Originally Posted by
Gilrandir
All of this was said about Ukraine too, yet Russia felt its interests threatend and invaded. In my view, by supporting new Ukrainian regime and helping Ukraine out it could have gained a strategical victory and kept its influence over Ukraine. By rash steps in managed to estrange a formerly friendly people.
Now if Belorus or Kazakhstan were to have a succession crisis and the candiadate(s) for succession declared their course towards Europe or China (for Kazakhstan) it would immediately raise Russia's hackles. And Russia will always have the card of protecting Russian speakers up its sleeve. But perhaps the Ukraine debacle has taught Russia something and it would act by wiser and subtler ways.
Yes, what I said Russia was likely to do came to pass. They did not properly invade, they fomented a proxy rebellion in the eastern oblasts. The size and effectiveness of this rebellion is what fell short of expectations; it did not succeed in breaking off much of the country, and it did not neutralize pro-Western elements in Ukraine, the economic capacity of Ukraine, or Western willingness to cultivate Ukraine. Given the shortfall Russia might have then taken the option of invading the country and confronting the Ukrainian military head on to force a regime change or capitulation, but Russia turned out too weak and constrained to do this. It deployed to rescue Assad in Syria instead. It partnered increasingly with China instead. It wielded hybrid (information and cyber)-warfare instead.
But perhaps the Ukraine debacle has taught Russia something and it would act by wiser and subtler ways.
Russia's actions (aside from Crimea) were and are subtle in the context of geopolitics, that's the critical thing. Starting in the summer of 2014 they played a defensive role preventing the Ukrainian Army from overrunning the Luhansk PR/Donetsk PR, which they probably could have done absent Russian interference. Russia has deployed a comparable number of ground troops to Syria as to Donbass, itself comparable to the American ground force in Syria.
Kazakhstan has no strategic initiative to align with Europe against Russia, and if it somehow did Russia could embargo the primary long-distance connections without any special action. Because rail and pipe lines run through Russia. Europe's chief relationship with Kazakhstan is for its oil and gas, through the Russian intermediary. Western Europe is currently far more interested in developing relations with India, and for good reason.
If China came to dominate Kazakhstan, invading Kazakhstan would be a good way to alienate Central Asians, get walloped by China, and accelerate Russia's decline to Chinese client state.
The takeaways you should focus on: The Russian periphery is mostly pro-Russian, or else peer-competitor/adversary to Russia; Russia prefers to maintain the status quo in its periphery. Russia has many non-military options for managing its friendly periphery. If Russia came to the point where its only option to maintain its interests in its periphery were to launch an occupying invasion, it would not have the might to carry that (extremely costly) course of action through: a Catch-22.
The Turkish periphery is mostly anti-Turkish; Turkey prefers to change the status quo in its periphery. Turkey has increasing willingness to intervene militarily and politically in its periphery. Depending on developments in Europe, the US, and Turkey's neighbors, as well as Turkey's government, Turkey may be incentivized to assert hegemony in its periphery in the future.
Re: Turkish Election Results and Implication
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