The Treaty of Versailles has had a bad press. From the time that it was signed and John Maynard Keynes penned his all-too-well-known polemic,
The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) until a recent book by that aging
realpolitiker, Henry Kissinger, commentators have had little good to say about the Treaty. ‘We came to Paris confident that the new order was about to be established’, Harold Nicolson wrote in
Peacemaking, 1919, ‘we left it convinced that the new order had merely fouled the old’.
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Scholarly opinion, if one can use such a collective term, though divided, has moved in a different direction. A massive compilation of contributions from almost all the leading historians of the Versailles settlement opens with the observation that scholars ‘tend to view the treaty as the best compromise that the negotiators could have reached in the existing circumstances’ and ends with a question. Why has the original indictment of the Treaty seen off almost every attempt at revision and not just in the popular view?
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If what has emerged from recent multi-archival research is ‘a much more nuanced portrait of statesmen and diplomats striving, with a remarkable degree of flexibility, pragmatism and moderation to promote their nation's vital interests as they interpreted them’, why do even our more learned statesmen continue to repeat the shibboleths of the past?
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