Several things would have given the IJN a decided advantage in opposing any USN Rainbow plan:While superficially the carrier fleets were equal, too many of ours were in the Atlantic and the Japanese were all in the Pacific. Ours carried more per carrier and physically tougher planes [c. 320 total in 4 carriers], they had more planes overall [492] and better trained pilots. Moreover, it is likely that at least 25% of US fighters would have been Buffaloes while 25% of the Diver bombers would have been Vindicators.
1. Fleet doctrine---While it's true that USN carriers had larger aircraft capacities, the IJN concentrated their carriers into a single TF and could bring to bear overwhelming firepower on any 1941-early 1942 USN carrier group. Because USN doctrine at that time forbid more than one carrier per TF, USN carriers would have been picked off one-by-one.
2. Superior aircraft---The F4F could, and did, hold its own against the Zero-sen with proper tactics like the Thatch Weave (Wildcats actually had a positive kill/loss ratio vs. Zero's); the SBD was as good or better than the IJN Val; but the TBD was a complete turkey (as Midway proved) when compared to the Japanese Kate. The long-ranged Mitsubishi G3M Nell, and later the G4M Betty could be decisive battle winners as the fate of the PoW/Repulse Task Group showed that mainline battle groups without CAP were very vulnerable.
3. Superior air tactics---Given the vulnerability of unescorted battle groups, 1941-early 1942 USN doctrine prohibited carriers from traveling with the main battle line, but instead acting as "scouts". With the considerable range advantage enjoyed by the early-war Japanese aircraft, the IJN could hit the US fleets long before the US carriers could retaliate. Add to the mix the land-based LRB's, and you have a recipe for a total disaster, IMHO. So no, I can't agree with the Japanese suffering anything resembling "significant" losses.
4. Superior naval tactics---IJN cruisers were much more modern than USN cruisers (until the Cleveland & Baltimore class came into service), they carried the deadly Long Lance torpedo, and were far superior in night tactics to any other navy in the world. The destruction of the ABDA forces in the Java Sea in 1941, and the fierce battles later on in the Solomons in 1942-43 can attest to superior IJN cruiser and destroyer tactics.
And an important point to overlook is the quantity of fleet oilers in the US Pacific Fleet in 1941. I will have to dig up my numbers on cruising ranges for US ships, but suffice it to say for the moment that the USN did not have the capability to sail large battle groups much beyond Midway. It wouldn't be until the advent of the large Servron fleets of 1944-45 that USN TF's could sail right to the Marianas, Okinawa, and eventually the Japanese mainland.
And this is America's ace-in-the-hole. Japan just could not hope to be able to outproduce the US in anything from weapon systems to manpower. So the key word in that statement is "Eventually". How long is 'eventually' and does the American public support the war for that long despite huge losses in life and material?Eventually, US manufacturing would catch and surpass, but it would have given the Japanese far more than 6 months to "run wild."
A rather interesting analysis to that end:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
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