the most gains, just attacking straight down the local highway and belt of villages leading down from Velyka Novosilka toward the Russian main line. The road network in the area isn't great, and I barely considered the strategic implications of an offensive along the provincial border, but if they break through the sole RuFOR defensive belt in the sector UFOR could continue south on the road to Mariupol (though there's no advantage in focusing on a narrow salient to attempt to besiege the city), east toward Volnovakha and the relief of Vuhledar, or west toward Bilmak and outflanking Polohy.

"Keep it simple, stupid?"

spmetla

06-16-2023, 05:26

Yup, seems a very simple strategy so far, probing attacks all along the southern front, continued pressure on the Bakhmut area and retain the gains from last year in the northeast. The progress from those probing attacks has been okay so far, am a little surprised that there's so little SHORAD support there but I guess there's only so many gepards and air defense systems on had so probably tied up defending cities and logistic/command nodes.
I know the vaunted 'defense lines' haven't been approached yet but honestly it doesn't look like the Russians have the manpower to defend the length of those lines anyhow. The towns/cities around key intersections like Toma will certainly been defend more vigorously but I don't envision 'fortress' defense to the last man efforts if threatened to be cutoff.

I think if they reach the main M-14 coastal highway they'll have met their initial objectives as the land bridge would depend on supplies via Crimea/Kherson for everything west of any such salient. That's still pie-eyed wishing for me though, there's a lot of farmland and plenty of small towns in the 85kms to the highway and we've seen how effective those border hedges/treelines have been for defending forces.

If they get close the highway though, I don't think they'll try to take Mariupol as its too much an icon of the war so far and has overstated political value for both sides to retain, getting the port of Berdyansk would lengthen the supply routes for everything to the West, make the defense of Tokmak more difficult as forces would be needed for retaining Melitopol too. Offensively this would also enable the use of ASMs to threaten shipping the sea of Azov and seagoing drones to threaten Rostov too. Though this threat would be more useful in keeping leverage to keep the grain deal on and denying the black sea fleet another place from where to operate.

We've only seen a few of the new brigades in the offensive but suspect the others are being used as strategic and operational level reserves as well as to rotate out the current forces to prevent culmination too soon. Glad to see the western gear isn't 'tossing turret's and has been for the most part keeping the crews alive.

CrossLOPER

06-16-2023, 20:34

I hope this war ends in Ukraine's favor, and I hope the war doesn't continue on for too long after this offensive.
There is the issue of asymmetry related to end-goals. For Ukraine, it is relatively simple: restore pre-2014 borders. Anything after that will be determined by the state of the world. The country will need funding for rebuilding long enough so that it can support its own military industry. It does not have a choice so long as massive threats on its borders exist.

For Russia, the situation is odd. The goal is... hold Krim? Hold The eastern edges? To what end? Crimea will eventually become a battleground like that in Donbas. No one except the desperate would want to live there while it is in that state. What could it do even if it did hold them? The Russian economy was never a strong one, and there is less and less incentive to remain. So the goal is perhaps to wait out the outrage like Assad? Syria is not in good shape and probably will not be for some time.

Speaking of which, the third party, the world, will have to decide long term goals, as well. Will Ukraine be abandoned? Will Russian oil and gas flow freely again, or will alternative sources be used until greener alternatives eventually become as common? What use does Russia have beyond this frankly outdated fuel source? My father told me about burning brown coal for warmth and the haze that resulted. Will Russia just be an outdated village?

Lots of uncertainty. It will depend purely on the strength of leadership and the attention span of the dominant generation.

spmetla

06-18-2023, 05:28

For Russia, the situation is odd. The goal is... hold Krim? Hold The eastern edges? To what end? Crimea will eventually become a battleground like that in Donbas. No one except the desperate would want to live there while it is in that state. What could it do even if it did hold them? The Russian economy was never a strong one, and there is less and less incentive to remain. So the goal is perhaps to wait out the outrage like Assad? Syria is not in good shape and probably will not be for some time.

For Putin and his like, that's probably acceptable to him. He wanted to be one of the Great Russians of history and expand/reclaim its borders. Sad for the folks in Russia though, unless the leaders in Russia agree to a formal peace recognizing Ukraine's borders I don't see how they rejoin the international order again in a meaningful way. They may be resource rich but that on its own doesn't build a diversified economy. Could see them more and more dependent on China for investment.

Speaking of which, the third party, the world, will have to decide long term goals, as well. Will Ukraine be abandoned? Will Russian oil and gas flow freely again, or will alternative sources be used until greener alternatives eventually become as common? What use does Russia have beyond this frankly outdated fuel source? My father told me about burning brown coal for warmth and the haze that resulted. Will Russia just be an outdated village?

Lots of uncertainty. It will depend purely on the strength of leadership and the attention span of the dominant generation.

I don't think Ukraine will be abandoned like Syria, it is much closer to the European economies, on a path to join the EU and will be opened up for greater market integration. Ukraine still needs to conduct a lot of domestic reforms to do this but I could see continued investment from the US and EU into Ukraine as no one in Europe can allow so large a state to become a failed state. Modern day Marshal plan would be very much expected.

Sadly, for Russia though, if it continues with this same political class in charge will likely remain a pariah state. Russia has always had the potential to be one of the wealthiest countries around, blessed by geography to have lots of resources, access to lots of markets etc... Unfortunately, it has historically put way to much into its military. Given the countries Russia borders, that's understandable, however not to the degree that currently happens. You don't get such a large military with broad capabilities with an economy smaller than Italy without cutting corners and spending way to much GDP on the military.

I think Putin and his gang would merrily sell Siberia in all but name to China for the ability to continue to flip off the US and NATO and not have to admit that the Ukraine war has not gone in their favor so far. It's been repeated in history too often when aging rulers feel a need to cement their legacy through some drastic action at the expense of their country's future.

Montmorency

06-18-2023, 17:54

After a brief pause since last weekend, there's a lot of Ukrainian attacks up and down the front again since Friday. My comments below won't take developing events into consideration.

Ukrainian senior officer Arty Green asserts that the Ukrainian campaign this year will be focused on grinding attrition of Russian forward defenses and incoming reserves, or like Kherson but without the big costly assaults (Ed. most of the losses this month were basically in the one failed action of the first week on the Tokmak axis I guess). Others believe there will be no traditional offensive, and that Ukraine will remain on the strategic defensive while trying to force defenders out of their positions through artillery pressure on all echelons.

I straight-up assess that if this is indeed the strategy, it will fail both in seriously degrading RuFOR or in reclaiming strategically-significant territory, by the end of the year.

Separately, it has long been doubtful to me that the military-political leadership of Ukraine would hype themselves up domestically so much on intent to reclaim territory and just not follow through, since there will be a price to pay. Political pressure does always influence military decision-making.

Yup, seems a very simple strategy so far, probing attacks all along the southern front, continued pressure on the Bakhmut area and retain the gains from last year in the northeast. The progress from those probing attacks has been okay so far, am a little surprised that there's so little SHORAD support there but I guess there's only so many gepards and air defense systems on had so probably tied up defending cities and logistic/command nodes.
I know the vaunted 'defense lines' haven't been approached yet but honestly it doesn't look like the Russians have the manpower to defend the length of those lines anyhow. The towns/cities around key intersections like Toma will certainly been defend more vigorously but I don't envision 'fortress' defense to the last man efforts if threatened to be cutoff.

I think if they reach the main M-14 coastal highway they'll have met their initial objectives as the land bridge would depend on supplies via Crimea/Kherson for everything west of any such salient. That's still pie-eyed wishing for me though, there's a lot of farmland and plenty of small towns in the 85kms to the highway and we've seen how effective those border hedges/treelines have been for defending forces.

If they get close the highway though, I don't think they'll try to take Mariupol as its too much an icon of the war so far and has overstated political value for both sides to retain, getting the port of Berdyansk would lengthen the supply routes for everything to the West, make the defense of Tokmak more difficult as forces would be needed for retaining Melitopol too. Offensively this would also enable the use of ASMs to threaten shipping the sea of Azov and seagoing drones to threaten Rostov too. Though this threat would be more useful in keeping leverage to keep the grain deal on and denying the black sea fleet another place from where to operate.

We've only seen a few of the new brigades in the offensive but suspect the others are being used as strategic and operational level reserves as well as to rotate out the current forces to prevent culmination too soon. Glad to see the western gear isn't 'tossing turret's and has been for the most part keeping the crews alive.

I would definitely not underestimate the resilience of the main defensive line, given that even the Russian screening line has already put up a good show. UFOR personnel losses haven't been heavy by what I can tell, but visual evidence indicates that the armored loss ratio has dropped to only ~1x in UFOR's favor this month, albeit a larger share of these vehicles may be recoverable (for an example (https://t.me/drmjournal/5397)). During the winter it was 4-8x.

https://i.imgur.com/oHKZ71X.png

Moreover, we've seen the vindication of yet another piece of equipment that many were ready to declare obsolete earlier in the war, namely the attack helicopter. Even where the attacker is willing to aggressively risk short/mid-range SAMS, the helicopter can still reliably pop up below minimum engagement altitude and deliver an ATGM/PGM snipe at maximum range before retreating (for an example (https://twitter.com/i/status/1669350107266023428), two shots and the retreat is sounded). N.b. The Ka-52 outranges the Gepard, which Ukraine absolutely cannot afford to lose even one of unless it's a maximally-decisive juncture. Maybe ironically, the attack helicopter seems to be least vulnerable in wide-open areas compared to the hillier or more wooded terrain in parts of northern and eastern Ukraine, because it's easier to camp at standoff range outside the engagement radius of available enemy SHORAD. It's evidently still got a place in the procurement framework.

Some articles (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/17/21st-century-warfare-ukraine-counteroffensive-frontline) on the subject (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-armor-appears-to-have-a-russian-attack-helicopter-problem).

And beyond that, the proliferation of Russian Lancet drones basically remains devastating to Ukrainian artillery and special equipment. Be it as it may that their control and accuracy characteristics are mediocre, there's plenty of them, they're easily and quickly dispatched at whatever Russian UAVs uncover, and most importantly, Ukraine still has no answer to them. Jamming is of some use, as it is against any drone either side fields, but the Ukrainians are at a similar disadvantage here as they are in SAMs.

There definitely seems to be a flaw in the skills or training of the commander and/or soldiers of the brigade (47th Mech) that saw most of the action on the Tokmak axis. Sending small units in a single column into unreconnoitered breaching actions with no or minimal artillery support, gutting companies and losing precious engineering vehicles, even repeating the error multiple times in the same general area in a few days, is already approaching the level of systematic blunder. Two months' training just isn't enough time to master the maneuver of such a formation, even if the Western vehicles are marginally more survivable - though to be precise this does seem most like a problem with the leadership.

Montmorency

06-19-2023, 07:46

Check out this sweet satellite survey (gif) of trenches between Tokmak and Polohy.
https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1670514216028065794

Anyway, out of interest, it's worth looking at some maps of the Velyka Novosilka axis in case this does become the area of the main effort. Despite appearances, and the underdevelopment of the fortifications compared to the Tokmak and Polohy axes, and allegations of shoddy work on individual objects, the Russian planners have in fact apparently put a lot of thought and doctrinal attention into the layout of defenses here. Furthermore, some of the downstream operational considerations apply equally to any form of southern campaign.

First, I don't know where this vision of a Ukrainian offensive came from, but it is pretty ridiculous, reflecting a conception of UFOR akin to the image of the US Armed Forces.

https://i.imgur.com/A0glSfT.jpg

Anyway, here's a control map of the area with observed fortification overlaid. Take note of how the rail line runs (though AFAIK it has not been used during the war). Also note the hub town Bilmak/Kamyanka, and the road it runs on. This highway, the T0803, is the northern route that connects Mariupol to Melitopol, via Bilmak, Polohy, and Tokmak. Equidistant from - at the center of the triangle of - Mariupol, Volnovakha, and Bilmak is Rozivka, which is not labeled but is one of the fortified dots. It is also closely connected - a 10km bypass - to the minor highway T0518 leading leading from Velyka Novosilka. This is the highway that UFOR has largely thrust straight along in the sector, following as well the Mokri Yaly River and the belt of villages that runs along it.

https://i.imgur.com/Vx16iYm.jpg

Here's a topographic map of the region, overlaid with the shape of the Russian defensive belt. I've added other topographic maps of the region that I feel better demonstrate the gradation of elevation. Usually gradations are very gentle, associated with either ancient river valleys or the central plateau known as the Azov Upland. If UFOR were to enter this upland via Rozivka by following the river valley south, it would significantly complicate the LOC between Russian Donbas and Polohy. From that point, pushing just a little bit toward sub-envelopment - towards Bilmak from the east and towards Polohy from Orikhiv in the west - would leave Polohy in a geographically-untenable salient.

I suggest viewing the the full-sized images.

https://i.imgur.com/Vrx6mOf.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/rmytO6S.png
https://i.imgur.com/5aHMIVz.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/3j42G19.jpg

In other words, if it were to come to a breakthrough on the VNS axis, it would only be necessary to reach the main defensive line in the Tokmak-Polohy area in order to undermine the entire RuFOR defensive belt in the region.

But there are difficulties in a Ukrainian thrust down the T0518/Mokri Yaly:

1. Supply lines are more tenuous for UFOR than at Orikhiv/Hulyaipole, which are close to Zaporizhzhia City, the provincial capital and its Dnieper bridges. Whereas RuFOR is better supplied by being closer to Donetsk City and Mariupol. This means that strategic reserves can more easily reach the battle line.
2. Being heavily dependent on a single road leaves vulnerable flanks.
3. RuFOR took this possibility into account, even though the overall local defensive network is relatively weak.

If you look at the final map, it is a topographic of the VNS area (the lines roughly delineate UFOR starting positions pre-offensive, and current contact line, from north to south). There is a scale legend in the bottom-left. To avoid committing to an overly-narrow salient, UFOR will have to clear the heights beside the river valley as they move down it, largely cross-country work. The main defensive line here begins only just below the cutoff of the map. But it has an interesting feature. Rather than continuing eastward, there is a sudden perpendicular bend where the fortififcations begin to follow the west bank of the Mokry Yaly. So UFOR would have to break through the line at a joint, leaving blocking forces to defend the flanks along the continuation of the line westwards, while continuing to drive down the river valley with entrenched RuFOR positions running all the way down t that river valley for at least 10 km. These positions would provide sallying points for RuFOR to harrass the southward thrust.

UFOR would have to account for this by either breaking the line further north in multiple places, in order to force a retreat from the entire section running along the river, or expand the salient eastwards toward Volnovakha, which is still shielded by the defensive line at this latitude. Furthermore, in order to swerve from the Mokry Yaly toward the Azov Uplands, toward Rozivka and Bilmak, UFOR would have to break the main defensive line in one final place - the unlabeled Krasna Poliana - before it would have relatively-unhindered access toward Volnovakha or the Azov Uplands from below. And see also the strongpoints strung out along the T0803 up to Bilmak, which is ringed with significant emplacements similar to Tokmak, signalling its importance to RuFOR commanders.

Here's the control map again with junctures at which UFOR would be obliged to break through to secure their flanks and to progress southwards circled.

https://i.imgur.com/oK5sfb4.jpg

This is quite a challenging gauntlet, despite the sector seeming at first glance more vulnerable than a direct drive through multiple lines on the Tokmak or Polohy aces, and is one reason why I consider the overall Russian defensive belt to be well-formulated. The only maneuver it really doesn't ward against is a multi-axis breakthrough into deep cross-country geography, and that across narrow lanes given the standoff ranges of ATGM, PGM, and attack UAS.

Also, looking at the western end of the region, we can see that RuFOR has prepared a sort of fallback defensive line in the event that the whole region is lost to a UFOR offensive. It protects Melitopol from the north and east (but not the south), and is heavily committed to shielding the E105 highway running north from Melitopol, likely to enable coherent defense of the joint to the Dnieper River. After all, if this highway were cut, UFOR would essentially be given free reign to break out with flank to the river into the very rural interior border area of Zaporizhzhia-Kherson, which includes the Enerhodor nuclear facility; UFOR would be following a highway direct from Zaporizhzhia (P37), whereas there is no direct highway from south to north in the Russian zone.

My overall purpose here is to show that there are no easy axes to exploit here, but in the context of limited Ukrainian success, the T0803 highway and the axis from Vasylivka to Volnovakha, would be a sound stop line. It would place UFOR in a position to conduct future offensives from a stable line and from regional uplands down into coastal steppe. It would be much easier for UFOR to fortify along this line than for RuFOR, who certainly would not be able to fortify as well as they have along the old front.

spmetla

spmetla

06-22-2023, 19:34

Anyway, out of interest, it's worth looking at some maps of the Velyka Novosilka axis in case this does become the area of the main effort. Despite appearances, and the underdevelopment of the fortifications compared to the Tokmak and Polohy axes, and allegations of shoddy work on individual objects, the Russian planners have in fact apparently put a lot of thought and doctrinal attention into the layout of defenses here. Furthermore, some of the downstream operational considerations apply equally to any form of southern campaign.

First, I don't know where this vision of a Ukrainian offensive came from, but it is pretty ridiculous, reflecting a conception of UFOR akin to the image of the US Armed Forces.

Yup, the Russian defenses are well laid out and make excellent use of local topography, their obstacles are tied into natural obstacles to great effect.

Also agree on the concept being a bit ridiculous. That timeline is impossible without air superiority. We're seeing much more brigade-division sized actions which are limited in scope and culminate rather quickly as breaching obstacles is extremely difficult, especially when you've only got finite amount of artillery to achieve the suppress and obscure portions of SOSRA.

I straight-up assess that if this is indeed the strategy, it will fail both in seriously degrading RuFOR or in reclaiming strategically-significant territory, by the end of the year.

Separately, it has long been doubtful to me that the military-political leadership of Ukraine would hype themselves up domestically so much on intent to reclaim territory and just not follow through, since there will be a price to pay. Political pressure does always influence military decision-making.

The goal of reclaiming significant peices of territory does look like it will fail. The offensive potential of the Ukraine just cannot sustain this attritional approach. Looking at Orynx it's easy to see how much western supplied equipment has been destroyed or at least severly damaged, especially in artillery.
Change in topic but this is why I'm fully supportive of the US Army seeking to regain significant long range fires capabilities over its adversaries. In contested airspace one cannot rely on airpower to strike deep in the enemy, especially if its in a short time window that the 96hour air force targeting cycle can't hit fast enough.

And beyond that, the proliferation of Russian Lancet drones basically remains devastating to Ukrainian artillery and special equipment. Be it as it may that their control and accuracy characteristics are mediocre, there's plenty of them, they're easily and quickly dispatched at whatever Russian UAVs uncover, and most importantly, Ukraine still has no answer to them. Jamming is of some use, as it is against any drone either side fields, but the Ukrainians are at a similar disadvantage here as they are in SAMs.

The lancet drones is more why I'm surprised the gepards are more forward deployed, not against attack helicopters. The very small pockets of NATOs SHORAD capabilities have certainly come to light. The threat from enemy helicopters though is where and why the F-16s can be such an important asset. It's not about dogfighting Russians but to contest the airspace enough so those attack helicopters fly low and cannot engage at max range. Certainly shows how every military needs a good mix of high and low tech capability across multiple service branches to truly do air defense.

There definitely seems to be a flaw in the skills or training of the commander and/or soldiers of the brigade (47th Mech) that saw most of the action on the Tokmak axis. Sending small units in a single column into unreconnoitered breaching actions with no or minimal artillery support, gutting companies and losing precious engineering vehicles, even repeating the error multiple times in the same general area in a few days, is already approaching the level of systematic blunder. Two months' training just isn't enough time to master the maneuver of such a formation, even if the Western vehicles are marginally more survivable - though to be precise this does seem most like a problem with the leadership.

The big flaw that I saw was it looked like they were clearing a single breaching lane instead of multiple lanes. Perhaps do to lack of engineer and breaching vehicles. If that's the case then there are only a few (in this case one!) lane down which you can attack which is just madness. The bunching up that we saw though kind of makes sense. Once those first vehicles in the lanes hit a mine or take contact everything behind tends to stop. The spacing between vehicles though is what really gets me though, US doctrine we'd be much farther apart with the only exception being vehicles moving up to provide local direct fire support for those in contact so that recovery vehicles can get the personnel or vehicles back from where they were disabled.
It takes a lot of training and competence to learn not to bunch up. Human psychology likes having a vehicle or person close by to support you but outside of trench clearing and urban combat that's not the right answer.
The western vehicles are certainly more survivable, the amount of Leo2s in which we then see the hatches open post-combat are good indicators that the crew was able to evacuate successfully. This brigade however seemed to have bought in the 'wunderwaffe' problem and used them in a stupid manner. I imagine that brigade commander is probably fired or on very short notice.

The major lesson learned out of all this that I see for the US is that we don't deal with minefields too well and have limited resources to deal with that. The gulf war was the last major breaching action but that was with total air superiority in relatively open desert against a foe that didn't have the morale, training, or equipment to seriously contest the coalition against them.
As the US doesn't use anti-personnel mines anymore (apart from M18 claymores) it means when we make training plans we typically don't have minefields in our way. Simple minefields take away all speed and momentum, we saw it in WWII on the Russian Front and we see it now.

Shaka_Khan

06-24-2023, 00:34

I wouldn't be surprised if this civil war in Russia turns out to be true. It reminds me of Russia during WWI.
It could also be deception. I remember a video of the leader of the Wagner Group (Yevgeny Prigozhin) complaining about the lack of supplies. It doesn't seem to be the case now.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMWjYTRkgfA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sz9m9Ty4hB0

Montmorency

06-24-2023, 02:43

The goal of reclaiming significant peices of territory does look like it will fail. The offensive potential of the Ukraine just cannot sustain this attritional approach. Looking at Orynx it's easy to see how much western supplied equipment has been destroyed or at least severly damaged, especially in artillery.
Change in topic but this is why I'm fully supportive of the US Army seeking to regain significant long range fires capabilities over its adversaries. In contested airspace one cannot rely on airpower to strike deep in the enemy, especially if its in a short time window that the 96hour air force targeting cycle can't hit fast enough.

Why tanks are still needed, including with the capacity to counter the latest counterpart tanks where encountered.

The lancet drones is more why I'm surprised the gepards are more forward deployed, not against attack helicopters. The very small pockets of NATOs SHORAD capabilities have certainly come to light. The threat from enemy helicopters though is where and why the F-16s can be such an important asset. It's not about dogfighting Russians but to contest the airspace enough so those attack helicopters fly low and cannot engage at max range. Certainly shows how every military needs a good mix of high and low tech capability across multiple service branches to truly do air defense.

The thing is, the Gepards are literally irreplaceable for the time being, and we did indeed see one struck by a Lancet while redeploying back in the spring! In other words, there will be dear Gepard losses whenever they are brought up for extended periods, and out of the three dozen in Ukraine, even if the civil air defense were stripped of them all there is no way they can cover all the enablers even in the south alone.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9hlMYnzNbg

I guess it would be theoretically possible to succeed so well in counterbattery that RuFOR artillery is silenced, giving an opportunity to cluster entire brigades of own arty, EW, logistics, etc. while covering them with just a platoon or two of Gepards, but then that presents a great target for Russian UPMK and other air-dropped bombs, which Ukraine definitely doesn't have the long-range AD to deter reliably in this circumstance. Heck, at that point even tactical cruise missiles are a great bet. Rock, paper, scissors, lizard, Spock...

The big flaw that I saw was it looked like they were clearing a single breaching lane instead of multiple lanes. Perhaps do to lack of engineer and breaching vehicles. If that's the case then there are only a few (in this case one!) lane down which you can attack which is just madness. The bunching up that we saw though kind of makes sense. Once those first vehicles in the lanes hit a mine or take contact everything behind tends to stop. The spacing between vehicles though is what really gets me though, US doctrine we'd be much farther apart with the only exception being vehicles moving up to provide local direct fire support for those in contact so that recovery vehicles can get the personnel or vehicles back from where they were disabled.
It takes a lot of training and competence to learn not to bunch up. Human psychology likes having a vehicle or person close by to support you but outside of trench clearing and urban combat that's not the right answer.
The western vehicles are certainly more survivable, the amount of Leo2s in which we then see the hatches open post-combat are good indicators that the crew was able to evacuate successfully. This brigade however seemed to have bought in the 'wunderwaffe' problem and used them in a stupid manner. I imagine that brigade commander is probably fired or on very short notice.

The major lesson learned out of all this that I see for the US is that we don't deal with minefields too well and have limited resources to deal with that. The gulf war was the last major breaching action but that was with total air superiority in relatively open desert against a foe that didn't have the morale, training, or equipment to seriously contest the coalition against them.
As the US doesn't use anti-personnel mines anymore (apart from M18 claymores) it means when we make training plans we typically don't have minefields in our way. Simple minefields take away all speed and momentum, we saw it in WWII on the Russian Front and we see it now.

In Military Aviation History's review of that battle, a German Leopard 2 crewman was quoted that the vehicles should be spaced apart by 100m according to Bundeswehr doctrine.

Inability to field multiple attacking columns or groups at the same time has been a tactical plague on both sides almost since the beginning of the war. You don't have to be well-versed in military affairs to rcognize the concepts of mass and momentum delivered in a short time frame. But the absolute modal tactic of the war is sending up a platoon or company in a column until it either retreats or secures the objective and if the former, rinse and repeat. Though of course in more positional battles a success doesn't always mean occupying former enemy positions; turning it into a gray zone is also a common mission.

Many explanations besides insanity have been proposed, though how they combine in reality is unclear: Units have too little skill in combined arms, officers can't figure out the tactical coordination of larger formations, battlefield commanders have their hands tied somehow, there is a pound-foolish lack of loss tolerance in conducting attacks as opposed to initiating them, the perceived risk of preparing larger attacks is too high (concentrations or gathering points in the close rear are frequently targeted by artillery) , or command just have no intention of trying to exploit local breakthroughs but want to see action nevertheless...

Resolving this challenge is evidently still beyond UFOR.

But the bottom line is, without Desert Storm-style air supremacy or North Africa/Kharkiv levels of density, in order to conduct ground maneuver one has to be prepared to push forward mass and absorb high initial casualties. Even against helicopters at standoff range, by being spread out in multiple robust columns while deploying smoke and moving quickly - that's another thing, in this war vehicles are usually driving at school zone speeds it seems - it is possible to make progress despite the threat.

(Re: mines, recall my discussion a few months ago of how potent even sparse minefields are against single-column attacks with low loss tolerance. In WW2, greater loss tolerance and mass plus a broader distribution of tactical maneuver made mines less of a strategic barrier.)

If you look at the large control map from my previous post, you'll see - I might have pointed this out in the past - the very rural triangle between Polohy/Huliaipole, Bilmak, and Velyka Novosilka. Russia put some of the scarcest effort in fortifying that area, likely because it is tens of miles of mostly cross-country driving and they knew it would be difficult for UFOR in its current form to push a large force in there and keep it supplied and on the move.

Is my impression correct that the US Army in this situation, under similar constraints as Ukraine is experiencing, would do their best to try to pierce this part of the front? It is almost guaranteed to be a 'free ride' away from minefields between major outposts, and once you're at Bilmak, you're in the deep rear.

I wouldn't be surprised if this civil war in Russia turns out to be true. It reminds me of Russia during WWI.
It could also be deception. I remember a video of the leader of the Wagner Group (Yevgeny Prigozhin) complaining about the lack of supplies. It doesn't seem to be the case now.

Definitely one for waiting and seeing.

Montmorency

06-24-2023, 16:58

Well, this definitely seems like the real McCoy.

I've seen significant resistance, which indicates a reaction, but far too little to influence the progress of events, which indicates a loss of grip on the security apparatus.

Montmorency

06-26-2023, 02:21

Well, that allowed for a great variety of explanatory accounts.

EDiT: In better news, Germany has made a very large commitment of Gepards to Ukraine.

spmetla

06-27-2023, 19:39

In Military Aviation History's review of that battle, a German Leopard 2 crewman was quoted that the vehicles should be spaced apart by 100m according to Bundeswehr doctrine.

Yeah, that was a good interview he did.

The thing is, the Gepards are literally irreplaceable for the time being, and we did indeed see one struck by a Lancet while redeploying back in the spring! In other words, there will be dear Gepard losses whenever they are brought up for extended periods, and out of the three dozen in Ukraine, even if the civil air defense were stripped of them all there is no way they can cover all the enablers even in the south alone.
You're right that they are irreplaceable. Just goes to show how there needs to be a good SHORAD mix that is currently not fielded in the west. I think those 'skyranger' systems look the most suitable thing to be added to the mix but there's no existing stock of spares to give to Ukraine beyond the few that went there for testing. Hope that it goes to line production soon though industry is undoubtedly waiting to see if there're significant orders. This seems a system that should be produced in the hundreds so it can be present throughout the battlefield but that's not looking to be the case for actual orders.

But the bottom line is, without Desert Storm-style air supremacy or North Africa/Kharkiv levels of density, in order to conduct ground maneuver one has to be prepared to push forward mass and absorb high initial casualties. Even against helicopters at standoff range, by being spread out in multiple robust columns while deploying smoke and moving quickly - that's another thing, in this war vehicles are usually driving at school zone speeds it seems - it is possible to make progress despite the threat.

That's one of the problems in this contested environment, the usual way to deploy smoke is with artillery and to keep up a screen of smoke for even 15 minutes involves a lot of tubes that become very vulnerable to counter battery attacks. The distances are too great for mortar based systems to provide smoke and the threat is too dangerous for ground based smoke pots to assist.

Yup, the progress is slow and against such well prepared defenses tedious. Still they're making gains and undoubtedly taxing the ability of the Russians to use their reserves.

Interesting the Wagner group fallout. I'm curious how many will be relocated to Belarus, if that's all 4k that were involved in the march north that's a brigade of potential combat power taken off the board. Curious to see if there end up being loyalty tests and purges throughout the Army ranks in the following weeks as we did see videos of Russian troops supposedly putting out pro-Wagner videos in the early hours of their taking Rostov.
Those aviation assets and aircrews lost as well as just the fact they had to apply combat power against their own forces behind their own lines is quite the toll. Having to strike your own fuel reserves to deny their use to mutineers is certainly not a high point of military power.