What if the 20th of July 1944 Hitler has been "terminated"

[Brenus]

In order to shift the Alliances, and to keep Germany (and Eastern Europe) out of the communist hands, the new German government would need time.
I, and nobody will never know, if without the Western Allies push and the Strategic Bombing the Russians would have been able to win.
I tend to say yes, but…

How much time the German Government would need to negotiate, not only a separate peace but also a change in alliance?
I base the idea of a successful killing on the 20th of July.
So, what decision to take?
In term of military you can’t just withdraw all the troops inside Germany then deployed them just in front of the Russian without a Western Allies guaranty they won’t take advantage of this to invade the national territory…
You can try to negotiate a separate peace with France, Belgium, Holland and all the others governments in exiles, but how much chances you have too persuade the French Army which is soon to land in Provence to stop here and not pursuit…
The massacres of Oradour sur Glane and Tulles by the 2nd SS are from June. It would be difficult to the new German Government to convince the new French Government (as by now Petain’s Government is completely discredited) not only to cease-fire but to help against the Russian, which they help in their war thanks to the Groupe de Chasse 3 (Fighter Squadron) Normandy, at this date Normandy-Niemen (21st of July 1944) and Soviet Union Hero (Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union, Red Star Order, Red Flag Order and Lenin Order, plus some others)…

I agree with PJ, the biggest mistakes would be avoid, however I am not sure it would avoid the Eastern defeat…

“The loss of either of those would not have collapsed the German economy. Normal exchange rates could have been sustained in the short and medium terms without much impact, and women were a vast untapped resource throughout the war.”
On other matters, the release of the prisoners and the immediate cut in raw material, which would need to be compensate, would create a vacuum that Germany can’t easily fill.
To replace the Slave labour by the German Women labour would need more than just a shift in personnel. Most of the war factories were linked with the Labours Camps, and the logistic chains adapted (and work conditions) to the first kind of labour.
I spoke with one French Woman (refugee from Croatia in Serbia as she was married with a Yugoslav she met during the WW2 in Germany) who was in Forced Labour.
She worked for Siemens and all the work force was specialised and couldn’t protest against working conditions.
It wouldn’t be easy for a new Government to let these people to go (and de facto to provide the means of transportation) and to create more suitable premises for the German Labour to take their places… It would need time.
Would Germany have the skilled man/woman power to produce the ME 262 without the Slave Labour? I doubt.
It would need time to reshuffle the war industry, and this even if the Western Allies agree with the plan…
Time it wouldn’t have.

Because the Western Allies can decide to use the moment to push their advantage.
And the Russian as well.
Would the SS fight to hard in the boccage if Hitler would be dead?
Even the regular Heer would be in disarray…
How to avoid what happen to the Menshevik in 1917 when the Russian soldiers decided they had enough and “voted with their feet”…
Some the best German Generals were Nazi as e.g. Model. Kesselring and Sepp Dietrich for the best known. Would these Generals gave-up and agree to this, especially after an assassination and Coup?

[Jolt]

Some the best German Generals were Nazi as e.g. Model. Kesselring and Sepp Dietrich for the best known. Would these Generals gave-up and agree to this, especially after an assassination and Coup?

No doubt, by July 1944, discerning German Generals could quite well see that Germany was on the verge of defeat, and Hitler's lunacies and mad resistance until the end would change little. In the end, I'm sure they would be quite content in serving Germany to try and "lessen" the weight of defeat then madly follow Hitler to lead the country to total occupation.

[Sarmatian]

There are several issues here to discuss:

1) Western allies would have accepted a separate peace with Germany

That is highly, highly unlikely. Even though some people high up thought that Soviet Union is now greater threat than Germany, most of the leadership didn't think that way. Even if the political leadership managed to reach a consensus about it, there still remained a question of how would the population and the military react. At the time Nazis were "scum of the earth" and the Russians were "our gallant Soviet allies". Sure, in theory, with propaganda it could have been reversed but such things take time. There is very little chance that a coup would have totally changed the opinion of western allies, without the total denazification. By that point, nazis infiltrated practically everything, from education and politics to military structure. Again, it would take time and probably a a decent chunk of the military to enforce it. Time was something that Germans didn't have.

2) Germany would have been able to outproduce Russia.

This is even more improbable than the first one. There is little chance that half destroyed German industry and infrastructure would have been able to properly resupply the army. Women were an untapped resource, true, but moving them to factories and retraining them takes time. Even with that, it is questionable if German industry could have outproduced the Russian industry. Russian effort to do this showed how difficult it is, as their industry produced less equipment and of lesser quality for a long time until women were trained enough to perform those tasks well. Of course, the chaos of industry transfer was to blame for much of it but still we are talking about months.

3) Wehrmacht would have been able to defeat the Red Army without Hitler in 1944

This is the most improbable of all. Red Army of '44 wasn't the Red Army of '41. Even the Wehrmacht of '41, when it was at peak efficiency and pinnacle of military might would have trouble with it. Stalin, even though he was involved in strategic decision, largely left the planning and execution of military operations to the professionals. By that time, Soviet commanders were experienced and mature enough to conduct Deep Operations properly. Soviet soldiers (most of them) made up in experience what they lacked in training. A peasant who spent three years fighting in a huge conflict is a better soldier than a professional fresh out of the academy, no matter how good his training was. Huge Soviet advantage in equipment meant that it would take Germany a long time to catch up. By that time, surrender of Finland and Romania was a done deal, meaning Soviets could have easily put a stop to German iron ore supply from Sweden and oil from Romania, the only natural source of oil for the German army and industry. The most dangerous assumption is that Russian thinking was static and that because Manstein was able to counter attack at Kharkov, he would have been able to do so again at will. Quite the opposite, Red Army showed constant improvement throughout the war. Russians were quite aware that their winter offensives were halted by over-extension, just like German over-extension allowed them to perform counter offensives. Indeed, a huge problem for both armies in the first years of the war was to decide when to halt the offensives and to stop, rest and resupply. Precisely for that reason, Russian commanders were given fixed operational range for the offensive (100-120 km, iirc, may have to look it up) after the battle of Kursk, with the option to continue the offensive if the situation on the field allowed it. Their success was bigger than they expected so Stavka allowed continuation of the offensive beyond that original range in most cases. So, simply thinking that if Manstein was allowed to perform his "Backhand Slap" would have changed to course of the war is a huge mistake. Prolong it - probably, reverse it - unlikely.

[Ibn-Khaldun]

I think that WW2 would've ended much much sooner if Georg Elser would've succeeded on 8 November, 1939. Since the war had just started then with Hitler's death Western Allies would've accepted the peace more likely, I guess.

[PanzerJaeger]

2) Germany would have been able to outproduce Russia.

This is even more improbable than the first one. There is little chance that half destroyed German industry and infrastructure would have been able to properly resupply the army. Women were an untapped resource, true, but moving them to factories and retraining them takes time. Even with that, it is questionable if German industry could have outproduced the Russian industry. Russian effort to do this showed how difficult it is, as their industry produced less equipment and of lesser quality for a long time until women were trained enough to perform those tasks well. Of course, the chaos of industry transfer was to blame for much of it but still we are talking about months.

I don't know if this was directed at me, but if so, I just wanted to clarify. I don't think German industry could have ever outproduced that of the Soviets in raw output, but I do think it could have produced enough high quality weaponry to keep Germany in the war. Germany was well ahead of the Soviet Union in many key technologies (sometimes several generations), which then become combat multipliers.

3) Wehrmacht would have been able to defeat the Red Army without Hitler in 1944

This is the most improbable of all. Red Army of '44 wasn't the Red Army of '41. Even the Wehrmacht of '41, when it was at peak efficiency and pinnacle of military might would have trouble with it. Stalin, even though he was involved in strategic decision, largely left the planning and execution of military operations to the professionals. By that time, Soviet commanders were experienced and mature enough to conduct Deep Operations properly. Soviet soldiers (most of them) made up in experience what they lacked in training. A peasant who spent three years fighting in a huge conflict is a better soldier than a professional fresh out of the academy, no matter how good his training was. Huge Soviet advantage in equipment meant that it would take Germany a long time to catch up.

I don’t want to take anything away from the Russians as Deep Operations was an excellent doctrine, and far better than anything the Allies came up with, but it must be noted that the big victories under its name were scored with vast numerical majorities and against a hierarchally paralyzed enemy. For example, Wikipedia’s strength tables for Bagration, based mostly on Frieser and Glantz, have the opposing sides at:

Germany:
486,493 men
118 tanks
377 assault guns
2,589 guns

Russia:
1,254,300 men
2,715 tanks
1,355 assault guns
24,363 guns

Now, my point is that if either of those variables were altered – either the freedom of operation or the ratios of opposing forces – the situation would indeed be different. See the battle of Targul Frumos in May of '44 where Deep Operations fell flat:

Some of the blitzkrieg principles apply equally well to armor in the defense, and where they do not an understanding of them points the way to countering them. We spoke of moment and momentum as strengths of the armored offensive. The attacker loses both these when he is unable to move forwards or sideways - in other words when he is contained. The counter is thus simply: first contain, encircling if possible; then destroy.

Unfortunately the Wehrmacht's operations feature rather few instances of well-conducted defense and these are mainly at divisional or at most corps level. Hitler's (and Goering's) repeated interventions, mostly featuring refusals to give ground laced with accusations of cowardice and treachery, prevented the field and air commanders on the Eastern Front from conducting the kind of defense which they wanted and which would surely have influenced the duration of World War II in Europe and the situation at its end.

Manteuffel's handling of the Pz.Gr.Div. Grossdeutschland at Targul Frumos (northeast of the Ploesti oilfield region) on 2 May, 1944, is one of the best examples. This battle is also of interest as the Germans' first encounter with the Soviet heavy tanks in the shape of KV85. Schematically the ground is a horseshoe ridge with the opening facing roughly northeast and the left (west) side higher and longer than the right. There is rolling to hilly ground north of the horseshoe's opening. At the apex.of the horseshoe, above and to the south of the town of Targul Frumos, is a dominating hill on which Manteuffel set up his battle headquarters. He established both his infantry regiments, stiffened with jagdpanzers in depth and all other antitank weapons including a battery of 88mm guns, along the base of the horseshoe, with his tank reserve in depth. He deployed his reconnaissance and some tanks in the rolling ground about 8km to the north of the main position.

The Soviets advanced in strength with massive artillery support, mainly with tanks and evidently with the base of the horseshoe as their initial objective. Manteuffel's forward tanks fell back and to their left with fire and movement, drawing the enemy into the killing ground enclosed by the horseshoe and towards the southwest corner. The infantry were in concealed positions, which they had had several weeks to prepare. They lay low and allowed the Soviet tanks to pass through them, then took on the supporting infantry. The first crisis seems to have been caused by the Soviet heavy tanks thrusting down the west ridge just as the pressure on the southwest corner began to build up. Manteuffel used his tank reserve under his personal command.

Meanwhile the panzerfüsilier regiment on the right had deliberately been left entirely without tank support for over 2 hours. They were badly overrun and broken through, and the regimental headquarters had itself become involved in driving off a Soviet tank attack. Nevertheless they had held firm and succeeded in pinning down the enemy infantry. Then the Soviets, exploiting success, put in another tank attack on them.
After about 2 hours of intensive fighting, Manteuffel sensed a weakening of resolve on the part of the Soviets facing his left. Rather than counterattack at that stage, he took personal command of a company of Pzkw IVs and led his tank regiment, by now replenished, across to the right and straight into the attack off the line of march. His account says he appeared on that sector at 11.55 hrs - 5 minutes before the time he had promised the regimental commander. The tank regiment drove the Soviets right back with heavy losses.

That night he passed two companies each of Tigers and Panthers through the infantry into forward positions. These together with air support sufficed to beat off subsequent Soviet attacks. No ground had been lost; an estimated 350 Soviet tanks and SU guns were destroyed at an exchange rate better than 20:1; and Manteulfel's force remained capable of operating effectively at its previous level.

I have dwelt on this battle because it well represents the defensive side of the blitzkrieg coin and is a model of great relevance today. The hammer-and-anvil principle was of course used to excellent effect by Montgomery in the battle of Alem Halfa though his hammer blow consisted - typically perhaps - mainly of tank fire rather than tank maneuver. Manteuffel combined this tactic with two others. One had been much employed by the Afrika Korps at lower levels - the use of an actually or apparently weak force of tanks as a bait to draw the enemy onto a screen of (in those days) antitank guns. The other was to separate the enemy tanks and infantry by allowing the enemy tanks to overrun the defending infantry in the anvil, and then to destroy both in detail.

"Easy come, easy go", runs the saying. Armored forces properly handled can gain vast areas of territory rapidly and achieve strategic success by disruption of the enemy forces. Conversely the defense against an armored offensive calls for great speed and scope of maneuver. Real estate has to be traded off for time and - paradoxically enough - space if disruption is to be avoided and containment achieved. This is the dilemma that currently faces NATO's land forces -and most of all the FRG.

-- Brig. Gen. Richard Simpkin, Tank Warfare: An Analysis of Soviet and NATO Tank Philosophy (London: Brassey's Publisher's Ltd., 1979), pp. 44-48.

IIRC, the Germans had around 3500 AFVs in Normandy (equivalent to the total amount covering the entirety of the Eastern Front) and a further 400 AFVs in Italy. Those vehicles, not even mentioning the infantry, guns, and air forces focused on defeating the Allies and the removal of Hitler’s interference and stand fast orders would certainly have changed the equation considerably.

The most dangerous assumption is that Russian thinking was static and that because Manstein was able to counter attack at Kharkov, he would have been able to do so again at will. Quite the opposite, Red Army showed constant improvement throughout the war. Russians were quite aware that their winter offensives were halted by over-extension, just like German over-extension allowed them to perform counter offensives. Indeed, a huge problem for both armies in the first years of the war was to decide when to halt the offensives and to stop, rest and resupply. Precisely for that reason, Russian commanders were given fixed operational range for the offensive (100-120 km, iirc, may have to look it up) after the battle of Kursk, with the option to continue the offensive if the situation on the field allowed it. Their success was bigger than they expected so Stavka allowed continuation of the offensive beyond that original range in most cases. So, simply thinking that if Manstein was allowed to perform his "Backhand Slap" would have changed to course of the war is a huge mistake. Prolong it - probably, reverse it - unlikely.

Kharkov was largely a reactive operation. Manstein accurately judged that the Russians were strung out and vulnerable and used his smaller force more effectively to defeat them. From what I’ve read about his plans for Backhand Blow, it was to be a far more deliberate operation involving ruse to draw the Russians in. It never made it off the drawing board, of course, so we’ll never know. I do know that even in Bagration the Germans recognized several vulnerable Russian overextensions that they were not able to take advantage of due to the reasons discussed earlier.

[Louis VI the Fat]

I don't think German industry could have ever outproduced that of the Soviets in raw output, but I do think it could have produced enough high quality weaponry to keep Germany in the war. Germany was well ahead of the Soviet Union in many key technologies (sometimes several generations), which then become combat multipliers.

I don't think this is correct.
Germany had a raw industrial output larger than the Soviet Union and Britain combined. Germany also had an industrial labour force twice the size of the SU.

The Nazis refused to change to a war economy until it was all but over - spoiled Germans wouldn't have it otherwise. The war was not supposed to cost anything, to lower living standards. This wasn't specific to the Nazis. For decades, Berlin policy had been that the population should not have to make any sacrifice in living standard for Germany's foreign agression - the bills are for the others: occupied territories, Jews, Americans, French and Belgians for WWI, future generations.



The Nazis were simply not all that good in making smart decisions, in using their favourable position.

For example, they made high-tech equipment that was useless in the extreme circumstances in Russia. Russians knew better - one must rely on cheap, simple and therefore sturdy equipment. These work, these are low maintanance, and these can be mass produced in great numbers. On top of this, Germany also managed to rely in crucial aspects on low-tech equipment, which rendered much of their fancier equipment useless. For example, a reliance on horses to tow this fancy equipment around, against mobile mechanised Russians.

Stalin was smart. Half his country occupied from the get go, and half of Europe fighting against him, and he still managed to win against the odds. Germany, the largest and most advanced economy in Europe, couldn't have fared worse if its decisions were made by chimpansees throwing darts.

[PanzerJaeger]

\

I don't think this is correct.
Germany had a raw industrial output larger than the Soviet Union and Britain combined. Germany also had an industrial labour force twice the size of the SU.

I was referring to armaments production, in which Germany could not have attained parity with Russia even with a total war economy for a number of reasons.

The Nazis were simply not all that good in making smart decisions, in using their favourable position.

Yes and no. Which Nazis are you talking about? Which time period are you talking about? The Nazis certainly made many more intelligent decisions than the French and British leadership both diplomatically and militarily in the prelude to the war and the first two years. The invasion of the USSR was, of course, a fiasco fueled by arrogance from previous campaigns. The proper planning and foresight that allowed for the decimation of the French and British forces in the West was not carried out, despite warnings from some in the military hierarchy. However, in spite of the sloppiness and haste that went into its preparation, Barbarossa almost succeeded. Some have speculated that a few more armored divisions would have tipped the scale. The failure led to a drawn out war, for which Germany was definitely not prepared. This was by far the Nazi... Hitler's biggest mistake, and slowly drained the lifeblood out of Germany. As the war progressed, both Hitler and Goering, the two most important men to the military situation, became strung out on narcotics and made many more poor decisions.

While it can certainly be said that the invasion of Russia was a monumental mistake, it was one miscalculation that had a not insignificant chance of success. Had that happened, Germany would have won WW2.

For the record, I'm not defending the Nazi political leadership. When they got involved in military decision making, their meddling was devastating. I just don't think such blanket statements paint the most accurate picture possible.

Ignoring moral issues and simply focusing on goal attainment (and assuming Hitler's goals were the military domination of Europe), the Nazis made a lot of intelligent decisions up front and made one critical mistake from which they could not extricate themselves. The French and British made highly ignorant decisions and were lucky to be bailed out by the US and Russia, who both made the wisest decisions of the war and propelled themselves into world domination after the fact.

For example, they made high-tech equipment that was useless in the extreme circumstances in Russia. Russians knew better - one must rely on cheap, simple and therefore sturdy equipment. These work, these are low maintanance, and these can be mass produced in great numbers. On top of this, Germany also managed to rely in crucial aspects on low-tech equipment, which rendered much of their fancier equipment useless. For example, a reliance on horses to tow this fancy equipment around, against mobile mechanised Russians.

Can you elaborate? Which "fancy" equipment was towed around by horses? How was it then rendered useless? It is well known that the majority of German forces relied on horses (as sufficient numbers of trucks were unavailible), but off the top of my head I cannot think of any fancy equipment that was towed by horses. I can only think of run-of-the-mill type stuff like artillery, wagons, etc.

Stalin was smart. Half his country occupied from the get go, and half of Europe fighting against him, and he still managed to win against the odds. Germany, the largest and most advanced economy in Europe, couldn't have fared worse if its decisions were made by chimpansees throwing darts.

Stalin had the largest army in Europe. He had far greater quantities of armor, artillery and airplanes than Germany. He had brilliant military minds and a sound doctrine. Despite Western historiography, the Soviet military was second only to the Wehrmacht in quality, even in 1941. Due to his intelligent decisions, his brilliant officer corps was systematically murdered by their own leader directly before the war and the vast majority of this force was destroyed by the Germans in the first year of the war, having to be rebuilt from scratch. Stalin's best decision was when he decided to stop making decisions and leave it to the professionals.

This all seems to be based more in narrative than history, Louis. Obviously the Nazis made poor decisions that lost the war, but writing them off as little more than chimps is perilously simple. Hitler in his prime was a personally courageous and politically brilliant leader that managed to bring a fringe ideology to power in Germany through the sheer force of his personality and then went on to almost conquer Europe. That is why he was so dangerous.

[Brenus]

“Yes and no. Which Nazis are you talking about? Which time period are you talking about? The Nazis certainly made many more intelligent decisions than the French and British leadership both diplomatically and militarily in the prelude to the war and the first two years.”
As you say, depend of the time period. When Hitler came to power it was thanks to German mistakes from the Conservative party (E.G. Von Papen) who though they can out manoeuvre the Nazi after they’re crushed the Communist, except of course that the Spartakists were crushed by Noske and the Weimar Republic. Hitler benefited of this, but in fact he wasn’t involved in this process.
As he inherited a new Army coming from the Reichwerh, a tank doctrine developed in cooperation with the Soviets and a trained Luftwaffe, still thanks to Weimar.

Hitler smartly took the glory and the aura for these achievements and capitalised on things he didn’t.
So when he came on power he was able to bluff the Western Powers finally aware of their weaknesses.
In France you will have to wait for the Front Populaire, which will nationalise the Weapons Industries, to start to build a new army.
It was too late.

Germany had a constant policy from 1919 to 1933 for rearming and to avoid all obligations from the Treaty of Versailles.
So, in these terms, yes, the Germans outsmarted their (future) opponents.
I give (because I am a nice person) credit to the French and UK leaders they couldn’t believe somebody wanted to start again a new war after the blood bath of 1914-1918...

However, the Nazis were never able to prioritise their production. Hitler was ruling by dividing and eliminating all opponents (as Reom will discovered at his costs), SS against Heer, Gestapo against Abwehr, Himmeler against Goering, etc.
Focke Wuff airplanes, Junkers, Me, Gotha, and others for airplanes.
Same for tanks and equipment.

[Louis VI the Fat]

This all seems to be based more in narrative than history, Louis.

I shall have to get back to you about those horses.


As for the rest, there is a narrative indeed. Like you, my interest is in dispelling myths based in ancient contemporary propaganda.

Europe's most advanced country and largest power twice suffered disastrous defeat in war, despite not unfavourable circumstances. Regardless, this Germany has become synonymous with fantastic overachievement.

Something doesn't add up about that.


Adrian summed up one of the myths I'm up against with his statement: 'Germany took on half the world and nearly won'. Me, I'd say that by the time half the world indeed started fighting, Germany was effortlessly defeated.
I'd rather say that Germany could pick off a handful of smaller opponents one by one, and the very first time it took on somebody roughly its own size it suffered devastating defeat in a period measured not in years, but months. Some achievement for a Reich as large as France and Britain combined.

The scale of the staggeringly poor performance becomes even more clear when one considers that Germany was supported by half of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union was a second world newly industrialising agragrian country run by a madman who had killed his officer corps, had decimated its restless population with mass starvation the decade before, and had let himself be taken by complete surprise. Far from military overachievement, Nazi Germany deserves the title of 'worst military performance in modern history'.

[TinCow]

IIRC, the Germans had around 3500 AFVs in Normandy (equivalent to the total amount covering the entirety of the Eastern Front) and a further 400 AFVs in Italy. Those vehicles, not even mentioning the infantry, guns, and air forces focused on defeating the Allies and the removal of Hitler’s interference and stand fast orders would certainly have changed the equation considerably.

For the purposes of hypothetical discussion, I will agree with this. If we assume some kind of scenario in which ALL hostilities (ground, air, and naval) against Germany cease in western, southern, and northern Europe and Germany is able to shift ALL of their forces in those theaters to the Eastern Front, then there would be a situation in which a Soviet victory would be uncertain. I'm not prepared to say that Germany would win or even obtain a stalemate, but I'll give Germany enough credit to state that if they were able to focus all of their forces against the Soviet Union they did have a realistic chance of turning around the situation, even as late as summer 1944. However, I still find the assumptions required for that scenario to be complete fantasy.