What if the 20th of July 1944 Hitler has been "terminated"

[Seamus Fermanagh]

1. Hitler's death was not enough. To succeed the coup had to kill or neutralize Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Borman, and Goebbels.

Assume that they did.

2. Germany is now headed by a half-military/half-civilian junta. The Holocaust is happening on autopilot until countermanded. The Soviets are attacking. The Western Allies have taken Rome and are established in a bridgehead in Normandy. Germany sues for peace.

The Russians say no and continue -- which they will do regardless. They have no interest in stopping short of the Elbe and probably would have preferred to get to the Rhine. The Western Allies honor their alliance with the Soviets -- however grudgingly. The War continues and we end up with the same partition (though the Holocaust is quickly curtailed and some of the stupider "hold and die" orders are never given.

But suppose the West did make a separate peace (however unlikely).

3. The Russians get to the Rhine. Sorry PJ, but der Wermacht is a shell of what it was by this point. It is the Soviets who are punching holes with armored spearheads while the Germans use hastily trained conscripts and kampfgruppe "fire brigades" to stop them as best they can. German industry, revamped by Speer, is up to the task (especially if the Western Allies are not involved anymore) but the Germans simply do not have the time to train people or enough experienced cadre to use all the new wonders that had been cooked up. Moreover, the remaining elite formations are very likely being broken up by the new German government which cannot afford groups of SS troops or Luftwaffe troops of dubious loyalty to the new government. So maybe JV-44 sets an all time record for kills and we see that in competent hands the Jadgtiger really could knock out a JS-III, but it is still too little too late. The Soviets bleed a lot more, but they still get to the Rhine (or to the split line between them and the West).

[Louis VI the Fat]

German industry, revamped by Speer, is up to the task (especially if the Western Allies are not involved anymore)

With the west out, German industry will collapse immediately. The millions of slaves must be released. There can be no more plunder either. The wholesale transfer of money, resources, products will come to a halt.

Nazi Germany economically had come to fully rely on a pyramid schemes of conquest, plunder, and bills being pushed ahead.


One must not forget the depths of depravity of Nazi Germany. How would a seperate Western peace work anyway? Would they check German factories to ensure Western slaves have been released, and just leave those of its former allies? Only leave the Russians?

Would there be Western inspectors to check the rape camps the Germans had set up for their troops, leave the Czech girls and liberate the Belgian ones?

What of Western reparations (or 'greedy and duplicitous punitive measures' for those who think reparations are not precisley that when it concerns Germany)? Would the West make a peace that leaves the plundered goods and money in Germany, only for the Russians to destroy and collect it to satisfy their claims? Or would the West prevent that and rapidly collect their restitutions themselves, with the immediate collapse of Nazi Germany's plunder economy?

What of the looted art, antiques, valuables, much in the hands of millions of ordinary Germans? For banal plunder, mere thuggery, from the lowest to the highest rank, was the largest economical sector of Germany behind the military. The Nazis had the morality of a street corner gang of thugs, including their little 'cool' gestures, identification marks, uniforms, honour codes and utter disregard for their victims.

[Jolt]

With the west out, German industry will collapse immediately. The millions of slaves must be released.

I fully agree with you. However, Speer would simply begin using German women ask a workforce for the industry. It was his original plan anyway. The other plan was use foreign forced labour (If I'm not mistaken, proposed by Himmler). The adopted plan was the second one.

[TinCow]

Part of the problem for any July 20th scenario is simply that the Germans had already been broken by that point, on both fronts. In the west, the entire defense of Normandy collapsed within two weeks and Paris was liberated only a month later. On the eastern front, Germany was in full-scale retreat and had essentially been completely kicked out of the USSR:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

I honestly think that by that point it was too late for Germany to recover, no matter what happened domestically. Hypothetical German victory scenarios need to be based upon changes in the war that occurred much, much earlier.

[Pannonian]

Part of the problem for any July 20th scenario is simply that the Germans had already been broken by that point, on both fronts. In the west, the entire defense of Normandy collapsed within two weeks and Paris was liberated only a month later. On the eastern front, Germany was in full-scale retreat and had essentially been completely kicked out of the USSR:

I honestly think that by that point it was too late for Germany to recover, no matter what happened domestically. Hypothetical German victory scenarios need to be based upon changes in the war that occurred much, much earlier.

There was still a window of opportunity for Germany to achieve a comparatively satisfactory peace. The Soviet offensives had run out of steam by around mid-August, and they would customarily have to wait until winter before building up supplies for another push. This gave the Germans around 4 months in which to completely collapse in the west, and let the Allies know this to be so, so that the Anglo-Americans would be in occupation of as much of Germany as possible while the Russians were still preparing for their winter offensive.

[TinCow]

There was still a window of opportunity for Germany to achieve a comparatively satisfactory peace. The Soviet offensives had run out of steam by around mid-August, and they would customarily have to wait until winter before building up supplies for another push. This gave the Germans around 4 months in which to completely collapse in the west, and let the Allies know this to be so, so that the Anglo-Americans would be in occupation of as much of Germany as possible while the Russians were still preparing for their winter offensive.

Yes, this I agree with. Germany could certainly have had a more favorable peace. The partition of Germany was not agreed upon until Quebec in September 1944. If the war had ended in summer 1944, perhaps the partition would not have happened. That alone would have drastically improved Germany's post-war situation.

[KrooK]

Gah and you are all into mistake. GB and France entered World War 2 not to protect Poland (I assume that we are looking for real reasons not casus belli). People from GB and France - sorry but you have to face the truth.
And thats why Jaeger was right talking that no one cares about Poland. Ok maybe Churchill a bit but into 1945 he lost leadership.

But you Jaeger are making another mistake. Don't you remember that France fallen into 1940 and GB was close to fall. Do you really believe that they would stop war when they were clearly winning. And give Germany time to get stronger? They knew that victory of Germany would made them strongest country into Europe. Empire stronger than France and GB. Thats why they would not stop after Hitler's death. They simply knew that winner of this war will be ruling Europe and probably world.

Anyway jaeger - battle of Falaise was not disaster. It was great victory that let Allies finish with Germany faster.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Gah and you are all into mistake. GB and France entered World War 2 not to protect Poland (I assume that we are looking for real reasons not casus belli). People from GB and France - sorry but you have to face the truth.
And thats why Jaeger was right talking that no one cares about Poland. Ok maybe Churchill a bit but into 1945 he lost leadership.


But you Jaeger are making another mistake. Don't you remember that France fallen into 1940 and GB was close to fall. Do you really believe that they would stop war when they were clearly winning. And give Germany time to get stronger? They knew that victory of Germany would made them strongest country into Europe. Empire stronger than France and GB. Thats why they would not stop after Hitler's death. They simply knew that winner of this war will be ruling Europe and probably world.

As to the first, few, if any, think WWII was fought to guarantee Poland. Even back then, the Polish border was presented as the line in the sand, not the reason for war. Although some sentimental attachment to the history of French patronage over Polish independence was present - it was not France that sold out Poland to gain Russia, even if that would have been the obvious strategic course of action prior to 1939.



As to the second, I am not sure at what point it dawmed on France and Britain that the new superpowers would be the US and SU. Fairly soon, I'd wager.
France was rather pre-occupied with simply being restored, and at any rate had since decades earlier resigned herself that Germany was structurally larger. For decades prior to WWII France's entire policy had been based on this acceptance of Germany's position as the greatest power in Europe. Prior to WWI, alliance against Germany was the defence against it, after WWI the dual policy of alliance against and tentative co-operation with Germany, after WWII, co-operation.

[PanzerJaeger]

3. The Russians get to the Rhine. Sorry PJ, but der Wermacht is a shell of what it was by this point. It is the Soviets who are punching holes with armored spearheads while the Germans use hastily trained conscripts and kampfgruppe "fire brigades" to stop them as best they can. German industry, revamped by Speer, is up to the task (especially if the Western Allies are not involved anymore) but the Germans simply do not have the time to train people or enough experienced cadre to use all the new wonders that had been cooked up. Moreover, the remaining elite formations are very likely being broken up by the new German government which cannot afford groups of SS troops or Luftwaffe troops of dubious loyalty to the new government. So maybe JV-44 sets an all time record for kills and we see that in competent hands the Jadgtiger really could knock out a JS-III, but it is still too little too late. The Soviets bleed a lot more, but they still get to the Rhine (or to the split line between them and the West).

While that is certainly a valid opinion, I give the Wehrmacht a bit more credit. With independence of command, I think they could have stopped the Russians and even delivered some serious battlefield reversals. Of course, they wouldn't be marching triumphally into Moscow any time soon, but they could cause the Russians to question their commitment to total victory.

The German forces in '44 were battered, but still largley intact. Certain training programs were curtailed, but the major cut backs had not yet begun. The quality of the average German soldier and the specialists coming out of training was still better than that of the Soviets. Further they still had a large cadre of experienced veterans to help fill in the gaps. The main deficiency, at least from a defensive standpoint, were tanks and/or anti-tank guns. Production was actually up, though, as Germany was finishing the transition to a total war economy.

Whilst Hitler's blunders at Stalingrad and Kursk and the resulting Russian counteroffensives cost the Germans serious casualties, their real cost was in battlefield momentum. They actually only limited the Wehrmacht's offensive capabilities (especially in tanks) for their respective years ('42 & '43). The true final nail in the coffin was Bagration in the summer of ‘44. That was where great swathes of German troops were simply encircled and captured/destroyed, where entire divisions and even armies were swallowed up in the most perfect example of Soviet deep operations theory until the invasion of Manchuria.

The Soviets must be given credit for excellent planning and coordination, but Bagration’s biggest benefactor was arguably Hitler himself. By this point, Hitler had wrested almost complete strategic and even tactical control over the battlefield from his generals. He insisted on a form of static warfare that was diametrically opposed to the reality of the battlefield. Every decision had to be approved by Hitler, who refused to allow his generals to give ground, denying them the fluidity that characterized conflict in the East. The biggest losses occurred during the liberation of Minsk, which Hitler had declared a Fester Platz, where the 4th and 9th Armies were not allowed to withdraw and were summarily encircled and destroyed.

However, with operational freedom, I think much of the damage could have been mitigated. Bagration was no surprise; it had been anticipated well in advance by the German commanders. They understood deep operations and how to defeat it – or at least how to avoid the massed encirclements. The Russians were somewhat successful in attempting to convince the Germans that the attack would be against Army Group North instead of Army Group Center, but by the time of the offensive the breakthrough points were well known. Had they been allowed to withdraw and let the Russians exhaust themselves, they would have been in decent shape. Manstein would almost certainly have been reinstated, and the addition of the freed up forces from the West and Italy would have put him in a perfect position to execute a “Backhand Blow” type operation that he had been arguing for since Kursk.

After such a victory, the Germans would have had a lot working in their favor. Unharrassed industry (at least until the Russians got around to building a strategic bombing force), one front to focus on, excellent leadership unhindered by constant interference, and many advanced new weapons coming online. The 262 would have decimated the Russian Air Force alone.

That’s all just speculation on my part, of course.

With the west out, German industry will collapse immediately. The millions of slaves must be released. There can be no more plunder either. The wholesale transfer of money, resources, products will come to a halt.

The biggest economic benefits Germany recieved from the occupied territories were favorable exchange rates and forced labor. The loss of either of those would not have collapsed the German economy. Normal exchange rates could have been sustained in the short and medium terms without much impact, and women were a vast untapped resource throughout the war.

But you Jaeger are making another mistake. Don't you remember that France fallen into 1940 and GB was close to fall. Do you really believe that they would stop war when they were clearly winning. And give Germany time to get stronger? They knew that victory of Germany would made them strongest country into Europe. Empire stronger than France and GB. Thats why they would not stop after Hitler's death. They simply knew that winner of this war will be ruling Europe and probably world.

I think removing the Nazis from power would have had a big impact on the Allies. We'll never know.

Anyway jaeger - battle of Falaise was not disaster. It was great victory that let Allies finish with Germany faster.

For the Germans, it was a monumental disaster, and one of Hitler's greatest blunders. That is what I was saying.

[Brenus]

In order to shift the Alliances, and to keep Germany (and Eastern Europe) out of the communist hands, the new German government would need time.
I, and nobody will never know, if without the Western Allies push and the Strategic Bombing the Russians would have been able to win.
I tend to say yes, but…

How much time the German Government would need to negotiate, not only a separate peace but also a change in alliance?
I base the idea of a successful killing on the 20th of July.
So, what decision to take?
In term of military you can’t just withdraw all the troops inside Germany then deployed them just in front of the Russian without a Western Allies guaranty they won’t take advantage of this to invade the national territory…
You can try to negotiate a separate peace with France, Belgium, Holland and all the others governments in exiles, but how much chances you have too persuade the French Army which is soon to land in Provence to stop here and not pursuit…
The massacres of Oradour sur Glane and Tulles by the 2nd SS are from June. It would be difficult to the new German Government to convince the new French Government (as by now Petain’s Government is completely discredited) not only to cease-fire but to help against the Russian, which they help in their war thanks to the Groupe de Chasse 3 (Fighter Squadron) Normandy, at this date Normandy-Niemen (21st of July 1944) and Soviet Union Hero (Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union, Red Star Order, Red Flag Order and Lenin Order, plus some others)…

I agree with PJ, the biggest mistakes would be avoid, however I am not sure it would avoid the Eastern defeat…

“The loss of either of those would not have collapsed the German economy. Normal exchange rates could have been sustained in the short and medium terms without much impact, and women were a vast untapped resource throughout the war.”
On other matters, the release of the prisoners and the immediate cut in raw material, which would need to be compensate, would create a vacuum that Germany can’t easily fill.
To replace the Slave labour by the German Women labour would need more than just a shift in personnel. Most of the war factories were linked with the Labours Camps, and the logistic chains adapted (and work conditions) to the first kind of labour.
I spoke with one French Woman (refugee from Croatia in Serbia as she was married with a Yugoslav she met during the WW2 in Germany) who was in Forced Labour.
She worked for Siemens and all the work force was specialised and couldn’t protest against working conditions.
It wouldn’t be easy for a new Government to let these people to go (and de facto to provide the means of transportation) and to create more suitable premises for the German Labour to take their places… It would need time.
Would Germany have the skilled man/woman power to produce the ME 262 without the Slave Labour? I doubt.
It would need time to reshuffle the war industry, and this even if the Western Allies agree with the plan…
Time it wouldn’t have.

Because the Western Allies can decide to use the moment to push their advantage.
And the Russian as well.
Would the SS fight to hard in the boccage if Hitler would be dead?
Even the regular Heer would be in disarray…
How to avoid what happen to the Menshevik in 1917 when the Russian soldiers decided they had enough and “voted with their feet”…
Some the best German Generals were Nazi as e.g. Model. Kesselring and Sepp Dietrich for the best known. Would these Generals gave-up and agree to this, especially after an assassination and Coup?

[Jolt]

Some the best German Generals were Nazi as e.g. Model. Kesselring and Sepp Dietrich for the best known. Would these Generals gave-up and agree to this, especially after an assassination and Coup?

No doubt, by July 1944, discerning German Generals could quite well see that Germany was on the verge of defeat, and Hitler's lunacies and mad resistance until the end would change little. In the end, I'm sure they would be quite content in serving Germany to try and "lessen" the weight of defeat then madly follow Hitler to lead the country to total occupation.

[Sarmatian]

There are several issues here to discuss:

1) Western allies would have accepted a separate peace with Germany

That is highly, highly unlikely. Even though some people high up thought that Soviet Union is now greater threat than Germany, most of the leadership didn't think that way. Even if the political leadership managed to reach a consensus about it, there still remained a question of how would the population and the military react. At the time Nazis were "scum of the earth" and the Russians were "our gallant Soviet allies". Sure, in theory, with propaganda it could have been reversed but such things take time. There is very little chance that a coup would have totally changed the opinion of western allies, without the total denazification. By that point, nazis infiltrated practically everything, from education and politics to military structure. Again, it would take time and probably a a decent chunk of the military to enforce it. Time was something that Germans didn't have.

2) Germany would have been able to outproduce Russia.

This is even more improbable than the first one. There is little chance that half destroyed German industry and infrastructure would have been able to properly resupply the army. Women were an untapped resource, true, but moving them to factories and retraining them takes time. Even with that, it is questionable if German industry could have outproduced the Russian industry. Russian effort to do this showed how difficult it is, as their industry produced less equipment and of lesser quality for a long time until women were trained enough to perform those tasks well. Of course, the chaos of industry transfer was to blame for much of it but still we are talking about months.

3) Wehrmacht would have been able to defeat the Red Army without Hitler in 1944

This is the most improbable of all. Red Army of '44 wasn't the Red Army of '41. Even the Wehrmacht of '41, when it was at peak efficiency and pinnacle of military might would have trouble with it. Stalin, even though he was involved in strategic decision, largely left the planning and execution of military operations to the professionals. By that time, Soviet commanders were experienced and mature enough to conduct Deep Operations properly. Soviet soldiers (most of them) made up in experience what they lacked in training. A peasant who spent three years fighting in a huge conflict is a better soldier than a professional fresh out of the academy, no matter how good his training was. Huge Soviet advantage in equipment meant that it would take Germany a long time to catch up. By that time, surrender of Finland and Romania was a done deal, meaning Soviets could have easily put a stop to German iron ore supply from Sweden and oil from Romania, the only natural source of oil for the German army and industry. The most dangerous assumption is that Russian thinking was static and that because Manstein was able to counter attack at Kharkov, he would have been able to do so again at will. Quite the opposite, Red Army showed constant improvement throughout the war. Russians were quite aware that their winter offensives were halted by over-extension, just like German over-extension allowed them to perform counter offensives. Indeed, a huge problem for both armies in the first years of the war was to decide when to halt the offensives and to stop, rest and resupply. Precisely for that reason, Russian commanders were given fixed operational range for the offensive (100-120 km, iirc, may have to look it up) after the battle of Kursk, with the option to continue the offensive if the situation on the field allowed it. Their success was bigger than they expected so Stavka allowed continuation of the offensive beyond that original range in most cases. So, simply thinking that if Manstein was allowed to perform his "Backhand Slap" would have changed to course of the war is a huge mistake. Prolong it - probably, reverse it - unlikely.

[Ibn-Khaldun]

I think that WW2 would've ended much much sooner if Georg Elser would've succeeded on 8 November, 1939. Since the war had just started then with Hitler's death Western Allies would've accepted the peace more likely, I guess.

[PanzerJaeger]

2) Germany would have been able to outproduce Russia.

This is even more improbable than the first one. There is little chance that half destroyed German industry and infrastructure would have been able to properly resupply the army. Women were an untapped resource, true, but moving them to factories and retraining them takes time. Even with that, it is questionable if German industry could have outproduced the Russian industry. Russian effort to do this showed how difficult it is, as their industry produced less equipment and of lesser quality for a long time until women were trained enough to perform those tasks well. Of course, the chaos of industry transfer was to blame for much of it but still we are talking about months.

I don't know if this was directed at me, but if so, I just wanted to clarify. I don't think German industry could have ever outproduced that of the Soviets in raw output, but I do think it could have produced enough high quality weaponry to keep Germany in the war. Germany was well ahead of the Soviet Union in many key technologies (sometimes several generations), which then become combat multipliers.

3) Wehrmacht would have been able to defeat the Red Army without Hitler in 1944

This is the most improbable of all. Red Army of '44 wasn't the Red Army of '41. Even the Wehrmacht of '41, when it was at peak efficiency and pinnacle of military might would have trouble with it. Stalin, even though he was involved in strategic decision, largely left the planning and execution of military operations to the professionals. By that time, Soviet commanders were experienced and mature enough to conduct Deep Operations properly. Soviet soldiers (most of them) made up in experience what they lacked in training. A peasant who spent three years fighting in a huge conflict is a better soldier than a professional fresh out of the academy, no matter how good his training was. Huge Soviet advantage in equipment meant that it would take Germany a long time to catch up.

I don’t want to take anything away from the Russians as Deep Operations was an excellent doctrine, and far better than anything the Allies came up with, but it must be noted that the big victories under its name were scored with vast numerical majorities and against a hierarchally paralyzed enemy. For example, Wikipedia’s strength tables for Bagration, based mostly on Frieser and Glantz, have the opposing sides at:

Germany:
486,493 men
118 tanks
377 assault guns
2,589 guns

Russia:
1,254,300 men
2,715 tanks
1,355 assault guns
24,363 guns

Now, my point is that if either of those variables were altered – either the freedom of operation or the ratios of opposing forces – the situation would indeed be different. See the battle of Targul Frumos in May of '44 where Deep Operations fell flat:

Some of the blitzkrieg principles apply equally well to armor in the defense, and where they do not an understanding of them points the way to countering them. We spoke of moment and momentum as strengths of the armored offensive. The attacker loses both these when he is unable to move forwards or sideways - in other words when he is contained. The counter is thus simply: first contain, encircling if possible; then destroy.

Unfortunately the Wehrmacht's operations feature rather few instances of well-conducted defense and these are mainly at divisional or at most corps level. Hitler's (and Goering's) repeated interventions, mostly featuring refusals to give ground laced with accusations of cowardice and treachery, prevented the field and air commanders on the Eastern Front from conducting the kind of defense which they wanted and which would surely have influenced the duration of World War II in Europe and the situation at its end.

Manteuffel's handling of the Pz.Gr.Div. Grossdeutschland at Targul Frumos (northeast of the Ploesti oilfield region) on 2 May, 1944, is one of the best examples. This battle is also of interest as the Germans' first encounter with the Soviet heavy tanks in the shape of KV85. Schematically the ground is a horseshoe ridge with the opening facing roughly northeast and the left (west) side higher and longer than the right. There is rolling to hilly ground north of the horseshoe's opening. At the apex.of the horseshoe, above and to the south of the town of Targul Frumos, is a dominating hill on which Manteuffel set up his battle headquarters. He established both his infantry regiments, stiffened with jagdpanzers in depth and all other antitank weapons including a battery of 88mm guns, along the base of the horseshoe, with his tank reserve in depth. He deployed his reconnaissance and some tanks in the rolling ground about 8km to the north of the main position.

The Soviets advanced in strength with massive artillery support, mainly with tanks and evidently with the base of the horseshoe as their initial objective. Manteuffel's forward tanks fell back and to their left with fire and movement, drawing the enemy into the killing ground enclosed by the horseshoe and towards the southwest corner. The infantry were in concealed positions, which they had had several weeks to prepare. They lay low and allowed the Soviet tanks to pass through them, then took on the supporting infantry. The first crisis seems to have been caused by the Soviet heavy tanks thrusting down the west ridge just as the pressure on the southwest corner began to build up. Manteuffel used his tank reserve under his personal command.

Meanwhile the panzerfüsilier regiment on the right had deliberately been left entirely without tank support for over 2 hours. They were badly overrun and broken through, and the regimental headquarters had itself become involved in driving off a Soviet tank attack. Nevertheless they had held firm and succeeded in pinning down the enemy infantry. Then the Soviets, exploiting success, put in another tank attack on them.
After about 2 hours of intensive fighting, Manteuffel sensed a weakening of resolve on the part of the Soviets facing his left. Rather than counterattack at that stage, he took personal command of a company of Pzkw IVs and led his tank regiment, by now replenished, across to the right and straight into the attack off the line of march. His account says he appeared on that sector at 11.55 hrs - 5 minutes before the time he had promised the regimental commander. The tank regiment drove the Soviets right back with heavy losses.

That night he passed two companies each of Tigers and Panthers through the infantry into forward positions. These together with air support sufficed to beat off subsequent Soviet attacks. No ground had been lost; an estimated 350 Soviet tanks and SU guns were destroyed at an exchange rate better than 20:1; and Manteulfel's force remained capable of operating effectively at its previous level.

I have dwelt on this battle because it well represents the defensive side of the blitzkrieg coin and is a model of great relevance today. The hammer-and-anvil principle was of course used to excellent effect by Montgomery in the battle of Alem Halfa though his hammer blow consisted - typically perhaps - mainly of tank fire rather than tank maneuver. Manteuffel combined this tactic with two others. One had been much employed by the Afrika Korps at lower levels - the use of an actually or apparently weak force of tanks as a bait to draw the enemy onto a screen of (in those days) antitank guns. The other was to separate the enemy tanks and infantry by allowing the enemy tanks to overrun the defending infantry in the anvil, and then to destroy both in detail.

"Easy come, easy go", runs the saying. Armored forces properly handled can gain vast areas of territory rapidly and achieve strategic success by disruption of the enemy forces. Conversely the defense against an armored offensive calls for great speed and scope of maneuver. Real estate has to be traded off for time and - paradoxically enough - space if disruption is to be avoided and containment achieved. This is the dilemma that currently faces NATO's land forces -and most of all the FRG.

-- Brig. Gen. Richard Simpkin, Tank Warfare: An Analysis of Soviet and NATO Tank Philosophy (London: Brassey's Publisher's Ltd., 1979), pp. 44-48.

IIRC, the Germans had around 3500 AFVs in Normandy (equivalent to the total amount covering the entirety of the Eastern Front) and a further 400 AFVs in Italy. Those vehicles, not even mentioning the infantry, guns, and air forces focused on defeating the Allies and the removal of Hitler’s interference and stand fast orders would certainly have changed the equation considerably.

The most dangerous assumption is that Russian thinking was static and that because Manstein was able to counter attack at Kharkov, he would have been able to do so again at will. Quite the opposite, Red Army showed constant improvement throughout the war. Russians were quite aware that their winter offensives were halted by over-extension, just like German over-extension allowed them to perform counter offensives. Indeed, a huge problem for both armies in the first years of the war was to decide when to halt the offensives and to stop, rest and resupply. Precisely for that reason, Russian commanders were given fixed operational range for the offensive (100-120 km, iirc, may have to look it up) after the battle of Kursk, with the option to continue the offensive if the situation on the field allowed it. Their success was bigger than they expected so Stavka allowed continuation of the offensive beyond that original range in most cases. So, simply thinking that if Manstein was allowed to perform his "Backhand Slap" would have changed to course of the war is a huge mistake. Prolong it - probably, reverse it - unlikely.

Kharkov was largely a reactive operation. Manstein accurately judged that the Russians were strung out and vulnerable and used his smaller force more effectively to defeat them. From what I’ve read about his plans for Backhand Blow, it was to be a far more deliberate operation involving ruse to draw the Russians in. It never made it off the drawing board, of course, so we’ll never know. I do know that even in Bagration the Germans recognized several vulnerable Russian overextensions that they were not able to take advantage of due to the reasons discussed earlier.

[Louis VI the Fat]

I don't think German industry could have ever outproduced that of the Soviets in raw output, but I do think it could have produced enough high quality weaponry to keep Germany in the war. Germany was well ahead of the Soviet Union in many key technologies (sometimes several generations), which then become combat multipliers.

I don't think this is correct.
Germany had a raw industrial output larger than the Soviet Union and Britain combined. Germany also had an industrial labour force twice the size of the SU.

The Nazis refused to change to a war economy until it was all but over - spoiled Germans wouldn't have it otherwise. The war was not supposed to cost anything, to lower living standards. This wasn't specific to the Nazis. For decades, Berlin policy had been that the population should not have to make any sacrifice in living standard for Germany's foreign agression - the bills are for the others: occupied territories, Jews, Americans, French and Belgians for WWI, future generations.



The Nazis were simply not all that good in making smart decisions, in using their favourable position.

For example, they made high-tech equipment that was useless in the extreme circumstances in Russia. Russians knew better - one must rely on cheap, simple and therefore sturdy equipment. These work, these are low maintanance, and these can be mass produced in great numbers. On top of this, Germany also managed to rely in crucial aspects on low-tech equipment, which rendered much of their fancier equipment useless. For example, a reliance on horses to tow this fancy equipment around, against mobile mechanised Russians.

Stalin was smart. Half his country occupied from the get go, and half of Europe fighting against him, and he still managed to win against the odds. Germany, the largest and most advanced economy in Europe, couldn't have fared worse if its decisions were made by chimpansees throwing darts.

[PanzerJaeger]

\

I don't think this is correct.
Germany had a raw industrial output larger than the Soviet Union and Britain combined. Germany also had an industrial labour force twice the size of the SU.

I was referring to armaments production, in which Germany could not have attained parity with Russia even with a total war economy for a number of reasons.

The Nazis were simply not all that good in making smart decisions, in using their favourable position.

Yes and no. Which Nazis are you talking about? Which time period are you talking about? The Nazis certainly made many more intelligent decisions than the French and British leadership both diplomatically and militarily in the prelude to the war and the first two years. The invasion of the USSR was, of course, a fiasco fueled by arrogance from previous campaigns. The proper planning and foresight that allowed for the decimation of the French and British forces in the West was not carried out, despite warnings from some in the military hierarchy. However, in spite of the sloppiness and haste that went into its preparation, Barbarossa almost succeeded. Some have speculated that a few more armored divisions would have tipped the scale. The failure led to a drawn out war, for which Germany was definitely not prepared. This was by far the Nazi... Hitler's biggest mistake, and slowly drained the lifeblood out of Germany. As the war progressed, both Hitler and Goering, the two most important men to the military situation, became strung out on narcotics and made many more poor decisions.

While it can certainly be said that the invasion of Russia was a monumental mistake, it was one miscalculation that had a not insignificant chance of success. Had that happened, Germany would have won WW2.

For the record, I'm not defending the Nazi political leadership. When they got involved in military decision making, their meddling was devastating. I just don't think such blanket statements paint the most accurate picture possible.

Ignoring moral issues and simply focusing on goal attainment (and assuming Hitler's goals were the military domination of Europe), the Nazis made a lot of intelligent decisions up front and made one critical mistake from which they could not extricate themselves. The French and British made highly ignorant decisions and were lucky to be bailed out by the US and Russia, who both made the wisest decisions of the war and propelled themselves into world domination after the fact.

For example, they made high-tech equipment that was useless in the extreme circumstances in Russia. Russians knew better - one must rely on cheap, simple and therefore sturdy equipment. These work, these are low maintanance, and these can be mass produced in great numbers. On top of this, Germany also managed to rely in crucial aspects on low-tech equipment, which rendered much of their fancier equipment useless. For example, a reliance on horses to tow this fancy equipment around, against mobile mechanised Russians.

Can you elaborate? Which "fancy" equipment was towed around by horses? How was it then rendered useless? It is well known that the majority of German forces relied on horses (as sufficient numbers of trucks were unavailible), but off the top of my head I cannot think of any fancy equipment that was towed by horses. I can only think of run-of-the-mill type stuff like artillery, wagons, etc.

Stalin was smart. Half his country occupied from the get go, and half of Europe fighting against him, and he still managed to win against the odds. Germany, the largest and most advanced economy in Europe, couldn't have fared worse if its decisions were made by chimpansees throwing darts.

Stalin had the largest army in Europe. He had far greater quantities of armor, artillery and airplanes than Germany. He had brilliant military minds and a sound doctrine. Despite Western historiography, the Soviet military was second only to the Wehrmacht in quality, even in 1941. Due to his intelligent decisions, his brilliant officer corps was systematically murdered by their own leader directly before the war and the vast majority of this force was destroyed by the Germans in the first year of the war, having to be rebuilt from scratch. Stalin's best decision was when he decided to stop making decisions and leave it to the professionals.

This all seems to be based more in narrative than history, Louis. Obviously the Nazis made poor decisions that lost the war, but writing them off as little more than chimps is perilously simple. Hitler in his prime was a personally courageous and politically brilliant leader that managed to bring a fringe ideology to power in Germany through the sheer force of his personality and then went on to almost conquer Europe. That is why he was so dangerous.

[Brenus]

“Yes and no. Which Nazis are you talking about? Which time period are you talking about? The Nazis certainly made many more intelligent decisions than the French and British leadership both diplomatically and militarily in the prelude to the war and the first two years.”
As you say, depend of the time period. When Hitler came to power it was thanks to German mistakes from the Conservative party (E.G. Von Papen) who though they can out manoeuvre the Nazi after they’re crushed the Communist, except of course that the Spartakists were crushed by Noske and the Weimar Republic. Hitler benefited of this, but in fact he wasn’t involved in this process.
As he inherited a new Army coming from the Reichwerh, a tank doctrine developed in cooperation with the Soviets and a trained Luftwaffe, still thanks to Weimar.

Hitler smartly took the glory and the aura for these achievements and capitalised on things he didn’t.
So when he came on power he was able to bluff the Western Powers finally aware of their weaknesses.
In France you will have to wait for the Front Populaire, which will nationalise the Weapons Industries, to start to build a new army.
It was too late.

Germany had a constant policy from 1919 to 1933 for rearming and to avoid all obligations from the Treaty of Versailles.
So, in these terms, yes, the Germans outsmarted their (future) opponents.
I give (because I am a nice person) credit to the French and UK leaders they couldn’t believe somebody wanted to start again a new war after the blood bath of 1914-1918...

However, the Nazis were never able to prioritise their production. Hitler was ruling by dividing and eliminating all opponents (as Reom will discovered at his costs), SS against Heer, Gestapo against Abwehr, Himmeler against Goering, etc.
Focke Wuff airplanes, Junkers, Me, Gotha, and others for airplanes.
Same for tanks and equipment.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

PJ:

I think you overstate the operational ability of the 262. Along with the 163, they were devastating interceptors -- probably the first to excell at that role -- but were much less reliable in a dogfight where they had a lousy turn radius, were prone to more engine problems, and where the lower velocity of the MK108 created far more shooting problems. This would have been especially true at low level where the IL-2s went out to play.

I think the mystique of the 262 was built on two things: speed and experience. Being 100 mph faster, the 262 could literally attack a bomber formation and break away before the fighters could react. The 51s and 47s had the briefest of firing windows. Galland is quite possibly correct that he could have stopped daylight bombing if he'd had 500 262s and an equal number of decent pilots.

And that's the second qualifier. A lot of the mystique of the 262 was created by those who flew them. They were given to the best of the best (especially JV-44) and almost all of those blokes had what the Germans called "the shooting eye." Had JV-44 been re-equipped with Fokker D7s from war one, they would STILL have gotten a positive kill ratio.

So, against the Russians, the 262 would have piled up quite a few kills -- almost certainly wiping the IL-4s and TB-3s from the sky -- but would have had a lot more trouble "low and slow" against the Russian tacair folks.

[TinCow]

IIRC, the Germans had around 3500 AFVs in Normandy (equivalent to the total amount covering the entirety of the Eastern Front) and a further 400 AFVs in Italy. Those vehicles, not even mentioning the infantry, guns, and air forces focused on defeating the Allies and the removal of Hitler’s interference and stand fast orders would certainly have changed the equation considerably.

For the purposes of hypothetical discussion, I will agree with this. If we assume some kind of scenario in which ALL hostilities (ground, air, and naval) against Germany cease in western, southern, and northern Europe and Germany is able to shift ALL of their forces in those theaters to the Eastern Front, then there would be a situation in which a Soviet victory would be uncertain. I'm not prepared to say that Germany would win or even obtain a stalemate, but I'll give Germany enough credit to state that if they were able to focus all of their forces against the Soviet Union they did have a realistic chance of turning around the situation, even as late as summer 1944. However, I still find the assumptions required for that scenario to be complete fantasy.

[Louis VI the Fat]

This all seems to be based more in narrative than history, Louis.

I shall have to get back to you about those horses.


As for the rest, there is a narrative indeed. Like you, my interest is in dispelling myths based in ancient contemporary propaganda.

Europe's most advanced country and largest power twice suffered disastrous defeat in war, despite not unfavourable circumstances. Regardless, this Germany has become synonymous with fantastic overachievement.

Something doesn't add up about that.


Adrian summed up one of the myths I'm up against with his statement: 'Germany took on half the world and nearly won'. Me, I'd say that by the time half the world indeed started fighting, Germany was effortlessly defeated.
I'd rather say that Germany could pick off a handful of smaller opponents one by one, and the very first time it took on somebody roughly its own size it suffered devastating defeat in a period measured not in years, but months. Some achievement for a Reich as large as France and Britain combined.

The scale of the staggeringly poor performance becomes even more clear when one considers that Germany was supported by half of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union was a second world newly industrialising agragrian country run by a madman who had killed his officer corps, had decimated its restless population with mass starvation the decade before, and had let himself be taken by complete surprise. Far from military overachievement, Nazi Germany deserves the title of 'worst military performance in modern history'.

[Meneldil]

I'd rather say that Germany could pick off a handful of smaller opponents one by one, and the very first time it took on somebody roughly its own size it suffered devastating defeat in a period measured not in years, but months. Some achievement for a Reich as large as France and Britain combined.

The scale of the staggeringly poor performance becomes even more clear when one considers that Germany was supported by half of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union was a second world newly industrialising agragrian country run by a madman who had killed his officer corps, had decimated its restless population with mass starvation the decade before, and had let himself be taken by complete surprise. Far from military overachievement, Nazi Germany deserves the title of 'worst military performance in modern history'.

While I'm not too found of the "Germany was sooo badass" mindset, I don't think saying they outrightly sucked is correct. In 1939, France was widely regarded as having the most impressive military in the western world, and USSR wasn't far behind (if only thanks to the available manpower). On that respect alone, Germany did well: France and her 'mighty' (but outdated) army was trampled in a few months, and the SU would have suffered an even more crushing defeat if it weren't for the sheer size of the country.

[A Nerd]

A two front war when the west was still rather volitile didn't help either. Instigation of war with a neutral US and a passive USSR were very foolish decisions indeed. Though circumstance may have made them inevitable before the west was realatively stabilized.

[PanzerJaeger]

So, against the Russians, the 262 would have piled up quite a few kills -- almost certainly wiping the IL-4s and TB-3s from the sky -- but would have had a lot more trouble "low and slow" against the Russian tacair folks.

I largely agree with your specific criticisms of the 262, however, many of them, such as engine reliability and armament, had already been improved or corrected in later variants of the plane that did not see action. I also think you give the IL-2's, and Russian fighters, too much credit. Sturmoviks were very vulnerable to fighters, so I'm not sure how a faster, more advanced fighter would fare worse; and Russian fighters and pilots were on average worse than their Allied equivalents. 262s put down P-51s with relative ease, so I don't think it would have too much trouble with Russian fighters. Yes, much of their success can be attributed to pilot skill, as with every fighter, but even with the poor turning radius, the plane was very capable - especially when new tactics were developed to maximize it's strengths and minimize its limitations. Further design enhancements would have only helped.

As for the rest, there is a narrative indeed. Like you, my interest is in dispelling myths based in ancient contemporary propaganda.

Far from military overachievement, Nazi Germany deserves the title of 'worst military performance in modern history'.

I agree that the conventional wisdom surrounding WW2 and what actually happened are often not even close to matching up. However, in correcting the historical record, one should be mindful of not creating new myths.

I also agree with the limited economic point you made. Had Germany transitioned to a total war economy in 1939 instead of 1943, her production of armaments would have been far greater. (Not anywhere close to Allied production, but higher.) You seem to attribute that failure to base stupidity of Nazi leadership and a spoiled German populace. I think a more accurate analysis would reveal that the German plan for war was based on quick victories, and that that strategy was largely supported by results, except for the one fundamental miscalculation I discussed earlier (Russia). Once it was determined that the war would be prolonged, Germany responded accordingly. Further, Russia's early adoption of a total war type economy wasn't some brilliant decision that they chose correctly and the Germans didn't, they simply had no choice. Now, if one wants to find support for the notion that Germany was terrible in WW2, one could retroactively assert that Germany should have known that it could not knock out Russia during Barbarossa. However, that ignores all the information Germany had available and how close that it came to victory. I believe Hitler told Mannerheim that if he knew the Soviets could produce so many tanks, he never would have invaded. Again, every nation made such miscalcutlations during the war.



However, to conflate that economic point with German military performance is misguided at best and dubious at worst. The facts you use to support your assertion are simply incorrect.

I'd rather say that Germany could pick off a handful of smaller opponents one by one,

You seem to completely ignore your own nation's effort. The battle for France can hardly be described as Germany picking off a handful of smaller opponents. French and British forces were not outnumbered, and even enjoyed vast numerical superiority in artillery and tanks, many of which were technically superior to Germany's. Further, it was not a slow attritional battle where Germany's economy out produced France and Britain, but a quick campaign where military superiority won the day.

and the very first time it took on somebody roughly its own size it suffered devastating defeat in a period measured not in years, but months

I can only assume you are referring to Russia, although your assertion that it was roughly the same size really threw me off. 35,400,000 men served in the Red Army during WW2, comprising roughly 500 divisions. Germany committed 3,200,000 troops to Barbarossa and the number of German troops serving on the Eastern Front never grew above that number. Their divisional strength never grew beyond 150. Further, Russia far out produced Germany in every quantifiable armaments measure, not to mention the benefits Russia inherited from the actual geographic size of the country. At the time of our scenario - around Bagration in '44 - Germany had 2.5 million troops in the East, while Russia had 11 million - in addition to huge numerical superiorities in artillery, tanks, and airplanes. You seem to be trying to substitute industrial capacity with all other measures of size, which besides being fundamentally flawed, has little to do with the combat performance of comparative militaries.

This highlights one of the flaws in your estimation of German production capacity. Manpower, in itself, is a critical production constraint. Let's say Germany pulled off your economic miracle and produced 106, 334 brand new, shiny Panther tanks - exactly the number of tanks the Soviet Union produced throughout the war. Where are the 531, 670 crew going to come from to operate them, to say nothing of the maintenance and support personnel and or the people needed to train the crews? I refer you to the tens of thousands of brand new fighters the Luftwaffe had in storage when the war ended, as there were no pilots to fly them.

one considers that Germany was supported by half of Europe,

More cleverly deceptive language. Would you care to discuss the number of German allied troops committed to Russia and their effectiveness?

Soviet Union was a second world newly industrialising agragrian country run by a madman who had killed his officer corps, had decimated its restless population with mass starvation the decade before, and had let himself be taken by complete surprise.

He had also kept the population's living standards at such a base level that his country could focus nearly 95% of its industrial capacity towards military production without destroying its economy. Your spoiled Germans don't represent the full picture.


Overall, you could make the point that Germany should not have produced 15 million spools of wallpaper in 1945, and I would agree with you. However, you cannot then transfer that questionable economic performance onto the performance of the German military. The German forces are widely regarded as the best of the war, and various statistical analyses support those findings.

I'll go with Anthony Evans from World War II : An Illustrated Miscellany who has the most accurate and concise description of the Germans during WW2 I've read:

The German soldier was very professional and well trained, aggressive in attack and stubborn in defense. He was always adaptable, particularly in the later years when shortages of equipment were being felt.

I feel like you're trying to fight the war all over again, to deny the Germans even the recognition of being effective at much of anything at all. While your intentions are admirable, I think such statements do a disservice to history. It begs the question: If the German's were so stupid, spoiled, lazy, and militarily ineffective, what the hell was wrong with the Allies!?

[KrooK]

Jaeger and you still don't see something. Into our discussion we started from termination of Hitler into 1944 not 1941. Red Army into 1944 was not the same thing like into 1941. Its absolutely true that into 1941 they had no good officers and their soldiers were bad trained. But during 3 years of war situation changed a lot. Russian officers learnt much - they were still worse but not that bad like into 1941. Russian soldiers were always harder that german - Wermacht was winning due to organisation, training and leadership. But 3 years of war changed it. Russian soldiers were as experienced as Germans and still had something that let them hold first years of war. They were simply brave - really brave. And they knew how to cope with russian winter.
I do not believe that Wermacht in the 2nd part of 1944 would win with Russia. Too late. And even if Western Allies would agree on casefire (I doubt but lets think about it) - Germany still had no oil. Even 100.000 of panthers could do nothing without fuel.

[Brenus]

Just an info. According to the program I watch yesterday, the Foreign Labour (not including the Slave one), forced or voluntary, represented 7,000,000 people.
It won't easy to shift to women forces.
So, the only way to "save" Germany would be not only a sepearte peace with the main Powers, but a at least neutrality from the 1939-40 invaded countries, but an alliance with them, in order to get minerals, food, supplies and petrol for the war machine...

[Louis VI the Fat]

What great timing!


A Russian general revealed two days ago that Stalin twice cancelled advanced plans to assasinate Hitler. Stalin feared a separate peace, and thought Germany was weaker with Hitler than without Hitler.

Soviet dictator Josef Stalin blocked two attempts to kill Adolf Hitler during World War II, fearing that his replacement as Nazi leader would make peace with the Western Allies, a top Russian general said.
A plan to attack Hitler's bunker in 1943 and a 1944 plot involving an assassin who had gained the trust of the Nazi leadership were both canceled on Stalin's orders, General Anatoly Kulikov said at a conference in Moscow.
"A plan to assassinate Hitler in his bunker was developed, but Stalin suddenly canceled it in 1943 over fears that after Hitler's death his associates would conclude a separate peace treaty with Britain and the United States," Kulikov said Tuesday, RIA-Novosti reported.


In 1944, the Soviets again plotted to kill Hitler after a potential assassin managed to gain the trust of the Nazi leadership. "A detailed assassination plan was prepared, but Stalin canceled it again," Kulikov said.
Hitler killed himself on April 30, 1945, as Soviet forces closed in on Berlin, effectively ending the war in Europe and setting the stage for the Cold War standoff between Russia and the West.
An estimated 27 million Soviet citizens died in the 1941-45 war with Nazi Germany.
Kulikov was interior minister from 1995 to 1998 under President Boris Yeltsin. He said the Club of Military Leaders, which he heads, would include details of the assassination attempts in a forthcoming book on World War II.


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/a...er/406889.html

[PanzerJaeger]

Jaeger and you still don't see something. Into our discussion we started from termination of Hitler into 1944 not 1941. Red Army into 1944 was not the same thing like into 1941. Its absolutely true that into 1941 they had no good officers and their soldiers were bad trained. But during 3 years of war situation changed a lot. Russian officers learnt much - they were still worse but not that bad like into 1941. Russian soldiers were always harder that german - Wermacht was winning due to organisation, training and leadership. But 3 years of war changed it. Russian soldiers were as experienced as Germans and still had something that let them hold first years of war. They were simply brave - really brave. And they knew how to cope with russian winter.

I've agreed and acknowledged as much. However, the German forces were not the same as they were in 1941 either. In some ways they were worse, but in others they were much better. I think with the combined forces of the Western and Italian forces, they could have stopped and even possibly reversed the Russian advance.

A Russian general revealed two days ago that Stalin twice cancelled advanced plans to assasinate Hitler. Stalin feared a separate peace, and thought Germany was weaker with Hitler than without Hitler.

Hah! Amazing! Never would have thought that I would be in complete agreement with the big man himself. I cannot wait for further Russian declassifications and releases in the future. There's so much we don't know.

[Brenus]

I didn't know:
In January 1941, Stalin organised 2 “Kriegspiel” focused on defence and the other on counter-offensive. The German Forces are under Zhukov command who defeated he Soviet under Pavlov.
Zhukov will take Mereskov’s chair as Chief of the STAVKA and informed Stalin he will need 2 years to reorganise the Soviet Forces. Stalin gave him one.
Find this in a French What If: What If France didn't surrender in May 1940...

[RabidGibbon]

I just want to make a point that I think is important. On the 22nd of July the warsaw uprising hadn't happened yet, and that was an event that brought home to the west just how cynical Stalin could be. Admittedly they decided to let Stalin have his way, but one poster said that the british "Were happy to abandon Poland". This was simply not true - the situation was that certain elements of british government were rabid stalinists, but the warsaw uprising brought home to churchill (and perhaps alanbrooke) how ruthless Stalin was, and how he would ignore protesters who could not affect him (summed up by his quote "How many divisions does the pope have?").

But the point I'm trying to say is that by 22nd July the Red army was not deep into eastern europe, and the split that caused the Iron curtain speech had not happened yet. An assaination of Hitler on that date might have ended the war sooner, but the brits wouldn't have teamed up with the Germans against the Russians (And neither would the americans).

[Brenus]

Just a short answer:
Stalin wasn't cynical. I used to think like this before.
However, Stalin was more "political" than his allies. Why should he help future ennemies. The Polish in the Warswa upraising were nationalist and openly anti-communist.
In term of politic, Stalin did act in concordence with his own interests.
And don't forget that Roosevelt (and Churchill) prohibided the only French Armored Division available (2nd DB) as the others French Units were fighting in Italy to land ihe 6th of June 1944 to stop de Gaulle of Propaganda Material. Roosevelt wanted to treat France as a Occupied Country and was not keen to see a French Administration put in place.
And the same story when Paris took arms and revolted. It will be thanks to Patton who released Leclerc 2nd DB to rush to Paris that the French liberated their own Capital.
We can as well see how the Communist French Fighters Groups didn't received so much weapons from the British and US as thees were not really keen to arm potential ennemies...