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There was a reality TV mini-series on BBC a few years ago, called "The Trench", which looked at the everyday reality of trench warfare, based on the experiences of a Hull battalion in the war. In addition to the tedium, there were occasional highlights such as patrols, and there was a bit where one of the men certified for a Lewis gun qualification, having spent x hours training in said weapon. On a larger scale and over a longer time period, there were qualifications for other weapons as well, training in the latest tactical ideas, working with other branches, and other, less feasible and more hairbrained theories. All with meticulous documentation, so as to better control and disseminate ideas.
Interesting, thanks. Perhaps I will find the time to watch it.
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It was the British who went furthest in coordinating technology with infantry tactics, with whole departments dedicated to proving that their idea of technological advance was the war-winning way, and a huge bureaucracy gathering data on the success or otherwise of the latest experiment, in an effort to turn war into a science rather than an art. We all know about tanks, but far more immediately successful advances were the perfection of artillery use, and the proliferation of light machine guns among the spearhead, and squad tactics thereby derived. Artillery-wise, the British perfected the counter-battery system, and worked out just what weight and type of barrage was necessary to suppress defences, thus enabling infiltration tactics. Machine gun-wise, the British went wholeheartedly with the Lewis gun, which carried firepower with the advancing infantry, and developed squad tactics that both utilised said firepower and allowed fluid exploitation of changing situations.
I would also invite you to read the "The Dynamics of Doctrine", as it is a good summary of tactics IMHO. The creation of doctrines and tactics is a highly dynamic process and it is often hard to determine its exact evolution. The British drive to integrate technology was certainly impressive, however I would not call it war-winning. The stark difference in manpower and ressources was war-winning, the evolution in tactics was a helping component. After the debacle at the Somme a change was certainly needed. Even with large manpower pool loosing roughly 432000 men (killed, wounded and captured) against ~230000 (killed, wounded and captured) for some miles of ground is hardly a "victory".
The German army was certainly behind the curve when it came to tanks, but once again it is mostly a question of ressources. Although the pioneered the use of heavy artillery the suffered also greatly in the numbers of guns and the amount of ammunition. Keep in mind that the Allies had access to all the ressources they wanted and the USA first as supplier and later as ally. The Axis had a smaller industrial base and the naval isolation was far more harmful than the submarine campaign.
The wide use of the Lewis gun showed beside the capability to supply many the willigness to do so and tactical understanding. The MP 18 Bergmann was however arguably a greater step forward and was the first practical submachine gun.
The preceived impressions of the War
Google book
Battle Tactics of the Western Front (1996)
Von Paddy Griffith
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Historians have portrayed British participation in the Great War as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, untried new military technology and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book Paddy Griffith, a renowned military historian, examines the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies persistently failed during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology and, eventually, its self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the autumn of 1918, he argues, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during the Second World War. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties; but that the breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. By the end of 1916 the British were already masters of 'storm-troop tactics' and, in several important respects, further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, 'commando-style' trench raiding, the use of light machine guns or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, the book maintains they should at least be credited with having effectively invented much of thetwentieth century's art of war.
The myth of the Great War, 2003
Von John Mosier
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Based on previously unused French and German sources, this challenging and controversial new analysis of the war on the Western front from 1914 to 1918 reveals how and why the Germans won the major battles with one-half to one-third fewer casualties than the Allies, and how American troops in 1918 saved the Allies from defeat and a negotiated peace with the Germans
Draw an amazing amount of Flak by British readers at Amazon
The Somme, 2006
Von Robin Prior, Trevor Wilson
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Despite superior air and artillery power, British soldiers died in catastrophic numbers at the Battle of Somme in 1916. What went wrong, and who was responsible? This book meticulously reconstructs the battle, assigns responsibility to military and political leaders.
This shows just how controversial the whole topic is. Amazing is the differing account of casualites in major battles, especially on the German side when consulting Anglo-american literature. From war-time 600.000 plus to German-backed numbers as low as 165000. To sum it up i would not say that the british ability to integrate technology into tactics was unmatched (see the MP18 and storm troopers, to name one example) and that the tactical superiority of the German forces was very large. Anyway I would think it would be best to read the paper I posted.
