Patton pushes on (what if)

[Sarmatian]

That's why I used the numbers provided by Glantz.

June 1941: 3,767,000 vs. 2,680,000 (in theater)
3,117,000 (German) 5,500,000 (overall)
900,000 (in the west)

Makes 650.000 allied troops.

So as I stated before the Sovietunion had less troops in the theater but far more mobilized. Actually one can argue that in this very special case of total strategic, operational and tactical surprise more troops on the frontline in shallow depth would have only added to the desaster.

There's a reason why Glantz didn't count them until they were deployed. It would be the same as counting those Far Eastern armies immediately in June '41 and not in the December when they were deployed at the fronts, or counting German troops in the Balkans. Actually, I think even German troops in Norway shouldn't be counted because they didn't see any action. It's only 70,000 troops, it wouldn't change the ratio much but fair is fair.

I would certainly be surprised if such a small percentage would be needed to produce such a large amount of Trucks. Also the Soviets seemed to think that the Studer was athe superior truck design (mobile, reliable) and also made it the standard truck the Rocket batteries. Your numbers would certainly be very helpful.

According to any author, Glantz included, that I've seen, entire Lend-Lease from 1941-1945 made up only 4% of Soviet military production. That's those 400,000 trucks + aircraft, tanks, jeeps and everything else. It's pretty clear mathematically that Soviets would have to divert 4% of their industrial capacity to produce all that equipment. Of course that would mean 4% less T-34, 4% less Sturmoviks etc... It would have an impact but it would be marginal. Soviet casualties would probably be somewhat higher and the war would last a bit longer but it wouldn't change anything in the greater picture.

I've found some number for trucks production of the Soviet Union from 1941-1943 that I've probably copy/pasted from some site. I didn't write down the book but the author is Harrison. Anyway, here goes.

Trucks produced by the Soviet Union:
1941 - 139,879
1942 - 32,409
1943 - 46,720

Received through lend-lease from both US and UK
1941 - 2,373
1942 - 79,000
1943 - 173,000

Slightly larger number produced in 1943 than 1942 is because all the chaos of industry transfer, 1942 was particularly bad in terms of production because of that, but it clearly be seen from their production in 1941 that they had to means to produce large numbers of trucks.


I more than a bit sceptical about a 10:1 ratio in favour for the Red Army - could you bring up sources? The brilliant Operation Bagration Operation Bagration which is widely seen as the heaviest defeat of the Heer in the East seems to have a far smaller ratio.

I should have been more clear. When I said losses were comparable in the Operation Bagration I meant German and Soviet losses were comparable, not comparable to the 10:1 ratio. And yes, you're right, it wasn't almost 10:1 it was almost 7:1. It seems my mind's astonishing ability to remember useless information like that failed me . I thought it was 400,000 to 47,000 which would make the ration almost 10:1 but it was actually 400,000 to 67,000 which makes the ration almost 7:1.

It was during the Iassy-Kishinev offensive and the reason it's not so well known is because army group South Ukraine was formed from what was left of army group South (500,000) and about 400,000 Romanian troops, as PJ already said.

By 29 August, Army Group South Ukraine had suffered a fate similar to that of Army Group Center—the destruction of Sixth Army and two Rumanian armies and the utter collapse of the German front in Rumania. The Germans lost control of the Ploesti oilfields and Bucharest by 2 September. German and Rumanian losses exceeded 400,000 men at a cost to the Soviets of about 67,000 casualties. By 1 September, Army Group South, renamed Army Group South Ukraine, had strength returns of only 200,000 men, with 2,000 allied forces. An Axis retreat ensued across the Carpathians, which did not halt until Soviet forces had penetrated Bulgaria and swung westward into the plains of eastern Hungary. (David W. Glantz, When Titans Clashed, pg. 135)

I agree with you about Krivosheev, he pretty much set the standard for any research on the Red Army and is widely considered the best source for anything involving Red Army and numbers. That's why I like Glantz, he used Krivosheev and not old sources that are usually either incomplete or full of propaganda. Or both, actually.

Sorry that my poor wording forced you to write all that text about Bagration but excellent breakdown of casualties anyway.

I just wanted to quickly respond to a few points...
I don't think these troops are forgotten. They're simply given the historical weight that they merited. Despite Tali-Ihantala and other victories, the Finns were never a good ally. While they may have been strongest militarily (or tied with Hungary), they were never willing to coordinate their forces with the Germans to much of a degree and constantly chose if and when they were to engage. From there, the list of nation's militaries deteriorates rather quickly in quality and skill culminating in the Stalingrad debacle. Romania had significant numbers, but I wouldn't consider them the most important minor Axis nation as the quality of most divisions was so poor.

True in a way, but if we're gonna count only troops that were of German quality than we would probably end not counting all other troops involved in WW2. Overall, German army was of better quality than any other involved in the WW2. Also, many of the Soviet troops even in 1945 and especially so in 1941 or 1942 were sent to the fronts without practically the basic training and many Soviet divisions were of poorer quality than Romanian divisions.

I generally agree with your assessment of the Soviet forces being highly underrated by Western historians, but I don’t think using their performance in late '44 and '45 is a good example. By that time, the crushing numerical superiority of the Red Army, especially in armor and artillery was simply overwhelming; and the German forces could no longer compensate for their losses - particularly in experienced NCOs. Compounding these difficulties were of course Hitler's stand fast orders and growing interference in day to day operations.

Why are Hitler's idiotic decisions excuse for every defeat and Stalin's aren't? It's often emphasized how Stalin trusted his generals unlike Hitler who interfered in every decision while both of them interfered and made disastrous decisions. The difference is that Stalin interfered gradually less and Hitler gradually more as the war went on. Stavka members (Zhukov especially) warned Stalin that Kiev would be lost and should be abandoned because Germans would encircle the city and trap. Stalin wouldn't hear of it and removed Zhukov from his position of the Chief of Staff. Kiev was lost precisely in a way Zhukov said it would and app. 600,000 Red Army troops was lost. That's seen as great German victory because of their tactical, doctrinal, strategic or whichever superiority. At Stalingrad, Hitler forbade 6th Army to try to break out, 300,000 German soldiers were lost. That's seen as Hitler's stupidity.

In a way, after '43, German army started to look more and more like the Red Army in 1941 and 1942, while after '43, Red Army started to look more like German army in 1941. Hitler sent Fuehrungoffiziers, which were practically Nazi equivalents of Party Komisars to monitor various commanders, effectively curbing any initiative that they might have had before. Fuehrungoffiziers blamed commanders for every defeat and usually relieved them of command on the spot. Every city was declared a fortress city that's to be defended to the last man etc... Every single one of those things Stalin did in 1941 and 1942 and even 1943, to a lesser degree. So, in essence, why are 1941 and 1942 seen as the period of German crushing victories because of their superiority and 1944 and 1945 are seen as the period of Soviet crushing victories because of Hitler's stupidity?

In Bagration, for example, as was already noted, the ratios were enormous. Ignoring the manpower difference, the Soviets had nearly 10,000 AFVs and well over 20,000 peices of artillery. What the Germans could muster paled in comparison. More importantly, much of it was outdated. If we were to cut out only the tanks capable of engaging, say, a T-34/76 - ie later model pzIVs, Panthers, and Tigers - the numbers would be even smaller. The same differences existed in the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive in the Ukraine. Even worse there, nearly half the Axis force was comprised of Hungarian troops. Still, the Russians lost nearly 300,000 men and 1300 tanks in that one operation.

Again, why is German inferior equipment suddenly an excuse? Earlier German tanks could destroy T-34/75 if they got close or attacked it from the flank or rear. When Manstein's tanks spearheaded by brand new Panthers and Tigers got dangerously close to penetrating Soviet defenses at Kursk, Vatutin's tank army was sent to stop them. The best tank in that army was T-34/75 as 85mm variant didn't exist yet. T-34/75 couldn't penetrate frontal armour of either Panther or Tiger unless at very close range or if it ataccked their sides or rear. On the other hand, Tigers and Panthers could engage T-34/75 at several time bigger distance and they did, quite lethally. So, are we to discount entire Vatutin's tank army because it was inferior and say that Von Manstein was stopped by ghosts?

It should also be noted that when the Germans had even a fraction of parity with their Soviet counterparts, they were still able to deliver tactical and even strategic victory - even in '44. (Debrecen, the Narva battles, the first Jassy-Kishinev Offensive, etc.) Moreover, the '44 Soviet offensives in the North were successful overall, but littered with literally hundreds of German localized victories. There just was not enough of anything to translate them into strategic success.

True, there were instances when German managed to perform well in 1944 or even 1945, but also there are instances when Soviet managed to do the same in 1941, like Je'lna counteroffensive by Zhukov. All in all, it doesn't prove much.

Considering north in the 1944, you're right - Soviet performance was usually mediocre to bad. The reason for it is that the front in the north was much more static than the one in the south and Soviet commanders around Leningrad lack the experience acquired by their colleagues in the south.

I would argue that German doctrine and tactics were still far superior to Russian at this time and to the end of the war. The Deep Operations theory was concieved before the war and perfected throughout. However, it can only be cited as successful when the Soviets had massive numerical superiorty. Even with such superiority, it failed cosistently throughout the war - particularly the spectacular defeat of Operation Mars. With significant German resistence, the Russians could ethier not make the initial breakthroughs, as was the case with Mars, or could not sustain the overextension of the lines that Deep Operations called for, as was the case with 3rd Kharkov.

Operation Mars is indeed the biggest Soviet blunder of the war. They underestimated the opponent, not realizing that AG Center was in much better state than AG South. Even then, Soviets did achieve some success, Tarasov's 41st army penetrated the defences north and south of Belyi for example, but Germans were able to put a sizable number of reserves to the field (1st and 9th Panzer division, GrossDeutschland division, 14th Panzergrenadier division and later 12th, 19th and 20th Panzer division - Glantz, When Titans Clashed, pg. 88) and eventually to close all the gaps.

I am of the opinion that Deep Operations doctrine was superior to Blitzkrieg, although I wouldn't consider either "far superior" to the other as doctrines were very similar - choose a weak spot, apply superior number of combined arms on a narrow frontage, achieve a breakthrough, move mechanized force in to exploit the gap, encircle enemy troops and stop reinforcements and move infantry and slower moving units in to mop up. Of course there were variations but that's the basic principle. Also, from what I remember reading, Tukhachevsky writings on the subject of Deep Battle featured prominently in Guderian's research material.

While I believe the Soviets were never as hapless as some have inferred and that they certainly became far more proficient as the war progressed, many factors played more heavily in the '44 offensives than Soviet skill at arms - such as Hitler's constant intervention, the loss of the irreplaceable core of low level officers and NCOs that translated German strategy into battlefield success, and most importantly - massive Soviet numerical superiority. There was simply no way to counter that much armor and artillery.

True, but in the same way, many factors played more heavily in '41 and '42 offensives than German skill at arms. Stalin's constant intervention, the loss of irreplaceable core of command cadre in the purges (from the same book by Glants) - Of an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 officers in the armed forces, at least 30,000 were imprisoned or executed. They included three out of five marshals; all 11 deputy defense commissars; all commanders of military districts; the commanders and chiefs of staff of both the Navy and the Air Force; 14 of 16 army commanders; 60 of 67 corps commanders; 136 of 199 division commanders; 221 of 397 brigade commanders; and 50 percent of all regimental commanders. In addition to that, Red Army was caught mid-doctrines, trying to revert to something remotely similar to Deep Operations after it was practically abandoned after the Spanish Civil War and the death of Tukhachevsky. Defensive positions weren't prepared as they were moved west, most of the equipment was obsolete, new equipment, T-34s for example were few and still new, lacking trained crews, spare parts and fuel and most of all commanders who could use them effectively. Party Komisars terrorized army commanders, curbing any initiative. Stalin changed commanders of the fronts on a daily basis. In 1941 there were three different Chiefs of Staff. Massive numerical superiority in 1944 and 1945 wasn't really that massive and many soldiers in the Red Army were conscripted and sent to front without practically any training. They simply didn't have the staying power of German soldiers. Not to mention that even those soldiers who received proper training, as much as proper training was possible in the chaos that was the Red Army in '38, '39 and '40, they still lacked two years of combat experience their opponents had.

All in all, I would say German army in 1944 was in far better state than Red Army in 1941. By luck, instinct or good use of intelligence (probably by a combination of all three factors) Hitler attacked when Red Army was in its weakest state in decades. Red Army of the 30's would put up a better fight than Red Army of the '41. Basically Red Army in 1941 was no army. Yes, there were a bunch of people wearing the same clothes and they had weapons but that's where any similarity with an army ends.