Great Power contentions [Archive] - Page 4

Montmorency

07-14-2023, 06:15

Ukrainian scout trainee critical (https://twitter.com/SmartUACat/status/1679223826398212096) of the manifest backwardness (https://twitter.com/SmartUACat/status/1679501999061053440) of the US military. I suspected this was a trainee of the battalion-scale 6-week "combined arms" program in Grafenwoehr, Germany I mentioned back in the late winter, but the author also mentions it involving a brigade formation, so maybe it was one of the Bradley or Stryker brigades.

One of the major points is the refusal of US instructors to think outside the paradigm of "pure recon on foot." There was zero tactical UAV (civilian drone) training despite repeated requests, and little practical combat training.

A lot of comments proposed that soldiers must be trained in non-electronic and non-drone backup methods, ignoring that these are inferior and waste the precious time of soldiers soon to be deployed in a real-live war with real-life tactics, practices, and procedures that contradict mere dusty doctrine and theory (namely, both sides have from the beginning relied on networked digital apps fed real-time tactical drone observation data to manage most artillery fires; somehow they've not been reduced by EW to wishing for old-fashioned FIST teams). It's like demanding riflemen be trained on iron sights equally as with ACOGs or other optics, reducing overall competence in practice.
spmetla

Shaka_Khan

07-26-2023, 03:35

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkChj0PYk78

Montmorency

08-05-2023, 17:30

The one big prediction I'm already labeling a wrong call of mine with respect to Ukraine's 2023 campaign - though there's still time this year for events to prove me more prescient - is that almost all of the activity would take place within the administrative borders of Zaporizhzhia. So far it's been a majority, but only a majority. The majority again of that remainder is what we might refer to as "semi-wrong", taking place along the Donetsk side of the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia border, but the rest is further north, especially around Bakhmut. Call that a sixth of the overall effort. I had thought - hoped - that UFOR wouldn't expend much on pressuring Bakhmut, and I concluded against a Velyka Novosilka axis because I assessed that the optimal location for the eastern axis through the Russian defensive network would be cross-country between Hulyaipole and Polohy.

I'm glad that Ukraine has received elevated artillery munitions flows, but they need more tubes and crews now for coverage. Eastern Europe is gradually producing a marginally self-sufficient production base in large Soviet-caliber rounds, but really the replacement and initial supply of 155mm cannons is not adequate. Ukraine needs to receive at least one per day - with a properly-trained crew - indefinitely just to account for attrition, with the only candidate platform being the large outstanding storages of M109s. That is to say nothing of the need for delivery platforms for new arty brigades by the time NATO can produce a couple million shells a year.

Ukraine still needs a proper war economy with government-directed industrial policy, and proper investment in its development and manufacture of military-grade recon drones. Also, the US needs to really get started on investing in the development of true loitering drones, for point defense and counter-drone war. Just tactical drone warfare in general is a big blind spot for NATO.

But as I've noted since last fall, Ukraine and NATO need to prioritize institutional reform of UFOR from the ground up first of all, increasing the level of skill and professionalism to the extent that the operational and tactical default wouldn't be a consistent convergence on Russian methods. (Literally, by the end of June people were beginning to remark that the structure of the UFOR campaign closely reflected the shape of Russian/Wagner winter offensives.) The feasibility of large-scale forcible recovery of territory can't be rated highly with a basically attritional strategy against a larger opponent and with reliance on external sources of supply.

For yet another formulation:

It's likely that many of the problems we've seen since the offensives of last years will persist. Enduring challenges with command and coordination will likely limit the AFU ability to create significant strategic success in the short term. This is further challenged by dwindling amount of AFU reserves to exploit breakthroughs.
[...]
Equipment is only as good as its users. Experienced UA brigades are doing better with worse equipment than the newer NATO trained ones. Indeed the challenges of this summers offensives should definitely prove that despite western wishes there is no magic bullet to end the war.
[...]
The west, mainly the US, at least has doctrinal and training, as well as high level C2 understanding of how to do large scale mechanized offensives. It's not just air supremacy, seeing how Russia had ability to do some of that coordination in the first weeks too.In general we also have to get away from the discourse where Ukraine is always choosing the optimal solutions or has mastered modern warfare in a unique way. It hasn't. Most of the great successes came on the defensive, and often with great costs. Defence has proven to be a lot easier than offence here. That doesn't mean that the West doesn't have a ton to learn from Ukraine. It absolutely does. However, there is a lot of institutional problems that are in the way of objectively better Western methods of doing things. One big thing is the enduring complaint of Ukrainian hierarchical top-down-command, where instead of flexible mission tactics commanders micromanage subordinates and don't give them freedom to choose solutions that best fit their own tactical situations.
[...]
What this means is that the West must commit for the long haul. Instead of only giving Ukraine quick off-the-shelf western solutions, ie. equipment, we must start building long term solutions together with the Ukrainians to overcome their unique challenges. This will demand a lot of adaptation, compromises, commitment, willignes to learn and maybe even humility, from both sides of the deal. It should look very different from the current piecemeal approach to aid.

spmetla

08-11-2023, 03:59

Ukrainian scout trainee critical of the manifest backwardness of the US military. I suspected this was a trainee of the battalion-scale 6-week "combined arms" program in Grafenwoehr, Germany I mentioned back in the late winter, but the author also mentions it involving a brigade formation, so maybe it was one of the Bradley or Stryker brigades.

One of the major points is the refusal of US instructors to think outside the paradigm of "pure recon on foot." There was zero tactical UAV (civilian drone) training despite repeated requests, and little practical combat training.

A lot of comments proposed that soldiers must be trained in non-electronic and non-drone backup methods, ignoring that these are inferior and waste the precious time of soldiers soon to be deployed in a real-live war with real-life tactics, practices, and procedures that contradict mere dusty doctrine and theory (namely, both sides have from the beginning relied on networked digital apps fed real-time tactical drone observation data to manage most artillery fires; somehow they've not been reduced by EW to wishing for old-fashioned FIST teams). It's like demanding riflemen be trained on iron sights equally as with ACOGs or other optics, reducing overall competence in practice.

Considering that the US has not waged a conventional war since 2003 I'm not surprised that American trainers will be seen as a bit behind curve compared to what's happening in real-time in Ukraine. This is probably amplified by the size of the US military which means its trainers must likely stick to current US doctrine and practices which are being updated but have not yet been updated to represent what we've seen the last year and a half. Smaller European militaries are liker to adapt more quickly and implement today's lessons learned in their training rather than the large and unwieldly US Army TRADOC bureaucracy.

The emphasis on ground scouts and recon though reflect a lot of hard lessons learned in decades past in which the US has tried to essentially get rid of ground scouts with technology (recon planes, sensors, ground focused radar etc...) and in every war finds that it must still have scouts on the ground to find enemy gaps.
Think the trend that's not represented in the current training will be that ground recon (infantry and cavalry scouts) will need to be an even more selective group of individuals as opposed to the current US approach in which it's just a mission set anyone can do. US CAV scouts do need higher GT scores to qualify but there's no selection process like for SOF, this may be something that needs to happen though as using SOF to recon in the close fight would be a waste of resources.

Ground recon is much more dangerous and difficult though irreplaceable as drones are not quite up to the level yet of locating minefields, bypasses for obstacles, and so on. For enemy focused recon drones are superior though they are not all-weather. The terrain of Ukraine also makes it much more favorable for drones, much more densely wooded areas would be more difficult for them to operate in.

The current US approach to small drones is still in its infancy for the overall force. Micro drones and off the shelf stuff are in use at the NTC and JRTC and in some current units but it's not uniform across the force yet so doctrine and training TTPs need to catch up.

Montmorency

08-12-2023, 04:49

A measure that (https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1689733375056076800) can boost Ukraine's potential without compromising combat capabilities should involve the training of ~500 NCOs and mobilized officers in the US, in a 6-7 month program similar to the US TBS and OIC courses. This will help to prepare platoon and company commanders.

There is indeed plenty of ground-based recon going on in the war, but it's not a specialized role most of the time as we're seeing. Though it does have a specialized operational structure by Soviet/post-Soviet doctrine, so maybe it's more precise to say that while there are some dedicated recon elements, anyone can be expected to carry out accountable recon activities. We see a lot of ad hoc squad-level recon by fire among both sides. Squad and platoon-level UAS capacity is usually crowdsourced and not supplied by regulation, so if you don't have a drone, there's no choice but to hoof it. There is a heavy reliance on SOF for more complex recon missions, or those that venture through the grey zone into enemy-controlled territory, which shouldn't be that dissimilar to US doctrine. (I think the Ukrainian trainee above was most critical however of a mindset that prioritized doing everything analog and by muscle, so to speak.)

There could be reasons for the US not to universalize ground recon operations in this way, given the much higher level of both professional training and specialization, and greater availability of large, high-echelon recon drones. I'm definitely not familiar with the current discourse. But even the point about the difficulty of drones with forests only goes so far, since we know consumer drones have been used extensively in the Serebryanka Forest, the Svyati Hori national park area along the Siversky Donets River west of Kreminna that's been contested for almost a year. Videos aren't hard to find, such as this longer one of a Russian drone team (https://twitter.com/chris__759/status/1626251139384545282) guiding infantry through the woods in real-time*. Thermals help a lot too. (In a truly dense forest or jungle, only light or airmobile infantry can really work anyway; we may even recall Vietnam.)

As you indicate, it can be profitable to emphasize organic tactical drone capabilities among infantry while retaining a more focused, specialized element for appropriate circumstances. Just like mobile firepower (e.g. tanks) in the immediate area is more responsive than air support, giving a squad visibility on their immediate area is more responsive than liasing with battalion or brigade HQ. Establishing organic drone platoons/companies at all levels, or special army or theater-level drone units that are assigned on a task basis are also approaches that have been observed.

What's clear with respect to Ukraine IMO is that to the extent Ukrainian soldiers are being given abbreviated courses of individualized training as opposed to comprehensive and prolonged generation of large units, it's inappropriate to insert US doctrine that is contrary to the day-to-day practices on the real battlefield and is too inefficient to supplant them. It wastes precious training time.

And to be cliche, every war is different and there will be good lessons to be discerned both toward general best practices as well as contextual adaptations. Moreover, every country has different circumstances, so there may be some sound lessons that the US, as opposed to other countries, could ignore in favor of emphasizing others (e.g. maybe for sake of argument massive EW and countermeasures could compensate for lack of tactical UAS).

But some lessons are still inevitable:

Boxer, a toy (https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1689674770592276482) that costs almost 30 million dollars. It will still die to an ATGM, an FPV drone, and will be immobilized by a mine.

Planners in the West must understand that wonder weapons only work against weak opponents, where enemies have limited capabilities.

If the NATO country takes part in the big war, they will end up with 2 armored brigades (6000 people) and 200000 infantry on trucks.

What the war in Ukraine has shown is that scale matters. Paying 80% more for a 20% efficiency upgrade only works on paper.

Have you heard about the new British ASRAAM-mounting Supacat? Seemingly in a few months they jerry-rigged trucks with ASRAAMs, and their double-digit range counters helicopters well, perhaps being better in range and pop-up availability than Buks with Sea Sparrow. I bet designing a new mid-range SAM platform from scratch - albeit with better specs overall - would cost several billion dollars in R&D, take 5-10 years to reach serial production, and then contract for $10+ million a unit. This is just the kind of frugality and improvisation we need more of.

*It's been commented a lot that ubiquitous drone technology will push advanced militaries back towards centralization and micromanagement of tactics, maybe not at the staff level but up through the lieutenant-colonel or equivalent. The availability of real-time information will reactivate those managerial impulses in the command element, so the argument goes, and though it may be effective in some cases (e.g. Wagner's MO), it can also undermine mission-oriented tactics at the lowest level. Not a high-level example, but one that comes to mind is one of the more famous Ukrainian emplaced defense videos, in which a squad commander frequently receives updates over his radio, like "Hostiles inbound 11 o'clock", "Do this", "Do that", "Throw a grenade", "Reposition"... How do you interpret this trend? The revival of "network-centric warfare?" The videogamization of command?

spmetla

08-12-2023, 19:05

There could be reasons for the US not to universalize ground recon operations in this way, given the much higher level of both professional training and specialization, and greater availability of large, high-echelon recon drones. I'm definitely not familiar with the current discourse.

The US has scouts at the battalion level (special selection of regular infantrymen), the brigade level (a squadron of cavalry scouts light/stryker/ or heavy), and soon again at the division level with DIVCAV coming back, and in the past when we had regular Corps the ACRs acted as Corps Scouts.

s you indicate, it can be profitable to emphasize organic tactical drone capabilities among infantry while retaining a more focused, specialized element for appropriate circumstances. Just like mobile firepower (e.g. tanks) in the immediate area is more responsive than air support, giving a squad visibility on their immediate area is more responsive than liasing with battalion or brigade HQ. Establishing organic drone platoons/companies at all levels, or special army or theater-level drone units that are assigned on a task basis are also approaches that have been observed.

The US has actually done so and for a while now. At the company level there are Raven Small UAS systems available which I had when I was a company level commander ten years ago. The bigger problem there is that the Raven is a flying 'sensitive item' that if it goes of course, gets stuck in a tree, etc... is a major property book item to recover and any incident with a Raven crashing in a training area is still an 'aviation crash' of a sort which requires a bit of investigation. Not to mention that (especially the guard) when you only have so much training time available, incorporating the raven into your training plan and getting those soldier (it's an additional duty not a special job set) the qualifications needed to fly without a master trainer nearby can be taxing and generally does not match up specifically against your assigned training tasks so a lot of people just don't really train on them.
The solution to the above is the US needs to treat small UAS and drones as more expendable items, sorta like ammunition so that people can train aggressively with them without the fear of having to walk through the wood line for three days looking for a crashed drone.

What's clear with respect to Ukraine IMO is that to the extent Ukrainian soldiers are being given abbreviated courses of individualized training as opposed to comprehensive and prolonged generation of large units, it's inappropriate to insert US doctrine that is contrary to the day-to-day practices on the real battlefield and is too inefficient to supplant them. It wastes precious training time.

And to be cliche, every war is different and there will be good lessons to be discerned both toward general best practices as well as contextual adaptations. Moreover, every country has different circumstances, so there may be some sound lessons that the US, as opposed to other countries, could ignore in favor of emphasizing others (e.g. maybe for sake of argument massive EW and countermeasures could compensate for lack of tactical UAS).

Fully agree on both points, just as we've seen with armor, application to a breakthrough in the american style without american air power to back it up is foolish.

Boxer, a toy that costs almost 30 million dollars. It will still die to an ATGM, an FPV drone, and will be immobilized by a mine.

Planners in the West must understand that wonder weapons only work against weak opponents, where enemies have limited capabilities.

The Boxer works though in the Australian model in which it's likely opponents are indonesia or china's expeditionary capabilities. Also, an IFV or APC still get infantry farther forward, faster, and with more protection than walking.

What should change though is the top dollar that the west pays out for essentially an APC with a mounted gun. There's a lot of overhead, graft, and inefficiency that's unnecessary, part of that is buying on a scale of dozens to low hundreds instead a production run of thousands.
Much as the Europeans hate to work together on major defense purchases they need to really settle on a one or two base models for each platform role instead of each country having a different version. If all of europe settled on the CV-90, Lynx, or ASCOD for the IFV roles they could make larger purchases at less cost with only small variations from country to country.

Montmorency

08-12-2023, 21:52

The Boxer works though in the Australian model in which it's likely opponents are indonesia or china's expeditionary capabilities. Also, an IFV or APC still get infantry farther forward, faster, and with more protection than walking.

What should change though is the top dollar that the west pays out for essentially an APC with a mounted gun. There's a lot of overhead, graft, and inefficiency that's unnecessary, part of that is buying on a scale of dozens to low hundreds instead a production run of thousands.
Much as the Europeans hate to work together on major defense purchases they need to really settle on a one or two base models for each platform role instead of each country having a different version. If all of europe settled on the CV-90, Lynx, or ASCOD for the IFV roles they could make larger purchases at less cost with only small variations from country to country.

From a practical and political standpoint, I personally don't think Western Europe or CAN/ANZAC should prioritize national resources on remilitarization for mass mechanized attrition, so it's not that I oppose something like the Boxer on principle. It would have been for the best if NATO militaries were tightly focused on complementing the US in the Western hemisphere and everyone was on that same page. But from the perspective of Eastern Europe, or most other countries (to the extent a given country should even have a military), you really prefer something like a souped-up BMP-2 type of bulk platform (with higher survivability) as the most cost-effective IFV solution. Russia (post-Soviet) has exported BMP-2s for ~$300K, which I believe is something like the export price of a Javelin CLU and one missile. The Yemen deal in the 2000s was ~$200K per unit. If the chart below is correct, BMP-3s tend to sell for around $3 million/unit (another source showed a contract price for domestic manufacture at around $1 million/unit), which IMO is not worth the added value.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2022/08/31/russia-mulls-restarting-production-of-older-fighting-vehicles-to-replace-ukraine-losses/?sh=347cbc234b1b
https://dfnc.ru/en/analytics/export-of-infantry-combat-vehicles-from-russia/

26596

Czechia recently announced a package deal for 246 CV-90 Mk.IV, a few months ahead of Slovakia signing on 152 units. News reports attest the respective contracts at $2.2 billion and €1.3 billion. Let's round it up to $4 billion total for 400 units plus spares, support, and all else typically associated with such contracts. That's effectively $9-10 million per unit. Cut that cost in half, make it the upcoming Mk.V model, and carry over the price cut to the older models, and the CV-90 could be extremely competitive worldwide. I would definitely prefer a Mk.IV to the overspecced BMP-3 at the same price point. But to make it possible you would probably need to get several dozen European countries to agree to massively subsidize Sweden to produce thousands, which can't happen without an unprecedented quid pro quo and technology transfer between EU members. Especially since it would be matching or beating the Polish Rosomak/Borsuk and South Korean K21 at price point, to say nothing of Lynx or smaller competitors.

I hope we don't have to find out, but in West Africa we may soon receive the first 21st-c. lessons on the requirements of 'real war' for countries that aren't rich or in the top tier.

Montmorency

08-28-2023, 11:25

spmetla

I'm sorry bro, but come on (https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1695867428247396359). Come. On.

Just like the trainee reported.

This is right up there with the perennial complaints from the Pentagon in the media on how they wish the Ukrainian military would try just shooting less artillery.

spmetla

08-29-2023, 02:56

It's kinda of mind boggling what's coming out of the pentagon. Same with the criticism of the offensive so far. The "this is Kursk not rebels" comment sums it up best.

Ground recon is great but drones are absolutely essential in modern war.

Montmorency

09-15-2023, 02:06

The "kids these days wouldn't storm Omaha beach" crowd get super uncomfortable when you then ask them how they feel about mandatory service, nationalized industry and transportation, and rationing

I can't find the quote directly, but in one of Rick Atkinson's WWII books, he highlights how the winning essay in Life's "Why I Serve" essay contest for '43 or '44 was simply, "I got drafted"

National service & national industry combined to bring about victory in both world wars

No discussion about large scale combat operations against a near-peer enemy should happen without discussing both of those things

And yet. And YET. The US military services chalk that up to "political problems that aren't our problem" and then try to make war plans

*Nations* fight wars, as wars are an extension of political and social ends -- but if you try to fight a war without the nation, like, oh, I don't know, the last 20 years, then you get a military that is divorced from national strategy and a people disconnected from reality

And this is why historians don't get invited to many parties. Apparently we're too negative.

Heh. But though it's not the poster's exact point, I reckon if the US has to reinstate a general draft to fight a war, something would seem to have gone very, very wrong. Like "World in Conflict" wrong.

Tangentially, it's generally agreed now that in the past year - including the "partial mobilization" - Russia's military has recruited at least half a million personnel. (I'm referring just to the military, not Wagner or anything else.) There's the well-known 300K, but the rest have been voluntary or semi-voluntary recruits (prisoners, the accused, debtors, immigrants, people tricked by administrative means, covert mobilization, etc.) subject to 'hard-press' treatment. It's probably why the leadership has been acting so confident that their ongoing losses have been covered.

spmetla

09-19-2023, 07:45

Would agree with the premise that the US needs to look at economic and industrial capacity in a wartime setting and take that more seriously. If there's a war with China and most of the worlds ships are made in China, Japan, and South Korea we're going to have a bit of a problem worldwide building ships for our own commerce and military if those shipyards are building for their militaries. I think China is still thinking that the US would be a 'paper tiger' in a war over a periphery interest. Think their lesson learned is a direct attack like Pearl Harbor is a no-no but a gradual ramp up in the scale of war from the current 'competition' to more blatant war of Taiwan would cause the US to backdown or just dither about too long before it could make an impact in time.

For terms of conscription, well the US might need to do that in the future just for our peace-time force as the US population continues to live increasingly unhealthy lives and as military service requires more skilled persons than in the past. If kids are still wanting free college but not willing to serve a few years in peace time to do so then what other incentives are there?

Montmorency

09-20-2023, 04:49

I’ve consistently seen it remarked that the military’s uncompetitive pay scale and unappealing work conditions discourage potential applicants in the context of a high-employment economy (esp. since the late 2010s).

IIRC in WW2 enlisted GIs were paid comparably to white-collar workers. We can’t afford that now, but I think before long something like the link is going to be the bipartisan consensus.
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/09/11/white-house-threatens-veto-pentagon-spending-bill-30-pay-hike-junior-troops.html/amp

CrossLOPER

09-27-2023, 18:15

For terms of conscription, well the US might need to do that in the future just for our peace-time force as the US population continues to live increasingly unhealthy lives and as military service requires more skilled persons than in the past. If kids are still wanting free college but not willing to serve a few years in peace time to do so then what other incentives are there?
Not a dangerous trend at all.

Healthcare costs insane? Military service.
Basic college education unreachable? Military service.
Many common jobs paying wages not worth considering? Military service.
Rations not high enough for survival? Military service.
Habshelter unlivable? Military service.

Maybe the solution is the reverse?

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/09/11/white-house-threatens-veto-pentagon-spending-bill-30-pay-hike-junior-troops.html/amp
The White House also argued the changes would create "pay compression" in some areas.

"This would remove an important incentive for enlisted members to seek increased responsibilities and earn promotions at the grade of E-6 and higher, harming military readiness," the statement said.

The House's defense spending bill was already unlikely to become law as-is after Republicans included a slew of partisan riders aimed at Pentagon policies that conservatives consider "woke."

The funding bill would, among other provisions, prohibit surgery or hormone therapy for transgender troops and ban funding from being used to pay for travel and leave for service members seeking abortions.
The US is absolutely screwed unless the leadership gets it into their head that dangling promises of better pay, and interfering with medical care is unacceptable.

Montmorency

10-04-2023, 02:25

Speaking of college education, the latest reporting finds an 8-year life expectancy gap between college Americans (bachelors or higher) and no-college Americans (though including 2-year degree and some college), largely because the latter are much likelier to have worse healthcare, environment, diet, and working conditions.

More broadly than life-expectancy, we could almost say non-college Americans live in Mexico, and college Americans live in Western Europe.

Crandar

10-09-2023, 10:30

An interesting comparison of the coverage of international crises by the New York Times (https://theconversation.com/headlines-and-front-lines-how-us-news-coverage-of-wars-in-yemen-and-ukraine-reveals-a-bias-in-recording-civilian-harm-209652).

Montmorency

10-09-2023, 22:12

There is a long history in media of a bias toward national foreign policy, and moreover the accessibility and relatability of the events and the place/people. Look at coverage of terrorist attacks and natural disasters in more vs. less developed countries.

Shaka_Khan

10-20-2023, 05:17

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQohz2t1WdY

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GQZwDDLHR_A

spmetla

10-20-2023, 19:36

Montmorency

10-21-2023, 04:04

It is quite crazy how the Houthi 'rebels' now have cruise missiles and ballistic missiles with the ability to launch strikes on the Saudis and Israelis.
Glad the DDG was there to detect and stop those missiles while transiting the Red Sea. Not a friendly neighborhood as the USS Cole remembers.

Houthis fired 19 missiles and drones in a single salvo. Precision strike capability is proliferating and is accessible to more & more states and groups (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3752391
). Any country not investing in air-defence systems now is in for a world of trouble in a few years.

At least we know our destroyers can intercept 19 targets in a single engagement.

Montmorency

10-26-2023, 19:25

At least we know our destroyers can intercept 19 targets in a single engagement.

Hmm, now there are some claims that the USS Carney could not have been where the US claimed it was in the Red Sea at the time of engagement, and that if it were, it could not have been engaging Houthi missiles, none of which have the range to strike Israel - so to the extent there were Houthi missiles being launched, it was KSA intercepting them. Not going to take the effort to check the facts against primary sources and raw data for something like this, but worth pointing out the controversy.

Shaka_Khan

12-10-2023, 00:39

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7IvDlJ-TV8g

spmetla

12-16-2023, 20:42

Thought Perun did a good piece on the crisis there. Seems unlikely that Venezuela will actually invade though, fingers crossed they don't. Though if they do I think a US carrier group off the coast would be able to wreak havoc upon the long supply lines and everything that is bigger than a 4x4 truck that I doubt an attack would come.

I think rather than a military invasion that Maduro will just use the gray zone tactic of acting likes it's their territory by allowing loggers, miners, and oil exploration to start and see if anyone will dare stop it.

It's the lesson learned from 2014's Crimea invasion and the reef building campaign by China, at levels short of war the ability of the US and friends to influence events is extremely difficult. With the internet our opponents are allowed to and do excellent information warfare to create discord about policy or distracting domestic problems (perpetual immigration problems for the US and Europe for example). When it's aggressive merchant marines, coast guard forces or paramilitiaries such as Russia's "little green men" there's too little outright conflict to draw the US in decisively. This allows the opponent to rise the stakes or just act as if the territory is theirs and force an reversion to the previous status quo to require the victim to resort to outright force.

We see this with the Philippine coast guard. If they start shooting at Chinese "Blue and White Hull" ships it starts a war they can't win and would allow the US to weasel out of its defense agreement as China would paint the Philippines as the aggressor using force to change the status quo.
I see the same will likely happen in Guyana. Maduro will simply just start to use the territory as if it belongs to Venezuela. Guyana is too weak to do anything outright and isn't guaranteed outside support to assert claims over its territory so it will eventually lose de facto control over its territory. An outright invasion by Venezuela would be too risky, costly, and potentially bring in outside forces which could spell defeat or internal instability.

Though Maduro would be right to gamble on the US willingness to intervene or not. Looking at the Houthi actions in the Red Sea and the complete lack of action by Biden in a military manner along this major sea artery shows the US as weak, divided, and for the moment impotent as any foreign war further risks Biden's reelection chances.
The actions of the Houthis should have compelled a powerful intervention up to essentially a giant raid against the Houthis by the USMC to destroy their ability to attack ships in the Red Sea with the backing of the Saudis and the rest of Yemen. No one in the US wants another war in the middle east but the actions of the Houthis demand a response.

Perun's video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWSE9dPEx6Y

Montmorency

12-17-2023, 18:55

The White House strategy throughout most of the Gaza War, albeit awfully gently and tentatively, has been to press Israel to deescalate in Gaza and find a non-final solution. Our relations with Egypt and the Saudis, among others (Muslims in general really), are diving due to their dissatisfaction with our role. The Palestinian Authority may not even survive beyond 2024, with polls suggesting its unpopularity is at or near record heights. The Iranians and Hezbollah have pretty clearly signalled since the start that they want this situation to wind down without any side attempting to change the status quo. We don't have to accept that it's trivial to shrug off Houthi actions, but spreading the war to peripheral actors by our own hand has near-unlimited downside, and for what? A temporary degradation of the capabilities of a group we have no real truck with other than trying to get the Saudis to make peace with them over the past 5 years.

Speaking of Perun, he did point out with respect to Ukraine last winter that the long-term progression of the war would see Ukraine and Russia equalize on soldier and unit quality and motivation or morale. We could see that already in play in October 2022. The Texeira leaks in April were of course cast an incredibly dour picture of UFOR, which indeed was accurate, but I believed even then that there was a long-term possibility of reclaiming the South and negotiating back close to prewar borders, assuming UFOR had spent the time training their assault corps to drive forward at a main effort (broadly the Azov Uplands) regardless of losses (30%, 40%, whatever) just to break the defensive belt somewhere and compromise it progressively. Thus they could make an argument to NATO for guaranteeing concrete support toward a limited goal, say over the next two years. But by July, as we learned that the Ukrainian leadership was rejecting as too risky large-scale operations for small-unit infiltration - the tactic Russian defenses are best equipped to absorb - I understood it was a near-hopeless situation.

It's incredible that reporting has consistently indicated most in the US and UA general staffs were convinced underequipped green brigades with on average 3 months of cumulative training would blow past the best-rested RuFOR formations in the best fortifications outside the Korean DMZ at a ~1:1 strength ratio. All prior evidence indicated that an offensive operation in such conditions could only proceed with great difficulty - again why I assumed GSUA planned for a bloody Hail Mary just to take some modest territory in order to make the point and enable future operations. In reality, UFOR and RUFOR have been converging on largely the same offensive tactics and structures since Summer 2022, and only a comprehensive remodeling of UFOR to the General level would be enough to offer some sort of edge. Meanwhile, increasing Ukrainian conscription woes have been reported since at least 12 months ago, whereas Russia again surprised even me by constructing a good enough incentive and shadow mobilization scheme to add at least 250-300K new personnel this year, to a total net size of the VSRF of as many as 1.5 million (12 months into the war the VSRF + separatists undergoing absorption, less PMC, were probably at least 1.3 million heads). I haven't seen up-to-date data on the average age of members, but it may even be a little lower than UFOR's current average age of 43 (per the Zelensky Time interview). In other words, notwithstanding the obvious point that if NATO was ever prepared to make the financial and resource commitment to see through restructuring their partner's military that chance was lost in 2022, it is too late for Ukraine itself to attempt such a task itself. Their best human resources have been recruited, or expended, or are outside the country.

Equipment attrition has been steadily declining for the past year, implying that the Russian storage and production of equipment will be sufficient to sustain parity with UFOR's level for a good three years if necessary. The vast majority of RuFOR losses overall, notably, come from their own inefficient attacks, which they could presumably finally choose to cease at whichever point it became too stressful for them. The balance of Western aid looks set only to allow Ukraine to survive.

Economically, the Russian sale price of petroleum products has recovered in the second half of the year, and the global capitalist paradigm is so complex and robust that not even the likes of Poland can, or is willing to, keep its companies from selling vital machine parts and tools quasi-directly to Russia.

In August I was predicting that RuFOR would launch an offensive during the winter to attack the Orikhiv salient. I think they still will, but it bespeaks Russian confidence that they've been willing to take some of their worst equipment and personnel losses of the entire year in South Donetsk this fall for the less strategically-relevant Avdiivka salient (personnel exchange ratios seem to be tolerable for Russia here, but the equipment exchange ratio may almost be the worst of the whole war).

The reported March 2022 truce proposal, coupled with a bilateral alliance with Poland, looks to have been the best case for Ukraine.

I might as well post this obscure blogger (https://onukraine.substack.com/) who dropped a handful of posts last fall and disappeared. I read these at the time they were published, and pretty much agreed with the whole. If our political and military classes had shared his interpretations however, they might have declined to support Ukraine in the first place, anyway. But I do have contempt for the blindness of the commentary class who got high on their own supply.

Shaka_Khan

04-14-2024, 03:26

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPyk69APB28

Shaka_Khan

04-19-2024, 04:21

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LfbuoL4S520

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xKVy4NgZF-w

Shaka_Khan

05-27-2024, 11:04

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Omcc81bXIc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Y8IDzWru34

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkD5pha2ezM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-sXI4bHxTxo

Shaka_Khan

07-21-2024, 07:11

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=StNkBIiAR3E

spmetla

08-13-2024, 03:09

The Kursk attack by Ukraine has been an interesting thing to watch.

Hurts Putin and the MoD domestically, allows Ukraine to attack troops in weak positions or rushing to reinforce, *may (to be determined) ease pressure on the Donbass, forces Russia to no longer treat the border as only something they can cross in force which will create a much greater 'garrison' requirement and deplete manpower availability for the fighting in Ukraine.

Just wonder what Ukraine will do in there in future. Assume they'll dig in and make it as difficult as possible for Russia to 'restore their borders' so it remains a thorn in Putin's side.

Montmorency

08-13-2024, 19:29

I doubt much of that. Putin so far has been reacting like Kursk isn't a top priority for him, which indeed is the strategically-intelligent choice - one I believe Russia's government can better afford politically than Ukraine can (e.g. in North Kharkiv). Although for reasons I doubt he will adopt the strong version of that approach of ignoring foreign occupation.

The border areas have long been defended by tens of thousands of Russian troops, just ones with minimal combat experience or arrayed as light infantry. Given the patterns of equipment usage through 2024, Putin can be judged to have a strong preference for feeding all available heavy equipment to the main theater of war; there aren't yet indications that Kursk is pressuring him to do otherwise.

What we may see happen is the Kursk salient be progressively contained, and attritted in place, as Ukraine's Dnieper bridgeheads were. But onto the latter RuFOR threw a great deal of metal, and in the case of Kursk the expected counterattacks may emphasize long range fires relatively-more. Meanwhile, Putin can feel somewhat comfortable that for UFOR to attack along the whole border with mechanized forces would require them to commit their entire strategic reserve at least, without actually being able to exploit very deep into the interior, rendering that threat more of a bluff. (It is also reported that some elements of UFOR deployed to Kursk were actually pulled from the central front, which seems suboptimal.)

While it's too early for such predictions, it is entirely plausible that the Kursk operation will turn into another typical muddle that neither side can benefit much from operationally.

However, given the declining internal political unity of Ukraine over this year, it may be argued that the morale boost from the operation is a strong upside, depending on how long it exerts such an effect.

spmetla

08-13-2024, 23:17

His reaction as certainly been lighter than what appears to be the reaction by Russian citizens and milbloggers.

I agree that for Russia, realistically this incursion is really a none factor, it doesn't take anything strategically significant at all, really a diversion. However, I think the internal pressure in Putin's regime will need to crush this incursion quickly just because it is recognized Russian territory.

Side point that I'd noticed though, given how weak the border areas were, the lack of preparation by the Russians, the factor of surprise and so on it's actually a surprisingly small initial push. Really shows me how naïve I was about the ability of Ukraine to do anything significant against prepared defenses in last year's counter offensive.
The initial EW superiority (amount of EW jamming, drone use, new frequencies) was a major win but something that they'll struggle to replicate again so hopefully this incursion is worth it.

I too wonder what Ukraine has left for its strategic reserve.

Montmorency

08-14-2024, 03:06

With RuFOR reinforcements (some of them interdicted by HIMARS) gradually streaming into the region, we'll see how resilient the UFOR op plan is. That will also determine the needed level of commitment by RuFOR. So far UFOR doesn't seem to intend to dig in on hostile territory, but the longer it operates in such conditions, even defensively, the less favorable the attrition ratios will be. (I wonder if Zelensky was thinking he needed a bargaining chip ahead of a potential Trump reelection, and/or that Ukraine had nothing left to lose vis-a-vis American support. Holding the territory for months and months is a challenge in itself.)

Ukraine basically did the same sorts of things it did in Kharkiv 2022, and that Russia did in February 2022. On the former, it built up forces in a soft area - OPSEC was better than Kharkiv 2022, some of the best of the war even, but they were still evidently observed - and took advantage of GSRU's inflexibility in order to maintain that buildup unilaterally until go-time. GSRU famously ignored all warnings coming from Kharkiv in August 2022, and it seems like an institutional problem. (Note that very similar flaws befell the Israeli process leading up to Al Aqsa Flood, which perhaps leads to a more general lesson about the corruption of military information synthesis and reporting under authoritarian civlian control.)

On the latter, Ukraine increased opsec this time in part by just doing what Russia did when it opened the invasion, which is relying on pretext and internal deceit/information-withholding to reduce attention. Russia had a "military exercise" pretext for assembling near the international borders, and Ukraine had a pretext of speculation that Russia was about to launch a buffer operation into Sumy province, just like it had into Kharkiv; officials were warning of this since April/May. (This also rhymes with the very public Ukrainian messaging/advertising throughout summer 2022 of a coming main effort in Kherson, which left Russia comfortable drawing down the Izyum axis.) Putin kept his plans secret from almost all of RuFOR until just about zero-day 2022, and so Syrski/Zelensky kept the plan secret from the Kursk task force (enlisted and many/most officers) until early August. Some soldiers were seemingly rotated in from other assignments around the theater with no briefing of where or what they were going to participate in.

So sure, surprise is still possible in 21st century LSCO, but it's risky and depends on very specific circumstances and opfor behaviors.

As for the size of the task force in Kursk currently, to my knowledge it is thought that there was a minimum of one brigade-equivalent maneuvering in Kursk in the first 24 hours, then a minimum of 2 brigades after 3-5 days. The floor could be higher now. But it's mostly mechanized and airborne/mobile units, and in that case the border guards and conscripts that UFOR overran early on performed better than one might expect, given they were largely armed with just MGs, RPGs, and the like, and had largely never seen real combat, yet still succeeded in holding up the UFOR advance significantly at places like Sudzha and Korenevo in the first day or two. Even if up to a whole battalion surrendered in the initial time period, against a US Army incursion (air force handicapped) I would expect them all to just melt away.

By the end of last week, we saw the increasing force level of RuFOR in terms of the participation of tanks, IFVs, and artillery (which was initially absent as RuFOR had little idea of where the opfor was). Here's an example (https://x.com/moklasen/status/1822998761246773434) of a Ukrainian vanguard BTR-4 getting obliterated by what looks like autocannon.

BTW, check your PMs.

Shaka_Khan

08-22-2024, 02:33

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MX3bU11CZOs

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RUSnA_MPDQI

Shaka_Khan

10-19-2024, 10:38

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yMosHZgJs4I

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IApQnD78UIo

spmetla

10-26-2024, 20:30

Crazy to think that DPRK is having its troops fight in Ukraine. Will certainly boost ROK support for Ukraine. Does make me angry that two and a half years later and the "west" is still not supporting Ukraine enough.
Kills me that they haven't been given hundreds of Abrams and Bradleys.

Was interesting to read about the Russians wanting to use tactical nukes in Ukraine over their Zaporozhe sabotage and being told off by Austin.

Shaka_Khan

12-11-2024, 01:54

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0pO12xJrIc0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6x9Hnsynye4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFPIWfg9Vxk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOGpB3mf6GI

spmetla

12-17-2024, 19:27

While the drone sightings are overblown and it's clear a lot of folks don't know what aircraft look like they are certainly a security risk. Low cost, often single use, able to fly about anywhere and requires very updated defenses to do soft or hard kills which is not suitable for so many public institutions.

Allowing so many Chinese students that are hostile to the West to study in the West is pretty stupid too. The old days of them learning to love their adopted country don't apply so much now that the PRC can have its plain clothes 'overseas police' to ensure loyalty and support of espionage. While the majority of the Chinese immigrants are probably safe I could see that militant minority being a major security risk in event of a conflict.
Would be a shame to have to do 'detention camps' like they did for the Japanese during WWII, if that's something even doable in today's political climate.

Montmorency

12-22-2024, 16:34

Expropriating and incarcerating fully-loyal citizens and redistributing their property on behalf of their envious neighbors turned out to be an exorbitant waste of wartime resources, as some clear-sighted individuals predicted at the time. Yes, it was a shame. But it would be in keeping with the theme of repeating the same mistakes over and over and over again, until we discover just how much ruin there is in a civilization…

Shaka_Khan

12-28-2024, 13:49

spmetla

12-31-2024, 20:20

The large numbers of small drones are usually very vulnerable to air burst munitions. Check out some videos of Germany's Skyranger SHORAD system, it's anti drone swarm is a start in the right direction. Of course 'hard kill' is not something that'd go over well in populated areas.

Even the soft kill has limits due to freq hop, limited AI capabilities for when contact is lost and then flying by wire with fiberoptic cables which are EW proof but much shorter in range.

Expropriating and incarcerating fully-loyal citizens and redistributing their property on behalf of their envious neighbors turned out to be an exorbitant waste of wartime resources, as some clear-sighted individuals predicted at the time.
I completely agree about the fully-loyal citizens being locked up as a waste of time, resources, and more likely to turn people away from the US.
I mean more the openly pro-PRC or very close ties to the PRC folks that for some reason are still permitted jobs within our government and key positions in private and public owned research groups.
At the very least these pro-PRC 'drone hobbyists' should face significant jail time for espionage related activities.

Montmorency

01-02-2025, 02:14

There have been a lot of reports about Chinese and Russian espionage activities in the West over the past decade, and my uninformed impression is that there's still a lot of 'gentleman's courtesy' in operation. Not that Russia and China have had a soft touch with Western agents, but that Western leaders fear they may have more to lose from a more aggressive tit-for-tat.

EDIT: Interesting tangential coverage (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/31/india-pakistan-targeted-killings-assassinations/).

spmetla

01-07-2025, 19:24

Seeing as China seems to just kill US spies I don't think there's much of a gentlemen's agreement. They just take advantage of the 'the West's' soft approach to national security. Same as they use gray war tactics in the South China Sea knowing there's nothing we can do about it seeming like bad guys.

The CIA falsely believed it was 'invincible' in China — here's how its spies were reportedly discovered and killed in one of the biggest blows to the agency
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-china-found-cia-spies-leak-2018-8

Though it's from the last Trump presidency I think it's something the CIA has likely not been able to recover from. The Chinese language/ character system are sort of a natural barrier to more US recruitment and make it hard for casual intercepts as well as that there's not that many westerners in the PRC and those that are, are under close scrutiny by a very 1984-esque state security infrastructure.

Montmorency

01-10-2025, 06:18

By gentleman's courtesy I mean that analysis I recall indicated that Russia, China, and the US are all to some extent aware of the domestic moles and foreign operatives each country has in the other at a given time, but don't crack down on them all at once in order to limit retaliation. I acknowledged that Russia and China are tougher on this than the US (the big China breach happened in the early 2010s btw). On top of the covert spies that get caught, sooner or later, such as Victor Manuel Rocha, and on top of the agents who are manipulated into feeding back disinformation, such as was common during WW2 and the Cold War, it just seems to be documented that governments - maybe Western ones more so - will also prefer to let some spies continue with some mitigation in a type of informational MAD. Maybe this is most visible in the work of embassies and consulates, which generally speaking each large country runs as information posts of some kind. Note all the Russian diplomats expelled from EU countries in the past couple years.

Beyond spies, IIRC this dynamic was all but officially confirmed with respect to Chinese police in the US and Europe a few years back.

Shaka_Khan

01-13-2025, 12:20

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-I5Trk0VCU

Furunculus

01-18-2025, 22:35

Shaka_Khan

02-20-2025, 12:27

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lX5sylNm8VY

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHy03dfIuyI

spmetla

02-20-2025, 21:34

Perhaps Chinese rising strength doesn't make this the best time for cutting the DoD by 40% over the next five years as proposed by SecDef Hegseth

Seamus Fermanagh

02-24-2025, 00:32

This Trump administration is different then the last on foreign policy. His first term was mostly devoted to his personal negotiation with strongmen leaders and an emphasis (admittedly with some legitimacy behind it) of trying to get NATO to pick up its share of the costs in defense (Putin's invasion of Ukraine was more successful than Trump's pressure/shame tactics in doing this).

Trump's second administration was elected with a substantial core of voter support that is firmly neo-isolationist. This cadre of support views Ukraine as a kleptocracy not worth our time or treasure and certainly no worthy of coming under article 5 commitment. And while Trump has said comparatively little regarding Taiwan, nothing he has said so far this term clearly shows support for the idea that he would defend it against a Chinese invasion. Source (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/21/donald-trump-russia-ukraine-foreign-policy-impact-taiwan)

Hegseth and the rest of the administration assume that some of the defense costs will come from scrapping DEI (which they view as racist and as diminishing capability) and reducing waste/fraud (some of which probably does exist, especially waste). But I think they are viewing a reduced "World's police officer" role for the USA in favor of a more isolationist stance -- which means less that must be paid for.

So, if you aren't going to defend Taiwan, you certainly don't have to keep the budget big enough to do so.

spmetla

02-27-2025, 02:45

I don't think Trump has any intention to defend Taiwan or even deter China from attacking them. Looking at how we've closed one of our bases in Greece because Erdogan asked Trump too just shows our foreign policy is now just up to which totalitarian state is willing to pay the most.

Trump and so much of MAGA just want the Army to be a border patrol force and throwing our weight around the American continent so that who knows what the DoD's future is.

Taiwan's defense without US support is doomed because unlike Ukraine, there's no way that the rest of the Quad could break a blockade and help resupply/reinforce Taiwan if the US reneges on our promises.

At least Ukraine has roads and railroads to the rest of Europe that allowed its economy to survive until the Black Sea fleet was reduced to irrelevance. Short of major and quick investments by Taiwan in anti-ship and anti-air of everything from shoulder fired to semi mobile batteries I don't see how they would survive militarily much less economically (just food water and fuel for example) on a blockaded island.

Shaka_Khan

03-01-2025, 03:09

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ReIl8o_kXeI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcDcxWS5BWA

spmetla

03-14-2025, 19:17

Any thoughts on this 'peace process' sought out by Trump?

I can't in my right mind thing that there's anything Trump could do to achieve peace aside from getting Ukraine to capitulate.

The Russians certainly don't want peace under any terms short of victory, there's not much pressure the US can put directly on Russia via sanctions etc at this point as so much has already been done. The only leverage against Russia that the US really has in in how much it supports Ukraine.

This is of course played out by Trump's weakening of NATO. China has been able to step into European politics as the mature and stable partner now that the 'leader of the west' has decided to go rogue against its own partners and allies.

Deterrence against an invasion of Taiwan is certainly weakened.

I just hope that the supposed planning for an 'invasion of Panama' to seize the canal never happens. There're no guard rails around Trump anymore and I don't think the military brass would ever refuse even without explicit support for war from Congress.
If the US were to do that it would be the final nail in the coffin of the 'rule-based world order' as though the US has done wars in the past (post-WW2 i mean) it's never done so for conquest. Additionally, a guerilla war against the US would likely happen in Panama for years which would destroy any economic 'benefits' of outright US ownership.

A US war against Panama would also outline the vulnerability of Canada and Mexico. Canada at least has the rest of NATO as a deterrence. Mexico however is without formal allies. This could lead to it joining NATO (a positive development) or to partnering with the PRC (less likely but still possible due to money available).

Montmorency

03-15-2025, 01:19

Unless Trump durably shuts down the USAI contracted pipeline (unfortunately Biden left billions on the table here and was generally extremely slow, Euro-slow, on actually settling contracts, notwithstanding even their relevance/soundness, which is more technical to comment on), there's not really any difference in the long-term prospect we observed for Ukraine a year ago compared to now or a year from now. Russia's industrial, economic, demographic, and materiel limits remain what they are (another 1-1.5 years of hard press in LSCO), Ukraine will never develop the skills and heavy formations necessary to have any hope of retaking territory (though they seem to have gotten wiser about dynamic defense this winter), and their morale remains comparable to Russian morale, or maybe worse.

Same situation as a year ago regardless of who's in office. This is actually analogous to the Israel-Palestine situation, where both a Biden/Harris or a Trump admin also seemed poised to entail the long-term destruction of the Palestinian state project in the long-term. It wasn't even clear which government would result in less human suffering before the 'final solution', though I'd suggest Trump is worse for Palestinian lives and livelihoods in aggregate.

The one wildcard a year ago was just how low Ukrainian morale could go. Too low and there was a serious risk of an operational collapse occurring somewhere, and spreading into a strategic collapse that took down UFOR east of the Dnieper, or even the government itself. But by late last year it was pretty clear that Ukrainian morale had stabilized, as had the government's legitimacy - despite sinking fast after the failed 2023 campaign, by the end of last year Zelensky still maintained majority approval, which is quite a feat in a democratic system nowadays. So in other words, it's far from obvious that the Russians have such a surfeit of will as to outlast Ukraine. Maybe the Kursk Offensive even supported this resolve, I don't know. Also this winter the RuFOR operational tempo has declined dramatically, in part due to more effective UFOR spoiling attacks against their salients. To be fair, part of the picture is probably just waiting for clear decisions by the new Trump admin, as well as the exhaustion of reserves following a ridiculously protracted and intense year-plus-long campaign. And combat activity remains elevated far above 2022-3 averages overall. On the other hand, the UFOR equipment pipeline and stockpile from EU/US donations, arms contracts, and domestic production remains very ample for defensive purposes, as long as Ukraine can manage its manpower situation properly.

But TLDR: Stalemate. Same as always. It's hard to see Ukraine collapsing, but Russia won't stop until it's convinced there's no further point for the time being. It can aspire to taking the rest of Donetsk, most optimistically continuing to roll up the old southern front to the Dnieper, but not really any more.

I'd be more worried about Chinese influence in Africa and Latin America now that the US has gone fully rogue.