"Soviet" solution in Afghanistan?

[PanzerJaeger]

Are the USA and Allies opting for a Soviet Style withdrawing of Afghanistan?

The war in Afghanistan was lost in November of 2008. O's comically long four month strategy session, culminating in a grand display of political fence riding which gave McCrystal almost as much as he needed and told the Taliban exactly how long they had to wait to retake the country (2011), only further confirmed it.

Its a sad state of affairs, but our current C&C doesn't take the threat from Islamic extremism seriously and doesn't have the will to win.

[drone]

The war in Afghanistan was lost March 20th, 2003.

[The Wizard]

Nothing's lost. The problem is twofold: reversing 30 years of vicious conflict in Afghanistan, and getting Pakistan to actually do something. Pakistan is perhaps our worst ally, worse even than Saudi Arabia.

And yes, I am aware that these are no small barriers to success.

[Brenus]

The war is far from lost. Actually, the Taliban never won a war.
The Soviets left under the pression of the Mudjahidin, then these took power thanks to the collapse of USSR, then fought each others.
The Taliban arrived then, and were welcome by a population tired by the endless war. But just before the NATO attack, they had problem to finish off the Nothern Alliance...

The only power they have is they can drag the war for years, so they bet on USA & Allies to become tired...
But they are not the Viet-cong nor NVA...

My view on this is do what the Soviets intend to do: Withdraw with dignity, but, as nobody really think that US will implod soon, support a "democratic" government, and from outside, just time to time, when needed, drop LRRP and Recon to kill theTaliban leaders who will be obliged to show up, if they want to control the population.

Built markets, school and rural health Centres, attrack the ennemy out of the mountains or hit and run them in their lairs...

[rory_20_uk]

Danegeld does not work. After the free money today goes, better stir up some more trouble for another bolus. The dear President is only thinking of himself. Bribes further increases the money sloshing around the country which he can then syphon off, and provides temporary safety so he and his mates can suck that bit more cash, before a "dignified" extended trip abroad when the time comes.

If there is anything that is of value in the country, protect that resource and leave the rest of the place to the locals. A proportion of the profits can be given to the government of the country to do as they see fit

[Skullheadhq]

Also, the 'war' in Afganistan was never lost, its just impossible to win. As soon as you kill one terrorist, ten more are levied to take his place.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Also, the 'war' in Afganistan was never lost, its just impossible to win. As soon as you kill one terrorist, ten more are levied to take his place.

You ARE aware that a majority of guerilla-style efforts have failed, yes? In point of fact, guerilla efforts never succeed until they a) transform themselves into a force capable of winning conventionally, or b) the occupying power says "Oh, chuck it all" and leaves.

[KukriKhan]

The war in Afghanistan was lost March 20th, 2003.

Amen.

If I were the guy in charge of "doing something" - besides packing up and waving good-bye - I'd set my soldiers to being Afghanistan's Border Patrol, stopping the leakage in and out of the place. Let CIA & Spec Ops work the interior. Home by September 2012. That will have been 11 years in that place. Enough.

[The Wizard]

And let the country drop like a stone, the way we did in 1989? No thanks.

[Lemur]

The war in Afghanistan was lost in November of 2008.

Um, yeah, 'cause the Afghanistan front was managed so brilliantly up until then.

[A] new unpublished Army history of the war concludes [...] the Pentagon insisted on maintaining a “small footprint” in Afghanistan and because Iraq was drawing away resources, General Barno commanded fewer than 20,000 troops.

As a result, battalions with 800 soldiers were trying to secure provinces the size of Vermont. “Coalition forces remained thinly spread across Afghanistan,” the historians write. “Much of the country remained vulnerable to enemy forces increasingly willing to reassert their power.”

That early and undermanned effort to use counterinsurgency is one of several examples of how American forces, hamstrung by inadequate resources, missed opportunities to stabilize Afghanistan during the early years of the war, according to the history, “A Different Kind of War.”