Quote Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger View Post
Your position seems to have shifted a bit. I thought your argument was:



Which may or may not be true (I'm taking your word on the SOCOM General's testimony about a lack of resources as the only such incident I am aware of was a Delta Force commander, 'Fury', who did interviews on Tora Bora but said nothing about a lack of resources*), but, as I pointed out, had absolutely nothing to do with the Iraqi adventure.

Now that position seems to have transformed into 'because there were resource problems at the Battle of Tora Bora in 2001, there must have been resource problems when the Iraq war commenced several years later'.

Such a position is rife with logical inconsistencies, one of the largest being that you are mixing macro-level strategic resource commitment over a broad period of time to tactical resource commitment during a specific engagement. The resource problems that may or may not have existed at a specific date, at a specific time, at a specific location, and in a specific battle do not say much one way or the other regarding the overall resource situation of the broader war effort, to say nothing of long term development aid. For example, at Khe Sanh in Vietnam the US forces faced severe resource shortages for a period of time during the battle, but that was not indicative of the greater US resource situation in South Vietnam.

And more importantly, in the case of Tora Bora, there were at least 800 Army Rangers in the area that could have been committed to the battle but were not, which indicates that the resource deficiency in the battle was more a function of leadership than a systemic under-deployment. Tommy Franks' decision not to use them has been heavily criticized for years now.

* IIrc, 'Fury' indicated that Bin Laden's escape was due mainly to an over reliance on Afghan native fighters with questionable loyalties and commitment to the fight, the assumption that Pakistan would seal its border, and the failure to utilize air dropped mine fields to contain him. The former highlights another issue with your analysis. In 2001, the US was using a very different strategy than is currently being used - one that emphasized a small footprint, special forces, and a reliance on Afghan fighters. If I were to bet, I would say that your SOCOM general came to the same conclusion that most other military types have over the years - that a stronger presence in the beginning, and especially around Tora Bora, would have yielded better results. The lack of resources he cites is completely different than the lack of resources being discussed earlier in the thread, in that the former was a tactical decision in which resources were available and not used and the latter was a strategic decision to shift limited resources from one front to another.


The White House had to be near dragged into going into Afghanistan such was the obsession with Iraq.

Do you seriously believe this did not have any effect in anyway in Afghanistan.

A country like Afghanistan always needed far more resources than it got, massive reliance on Pakistan and local elements has basically done in your efforts and all you can do now is choose your leaving.