Could Germany have won WWII?

[Sp4]

I have na ex-lover from Russia and another girl I know from there. Both tell me that outside of Moscow the ratio between men and women is skewered. There's usually 20 girls on the dance floor of a club and only 1 or 2 guys. They attest this to the heavy losses from WWII, not sure how accurate this is...

Hahaha wow. XD Cool. That's great.

[Papewaio]

There is some validity to this. Of course, absolutely accurate numbers will never be known, but the Soviet Union lost about 20% of its population and 25% of its resources during WWII.

Mark Harrison states in Accounting for War that "supply-side shocks to Soviet population, fixed capital, and GNP were never made up post-war in terms of trajectory" (as of 1996 when the book was published).

He goes on further to say that "...the USSR began 1946 with an overall demographic deficit of 35 million...combining war deaths, emigrations, and wartime birth deficits."

As a comparison, combined Anglo-American civil + military losses were roughly 1 in 250; Soviet losses were 2 in 9 for military personnel, and 1 in 10 for civilians. And the Soviet Union was the only one of the victorious Allies to suffer significant post-war economic stagnation. All other nations (and in particular the US) experienced economic booms and high population growth.



Let's hope not

It explains the generation that fought in WWII having skewed ratios of men to women. It does not in any ways go remotely close to being a reason for skewed demographics from the baby boomer generation onwards.

Any skewed demographics real or perceived post WWII would have to be because of lifestyle choices. Male to female birth rates should be the same. There might be a ratio change due to poor nutrition and maybe males die off quicker.

But all one needs to do is look at a western dance floor to see a ratio skewed towards females. It isn't an accurate way to poll populations.

[Sp4]

Women just go out more... We're sitting here playing video games ^^

[Myth]

Exactly. Women go out for fun. Men go out for women.

Men go out for fun too. But fun for us is women, booze and food. So if we can't get a girl, we drink and then we get the munchies at 4 AM.

[Empire*Of*Media]

This Thread is About WWII or Modern Women's life ?!!!!!

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Well, even on the premise that children are born 50/50, there has been at least three generations since the Great War. Any deficit would have recovered in the younger generations by now, so going to a club with a bunch of young adults will not the be the result of the Great War, unless these 20 girls on the dance floor are Old Age Pensioners.

As a result of normal PH factors, there is a slight advantage toward girl children, usually in a .2% or so swing. You are, of course essentially correct that with 3 full generations of "turnover" since 1945 that a more or less 50/50 balance must have reasserted itself.

That said, I don't think that the Russians have yet recovered from the deaths of so many during the Stalin era. Russia lost more than 13 % of its population (maybe even higher if the Soviets had been inflating the population numbers for propaganda purposes) in WW2 and those figures are exclusive of the purge/starvation campaigns of the 1930s or the Gulag efforts of the Post-War era. The pre-war CCCPP claimed over 168 million. Current day Russia claims fewer than 144 million. By contrast the UK had 46.5 million in 1939 and has over 62 million today. France had over 40 millions in 1939 and now has a population of over 61 million. The USA had 132 million in 1940 and has over 310 million today.

Some of Russian's retrograde is the divesture of all of its other countries -- the stans, Belorussia etc. But even if you add in their current total population, Russian barely keeps pace with France in terms of growth percentage.

[El Barto]

Back on the Pacific front… what would have happened if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbour? What would have happened to Australia, would it have been invaded, would there have been a sort of no-man's land across Insulindia?
How long would it have taken for the US to join the Allies? I don't know to what extent they were already helping the Allies in the Southeast Asian area, if any.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Back on the Pacific front… what would have happened if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbour? What would have happened to Australia, would it have been invaded, would there have been a sort of no-man's land across Insulindia?
How long would it have taken for the US to join the Allies? I don't know to what extent they were already helping the Allies in the Southeast Asian area, if any.

Deserves its own thread.

That Summer, the USN was already fighting against the Unterseebooten in the Atlantic -- Roosevelt was pushing for us to intervene on behalf of Britain but couldn't get past the isolationist lobby at that time. Lend Lease was finally getting Americans back to work, but that did NOT translate as a desire to involve themselves in a European war for many.

In the Pacific, we really weren't positioned to do anything but haul out Case Orange and go for a big fleet battle with the IJN. The Embargo etc. was begun because, at the time, it was truly believed that Japan would find a face-saving excuse to back down in China or, if they went to war, would be striking against the Phillipines with their limited sea-lift. The Phillipine Army would fight a delaying action until the USN could smash the IJN and then Japan would sue for peace with their navy broken and no way to project power. Obviously, it didn't turn out that way.

Roosevelt and Winston were ecstatic that Germany declared war -- it was gonna be impossible to sell "Germany First" when only Japan had attacked or declared.

[El Barto]

Erm, what is Case Orange?

I really do think -from reading your posts- that both the US and Japan overestimated their own power.

Still, if Germany hadn't declared war -I don't think they could have with their ideological blindfold, but let's assume so- the US could've taken charge of the APcific front and the UK and the Soviet Union could've engaged Germany.

Another big question is what if the Japs had attacked Vladivostok and then Mongolia and Siberia instead of trying to fight across the Pacific? The US would've been mired in its own internal politicking and I don't think the Red Army could've handled two land fronts across such a large distance, but I don't know how good their railway network was beyond the Urals.

[Montmorency]

No one in the world would have had the logistics to cross 1500 miles of empty taiga to get to the Urals.

Disabling the Pacific ports would have been the limit for the Japanese, and in that case would at least have dealt a noticeable blow to the Lend-Lease transfer. At that point, there would have been nothing for the Soviets to create a second front against - no enemy infantry on the opposing side, and no strategic points to defend from them anyway.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Erm, what is Case Orange?

I really do think -from reading your posts- that both the US and Japan overestimated their own power.

Still, if Germany hadn't declared war -I don't think they could have with their ideological blindfold, but let's assume so- the US could've taken charge of the APcific front and the UK and the Soviet Union could've engaged Germany.

Another big question is what if the Japs had attacked Vladivostok and then Mongolia and Siberia instead of trying to fight across the Pacific? The US would've been mired in its own internal politicking and I don't think the Red Army could've handled two land fronts across such a large distance, but I don't know how good their railway network was beyond the Urals.

Case Orange, or rather War Plan Orange, was the USA's ongoing planning program for war with Imperial Japan.

Of COURSE the USA and Japan overestimated their power. As did Germany in 1941, As did Germany in 1914, As did the USA in Korea and Vietnam, as did Pompey facing Sertorius. Pretty much everybody all the time overestimates their ability at the outset of wars.

The Japanese could have dealt the Russians a blow and either conquered Vladivostok or neutralized it along with the minor Pacific ports. It would have been a blow to the USSR, but not a crippling one. Had the Japanese seriously gone after the Russians, they would have had to have paid a horrible blood price to advance against an opponent with far better armor and artillery. On top of it all, logistically, there was, essentially, one double tracked rail line over which ALL of the logistics would travel and which would have been exposed to partisans with dynamite for virtually all of its distance. It was tough enough for the Mongols, and they didn't have to try to haul artillery shells and ammo reloads with them. Even had they been able to defeat the USSR forces, they would have been able to advance, at best, at the speed of their mule transport. All the while, the Soviets would be maintaining there and of the rail line while falling back toward their sources of supply. Simply not practicable.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Disabling the Pacific ports would have been the limit for the Japanese, and in that case would at least have dealt a noticeable blow to the Lend-Lease transfer.

As it turned out, this would be the case; but I doubt that anyone in 1941 could have predicted that Vladivostok would eventually become the single largest conduit for LL supplies to the Soviet Union.

was the USA's ongoing planning program for war with Imperial Japan.

All the Rainbow plans were rather overoptimistic as to what could be achieved. The US grossly underestimated IJN air capabilities, and even more so the Japanese innovation to place all six of their large fleet carriers into a single task force (something totally against the then current USN policy of having only one carrier per task force). Any sortie by US 1st Fleet would've meant alot of unrecoverable iron on the bottom of the ocean instead of the shallow water of Pearl Harbor, where all but several of the ships sunk were eventually salvaged. The US also had no information concerning the new land-based LRB's available to the Japanese---namely the G3M & G4M. It's not hard to imagine the USN 1st Fleet suffering the same fate as the PoW/Repulse when faced with land-based air from Saipan and Truk.

One other factor US planners failed to take into consideration for their Rainbow plans was the lack of fleet oilers in the Pacific Fleet, and lack of training in at-sea replenishment. In 1941, there were only 11 fleet oilers in the whole of the Pacific Theatre, and seven of them were servicing the West Coast. That leaves only four oilers at PH to service USN fleets. Not nearly enough to support a cross-ocean sortie to the PI (and no major stockpiles of fuel west of PH).

So essentially, once the PI's were attacked, it was a certainty they would fall to the Japanese.

Had the Japanese seriously gone after the Russians, they would have had to have paid a horrible blood price to advance against an opponent with far better armor and artillery.

This would have been true if the Japanese had chosen to advance in the tank-friendly country in the vicinity of Khalkin-Gol...but not in the rugged, forested terrain of Kharbarovsk and the westward approaches to Vladivostok. Khalkin-Gol is noted as a major set-back for the IJA, but what few realize is that for the first half of the campaign the Japanese were advancing and driving the Soviets and MPRA back. Zhukov's blitzkrieg-style victory grabs much of the limelight, but neglected is the horrible casualties suffered by Red Army regulars, and MPRA soldiers. Coox, in his monumental work Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia 1939, places Japanese casualties somewhere around 17000-20000. Soviet & MPRA casualties will never be known accurately, but when interviewed in the mid-fifties, several Soviet generals who participated in the campaign did not deny the assertion made by Japanese estimates of 30000 casualties.

Bottom line for the "go-north" option available to the Japanese was the virtual lack of strategic targets. Above all things, the Japanese needed oil. When the US embargo hit them in the summer of 1941, they had roughly two years stockpiled. With the exception of a limited supply of oil in the Sakhalin Islands, there is no oil in the Soviet Far East, and very limited sources of other raw materials needed for war. So unless the Germans compensated the Japanese heavily for attacking the Soviets in the Far East (another topic deserving of it's own thread...ie. what could the Germans have proffered?), Japan was going after DEI oil and rubber.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

RS:

Good points.

I agree completely on the LL point. Yes, our trucks would eventually make a huge impact on CCCP offensive logistics, but nobody knew that in 1941.

I agree also, for the most part, regarding Japan's fighting ability moving West. I think the Russian emphasis on artillery would have been more problematic than the tanks in most of the terrain and I agree completely with you on the nature of the strategic objectives. The only easily exploitable resource that would have been of benefit to Japan was lumber and Siberia is hardly the only practical source for that. There were a number of other valuable resources to be exploited, but all of a "long term" character rather than the immediate critical need for POL that you rightly identify as the proximate cause for the war.

I simply don't know what would have happened it there had been a Japanese attack but no Pearl Harbor. War Plan Orange really did envisage a grand clash between the two fleets somewhere between Iwo and Okinawa. Battleship forces were about even, with the Japanese having 11 to our 10 (Yamato so new it squeaked); Japan outnumbered us in cruisers (CA and CL) as well as destroyers [their designs were not as robust, but they did have the 24" torpedoes]; subs were about equal [though ours were tasked against shipping more than the IJN's so in a fleet action the edge would probably have been to Japan here as well.

While superficially the carrier fleets were equal, too many of ours were in the Atlantic and the Japanese were all in the Pacific. Ours carried more per carrier and physically tougher planes [c. 320 total in 4 carriers], they had more planes overall [492] and better trained pilots. Moreover, it is likely that at least 25% of US fighters would have been Buffaloes while 25% of the Diver bombers would have been Vindicators.

Midway illustrates that signals intelligence and luck can overcome numbers, so the USN might have engineered a carrier victory -- but the odds are long that it would actually have been a victory the other direction.

In short, if we had managed to actually execute Plan Orange, I suspect that the result would have been a telling victory -- at significant cost -- for Japan. But we would have been years recovering from the defeat. Eventually, US manufacturing would catch and surpass, but it would have given the Japanese far more than 6 months to "run wild."

[ReluctantSamurai]

While superficially the carrier fleets were equal, too many of ours were in the Atlantic and the Japanese were all in the Pacific. Ours carried more per carrier and physically tougher planes [c. 320 total in 4 carriers], they had more planes overall [492] and better trained pilots. Moreover, it is likely that at least 25% of US fighters would have been Buffaloes while 25% of the Diver bombers would have been Vindicators.

Several things would have given the IJN a decided advantage in opposing any USN Rainbow plan:

1. Fleet doctrine---While it's true that USN carriers had larger aircraft capacities, the IJN concentrated their carriers into a single TF and could bring to bear overwhelming firepower on any 1941-early 1942 USN carrier group. Because USN doctrine at that time forbid more than one carrier per TF, USN carriers would have been picked off one-by-one.

2. Superior aircraft---The F4F could, and did, hold its own against the Zero-sen with proper tactics like the Thatch Weave (Wildcats actually had a positive kill/loss ratio vs. Zero's); the SBD was as good or better than the IJN Val; but the TBD was a complete turkey (as Midway proved) when compared to the Japanese Kate. The long-ranged Mitsubishi G3M Nell, and later the G4M Betty could be decisive battle winners as the fate of the PoW/Repulse Task Group showed that mainline battle groups without CAP were very vulnerable.

3. Superior air tactics---Given the vulnerability of unescorted battle groups, 1941-early 1942 USN doctrine prohibited carriers from traveling with the main battle line, but instead acting as "scouts". With the considerable range advantage enjoyed by the early-war Japanese aircraft, the IJN could hit the US fleets long before the US carriers could retaliate. Add to the mix the land-based LRB's, and you have a recipe for a total disaster, IMHO. So no, I can't agree with the Japanese suffering anything resembling "significant" losses.

4. Superior naval tactics---IJN cruisers were much more modern than USN cruisers (until the Cleveland & Baltimore class came into service), they carried the deadly Long Lance torpedo, and were far superior in night tactics to any other navy in the world. The destruction of the ABDA forces in the Java Sea in 1941, and the fierce battles later on in the Solomons in 1942-43 can attest to superior IJN cruiser and destroyer tactics.

And an important point to overlook is the quantity of fleet oilers in the US Pacific Fleet in 1941. I will have to dig up my numbers on cruising ranges for US ships, but suffice it to say for the moment that the USN did not have the capability to sail large battle groups much beyond Midway. It wouldn't be until the advent of the large Servron fleets of 1944-45 that USN TF's could sail right to the Marianas, Okinawa, and eventually the Japanese mainland.

Eventually, US manufacturing would catch and surpass, but it would have given the Japanese far more than 6 months to "run wild."

And this is America's ace-in-the-hole. Japan just could not hope to be able to outproduce the US in anything from weapon systems to manpower. So the key word in that statement is "Eventually". How long is 'eventually' and does the American public support the war for that long despite huge losses in life and material?

A rather interesting analysis to that end:

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Several things would have given the IJN a decided advantage in opposing any USN Rainbow plan:

1. Fleet doctrine---While it's true that USN carriers had larger aircraft capacities, the IJN concentrated their carriers into a single TF and could bring to bear overwhelming firepower on any 1941-early 1942 USN carrier group. Because USN doctrine at that time forbid more than one carrier per TF, USN carriers would have been picked off one-by-one.

2. Superior aircraft---The F4F could, and did, hold its own against the Zero-sen with proper tactics like the Thatch Weave (Wildcats actually had a positive kill/loss ratio vs. Zero's); the SBD was as good or better than the IJN Val; but the TBD was a complete turkey (as Midway proved) when compared to the Japanese Kate. The long-ranged Mitsubishi G3M Nell, and later the G4M Betty could be decisive battle winners as the fate of the PoW/Repulse Task Group showed that mainline battle groups without CAP were very vulnerable.

3. Superior air tactics---Given the vulnerability of unescorted battle groups, 1941-early 1942 USN doctrine prohibited carriers from traveling with the main battle line, but instead acting as "scouts". With the considerable range advantage enjoyed by the early-war Japanese aircraft, the IJN could hit the US fleets long before the US carriers could retaliate. Add to the mix the land-based LRB's, and you have a recipe for a total disaster, IMHO. So no, I can't agree with the Japanese suffering anything resembling "significant" losses.

4. Superior naval tactics---IJN cruisers were much more modern than USN cruisers (until the Cleveland & Baltimore class came into service), they carried the deadly Long Lance torpedo, and were far superior in night tactics to any other navy in the world. The destruction of the ABDA forces in the Java Sea in 1941, and the fierce battles later on in the Solomons in 1942-43 can attest to superior IJN cruiser and destroyer tactics.

And an important point to overlook is the quantity of fleet oilers in the US Pacific Fleet in 1941. I will have to dig up my numbers on cruising ranges for US ships, but suffice it to say for the moment that the USN did not have the capability to sail large battle groups much beyond Midway. It wouldn't be until the advent of the large Servron fleets of 1944-45 that USN TF's could sail right to the Marianas, Okinawa, and eventually the Japanese mainland.



And this is America's ace-in-the-hole. Japan just could not hope to be able to outproduce the US in anything from weapon systems to manpower. So the key word in that statement is "Eventually". How long is 'eventually' and does the American public support the war for that long despite huge losses in life and material?

A rather interesting analysis to that end:

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

RS:

We are, essentially, on the same page here. You and I both view a Japanese short term tactical victory as the very likely end result of a late 1941 attack and or any confrontation resulting therefrom up through March of 1942. We are both, additionally, well aware of the economic/logistic inevitability of a Japanese defeat over the long run. Our only remaining argument is to the scope/nature of such an early victory. I suspect our answers to the "war weariness" concern to be pretty similar as well.

With that said:

1. The USN would have been operating in fairly coordinated task groups. Yes, the emphasis on smaller single-CV groupings would have created more of a CAP problem and less of an AAA interference to attack, but a lot would depend on whose scouts spotted who first and most accurately. Assuming a USN signals advantage, such as we often enjoyed due to Magic, they might have gotten in a few licks from coordinated strikes before the Japanese could begin picking off carriers and the one-CV per group would have slowed down the killing even as it limited defensive effectiveness. I still give the Japanese the advantage here (the kido butai concept was good), just not so widely as you.

2. Plane comparison is good and I agree. Early on though, the Brewsters and Vindicators that would have been part of the force would have hampered USN effectiveness. The limitations for the IJN were the fragility of their aircraft -- they simply lost more to all combat causes than we did as a result of their under-armoring and unsealed tanks. The Zero would have slaughtered the Buffaloes and probably -- due to pilot skill at that stage of the war -- outfought the Wildcats. The Kate outclassed the Dev easily, but the Dev's could have ended up playing just the same role they did at Midway (Judas Goats that let the Daunts drop unopposed). The Dauntless made the Val look like a piece of crud on payload even if the rest of things were mostly a wash. The only capital ships sunk by Vals were British County class -- notoriously under-armored -- and it took 8 to 10 hits to accomplish that. All in all, with numbers and pilot skill during the first few months factored in, you have to give the edge to the IJN, but the tactical tools for a Midway style lucky-timing strike would still have been present.

3. I don't know that I'd attribute the early successes as much to superior tactics as superior training. IJN aviators were SCARILY well trained (in some ways too well as later war throughput figures show). The whole point of USN doctrine was to prevent a USN force from facing what Force Z was destroyed by. Our AAA was a good notch better than our British counterparts and the whole point was for the battle groups NOT to be denuded of air cover. Nells and Bettys were great for payload and range, but not for survivability against fighters. Had the Japanese used the Zero range advantage (Kates and Vals did not outrange the Dauntless) to wipe out the CAPs and then sent in the LBA, then all Hell might have broken loose. Though, if they were getting uncovered that quickly, I think the Battle Fleet would have withdrawn rather than put themselves into harms way without air cover and with many miles to go to reach their counterparts. That WOULD be a recipe for disaster.

Japanese martial tradition here, would have worked against them holding back the LBA and holding off any strike until the Zeros had achieved air superiority -- precisely because it would also create the chance for the yanks to discern this and withdraw before the moment of decision. Therefore, I think you would have seen strikes by coordinated Japanese naval air groups, but from a range at which the USN could reply (and at least hope for a Midway like result). The LBA would have added to the USN's woes, but would probably have been committed while a CAP still existed and would have suffered notable losses. Again, I think the likely winner is Japan, but not quite in lopsided fashion.

4. Depends on a Day or Night engagement. Presuming the former, I think the advantage has to go to Japan because of the Torpedoes, but the main battle line gunnery would have been fairly advantageous for the USN. At night it would go the other way. USN 1941 radar could detect splashes only out to 20k yards and our night optics and training levels did NOT come close to the IJN. Combine the torpedoes with Japanese optics/drill at night and you would see the USN take a hammering. We did much better and damage control than the IJN....and we would have had to have done so. And nothing would save the pre-war cruiser classes from 2+ Long Lance hits -- they didn't have the armor to do it.

5. Fleet sailing oilers that could refuel at useful speeds WERE in short supply, but remember that Plan Orange envisaged refueling only the DDs and tanking up in Guam and/or the Philippines. Had a Japanese surprise attack neutralized both options prior to March 1942, than the plan would probably have been hamstrung until the new oiler class showed up in greater numbers. Historically, Guam and Luzon went quickly, but facilities in Mindanao and elsewhere were usable through mid March. Hard to say if a Japanese surprise attack on the Philippines instead of Pearl would have sped that up. On the whole though, until the new fast oilers came in, the USN was not well equipped for fast refueling at sea except for DDs fueling from carriers.

6. Staying in the fight. I suspect that, given attitudes both cultural and regarding "fair play," a Japanese surprise attack on the Phillipines that killed thousands of US personnel might have been as galling. 9-11-01 prompted enough anger to fuel 4-5 years of fighting spirit and a willingness to put up with more after that. Besides, a Japanese naval victory early on would likely have incurred a vengeance response that lasted long enough for the Fleet numbers to ramp up and for success to begin to be seen. Still, if a victory against Plan Orange was big enough and the Japanese could have focused on harming the USA enough, then maybe. I just think that they had too much to do for resources to project power past the Hawaiian islands...or to them for more than a raid for that matter. Still, the other side of things could be argued.

[ReluctantSamurai]

In regards to #1 in your previous post:

All in all, with numbers and pilot skill during the first few months factored in, you have to give the edge to the IJN, but the tactical tools for a Midway style lucky-timing strike would still have been present

.

I disagree with this for the following reasons:

Midway was a defensive battle with two modifiers...the cracking of IJN transmission codes, and the availability of long-range Cats based from Midway to do the spotting for the carrier fleets. Any implementation of a Rainbow plan will require the USN to be on the offensive and far from any land-based assistance. Cracking the IJN transmission code has as much a luck factor as skill.

Given the operational range advantages of Japanese scouting aircraft over the SBD, and the very aggressive nature of IJN I-boat patrols, I don't see many situations (if there are any at all) where the USN gets the in first strike when fighting anywhere between Midway and the Marianas. Even in late 1943, with carrier superiority (and the new doctrine of multiple carrier TF's) and the Hellcat filling out Navy VF squadrons, US carrier groups moved within range of Japanese land-based airpower with extreme caution, and for short durations only.

Staying in the fight. I suspect that, given attitudes both cultural and regarding "fair play," a Japanese surprise attack on the Phillipines that killed thousands of US personnel might have been as galling.

The much debated elimination of the PH attack. Would the American public react the same without it? That's the seven and a half million barrels of oil per year question

One unconventional way of looking at the PH attack was that it forced the USN to depend on its carriers almost exclusively for the next year or so, which eventually led to the creation of the fast carrier TG's we have come to know as the mainstay for the US from 1943 to the end of the war......

[Gregoshi]

Excellent discussion SF and RS. Very informative and entertaining.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

In regards to #1 in your previous post:

I disagree with this for the following reasons:

Midway was a defensive battle with two modifiers...the cracking of IJN transmission codes, and the availability of long-range Cats based from Midway to do the spotting for the carrier fleets. Any implementation of a Rainbow plan will require the USN to be on the offensive and far from any land-based assistance. Cracking the IJN transmission code has as much a luck factor as skill.

Given the operational range advantages of Japanese scouting aircraft over the SBD, and the very aggressive nature of IJN I-boat patrols, I don't see many situations (if there are any at all) where the USN gets the in first strike when fighting anywhere between Midway and the Marianas. Even in late 1943, with carrier superiority (and the new doctrine of multiple carrier TF's) and the Hellcat filling out Navy VF squadrons, US carrier groups moved within range of Japanese land-based airpower with extreme caution, and for short durations only.

Went back to things and scanned a bit. Turns out you were right about the signals. While we repeatedly broke their codes, it took us weeks/months at a time and their most recent code update was 4dec41. It is thus unlikely that useful sigint would have been available in our focal time frame of 21dec41-15mar42. That suggests a scenario more analogous to the Coral Sea in its opening phases and -- given concentration of forces -- a more distinct Japanese advantage, especially in light of LBA.

Thus, defeating the Japanese fleet en masse would have required a number of repeated interventions by luck for the USN and/or murphy to the detriment of the IJN. Such things are possible, as any student of history knows, but not really likely. As Runyon said, "the race is not always to the swift, nor battle to the strong....but that's the way to bet."

I still think it ends up being more than a simple demonstration of concentrated airpower annihilating the opponent at little loss to one's self. I believe that Japanese air losses during successful missions against the US carriers would have drained much of their striking power, forcing the final confrontation between battle lines to settle the matter. However, having neutralized USN air cover, the Japanese would have been able to control the timing of such an engagement allowing them to pick both a night time setting and a concentrated initial effort. The Japanese would have taken casualties but would have been able to inflict a decisive defeat.

Such would have delayed a return to offensive operations into early '43 if not later. Ouch.

Odd to think that the Pearl Harbor attack may have been, ultimately, a huge life saver for the US.

Good argument, RS, very informative.

[El Barto]

Why a nighttime setting? How would that have benefitted the Japanese Navy?

[ReluctantSamurai]

Why a nighttime setting? How would that have benefitted the Japanese Navy?

Because until late 1943, the Japanese nearly always got the better of night engagements with the USN. Google these battles and see what I mean: (in chronological order)

Savo Island
1st & 2nd Naval Battles of Guadalcanal
Kula Gulf
Vella Gulf August 6-7 1943 (the first time USN DD's got the better of their Japanese counterparts, mainly due to an improved torpedo design and more importantly, better tactics, which up to this point hamstrung the DD's by forcing them to screen the cruisers)
Vella Lavella
Empress Augusta Bay
Cape St. George

Even after the victory at Vella Gulf, the USN got toasted at Vella Lavella, came out much better at Empress Augusta Bay, and finally exerted dominance for good at Cape St. George on 26 Nov, 1943.

[El Barto]

I'll do thorough reading of all those later tonight, but, in the meantime… how did the lack of light (at night) affect submarine operations? Submarines didn't win battles by themselves but they could do some surgical strikes indeed (except in Silent Hunter where you can destroy a handful of Yamato-class BBs)

[ReluctantSamurai]

how did the lack of light (at night) affect submarine operations?

At night subs can run on the surface and use their radar to locate and track targets. Speaking of Yamato-class BB's, one of my favorite sub engagements was the ambush pulled off by the skippers of SS 227 and SS 247 (USS Darter & USS Dace, respectively) at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. IJN Adm Kurita was attempting to force the Palawan Passage in an effort to destroy the landings taking place on the island of Leyte. On Oct 23, 1944 Darter and Dace engaged and sank the cruisers Atago and Maya, while heavily damaging Takao. Unfortunately (for the USN) they missed both the Yamato & Musashi who were both in the Japanese Task Force. Musashi was later sunk by carrier planes from USS Intrepid, USS Essex, USS Lexington, USS Enterprise, and finally from USS Franklin and Cabot. In all, she took an incredible 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs before rolling over and sinking at 7:36 in the evening of 24 October, 1944.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Why a nighttime setting? How would that have benefitted the Japanese Navy?

RS' suggested examples are good ones.

Summary: Better night optics (at least on the newer cruisers and the Yamato class) translating into a higher percentage of hits; better drill (they did more of their training at night and were less flustered by the inherent confusions of night actions); slightly higher ship speeds (making targeting harder at all times, but even more so at night with less visual sighting ability); equally accurate, longer ranged, and far more hard-hitting naval surface torpedoes. Night-time was the better time for torpedo attacks as the destroyers could close to optimal firing ranges without being spotted (daylight you can see what they're doing and adjust, at night you might not even see the destroyer before the attack had been launched -- especially with the LL torpedoes -- and if the first chance you have to evade is when you are spotting torp tracks visually at night....)

All of this changed when the USN drilled more for night actions and developed the 3rd and 4th generations of search and gunnery targeting radar. During the time frame RS and I are discussing, search radars were somewhat crude and targeting radars couldn't spot shot splash at enough distance or provide truly accurate angle of shot. In 1941 it didn't do much more than give a strong estimate as to distance of target.

[The Lurker Below]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VImNBuJW3sQ

All this talk of Pacific naval battles brings back my favorite youth reading topic. A few weeks ago the planes in the video above flew over the park I was in, twice. Nearly all the planes are finished with US Navy color schemes with appropriate decals. They are all homemade aircraft, and not supposed to be WWII replicas at all, but with the appropriate painting, they were very passable. Though I despise the use of the word awesome, when these things passed overhead at 400 feet...it gave me goosebumps.

edit, failed to embed video, left you with link instead. sorry, am not internet savvy.