Afrika Korps

[Agent Miles]

I think that one must blur a lot of facts to reasonably compare the two. The Greek garrison army defeated the Italians and drove them back into Albania. So one could argue that they accomplished what O’Connor did. The French drove back an Italian army on their southern border while they were being overrun by the Germans. I’m pretty sure that the only people who did not defeat the Italians were the spear-armed Ethiopian tribesmen. Yes, Rommel and O’Connor brilliantly out-flanked their opponent, but one has to remember who their opponents were to scale the accomplishment. House training my puppy is not reasonably comparable to lion taming.

[Pannonian]

I think that one must blur a lot of facts to reasonably compare the two. The Greek garrison army defeated the Italians and drove them back into Albania. So one could argue that they accomplished what O’Connor did. The French drove back an Italian army on their southern border while they were being overrun by the Germans. I’m pretty sure that the only people who did not defeat the Italians were the spear-armed Ethiopian tribesmen. Yes, Rommel and O’Connor brilliantly out-flanked their opponent, but one has to remember who their opponents were to scale the accomplishment. House training my puppy is not reasonably comparable to lion taming.

Well, you highlighted the tactical genius of Rommel in doing what he did, so I showed you that O'Connor did exactly the same thing, using the same tactics, even down to capturing enemy fuel and equipment and using it to further push one's offensive forward. The mobile column that crossed the desert to cut off the Italian retreat was an example of kampfgruppe tactics, as it consisted of whatever mobile elements the British could pull together from available units, given an objective, then left alone to carry it out while the slower Australians pushed the Italians back frontally. How is this different in methodology from Rommel?

O'Connor can't have been all that clever if he got captured early on.

Rommel was lucky, O'Connor was unlucky. On a number of occasions, Rommel was scouting at the front when he ran into British scouts, on one occasion only getting away because he was riding in a captured British vehicle that wasn't identified. O'Connor was returning to his relocated HQ when he was caught, and his captors initially didn't realise whom they'd captured (his aides were dressed more impressively than him).

Rommels first success was mostly because Britons did not respect his skills.
British generals had to send best units to Greece.
If we are comparing O'Connor and Rommel - O'Connor was better for me. Africa Corps and Britons into Africa had equal strenght at the beginning of that stage of war. O'Connor had to attack few times stronger enemy.

Anyway someone showed polish flag. Thx - looks like you are using tactic "I have no arguments so I will tell that he is Pole and uses polish propaganda". Imagine my friend that polish brigade defended Tobruk against Rommel.
And his great africa corps lost that battle (and appeared to be lower skilled than infantry brigade).

Rommel's much vaunted genius failed him whenever he had to attack a competent enemy front-on. The Australians bloodied his nose at Tobruk, Auchinleck and Montgomery fended him off at Alamein, Montgomery was astonished at his idiocy at Medinine, and thereafter he never launched another offensive. Whatever his limitations, Montgomery was able to crumble his enemy, bulldog style, grabbing a biteful then holding on until the enemy was exhausted. The British initially failed because their commanders had outdated cavalry ideas of charges and counter charges, while the PBI were left to hold a line or bring up the rear. Once they had a commander with modern ideas of combined arms warfare, and previously, before they lost their commander with modern ideas of combined arms warfare, they were able to deal with the best the Axis could throw at them.

[Husar]

Rommel was lucky, O'Connor was unlucky.

You could use that argument for the progression of the war as well. The americans were lucky to live in america for example, the british were lucky to live on an island that's relatively hard to overrun etc. etc.

[Agent Miles]

How is this different in methodology from Rommel?

It is different because it obscures the most important factor, that of scale. If Nadal takes my six year old grandson onto a tennis court and beats him it is not comparable to Nadal beating Roddick just because he used the same “methodology”. Every nation armed with more than pointy sticks beat the Italians. Granted, O’Connor was really brilliant when he did it, but you must agree that it’s just not comparable to what Rommel did.

[PanzerJaeger]

In such a comparison, it is important to remember just how terrible the Italian army was at this time. The British were outclassed, but the Italians were simply incompetent. Some of the stunts they pulled belonged in a Monty Python skit instead of the battlefield, including top commanders deserting their armies before battles even commenced.

"Failure has had the healthy effect of once more compressing Italian claims to within the natural boundaries of Italian capabilities." -Hitler

This is not to say that O'Connor wasn't a good commander, but to hold him in the same league as Rommel due to his performance against the Italians is slightly off base.

If one were to examine Operation Compass, it is clearly evident that aside from some minor combat, it was nothing more than a series of massed surrenders. In a campaign which involved the capture or surrender of well over 100,000 Italians, the British lost around 500 men and 15 aircraft, while the Italians lost less than 3000 in non-captured or surrendered casualties. The Italian leadership was just unimaginably terrible, and the troops had very little will to put up serious resistance.*

Compare this, to say, Gazala, which involved similar troop deployments - where the British lost nearly 100,000 men and the Axis lost around 30,000 along with large numbers of tanks and planes on both sides, or 1st El Alamein where both sides lost around 15,000, or any other face off between the British and the German-led forces. These battles involved real combat on a large scale and represented a very different situation than what was prevalent during Compass. Neither side simply threw up their hands in surrender so willingly.

*The turnaround the Italians had under Rommel and German leadership is quite amazing, and demonstrates the vital importance that moral and confidence in command plays in the effectiveness of a fighting force.

Rommel's much vaunted genius failed him whenever he had to attack a competent enemy front-on. The Australians bloodied his nose at Tobruk, Auchinleck and Montgomery fended him off at Alamein, Montgomery was astonished at his idiocy at Medinine, and thereafter he never launched another offensive. Whatever his limitations, Montgomery was able to crumble his enemy, bulldog style, grabbing a biteful then holding on until the enemy was exhausted. The British initially failed because their commanders had outdated cavalry ideas of charges and counter charges, while the PBI were left to hold a line or bring up the rear. Once they had a commander with modern ideas of combined arms warfare, and previously, before they lost their commander with modern ideas of combined arms warfare, they were able to deal with the best the Axis could throw at them.

Really?

Much is made of Tobruk, but in reality it was a fully supplied and reinforced fortress, with both heavily reinforced man-made defenses and natural barriers. The Axis forces only slightly outnumbered those of the Allies, and more importantly, were almost all Italian. The few German units available had to be used to defend against relieving actions such as Brevity and Battleaxe. One must also remember that the siege did not take place in a vacuum. There was a whole Allied Army just beyond the horizon that had to be kept in check.

There is little room for tactical genius in siege warfare. You either have the blunt force to knock down the proverbial walls or you don't. What is more telling is how Tobruk came under siege to begin with and O'Conner captured. Therein lies Rommel's command abilities.

Also, which Alamein are you referring to? In both battles the Axis were completely outnumbered in every respect. Take the Italians out of the equation and the German men and material were but a small fraction of the British forces. And again, there was not really much that could have been done tactically given the geographical circumstances.

You're also way off on Medinine. Rommel had very little if anything to do with the planning or command of that operation. I'm also not sure what you are trying to emphasize by stating he never launched another offensive - as this was in March of 1943 and there was nothing even remotely close to parity between the two forces numerically, not to mention the American's on the other side.

Now then, you seem to discount all of Rommel's victories as battles won against incompetents. Wouldn't that make O'Connor, who hesitated in taking command of the situation the first time the British collapsed and then got himself captured, an incompetent as well?

[Oleander Ardens]

Mostly good posts here.

Sadly PJ is quite right that the Italian army seemed to be partly something out of Monty Python sketch. The greates fault lies on officer corps and generals and their staff. Partly Italian soliders fought valiantly, but there is only so much you can do without supply. Given the terrible and poor performances of the Italian forces in France (alpine theater, IIRC the field artillery magazine had in 1941 a nice article about it), Albania, Abessinia and Somalia the Italian army can be rated as third-class. More so in this Operation where the excellent spirit and vigor of the Allies and inspired command hammered them. I guess that all this wars by waged by the Italians with mixed results against the poor and heavily outgunned African nations had a bad influence on the Italian army.


Note that under Rommel many of them performed quite well, which just shows how incompetent their leaders were.

There is little room for tactical genius in siege warfare. You either have the blunt force to knock down the proverbial walls or you don't. What is more telling is how Tobruk came under siege to begin with and O'Conner captured. There in lies Rommel's command abilities.

Most people have sadly little understanding of warfare. As PJ rightly points out a siege is a bloody affair for the attacker unless he has overwhelming firepower. Clausewitz dictum that defense is the stronger form has been proven again and again. Thus the need to concentrate large amounts of manpower and firepower with good mobility to achieve a breakthrough. With as little as 5000 tons a day of supply there was no way to reduce the fortress-city with the little artillery they had. With only a slight superiority in numbers - most of them Italians - chances of a victory would be slim against isolated city. But Tobruq had due to it's position a very short frontline and could be supplied well by the Royal Navy. Take a look on the map.

P.S: Just compare the siege to other hard-fought sieges in WWII (Monte Cassino for example) to see how laughable the firepower of the Axis was. Note they the weight and amount of gun wasn't even that terrible - the tiny number of shells was. This battlefield series helps the less educated a good starter - here the siege of Sevastopol. Note the focus on heavy firepower - the "annihilation princip" of Napoleon, codified by Clauswitz.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Rommel understood the difficulty of assaulting built-up positions. His service in Italy in 1918 would have been instructive. Still, it is obvious that such situations do limit tactical options. The 'stormtrooper' tactics used by Imperial Germany in 1918 were as good as it gets for taking built up positions by storm -- and they require high-quality motivated troops who will take significant casualties. Even knowing those tactics, Rommel may simply not have had the ability to absorb that kind of loss without the whole exercise being rather Pyrhhic.

Of all of the modern "desert" generals named, I'd probably give the nod to Rommel, but I don't think his leadership was orders of magnitude better than O'Connor or Schwartzkopf -- just a few notches.

[Oleander Ardens]

Rommel understood the difficulty of assaulting built-up positions. His service in Italy in 1918 would have been instructive. Still, it is obvious that such situations do limit tactical options. The 'stormtrooper' tactics used by Imperial Germany in 1918 were as good as it gets for taking built up positions by storm -- and they require high-quality motivated troops who will take significant casualties. Even knowing those tactics, Rommel may simply not have had the ability to absorb that kind of loss without the whole exercise being rather Pyrhhic.

True enough, even if he actually did attack initially the fortress, taking rather heavy casualities in the process. The infiltration tactics of WWI were of course the tactical (becoming also partly the operational) mold for every intelligent offensive operation. However the concept ever called for heavy firepower directed ala' Bruchmueller. It was impossible to achieve against Tobruk given the small weight of the artillery and the even smaller of the available ammunition. Heavy mobile direct firepower in the form of well-armored assault guns and self-propelled artillery who proved to be of so great importance later in the war lacked completely. Airpower was also not available in even remotely sufficient numbers, nor to support the siege, nor to cut off the supplies. Seapower was not present.

All in all the defenders of Tobruk were brave but all but successfull defense under this circumstances would have cast a deep shadow on the capabilities of allied forces in a "conventional" setting.

[Pannonian]

True enough, even if he actually did attack initially the fortress, taking rather heavy casualities in the process. The infiltration tactics of WWI were of course the tactical (becoming also partly the operational) mold for every intelligent offensive operation. However the concept ever called for heavy firepower directed ala' Bruchmueller. It was impossible to achieve against Tobruk given the small weight of the artillery and the even smaller of the available ammunition. Heavy mobile direct firepower in the form of well-armored assault guns and self-propelled artillery who proved to be of so great importance later in the war lacked completely. Airpower was also not available in even remotely sufficient numbers, nor to support the siege, nor to cut off the supplies. Seapower was not present.

All in all the defenders of Tobruk were brave but all but successfull defense under this circumstances would have cast a deep shadow on the capabilities of allied forces in a "conventional" setting.

How would you assess the original Australian assault on Tobruk?

[Oleander Ardens]

How would you assess the original Australian assault on Tobruk?

Pretty much as Wikipedia:

Following the fall of Bardia, 7th Armoured Division with Australian 19th Brigade advanced to Tobruk which was isolated by the 7th Armoured Division on the 6 January. By 9 January it was surrounded.[34] After a twelve day period building up forces around Tobruk, O'Connor attacked on 21 January and Tobruk was captured 22 January, yielding over 25,000 prisoners along with 236 field and medium guns[6], 23 medium tanks and more than 200 other vehicles. The Australian losses were 49 dead and 306 wounded

A truly fierce siege against determined defenders which made a crushing amount of firepower an absolute necessity. Still kudos to the Aussies.

P.S: The article CBR posted shows just how terrible the intratheater supply situation of the Axis forces was. No fuel - no mobility, no ammunition - no firepower.

[Pannonian]

How would you?

The Australians lacked overwhelming firepower, numbers, and time, needing to take it quickly with whatever was at hand so their pursuit wouldn't be delayed.

[Oleander Ardens]

I edited my post without seeing your reply

How would you assess the original Australian assault on Tobruk?

Pretty much as Wikipedia:

Following the fall of Bardia, 7th Armoured Division with Australian 19th Brigade advanced to Tobruk which was isolated by the 7th Armoured Division on the 6 January. By 9 January it was surrounded.[34] After a twelve day period building up forces around Tobruk, O'Connor attacked on 21 January and Tobruk was captured 22 January, yielding over 25,000 prisoners along with 236 field and medium guns[6], 23 medium tanks and more than 200 other vehicles. The Australian losses were 49 dead and 306 wounded

A truly fierce siege against determined defenders which made a crushing amount of firepower an absolute necessity. Still kudos to the Aussies. See also that they had in their infantry tanks (Matilda) an excellent "assault gun" for the specific METT-T.

Next day, the capture of the remaining outposts from R1 to S11 was completed and assisted strongly by Infantry tanks of the Support Group and the 2nd Rifle Brigade and 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps which had arrived as reinforcements that morning. Meanwhile, the 7th Armoured Division which had also entered the perimeter from the Derna road that morning stood by to advance into the town if required.

P.S: The article CBR posted shows just how terrible the intratheater supply situation of the Axis forces was. No fuel - no mobility, no ammunition - no firepower.

[Mount Suribachi]

Contrary to popular belief, German tanks in North Africa, excluding the Tigers, were not superior to their Allied equivalents in any particularly meaningful ways. It was the skill of the crews as well as their doctrine which resulted in the lopsided results

I'm sorry. but you're taking the michael here. The PzIII & PzIV not superior to the Crusader, A13 and Matlida? British tanks were without exception, underpowered, underarmed, unreliable and (Matilda excepted) underarmoured. Not only was the 2pdr a pop-gun, it was also unable to fire HE ammunition. Then throw in the German 88m AT gun (which to be fair probably destroyed more British tanks than the Panzers) and the British were totally outclassed until the arrival of the Sherman put them back on a level playing field.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I'm sorry. but you're taking the michael here. The PzIII & PzIV not superior to the Crusader, A13 and Matlida? British tanks were without exception, underpowered, underarmed, unreliable and (Matilda excepted) underarmoured. Not only was the 2pdr a pop-gun, it was also unable to fire HE ammunition. Then throw in the German 88m AT gun (which to be fair probably destroyed more British tanks than the Panzers) and the British were totally outclassed until the arrival of the Sherman put them back on a level playing field.

The panzers WERE superior -- but not by large margins.

The most common marks fielded by Axis forces: M13/40, Pzkw-II, Pzkw-IIIh were, respectively, a fully-tracked assisted suicide device, an undergunned lightweight, and a mediocre performer. Only the relatively few up-gunned types (such as the less-than-two dozen IIj's and infrequent Marders) really outclassed the Allied armor. Moroever, while the 2-pounder was very much past its prime by the Gazala battles, the 37mm mounted by the Stuarts and Lees fought all but the best gunned German armor at par. The key to German success was their excellent tactical coordination. THAT is what got the 88's in place for the armor to fall back through them and let them brew up Crusaders and the like. In short, the playing field was a good bit more "level" than some would like to admit.

[Husar]

a fully-tracked assisted suicide device

Also I tend to agree, the Panzer II to me always looked more like an armored machinegun position than anything else, if it can crack your armor with that tiny gun, then your armor must be pretty weak. I'm by no means an expert but I think the british tanks had bigger guns than 20mm.
I don't know much about the Panzer III, except that there must have been a reason to introduce a Panzer IV.

Interesting topic by the way but I don't know a lot about it, obviously.

[Oleander Ardens]

I think not all people are able to appreciate the great advantages of the strategic defense which the British enjoyed after having been beaten quite badly be the Axis. The political and economical situation made time and space commodities on the Allied side and so the good tactical defense in depth against forces inferior in ressources made it able to lay the foundations of a new offensive operations.

[PanzerJaeger]

I'm sorry. but you're taking the michael here. The PzIII & PzIV not superior to the Crusader, A13 and Matlida? British tanks were without exception, underpowered, underarmed, unreliable and (Matilda excepted) underarmoured. Not only was the 2pdr a pop-gun, it was also unable to fire HE ammunition. Then throw in the German 88m AT gun (which to be fair probably destroyed more British tanks than the Panzers) and the British were totally outclassed until the arrival of the Sherman put them back on a level playing field.

First of all, British tanks were clearly superior to the Pz.II. That much is not debatable, I would think. As to the pz.III, the Matilda had a significant armor advantage and the Crusader was faster. The early pz.IV is also often misjudged. It was actually meant to be an infantry support tank much like the British models and performed worse than the pz.III in tank versus tank combat:

Although the Panzer IV was deployed to North Africa with the German Afrika Korps, until the longer gun variant began production the tank was outperformed in penetrating armour by the Panzer III.[64] Both the Panzer III and IV had difficulty in penetrating the British Matilda II's thick armor, while the Matilda's 40 mm QF 2 pdr gun could knock out either German tank; its major disadvantage was its low speed.[65] By August 1942, Rommel had only received 27 Panzer IV Ausf. F2s, armed with the L/43 gun, which he deployed to spearhead his armored offensives.[65] The longer gun could penetrate all American and British tanks in theater at ranges of up to 1,500 metres (4,900 ft).[66] Although more of these tanks arrived in North Africa between August and October 1942, their numbers were insignificant compared to the amount of matériel shipped to British forces.[67]

What really kills your assertion, though, is Lend-Lease. By the time the more powerful variants of the pz.III and the pz.IV mentioned in the above quote arrived in Africa in significant numbers, the US M3 and later Sherman were in abundance - in time for Gazala and El Alamein respectively.

M3:

The Medium Tank M3 first saw action in 1942 during the North African Campaign. British Lees and Grants were in action against Rommel's forces at the disastrous Battle of Gazala on May 27 that year. They continued to serve in North Africa until the end of that campaign. A regiment of M3 Mediums was also used by the U.S. 1st Armored Division in North Africa. In the North African campaign, the M3 was generally appreciated for its mechanical reliability, good armor, and heavy firepower. In all three areas it outclassed the available British tanks, and were able to fight German tanks and towed anti-tank guns.

Overall, the M3 was able to cope with the battlefield of 1942. Its armor and firepower were the equal or superior to most of the threats it faced. Long-range, high velocity guns were not yet common on German tanks.

M4:

When the Sherman first saw combat in 1942, its 75 mm M3 gun could defeat the armor of the German Pzkw III and Pzkw IV tanks it faced in North Africa at normal combat ranges.

So, yes, I am confident in my original statement. Niether the British nor the American armored forces ever suffered from a significant inferiority to their German counterparts. Its simply a myth created to excuse poor performance. Even at their worst (the time directly before receiving American armor), the British tanks still enjoyed advantages over their German rivals. By the time the few long barreled pz.IVs reached Africa, the Sherman was already in service - which held significant advantages of its own. Your comment about the 88s had nothing to do with tank versus tank comparability, and is thus irrelevant. Do I get to mention how many more tanks the Allies had?

The British armored forces, and the Americans to a lesser extent, performed in the manner that they did not because of technical inferiority but of doctrinal. Despite those huge numerical advantages mentioned above, they allowed themselves to be outmaneuvered, tricked into tank traps, and generally outfought. This was an issue of skill, not equipment.

[Papewaio]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Tobruk

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leslie_Morshead

The Battle of the Salient

Rommel's troops had captured fifteen posts on an arc of three-and-a-half miles of the perimeter, including its highest fort. But the Australians had largely contained this Italo-German thrust. One German POW said: "I cannot understand you Australians. In Poland, France, and Belgium, once the tanks got through the soldiers took it for granted that they were beaten. But you are like demons. The tanks break through and your infantry still keep fighting."[28] Rommel wrote of seeing "a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prisoners [largely from C Company of the 2/24th Battalion that had been taken prisoner by the Italians]... marched off close behind us—immensely big and powerful men, who without question represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a fact that was also evident in battle."

Rommel placed the blame for the failure to capture Tobruk squarely on the Italians.[citation needed] However, it was the 19th and 20th Infantry Regiments of the 27th "Brescia" Division along with the 5th and 12th Bersaglieri Battalions of the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment, the 3rd Company, 32nd Combat Sappers Battalion and "Ariete" Armoured Division who after much hard fighting, had possession of most of the positions which the Australians had lost[30] The 7th Bersaglieri Regiment soldiers bunkered along the newly captured concrete bunkers. The Australians fought hard to win back their positions. Much fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place from 1 May till the end of August 1941 when finally the weary soldiers of the 7th Bersaglieri were ordered move to Ain Gazala to rest and refit.[31] According to an Australian soldier, "In Tobruk we became part of the 9th Division with the 28th and 16th Battalions. Each Platoon had to do two or three weeks in the Salient, which was a section of ‘no man’s land’ where the enemy had driven us back from fortifications that skirted Tobruk from sea to sea. Time up there wasn’t exactly pleasurable. We were in dugouts with interconnecting trenches about a foot or so deep (hence becoming known as the ‘rats of Tobruk’). The Germans pummelled us with trench mortar bombs and also had fixed machine guns firing on us."[32]

[PanzerJaeger]

Heh, Pap, that Wiki on ol Ming was obviously written by someone who admired him as much as you do.

[Papewaio]

My two quotes showed that Rommel's word had to be taken with a grain of salt. Even though he compliments the Aussies, he shows inaccuracy in summing up how the Italians performed. As such his compliment has to be taken into context too.

Morshead tactics did work to counter Rommel. But they are not new by any means as they were used by the Australian's in the second Boer War. Aggressive patrolling was also seen later on in the likes of Vietnam. End of the day patrols reduce the fog of war.

I don't like Ming... far too right wing and no were as good as Monash. Also while Monash is on the $100 note, I don't think you'll find Morshead on any currency.

The true role of infantry is not to expend itself upon heroic physical effort, not to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire, not to impale itself on hostile bayonets, but on the contrary, to advance under the maximum possible protection of the maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine-guns, tanks, mortars and aeroplanes; to advance with as little impediment as possible; to be relieved as far as possible of the obligation to fight their way forward.

Combined Arms...

[Oleander Ardens]

I think we should not divert our focus on Monash. A great tactician to be sure, but not certainly the first and most brilliant mind to come up with "combined arms". The concept is as old as war, while its form in WWI was mostly driven by the Germans - with important contribuitions of the French and Russians, and less so of the British.

The Dynamics of Doctrine:
The Change in German
Tactical Doctrine During the
First World War

The Germans did not win the First World War and their strategic conduct of the war was often flawed. Yet, much value can be derived from their development of tactical doctrine, for the Germans developed and applied new tactical doctrine impressively in 1917 and 1918. Their tactical changes were systematic and thorough, for these changes in doctrine directly effected subsequent battlefield success. The analysis of the doctrinal changes cannot be restricted to examining changes to regulations because doctrine that influences nothing beyond the printing press is stillborn.

German successes in World War I demonstrated a thorough process:

* Perception of a need for change
* Solicitation of ideas, especially from the battlefield units
* Definition of the change
* Dissemination of the change
* Enforcement throughout the army
* Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate
the change
* Thorough training
* Evaluation of effectiveness
* Subsequent refinement

This outline describes the manner by which the German Army succeeded in changing and implementing tactical doctrine during war. The process is not rigidly sequential; it is a dynamic process that requires great intellectual ability and strong character from tacticians who desire to make successful changes.

Many characteristics ascribed to the German military have too often sufficed for explanations of German military success. Glib expressions such as "great organization" or "a knack for war" do little justice to the men who brought success to German arms and, more importantly, offer little guidance for anyone who desires to achieve similar success.

In the examination of the German process of tactical change, several important personalities emerge. Their memoirs certainly must be used with caution, but I have quoted extensively from participants in this paper, in part to convey the essential interest in tactics among the participants. Their interest in tactics is instructive, for not all military leaders possess a continuing interest in tactics.

I do not intend to portray all German tactical efforts as inherently brilliant. The Germans usually achieved a relative advantage over the Allies with respect to tactical change. Tentative generalizations about the reasons for this German success and about the limitations of doctrine itself in wartime are described in chapter 3. These conclusions can only be tentative, for the uncertainties of war extend to its analysis.

So let us go back the theater of Northern Africa. So far I have seen little evidence that the overall tactical skill of the German soldiers and their leadership wasn't superior to the allies. Did the Australians put up a dogged resistence? Did the Allies show great morale? Sure enough.

However the siege of Tobruk was a defensive battle, and the Australians enjoyed rather well built strongholds and defensive works in depth. They had:

a) superior amounts of artillery (72 + additional captured Italian heavy guns vs 12 + unknow Italian)
b) superior amounts of AT-guns (113 vs 33 + few Italians + several 88 Flak ) - mostly 2-pounders.
c) anti-aircraft guns (68 (40 captured Italians) vs ?)
d) inferior number of tanks (60:250 - the number of operational axis tanks is unknown)
e) superior numbers of men: 30500 soldiers plus 3000 Lybians against an overall 25000 Germans and Italians (not well documented)
f) Inferior numbers of aircraft: (250 operational vs ~20). It is unknow how many were used against Tobruk)

All in all the Allies enjoyed:

a) Greatly superior terrain - the dominating features were in allied hand, the terrain of the defenseline was mostly unsuited for tank operations yet offered the attackers no cover and no chance to dig in.
b) Relative short lines and protected by large fluid maneuvers by the sea.
b) Good to very good defenses - far better chances to camo and hide positions. Lot of mines and wire, and a AT ditch.
c) Greatly superior supply, especially ammunition
d) The ability to negate almost completely deny surprise by the German due to the terrain
e) The ability to use their greatly superior firepower far more effectively thanks to far better possibilities of observation
f) Far superior firepower thanks to the number and weight of the guns and even more to the clearly better supply of ammunition

The Germans enjoyed

a) Greatly superior numbers of tanks, the majority being light and suscitable by even the 2-pounders at long ranges. The Mark IV was mostly used as mobile artillery due to the lack of guns, but was restriced due to meager supplies in this role. All in all 80 of the 240 tanks were Mark III and Mark IV, the rest light MkII and italian M-13 tanks - good scouts but terrible in a direct assault with dug-in AT-guns.
b) Greatly superior numbers of aircraft, with a lot of dive-bombers. The dismal supply situation greatly restriced flighttimes and bombing runs. When the logistics allowed they were able to mass 30-40 Stukas with fighter support against the 14 Hurricanes.

So they had little relative firepower added to the non-existent room to manuever. Under such condition a shadow would be fallen on the performance of the Allies if the Axis would have taken Tobruk. Amusing that the Wiki states that "it was the first time the Blitzkrieg was stopped". The author had seemingly no idea what "Blitzkrieg" was.

A study written from an Allied Point of View is here. Very interesting work, but note the almost total reliance on allied sources. It is sometimes surprising too, for it comes up now with 30500 allied soldiers and 3000 Lybians on one side and 25000 Germans and Italians on the other in the first operations - combat and support troops (not all documented he says). Does this mean that the well-supplied defenders outnumbered the badly-supplied attackers by a quit an margin?

Some interesting pieces:

An Infantry Division Against
Tanks-Tobruk, Libya, 1941

During both engagements, the Australians fought from a
static defense in depth. Australian infantrymen occupying the
first line of defense allowed the German tanks to pass through
their initial perimeter into extensive minefields. British and Australian
artillery and antitank gunners, deployed well to the rear
of the infantry and supported by British tanks, then engaged
the German tanks with devastating direct fire. As the German
infantrymen, artillerymen, and machine gunners following the
tanks passed through the perimeter, the Australian infantry,
lying in wait on the flanks, moved in behind them with rifle
fire and bayonets. At the same time, British fighter planes
overhead, supported by antiaircraft artillery, attempted to fight
off the attacking German dive-bombers and fighter aircraft.

Good to see that the infantry division had also quite some tank support (60 serviceable out of 86), mostly cruiser and light.
The Germans had roughly 25 armoured cars, 70 Mark II and 80 Mark III and IV tanks. How many were serviceable is seemingly not known). The Italians fielded around 80 M-13 (light tanks with a good gun, the operational numbers is seemingly unknown). The author also points out just how inferior the common 2-pounder was in comperision with the large AT-guns of the Germans, but seems to forget that the German 37mm AT-gun was by far the most comon on the Axis side. They had just "several" 88 guns. At least he concedes that the Australians enjoyed a marked superiority in artillery - by far the most important support weapon in such conditions.

Part 2 is also available.

[Pannonian]

I think we should not divert our focus on Monash. A great tactician to be sure, but not certainly the first and most brilliant mind to come up with "combined arms". The concept is as old as war, while its form in WWI was mostly driven by the Germans - with important contribuitions of the French and Russians, and less so of the British.

It was the British who went furthest in coordinating technology with infantry tactics, with whole departments dedicated to proving that their idea of technological advance was the war-winning way, and a huge bureaucracy gathering data on the success or otherwise of the latest experiment, in an effort to turn war into a science rather than an art. We all know about tanks, but far more immediately successful advances were the perfection of artillery use, and the proliferation of light machine guns among the spearhead, and squad tactics thereby derived. Artillery-wise, the British perfected the counter-battery system, and worked out just what weight and type of barrage was necessary to suppress defences, thus enabling infiltration tactics. Machine gun-wise, the British went wholeheartedly with the Lewis gun, which carried firepower with the advancing infantry, and developed squad tactics that both utilised said firepower and allowed fluid exploitation of changing situations.

There was a reality TV mini-series on BBC a few years ago, called "The Trench", which looked at the everyday reality of trench warfare, based on the experiences of a Hull battalion in the war. In addition to the tedium, there were occasional highlights such as patrols, and there was a bit where one of the men certified for a Lewis gun qualification, having spent x hours training in said weapon. On a larger scale and over a longer time period, there were qualifications for other weapons as well, training in the latest tactical ideas, working with other branches, and other, less feasible and more hairbrained theories. All with meticulous documentation, so as to better control and disseminate ideas.

[Oleander Ardens]

There was a reality TV mini-series on BBC a few years ago, called "The Trench", which looked at the everyday reality of trench warfare, based on the experiences of a Hull battalion in the war. In addition to the tedium, there were occasional highlights such as patrols, and there was a bit where one of the men certified for a Lewis gun qualification, having spent x hours training in said weapon. On a larger scale and over a longer time period, there were qualifications for other weapons as well, training in the latest tactical ideas, working with other branches, and other, less feasible and more hairbrained theories. All with meticulous documentation, so as to better control and disseminate ideas.

Interesting, thanks. Perhaps I will find the time to watch it.

It was the British who went furthest in coordinating technology with infantry tactics, with whole departments dedicated to proving that their idea of technological advance was the war-winning way, and a huge bureaucracy gathering data on the success or otherwise of the latest experiment, in an effort to turn war into a science rather than an art. We all know about tanks, but far more immediately successful advances were the perfection of artillery use, and the proliferation of light machine guns among the spearhead, and squad tactics thereby derived. Artillery-wise, the British perfected the counter-battery system, and worked out just what weight and type of barrage was necessary to suppress defences, thus enabling infiltration tactics. Machine gun-wise, the British went wholeheartedly with the Lewis gun, which carried firepower with the advancing infantry, and developed squad tactics that both utilised said firepower and allowed fluid exploitation of changing situations.

I would also invite you to read the "The Dynamics of Doctrine", as it is a good summary of tactics IMHO. The creation of doctrines and tactics is a highly dynamic process and it is often hard to determine its exact evolution. The British drive to integrate technology was certainly impressive, however I would not call it war-winning. The stark difference in manpower and ressources was war-winning, the evolution in tactics was a helping component. After the debacle at the Somme a change was certainly needed. Even with large manpower pool loosing roughly 432000 men (killed, wounded and captured) against ~230000 (killed, wounded and captured) for some miles of ground is hardly a "victory".

The German army was certainly behind the curve when it came to tanks, but once again it is mostly a question of ressources. Although the pioneered the use of heavy artillery the suffered also greatly in the numbers of guns and the amount of ammunition. Keep in mind that the Allies had access to all the ressources they wanted and the USA first as supplier and later as ally. The Axis had a smaller industrial base and the naval isolation was far more harmful than the submarine campaign.

The wide use of the Lewis gun showed beside the capability to supply many the willigness to do so and tactical understanding. The MP 18 Bergmann was however arguably a greater step forward and was the first practical submachine gun.

The preceived impressions of the War

Google book

Battle Tactics of the Western Front (1996)
Von Paddy Griffith

Historians have portrayed British participation in the Great War as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, untried new military technology and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book Paddy Griffith, a renowned military historian, examines the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies persistently failed during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology and, eventually, its self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the autumn of 1918, he argues, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during the Second World War. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties; but that the breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. By the end of 1916 the British were already masters of 'storm-troop tactics' and, in several important respects, further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, 'commando-style' trench raiding, the use of light machine guns or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, the book maintains they should at least be credited with having effectively invented much of thetwentieth century's art of war.

The myth of the Great War, 2003
Von John Mosier

Based on previously unused French and German sources, this challenging and controversial new analysis of the war on the Western front from 1914 to 1918 reveals how and why the Germans won the major battles with one-half to one-third fewer casualties than the Allies, and how American troops in 1918 saved the Allies from defeat and a negotiated peace with the Germans

Draw an amazing amount of Flak by British readers at Amazon

The Somme, 2006
Von Robin Prior, Trevor Wilson

Despite superior air and artillery power, British soldiers died in catastrophic numbers at the Battle of Somme in 1916. What went wrong, and who was responsible? This book meticulously reconstructs the battle, assigns responsibility to military and political leaders.

This shows just how controversial the whole topic is. Amazing is the differing account of casualites in major battles, especially on the German side when consulting Anglo-american literature. From war-time 600.000 plus to German-backed numbers as low as 165000. To sum it up i would not say that the british ability to integrate technology into tactics was unmatched (see the MP18 and storm troopers, to name one example) and that the tactical superiority of the German forces was very large. Anyway I would think it would be best to read the paper I posted.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Excellent points on the development of squad tactics, 1916-1918. I am loving this discussion.

I was well aware of the Brit development of better timing with artillery and the use of light machine-guns. I was not aware of their shift in squad tactics. Tanks are, of course, the quintessential innovation and the tactics for their use were better developed than the tanks themselves were reliable enough to make it happen. But you can't fault the Brits for that -- the tank went a very long way from nowhere to Cambrai.

However, I think it is fairly obvious that the British were trying to improve tactics throughout their force and never really developed the "assault group" concept as far as the Germans did. By grouping their assault troops and lavishly equipping them for their work, the Germans had a better cutting edge (though the depth of English cross-the-board skills certainly allowed them to weather it well enough).


Regarding Rommel's dismissive characterizations of the Italians under his command:

Since his comments were contemporaneous, I wonder how much of his criticism was simply an effort to "lobby" OKW for more troops? Would Rommel have been equally critical of the Italians had he been writing his memoirs in 1955 or would more of the blame have shifted toward the failure to neutralize Malta as a base for interdicting supplies and OKW's treatment of the campaign as a sideshow?

[Pannonian]

Excellent points on the development of squad tactics, 1916-1918. I am loving this discussion.

I was well aware of the Brit development of better timing with artillery and the use of light machine-guns. I was not aware of their shift in squad tactics. Tanks are, of course, the quintessential innovation and the tactics for their use were better developed than the tanks themselves were reliable enough to make it happen. But you can't fault the Brits for that -- the tank went a very long way from nowhere to Cambrai.

However, I think it is fairly obvious that the British were trying to improve tactics throughout their force and never really developed the "assault group" concept as far as the Germans did. By grouping their assault troops and lavishly equipping them for their work, the Germans had a better cutting edge (though the depth of English cross-the-board skills certainly allowed them to weather it well enough).

Griffith goes into some detail about the adoption of diamond formations, with one squad taking the lead, one on each flank, and another in the rear, all armed with a mixture of rifles, Lewis guns and bombs, where they would advance until they meet resistance, then one pins down the enemy strongpoint while the others would feel their way around the flanks until they found sufficient give, the idea being that the formation would be fluid, self-sufficient and yet mutually supporting. Once the breakthrough had been made with artillery support, this kind of squad tactics, along with mobile mini artillery in the form of plentiful mortars, and the encouragement to bypass the more intractible strongpoints, allowed the British to continually advance through the German defences. There was a project a few years back to get as much testimony as they could from WW1 survivors while they were still around, and I remember one of them remarking on how disappointed he was that the war ended when it did, as they were advancing around 2 miles per day at that point.

Regarding Rommel's dismissive characterizations of the Italians under his command:

Since his comments were contemporaneous, I wonder how much of his criticism was simply an effort to "lobby" OKW for more troops? Would Rommel have been equally critical of the Italians had he been writing his memoirs in 1955 or would more of the blame have shifted toward the failure to neutralize Malta as a base for interdicting supplies and OKW's treatment of the campaign as a sideshow?

Phoebus over at TWC talks a lot about how well some Italian units performed, even with inferior equipment, with the Ariete probably the equal of the more famous (British) 7th Armoured Division.

[Agent Miles]

Here’s a really good analysis of the first Battle of Tobruk.
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...ler/miller.asp
Basically, Rommel tried all the wrong things by attacking the fortress’ strong points with tanks. Mobile combined arms tactics aren’t a magic wand that automatically wipes away a determined defender. Barbed wire and bayonets will still spoil the party if you let them get you in a bear hug. The Italians proved to be better at building the defenses of Tobruk than at taking them back. Rommel finally overran the fortress with a blitz from the flat, open terrain of the southeast sector in the second battle for Tobruk.

Here's another good reference:
http://www.wwiivehicles.com/default.asp

[PanzerJaeger]

Excellent analysis Orleander.

So they had little relative firepower added to the non-existent room to manuever. Under such condition a shadow would be fallen on the performance of the Allies if the Axis would have taken Tobruk. Amusing that the Wiki states that "it was the first time the Blitzkrieg was stopped". The author had seemingly no idea what "Blitzkrieg" was.

Heh, I have been referencing Wiki quite a bit lately as I haven't been in a position to consult my books on the subject to ensure what I remembered was at least vaguely correct, and I have to say the Wiki's on the Commonwealth troops in North Africa border on ridiculous in their inaccuracies and the dramatic license taken. I had to look twice when I saw on one of them that the DAK was "crushingly defeated", when in fact it was an Italian division that was eventually ground down, ran out of ammunition and supplies, and made an orderly withdrawal.

Overall the Eastern front battles seem to be covered in a much more neutral manner.

Regarding Rommel's dismissive characterizations of the Italians under his command:

That Wiki is not entirely accurate - or it is at least misleading. (Notice it is without citation.) We're led to believe that Rommel attempted to blame the Italian troops to cover for his own failure, when in actuality it is based on a quarrel about the plans for the defenses not being forthcoming by Italian leadership, not the capabilities of their troops. He felt that if he had the plans faster, he could have taken the fortress before the defenders were able to set up their defenses properly. Later, he simply gave an accurate assessment of the siege, which included the fact that the Italians made up most of the besieging force.

Rommel was actually pretty honest with Hitler and OKW about such things as combat performance, as at this point he did not fear replacement and as you said, he wanted them to know how badly he required reinforcements. During the siege, he had far more criticism for his direct superior, Halder, than the Italians.

As to the Italians in general, his statements generally reflected their performance.

When he arrived in Africa and was questioned about the Italian capabilities at making war, he responded along the lines of "They're certainly not good at it."

However, under German leadership the Italian performance greatly improved and he was never shy to praise them - when they deserved it. He is quoted many times praising his Italians, probably culminating in his feelings during 2nd El Alamein about a particularly fierce Italian AT defense.

"The German soldier has impressed the world. However the Italian Bersagliere has impressed the German soldier."

[Papewaio]

I think we should not divert our focus on Monash. A great tactician to be sure, but not certainly the first and most brilliant mind to come up with "combined arms". The concept is as old as war, while its form in WWI was mostly driven by the Germans - with important contribuitions of the French and Russians, and less so of the British.

OT

I was called out as liking Morshead (too right wing for me). Monash's brilliance wasn't just combined arms, it was in the details and use of it. Everything from food supplies to artillery bombardment combined with an element of surprise.

The Battle of Hamel, then the Battle of Amiens certainly showed what he and his Corps was capable of.

Both these Battles gained more ground and lost less troops then other major operations.

Amiens was the beginning of the end of WWI. It is relatively easy to compare the German combined arms doctrine to that of the allies at the time. The British at the battle of Amien had a very hard time as they had relatively few tanks. The Australians and Canadians Infantry had considerably more armor (British). The Australian and Canadian advance stopped once they ran out of tanks and where getting beyond artillery support.

There was some concern among the Allies on 6 August when the German 27th Division actually attacked north of the Somme on part of the front on which the Allies planned to attack two days later. The German division (a specially selected and trained Stosstruppen formation) penetrated roughly 800 yards (730 m) into the one-and-a-half mile front. This attack was made in retaliation for the repeated Australian trench raids south of the Somme which had gained many prisoners and affected the morale of the "Trench" divisions the Germans had stationed there.[12] The German division moved somewhat back to its original position on the morning of 7 August, but the movement still required changes to the Allied plan.

vs

In the first phase, seven divisions attacked: the British 18th (Eastern) and 58th (2/1st London), the Australian 2nd and 3rd, and the Canadian 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The Canadian and Australian attackers were supported by eight battalions of the Royal Tank Corps, with a paper strength of 216 Mark V and 72 Mark V* tanks, with 48 unarmed tanks used as supply-carrying tractors. Parts of the American 33rd Division supported the British attackers north of the Somme.

The attackers captured the first German position, advancing about 4,000 yards (3,700 m) by about 7:30 a.m.[16] In the centre, supporting units following the leading divisions attacked the second objective a further two miles (3 km) distant. Australian units reached their first objectives by 7:10 a.m., and by 8:20 a.m., the Australian 4th and 5th and the Canadian 4th divisions passed through the initial hole in the German line.[16] The third phase of the attack was assigned to infantry-carrying Mark V* tanks. However, the infantry was able to carry out this final step unaided.[16] The Allies penetrated well to the rear of the German defences and cavalry now continued the advance, one brigade in the Australian sector and two cavalry divisions in the Canadian sector. RAF and armoured car fire kept the retreating Germans from rallying.[16]

So a larger scale combined arms formation, with tighter scheduling of the artillery and a more effective use of surprise then that of the German Stosstruppen formation. Resulting in by the end of the day:

The Canadian and Australian forces in the center advanced quickly, pushing the line 3 miles (4.8 km) forward from its starting point by 11:00 a.m. The speed of their advance was such that a party of German officers and some divisional staff that were eating breakfast were captured.[18] A gap 15 miles (24 km) long was punched in the German line south of the Somme by the end of the day.

I think the larger scale and the greater results 800m vs 4.8kms achieved at the same territory 2 days apart shows who had successfully integrated combined arms at a formation level more successfully. Also as the attacking force vs the defending one the Allies lost 22,000 to 74,000 of the Germans. Quite remarkable in comparison with the Somme.

I think the results speak for themselves.

[PanzerJaeger]

I was called out as liking Morshead (too right wing for me).

Understood. I'm having a bit of difficulty understanding the point you're trying to make in the above comparison though. Could you straighten me out on it?

I think the larger scale and the greater results 800m vs 4.8kms achieved at the same territory 2 days apart shows who had successfully integrated combined arms at a formation level more successfully.

You seem to be comparing a limited divisional Stosstruppen attack to a full scale Allied armored offensive involving hundreds of tanks - in August of 1918 no less.

I'm not sure what can be gleaned from such a comparison. Wouldn't it be better to examine Stosstruppen actions during, say, Operation Michael or some of the other full scale offensives they had a major impact on? I would say they forced a much greater change in the battlefield dynamics. Or maybe I'm just completely missing your point.

[Papewaio]

The German Assault troops are a very good (elite) and well equipped style of units that showed how combined arms, artillery barrage, surprise and infiltration work.

I was countering the other posters suggestion that the Brits didn't understand that. The counter example showing that the British also had a firm grip of the same concepts and actually could put together larger formations of combined arms which in turn had much larger gains then smaller ones.

The Stosstrupen were fine and if they had 12 divisions in their attack the battle of Amiens would have been the German victory on the 6th. Not the Allies one on the 8th.

Amiens is a very good example in showing how combined arms worked. The small Stosstrupen did better on the 6th then the British did on the 8th. Whilst the divisions that had tanks did better again.

It is interesting that the very reason for the Stosstrupen engagement on the 6th was the infiltration tactics being done by the Allies side. I think both sides adapted to use the best of tactics from each side.

One of the most interesting battles is when both the Stosstrupen and the first British tanks were used. I often wonder what it would have been like if had been both Stosstrupen and tanks on the German side vs the static Haig defence... the war would have been over before the Americans had got involved.